Fault analysis support system and fault analysis support method

The failure analysis support system addresses inefficiencies and safety risks in control system analysis by collecting data, estimating causes, and prioritizing tasks, ensuring safe and efficient on-site maintenance in distribution warehouses.

JP2024156343APending Publication Date: 2024-11-06HITACHI LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
JP2023070723
Authority / Receiving Office
JP · JP
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2023-04-24
Publication Date
2024-11-06

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing failure analysis systems for control systems in distribution warehouses face inefficiencies and safety risks due to insufficient data for analysis, potential security-related causes like cyber attacks, and the need for on-site confirmation work that may not acquire valid data efficiently, increasing safety risks.

Method used

A failure analysis support system that collects device monitoring data, detects abnormalities, estimates causes, analyzes safety impacts, derives and evaluates confirmation work, and prioritizes tasks to ensure safe and efficient on-site maintenance by integrating databases for monitoring logs, cause estimation, safety analysis, and confirmation work derivation.

Benefits of technology

Enables on-site maintenance personnel to perform confirmation work safely and efficiently by deriving necessary tasks, analyzing safety impacts, and prioritizing work based on dependencies, reducing safety and security risks during cause investigation.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

To provide a fault analysis support system and a fault analysis support method that allow on-site maintenance personnel to safely and efficiently carry out on-site confirmation work when an abnormality is detected in a control system.SOLUTION: A fault analysis support system includes: a monitoring input unit that collects appliance monitoring data and stores it in an appliance monitoring log database; an abnormality detection unit that monitors the appliance monitoring data and detects abnormalities in a control system; an abnormality cause database that stores the abnormalities in the control system and causes inferred from the abnormalities in association with each other; a cause inference unit that infers a cause based on a detected abnormality in the control system; and a safety analysis unit that analyzes the effect on safety of work for confirming the inferred cause; and a confirmation work evaluation unit that evaluates safety of a confirmation work from a confirmation work database that stores a confirmation work that lists pieces of work to be performed for checking whether the inferred cause is the true cause and a work area to perform the confirmation work in association with each other, and outputs a confirmation work list that reflects the results of the evaluation.SELECTED DRAWING: Figure 1
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Description

[Technical field]

[0001] The present invention relates to a fault analysis support system and a fault analysis support method for a control system. [Background technology]

[0002] Technologies related to monitoring devices are being actively developed to make it more efficient to respond to incidents that occur in control systems. Because it takes a long time for on-site maintenance personnel who use the control system to analyze the incidents, monitoring devices monitor the system and provide instructions to on-site maintenance personnel on how to respond, thereby improving efficiency.

[0003] The following Patent Document 1 discloses a technology in which a system monitoring device receives abnormality data from a control system, analyzes how to deal with the problem, and instructs on-site maintenance personnel on how to deal with the problem. Also, the following Patent Document 2 discloses a technology in which a monitoring system collects data from a control system and analyzes whether the cause of an incident is a cyber attack. [Prior art documents] [Patent documents]

[0004] [Patent Document 1] JP 2018-185712 A [Patent Document 2] JP 2021-111003 A Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]

[0005] A logistics warehouse system is composed of a control system that controls each device in the warehouse and a fault analysis support system that measures the operation data of each device and monitors the operation status of the entire control system or each device.

[0006] When an abnormality occurs in a control system, the measurement data uploaded to the fault analysis support system may not be sufficient to analyze the status of the control system. Also, in order for on-site maintenance personnel at the warehouse where the abnormality occurred to analyze the cause, confirmation work such as obtaining data such as operation logs and appearances of various devices may be required.

[0007] The causes of control system anomalies are not limited to equipment failures due to aging, but also include security-related causes such as cyber attacks and malware infections. When security issues are the cause, anomalies may occur simultaneously in multiple devices, which can increase safety risks during on-site inspection work. In addition, when confirming the cause of the analysis, various data is acquired and equipment is operated, but depending on the order in which the work is performed, valid data may not be acquired, which can reduce the efficiency of the cause analysis.

[0008] An object of the present invention is to provide a technique that enables on-site maintenance personnel to safely and efficiently carry out on-site inspection work when an abnormality is detected in a control system. [Means for solving the problem]

[0009] The fault analysis support system according to the present invention is a fault analysis support system that supports fault analysis of a control system consisting of one or a plurality of devices, and includes a monitoring input unit that collects device monitoring data related to the operating states of the devices and accumulates it in a device monitoring log database, an anomaly detection unit that monitors the device monitoring data to detect anomalies in the control system, an anomaly cause database that associates and stores anomalies in the control system and causes estimated from the anomalies, a cause estimation unit that estimates a cause based on a detected anomaly in the control system, and a system anomaly database that associates and stores the anomalies in the control system, a common cause event having the estimated cause as a common cause, the operating state of the control system, and a safety impact indicating an impact on safety in a work area caused by an anomaly in the device. The system is configured as a failure analysis support system comprising: a safety analysis unit that uses an operation database to analyze the impact on safety of the work to confirm the estimated cause; a confirmation work derivation unit that uses the estimated cause and the common cause event to search for confirmation work corresponding to the estimated cause and the common cause event from a confirmation work database that associates and stores confirmation work listed in a list of work to investigate whether the estimated cause is the true cause with the work area where the confirmation work is performed, and derives the search results as a confirmation work list; and a confirmation work evaluation unit that evaluates the safety of the confirmation work based on the analysis results of the impact on safety and the confirmation work included in the confirmation work list, and outputs the confirmation work list reflecting the results of the evaluation. Effect of the Invention

[0010] According to the present invention, when an abnormality is detected in a control system, an on-site maintenance worker can safely and efficiently carry out on-site inspection work. [Brief description of the drawings]

[0011] [Figure 1] 1 is a diagram showing a state in which a fault analysis support system according to one embodiment of the present invention is connected to equipment in a logistics warehouse or information terminal equipment of a site maintenance worker via a communication network. [Diagram 2] 1 is a configuration diagram of a failure analysis support system according to an embodiment. [Figure 3A] FIG. 2 illustrates an example of a device monitoring log database. [Figure 3B] FIG. 13 is a diagram illustrating an example of an abnormality cause database. [Figure 3C] FIG. 13 is a diagram illustrating an example of a system abnormal operation database. [Figure 3D] FIG. 11 is a diagram illustrating an example of a confirmation work database. [Figure 3E] FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating an example of a safety measure database. [Figure 4] 13 is a flowchart illustrating a processing flow from when the fault analysis support system detects an abnormality in a control system to when the system evaluates the safety of a work area in a logistics warehouse. [Diagram 5] 11 is a flowchart illustrating a process flow in which the failure analysis support system derives confirmation work contents necessary for cause investigation and determines the execution order. [Figure 6] This figure shows a flowchart from when a confirmation work list created by the fault analysis support system is displayed on a screen display unit viewed by a field maintenance worker, to when, based on the results of the confirmation work, cause analysis is performed and the confirmation work list is re-created until the cause can be identified. [Figure 7] FIG. 13 is a diagram showing an example of a confirmation task list displayed on a screen display unit. [Figure 8] FIG. 2 illustrates an example of a hardware configuration of a failure analysis support system. [Figure 9] FIG. 11 is a diagram showing an example of a site confirmation work list. [Figure 10] FIG. 11 is a diagram showing an example of a site confirmation work list (after steps ST502 and ST503 are performed). [Figure 11] FIG. 11 is a diagram showing an example of a site confirmation work list (after steps ST505 and ST506 are performed). DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

[0012] Hereinafter, an embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings. The examples are illustrative for explaining the present invention, and are omitted and simplified as appropriate for clarity of explanation. The present invention can be implemented in various other forms. Unless otherwise limited, each component may be singular or plural. The position, size, shape, range, etc. of each component shown in the drawings may not represent the actual position, size, shape, range, etc., in order to facilitate understanding of the invention. Therefore, the present invention is not necessarily limited to the position, size, shape, range, etc. disclosed in the drawings.

[0013] As examples of various information, the various information may be described using expressions such as "table," "list," and "queue," but the various information may be expressed using data structures other than these. For example, various information such as "XX table," "XX list," and "XX queue" may be expressed as "XX information." When describing identification information, expressions such as "identification information," "identifier," "name," "ID," and "number" are used, but these are mutually interchangeable.

[0014] When there are multiple components having the same or similar functions, they may be described by using the same reference numerals with different subscripts, or when there is no need to distinguish between these multiple components, the subscripts may be omitted.

[0015] In the embodiments, a process performed by executing a program may be described. Here, a computer executes the program using a processor (e.g., CPU, GPU), and performs the process defined by the program while using a storage resource (e.g., memory) and an interface device (e.g., communication port), etc. Therefore, the subject of the process performed by executing the program may be the processor. Similarly, the subject of the process performed by executing the program may be a controller, device, system, computer, or node having a processor. The subject of the process performed by executing the program may be a calculation unit, and may include a dedicated circuit that performs specific processing. Here, the dedicated circuit is, for example, an FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array), an ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit), or a CPLD (Complex Programmable Logic Device), etc.

[0016] The program may be installed in the computer from a program source. The program source may be, for example, a program distribution server or a computer-readable storage medium. When the program source is a program distribution server, the program distribution server may include a processor and a storage resource that stores the program to be distributed, and the processor of the program distribution server may distribute the program to be distributed to other computers. In addition, in the embodiment, two or more programs may be realized as one program, and one program may be realized as two or more programs.

[0017] <Figure 1: Overview of the logistics warehouse system> FIG. 1 is a diagram showing a state in which a fault analysis support system 20 according to one embodiment of the present invention communicates with equipment in a logistics warehouse or an information terminal device 80 of a site maintenance worker 10 via a communication network 70.

[0018] The communication network 70 is a data communication path using a communication protocol such as EtherCAT or Modbus. The logistics warehouse is also equipped with automatic transport devices 30 and 40, a robot arm 50, and a conveyor device 60, etc., for transporting, loading and unloading luggage, processing luggage, and the like.

[0019] The fault analysis support system 20 is positioned as one of the subsystems provided in the WMS (Warehouse Management System) that manages the incoming and outgoing of goods in the logistics warehouse system 1000 and the WES (Warehouse Execution System) that controls the equipment and handles communication between devices.

[0020] Like the WES, the failure analysis support system 20 monitors the operating status of the control system 200, and when a failure occurs, performs an analysis to determine the cause and provides the information to the field maintenance personnel 10.

[0021] <Problem description> If an abnormality occurs in the control system 200, since the measurement data uploaded to the fault analysis support system 20 is limited, there are cases where confirmation work is required, such as for the on-site maintenance worker 10 to collect data such as operation logs and external appearances of various devices at the location where the abnormality occurred in order to analyze the cause.

[0022] The causes of abnormalities in the control system 200 are not limited to equipment failure due to aging or the like, but also include security-related causes such as cyber attacks and malware infections.

[0023] When security issues such as these are the cause, malfunctions may occur in multiple devices at the same time, which can increase safety risks during on-site inspection work.

[0024] Furthermore, in the process of confirming the cause of an analysis, various data is acquired and equipment is operated, but depending on the order in which tasks are performed, valid data may not be acquired, which can reduce the efficiency of the cause analysis.

[0025] <Solution> Therefore, the failure analysis support system 20 in the embodiment of the present invention derives the tasks required for cause investigation when an abnormality is detected in the control system 200, and enables on-site maintenance personnel to safely and efficiently analyze the cause based on the analysis results of the safety of each task and the dependencies between tasks. Furthermore, the system supports system failure analysis by calculating the priority of tasks and notifying the on-site maintenance personnel 10. Since the analysis of the cause of the failure is performed in a remote environment, the on-site maintenance personnel 10 is able to efficiently perform the tasks required for cause investigation on-site while reducing safety and security risks.

[0026] <Figure 2: Fault analysis system configuration> FIG. 2 is a configuration diagram of a failure analysis support system 20 according to this embodiment. The fault analysis support system 20 according to this embodiment has a monitoring input unit 202, an abnormality detection unit 203, a cause estimation unit 204, a safety analysis unit 205, a confirmation work derivation unit 206, a confirmation work evaluation unit 207, a monitoring output unit 208, an equipment monitoring log database 210, an abnormality cause database 211, a system abnormal operation database 212, a confirmation work database 213, and a safety measure database 214. The screen display unit 701 is a display device such as a display of the information terminal device 80.

[0027] The abnormality detection unit 203 monitors equipment monitoring data including operation logs of each control device 201 that constitutes the control system 200 and a system operation status indicating whether the control system 200 is operating or not, as well as on-site confirmation data obtained by the on-site maintenance worker 10 during confirmation work, to detect abnormalities (referred to as observed events) in the control system 200.

[0028] The cause estimation unit 204 estimates the cause based on the abnormality detected by the abnormality detection unit 203 (the estimated cause is referred to as an estimated cause), and derives events that occur with the estimated causes as a common cause (referred to as a common cause event).

[0029] The safety analysis unit 205 analyzes the impact on safety of observed events, presumed causes, and common cause events.

[0030] The confirmation task derivation unit 206 derives confirmation tasks required for the field maintenance personnel 10 to investigate the occurrence status of the event, and creates a confirmation task list.

[0031] The confirmation work evaluation unit 207 evaluates the safety of each confirmation work content based on the impact analysis result on safety and each confirmation work content, and outputs a confirmation work safety evaluation result. The confirmation work evaluation unit 207 also outputs a confirmation work feasibility evaluation result. Furthermore, the confirmation work evaluation unit 207 outputs a confirmation work safety evaluation result after countermeasures are taken and a confirmation work feasibility evaluation result after countermeasures are taken.

[0032] <Figure 3: Database configuration> 3A to 3E are diagrams showing examples of each database used for analyzing a system fault by fault analysis support system 20 according to this embodiment. They show data items and data contents of each database (device monitoring log database 210, abnormality cause database 211, system abnormal operation database 212, confirmation work database 213, and safety measure database 214) shown in the configuration of fault analysis support system 20 in FIG.

[0033] FIG. 3A is a diagram showing an example of the equipment monitoring log database 210. The equipment monitoring log database 210 stores data of the logistics warehouse site by the fault analysis support system 20. The equipment monitoring log database 210 stores equipment monitoring data including operation logs of each control device 201 constituting the control system 200 and a system operation status indicating whether the control system 200 is operating or not, and on-site confirmation data acquired by the on-site maintenance personnel 10 in the confirmation work. For example, the database is configured with information such as the collection target date, the target device, and the transmission source for identifying whether the data is sent from the device or collected by the on-site maintenance personnel 10. In reality, in addition to these pieces of information, the entities of the above-mentioned equipment monitoring data and on-site confirmation data are stored in association with these pieces of information.

[0034] In Fig. 3A, for example, the collection date "YYYY / MM / DD" indicating the timing when the data was acquired, the target device "Device A" indicating the subject of data acquisition, and the sender "Device A" indicating the location of the subject of data acquisition are stored in association with each other, and further, the data acquired during monitoring is associated with these pieces of information and stored as device monitoring data. As with the device monitoring data, the data acquired during on-site inspection is also stored in association with each of these items.

[0035] 3B is a diagram showing an example of the anomaly cause database 211. The anomaly cause database 211 is used by the cause estimation unit 204 to estimate the cause of a detected anomaly in the control system 200. The anomaly cause database 211 contains information on observed events and causes (estimated causes) estimated from the observed events.

[0036] In FIG. 3B, for example, "no response from device A" is stored as an observed event of a device, and "cybersecurity attack" and "failure of device A" are stored in association with each other as presumed causes of the observed event.

[0037] 3C is a diagram showing an example of the system abnormal operation database 212. The system abnormal operation database 212 is used by the safety analysis unit 205 to further investigate events that may occur due to the same cause. The system abnormal operation database 212 includes information such as the above-mentioned observed events and common cause events, each piece of information on the system operation state indicating whether the control system 200 is operating, and safety impact information indicating the impact on safety of the work area in the logistics warehouse caused by an abnormality in the control system 200.

[0038] 3C, for example, when "no response from device A" is observed as an observed event and the system operation status is "all operational," events that are causally related to the observed event "no response from device A," i.e., possible behaviors, include "abnormal operation of device A," "abnormal operation of device B," and "abnormal operation of device C." Also, among these behaviors, when "abnormal operation of device A" or "abnormal operation of device B" occurs, there is no impact on safety, whereas when "abnormal operation of device C" occurs, there is concern about an increased safety risk in work area 1 (for example, the danger of work in work area 1 due to a collision of device C under control system 200 increases above a certain level).

[0039] 3D is a diagram showing an example of the confirmation work database 213. The confirmation work derivation unit 206 uses the confirmation work database 213 to derive on-site confirmation work for analyzing the true cause of a system abnormality. The confirmation work database 213 includes information such as the above-mentioned presumed causes and common cause events, confirmation work that lists the work for investigating whether the presumed cause is the true cause, the work area where the confirmation work is performed, the work procedure in the confirmation work, the equipment used in the confirmation work, the data collected in the confirmation work, and the dependency relationship between the confirmation work and other confirmation works.

[0040] FIG. 3D shows that, for example, when a "cybersecurity attack" is presumed as the presumed cause and "abnormal operation of device A" is derived as the common cause event, the operation log of device A is collected in work area 1 as a confirmation work to check whether the presumed cause is the true cause. It also shows that the confirmation work is performed using a USB memory and an information terminal device 80 that serves as the operation terminal of device A, by first connecting the USB memory to device A and saving the operation log of device A dated YYYY / MM / DD. It also shows that the confirmation work is constrained to be performed before the reboot of device A as a dependency relationship with other confirmation works other than the confirmation work.

[0041] FIG. 3E is a diagram showing an example of the safety measures database 214. The safety measures database 214 is used by the confirmation work evaluation unit 207 to investigate countermeasure methods for reducing the risk of confirmation work with high safety risk. The safety measures database 214 includes information on the above-mentioned confirmation work, measures for reducing the safety risk of the confirmation work, and expected effects. Examples of safety measures include changing the execution order of multiple confirmation works stored in the confirmation work list, moving equipment (e.g., equipment A, equipment C) operated in the confirmation work, and stopping the operation of equipment with high safety risk or the control system 200 including the equipment or the equipment based on the safety impact analysis result. In addition, as an effect of these measures, there is information on changes in risk, such as a safety risk that was "high" becoming "low." The confirmation work evaluation unit 207 reduces the safety risk by performing at least one of these.

[0042] FIG. 3E shows that, for example, as a safety measure for the confirmation work of collecting the operation log of device A, a measure is required to stop the abnormal operation of device C and reduce the safety risk in work area 1.

[0043] The equipment monitoring log database 210 is configured by accumulating data collected from the control system 200. The data for each of the other databases (210-214) shown in Fig. 3A-3E is prepared based on the results of a prior analysis of the safety of the configuration of the control system 200 and the logistics warehouse site, such as events to be observed in advance and their presumed causes, events that may occur due to common causes, and their impact on safety.

[0044] <Figure 4: Safety risk assessment flowchart> 4 is a flowchart explaining the flow of processing in which the fault analysis support system 20 detects an abnormality in the control system 200, infers the cause, and evaluates events that may occur due to the cause and the safety of the work area in the logistics warehouse due to the events. Each step in FIG. 4 will be explained below.

[0045] (Figure 4: Step ST401) Detecting abnormalities in the control system The abnormality detection unit 203 monitors the equipment monitoring data received by the monitoring input unit 202, including the operation logs of each control device 201 that constitutes the control system 200 and a system operation status indicating whether the control system 200 is operating, and detects abnormalities in the control system 200.

[0046] (FIG. 4: Step ST402) Cause estimation The cause estimation unit 204 estimates a possible cause based on the abnormality detected by the abnormality detection unit 203. The cause estimation unit 204 outputs the estimated cause (estimated cause). This will be specifically described below.

[0047] When the cause estimation unit 204 receives equipment monitoring data including an observed event and a system operating state from the anomaly detection unit 203, it searches for an estimated cause of an anomaly from the anomaly cause database 211 using the system operating state and observed event as conditions. The cause estimation unit 204 sets a cause that meets the search conditions as an estimated cause that may have caused the observed event. For example, the cause estimation unit 204 reads out equipment monitoring data included in the equipment monitoring log database 210 shown in Fig. 3A, and when the control system 200 is in a normal operating state while equipment A is unresponsive, it refers to the anomaly cause database 211 shown in Fig. 3B and outputs "cybersecurity attack" and "equipment A failure" as the estimated cause of the observed event.

[0048] (Figure 4: Step ST403) Identifying common cause events The cause estimation unit 204 derives events (called common cause events) other than the observed events that may occur due to the estimated causes. This will be described in detail below.

[0049] The cause estimation unit 204 searches for events other than the observed event in the anomaly cause database 211 using the estimated cause estimated in step ST402 and the system operation state as conditions. The cause estimation unit 204 regards the cause that meets the search conditions as the estimated cause that may have caused the observed event.

[0050] For example, consider a case where the cause estimation unit 204 detects a communication anomaly between the device of the control system 200 and the fault analysis support system 20, in which the operating state of the device cannot be monitored (no response from device A), as an observed event. In this case, the estimated cause may be not only a failure of the device of the facility due to aging or the like, but also a cause related to security, such as a cyber attack or malware infection. Although the observed event is a communication anomaly with the device, an operation anomaly due to a failure of the device of the facility or an unintended operation due to a security factor is derived as a common cause event. In FIG. 3B, as an example, when "cybersecurity attack" and "device A failure" are determined as the estimated causes of the device A that is the observation target in ST402, "cybersecurity attack" similar to device A is stored as the estimated cause of device B, which is a device other than the target device. Therefore, the cause estimation unit 204 derives "cybersecurity attack" as the common cause event of devices A and B. The cause estimation unit 204 outputs the observed event (no response from device A), the common cause event (cybersecurity attack), and the system operation status (all control systems 200 are in a normal state). If the same is stored for device C in the anomaly cause database 211, it outputs "cybersecurity attack" as the common cause event for devices A to C, and outputs the system operation status (all control systems 200 are in a normal state).

[0051] (Figure 4: Step ST404) Safety impact analysis The safety analysis section 205 analyzes the influence on safety of the estimated cause estimated in ST402 and the common cause event derived in ST403. This will be specifically described below.

[0052] The safety analysis unit 205 receives each piece of information on observed events, common cause events, and system operation status from the cause estimation unit 204, and uses this information to search for impacts on safety on work areas in the logistics warehouse from the system abnormal operation database 212. The safety analysis unit 205 evaluates the safety of each work area using search results that correspond to the contents of each piece of information above.

[0053] Examples of the impact on safety include changes in the degree of danger in a specific area in a logistics warehouse and the presence or absence of such changes. Specifically, a transport device moving through the work area 1 may perform unintended operations due to an observed event or a common cause event, and may collide with or harm devices or workers in the work area 1. In consideration of such cases, the system abnormal operation database 212 evaluates the safety of the work area as "increased safety risk in the work area 1" (i.e., there is an impact that safety is reduced). Therefore, in the case of an observed event (no response from device A), a common cause event (abnormal operation of device C in this example), and a system operating state (all control systems 200 are in a normal state), the safety analysis unit 205 outputs a safety impact of "increased safety risk in the work area 1" corresponding to these pieces of information. Although not illustrated here, the case where the common cause event is a "cybersecurity attack" is also defined in the system abnormal operation database 212 in the same manner.

[0054] Through the above processing flow, after the fault analysis support system 20 detects an abnormality in the control system 200 in the logistics warehouse, the fault analysis support system 20 estimates the cause of the abnormality and analyzes events that occur due to a common cause, and performs a safety evaluation of the work area in the logistics warehouse that changes depending on the abnormality detected as an observed event and the common cause event.

[0055] <Figure 5: Flowchart from deriving confirmation tasks to deciding the execution order of confirmation tasks> FIG. 5 is a flowchart illustrating the flow of processing performed by the failure analysis support system 20, from deriving the confirmation work contents required for cause investigation to determining the order of execution.

[0056] (Figure 5: Step ST501) Derive the confirmation tasks required to determine the cause The confirmation work derivation unit 206 derives a confirmation work for the field maintenance worker 10 that is required to determine whether the estimated cause is the true cause.

[0057] The confirmation work derivation unit 206 refers to the confirmation work database 213 and outputs a confirmation work list for investigating the occurrence status and occurrence process of the presumed cause, observed event, and common cause event output in each process from step ST401 to step ST404. Based on the confirmation work list output by the confirmation work derivation unit 206, the on-site maintenance worker 10 performs confirmation work such as checking the device log, communication log between devices, external appearance state, conducting diagnostic tests, etc., and collecting data.

[0058] For example, if the observed event is a communication anomaly, the confirmation task derivation unit 206 derives a confirmation task list, such as collecting communication logs between devices, diagnosing a communication interface failure, and collecting operation logs of devices that are unable to communicate.

[0059] Information on presumed causes, observed events, common cause events, and the confirmation tasks required for them are contained in the confirmation task database 213. The confirmation task derivation unit 206 uses the input information on presumed causes, observed events, and common cause events to search the confirmation tasks stored in association with the presumed causes and common cause events from the confirmation task database 213. The corresponding search results are listed and output as a confirmation task list.

[0060] For example, the confirmation work derivation unit 206 searches the confirmation work database 213 for a confirmation work list for investigating the true cause of (1) a cybersecurity attack and (2) a failure of device A, which are stored as presumed causes. In this search, the record 301 is searched. An example of the search result is shown in the on-site confirmation work list 901 in FIG. 9.

[0061] FIG. 9 is a diagram showing an example of the on-site inspection work list 901. As shown in FIG. 9, the on-site inspection work list 901 corresponds to an order indicating the order in which the inspection work is performed, a state indicating the implementation state of the inspection work, each item similar to the above-mentioned inspection work database 213, as well as a safety risk when performing the inspection work and a feasibility item indicating whether the inspection work can be performed in light of the safety risk. The above-mentioned order, state, safety risk, and feasibility items are recorded in the following processing. The list obtained by the above search corresponds to record 9011 of the on-site inspection work list 901. In FIG. 9, the above lists are output for all of the estimated causes, observed events, and common cause events output in each processing from step ST401 to step ST404 in FIG. 4 (a total of four records).

[0062] (Figure 5: Step ST502) Safety evaluation of confirmation work The confirmation task evaluation unit 207 evaluates the safety of each confirmation task included in the confirmation task list derived in step ST501.

[0063] The confirmation work evaluation unit 207 searches the work area of ​​each confirmation work included in the confirmation work list in the confirmation work database 213. The confirmation work evaluation unit 207 compares the work area found by this search with the safety evaluation result of each work area evaluated in step ST404, evaluates the safety of each confirmation work, and outputs the evaluation result as the confirmation work safety evaluation result.

[0064] For example, the confirmation work evaluation unit 207 identifies the confirmation work "Acquisition of device A operation log" in the on-site confirmation work list 901 shown in FIG. 9 and the work area "Work area 1" corresponding to the confirmation work in the confirmation work database 213 shown in FIG. 3D. The confirmation work evaluation unit 207 compares the confirmation work "Acquisition of device A operation log" with the safety impact "Increased safety risk in work area 1" output in ST404, and evaluates that the confirmation work will have an impact of increasing the safety risk if performed in work area 1. Although the confirmation work "Acquisition of device A operation log" has been described here, the same applies to other confirmation works. That is, if the confirmation work in the on-site confirmation work list 901 shown in FIG. 9 is "Acquisition of device C operation log" and the safety impact "Increased safety risk in work area 1" is output in ST404, it is evaluated that the confirmation work will have an impact of increasing the safety risk if performed in work area 1, as in the case of the confirmation work "Acquisition of device A operation log."

[0065] The confirmation work evaluation unit 207 sets a safety standard in advance and evaluates the above safety risk. For example, three levels of "high, medium, low" are set as the judgment criteria for the level of safety risk, with a level that harms people being "high," a level that hits things but does not break them being "medium," and a level that has no impact on the outside being "low." When the level required for safety of the work area 1 is a predetermined level of safety risk that harms people, the confirmation work evaluation unit 207 evaluates the safety risk of the confirmation work as "the confirmation work in work area 1 has a high safety risk."

[0066] (Figure 5: Step ST503) Evaluate the feasibility of confirmation work before taking measures The confirmation task evaluation unit 207 evaluates the feasibility of each confirmation task using the confirmation task safety evaluation result, which is the processing result of step ST502.

[0067] The confirmation work evaluation unit 207 sets a criterion for judging whether or not a confirmation work can be performed in advance, and performs the evaluation of the feasibility. For example, if the safety risk described in step ST502 is expressed in three levels of "high, medium, and low," the confirmation work is evaluated as "executable" if the safety risk is "medium" or "low," and is otherwise evaluated as "not executable." The feasibility evaluation result is output as the feasibility evaluation result of the confirmation task.

[0068] An example of an on-site confirmation work list created when steps ST502 and ST503 are performed is shown in Fig. 10. In Fig. 10, it can be seen that by performing the processing of steps ST502 and ST503, the items of safety risk and feasibility are evaluated, and the results of the evaluation are written and reflected in the confirmation work list, which is output.

[0069] For example, among the confirmation tasks identified in the on-site confirmation task list 901, it can be determined that the confirmation task in task area 1 poses an increased safety risk in task area 1 based on the common cause events and safety impact data in the system abnormal operation database 303. Therefore, the confirmation task evaluation unit 207 evaluates the safety risk as "high." On the other hand, based on the same idea, the confirmation task evaluation unit 207 evaluates the safety risk of other tasks performed in task area 2 as "low." Furthermore, referring to the criteria in step ST503, the confirmation task evaluation unit 207 evaluates the feasibility of tasks with a "high" safety risk as "not feasible," and creates an on-site confirmation task list 1001 for which no safety measures are to be taken.

[0070] (Figure 5: Step ST504) Setting and reevaluating safety measures The confirmation work evaluation unit 207 sets safety measures for the confirmation work that is determined to be "unfeasible" in the feasibility evaluation result of the confirmation work, which is the processing result of step ST503, and re-evaluates the safety risk and feasibility.

[0071] The confirmation work evaluation unit 207 searches the safety measures database 214 for safety measures for the confirmation work that has been evaluated as having a high safety risk and being unfeasible based on the confirmation work safety evaluation result output in step ST502 and the confirmation work feasibility evaluation result output in step ST503, and selects effective measures.The confirmation work evaluation unit 207 then reevaluates the safety risk caused by the measures, and outputs the result as the confirmation work safety evaluation result after the measures have been taken.Furthermore, it reevaluates feasibility based on the reevaluated safety risk, and outputs the result as the feasibility evaluation result of the confirmation work after the measures have been taken.

[0072] For example, the confirmation task evaluation unit 207 evaluates the confirmation task "collect device A operation log" in work area 1 as having a safety risk of "high" and feasibility of "not feasible." Therefore, by referring to the safety measure database 214 shown in Fig. 3E, the confirmation task evaluation unit 207 selects the safety measure "stop abnormal operation of device C to reduce the safety risk of work area 1" that corresponds to the confirmation task "collect device A operation log."

[0073] When the on-site maintenance worker 10 checks the above safety measures and performs "stopping the abnormal operation of device C", the confirmation work evaluation unit 207 performs steps ST502 and ST503 again. At this time, in ST502, the safety evaluation result of each work area evaluated in step ST404 is again referred to. In this reference, the confirmation work evaluation unit 207 requests the safety analysis unit 205 to perform step ST404 again. In accordance with the request, the safety analysis unit 205 performs an impact analysis on safety at the current time. In this example, since the on-site maintenance worker 10 checks the above safety measures and performs "stopping the abnormal operation of device C", the "abnormal operation of device C" is removed as a common cause event. Therefore, the safety analysis unit 205 returns a result of "none" as a safety impact to the confirmation work evaluation unit 207.

[0074] The confirmation work evaluation unit 207 performs step ST502 in accordance with the safety evaluation received from the safety analysis unit 205, and evaluates that if the confirmation work "collecting device A's operation log" is performed in work area 1, the safety risk has decreased to a certain degree and the level has become "low". Furthermore, the confirmation work evaluation unit 207 performs step ST503, and evaluates the confirmation work as "feasible" in accordance with the above-mentioned criteria. In this example, the confirmation work "collecting device A's operation log" in work area 1 is reevaluated as having a safety risk of "low" and feasibility of "feasible".

[0075] (Figure 5: Step ST505) Analyze dependencies between confirmation tasks In the processes up to this point, the confirmation work evaluation unit 207 has evaluated the safety risk and feasibility of each confirmation work included in the on-site confirmation work list 901, and further re-evaluated it. In the next process, the confirmation work evaluation unit 207 checks the dependency relationships between each confirmation work included in the confirmation work list. Using the confirmation work database 213 shown in Fig. 3D, the confirmation work evaluation unit 207 checks the work procedure indicating the specific work content of each confirmation work, and the impact on other works.

[0076] From the perspective of dependencies between verification tasks, it is important to consider whether the order in which verification tasks are performed will interfere with other verification tasks, or whether the tasks can be performed if the order is changed. It is also important to consider whether data that should be collected during a verification task will be changed or deleted by other verification tasks. A specific example of dependency is, "Other verification tasks involve reboots and test operations. These reboots and test operations may change or delete data in memory. Therefore, it is necessary to collect data in memory before these reboots and test operations."

[0077] The confirmation work evaluation unit 207 refers to the item "dependency with other confirmation work" stored in the confirmation work database 213 shown in Fig. 3D and analyzes the contents of that item, or reads all of the items "work steps" of each confirmation work and analyzes their contents. From the results of these analyses, the confirmation work evaluation unit 207 determines the chronological order of each work step, thereby determining the precedence relationship of each confirmation work. The confirmation work evaluation unit 207 checks the dependency relationships as described above, and outputs the results as the dependency relationship check results.

[0078] (FIG. 5: Step ST506) Deciding the execution order of confirmation tasks The confirmation task evaluation unit 207 determines the execution order of each confirmation task for which the feasibility has been evaluated and the dependency relationship has been confirmed. The confirmation task evaluation unit 207 selects basic priorities based on the following criteria: tasks that are feasible with low safety risks, and that have no dependencies on other tasks or that should take precedence due to dependencies are highly rated, and the confirmation task evaluation unit 207 starts with these tasks.

[0079] The following method is an example of determining the execution order. The confirmation work evaluation unit 207 first selects, as the work to be executed first, (1) confirmation work that does not require safety measures, has low safety risks, and has been evaluated as "feasible" for feasibility, and has no dependencies with other work. Next, the confirmation work evaluation unit 207 selects, as the work to be executed first, (2) confirmation work that has been evaluated as "feasible" for feasibility, with safety risks reduced after safety measures have been implemented, and has been evaluated as "feasible" for feasibility, in order of priority in terms of dependencies. The confirmation work selected as in (2) is the confirmation work whose safety risk and feasibility have been reevaluated in steps ST502 and ST503 described above.

[0080] FIG. 11 shows an example of a site confirmation task list created when steps ST505 and ST506 are performed. For example, the confirmation task evaluation unit 207 identifies a confirmation task that has a high safety risk and is not feasible. The confirmation task evaluation unit 207 adds a procedure to stop the operation of device C based on the safety measures in the safety measures database 214 in order to ensure the safety of the work area 1, which was a factor in increasing the safety risk, for the identified confirmation task. In FIG. 11, "(1) Operation stopped for safety measures" is added to the record with the order "2". By adding this procedure, the safety risk of the work area 1 can be reduced, and all tasks can be performed. That is, when reevaluating the safety risk and feasibility described in step ST504, a site confirmation task list 1101 as shown in FIG. 11 is output. The site maintenance worker 10 refers to the list and performs the work procedure of the confirmation task (in this case, for device C, the work procedure "(1) Operation stopped for safety measures" of the confirmation task "Fault diagnosis and log collection of device C"). As a result, the safety risk of other inspection tasks performed in work area 1 (in this example, inspection tasks numbered "3" and "4") becomes "low" and the feasibility becomes "feasible."

[0081] In this example, in terms of the order of tasks, the confirmation work evaluation unit 207 prioritizes log collection for device B, which has no execution dependency (order 1), and then performs fault diagnosis and log collection for device C, which includes safety measures procedures (order 2). Furthermore, in collecting logs for device A, the confirmation work evaluation unit 207 performs operation log collection for device A before the device is restarted, due to the dependency of collecting logs before the device is restarted (order 3). Finally, the confirmation work evaluation unit 207 performs operation log collection after the device A is restarted (order 4).

[0082] <Figure 6: Flowchart from confirmation screen output to reanalysis based on confirmation results> FIG. 6 is a flowchart showing the process from displaying the confirmation work list created as described above on the screen display unit 701 of the information terminal device 80 to re-creating the confirmation work list based on the results of the confirmation work performed by the on-site maintenance worker 10.

[0083] (Figure 6: Step ST601) Screen display for confirmation work The monitor output unit 208 receives the confirmation task list including the execution order, which is the output of step ST506, and sends the confirmation task list to the screen display unit 701 of the information terminal 80. The screen display unit 701 displays the confirmation task list to the site maintenance technician 10.

[0084] <Figure 7: Example of confirmation task list displayed on the screen> 7 is a diagram showing an example of a confirmation work list displayed by the screen display unit 701. The items displayed by the screen display unit 701 include some or all of the items in the on-site confirmation work list described using FIGS.

[0085] (FIG. 6: Step ST602) Confirmation and upload to the fault analysis support system The on-site maintenance worker 10 checks the check work list displayed on the screen display unit 209 and understands the check work required for the cause analysis. The on-site maintenance worker 10 performs the check work according to the order of the check work displayed on the screen display unit 701. The screen display unit 701 of the information terminal device 80, in response to an operation from the on-site maintenance worker 10, uploads data of the work result (referred to as on-site check data) acquired from the device or system in association with the performed check work to the fault analysis support system 20. For example, the screen display unit 701, in response to an operation from the on-site maintenance worker 10, acquires log data of device A. The on-site maintenance worker 10 connects a recording medium such as a USB memory to device A, and the control device 201 connected to device A transmits the log data of device A to the monitoring input unit 202 of the fault analysis support system 20 and records it in the USB memory. The monitoring input unit 202 records the transmitted log data in the device monitoring log database 210 of the fault analysis support system 20.

[0086] When the log data is acquired and one confirmation task is completed, the screen display unit 209 rewrites the status of the target task in the confirmation task list from "not performed" to "completed." The screen display unit 209 can perform this rewriting by receiving, from the on-site maintenance worker 10, information that all tasks included in the work procedures in the on-site confirmation task list have been performed. The on-site maintenance worker 10 may manually operate the on-site confirmation task list to update the status when the data is uploaded. The screen display unit 209 recreates a new on-site confirmation task list that includes confirmation tasks other than the confirmation tasks whose updated status has become "completed" from the on-site confirmation task list with the updated status, and displays it on the screen. This makes it possible to present to the on-site maintenance worker 10 a new on-site confirmation task list that includes only uncompleted confirmation tasks, excluding completed confirmation tasks.

[0087] (Figure 6: Step ST603) Cause analysis using confirmation data and reanalysis of confirmation work The fault analysis support system 20 performs cause analysis using the transmitted log data. The fault analysis support system 20 checks the occurrence status of the common cause event and checks the accuracy of the estimated cause. Depending on the presence or absence of the occurrence status of the common cause event, it narrows down the possible estimated causes and limits the confirmation work content. That is, the fault analysis support system 20 can execute each process from FIG. 4 onwards, such as abnormality detection of the control system, cause estimation, and investigation of the true cause, based on the log obtained as a result of the completed confirmation work, by newly accumulating the transmitted log data in the equipment monitoring log database 210. The above log includes equipment monitoring data including the operation log of the control device 201 and the system operating status of the control system 200, and on-site confirmation data obtained by the on-site maintenance worker 10 during the confirmation work.

[0088] <Figure 8: Example of hardware configuration for fault analysis support system> 8 shows an example of a hardware configuration of failure analysis support system 20. The basic configuration of failure analysis support system 20 includes a CPU (Central Processing Unit) 801 that executes programs and the like, a ROM (Read Only Memory) 802 that records programs, tables, program data, and the like that realize each function, a volatile RAM (Random Access Memory) 803 that saves information such as files, a storage 804 that records databases, and the like, an input device 805 that serves as an interface for human operation input, a display device 806 that displays an operation screen, data, and the like, and a network interface 807 that communicates with control system 200.

[0089] Each functional unit of the CPU 801 can be configured using a circuit device that implements that function, or can be configured by the CPU 801 executing software that implements that function.

[0090] The control device 201 and the information terminal device 80 may also be configured by the computer shown in FIG.

[0091] <Summary> By executing the process from the control system abnormality detection in step ST401 to the confirmation work screen display in step ST601, when an abnormality in the control system is detected, an on-site maintenance worker can safely and efficiently perform on-site confirmation work. Also, by repeatedly executing the process from the control system abnormality detection in step ST401 to the reanalysis in step ST603, it becomes possible to proceed with confirmation work and cause investigation while maintaining safety and taking into account dependencies of the confirmation work.

[0092] As described above, according to the fault analysis support system of this embodiment, when an abnormality is detected in a control system, the on-site inspection work required to determine the cause is derived, and safety measures and work priorities for carrying out the inspection work safely and efficiently are notified to on-site maintenance personnel, thereby enabling the on-site maintenance personnel to carry out the on-site inspection work safely and efficiently.

[0093] For example, as described using steps ST501-ST503 of FIG. 5, a fault analysis support system 20 for supporting fault analysis of a control system 200 consisting of one or a plurality of devices includes a monitoring input unit 202 that collects equipment monitoring data related to the operating states of the devices and accumulates it in an equipment monitoring log database 210, an abnormality detection unit 203 that monitors the equipment monitoring data to detect an abnormality in the control system, an abnormality cause database 211 that associates and stores the abnormality in the control system with a cause estimated from the abnormality, a cause estimation unit 204 that estimates a cause based on the detected abnormality in the control system, and a system abnormality operation unit that associates and stores the abnormality in the control system, a common cause event having the estimated cause as a common cause, the operating state of the control system, and a safety impact indicating an impact on safety in a work area caused by the abnormality in the device. The control system has a safety analysis unit 205 that uses a database 212 to analyze the impact on safety of the work to confirm the estimated cause, a confirmation work derivation unit 206 that uses the estimated cause and the common cause event to search for confirmation work corresponding to the estimated cause and the common cause event from a confirmation work database 213 that associates and stores confirmation work, which lists work to investigate whether the estimated cause is the true cause, with the work area where the confirmation work is performed, and derives the search result as a confirmation work list, and a confirmation work evaluation unit 207 that evaluates the safety of the confirmation work based on the analysis result of the impact on safety and the confirmation work included in the confirmation work list, and outputs the confirmation work list reflecting the evaluation result, so that when an abnormality in the control system is detected, an on-site maintenance person can safely and efficiently perform on-site confirmation work.

[0094] 5, the confirmation work database stores the dependency relationship between the confirmation work and other confirmation works, and the confirmation work evaluation unit checks the dependency relationship between the confirmation works included in the confirmation work list and evaluates the priority of the confirmation work that should be preceded in the dependency relationship as high. This enables the on-site maintenance personnel to efficiently perform on-site confirmation work without being conscious of the work order.

[0095] 5, the confirmation work evaluation unit searches for the safety measures for confirmation work with high safety risks from the safety measures database 214 that associates the confirmation work with the safety measures for reducing the safety risks of the confirmation work, evaluates the effect of reducing the safety risks by the safety measures corresponding to the search results, and re-evaluates the feasibility of the confirmation work after the safety measures are implemented. This makes it possible to carry out on-site confirmation work based on the evaluation when the safety measures are implemented.

[0096] The confirmation work evaluation unit reduces the safety risk by performing at least one of the following safety measures: changing the execution order of the multiple confirmation works, moving the equipment operated in the confirmation work, and stopping the operation of equipment with a high safety risk or the control system including the equipment, thereby making it possible to reduce the safety risk based on these measures.

[0097] As described with reference to FIG. 7 etc., the system has a screen display unit 209 for displaying the confirmation work list including the priority order evaluated by the confirmation work evaluation unit, so that the on-site maintenance personnel can easily understand the confirmation work to be performed and the order in which to perform them.

[0098] 6 and the like, the monitoring input unit takes in data obtained in the confirmation work performed by the on-site maintenance personnel as confirmation data, and the failure analysis support system further uses the taken-in confirmation data to perform the processes of the cause estimation unit, the safety analysis unit, the confirmation work derivation unit, and the confirmation work evaluation unit, thereby investigating the true cause of the estimated cause. This makes it possible to investigate the true cause while analyzing the estimated cause, and to conduct an investigation for the investigation.

[0099] <About modified examples> The present invention is not limited to the above-described embodiment and includes various modifications. For example, the above-mentioned embodiments have been described in detail to clearly explain the present invention, and are not necessarily limited to those including all of the configurations described. Also, it is possible to replace a part of the configuration of one embodiment with the configuration of another embodiment. Also, it is possible to add the configuration of another embodiment to the configuration of one embodiment. Also, it is possible to add, delete, or replace a part of the configuration of each embodiment with another configuration.

[0100] Furthermore, the impact of the safety analysis unit on safety risks may not be limited to the work area, but may be evaluated for each piece of equipment used in the work or each type of work. [Explanation of symbols]

[0101] 10...on-site maintenance worker, 20...fault analysis support system, 30...automatic transport device, 40...automatic transport device, 50...robot arm, 60...conveyor equipment, 70...communication network, 80...information terminal equipment, 200...control system, 201...control device, 202...monitoring input section, 203...abnormality detection section, 204...cause estimation section, 205...safety analysis section, 206...confirmation work derivation section, 207...confirmation work evaluation section, 208...monitoring output section, 209...screen display section, 210...equipment monitoring log database, 211...abnormality cause database, 212...system abnormal operation database, 213...confirmation work database, 214...safety measures database, 801...CPU, 802...ROM, 803...RAM, 804...storage, 805...input device, 806...display device, 807...network interface

Claims

1. A fault analysis support system for supporting fault analysis of a control system consisting of one or more devices, a monitoring input unit that collects equipment monitoring data related to the operating state of the equipment and stores the data in an equipment monitoring log database; an abnormality detection unit that monitors the device monitoring data and detects an abnormality in the control system; an anomaly cause database that stores an anomaly of the control system and a cause that is inferred from the anomaly in association with each other, and a cause inferring unit that infers a cause of the anomaly based on the detected anomaly of the control system; a safety analysis unit that analyzes the impact on work safety to confirm the estimated cause, using a system abnormality operation database that stores, in association with each other, an abnormality in the control system, a common cause event having the estimated cause as a common cause, an operating state of the control system, and a safety impact indicating an impact on safety in a work area caused by the abnormality in the equipment; and a confirmation work derivation unit that uses the presumed cause and the common cause event to search for confirmation works corresponding to the presumed cause and the common cause event from a confirmation work database that stores confirmation works, which are a list of works for investigating whether the presumed cause is a true cause, in association with the work areas in which the confirmation works are performed, and derives the search result as a confirmation work list; a confirmation task evaluation unit that evaluates the safety of the confirmation tasks based on the analysis result of the impact on safety and the confirmation tasks included in the confirmation task list, and outputs the confirmation task list reflecting the evaluation result; A fault analysis support system comprising:

2. The confirmation task database stores a dependency relationship between the confirmation task and other confirmation tasks, the confirmation task evaluation unit examines dependencies between the confirmation tasks included in the confirmation task list, and evaluates the priority of a confirmation task that should precede the others in terms of the dependencies as high.

2. The fault analysis support system according to claim 1.

3. The confirmation work evaluation unit searches for the safety measures for confirmation work having a high safety risk from a safety measures database that associates the confirmation work with the safety measures for reducing the safety risk of the confirmation work, evaluates the effect of reducing the safety risk using the safety measures corresponding to the search results, and re-evaluates the feasibility of the confirmation work after the safety measures are implemented.

3. The fault analysis support system according to claim 2.

4. The confirmation work evaluation unit reduces the safety risk by performing at least one of the following as the safety measure: changing the execution order of the plurality of confirmation works, moving the equipment operated in the confirmation work, and stopping the operation of equipment with a high safety risk or the control system including the equipment.

4. The fault analysis support system according to claim 3.

5. a screen display unit that displays the confirmation task list including the priority order evaluated by the confirmation task evaluation unit; 3. The fault analysis support system according to claim 2, further comprising:

6. The monitoring input unit inputs data obtained in the confirmation work performed by a site maintenance worker as confirmation data, The failure analysis support system further uses the acquired confirmation data to perform the processes of the cause estimation unit, the safety analysis unit, the confirmation work derivation unit, and the confirmation work evaluation unit, thereby investigating the true cause of the estimated cause.

6. The fault analysis support system according to claim 5.

7. A fault analysis support method for supporting fault analysis of a control system consisting of one or more devices by a computer, comprising: Collecting equipment monitoring data relating to the operating status of the equipment and storing it in an equipment monitoring log database; Monitoring the equipment monitoring data to detect an abnormality in the control system; Inferring a cause based on an anomaly cause database that stores an anomaly in the control system in association with a cause inferred from the anomaly, and based on the detected anomaly in the control system; analyzing the impact on work safety to confirm the estimated cause using a system abnormality operation database that stores, in association with each other, the abnormality of the control system, a common cause event having the estimated cause as a common cause, the operating state of the control system, and a safety impact indicating the impact on safety in the work area caused by the abnormality of the equipment; using the estimated cause and the common cause event, searching for confirmation tasks corresponding to the estimated cause and the common cause event from a confirmation task database that stores confirmation tasks, which are a list of tasks for investigating whether the estimated cause is a true cause, in association with the work area in which the confirmation tasks are performed, and deriving the search result as a confirmation task list; evaluating the safety of the confirmation tasks based on the analysis result of the impact on safety and the confirmation tasks included in the confirmation task list, and outputting the confirmation task list reflecting the evaluation result; A fault analysis support system comprising:

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