Systems for detecting and alerting to security threats in vehicles

The EGPWS system with threat detection algorithms addresses cybersecurity vulnerabilities in vehicles by validating flight plans and providing real-time alerts, ensuring safer operations by detecting and mitigating unauthorized flight path deviations and data corruption.

DE202019006089U1Active Publication Date: 2024-11-07HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC
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Patent Information

Application Number
DE202019006089
Authority / Receiving Office
DE · DE
Patent Type
Utility models
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2018-10-30
Filing Date
2019-10-28
Publication Date
2024-11-07
Estimated Expiration
2029-10-31

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing vehicle systems, particularly in aircraft, are vulnerable to cybersecurity threats that can lead to unauthorized changes in flight paths, data corruption, and malicious activities by both authorized and unauthorized personnel, which are difficult to detect and can result in safety incidents.

Method used

An on-board monitoring system, such as the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS), is equipped with threat detection algorithms to analyze flight plans and sensor data, validate against independent databases, and alert crew and ground services via Wi-Fi and satellite communication, with optional cockpit door control and transponder changes.

Benefits of technology

Effectively detects and alerts potential security threats, mitigating risks of unauthorized flight path deviations and data corruption, ensuring safer operations by validating flight plans and providing real-time alerts and control measures.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

Monitoring system (200) for detecting a security threat during the operation of a vehicle, comprising the following: a data storage device (220) that stores instructions related to vehicle data systems; and a processor (210) trained to execute the instructions to perform a procedure comprising the following: Retrieving a planned route for a route of the vehicle by the monitoring system (200); Comparing the planned route with a restricted airspace by the monitoring system (200); Determine, using the monitoring system (200), whether the route overlaps with at least part of the restricted airspace, and in response to the determination that the route intersects with at least part of the restricted airspace, the monitoring system will transmit an alert about the security threat (200).
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Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] Various embodiments of the present disclosure relate generally to the detection of security threats in vehicles, and more particularly to the monitoring of data systems in vehicles for errors, data corruption, data tampering, and malicious activities by authorized and unauthorized personnel. BACKGROUND

[0002] Vehicles of all types are becoming increasingly complex as they are equipped with network connections, automated operating components (e.g., "autopilot" or "self-driving" functions), connected safety features, and the like. As vehicles become more complex and connected, a number of security issues are becoming increasingly prevalent, and mechanisms for detecting and remediating security issues must evolve accordingly. These security issues include both physical security and cybersecurity concerns posed by actors inside and outside the vehicle operating organization.

[0003] Particularly in the area of ​​aircraft, there have been several aviation incidents in which personnel on board the aircraft, including crew members, have deliberately diverted the aircraft from its course or deviated from a planned flight path. A first example is the Germanwings Flight 9525 incident. On Germanwings Flight 9525, the co-pilot locked other pilots out of the cockpit and initiated a controlled descent until the aircraft impacted the side of a mountain in the French Alps. A second example is the Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 incident. The Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 incident involved a missing aircraft that was out of range of Air Traffic Control (ATC) and military radar over open ocean while flying westward off its planned flight path and transmitting Inmarsat satellite messages.

[0004] Furthermore, flight crews may experience inadvertent and / or malicious modifications to an aircraft database (or databases), for example, the flight management system (FMS) and / or a terrain database in a synthetic vision system. These modifications may be made via cyberattack mechanisms that are not easily detected by an unsuspecting flight crew. This can be particularly challenging when the flight crew is flying in automatic, fully coupled flight control modes during approach or departure, and could be further complicated in adverse weather conditions. Furthermore, when providing aircraft data security, it is important to ensure that any databases, such as the FMS navigation database and / or terrain and obstacle databases for synthetic vision displays, are not maliciously tampered with.Cybersecurity issues can cause aircraft sensors to become corrupted, resulting in misleading aircraft guidance or other data provided to the flight crew or autopilot.

[0005] With or without aircraft data link connectivity, it is possible for a malicious actor with physical access to the aircraft to intentionally corrupt an aircraft database in a subtle but malicious way. Data can be intentionally corrupted in a way that also undermines a control mechanism. For example, cyclic redundancy checks (CRCs) could be calculated for a corrupted data value and used to replace the CRC of the original data and, at the same time, the original data. These mechanisms may also no longer be effective after the data in the system has been decrypted and the CRC or other protection layers removed from the data, for example, if an authorized or unauthorized entity has physical or local network access to the various databases.Previous efforts to address physical and cybersecurity issues in aircraft have focused on adding security safeguards to the cockpit (e.g., cockpit door locks) and adding security safeguards to the primary avionics to prevent external actors from gaining access. These techniques typically rely on trusted actors within the aircraft operating organization to operate the vehicle, perform maintenance, and maintain the security of access mechanisms, such as passwords. Thus, these techniques are vulnerable to undetected cybersecurity threats, and even trusted actors can act maliciously. Specifically, a trusted actor could intentionally deviate from a planned flight path.Furthermore, a trusted actor could modify the onboard systems so that one or more subsystems alert the flight crew to data that could cause the flight crew to deviate from a planned flight path, deviate from standard and safe routes or approaches, fly to an incorrect destination, request a change of destination, and plan a flight path through restricted airspace.

[0006] The present disclosure relates to systems and methods for addressing these objectives and interests. Thus, the techniques discussed herein disclose systems and methods for detecting security threats in vehicle systems and vehicle operations. SUMMARY OF REVELATION

[0007] According to certain aspects of the disclosure, systems and computer-readable media for detecting security threats during vehicle operation using an on-board monitoring system are disclosed.

[0008] For example, a method may include retrieving, by the on-board monitoring system, a route plan for a route of a vehicle from a database of the vehicle; identifying either a portion of the route or a portion of the route plan as a security threat based on an analysis of the route plan; and, in response to identifying the portion of the route or the portion of the route plan as a security threat, transmitting an alert about the security threat.

[0009] The on-board monitoring system for detecting security threats during vehicle operation of a vehicle may include a data storage device storing instructions associated with vehicle data systems; and a processor configured to execute the instructions to perform a method. The method includes retrieving a route plan for a route of the vehicle from a database of the vehicle; identifying either a portion of the route or a portion of the route plan as a security threat based on an analysis of the route plan; and in response to identifying the portion of the route or the portion of the route plan as a security threat, transmitting an alert about the security threat.

[0010] The non-transitory computer-readable medium stores instructions that, when executed by an on-board monitoring system, can cause the on-board monitoring system to perform a method for detecting security threats during vehicle operation of a vehicle. The method can include retrieving a route plan for a route of the vehicle from a database of the vehicle; identifying either a portion of the route or a portion of the route plan as a security threat based on an analysis of the route plan; and in response to identifying the portion of the route or the portion of the route plan as a security threat, transmitting an alert of the security threat over the wireless communication interface.

[0011] Additional objects and advantages of the disclosed embodiments will be set forth in part in the description which follows, and in part will be obvious from the description, or may be learned by practice of the disclosed embodiments. The objects and advantages of the disclosed embodiments will be realized and attained by means of the elements and combinations particularly pointed out in the appended claims.

[0012] It is to be understood that both the foregoing general description and the following detailed description are exemplary and explanatory only and are not restrictive of the disclosed embodiments as claimed. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0013] The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and constitute a part of this specification, illustrate various exemplary embodiments and, together with the description, serve to explain the principles of the disclosed embodiments. Fig. Figure 1 depicts an exemplary data infrastructure for an aircraft system according to the techniques presented herein. Fig. Figure 2 depicts an exemplary infrastructure for an Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) according to the techniques presented herein. Fig. Figure 3 depicts a flowchart of an exemplary method for detecting security threats according to the techniques presented here. Fig. Figure 4 illustrates an example system that can perform the techniques presented herein. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE EMBODIMENTS

[0014] Various embodiments of the present disclosure relate generally to security threat detection, and more particularly to monitoring data in aircraft systems for errors, data corruption, data tampering, and malicious activities by authorized and unauthorized personnel.

[0015] In general, the present disclosure relates to the use of an enhanced ground proximity warning system and a wireless connectivity interface to implement an alert system against malicious actors or other cybersecurity threats. As described in more detail below, the proposed malicious actor alert could be implemented using an enhanced ground proximity warning system ("EGPWS"). The software algorithms for detecting suspicious behavior can be implemented in the EGPWS. Connection to the ground can be via a Wi-Fi connection to the cabin satcom system along with a VPN to provide data link security. The Wi-Fi interface can also be used to provide alerts to other cabin crew members, including any onboard flight safety attendant.The data link to the ground can be used to validate any unusual flight path changes and alert alert personnel on the ground. While linking cockpit systems to the cabin poses significant cybersecurity concerns, these concerns can be mitigated by using a VPN connection and by the fact that the EGPWS system receives extensive data from aircraft systems but can only transmit very limited data to other aircraft systems.

[0016] The terminology used below may be interpreted in the broadest sense possible, even when used in the context of a detailed description of certain specific examples of the present disclosure. Indeed, certain terms may even be emphasized below; however, any terminology intended to be interpreted in a more limited manner will be openly and specifically defined as such in this section of the detailed description. Both the foregoing general description and the following detailed description are exemplary and explanatory only and do not limit the claimed features.

[0017] As used herein, the terms “comprises,” “comprising,” “having,” “including,” or other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or device comprising a list of elements includes not only those elements, but may also include other elements not expressly listed or inherent in such process, method, article, or device.

[0018] In this disclosure, relative terms such as "approximately," "substantially," "generally," and "approximately" are used to indicate a possible deviation of ±10% from a stated value.

[0019] The term "exemplary" is used in the sense of "example" rather than "ideal." As used herein, the singular forms "a," "an," and "the" include the plural unless the context dictates otherwise.

[0020] While this disclosure describes the systems and methods with respect to aircraft (e.g., primary avionics systems of aircraft), it should be understood that the present systems and methods are applicable to the security of any vehicle management system, including those of drones, cars, trains (locomotives), or any other autonomous and / or internet-connected vehicles.

[0021] Referring now to the attached drawings, Fig. 1 depicts an exemplary data infrastructure for a vehicle, such as an aircraft system, according to the techniques presented herein. In general, Fig. 1 depicts an exemplary data infrastructure system 100 for detecting security threats to an aircraft system. As shown, the exemplary data infrastructure system 100 includes a global positioning system (“GPS”) 115, a flight management system (“FMS”) 105, aircraft sensors 110, an audio system 130, an enhanced ground proximity warning system (or “EGPWS”) 200, an aircraft satcom system (data link) 120, a speaker 224, a display system 218, a cabin Wi-Fi router 132, and a personal communication device 135.

[0022] A flight management system (or "FMS") 105 may be any type of computer that functions as a type of navigation equipment and may be configured to receive input data from a variety of other navigation instruments. Other navigation instruments may include aircraft sensors 110, such as inertial navigation systems, radio navigation instruments, including one or more very high frequency omnidirectional radio range (VOR) systems, and a global positioning system (GPS) 115. The aircraft sensors 110 may generate various data, including altitude data, heading data, air data references, radar altimeter data, etc.Using this data and / or data from GPS 115, the FMS 105 can generate position information and, during flight, can also be involved in managing a flight plan that may be stored in an FMS database (or a vehicle database). Using data from the FMS database, the FMS 105 can calculate a course for the aircraft, including a lateral flight plan and / or a vertical flight plan.

[0023] The enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS or onboard monitoring system) 200 is configured to alert pilots when there is an imminent danger of the aircraft striking the ground or an obstacle. The EGPWS 200 can receive data from many aircraft systems, including the FMS 105, the GPS 115, and / or the aircraft sensors 110, such as air data, radar altimeter, inertial system, etc. The EGPWS 200 can be configured to communicate with the data link 120 through direct communication (dashed line) or indirect communication (through the cabin Wi-Fi router 132). The data link 120 can include one or more antennas 125. The EGPWS 200 may further communicate with the audio system 130, which may generate a tone through one or more speakers 224, which may include, for example, an audible alarm when the altitude of the aircraft falls below a threshold.The FMS 105 and / or the EGPWS 200 may be linked to at least one display system 218 that can display flight path information, location information, ground proximity data, temperature data, aircraft sensor data, etc., to the crew. The EGPWS 200 may further include a Wi-Fi router (not shown) either connected thereto or built-in and capable of communicating with the cabin Wi-Fi router 132. The cabin Wi-Fi router 132 may communicate with the aircraft satcom system 120 and at least one personal communications device 135. The personal communications device 135 may be owned by a flight crew member or a flight safety attendant, or both, and the personal communications device 135 may be a cellular phone, a mobile computer, a tablet, etc.

[0024] Fig. Figure 2 depicts an exemplary infrastructure for the EGPWS 200 according to the techniques presented herein. In one embodiment, the EGPWS 200 may include a memory or data store 220 containing an independent copy of one or more aircraft databases, including a terrain database 230, an obstacle database 235, and a navigation and / or runway database 240. The EGPWS 200 may further include a processor 210, a GPS receiver 212, an altitude encoder 224, a temperature sensor 228, a display 218, an alarm light 222, and a speaker 224. The EGPWS 200 may also include a set of input and / or output (I / O) paths (not shown) for monitoring data on aircraft data buses. The I / O can include analog signals, discrete signals, Arinc 429, RS-422 and / or RS-232 data and / or Ethernet data buses.Processor 210 may be configured to retrieve data from memory and / or data storage 220 and / or receive data from aircraft sensors 110 to perform the techniques presented herein. Processor 210 may be configured to generate outputs to display 218, such as a computer monitor, outputs to one or more indicator lights 222, outputs to one or more audio speakers 224, and / or outputs to cabin Wi-Fi router 132 or data link 120.

[0025] The EGPWS 200 may be linked to, and send and receive data from, a separate array of sensors, such as the GPS receiver 212, the altitude encoder 224, and / or the temperature sensor 228, which may be embedded in the EGPWS 200 or separate from the EGPWS 200. These sensors may be independent or duplicate sensors associated with the FMS 105 or other aircraft sensors. All of the aforementioned sensors may transmit data to the processor 210 and stored in the data memory 220 (collectively, "route parameters" or "flight parameters"). The EGPWS 200 may be configured to use independent database copies and connections to aircraft sensors to monitor other aircraft systems, such as the FMS 105, and to provide alerts to the crew and / or the ground in the event of a safety threat.The EGPWS 200 may share a display with the FMS 105, or separate displays may be present. The display 218 of the EGPWS 200 may be used to provide alerts to the crew. Potential safety threats could also be provided to this display 218. For example, in one embodiment, the FMS 105 may communicate flight plan information to the display system 218 and to the EGPWS 200.

[0026] In one embodiment, the EGPWS 200 may receive the flight plan information data from the FMS 105, while the EGPWS 200 receives sensor data information from the various sensors (e.g., GPS receiver 212, altitude encoder 224, and / or temperature sensor 228, or aircraft sensors 110 or GPS 115) or from the data store 220. Such received data may be used to monitor for safety threats (e.g., unusual crew actions and unusual flight plan information), including the following potential issues with appropriate threat detection algorithms: 1. Significant deviation from the entered flight plan: For example, when a current position, current course, current altitude or current speed of the aircraft (based on the flight parameters mentioned above) deviates by more than a threshold value (e.g. 10%) from a planned position, planned course, planned altitude or planned speed as shown in the flight plan at a corresponding time. 2. Unexpectedly low flight plan: A flight planned at an unusually low altitude compared to terrain in the EGPWS 200 Terrain Database 230 may be reported as a potential safety threat, even if the specific altitude is explicitly specified in the flight plan. For example, if the EGPWS 200 compares the flight plan altitude with the altitude in the Terrain Database 230 and the flight plan altitude is within a threshold distance (e.g., 500 feet [=152.4 meters]) of the altitude, such a plan may be reported as a potential safety threat. 3. Descent at a significant distance from the destination: Even if the descent is planned in the flight plan, a descent that takes place at a significant distance from the destination may be reported as a potential safety threat. For example, if the descent planned in the flight plan is a threshold distance (e.g., more than 10 miles [=16.0934 kilometers]) from the indicators contained in the EGPWS 200 runway database 240. 4. Change of the aircraft’s destination. 5. Destination without a runway: A destination that does not have a runway, even if one is included in the flight plan, can be reported as a potential safety threat. For example, if the destination planned in the flight plan does not have a runway, as shown in the runway database 240, such a flight plan can be reported as a potential safety threat. 6. Flight over restricted airspace: Even if planned in the flight plan, a flight over restricted airspace may be reported as a potential safety threat. For example, if the route planned in the flight plan is compared with the restricted airspace included in the obstacle database 230 and it is determined that the route overlaps with the restricted airspace (e.g., crosses a boundary [of the restricted airspace]), such a plan may be reported as a potential safety threat. 7. Path Deviations: In cases where the flight plan includes deviations from the paths defined for standard instrument approach procedures, this may be reported as a potential safety threat. For example, if the route planned in the flight plan deviates by more than a threshold from the paths defined for standard instrument approach procedures, the paths included in the Runway 240 database or another EGPWS 200 database may be reported as a potential safety threat.

[0027] The above issue 1 (significant deviation from the input flight plan) can be detected by monitoring flight parameters (e.g., altitude, heading, etc.) of the aircraft by the EGPWS 200 based on input signals to the EGPWS 200; and detecting significant deviations from the flight plan by the EGPWS 200 by comparing the retrieved flight plan with the monitored flight parameters.

[0028] Issues 2-3 and 5-7 above may be detected by predicting the flight plan by the EGPWS 200 with respect to various issues included in the terrain database 230, the obstacle database 235, or the runway database 240, or another database of the EGPWS 200, to predict the relative interactions between the aircraft and the external environment and external aircraft features; and detecting anomalies by the EGPWS 200 based on the predicted relative interactions.

[0029] For example, a relative interaction between the aircraft and the external environment may be that the aircraft is at a low altitude (closer to the ground than standard), even if the altitude above sea level is essentially normal. For example, an altitude of 10,000 feet [= 3,048 meters] above sea level would not be abnormal, but a flight plan altitude of 10,000 feet [= 3,048 meters] near Denver, Colorado, USA, would indicate low altitude conditions, since Denver is approximately 5,000 feet [= 1,524 meters] above sea level and the Rocky Mountains (near Denver) reach up to approximately 14,000 feet [= 4,267.2 meters] above sea level. Another relative interaction could be that the flight plan includes a route with a trajectory that overlaps with restricted airspace. Any of these interactions could be reported as an anomaly.

[0030] The above fact 4 could be detected by the EGPWS 200 monitoring a data bus of the aircraft system 100 and determining that a destination in the flight plan has been changed.

[0031] Therefore, an on-board monitoring device (such as the EGPWS 200) can review a section of a route or a portion of a vehicle's route plan using the threat detection algorithms described above to detect security threats. For example, the on-board monitoring device can compare the route plan with independent data sources, including databases of terrain, navigation aids, airways, and runways, and / or compare an aircraft condition (e.g., based on sensors), such as GPS position, airspeed, altitude, vertical speed, attitude, and acceleration, with the route plan to identify unusual behavior as a security threat. Furthermore, specific thresholds for the threat detection algorithms can be selected to ensure they are sensitive enough to detect threats while minimizing unwanted nuisance alarms.

[0032] The EGPWS 200 may be provided with a data link connection, such as the aircraft satcom system 120, enabling communication outside the aircraft. Using an aircraft satcom system 120, the EGPWS 200 may transmit a validation request to a ground-based service (or validation service), which may be an airline ground operations center, the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), etc., to validate the aforementioned potential issues before issuing a security threat alert.

[0033] For example, the flight plan can be compared with the flight plan maintained by the airline's ground operations center. The weather at the destination can be checked to ensure that the aircraft has not made a legitimate diversion. Turbulence reports can be checked to ensure that changes in altitude are the result of actions taken by the flight crew to minimize turbulence. Specifically, the EGPWS 200 can transmit a leg of the flight (i.e., the significant deviation from the entered flight plan) or a leg of the flight plan (e.g., destination, change of destination, planned descent, flight path, etc.) to the validation service via the aircraft satcom system 120. The EGPWS 200 can also transmit an indication of the reason the leg of the flight or the leg of the flight plan was reported to the EGPWS 200 (e.g.,low altitude compared to the terrain in the terrain database 230, the destination has a different waypoint than the waypoint in the runway database 240, the flight plan route overlaps with the restricted airspace, etc.).

[0034] The validation service may transmit a response back to the EGPWS 200 via the aircraft satcom system 120. The response may provide the EGPWS 200 with information to evaluate the potential issue and determine whether or not the reported issue is a security threat; or the response may indicate that the potential issue is or is not a security threat.

[0035] The same monitoring capabilities proposed above could also potentially mitigate some cybersecurity issues if a database or flight plan is inadvertently altered or maliciously modified by authorized or unauthorized personnel on board the aircraft. Authorized or unauthorized personnel could load the modified database or flight plan information onto the aircraft, thereby circumventing valid integrity mechanisms. Cyclic redundancy checks (CRCs) are typically used to rule out data corruption by the transmission mechanism; however, valid CRCs can easily be created and used by a hacker to load seemingly valid data that has been subtly corrupted. The proposed algorithms for detecting unusual planned flight paths in the flight plan could also detect some cases of corruption due to cybersecurity issues.

[0036] Additionally, the EGPWS 200 may be equipped with a wireless communication mechanism, such as Wi-Fi. The EGPWS 200 may use the Wi-Fi interface to connect to the cabin Wi-Fi router 132 to alert the flight crew, flight attendants, or an onboard flight safety attendant via personal communication devices 135.

[0037] Another aspect is that the EGPWS 200 can control one or more cockpit security doors. Due to aircraft hijacking incidents, cockpit security doors (not shown) have been added to many aircraft. However, this has resulted in incidents where crew members were locked out of the cockpit and therefore unable to intervene. The EGPWS 200 can include an interface to unlock the cockpit door in the event that significant flight path deviations are validated as a safety threat (or one of the other potential scenarios is validated as a safety threat).For example, if the EGPWS 200 detects a potential issue, the EGPWS 200 can transmit a message to the ground for confirmation. If the EGPWS 200 receives confirmation that the potential issue is a security threat, the EGPWS 200 or another onboard system can automatically unlock the cockpit door. The EGPWS 200 can also (or alternatively) automatically change the aircraft transponder code to 7500 and alert air traffic control (ATC) of the possible hijacking. This would preclude both malicious unlock commands from the ground and door unlocking during legitimate flight path changes, such as weather diversions.

[0038] An additional aspect is that the connection from the EGPWS 200 to the ground (or to the validation service) can be implemented using the cabin Wi-Fi router 132 and the aircraft satcom system 120, along with a virtual private network (VPN) to provide data link security. While there are cybersecurity concerns associated with linking cockpit systems (e.g., the EGPWS 200) to the cabin, these concerns would be mitigated (1) by using a VPN connection and (2) by the fact that while the EGPWS 200 receives extensive data from aircraft systems, the EGPWS 200 has very limited ability to communicate data to other aircraft systems. Furthermore, the EGPWS 200 would have little to no control over the aircraft and no ability to provide deceptive guidance to the crew should it be hacked.However, it is likely that the crew would respond to such an alarm by climbing to a safe altitude, so that such deceptive guidance or nuisance alarm would not in itself pose a danger.

[0039] Fig. 3 depicts a flowchart of an exemplary method for detecting security threats during vehicle operation using an on-board monitoring system in accordance with the techniques presented herein.

[0040] First, the on-board monitoring system may retrieve a route plan for a vehicle's route from a vehicle database (block 300).

[0041] The on-board monitoring system may then identify either a section of the route or a section of the route plan to be validated based on an analysis of the route plan (block 305).

[0042] Then, in response to identifying the portion of the route or the portion of the route plan to be validated, the on-board monitoring system may transmit a validation request to a validation service via a wireless communication interface (block 310).

[0043] The on-board monitoring system may then receive a response from the validation service via the wireless communication interface (block 315).

[0044] The on-board monitoring system may then identify the section of the route or the section of the route plan as a security threat based on the response from the validation service (block 320).

[0045] Then, in response to identifying the portion of the route or the portion of the route plan as a security threat, the on-board monitoring system may transmit an alarm about the security threat via the wireless communication interface (block 325).

[0046] Fig. Figure 4 is a simplified functional block diagram of a computer used as any of the systems of Fig. 1 may be configured to perform techniques described herein in accordance with exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure. Specifically, in one embodiment, any of the aircraft systems 100, including the EGPWS 200 and / or the FMS 105, may be an assembly of hardware 400, including, for example, a data communications interface 460 for packet data communications. The platform may also include a central processing unit ("CPU") 420 in the form of one or more processors for executing program instructions. The platform may include an internal communications bus 410, program memory, and data storage for various data files to be processed and / or transmitted by the platform, such as ROM 430 and RAM 440, although the system 400 may receive the programming and data via network communications.The system 400 may also include input and output ports 450 for connecting to input and output devices such as keyboards, mice, touchscreens, monitors, displays, etc. Of course, the various system functions may be implemented in a distributed manner on a number of similar platforms to distribute the processing load. Alternatively, the systems may be implemented by appropriately programming a computer hardware platform.

[0047] Any suitable system infrastructure may be established to enable the evaluation of monitoring device models. Fig. 1 and the following discussion provide a brief, general description of a suitable computing environment in which the present disclosure may be implemented. In one embodiment, any of the disclosed systems, methods, and / or graphical user interfaces may be executed or implemented by a computer system compliant with the Fig.1. Although not required, aspects of the present disclosure are described in the context of computer-executable instructions, such as routines executed by a data processing device, e.g., a server computer, a wireless device, and / or a personal computer. Those skilled in the relevant art will appreciate that aspects of the present disclosure may also be practiced with other communications, data processing, or computer system configurations, including: Internet devices, handheld devices (including personal digital assistants ("PDAs")), portable computers, all types of mobile phones (including Voice over IP ("VoIP") phones), silent terminals, media players, gaming devices, virtual reality devices, multiprocessor systems, microprocessor-based or programmable consumer electronics, set-top boxes, network PCs, minicomputers, mainframes, and the like.In fact, the terms “computer,” “server,” and the like are generally used interchangeably herein and refer to any of the above devices and systems, as well as any data processor.

[0048] Aspects of the present disclosure may be embodied in a special-purpose computer and / or data processor that is specifically programmed, configured, and / or constructed to perform one or more of the computer-executable instructions detailed herein. While aspects of the present disclosure, such as certain functions, are described as being performed exclusively on a single device, the present disclosure may also be practiced in distributed environments where functions or modules are shared among various processing devices linked together over a communications network, such as a local area network ("LAN"), a wide area network ("WAN"), and / or the Internet. Similarly, the techniques illustrated herein as requiring multiple devices may be implemented in a single device.In a distributed computing environment, program modules can be located on both local and remote storage devices.

[0049] Aspects of the present disclosure may be stored and / or distributed on non-transitory, computer-readable media, including magnetically or optically readable computer disks, hard-wired or pre-programmed chips (e.g., EEPROM semiconductor chips), nanotechnology memory, biological memory, or other data storage media. Alternatively, computer-implemented instructions, data structures, screen displays, and other data according to aspects of the present disclosure may be distributed over the Internet and / or other networks (including wireless networks), via a time-propagating signal on a propagation medium (e.g., electromagnetic wave(s), sound waves, etc.), and / or may be provided over any analog or digital network (packet-switched, circuit-switched, or other system).

[0050] Programming aspects of the technology may be considered "products" or "articles of manufacture," typically in the form of executable code and / or associated data stored on or embodied in some type of machine-readable medium. "Storage"-type media includes any or all physical memory of computers, processors, or the like, or associated modules, such as various semiconductor memories, tape drives, disk drives, and the like, that may provide non-volatile storage for software programming at any time. All or portions of the software may be distributed over the Internet or other telecommunications networks from time to time.Such transfers may, for example, enable the software to be loaded from one computer or processor to another, for example, from a management server or host computer of the mobile communications network to the computing platform of a server and / or from a server to the mobile device. Thus, another type of media that may carry the software elements includes optical, electrical, and electromagnetic waves, such as those used via physical interfaces between local devices, via wired and optical fixed networks, and via various air links. The physical elements that transmit such waves, such as wired or wireless links, optical links, or the like, may also be considered media carrying the software.As used herein, terms such as "computer" or "machine-readable medium" refer to any medium involved in providing instructions to a processor for execution, unless limited to non-transitory, physically tangible "storage media."

[0051] While the presently disclosed methods, apparatus, and systems are described with exemplary reference to the transmission of data, it should be understood that the presently disclosed embodiments are applicable to any environment, such as a desktop or laptop computer, an in-car entertainment system, a home entertainment system, etc. Also, the presently disclosed embodiments may be applicable to any type of Internet protocol.

[0052] Other embodiments of the disclosure will become apparent to those skilled in the art from consideration of the specification and practice of the invention disclosed herein. It is intended that the specification and examples be considered as exemplary only, with a true scope and spirit of the invention being indicated by the following claims.

Claims

[1] A monitoring system (200) for detecting a security threat during the operation of a vehicle, comprising: a data storage device (220) that stores instructions associated with vehicle data systems; and a processor (210) configured to execute the instructions to perform a method comprising: Retrieving a planned route for a route of the vehicle by the monitoring system (200); Comparison of the planned route with a restricted airspace by the surveillance system (200); Determining by the monitoring system (200) whether the route plan overlaps with at least a portion of the restricted airspace, and in response to determining that the route path overlaps with at least a portion of the restricted airspace, transmitting an alarm about the security threat by the monitoring system (200). [2] Monitoring system (200) according to claim 1, wherein the monitoring system (200) is configured to transmit the alarm to a crew member or a ground station. [3] Surveillance system (200) according to one of claims 1 or 2, wherein the vehicle is an aircraft. [4] Surveillance system (200) according to one of claims 1 or 2, wherein the vehicle is a drone. [5] The monitoring system (200) according to any one of claims 1 to 4, wherein the monitoring system (200) is configured to detect the security threat using a global positioning system (115).