Microcontroller
The microcontroller integrates SPAD diodes and optical fibers to generate high-entropy random numbers, addressing integration challenges and enhancing security in the automobile industry against piracy and hacker attacks.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- JP2024525245
- Authority / Receiving Office
- JP · JP
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2022-10-06
- Filing Date
- 2022-10-25
- Publication Date
- 2024-12-06
- Estimated Expiration
- 2042-10-25
AI Technical Summary
The automobile industry faces challenges in integrating true random number generators based on quantum processes due to low quantum yield and difficulty in integration, which are crucial for secure data encryption against piracy and hacker attacks, especially in autonomous systems.
A microcontroller with a quantum process-based true random number generator using SPAD diodes and optical fibers for photon processes, integrated into a semiconductor substrate with a processing circuit to generate random numbers through spontaneous and stimulated photon emissions, enhancing entropy and security.
The solution provides high-entropy random numbers suitable for post-quantum cryptography, improving security against piracy and hacker attacks by ensuring efficient and secure data encryption.
Smart Images

Figure 2024545392000001_ABST
Abstract
Description
[Technical field]
[0001] This PCT application claims priority to German Patent Application No. 102021128005.2 dated October 27, 2021, German Patent Application No. 102021130107.6 dated November 18, 2021, German Patent Application No. 102022110713.2 dated May 2, 2022, German Patent Application No. 102022125574.3 dated October 4, 2022, German Patent Application No. 102022125617.0 dated October 5, 2022 and German Patent Application No. 102022125768.1 dated October 6, 2022, the contents of which are incorporated by reference as constituting the subject matter of this application.
[0002] The invention relates in particular to a microcontroller equipped with at least one true random number generator (English: Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG)) based on a quantum process, in particular as a cryptographic random number generator. [Background technology]
[0003] The automotive industry and other related industries are increasingly exposed to a wide variety of piracy threats. Counterfeiters copy spare parts and products of the relevant industrial manufacturers, often using their brand names. Further risks include hacker attacks, such as the influence of data exchange in or with the products, for example during Car-to-Car or Car-to-X communication or during data communication within vehicle components, where protection against hacker attacks is particularly important, especially in autonomous systems and in their data communication with the outside world.
[0004] In such systems, the entropy properties of currently employed random number generators for data encryption are often insufficient. In the background art, true random number generators (English: Quantum Random Number Generators (QRNGs)) based on quantum processes are known, but they are difficult to integrate and have low quantum yields.
[0005] Details of the data signal processing unit with a microcontroller and a random number generator based on quantum processes are described, for example, in: [Prior art documents] [Patent documents]
[0006] [Patent Document 1] U.S. Patent No. 10802800 [Non-patent literature]
[0007] [Non-Patent Document 1] “Session key”, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, Edit status: October 1, 2020, URL: https: / / en.wikipedia.org / w / index.php?title=Session_key&oldid=981281879 [Accessed May 31, 2022] [Non-Patent Document 2] “Integrated circuit”, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, Editing status: October 12, 2021, URL: https: / / en.wikipedia.org / w / index.php?title=Integrated_circuit&oldid=1049603915 [Accessed May 31, 2022] [Non-Patent Document 3] “BIOS”, Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, Edit status: October 24, 2021, URL: https: / / en.wikipedia.org / w / index.php?title=BIOS&oldid=1051566527 [Accessed May 31, 2022] [Non-Patent Document 4] BURRI, S. et al., “SPADs for Quantum Random Number Generators and beyond”, 19th Asia South Pacific Design Automation Conference (ASP-DAC), 20-23 January 2014, Singapore, IEEE, p.788-794, DOI:10.1109 / ASPDAC.2014.6742986 [Non-Patent Document 5] Fabio Acerbi, Nicola Massari, Leonardo Gasparini, Alessandro Tomasi, Nicola Zorzi, Giorgio Fontana, Lorenzo Pavesi, Alberto Gola, “Structures and Methods for fully-integrated Quantum Random Number Generators”, IEEE Journal of selected topics in quantum electronics, Vol. 16, No. 3, May / June 2020 Summary of the Invention [Problem to be solved by the invention]
[0008] The present invention aims to provide an apparatus and method for generating truly random numbers based on optical quantum processes. [Means for solving the problem]
[0009] In order to achieve the above object, the present invention proposes a microcontroller for controlling an apparatus in a motor vehicle, the microcontroller comprising: A semiconductor substrate; A plurality of storage elements; At least one internal bus; At least a microcontroller core and one or more data interfaces; and a true random number generator based on at least one quantum process; the storage element is connected to the internal bus; the data interface is connected to the internal bus; a quantum process based generator connected to the internal bus; the microcontroller core is connected to the internal bus; said quantum process based generator generating random numbers specifically in response to requirements of said microcontroller core; said quantum process based generator providing said random numbers; the microcontroller core generates a key using a program from one or more of the storage elements and the random number; said microcontroller core using a program from one or more of said storage elements and said key to encrypt and decrypt data communicated internally or with external devices via said data interface; the semiconductor substrate integrally carrying the safety microcontroller subsystems described herein; the quantum process based generator having at least one first SPAD diode as a light source for the optical quantum signal; the quantum process based generator having at least one second SPAD diode as a photodetector for receiving the optical quantum signal; the quantum process based generator having at least one processing circuit; the quantum process based generator having at least one optical fiber for optically coupling the at least one first SPAD diode to the at least one second SPAD diode; the quantum-based generator having an operating circuit for providing electrical energy to the at least one first SPAD diode to generate light; The quantum-based generator has processing circuitry for detecting a signal of the at least one second SPAD diode, forming a random number from the signal of the at least one second SPAD diode, and providing the random number to the microcontroller core.
[0010] An essential feature of the microcontroller according to the invention is a generator based on quantum processes for truly random number generation (entropy source based on quantum processes). This generator is based on photonic processes and on a combination of stimulated and spontaneous photon emission in at least one second or receiving SPAD diode. This receiving SPAD diode is coupled via an optical fiber to at least one first or transmitting SPAD diode. Both SPAD diodes are operated in Geiger mode.
[0011] An innovative feature is the formation of an optical fiber as at least a part or portion of one or more dielectric layers constituting a metallization stack as an insulating layer, the metallization stack being formed on a semiconductor material on which the first and second SPAD diodes are integrated. Alternatively, the optical fiber may connect two semiconductor substrates on which at least one first SPAD diode and at least one second SPAD diode are respectively formed. However, the preferred embodiment of the microcontroller has a semiconductor substrate on which all the SPAD diodes are integrated and on whose surface the optical fiber is arranged.
[0012] Due to the spontaneous and stimulated photon emission of the second SPAD diode, the emission signal has very narrow pulses (hereinafter called spikes) of different heights. Thus, the emission signal has a first spike resulting from a single photon emission. If the spontaneous photon emission occurs simultaneously with the stimulated photon emission, a second spike occurs in the emission signal of the second SPAD diode, which is higher than the first spike. Since this combination of photon emissions is highly random and based on quantum processes, evaluating the time series of occurrence of the second spikes is suitable for generating truly random numbers therefrom.
[0013] In this regard, in a useful aspect of the present invention, the emission signal of the at least one second SPAD diode has a first spike and a second spike larger than the first spike, the first and second spikes are each larger than a predefinable reference value, the first spike is generated by spontaneous photon emission of the at least one second SPAD diode without simultaneous occurrence of stimulated photon emission of the at least one second SPAD diode, and the second spike is generated by simultaneous occurrence of spontaneous photon emission and photon emission of the at least one second SPAD diode stimulated by receiving a photon of the at least one first SPAD diode, and the processing circuitry of the quantum process based generator generates a first logic value or a second logic value as a bit for generating the random number by comparing a time interval of the second spike with a threshold value or by comparing time intervals of the second spikes with each other.
[0014] According to a variant of the present invention, the processing circuit generates the first logical value or the second logical value by comparing the time interval between two spikes with a threshold, and the processing circuit outputs the first logical value as a bit of the random number if the time interval is smaller than the threshold, and outputs the second logical value as a bit of the random number if the time interval is greater than the threshold, thereby generating the true random number.
[0015] According to a second variant of the generation of true random numbers, the processing circuit generates the first logical value or the second logical value by comparing the time intervals of the second spikes of different pairs of second spikes, and the processing circuit may output the first logical value as a bit for generating the random number if the time interval of the last-appearing second spike is smaller than, for example, the time interval between the penultimate second spike and the third-last second spike or the time interval between another pair of preceding second spikes, and output the second logical value as a bit for generating the random number if the time interval of the last-appearing second spike is larger than, for example, the time interval between the penultimate second spike and the third-last second spike or the time interval between another pair of preceding second spikes.
[0016] In both of the above-mentioned true random number generation variations, if an equality is detected in the comparison of the time interval with the threshold (Variation 1) or the comparison of the time intervals with each other (Mode 2), this result is discarded for use as a random number. Alternatively, the result of the comparison that is equal can be used, but in that case, it must be determined purely randomly as the first or second logical value.
[0017] For completeness, it is also allowed that a third spike, approximately three times as high as the first spike, occurs in the emission signal in the second or receiving SPAD diode. Such an event occurs when the photon emission stimulated by the reception of a photon in the first SPAD diode coincides with the spontaneous photon emission and the stimulated photon emission stimulated therein in the second SPAD diode. Advantageously, this "triple spike" is not used. In this regard, therefore, when examining the emission signal of each second SPAD diode, it is compared with a predetermined reference range that it should fall within so that it can be evaluated for the generation of truly random numbers.
[0018] In order to parallelize the generation of the individual bits of the true random number, it is advantageous to provide multiple pairs of a first SPAD diode and a second SPAD diode, in which case the emission signal of the second SPAD diode can be supplied to the processing circuitry, which uses the emission signal of each second SPAD diode to output another one of the bits for generating the random number.
[0019] To continuously generate the individual bits of a truly random number, a pair consisting of one first and one second SPAD diode is essentially sufficient, with the processing circuitry continuously outputting the logical values of the bits for generating said random number.
[0020] In another variation of the optical coupling of the first and second SPAD diodes, there is provided a single first SPAD diode and a number of second SPAD diodes optically coupled to the single SPAD diode, the emission signal of the second SPAD diode can be provided to the processing circuit, and the processing circuit may use the emission signal of each second SPAD diode to output another one of the bits for generating the random number.
[0021] In order to be able to detect functioning errors and to be able to generate random numbers even in the case of errors, an error detection unit and a pseudorandom number generator may advantageously be provided, in which if the error detection unit detects an error in the functioning of the components involved in the light quantum based process of the quantum process based generator or if it detects an error in its processing circuitry, the processing circuitry of the quantum based generator switches from outputting bits for random number generation using the emission signal of the at least one second SPAD diode to outputting bits for pseudorandom number generation generated by the pseudorandom number generator. Here, it may be useful if the error detection unit outputs an error signal when it detects an error, which is in particular representative of the type and / or cause of the error. It is advantageous for the error detection unit to detect not only the presence of an error, but also the type of error that has occurred. The reaction of the quantum based generator to such a result depends on the application and may mean, for example, that a self-test is performed. However, in the event of an error in the quantum based generator, it is preferable to switch to the pseudorandom number generator and generate pseudorandom numbers, for example, based on the last bit generated by the quantum based generator before the error is detected.
[0022] Sources of errors include the following: - Abnormalities in the supply voltage to individual components of the microcontroller Generation of false signals in the first and / or second SPAD diodes Anomalies in the optical fiber and / or when coupling the first SPAD diode and / or the second SPAD diode to the optical fiber. Circuit failures in the analog and / or digital components of the microcontroller and quantum random number generator The false entropy of the random numbers supplied by the test, as described, for example, in David Johnston, “Random Number Generators-Principles and Practices”, Chapters 8 and 9, 2018, Walter De Gruyter GmbH, Berlin / Boston, ISBN 978-1-5015-1530-2
[0023] Variations of the microcontroller with the error detection unit and pseudorandom number generator described above can also be realised using a microcontroller with another quantum-based generator than the one described above, for which separate protection is claimed for the subject matter of this aspect.
[0024] In a useful embodiment of the invention, the storage element may comprise one or more read-write memories RAM, one or more writable non-volatile memories (e.g., EEPROM memories, flash memories and / or one-time programmable (OTP) memories), one or more purely read-only memories and / or one or more non-volatile manufacturer memories (e.g., one or more manufacturer ROMs, one or more manufacturer EEPROMs and / or one or more manufacturer flash memories).
[0025] In a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the manufacturer ROM may include boot software.
[0026] In another preferred embodiment of the present invention, a manufacturer memory firewall may be provided between the manufacturer memory and the internal bus.
[0027] In a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the microcontroller comprises: Basic clock generator, A clock generation circuit, Reset circuit, a current supply or Vcc circuit with a voltage regulator providing said operating voltage; ground circuit, Input / Output Circuits and / or may include one or more processing modules; the processing module in communication with the internal bus; The processing module: CRC module (Cyclic Redundancy Check), A clock generation module, A module having a DES accelerator and / or an AES accelerator, one or more timer modules; Safety monitoring control circuit and The data interface may include one or more modules, specifically, a Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter.
[0028] In another useful embodiment of the invention, the semiconductor substrate having a surface; the semiconductor substrate having a semiconductor material below the surface; the surface of the semiconductor substrate having a metallization stack; the metallization stack comprises an electrically insulating layer disposed on the surface of the semiconductor substrate, typically a structured, optically transparent electrically insulating layer; At least a portion of the transparent electrically insulating layer constitutes the at least one optical fiber; the first SPAD diode emits photons from the semiconductor material of the semiconductor substrate into the optical fiber (50); The at least one optical fiber may carry such photons to the second SPAD diode.
[0029] In a preferred embodiment of the invention, the optical fiber may illuminate the second SPAD diode such that light re-enters the semiconductor material of the semiconductor substrate from within the optical fiber, where it reaches a device portion of the second SPAD diode.
[0030] In another preferred embodiment of the present invention, the at least one operating circuit at least temporarily supplies electrical energy to the at least one first SPAD diode; the at least one first SPAD diode, when supplied with sufficient electrical energy, provides photons to the at least one optical fiber; the at least one optical fiber conveys such photons to the second SPAD diode; The at least one optical fiber may emit such photons to the second SPAD diode.
[0031] In a useful embodiment of the present invention, the one data bus interface may be a wired automotive data bus interface, or one or more of the multiple data bus interfaces may be a wired automotive data bus interface.
[0032] In another useful embodiment of the present invention, the one or more wired automotive data bus interfaces include: CAN data bus interface, CAN-FD data bus interface, FlexRay data bus interface, PSI5 data bus interface, DSI3 data bus interface, LIN data bus interface, Ethernet data bus interface, LIN data bus interface and / or It may also be configured as a MELIBUS data bus interface.
[0033] In a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the one data bus interface may be a wireless data bus interface, or one or more of the multiple data interfaces may be wireless data bus interfaces.
[0034] In another useful embodiment of the invention, the one or more wireless data bus interfaces: WLAN interface, Mobile communication interface and / or It may also be configured as a Bluetooth interface.
[0035] In a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the one data bus interface may be a wired data bus interface, or one or more of the multiple data interfaces may be a wired data bus interface.
[0036] In another preferred embodiment of the present invention, the one or more wired data bus interfaces are: KNX data bus interface, EIB data bus interface, DALI® data bus interface and / or It may also be configured as a PROFIBUS data bus interface. Effect of the Invention
[0037] An important advantage of the present invention is that instead of using the semiconductor material in which the optically coupled SPAD diodes are integrated for the transport of photons, one or more dielectric layers near the surface of the semiconductor material, i.e. insulating layers of the metallization stack, are used for the transport. This significantly increases the "yield" of photons reaching the receiving SPAD diode. This means that more events can be observed in a shorter time at the receiving SPAD diode, which can be used to generate random numbers based on longer quantum processes in a very short time, or to generate many random numbers based on quantum processes in a very short time. This improves the effectiveness of the generation of random numbers based on quantum processes that are also secure against so-called post-quantum cryptography (PQC) or quantum-resistant cryptography.
[0038] The present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the drawings using various embodiments. [Brief description of the drawings]
[0039] [Figure 1]FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing an example of a safety microcontroller 1. [Diagram 2] 2 is a diagram showing an example of a flow of product protection using a first safety microcontroller (IC1) and a second safety microcontroller (IC2) according to the present invention. In this case, the first safety microcontroller (IC1) and the second safety microcontroller (IC2) exchange data that is encrypted using random numbers generated by a true random number generator 15, preferably based on one or more quantum processes. [Diagram 3] FIG. 3 shows how SPAD diodes are integrated into semiconductor material. [Figure 4] FIG. 4 illustrates the combination of a first SPAD diode with a second SPAD diode, both of which are integrated into a semiconductor material and optically coupled by an optical fiber disposed on the semiconductor material as part of a metallization stack, i.e., as part or a portion of an insulating layer of the metallization stack. [Diagram 5] FIG. 5 illustrates the combination of a first SPAD diode with a second SPAD diode, both of which are integrated into a semiconductor material and optically coupled by an optical fiber disposed on the semiconductor material as part of a metallization stack, i.e., as part or a portion of an insulating layer of the metallization stack. [Figure 6] FIG. 6 illustrates a quantum-based entropy source consisting of at least one transmitting SPAD diode and at least one receiving SPAD diode in combination with an optical fiber optically coupling them and having an evaluation operating circuit. [Figure 7] FIG. 7 is a diagram in which a monitoring circuit is added to a configuration similar to that of FIG. [Figure 8] FIG. 8 is a flow diagram illustrating a method for extracting entropy according to one embodiment of the present invention. [Figure 9]FIG. 9 shows a typical output signal of a receiving SPAD diode. [Figure 10] FIG. 10 is a schematic diagram illustrating the steps of a method for generating quantum random numbers using a photon-based process according to the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS
[0040] The drawings illustrate in simplified form the principal parts of the proposed apparatus and method. For purposes of illustration, a specific example constructed in accordance with the teachings of the invention will now be described with reference to the accompanying drawings.
[0041] The embodiments of the present invention in the following specification and drawings are merely examples and are not limited to the specific examples or elements described. Various examples can be derived by modifying, combining, or changing some elements. Furthermore, a person skilled in the art can derive examples or elements not described in words from the specification or drawings.
[0042] The integrated circuit according to the invention preferably comprises a secure microcontroller 1, i.e. a microcontroller for securely encrypting data. Figure 1 shows a block circuit diagram of an example of a secure microcontroller 1. The secure microcontroller 1 comprises, for example, a number of storage elements connected to an internal bus 2. The storage elements may comprise, for example, one or more read-write memories RAM 3, and / or one or more writable non-volatile memories, such as an EEPROM memory 4 and / or a Flash memory 4 and / or an OTP memory 4. The secure microcontroller 1 also preferably comprises one or more purely read-only non-volatile memories 5, such as a ROM. Furthermore, the secure microcontroller 1 preferably comprises one or more writable and / or non-writable non-volatile manufacturer memories 6, which generally contain reference data that are important for possible subsequent testing of the microcontroller or other electronic equipment. In the case of a non-writable manufacturer memory 6, the manufacturer memory 6 may be a manufacturer ROM. The manufacturer ROM 6 preferably comprises boot software. The secure microcontroller 1 comprises one or more cryptographic accelerators 7, such as for example a DES and / or AES accelerator 7 for accelerating cryptographic calculations and connected to the internal bus 2. At least one manufacturer memory firewall 8 is preferably provided between the manufacturer memory 6 and the internal bus 2. A microcontroller core 16 has access to these memories via the data bus 2. The secure microcontroller 1 comprises for example a processing module which communicates with the microcontroller core 16 via the internal bus 2.The processing module of the microcontroller 1 preferably comprises at least one of the following modules: a CRC module (Cyclic Redundancy Check) 11, a clock generation module 12, one or more timer modules 13, a safety monitoring control circuit 14, one or more true random number generators 15 (English: Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG)) based on quantum processes, an 8 / 16 / 32 / 64 bit microcontroller core 16, and one or more data interfaces 17, in particular one or more Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitters (UARTs) for supporting high speed continuous data. Other circuit components of the safety microcontroller 1 include, for example, one or more basic clock generation circuits 21 (CLK) and / or one or more clock generation modules 12, a reset circuit 22, a current supply or Vcc circuit 23 with a voltage regulator for providing the operating voltage, a ground circuit 24, and an input / output circuit 25.
[0043] The safety microcontroller 1 is preferably configured to be able to perform a secure authentication, so that in addition to the authentication code the safety microcontroller 1 stores further data such as e.g. one or more life and expiry data, and / or e.g. logistic data, and / or e.g. commercial data, and / or website and email addresses, and / or image data, as well as an instruction set for the vehicle control devices with which the microcontroller core 16 communicates via the data interface. The safety microcontroller 1 may also store further application data.
[0044] The first integrated circuit preferably comprises a secure microcontroller 1, for example configured to facilitate secure authentication of a product.
[0045] FIG. 2 shows an example of a method for making a circuit for a product with a secure microcontroller 1 according to the invention. The method comprises, for example, a step of writing a product ID into a second integrated circuit of the product (block 250). According to the present application, the second integrated circuit preferably comprises a second secure microcontroller 1. The method comprises, for example, a step of writing an authentication code corresponding to the product ID into the memory of the first integrated circuit of the first secure microcontroller 1 (block 211). According to the present application, the first integrated circuit of the product also preferably comprises a secure microcontroller 1. The method comprises, for example, a step of writing a different product ID and a different corresponding authentication code into the memory of each integrated circuit of each secure microcontroller 1. It is also possible to write a different product ID and a different corresponding authentication code into the memory of each integrated circuit of each secure microcontroller 1 for each product (block 221), so that each product has a unique product ID and a unique authentication code. The last-mentioned step gives, for example, one secure and unique authentication code per product.
[0046] Some features described herein allow, for example, secure authentication of a circuit or product while allowing for cost-effective and consistent production of the circuit or product. For example, the second integrated circuit is preferably configured to perform the secure authentication. In various examples, various host devices, such as automobiles, smartphones, web servers, any data processing device, etc., can authenticate the circuit or product. In one example, an interface is established between the host device and the circuit via a control computer of the automobile. In another example, a first integrated circuit of the circuit is configured to store additional data, such as product-related codes and product configuration information. The host device can access, modify or process such additional data, for example, only after a secure authentication has been performed via the first integrated circuit. The first integrated circuit is configured, for example, to provide or allow access to said additional data only after authentication. For example, little or no adjustments are required for the product when used in different automobile series.
[0047] The internal data bus 2 (see FIG. 1) can have multiple data buses 2 for multiple microcontroller cores 16, so that the various sub-devices of the safety microcontroller 1 can be accessed independently, time-shifted and / or overlapping or simultaneously. Typically, however, the safety microcontroller 1 only has one internal data bus 2 and one microcontroller core 16. The microcontroller core 16 is preferably an Advanced Risk Maschine (AMR) processor or the like. It is preferably an 8-bit or 16-bit or 32-bit or 64-bit microcontroller computer core.
[0048] The safe microcontroller 1 preferably comprises one or more read-write memories RAM3. Here, these may be, for example, static RAMs and / or magnetoresistive and / or ferroelectric memories. They may also be dynamic read-write memories such as DRAMs, which need to be periodically read and rewritten in a refresh cycle. To access this memory, the safe microcontroller 1 according to the invention may have an access logic which periodically performs refresh operations. However, DRAMs generally open up opportunities for attack and often have potential vulnerabilities. The read-write memories RAM3 are preferably accessible by the microcontroller core 16 using the internal data bus 2.
[0049] The secure microcontroller 1 preferably comprises one or more writable non-volatile memories 4, which the microcontroller core 16 preferably has access to by means of an internal data bus 2. The non-volatile memories may for example comprise an EEPROM memory 4 or a Flash memory 4 or an OTP memory 4, where OTP stands for "One Time Programmable" in English.
[0050] Possible attacks include, for example, erasing the non-volatile memory 4 by radiation, such as X-rays and / or ionizing radiation and / or heating of the memory cells. In response, the safety microcontroller 1 preferably comprises one or more safety monitoring control circuits 14 which monitor the data integrity of the memory cells of the erasable memory 4. At least two check bits are provided for a data word, preferably 8 bits long, i.e. for one byte of data word, and the memory cells preferably have a redundancy such that at least one check bit always has the content 1 and another check bit has the content 0. For example, the first check bit can be the parity bit of the byte and the second check bit can be the inverse bit of the parity bit. Now, if an attack, such as by ionizing radiation, occurs, the attack resets both check bits to the same value. The one or more safety monitoring control circuits 14 detect this deviation and block further access from the safety microcontroller 1.
[0051] Each bit of the memory of the safety microcontroller 1 is preferably designed double, whereby each logical data bit is realized as a pair of a first physical data bit with a first internal logic value and a second physical data bit with a second internal logic value, where the second internal logic value is typically the logical inverse of the first internal logic value. The one or more safety monitoring control circuits 14 preferably monitor that this is always the case. The one or more safety monitoring control circuits 14 detect deviations and preferably block, for example, the execution of further programs or specific program parts by the microcontroller core 16 and / or block access to data in case of deviations.
[0052] The safety microcontroller 1 preferably comprises one or more reset circuits 22 (see FIG. 1 ). The reset circuits 22 reset the safety microcontroller 1 and / or the sub-devices of the safety microcontroller 1 to a predefined state, respectively, upon predefined or configurable reset conditions and / or combinations and / or chronological sequences of such reset conditions. For example, these conditions may be signalling one or more safety supervisory control circuits 14. These conditions may also be changes in potential and / or values of the operating voltages of the safety microcontroller. Such conditions may also concern the integrity of the enclosure of the safety microcontroller 1.
[0053] The safety microcontroller 1 preferably comprises a detector for detecting the opening of the housing of the safety microcontroller 1. Here, it can be, for example, a wire surrounding or covering the safety microcontroller 1 or covering at least a part of the safety microcontroller 1 as a textile net or woven fabric. It can also be a wire network covering the safety microcontroller 1, dedicated to detecting attacks. For example, the safety microcontroller 1 can comprise a first input / output, whereby a current can be fed into such a wire and taken off again at a second input / output. If the current flow stops, an attack is indicated, which is detected by one or more safety monitoring control circuits 14 and which communicate this attack, for example to the microcontroller core 16 of the safety microcontroller 1 according to the invention. In case of such predicted damage to the integrity of the housing, for example, one or more of the one or more safety monitoring control circuits 14 may block write and / or read access to the memory contents of the memory of the safety microcontroller 1, or erase such contents, or set these contents to a predetermined value, or overwrite them with meaningless data, or process them in another way. The memory of the safety microcontroller 1 preferably comprises one or more purely read-only non-volatile memories 5, such as ROM. The ROM 6 of the safety microcontroller 1 preferably contains data and / or program instructions set by the designer.
[0054] The safety microcontroller 1 (see, for example, FIG. 1) preferably includes one or more writable and / or non-writable non-volatile manufacturer memories 6 in which a semiconductor manufacturer or other supplier can store manufacturing and security data, such as serial numbers. The semiconductor manufacturer preferably blocks access to the writable and / or non-writable non-volatile manufacturer memories 6 after final manufacturing testing. The writable and / or non-writable manufacturer memories 6 are preferably accessible using a manufacturer password. A dual key method is often effective. In such cases, a customer (downstream of the semiconductor manufacturer) stores a customer password in a customer block register that can also block access using a password. The semiconductor manufacturer preferably has access to all memory areas of the safety microcontroller 1 using only the customer password and the manufacturer password. The semiconductor manufacturer preferably provides an analysis password, which allows one or more of the one or more safety monitoring control circuits 14 to erase the customer contents, typically using a reset circuit 22, and make all memory areas of the safety microcontroller 1 accessible for error analysis. In the case of a non-writable manufacturer memory, the manufacturer memory 6 can be, for example, a manufacturer ROM, the content of which is set, for example, during manufacture of the semiconductor circuit of the secure microcontroller.
[0055] The secure microcontroller is typically arranged to receive and / or transmit data and / or program code portions and / or instructions encrypted by cryptographic methods stored in its memory and executed by the microcontroller core 16. Some of these methods require significant computational power. It has therefore been found useful for the microcontroller core 16 not to execute certain program portions of these cryptographic methods as sub-steps of the cryptographic methods, but for one or more special hardware accelerators 7 to execute said program portions on behalf of the microcontroller core 16, preferably accelerating them with specially synthesized hardware logic. For this purpose, the secure microcontroller 1 preferably comprises, for example, a DES accelerator for the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm and / or an AES accelerator 7 for the execution of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm. The microcontroller core 16 typically addresses said hardware accelerators 7 via an internal data bus 2. The microcontroller core 16 preferably comprises a redundant clock system, so that it is able to detect accesses to the clock system. One or more of the one or more safety monitoring control circuits 14 can monitor the consistency of the logical content of the preferably multiple redundant clock systems to detect attacks and errors. Access to the manufacturer memory by the microcontroller core 16 and the test logic of the safety microcontroller 1 is preferably prevented by one or more manufacturer memory firewalls 8, which can preferably be defeated by a manufacturer password as described above. To minimize the rate of successful attacks, the number of incorrect inputs is preferably very limited.
[0056] The safety microcontroller preferably comprises one or more CRC modules (Cyclic Redundancy Check) 11, which in case of a sending operation generate CRC data for continuous data communication, which is adopted in most data protocols, in order to detect erroneous data transmissions, and in case of a receiving operation make it possible to check the correct reception of a data message. The safety microcontroller 1 preferably comprises one or more clock generation modules 12 (English: Clock Driver, CLK) which generate one or more clocks for operating the circuits of the safety microcontroller. The one or more clock generation modules (English: Clock Driver, CLK) 12 preferably generate redundant clocks allowing to detect attacks on the clock system. The safety microcontroller 1 typically comprises one or more timer modules 13, which are necessary for example to detect timeouts. The safety microcontroller 1 preferably comprises one or more watchdog timers which monitor the execution of the various program parts. This watchdog timer can be part of one or more safety monitoring control circuits 14.
[0057] According to the invention (see, for example, FIG. 1), the secure microcontroller 1 comprises at least one quantum process based generator 15. Quantum based processes have the advantage that they are based on true randomness. In the 1970s, physicist Bell proved the theory of "hidden parameters" wrong, i.e. there is no hidden cause for the randomness of quantum mechanical events, such as the emission of photons. The microcontroller core 16 can be, for example, an 8-bit microcontroller core or a 16-bit microcontroller core or a 32-bit microcontroller core or a 64-bit microcontroller core or a 128-bit microcontroller core, etc. The secure microcontroller 1 can comprise one or more 8 / 16 / 32 / 64 / 128-bit microcontroller cores 16, which are preferably accessible to other sub-devices via one or more internal data buses 2. The secure microcontroller 1 preferably comprises one or more data interfaces 17, such as, for example, one or more Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitters (UARTs) for supporting continuous high-speed data. The safety microcontroller 1 preferably comprises one or more basic clock generators 21 (CLK), which preferably provide the basic clock 12 to one or more clock generation modules (English: Clock Driver, CLK), respectively. The basic clock generator 21 (CLK) is preferably an oscillator. The safety microcontroller 1 also preferably comprises one or more current supply or Vcc circuits 23 with a voltage regulator, which provide the operating voltage for the safety microcontroller 1. The safety microcontroller 1 also preferably comprises one or more ground circuits 24 (i.e. circuits inserted into the ground line or "grounded" circuits, in the simplest case a wire) with reverse polarity protection and protection circuits against manipulation of the potential of the semiconductor substrate, for example. It is useful, for example, if one or more of the ground circuits 24 have reverse polarity protection.For example, it may be useful for one or more of the ground circuits 24 and / or one or more of the current supply or Vcc circuits 23 to interact such that modulation of the power consumption and / or internal resistance and / or voltage drop across the supply voltage terminals of the safety microcontroller does not, at least temporarily, affect the operation and / or state of the safety microcontroller.
[0058] For controlling and / or communicating with and / or monitoring other devices, it is generally useful if the safety microcontroller comprises one or more input / output circuits 25, usually configured as digital inputs and / or digital outputs, preferably also tri-stated. The safety microcontroller 1 may comprise an analog-to-digital converter, so that the safety microcontroller 1 can monitor internal and external analog values, such as operating voltages. In some cases, the safety microcontroller 1 may be provided with a driver stage, for example, so as to be able to drive actuators. The actuators may be motors and / or other resistive and / or inductive and / or capacitive loads, etc. Such driver stages may be, for example, half-bridges and / or H-bridges, etc. It is also conceivable to provide a power supply for lighting, for example LEDs.
[0059] Thus, according to the invention (see for example FIG. 1 ), a safety microcontroller 1 for controlling devices in a motor vehicle is proposed, which comprises a semiconductor substrate. The safety microcontroller 1 is preferably made in CMOS or bipolar or BiCMOS circuit technology. The safety microcontroller preferably comprises a number of storage elements, one or more internal data buses 2, one or more 8 / 16 / 32 / 64 bit microcontroller cores 16, one or more data interfaces and one or more quantum process based generators 15. The quantum process based generators 15 differentiate the proposed safety microcontroller 1 from the background art, which are based on so-called true random number generators, which are “less random” due to the poor von Neumann entropy of the generated random numbers.
[0060] The internal data bus 2 may comprise several data buses. The storage elements of the secure microcontroller 1 are typically connected to the internal data bus 2. The data interfaces are also typically connected to the internal data bus 2. One or more quantum process based generators 15 are preferably also connected to the internal data bus 2. One or more microcontroller cores 16 are preferably also connected to the internal data bus 2. The one or more quantum process based generators 15 typically generate one or more random numbers on demand of the microcontroller cores 16. The random numbers are preferably superior in entropy, particularly with respect to the random numbers of true random number generators of the background art. Preferably, one or more of the microcontroller cores 16 generate one or more keys using a program from one or more of its storage elements and one or more of the generated random numbers. Typically, one or more microcontroller cores 16 use respective programs from one or more of their storage elements to encrypt and / or decrypt data that they typically communicate with devices external to the secure microcontroller via one or more data interfaces with respective ones of a number of keys. Typically, a semiconductor substrate carries substantially all sub-devices of the secure microcontroller 1 together.
[0061] In a first development of the safety microcontroller 1 (see FIG. 1 ), the storage elements of the safety microcontroller 1 comprise one or more read-write memories RAM 3, one or more writable non-volatile memories 4 (in particular an EEPROM memory 4, a flash memory 4 and / or an OTP memory 4), one or more purely read-only memories and / or one or more non-volatile manufacturer memories. The one or more manufacturer memories can comprise, for example, one or more manufacturer ROMs 6, one or more manufacturer EEPROMs and / or one or more manufacturer flash memories.
[0062] In a second development, the manufacturer memory, in particular the manufacturer ROM 6, comprises boot software for a secure start-up of the secure microcontroller.
[0063] In a third development (see FIG. 1), the secure microcontroller 1 is provided with a manufacturer memory firewall 8 between the manufacturer memory 6 and the internal bus 2, which prevents access to the manufacturer memory without authorization.
[0064] In a fourth development (see FIG. 1 ), the safety microcontroller 1 comprises one or more of the following components: a basic clock generator 21 (CLK), a clock generation circuit 12, a reset circuit 22, a current supply or Vcc circuit 23 with a voltage regulator for providing different operating voltages, a ground circuit 24, an input / output circuit 25 and one or more processing modules, where the processing modules communicate with an internal data bus 2 and also, typically, with a microcontroller core 16. The processing modules preferably comprise one or more of the following components (see FIG. 1 ): a CRC module (Cyclic Redundancy Check) 11, a clock generation module 12, a cryptographic accelerator, in particular a DES accelerator and / or an AES accelerator 7, one or more timer modules 13, one or more safety monitoring control circuits 14, one or more data interfaces, in particular one or more Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitters (UARTs) 17.
[0065] In a fourth development of the safety microcontroller 1 (see Fig. 4 and Fig. 5), the safety microcontroller 1 comprises at least one first SPAD diode 44 and at least one second SPAD diode 45, at least one optical fiber 50, at least one processing circuit and at least one operating circuit. The circuit-technical integration of the SPAD diodes (for example SPAD diode 44 or 45) is shown again in Fig. 3. In the fourth development according to Fig. 4, the generator based on quantum processes 15 (see Fig. 1) comprises at least a first SPAD diode 44 as a source of photon signals and a second SPAD diode 45 as a photodetector for photon signals. In this fourth development, the generator based on quantum processes 15 also comprises at least a processing circuit and an optical fiber 50. In this fourth development, the at least one optical fiber 50 optically couples the at least one first SPAD diode 44 to the at least one second SPAD diode 45. The operating circuit supplies electrical energy to the first SPAD diode 44 so that it emits photons. The emission of photons occurs when the bias voltage of the first SPAD diode 44 is sufficient. In this fourth development, the processing circuit detects the (output) signal of the second SPAD diode 45 and generates a random number therefrom.
[0066] 4, optical fiber 50 is comprised of a single electrically insulating layer disposed on surface 46 of the semiconductor substrate, whereas FIG. 5, for example, illustrates an embodiment in which optical fiber 50 is comprised of two optically transparent, electrically insulating insulating layers 34', 34".
[0067] The processing circuitry then preferably provides the random numbers so generated to one or more of the one or more microcontroller cores 16 via internal data bus 2 (FIG. 1). Aspects of this processing circuitry are described below in connection with FIGs. 6 to 9.
[0068] In a sixth development of the invention (see Fig. 4 and Fig. 5), the semiconductor substrate has a surface 46. The semiconductor substrate usually comprises a semiconductor material below said surface 46. In particular when using conventional manufacturing processes for semiconductor circuits such as CMOS, bipolar or BiCMOS processes, a metallization stack is usually provided on said surface 46, which consists of structured metal layers and an insulating layer electrically insulating said metal layers, at least one of said insulating layers 34 at least partially or sectionally constituting an optical fiber 50. Here, the structured metal layers usually constitute conductive paths which are electrically separated from each other by an insulating layer. The metallization stack thus comprises a structured, optically transparent and electrically insulating insulating layer 34, typically made of silicon oxide, which is provided on said surface 46 of the semiconductor substrate. At least a part of this insulating layer 34 on said surface 46 of the semiconductor substrate (i.e. a part of the insulating layer in the horizontal and / or vertical extension) preferably constitutes the optical fiber 50. Part of the metallization stack above the insulating layer 34 is shown diagrammatically in Figures 4 and 5. The first SPAD diode 44 typically emits light 47 from the semiconductor material of the semiconductor substrate into the optical fiber 50. In contrast to the background art, the first SPAD diode 44 typically emits upwards perpendicular to the surface 46, rather than laterally to the semiconductor substrate, where attenuation is higher. This allows the device to couple more photons of the first SPAD diode 44 directly to the second SPAD diode 45. The optical fiber 50 transports the photons 48 of the first SPAD diode 44 through the optical fiber 50 to the second SPAD diode 45 with almost no loss compared to the background art. The bottom surface of the metallization stack 43 then reflects the light (photons). The optical fiber 50 illuminates the photons 48 of the first SPAD diode 44 onto the second SPAD diode 45 such that light 49 from within the optical fiber 50 re-enters the semiconductor material of the semiconductor substrate at the surface 46, where it reaches the device portion of the second SPAD diode 44. The second SPAD diode 45 then generates an output signal in response to the illumination of the photons 48 (of the light 49), from which a random number is generated based on a quantum process as described below.
[0069] Typically, at least one operating circuit provides at least a temporary supply of electrical energy to at least one first SPAD diode 44. When the at least one first SPAD diode 44 is provided with sufficient electrical energy, it provides a photon 47 to at least one optical fiber 50, which then transports this photon 48. The at least one optical fiber 50 then irradiates the photon 48 as a photon 49 to the second SPAD diode 45, approximately "from above". This transport of photons from the first SPAD diode 44 to the second SPAD diode 45 has a very high quantum efficiency, since due to the low attenuation in the optical fiber 50, much fewer photons are lost than in the background art arrangements using highly absorbing semiconductor substrates. Therefore, in the arrangement shown here, a pair of one first SPAD diode 44 and one second SPAD diode 45 is sufficient (although, according to the invention, multiple pairs of SPAD diodes can also be used). In the background art, multiple SPAD diodes are always used on both the transmitting and receiving sides.
[0070] FIG. 5 shows two or more dielectric layers, namely optically transparent insulating layers 34′, 34″, in direct contact at least in some areas and not separated by a metallization layer in this area, forming an optical fiber 50′. In this embodiment, the contacts 51 and 52 of the SPAD diodes 44 and 45 are arranged in pairs, arranged on either side of the central area of the optical fiber 50′, so that the optical fiber, in the part of the insulating layers 34′, 34″ that are in contact with each other on the plane 53, conveys the photons 47 of the SPAD diode 44, as shown at 48, through both layers, not necessarily only the top layer of the two insulating layers 34′, 34″, until it reaches the SPAD diode 45 at 49. The contacts 51, 52 then advantageously also function as reflectors and “introduce” the photons to the SPAD diode 45. In this regard, the contacts 51, 52 of the SPAD diode 44 also function as reflectors and “divert” the photons 47 generated by the SPAD diode 44 in the direction of the SPAD diode 45.
[0071] In a further development of the safety microcontroller 1 according to the invention, at least one of the one or more data interfaces is a wired automotive data bus interface, which can in this case be, for example, a CAN data bus interface, a CAN-FD data bus interface, a FlexRay data bus interface, a PSI5 data bus interface, a DSI3 data bus interface, a LIN data bus interface, an Ethernet data bus interface, a LIN data bus interface or a MELIBUS data bus interface.
[0072] In a further development of the safe microcontroller 1 according to the invention, the at least one data interface is a wireless data bus interface, which can be, for example, a WLAN interface or a Bluetooth interface.
[0073] In a further development of the safe microcontroller 1 according to the invention, the at least one data interface is a wired data bus interface. The wireless data bus interface can be, for example, a KNX data bus interface, an EIB data bus interface, a DALI data bus interface or a PROFIBUS data bus interface.
[0074] Figure 6 shows a simplified block diagram of a quantum-based random number generator QRNG 400 according to one embodiment of the present invention. The digital circuits of the device illustrated in Figure 6 are preferably clocked by a common clock. The arrangement includes an entropy source 401 based on a quantum process, a preferably broadband high frequency amplifier 402, an analog-to-digital converter 403 with, for example, 14-bit resolution and a sampling rate of, for example, 125 MS / s, and a field programmable gate array (FPGA) 404.
[0075] The entropy source 401 comprises a 2D array of single photon avalanche diodes (SPADs) 401.1 and 401.3. These SPAD diodes are operated in Geiger mode with a supply voltage exceeding their breakdown voltage. A quenching resistor 401.4 is connected in series with each SPAD diode. The quenching resistor 401.4 prevents thermal destruction of the diodes in the event of a charge avalanche. The current signal of the SPAD diodes is measured via a shunt resistor, which can be the quenching resistor or an additional resistor. The array of SPAD diodes comprises, for example, four (active or transmitting) SPAD diodes 401.1 and twelve (passive or receiving) SPAD diodes 401.3 in the example of FIG. 6, which are connected to the SPAD diodes 401.1 via the optical fiber 401.2 as previously described for the optical fiber 50 in FIG. 4 and FIG. 5. The active SPAD diode 401.1 emits light. It corresponds to the first SPAD diode 44 in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5. The active SPAD 401.1 is preferably arranged in an array of SPAD diodes. The proposed arrangement operates the active SPAD diode 401.1 well above its breakdown voltage by providing it with a high supply voltage. This increases the dark count rate and thus the number of spontaneously emitted photons 47. The optical fiber 401.2 carries some of these photons as photons 48 to the passive SPAD diode 401.3. The optical fiber 401.2 corresponds for example to the optical fiber 50 in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5. Each passive SPAD diode 401.3 corresponds for example to the second SPAD diode 45 in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5. The proposed arrangement provides a high supply voltage to the passive SPAD diode 401.3, operating it just above its breakdown voltage, which is preferably arranged in a ring around the active SPAD diode 401.2.The passive SPAD diode 401.3 detects photons arriving via the optical fiber 401.2 and generates a voltage signal in response to the arriving photons, for example by causing a current to flow through a shunt resistor.
[0076] The voltage signal 405 of the entropy source 401 is preferably provided to a high frequency amplifier 402, e.g., 40 dB broadband. The high frequency amplifier 402 preferably has a bandwidth of 30 to 4000 MHz and a 1 dB compression point of 20 dBm. The voltage amplitude of the voltage signal 405 of the entropy source 401 typically varies in the sub-millivolt range. The high frequency amplifier 402 amplifies the voltage amplitude of the voltage signal 405 of the entropy source 401 to, e.g., 50 to 150 mV.
[0077] The amplifier output signal 406 of the high frequency amplifier 402 is converted from analog to digital by the ADC 403 and then transmitted to, for example, an FPGA 404. Of course, other discrete or ASIC-based approaches are also possible. In this regard, the FPGA is only one of many different approaches to realize the technical teachings presented in this embodiment. The FPGA 404 preferably comprises a microcontroller. For example, the FPGA 404 may be a Zynq7010 with a Dual-Core Arm Cortex-A9 MPCore from Xilinx. This is part of the SPAD evaluation circuit of this embodiment, which further comprises, in the example of Figs. 4 and 5, an ADC 403, for example, of 14 bits, having a sampling rate of, for example, 125 megasamples / s and a bandwidth of, for example, 50 MHz. The amplified voltage signal is provided to the input of the high frequency amplifier 402 as the amplifier output signal 406. The ADC 403 samples the amplifier output signal 406 of the high frequency amplifier 402. The ADC 403 transmits, for example, a calculated sample value of the amplifier output signal 406 of the high frequency amplifier 402 to an internal FPGA 404 of the measurement board as a digital value with a bit width of, for example, 14 bits.
[0078] The device, shown simplified as a block circuit diagram in FIG. 6, includes a comparator 404.2, a time to digital converter (TDC) 404.3, an entropy extractor 404.4 and a state machine 404.8.
[0079] The comparator 404.2 compares, for example, the digital 14-bit value 407 of the ADC 403 with a reference value 404.1, which is a threshold value, and if the value of the output of the ADC 403 is greater than the reference value 404.1, a 1-bit output pulse of length 2 clocks is obtained as the output signal 409 of the comparator 404.2. The output signal 409 of the comparator 404.2 is fed to a time-to-digital converter 404.3. The time-to-digital converter 404.3 preferably has a 32-bit counter, which is increased for example in accordance with the SPAD evaluation circuit. The bit width of the counter may vary depending on the application. This clock may have a frequency of, for example, 125 MHz. The 1-bit output signal of the comparator 404.2 preferably resets the measured value of this counter. The time-to-digital converter 404.3 transmits the measured value at this time, i.e. the measured value just before the reset, to its output 410. The counting result has a resolution of, for example, 1 / 125 MHz = 8 nanoseconds at a clock of 125 MHz. The output 410 of the time-to-digital converter (TDC) 404.3 conveys the counting result (also called raw data RD), for example 32 bits, of the time-to-digital converter 404.3 to the entropy extractor 404.4. The entropy extractor 404.4 converts the raw data RD of the signal at the output 410 of the time-to-digital converter (TDC) 404.3, which is random in its composition and sequence, into a 1-bit random number RN411 at the output of the entropy extractor 404.4. The output 411 of the entropy extractor 404.4 is connected to the input of the finite automaton (FSM) 404.8.
[0080] The FSM 404.8 is responsible for receiving data from the entropy extractor 404.4 and generating a QRNG random number therefrom, which the FSM 404.8 stores in the memory RAM 404.9 of the FPGA 404. If the write operation is successful, the FSM 404.8 sets a finish flag 404.10. The finish flag 404.10 is not set at system startup. The microcontroller 404.11 is, for example, a Dual-Core Arm Cortex-A9 MPCore, which accesses the blocks of RAM 404.9 and reads the random number from RAM 404.9. Thus, the microcontroller 404.11 is, for example, a microcontroller core according to the present invention.
[0081] FIG. 7 shows an example of an extended FPGA design with the capability to monitor the signal used for the random number RN at the output 411 of the entropy extractor 404.4 and an additional back-up system in case of potential errors during the generation of the random number based on the QRNG.
[0082] The device according to Fig. 7 is extended with respect to an additional watchdog 404.5, a linear feedback shift register 404.6, which is an example of a PRN generator, a signal multiplexer 404.7 and a voltage motor 413. The microcontroller 404.11 together with these components can also be provided externally.
[0083] Here, the output 411 of the entropy extractor 404.4 is connected to a watchdog 404.5 and a signal multiplexer 404.7. The watchdog 404.5 monitors the validity of the 1-bit random number RN at the output 411 of the entropy extractor 404.4. The watchdog 404.5 detects at least three defined error cases. To do so, the watchdog 404.5 provides, for example, the last valid random number as a seed S output signal 412 to the linear feedback shift register 404.6. When an error occurs, the watchdog sets an error bit in an error register ER (not shown) of the microcontroller 404.11. Which error bit the watchdog 404.5 sets in the error register of the microcontroller 404.11 preferably depends on the type of error case. The watchdog 404.5 is also connected to a voltage monitor 413 via one or more input / output signal lines 414, which are preferably digital.
[0084] Voltage monitor 413 monitors, for example, the operating voltage of entropy source 401. If the operating voltage of one of the circuits of SPAD diodes 401.1 and 401.3 becomes too low, thus falling below a lower SPAD operating voltage threshold, or too high, thus exceeding an upper SPAD operating voltage threshold, voltage monitor 413 detects this voltage deviation. If such a voltage deviation occurs, voltage monitor 413 communicates this to watchdog 404.5 or directly to microcontroller 404.11. If communicating to watchdog 404.5, watchdog 404.5 can generate, for example, an interrupt signal for microcontroller 404.11. For example, watchdog 404.5 can generate such an interrupt to microcontroller 404.11 or to another sub-device of the application system if the supply voltage of entropy source 401, high frequency amplifier 402, or another device part of quantum random number generator QRNG 400 contains an error.
[0085] If the watchdog 404.5 detects an error, the quantum random number generator 400 switches to a fail-safe state, so that the watchdog 404.5 sets the selection signal 416 of the signal multiplexer 404.7, which in turn provides the pseudorandom number PRN generated by the linear feedback shift register 404.6 in the form of a stream of pseudorandom bits to the input of the FSM 404.8 via the pseudorandom signal line 417, instead of the output 411 of the entropy extractor 404.4, as a replacement for the potentially erroneous 1-bit random number RN at the output 411 of the entropy extractor 404.4.
[0086] The linear feedback shift register 404.6 is connected to the output 412 of the watchdog 404.5 and obtains the seed S output signal 412 from the watchdog 404.5. The watchdog 404.5 activates the linear feedback shift register 404.6 (see connection 418) in an error case. The linear feedback shift register 404.6 then generates the pseudorandom number PRN. The seed S of the watchdog output signal 412 preferably contains, for example, 16 previous valid random numbers (for example, 1 bit each). The watchdog 404.5 preferably provides these previous valid random numbers to the input of the linear feedback shift register 404.6. Thus, the seed S serves as a random and secure PQC starting value for the generator polynomial of the feedback of the linear feedback shift register 404.6 to generate the pseudorandom number PRN for the pseudorandom number signal line 417. In this case, the generator polynomial and the degree of the generator polynomial can preferably be freely selected.
[0087] The signal at the output 411 of the entropy extractor 404.4, which contains the 1-bit random number RN of the entropy extractor 404.4, and the signal at the pseudorandom signal line 417, which contains the pseudorandom number PRN of the linear feedback shift register 404.6, are each connected to an input of a signal multiplexer 404.7. The signal multiplexer 404.7 transfers one of its two input signals to the FSM 404.8 depending on the value SEL of the selection signal 416. In some applications it is conceivable to use a multiplexer with more than two inputs and more complex control signals. Therefore, the number of inputs of the signal multiplexer 404.7 is usually more than two.
[0088] The FSM 404.8 also receives the random data RN or pseudorandom numbers PRN from the output of the signal multiplexer 404.7 and writes them to the memory RAM 404.9 of the FPGA 404. If the write operation is successful, the FSM 404.8 again sets the finish flag 404.10. The microcontroller 404.11 can then access the memory 404.9 RAM to read the random numbers and use them for e.g. encryption, authentication, signing, etc.
[0089] FIG. 8 shows a flow diagram 500 of an entropy extraction method implemented, for example, by the entropy extractor 404.4 of the QRNG 400 of FIGS. 6 and 7. The method begins with a first step 501 in which two values of the output 410 of the time-to-digital converter 404.3 are determined and stored in the shift register of the entropy extractor 404.4. Once the two values have been stored in the shift register of the entropy extractor 404.4, in a second step 502 the entropy extractor 404.4 compares the two values. Thus, the two values in the shift register of the entropy extractor 404.4 comprise a first value and a second value, both determined by the time-to-digital converter 404 using two different measurements of the respective times between two signal pulses exceeding the reference value 404.1. In a third step 503 the entropy extractor 404.4 determines the two values. If the first value is less than the second value and the difference between Value 1 and Value 2 is greater than the minimum difference ε, entropy extractor 404.4 sets the value of its output 411 to a first logical value. If the first value is greater than the second value and the difference between the first value and the second value is greater than the minimum difference ε, entropy extractor 404.4 sets its output to a second logical value different from the first logical value.
[0090] If the difference between the first and second values is less than the minimum difference ε, the entropy extraction discards the first and second values. In such a case, the entropy extraction method preferably causes the watchdog (in the device of FIG. 7) to increase the error counter by a first error counter increment. The first error counter increment may be negative. Conversely, if the difference between the first and second values is greater than the minimum difference ε, the entropy extraction device 404.4 may decrease the error counter of the watchdog by a second error counter increment. The second error counter increment may be equal to the first error counter increment. Typically, the first error counter increment and the second error counter increment have the same sign. The microcontroller 404.11 is preferably able to set the error counter increment, the start value of the error counter and the error counter threshold. If the count value of the error counter exceeds the error counter threshold, the watchdog 404.5 preferably signals the presence of a critical error condition to the microcontroller by an interrupt or another signaling. The microcontroller 404.11 then typically starts a self-test program to check the various parts of the quantum random number generator 400 according to FIG. 7. For this purpose, the microcontroller can, for example, put the analog-to-digital converter 403 in a state in which the microcontroller 404.11 can write a test value to the output register of the analog-to-digital converter, and the subsequent signal chain preferably processes this test value as if it were a real sample value. Since the test value is known, the correct reaction of the remaining system, for example the increment of the error counter in the watchdog 404.5, can be monitored and determined by the microcontroller 404.11. For this purpose, the microcontroller 404.11 can preferably monitor and read the logic state of all possible memory nodes of the FPGA 404.
[0091] When a value is smaller than the minimum value, which is within the dead time of the SPAD diode, such a value is preferably discarded and the error counter is increased by the first error increment. The entropy extractor 404.4 then waits until the next value is calculated by the time to digital converter 404.3.
[0092] Once the random bits have been so extracted, the method starts from the beginning.
[0093] If the error counter exceeds or reaches the error counter threshold, an error may have occurred, for example, the time to digital converter is providing a constant.
[0094] Thus, the device can detect failures in the voltage supply of the entropy source or other parts of the device. For testing purposes, the microcontroller 404.11 can also monitor the ADC 403, record the voltage and current in the quantum random number generator 400 and compare the values thus determined with the expected ranges in which these values should fall. The microcontroller 404.11 can also record the digital values in the quantum random number generator 400. For example, for testing purposes, the microcontroller 404.11 can set the reference value 404.1 so low that the time-to-digital converter 404.3 is substantially controlled by the signal noise at its input. The value of the time-to-digital converter 404.3 should then meet the expected statistics in the tolerance band. If not, an error is present.
[0095] The watchdog 404.5 can monitor the entropy of the random numbers provided. If the average entropy of the bits deviates by more than a tolerable entropy deviation over the entropy measurement time, for example 50%, the watchdog determines an error and increments an error counter. The watchdog then preferably stops the use of random bits at the output 411 of the entropy extractor 404.4 to prevent the transmission of plain text. "Plain text" refers to information that is poorly encrypted so that it can be understood by a third party by statistical methods or directly. That is, even in a working sub-device, it is conceivable that a logical "eternal 1" or a logical "eternal 0" can be generated by chance. It is therefore useful to limit the maximum length of the bit string at the output of the entropy extractor to a value programmable by the microcontroller 404.11.
[0096] In this manner, essentially, the quantum random number generator 400 described above can detect the following errors and catch them at a lower safety level by fail-safe using a linear feedback shift register 404.6 or another PRN generator: - Supply voltage abnormality False signal generation by SPAD diodes 401.1 and 401.3 A malfunction in the optical fiber 401.2 and / or a malfunction in the connection of the SPAD diodes 401.1 and 401.3 to the optical fiber 401.2 Circuit failure in the FPGA 404, i.e., the digital components of the quantum random number generator 400 - The false entropy of the random numbers supplied that may result from testing a 1-bit random number RN, as described, for example, in David Johnston, “Random Number Generators-Principles and Practices”, Chapters 8 and 9, 2018, Walter De Gruyter GmbH, Berlin / Boston, ISBN 978-1-5015-1530-2
[0097] It is conceivable to employ a second complete quantum random number generator 400 in place of the linear feedback shift register 404.6 and use the signal at the output of its entropy extractor 404.4 as a fail-safe instead of the signal on the pseudorandom signal line 417.
[0098] FIG. 9 shows an example of an oscillogram of the voltage signal 405 at the output of the entropy source 401. As can be seen from the figure, a first spike having a first height class 601 and a second spike having a second height class 602 are generated. The variance of the first height class 601 of the first spike and the variance of the second height class of the second spike are small, respectively, so that the two height classes 601, 602 can be clearly separated by the cut level 603. The cut level 603 corresponds to the value set by the microcontroller 404.11 as the reference value 404.1. For the generation of the spike (second spike) caused by the simultaneous occurrence of spontaneous photon emission and stimulated photon emission of the second SPAD diode or one of the plurality of second SPAD diodes and the spike (first spike) caused only by the spontaneous photon emission of the second SPAD diode or one of the plurality of second SPAD diodes, please refer to the description of the above test.
[0099] 10 is a schematic diagram of a proposed quantum random number generation method 3700. The method 3700 begins with step 3710 of generating a random single-photon current (47, 48, 49, 401.2) using one or more first SPAD diodes (401.1, 44). The method 3700 continues with step 3720 of sending the random single-photon current (47, 48, 49, 401.2) to one or more second SPAD diodes (401.3, 45) using an optical fiber (44, 401.2) different from the semiconductor substrate (49, 48). Then, a step 3730 is performed of converting the random single photon current (47, 48, 49, 401.2) into a detection signal, preferably in the form of a voltage signal 405 of an entropy source 401 having a first SPAD diode 401.1, an optical fiber 401.2 and a second SPAD diode 401.3. Then, a step 3740 is performed of conditioning, in particular amplifying, filtering and / or analog-to-digital converting, the detection signal into a conditioned detection signal, in particular a 14-bit digital value 407 in an analog-to-digital converter 403. Then, a step 3750 is performed of separating the conditioned detection signal pulses generated by the combined emission of the first SPAD diode 401.1 and the second SPAD diode 401.3 from the conditioned detection signal pulses generated by only spontaneous emission, in particular by comparing the conditioned detection signal with a threshold value in a comparator (see 404.2 in Figs. 6 and 7) and generating a corresponding output signal 409 of the comparator 404.2. Then, step 3760 follows, in particular to calculate a first value of the output 410 of the time-to-digital converter 404.3 and a second value of the output 410 of the time-to-digital converter 404.3, calculating a first time interval between a first pulse and a second pulse of a first pair of two successive photons generated by the combination of the spontaneous photon emission of the first SPAD diode 401.1 with the stimulated photon emission of the second SPAD diode 401.3, and calculating a second time interval between a third pulse and a fourth pulse of a second pair of two successive adjusted detection signal pulses generated by the combination of the same type of emission of the first SPAD diode 401.1 and the second SPAD diode 401.3.Then, based on this, a step 3670 is performed to calculate the bit value of the random bit by comparing the value of the first time interval with the value of the second time interval. In the final step 3680, it is verified whether the calculated number of random bits n is smaller than the number of random bits m of the desired quantum random number. If not, the above steps are repeated. Otherwise, the quantum random number generation process is completed.
[0100] <Advantages> The secure microcontroller described herein has improved entropy in at least one of its random number generators, which makes the encryption obtained using the microcontroller more efficient and quantum-safe compared to the background art, although the advantages of the invention are not limited thereto.
[0101] The above description is not intended to be complete and is not limited to the examples shown. Various modifications of the examples described herein can be understood and implemented by those of ordinary skill in the art using the drawings, the specification and the claims. The singular indefinite article "ein" or "eine" and its conjugations do not exclude a plurality, and the recitation of a specific number of elements does not exclude the possibility that more or fewer elements may be present. A single unit may fulfill the function of multiple elements described herein, and conversely, multiple elements may fulfill the function of one unit. Many alternatives, equivalents, modifications and combinations are possible without departing from the scope of the present application.
[0102] Unless otherwise specified, all features of the present invention can be freely combined. This is true throughout the present application. Features shown in the drawings can also be freely combined with other features as features of the present invention, unless otherwise specified. In this case, it is not explicitly intended to limit the combination of each feature of an embodiment with other features of the embodiment. In addition, material features of an apparatus can be read as method features and used, and method features can be read as material features of an apparatus. Therefore, such readings are automatically disclosed.
[0103] In the above detailed description, reference is made to the accompanying drawings. The examples in the specification and drawings are merely examples and are not limited to the specific examples or elements described. Various examples can be derived from the above specification, drawings and / or claims by changing, combining or modifying some elements. Furthermore, a person skilled in the art can derive examples or elements not described in the text from the specification and / or drawings.
[0104] The present invention has been described above using a microcontroller for automobiles. However, based on the present disclosure, it will be obvious to those skilled in the art that the application is not limited to the patent application from which priority is derived, nor to this international application. Rather, the microcontroller according to the present invention can be employed in any device involved in PQC secure encryption and / or PQR signing of data, and editing and processing of data related to security. PQR encryption can be preferably achieved by any of the following methods:
[0105] BIKE1-L1-CPA, BIKE1-L3-CPA, BIKE1-L1-FO, BIKE1-L3-FO, Kyber512, Kyber768, Kyber1024, Kyber512-90s, K yber768-90s, Kyber1024-90s, LEDAcryptKEM-LT12, LEDAcrypt-KEM-LT32, LEDAcryptKEM-LT52, NewHope-512- CCA, NewHope-1024-CCA, NTRU-HPS-2048-509, NTRU-HPS-2048-677, NTRU-HPS-4096-821, NTRU-HRSS-701, Lig htSaber-KEM, Saber-KEM, FireSaber-KEM, BabyBear, BabyBearEphem, MamaBear, MamaBearEphem, PapaBear, Pa paBearEphem, FrodoKEM-640-AES, FrodoKEM-640-SHAKE, FrodoKEM-976-AES, FrodoKEM-976-SHAKE, FrodoKEM -1344-AES, FrodoKEM-1344-SHAKE, SIDH-p434, SIDH-p503, SIDH-p610, SIDH-p751, SIDH-p434-compressed, SI DH-p503-compressed, SIDH-p610-compressed, SIDH-p751-compressed, SIKE-p434, SIKE-p503, SIKE-p610', SIKE-p751, SIKE-p434-compressed, SIKE-p503-compressed, SIKE-p610-compressed, SIKE-p751-compressed.
[0106] The PQR signature can preferably be achieved in one of the following ways:
[0107] DILITHIUM_2、DILITHIUM_3、DILITHIUM_4、MQDSS-31-48、MQDSS-31-64、SPHINCS+-Haraka-128f-robust、SPHINCS+-Haraka-128f-simple、SPHINCS+-Haraka-128s-robust、SPHINCS+-Haraka-128s-simple、SPHINCS+-Haraka-192f-robust、SPHINCS+-Haraka-192f-simple、SPHINCS+-Haraka-192s-robust、SPHINCS+-Haraka-192s-simple、SPHINCS+-Haraka-256f-robust、SPHINCS+-Haraka-256f-simple、SPHINCS+-Haraka-256s-robust、SPHINCS+-Haraka-256s-simple、SPHINCS+-SHA256-128f-robust、SPHINCS+-SHA256-128f-simple、SPHINCS+-SHA256-128s-robust、SPHINCS+-SHA256-128s-simple、SPHINCS+-SHA256-192f-robust、SPHINCS+-SHA256-192f-simple、SPHINCS+-SHA256-192s-robust、SPHINCS+-SHA256-192s-simple、SPHINCS+-SHA256-256f-robust、SPHINCS+-SHA256-256f-simple、SPHINCS+-SHA256-256s-robust、SPHINCS+-SHA256-256s-simple、SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-128f-robust、SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-128f-simple、SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-128s-robust、SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-128s-simple、SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-192f-robust、SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-192f-simple、SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-192s-robust、SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-192s-simple、SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-256f-robust, SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-256f-simple, SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-256s-robust, SPHINCS+-SHAKE256-256s-simple, picnic_L1_F S,picnic_L1_UR,picnic_L3_FS,picnic_L3_UR,picnic_L5_FS,picnic_L5_UR,picnic2_L1_FS,picnic2_L3_FS,picnic2_L5_FS,qTesla-pI,qTesla-p-III. ,
[0108] For example, the concept of the invention can be used to generate addresses in a communication bus system where devices are automatically addressed by the bus master, either in the bus master or in each device to be addressed. Thus, the invention can be used outside of cryptography to generate PQC secure codes. PQC stands for "Post-Quantum Cryptography" and refers to a sub-field of cryptography, specifically quantum-safe cryptography, which deals with cryptographic primitives that, unlike many asymmetric cryptosystems currently in use, are virtually undecryptable even using quantum computers (see Wikipedia definition). Different codes can also be used to better distinguish signals sent from essentially any designed system, and to separate these signals from each other and from adjacent systems that may interfere with them signal-wise. For example, when devising an ultrasonic measurement device in the automotive field, it can be useful to be able to distinguish the individual received signals with respect to their origin, i.e. the source that emits them.
[0109] <Features of the invention> The following list of inventions summarizes the features of the invention and its developments once again. In the application of technical doctrine, features can be combined, unless such combination leads to a factual contradiction. In this respect, the dependencies and reference numbers given herein are merely illustrative of particularly preferred embodiments.
[0110] 1) A safety microcontroller 1 for controlling devices in a motor vehicle, A semiconductor substrate; A plurality of memory elements; At least one internal bus 2; At least one 8 / 16 / 32 / 64 bit microcontroller core 16 and one or more data interfaces; At least one quantum process based generator 15; The storage element is connected to the internal bus 2, the data interface is connected to the internal bus 2; a quantum process based generator 15 connected to the internal bus 2; The microcontroller core 16 is connected to the internal bus 2; The quantum process based generator 15 generates random numbers on demand of the microcontroller core 16, the microcontroller core 16 generates a key using a program from one or more of the storage elements and the random number; the microcontroller core 16 uses the program from one or more of the storage elements and the key to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted to and from devices external to the secure microcontroller via the data interface; the semiconductor substrate integrally includes the subsystem of the safety microcontroller 1; A secure microcontroller, the sub-devices of which include the storage element, the internal bus, the at least one 8 / 16 / 32 / 64 bit microcontroller core, the data interface and the quantum process based generator.
[0111] 2) A safety microcontroller 1 according to item 1), wherein the storage elements comprise one or more read-write memories RAM 3, one or more writable non-volatile memories (specifically, an EEPROM memory 4, a flash memory 4 and / or an OTP memory 4), one or more purely read-only memories and / or one or more non-volatile manufacturer memories (specifically, one or more manufacturer ROMs 6, one or more manufacturer EEPROMs and / or one or more manufacturer flash memories).
[0112] 3) The safety microcontroller 1 according to item 2), wherein said manufacturer ROM 6 has boot software.
[0113] 4) The safety microcontroller 1 according to item 2) or 3), comprising a manufacturer memory firewall 8 between the manufacturer memory 6 and the internal bus 2.
[0114] 5) Basic clock generator 21 (CLK), A clock generating circuit 12, Reset circuit 22, A current supply or Vcc circuit with a voltage regulator to provide the operating voltage; ground circuit 24, Input / output circuit 25 and / or one or more components of one or more processing modules; The processing module communicates with the internal bus 2; The processing module: CRC module (Cyclic Redundancy Check) 11, Clock generation module 12, A module having a DES accelerator and / or an AES accelerator 7, one or more timer modules 13, A safety monitoring control circuit 14, The safety microcontroller 1 according to one or more of items 1) to 4) has one or more modules of a data interface, in particular a Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter (UART) 17.
[0115] 6) at least one first SPAD diode 44; and at least one second SPAD diode 45; At least one optical fiber 50; at least one processing circuit; at least one operating circuit; said quantum process based generator 15 having at least said first SPAD diode 44 as a light source for a light quantum signal; said quantum process based generator 15 having at least said second SPAD diode 45 as a photodetector for the optical quantum signal; said quantum process based generator 15 having at least said processing circuitry; said quantum process based generator 15 comprising at least said optical fiber; the at least one optical fiber 50 optically couples the at least one first SPAD diode 44 to the at least one second SPAD diode 45; the operating circuit provides electrical energy to the first SPAD diode 44 such that the first SPAD diode emits light 44; A safety microcontroller 1 according to one or more of items 1) to 5), wherein the processing circuit detects the signal of the second SPAD diode 45, forms a random number therefrom and supplies it to the microcontroller core 16.
[0116] 7) the semiconductor substrate has a surface 46; the semiconductor substrate having semiconductor material below the surface 46; the surface 46 of the semiconductor substrate having a metallization stack; The metallization stack typically includes a structured, optically transparent, electrically insulating layer 34; At least a portion of the electrically insulating layer, typically structured and transparent, on the surface 46 constitutes the optical fiber 50; the first SPAD diode 44 radiates from the semiconductor material of the semiconductor substrate into the optical fiber 50; The safety microcontroller 1 described in item 6) wherein the optical fiber 50 illuminates the second SPAD diode 44 such that light from inside the optical fiber 50 re-enters the semiconductor material of the semiconductor substrate from the surface and there reaches the device portion of the second SPAD diode 44.
[0117] 8) the at least one operating circuit at least temporarily supplies electrical energy to the at least one first SPAD diode 44; the at least one first SPAD diode 44, when supplied with sufficient electrical energy, provides photons to the at least one optical fiber 50; The safety microcontroller 1 according to items 6) and / or 7), wherein said at least one optical fiber 50 emits such photons to said second SPAD diode 45.
[0118] 9) Among the one or more data interfaces, one data interface is a wired automotive data bus interface; The wired automotive data bus interface is particularly CAN data bus interface, CAN-FD data bus interface, FlexRay data bus interface, PSI5 data bus interface, DSI3 data bus interface, LIN data bus interface, Ethernet data bus interface, LIN data bus interface and / or 2. A safety microcontroller 1 according to one or more of the preceding items having a MELIBUS data bus interface.
[0119] 10) Among the one or more data interfaces, one data interface is a wireless data bus interface; The wireless data bus interface is particularly WLAN interface and / or A secure microcontroller 1 according to one or more of the above items having a Bluetooth interface.
[0120] 11) Among the one or more data interfaces, one data interface is a wired data bus interface; The wireless data bus interface is particularly KNX data bus interface, EIB data bus interface, DALI® data bus interface and / or The safety microcontroller 1 according to one or more of the above items, being a PROFIBUS data bus interface.
[0121] 12) An apparatus comprising: The device comprises an integrated circuit 4 having a first processor 10-1 and a non-volatile memory 16, the apparatus comprising a first memory; the non-volatile memory stores at least one security code; the first memory stores data; the data in the first memory is in a first format and cryptographically protected; the integrated circuit is configured to authenticate data read from the first memory during a transfer of data from the first memory; The apparatus comprises a quantum random number generator 28; the integrated circuit and the quantum random number generator 28 are fabricated in a semiconductor crystal; the semiconductor crystal having a surface 46; the semiconductor crystal having semiconductor material below the surface 46; the surface 46 of the semiconductor crystal having a metallization stack; The metallization stack typically includes a structured, optically transparent, electrically insulating layer 34; At least a portion of the electrically insulating layer 34, which is typically structured and transparent, on the surface 46 constitutes the optical fiber 50; the first SPAD diode 44 emits a photon 47 from the semiconductor material of the semiconductor substrate into the optical fiber 50; The at least one optical fiber 50 conveys such photons 48 to the second SPAD diode 45; the optical fiber 50 illuminates the second SPAD diode 45 such that the light 49 from within the optical fiber 50 re-enters the semiconductor material of the semiconductor substrate at the surface 46 and there reaches a device portion of the second SPAD diode 45; The apparatus, wherein the first SPAD diode 44, the second SPAD diode 45 and the optical fiber 50 are part of the quantum random number generator 28.
[0122] 13) The device comprises at least one operating circuit; the at least one operating circuit at least temporarily supplies electrical energy to the at least one first SPAD diode 44; the at least one first SPAD diode 44, when supplied with sufficient electrical energy, provides photons 47 to the at least one optical fiber 50; The at least one optical fiber 50 conveys such photons 48 to the second SPAD diode 45; The apparatus according to item 12), wherein the at least one optical fiber 50 emits such photons 49 to a second SPAD diode 45.
[0123] 14) the quantum random number generator 28 has at least the first SPAD diode 44 as a light source for a light quantum signal; the quantum random number generator 28 has at least the second SPAD diode 45 as a photodetector for the optical quantum signal; The quantum random number generator 28 has at least one processing circuit, The quantum random number generator 28 has at least the optical fiber 50, the at least one optical fiber 50 optically couples the at least one first SPAD diode 44 to the at least one second SPAD diode 45; the operating circuit provides electrical energy to the first SPAD diode 44 such that the first SPAD diode emits light 44; 14) The apparatus according to item 13), wherein the processing circuit detects the signal of the second SPAD diode 45, forms a random number therefrom and supplies it to the data processor 10 or another apparatus part.
[0124] 15) The first memory is provided outside the integrated circuit; the apparatus comprising a second memory for storing data; the second memory is provided outside the integrated circuit; the apparatus is configured to transfer data from the first memory through the integrated circuit to the second memory such that the data processor can access the data from the second memory; The integrated circuit, authenticating the data read from the first memory using a security code stored in the non-volatile memory during a data transfer from the first memory to the second memory; if the data is authenticated, applying cryptographic protection in a second format to the authenticated data using a security code stored in the non-volatile memory; The apparatus according to any one of items 12) to 14), configured to store the data protected in the second format in the second memory.
[0125] 16) An apparatus according to any one of items 12) to 15), wherein the first memory comprises a read-only memory.
[0126] 17) An apparatus according to any one of items 15) and 16), wherein the second memory comprises a random access memory.
[0127] 18) An apparatus according to any one of items 15) to 17), wherein the cryptographic protection applied to the data in the first memory is different from the cryptographic protection applied to the data in the second memory.
[0128] 19) the integrated circuit has a memory for storing data to be processed by the data processor; The apparatus according to any one of claims 12) to 18), wherein the apparatus is configured to store a portion of an authenticated data set in the memory and a remainder in the second memory.
[0129] 20) An apparatus described in any one of items 15) to 19), wherein the first memory is configured to store data in a first data format and the second memory is configured to store data in a different second data format.
[0130] 21) The data stored in the first memory is protected by a first authentication technique; The apparatus according to item 20), wherein the apparatus is configured to protect the data in the second memory by a different second authentication technique.
[0131] 22) The data in the first memory is stored in at least one data set, the or each data set being cryptographically protected as a set; The apparatus of any one of items 15) to 21), wherein the apparatus is configured to store in the second memory a word or group of words of an authenticated data set, each word or group of words being separately cryptographically protected.
[0132] 23) The above device, reading said word or said group of words from said second memory; authenticating the word or group of words that have been read using a security code stored in the non-volatile memory; 23) The apparatus according to item 22), configured to process the retrieved and authenticated word or words in the data processor.
[0133] 24) The integrated circuit includes a hash computer; The data processor and the hash computer a) for each word or group of words, calculating a hash function in response to a security code stored in said non-volatile memory, and storing said hash in said second memory, associating said word or group of words; b) reading the stored word or group from said second memory, re-calculating a hash function for said read word or said read group of words using said security code, and comparing said re-calculated hash with said stored hash; c) A device according to item 23) arranged to cause the data processing facility to process the retrieved word or the retrieved words only if the recalculated hash and the stored hash are in a specific relationship.
[0134] 25) The apparatus according to item 24), wherein the hash computer is a circuit in the integrated circuit.
[0135] 26) The device described in any one of items 12) to 25), wherein the non-volatile memory of the integrated circuit is a one-time programmable memory.
[0136] 27) Apparatus according to any one of items 12) to 26), wherein the or each data set stored in the first memory is cryptographically protected by a corresponding digital signature.
[0137] 28) An apparatus according to any one of items 12) to 28), wherein the or each data set stored in the first memory is cryptographically protected by a corresponding digital signature using at least one random number of the quantum random number generator.
[0138] 29) The device described in item 27) or 28), wherein a security code generated by the device at least in part using at least one random number from the quantum random number generator (28) is stored in the non-volatile memory of the integrated circuit.
[0139] 30) An apparatus described in any one of items 27) to 29), wherein the apparatus is configured to authenticate a digital signature of the data set by referring to a security code stored in the non-volatile memory of the integrated circuit.
[0140] 31) A data processing device, the data processing device comprises an integrated circuit; the integrated circuit having a data processor; the integrated circuit having a non-volatile memory; the non-volatile memory stores at least one security code; the integrated circuit having a hash computer; the integrated circuit having an interface at a boundary of the integrated circuit; the integrated circuit comprises a quantum random number generator; the integrated circuit and the quantum random number generator are fabricated in a semiconductor crystal; the semiconductor crystal having a surface 46; the semiconductor crystal having semiconductor material below the surface 46; the surface 46 of the semiconductor crystal having a metallization stack; The metallization stack typically includes a structured, optically transparent, electrically insulating layer 34; At least a portion of the typically structured and transparent electrically insulating layer 34 on the surface 36 constitutes the optical fiber 50; the first SPAD diode 44 emits a photon 47 from the semiconductor material of the semiconductor substrate into the optical fiber 50; The at least one optical fiber 50 conveys such photons 48 to the second SPAD diode 45; the optical fiber 50 illuminates the second SPAD diode 45 such that the light 49 from within the fiber 50 re-enters the semiconductor material of the semiconductor substrate at the surface 46 and there reaches the device portion of the second SPAD diode 45; A data processing apparatus in which the first SPAD diode 44, the second SPAD diode 45 and the optical fiber 50 are part of the quantum random number generator 28.
[0141] 32) A data processing device according to item 31), wherein the data processor and / or another device part of the data processing device encrypts or decrypts data using at least one random number of the quantum random number generator.
[0142] 33) The data processing device comprises a memory; The memory stores data for use by the processor; 33. The data processing apparatus according to claim 31 or 32, wherein the memory is coupled to the data processor to receive words from the data processor and to provide words to the data processor.
[0143] 34) The memory is external to the integrated circuit; A data processing device as described in any one of items 31) to 33), wherein the memory is coupled to the data processor via the interface at the boundary of the integrated circuit, thereby receiving words from the data processor and supplying words to the data processor.
[0144] 35) The data processor and the hash computer a) for each word, computing a hash function in response to a security code stored in said non-volatile memory, and storing said hash in association with said word; b) reading the stored words from said memory and, for each word read, recalculating the hash function using said security code and comparing said recalculated hash value with said stored hash value; c) A data processing device according to any one of items 31) to 34), configured to cause the data processing facility to process the read word only if the recalculated hash and the stored hash have a pre-defined relationship.
[0145] 36) An integrated circuit having data processing means and non-volatile memory means for storing at least one security code; A first means for storing data; and a quantum random number generator 28 that is part of the integrated circuit, the data being cryptographically protected in a first format by at least one authentication code; the quantum random number generator comprises a first SPAD diode 44 and a second SPAD diode 45, the first SPAD diode 44 and the second SPAD diode 45 being coupled or connectable to each other via an optical fiber 50 fabricated on the surface of the integrated circuit outside the semiconductor substrate of the integrated circuit; The device uses at least one random number of the quantum random number generator 28, at least temporarily, for encryption or decryption of a date or of the authentication code.
[0146] 37) The device comprises a second device for storing data, in particular external to the integrated circuit; said apparatus comprising means for transferring data from said first memory through said integrated circuit to said second memory, so that said data processor can access said data from said second memory; the apparatus comprising means for authenticating the data read from the first memory during transfer using a security code stored in the non-volatile memory; the apparatus comprising means for, when the data is authenticated, applying cryptographic protection having at least one authentication code to the authenticated data in a second format using a security code stored in the non-volatile memory; Item 36) The apparatus according to item 36), further comprising means for storing the protected data in the second memory in the second format.
[0147] 38) The above device comprises a quantum random number generator 400; The quantum random number generator is, as an apparatus part, a first SPAD diode 404.1; a second SPAD diode 404.3; an optical fiber 404.2 optically connecting the first SPAD diode 404.1 and the second SPAD diode 404.3; an amplifier 403 and / or a filter; an analog-to-digital converter 403; A comparator 404.2; a time-to-digital converter 404.3; An apparatus as described in any one of claims 12) to 37), in particular comprising an entropy extraction device 404.4 for converting the output value of the time-to-digital converter 403 into a first and a second value and generating random bits therefrom.
[0148] 39) The apparatus described in item 27), wherein the apparatus comprises a watchdog 404.5 that monitors the apparatus portion of the quantum random number generator 400.
[0149] 40) An apparatus according to any one of items 38) and 39), wherein the apparatus comprises a voltage monitor 413 for detecting and monitoring an analog value of an analog signal.
[0150] 41) Apparatus according to any one of items 38) to 40), wherein the apparatus comprises a pseudorandom number generator 404.6, in particular in the form of a linear feedback shift register 404.6.
[0151] 42) An apparatus according to any one of items 38) to 41), wherein the apparatus comprises a signal multiplexer which in an error case switches from the signal of the output 411 of the entropy extraction apparatus to the signal of the preliminary random number generator or the preliminary pseudorandom number generator 404.6.
[0152] 43) An apparatus described in any one of items 38) to 42), in which in an error case, the starting value of the pseudorandom number generator 404.6 depends on random bits of the quantum random number generator 400 that were correctly generated in the past.
[0153] 44) generating a pulse sequence having pulses of a first height class 601 and pulses of a second height class 602 at random intervals using at least two SPAD diodes; Separating pulses of said first height class 601 from pulses of said second height class 602 by means of cutting levels 603, 404.1; A step 501 of detecting a first value of a time interval between a first pulse of the second height class 602 and a second pulse of the second height class 602 different from the first pulse; Detecting 501 a second value of a time interval between a third pulse of the second height class 602 different from the first pulse and a fourth pulse of the second height class 602 different from the first pulse, the second pulse and the third pulse; a step 502 of comparing the first value with the second value; outputting 503 a first logic value as a random bit if the first value is greater than the second value; and if the first value is smaller than the second value, outputting 503 a second logical value different from the first logical value as the random bit.
[0154] 45) A method 3700 for generating a quantum random number QZ having m random bits, comprising: generating 3710 a random single-photon current 47, 48, 49, 401.2 from the single photons using one or more first SPAD diodes 401.1, 44; transmitting 3720 the random single-photon current 47, 48, 49, 401.2 to one or more second SPAD diodes 401.3, 45 using an optical fiber 50, 401.2 different from the semiconductor substrate 39, 38; converting 3730 the random single-photon current 47, 48, 49, 401.2 into a detection signal using the one or more second SPAD diodes 401.3, 45; adjusting 3740 the detection signal to an adjusted detection signal; a step 3750 of separating a pulse of the adjusted detection signal caused by a combination of an emission of a first SPAD diode 401.1 of the one or more first SPAD diodes 401.1,44 and an emission of a second SPAD diode 401.3,45 of the one or more second SPAD diodes 401.3,45 from a pulse of the adjusted detection signal caused by a spontaneous emission of the second SPAD diode 401.3,45 by comparing the adjusted detection signal with a threshold value 404.1; calculating 3760 a first time interval between a first pulse and a second pulse of a first pair of two consecutive pulses of the adjusted detection signal generated by the combined emissions of the first SPAD diode 401.1,44 and the second SPAD diode 401.3,45, and calculating a second time interval between a third pulse and a fourth pulse of a second pair of two consecutive pulses of the adjusted detection signal generated by the combined emissions of the first SPAD diode 401.1,44 and the second SPAD diode 401.3,45; calculating 3670 a bit value for a random bit by comparing the value of the first time interval with the value of the second time interval; repeating steps 3710 to 3770 if the calculated number of random bits 3680n is less than the desired number m of random bits of the quantum random number QZ to be generated, and terminating the quantum random number generation process if the calculated number of random bits 3680n is greater than or equal to the desired number m of random bits of the quantum random number QZ to be generated.
[0155] 46) An integrated circuit having data processing means and non-volatile memory means for storing at least one security code; A first means for storing data; and a quantum random number generator 28 that is part of the integrated circuit, the data being cryptographically protected in a first format by at least one authentication code; The quantum random number generator comprises a first SPAD diode 44 and a second SPAD diode 45, the first SPAD diode 44 and the second SPAD diode 45 being connected or connectable to each other via an optical fiber 50 fabricated on the surface of the integrated circuit outside the semiconductor substrate of the integrated circuit; The device uses at least one random number of the quantum random number generator 28, at least temporarily, for encryption or decryption of a date or of the authentication code.
[0156] 47) The apparatus comprises a second device for storing data, in particular external to the integrated circuit; said apparatus comprising means for transferring data from said first memory through said integrated circuit to said second memory, so that said data processor can access said data from said second memory; the apparatus comprising means for authenticating the data read from the first memory during transfer using a security code stored in the non-volatile memory; the apparatus comprising means for, when the data is authenticated, applying cryptographic protection having at least one authentication code to the authenticated data in a second format using a security code stored in the non-volatile memory; Item 46) The apparatus according to item 46), further comprising means for storing the protected data in the second memory in the second format.
[0157] 48) The above device comprises a quantum random number generator 400; The quantum random number generator is, as an apparatus part, a first SPAD diode 404.1; a second SPAD diode 404.3; an optical fiber 404.2 optically connecting the first SPAD diode 404.1 and the second SPAD diode 404.3; an amplifier 403 and / or a filter; an analog-to-digital converter 403; A comparator 404.2; a time-to-digital converter 404.3; and an entropy extraction device 404.4 for converting the output value of the time-to-digital converter 403 into a first and a second value and generating therefrom random bits for the random number.
[0158] 49) The apparatus described in item 48), wherein the apparatus comprises a watchdog 404.5 that monitors the apparatus portion of the quantum random number generator 400.
[0159] 50) The apparatus according to items 48) and 49), wherein the apparatus comprises a voltage monitor 413 for detecting and monitoring an analog value of an analog signal.
[0160] 51) Apparatus according to any one of items 48) to 50), wherein the apparatus comprises a random or pseudorandom number generator 404.6, in particular in the form of a linear feedback shift register 404.6.
[0161] 52) An apparatus according to any one of items 48) to 51), wherein the apparatus comprises a signal multiplexer which in an error case switches from the signal of the output 411 of the entropy extraction device to the signal of the preliminary random number generator or the preliminary pseudorandom number generator 404.6.
[0162] 53) An apparatus described in any one of items 48) to 52), in which in an error case, the starting value of the pseudorandom number generator 404.6 depends on random bits of the quantum random number generator 400 that were correctly generated in the past.
[0163] 54) generating a pulse sequence having pulses of a first height class 601 and pulses of a second height class 602 at random intervals using at least two SPAD diodes; Separating pulses of said first height class 601 from pulses of said second height class 602 by means of cutting levels 603, 404.1; A step 501 of detecting a first value of a time interval between a first pulse of the second height class 602 and a second pulse of the second height class 602 different from the first pulse; Detecting 501 a second value of a time interval between a third pulse of the second height class 602 different from the first pulse and a fourth pulse of the second height class 602 different from the first pulse, the second pulse and the third pulse; comparing 502 the first value with the second value; outputting 503 a first logic value as a random bit if the first value is greater than the second value; and if the first value is smaller than the second value, outputting 503 a second logical value different from the first logical value as the random bit.
[0164] 55) A method 3700 for generating a quantum random number QZ having m random bits, comprising: generating 3710 a random single-photon current 47, 48, 49, 401.2 from the single photons using one or more first SPAD diodes 401.1, 54; transmitting 3720 said random single-photon current 47, 48, 49, 401.2 to one or more second SPAD diodes 401.3, 45 using an optical fiber 50, 401.2; converting 3730 the random single-photon current 47, 48, 49, 401.2 into a detection signal using the one or more second SPAD diodes 401.3, 45; adjusting 3740 the detection signal to an adjusted detection signal; a step 3750 of separating a pulse of the adjusted detection signal caused by a combination of an emission of a first SPAD diode 401.1 of the one or more first SPAD diodes 401.1,44 and an emission of a second SPAD diode 401.3,45 of the one or more second SPAD diodes 401.3,45 from a pulse of the adjusted detection signal caused by a spontaneous emission of the second SPAD diode 401.3,45 by comparing the adjusted detection signal with a threshold value 404.1; calculating 3760 a first time interval between a first pulse and a second pulse of a first pair of two consecutive pulses of the adjusted detection signal generated by the combined emissions of the first SPAD diode 401.1,44 and the second SPAD diode 401.3,45, and calculating a second time interval between a third pulse and a fourth pulse of a second pair of two consecutive pulses of the adjusted detection signal generated by the combined emissions of the first SPAD diode 401.1,44 and the second SPAD diode 401.3,45; calculating 3670 a bit value for a random bit by comparing the value of the first time interval with the value of the second time interval; repeating steps 3710 to 3770 if the calculated number of random bits 3680n is less than the desired number m of random bits of the quantum random number QZ to be generated, and terminating the quantum random number generation process if the calculated number of random bits 3680n is greater than or equal to the desired number m of random bits of the quantum random number QZ to be generated.
[0165] 56) A quantum random number QZ generator One or more first SPAD diodes 401.1, 44 that generate (3710) random single-photon currents 47, 48, 49, 401.2 based on photon processes from single photons; one or more second SPAD diodes 401.3,45; an optical fiber 50, 401.2 distinct from the semiconductor substrate 39, 38, which transmits (3720) the random single-photon current 47, 48, 49, 401.2 to the one or more second SPAD diodes 401.3, 45; The one or more second SPAD diodes 401.3, 45 convert (3730) the random single-photon currents 47, 48, 49, 401.2 into a detection signal; A signal processor, specifically an amplifier 402, conditions (3740) the detection signal into a conditioned detection signal; A comparator 404.02 or an equivalent device compares the adjusted detection signal with a threshold 404.1 to separate (3750) a pulse of the adjusted detection signal caused by a combination of an emission of a first SPAD diode 401.1 of the one or more first SPAD diodes 401.1,44 and an emission of a second SPAD diode 401.3,45 of the one or more second SPAD diodes 401.3,45 from a pulse of the adjusted detection signal caused by a spontaneous emission of the second SPAD diode 401.3,45; a time-to-digital converter 404.3 calculates (3760) a first time interval between a first pulse and a second pulse of a first pair of two consecutive pulses of the conditioned detection signal generated by the combined emissions of the first SPAD diode 401.1,44 and the second SPAD diode 401.3,45; and calculates a second time interval between a third pulse and a fourth pulse of a second pair of two consecutive pulses of the conditioned detection signal generated by the combined emissions of the first SPAD diode 401.1,44 and the second SPAD diode 401.3,45; an entropy extractor 404.4 calculates (3670) a bit value for the random bit by comparing the value of the first time interval with the value of the second time interval; An apparatus in which a finite automaton 404.8 generates a quantum random number QZ417 from the bit data stream of the random bits 411 described above. [Explanation of symbols]
[0166] 1 Safety Microcontroller 2 One or more internal data buses 3. One or more read / write RAMs 4. One or more writable non-volatile memories. This non-volatile memory can comprise, for example, an EEPROM memory, a flash memory or an OTP memory. 5 One or more purely read-only non-volatile memories, such as ROM 6. One or more writable and / or non-writable non-volatile manufacturer memories. In the case of non-writable manufacturer memories, this manufacturer memory may be, for example, a manufacturer ROM. 7 One or more cryptographic accelerators, such as a DES accelerator and / or an AES accelerator 8 One or more manufacturer memory firewalls 11 One or more CRC modules (Cyclic Redundancy Check) 12 One or more clock generation modules (English: Clock Driver, CLK) 13 Timer Module 14 One or more safety monitoring control circuits 15 Generators based on quantum processes 16 Microcontroller Cores 17 Data interface, specifically one or more Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitters (UARTs) to support continuous high-speed data 21 One or more basic clock generators (CLK) 22 One or more reset circuits 23 One or more current supplies or Vcc circuits with voltage regulators to provide the operating voltage for the safety microcontroller 24 One or more ground circuits 25 One or more input / output circuits 30 A typical SPAD diode used as the sensor element in a single photon detector 31 Typical SPAD Diode Shallow Trench Isolation STI 32 Anode contact of a typical SPAD diode 33 Cathode contact of a typical SPAD diode. The cathode contact of a typical SPAD diode is preferably made of indium tin oxide (ITO) or another transparent conductive material. 34 Insulating layer 34' Insulation layer 34” Insulation Layer 35 A highly doped first junction region of a first conductivity type. In CMOS technology using p-doped wafer material, for example, a n-doped region in the semiconductor substrate material of the SPAD diode. + It can be a doped region. 36 a first doped well of a second conductivity type. In a CMOS technology using p-doped wafer material, for example, a lightly doped region in the semiconductor substrate material of the SPAD diode 1820, i.e. p -- It can be a doped region. 37 A second doped well of a second conductivity type. In CMOS technology with p-doped wafer material, for example, a lightly doped region in the semiconductor substrate material of the SPAD diode, i.e. p - It can be a doped region. 38 Epitaxial layer of second conductivity type. In CMOS technology with p-doped wafer material, this can be, for example, a p-doped epitaxial layer in the semiconductor substrate material of the SPAD diode. 39 A substrate of a monocrystalline semiconductor wafer having a second conductivity type. In CMOS technology using p-doped wafer material, this may be, for example, a p-doped monocrystalline semiconductor wafer. 40 A second doped well of a second conductivity type below the anode contact. In CMOS technology using p-doped wafer material, for example, a p-doped well in the semiconductor substrate material of the SPAD diode. - It can be a doped region. 41 a highly doped second junction region of a second conductivity type. In a CMOS technology using p-doped wafer material, for example, a p-doped region in the semiconductor substrate material of the SPAD diode 1820 + It can be a doped region. 42 Insulators such as oxides 43 Metal cover for optical fiber 44 a first SPAD diode, which at least temporarily serves as a light source for irradiating a second SPAD diode with photons of the first SPAD diode; 45 a second SPAD diode, which acts, for example, at least temporarily, as a photodetector of the light of the first SPAD diode 46 Surface of the wafer in this application 47 The light of the first SPAD diode is emitted vertically and upwards, perpendicular to the surface. 48 A portion of the light emitted perpendicularly from the first SPAD diode into the optical fiber, which is carried horizontally in the optical fiber. 49 Light emitted from a first SPAD diode as vertical light into an optical fiber, and then horizontally conveyed from the optical fiber to a second SPAD diode, where the light of the first SPAD diode is emitted vertically and downwards, perpendicular to the surface, from the optical fiber to the second SPAD diode. 50 An optical fiber for carrying the photons of the first SPAD diode to the second SPAD diode. This optical fiber typically consists of a coating oxide or other optically transparent insulating layer over the circuitry of the SPAD diode. 50' An optical fiber for carrying the photons of the first SPAD diode to the second SPAD diode. This optical fiber may consist of a coating oxide or other optically transparent insulating layer over the circuitry of a typical SPAD diode, or may consist of two stacked optically transparent insulating layers (e.g., a metallization stack). 51 Contact 52 Contacts 53 The plane between two electrically insulating layers of an optical fiber 400 Quantum Random Number Generator QRNG 401 Entropy Source 401.1 One or more first SPAD diodes 401.2 Fiber Optics 401.3 One or more second SPAD diodes 402 High Frequency Amplifier 403 Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC) 404 Measurement board with FPGA 404.1 Constants 404.2 Comparators 404.3 Time to Digital Converters 404.4 Entropy Extractor 404.4 404.5 Watchdog 404.6 Linear Feedback Shift Registers. For generating pseudorandom bit sequences, the feedback is preferably a simple primitive polynomial. 404.7 Signal Multiplexer 404.8 Finite Automata 404.9 RAM 404.10 Finish Flags 404.11 Microcontrollers 405 Voltage signal of entropy source 401 406 Amplifier output signal 406 of high frequency amplifier 402 407 Digital 14-bit value 407 of analog-to-digital converter 403. Other bit widths are possible. 408 Signal with constant 404.1 409 Output signal of comparator 404.2 410 Output of the time-to-digital converter 404.3 411 Entropy Extraction 404.4 Output 412 Seed S 413 Voltage Monitor 414 Signal Line 416 Selection signal 417 Pseudorandom signal line 418 Random Data Words 419 Internal data bus of the quantum random number generator 400. Preferably an internal data bus of the control device 4. 420 Watchdog 404.5 of quantum random number generator 400 and interrupt signal of controller 4 of fuse 1 500 Flow diagram of entropy extraction method 500 501 A first step 501 of calculating a first value of the output 410 of the time-to-digital converter 404.3 and a second value of the output 410 of the time-to-digital converter 404.3 and storing them in a shift register of the entropy extraction 404.4 502 a second step of comparing the first value with a second value 503 A third step of determining the first value and the second value and generating random bits. 601 First Spike 602 Second Spike 603 Cutting Level A method for generating quantum random numbers QZ with 3700 m random bits 3710 generating random single-photon currents (57, 58, 59, 401.2) using one or more first SPAD diodes (401.1, 54); 3720 transmitting the random single-photon current (57, 58, 59, 401.2) to one or more second SPAD diodes (401.3, 55) using an optical fiber (44, 401.2) different from the semiconductor substrate (49, 48). 3730 Converting from the random single photon current (57, 58, 59, 401.2) to a detection signal in the form of a voltage signal 405 of an entropy source 401. The entropy source 401 preferably comprises a first SPAD diode 401.1, an optical fiber 401.2 and a second SPAD diode 401.3. 3740 conditioning, specifically amplifying, filtering and / or analog-to-digital converting, the detection signal into a conditioned detection signal, specifically a digital 14-bit value 407 in an analog-to-digital converter 403 3750 separating pulses of the conditioned detection signal caused by the combined emission of the first SPAD diode 401.1 and the second SPAD diode 401.3 from pulses of the conditioned detection signal caused by spontaneous emission, in particular by comparing the conditioned detection signal with a threshold value, in the comparator 404.2, and generating a corresponding output signal 409 of the comparator 404.2. 3760 calculating a first time interval between a first pulse and a second pulse of a first pair of two consecutive pulses of the adjusted detection signal generated by the combined emissions of the first SPAD diode 401.1 and the second SPAD diode 401.3 and calculating a second time interval between a third pulse and a fourth pulse of a second pair of two consecutive pulses of the adjusted detection signal generated by the combined emissions of the first SPAD diode 401.1 and the second SPAD diode 401.3, in particular to calculate a first value of the output 410 of the time-to-digital converter 404.3 and a second value of the output 410 of the time-to-digital converter 404.3. 3670 calculating a bit value of the random bit by comparing the value of the first time interval with the value of the second time interval. 3680. If the number n of random bits calculated up to this step is smaller than the desired number m of random bits of the desired quantum random number, repeat the above steps. Otherwise, end the process of generating quantum random numbers having m random bits.
Claims
1. 1. A microcontroller for controlling devices in a motor vehicle, comprising: A semiconductor substrate; A plurality of storage elements; At least one internal bus (2); at least a microcontroller core (16); One or more data interfaces; and a true random number generator (15) based on at least one quantum process, The memory element is connected to the internal bus (2); The data interface is connected to the internal bus (2); A generator (15) based on the quantum process is connected to the internal bus (2); The microcontroller core (16) is connected to the internal bus (2); said quantum process based generator (15) generating random numbers, in particular at the request of said microcontroller core (16); The quantum process based generator (15) supplies the random numbers, the microcontroller core (16) generates a key using a program from one or more of the storage elements and the random number; the microcontroller core (16) uses the program from one or more of the storage elements and the key to encrypt and decrypt data communicated internally or with external devices via the data interface; The semiconductor substrate integrally comprises a sub-device of the safety microcontroller (1) described herein, said quantum process based generator (15) having at least one first SPAD diode (44) as a light source for the optical quantum signal; said quantum process based generator (15) having at least one second SPAD diode (45) as a photodetector for receiving said light quantum signal; The quantum process based generator (15) has at least one processing circuit, the quantum process based generator (15) having at least one optical fiber (50) for optically coupling the at least one first SPAD diode (44) to the at least one second SPAD diode (45); the quantum-based generator (15) having an operating circuit for providing electrical energy to the at least one first SPAD diode (44) for emitting light (44); A microcontroller, wherein the quantum-based generator (15) has processing circuitry for detecting a signal of the at least one second SPAD diode (45), forming a random number from the signal of the at least one second SPAD diode (45), and providing the random number to the microcontroller core (16).
2. The emission signal of the at least one second SPAD diode (45) has a first spike (601) and a second spike (602) larger than the first spike (601), the first and second spikes (601, 602) being larger than pre-determinable reference values (404.1, 603), respectively, the first spike (601) being generated by spontaneous photon emission of the at least one second SPAD diode (45) without simultaneous occurrence of stimulated photon emission of the at least one second SPAD diode (45), and the spontaneous photon emission and the at least one second SPAD diode (45) being generated by spontaneous photon emission of the at least one second SPAD diode (45).
2. The microcontroller of claim 1, wherein the second spike (602) occurs simultaneously with a photon emission of the at least one second SPAD diode (45) induced by receiving a photon of another first SPAD diode (44), and the processing circuit of the quantum process based generator (15) generates a first logic value or a second logic value as a bit for generating the random number by comparing a time interval of the second spike (602) with a threshold value or by comparing time intervals of the second spikes (602) with each other.
3. 3. The microcontroller of claim 2, wherein the processing circuit generates the first logic value or the second logic value by comparing the time interval between two spikes (602) with a threshold, and the processing circuit outputs the first logic value as a bit of the random number if the time interval is smaller than the threshold, and outputs the second logic value as a bit of the random number if the time interval is greater than the threshold.
4. 3. The microcontroller of claim 2, wherein the processing circuit generates the first logic value or the second logic value by comparing time intervals of the second spikes (602) of different pairs, and the processing circuit outputs the first logic value as a bit for generating the random number if the time interval of the last second spike (602) is smaller than, for example, the time interval between the penultimate second spike (602) and the third last second spike (602) or the time interval between another pair of preceding second spikes (602), and outputs the second logic value as a bit for generating the random number if the time interval of the last second spike (602) is larger than, for example, the time interval between the penultimate second spike (602) and the third last second spike (602) or the time interval between another pair of preceding second spikes (602).
5. 5. The microcontroller according to claim 1, further comprising a plurality of pairs each consisting of a first SPAD diode (44) and a second SPAD diode (45), the emission signal of the second SPAD diode (45) being capable of being supplied to the processing circuit, the processing circuit using the emission signal of each second SPAD diode (45) to output another one of the bits for generating the random number.
6. 5. The microcontroller according to claim 1, further comprising a pair of a first SPAD diode (44) and a second SPAD diode (45), and wherein the processing circuitry continuously outputs the logic values of the bits for generating the random number.
7. 5. The microcontroller according to claim 1, further comprising a single first SPAD diode (44) and a plurality of second SPAD diodes (45) optically coupled to the single SPAD diode (44), the emission signal of the second SPAD diode (45) being capable of being fed to the processing circuit, the processing circuit using the emission signal of each second SPAD diode (45) to output another one of the bits for generating the random number.
8. 8. The microcontroller according to claim 1, further comprising an error detection unit and a pseudorandom number generator, characterized in that if the error detection unit detects an error in the functioning of components involved in the photon process of the quantum process based generator (15) or an error in the processing circuit, the processing circuit of the quantum process based generator (15) switches from outputting bits for generation of the random numbers using the emission signal of the at least one second SPAD diode (45) to outputting bits for generation of pseudorandom numbers generated by the pseudorandom number generator.
9. 9. A microcontroller as claimed in claim 8, characterized in that the error detection unit, upon detection of an error, outputs an error signal which indicates in particular the type and / or cause of the error.
10. 10. The microcontroller according to any one of claims 1 to 9, characterized in that the storage elements comprise one or more read-write memories RAM (3), one or more writable non-volatile memories (in particular EEPROM memories (4), Flash memories (4) and / or One-Time Programmable (OTP) memories (4)), one or more purely read-only memories and / or one or more non-volatile manufacturer memories (in particular one or more manufacturer ROMs (6), one or more manufacturer EEPROMs and / or one or more manufacturer Flash memories).
11. Microcontroller according to claim 10, characterized in that the manufacturer ROM (6) contains boot software.
12. 12. The microcontroller of claim 1, further comprising a manufacturer memory firewall (8) between the manufacturer memory (6) and the internal bus (2).
13. A basic clock generator (21) (CLK), A clock generation circuit (12), A reset circuit (22), A voltage regulated current supply or Vcc circuit (23) providing said operating voltage; grounding circuit (24), Input / output circuitry (25) and / or one or more components of one or more processing modules; The processing module communicates with the internal bus (2); The processing module: CRC module (Cyclic Redundancy Check) (11), A clock generation module (12); A module comprising a DES accelerator and / or an AES accelerator (7), One or more timer modules (13), A safety monitoring control circuit (14) and Microcontroller according to any one of the preceding claims, characterized in that it comprises one or more modules of a data interface, in particular a Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter (UART) (17).
14. the semiconductor substrate having a surface (46); the semiconductor substrate having a semiconductor material below the surface (46); the surface (46) of the semiconductor substrate having a metallization stack; the metallization stack comprises an electrically insulating layer (34) disposed on the surface (46) of the semiconductor substrate, typically a structured, optically transparent electrically insulating layer (34); At least a portion of the transparent electrically insulating layer (34) constitutes the at least one optical fiber (50); the first SPAD diode (44) emits photons (47) from the semiconductor material of the semiconductor substrate into the optical fiber (50); 14. The microcontroller of claim 1, wherein said at least one optical fiber (50) conveys such photons (48) to said second SPAD diode (45).
15. 15. The microcontroller of claim 14, wherein the optical fiber (50) illuminates the second SPAD diode (45) such that light (49) re-enters the semiconductor material of the semiconductor substrate from within the optical fiber (50) and there reaches a device portion of the second SPAD diode (45).
16. the at least one operating circuit at least temporarily supplies electrical energy to the at least one first SPAD diode (44); the at least one first SPAD diode (44), when supplied with sufficient electrical energy, provides photons (47) to the at least one optical fiber (50); the at least one optical fiber (50) conveys such photons (48) to the second SPAD diode (45); 16. The microcontroller of claim 1, wherein said at least one optical fiber (50) emits such photons (48) to said second SPAD diode (45).
17. 17. The microcontroller of claim 1, wherein the one data bus interface is a wired automotive data bus interface, or one or more of the plurality of data bus interfaces is a wired automotive data bus interface.
18. the one or more wired automotive data bus interfaces: CAN data bus interface, CAN-FD data bus interface, FlexRay data bus interface, PSI5 data bus interface, DSI3 data bus interface, LIN data bus interface, Ethernet data bus interface, LIN data bus interface and / or 18. The microcontroller according to claim 17, characterized in that it is formed as a MELIBUS data bus interface.
19. 19. The microcontroller of claim 1, wherein the one data bus interface is a wireless data bus interface, or one or more of the plurality of data interfaces is a wireless data bus interface.
20. said one or more wireless data bus interfaces; WLAN interface, Mobile communication interface and / or 20. The microcontroller according to claim 19, characterized in that it is formed as a Bluetooth interface.
21. 21. The microcontroller of claim 1, wherein the one data bus interface is a wired data bus interface, or one or more of the plurality of data interfaces is a wired data bus interface.
22. said one or more wired data bus interfaces; KNX data bus interface, EIB data bus interface, DALI® data bus interface and / or 22. The microcontroller of claim 21, configured as a PROFIBUS data bus interface.
Citation Information
Patent Citations
Systems and methods for single chip quantum random number generation
US10802800B1
