Control system, control method, and program
The control system addresses the lack of safety guarantees in automated driving by employing a simplex architecture with mechanical derivation rules and program logic to ensure safe switching between controllers, logically verifying safety conditions and ensuring responsible autonomous vehicle operation.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- PCT/JP2024/018673
- Authority / Receiving Office
- WO · WO
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2023-05-31
- Filing Date
- 2024-05-21
- Publication Date
- 2024-12-05
AI Technical Summary
Current control systems for automated driving lack a logically proven design method that ensures safety when incorporating Responsibility-Sensitive Safety (RSS) rules within a simplex architecture, which is crucial for guaranteeing the safety and accountability of autonomous vehicles.
A control system is designed with a simplex architecture that includes an advanced controller, a baseline controller, and a determination module, using mechanical derivation rules and program logic systems like differential Floyd-Hoare Logic (dFHL) to prove the satisfaction of safety contracts, ensuring safe switching between controllers based on defined safety rules.
The system guarantees safety in automated driving by logically verifying that safety conditions are met, allowing for high-performance autonomous driving while ensuring collision avoidance and adherence to safety protocols, thus providing a framework for socially acceptable and responsible autonomous vehicle operation.
Smart Images

Figure JP2024018673_05122024_PF_FP_ABST
Abstract
Description
Control system, control method, and program
[0001] The present invention relates to a control system, a control method, and a program.
[0002] Simplex Architecture has been proposed as a control system to ensure safety (Non-Patent Documents 1 and 2). On the other hand, Responsibility-Sensitive Safety (RSS) (Non-Patent Document 3) and Goal-Aware RSS (GA-RSS) have been proposed as safety rules for autonomous driving (Non-Patent Document 4).
[0003] T. L. Crenshaw, E. Gunter, C. L. Robinson, L. Sha, and P. R. Kumar, "The simplex reference model: Limiting fault-propagation due to unreliable components in cyber-physical system architectures," in 28th IEEE International Real-Time Systems Symposium (RTSS 2007), 2007, pp. 400-412.D. Seto, B. Krogh, L. Sha, and A. Chutinan, "The simplex architecture for safe online control system upgrades," in Proceedings of the 1998 American Control Conference. ACC (IEEE Cat. No.98CH36207), vol. 6, 1998, pp. 3504-3508.Shai Shalev-Shwartz, Shaked Shammah, and Amnon Shashua, "On a formal model of safe and scalable self-driving cars," CoRR, abs / 1708.06374, 2017.I. Hasuo, C. Eberhart, J. Haydon, J. Dubut, R. Bohrer, T. Kobayashi, S. Pruekprasert, X. Zhang, E. A. Pallas, A. Yamada, K. Suenaga, F. Ishikawa, K. Kamijo, Y. Shinya, and T. Suetomi, "Goal-aware RSS for complex scenarios via program logic," IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Vehicles, 2023, CoRR abs / 2207.02387.
[0004] However, in the prior art, no design method has been proposed that logically proves safety in a simplex architecture incorporating safety rules.
[0005] In view of the above technical problems, one aspect of the present invention aims to provide a control system that ensures safety.
[0006] In order to solve the above problem, a control system according to one aspect of the present invention comprises a plant configured to control the operation of a controlled entity and output status information indicating the status of the controlled entity, a first controller configured to instruct the plant to operate the controlled entity in accordance with a first safety rule, a second controller configured to instruct the plant to operate the controlled entity in accordance with a second safety rule, and a decision module configured to execute the first controller when the status information satisfies a switching condition determined based on the first safety rule, and to execute the second controller when the status information does not satisfy the switching condition.
[0007] According to one aspect of the present invention, a control system that ensures safety can be provided.
[0008] FIG. 1 is a diagram showing an example of a mechanical derivation rule. FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing an example of the hardware configuration of a control system. FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing an example of the functional configuration of a control system in the first embodiment. FIG. 4 is a flowchart showing an example of a control method in the first embodiment. FIG. 5 is a flowchart showing an example of a first switching process in the first embodiment. FIG. 6 is a flowchart showing an example of a second switching process in the first embodiment. FIG. 7 is a block diagram showing an example of the functional configuration of a control system in the second embodiment. FIG. 8 is a flowchart showing an example of a control method in the second embodiment. FIG. 9 is a flowchart showing an example of a first switching process in the second embodiment. FIG. 10 is a flowchart showing an example of a second switching process in the second embodiment. FIG. 11 is a flowchart showing an example of a third switching process in the second embodiment.
[0009] Hereinafter, embodiments of the present invention will be described with reference to the accompanying drawings. In this specification and drawings, components having substantially the same functional configurations are designated by the same reference numerals, and redundant description will be omitted.
[0010] [First Embodiment] A first embodiment of the present invention is a control system that controls a mobile object (an example of a controlled object) that is capable of autonomous driving. Examples of the mobile object in this embodiment include an autonomous vehicle, a route bus that operates on a fixed route, an unmanned aerial vehicle such as a drone, and a spacecraft such as an artificial satellite or an unmanned probe. The control system in this embodiment is not limited to mobile objects, and can be applied to, for example, plant operation control. Hereinafter, in this embodiment, a control system that controls an autonomous vehicle will be described as an example.
[0011] The control system in this embodiment is constructed using a simplex architecture incorporating autonomous driving safety rules. Examples of the autonomous driving safety rules in this embodiment include responsibility-sensing safety (RSS) and goal-achievement RSS.
[0012] <Automated Driving Safety Rules> Ensuring the safety of automated driving is an important issue for industry and society. For automated driving to be accepted by society, it is necessary to clearly guarantee safety and clarify accountability for it.
[0013] Autonomous driving safety rules are a concept that forms the basis for social acceptance of autonomous driving. If autonomous vehicles that comply with the autonomous driving safety rules are recognized by society as safe and can be driven safely on public roads, it is believed that the spread of autonomous vehicles will be promoted. Furthermore, the autonomous driving safety rules will serve as a standard for specifying the scope of manufacturer liability. The idea is that if an accident occurs with an autonomous vehicle, the manufacturer will not be held liable as long as the vehicle complies with the autonomous driving safety rules.
[0014] RSS has been proposed as a method to logically ensure the safety of autonomous driving. RSS is constructed with a logical structure that states, "If preconditions are met, safety conditions can be met by executing a control strategy." A control strategy is a method for controlling an autonomous vehicle. Examples of control strategies are driving operations such as turning the steering wheel, applying the brakes, or accelerating by stepping on the accelerator.
[0015] The RSS disclosed in Non-Patent Document 3 only guarantees the safety condition of collision avoidance. Therefore, a goal-achieving RSS has been proposed as an extension of RSS, which guarantees goal achievement. The goal-achieving RSS is constructed with a logical structure that states, "If the pre-conditions are met, by executing a control strategy, it is possible to achieve specified post-conditions while satisfying the safety conditions." The goal-achieving RSS can guarantee, for example, that any destination can be reached safely.
[0016] Hereinafter, the RSS disclosed in Non-Patent Document 3 will be referred to as Collision Avoiding RSS (CA-RSS) to distinguish it from Objective RSS. When simply referring to RSS, it is intended to include both Collision Avoiding RSS and Objective RSS.
[0017] <Simplex Architecture> Simplex architecture has been proposed as a control system to ensure safety. The simplex architecture consists of an advanced controller (AC), a baseline controller (BC), a decision module (DM), and a plant (P).
[0018] The plant operates controlled entities under the control of either an advanced controller or a baseline controller. The advanced controller performs complex control that pursues not only safety but also various performance indices. The baseline controller performs relatively simple control that prioritizes safety.
[0019] The decision module switches between the advanced and baseline controllers, typically switching to the advanced controller for better performance and switching to the baseline controller when it detects a safety-critical issue.
[0020] The simplex architecture ensures safety of the entire control system by having the decision module appropriately switch control between the advanced controller and the baseline controller.
[0021] <Simplex Architecture Incorporating Autonomous Driving Safety Rules> By incorporating autonomous driving safety rules into the simplex architecture, it becomes possible to control an autonomously driven vehicle by switching between an advanced controller and a baseline controller. In this case, the advanced controller is a general autonomous driving control module. The baseline controller is a module that executes a control strategy in accordance with the autonomous driving safety rules.
[0022] For example, the decision module monitors the preconditions of the RSS. The decision module causes the advanced controller to control the moving object while the RSS preconditions are satisfied. The advanced controller is a general autonomous driving control module, and therefore performs control while taking into account performance indicators such as comfort.
[0023] On the other hand, when the decision module detects that the preconditions of the RSS are no longer being satisfied, it switches control from the advanced controller to the baseline controller. The baseline controller performs control in accordance with the control strategy of the RSS, thereby pursuing safety.
[0024] As a result, a simplex architecture incorporating autonomous driving safety rules can achieve high-performance autonomous driving under normal circumstances and can avoid collisions in the event of a safety crisis.However, no design method has been proposed for a simplex architecture incorporating autonomous driving safety rules that has been logically proven to be safe.
[0025] The present embodiment aims to provide a control system that ensures safety in autonomous driving. In one aspect, this embodiment makes it possible to design a simplex architecture that incorporates autonomous driving safety rules and logically prove its safety.
[0026] <Contract to be Satisfied by Safety Rules> In this embodiment, in order to ensure safety in autonomous driving, a contract to be satisfied by the RSS is defined. Also, a mechanical derivation rule is provided to prove that the RSS satisfies the contract.
[0027] <<Contract>> Hoare logic is known for program verification. In Objective RSS, Hoare quadruples are defined by incorporating global safety conditions and continuous dynamics into Hoare triples given by Hoare logic.
[0028] Hoare logic guarantees that "if precondition P is true, then postcondition Q is true after executing program α," where P, α, and Q are a Hoare triplet. Hoare logic is expressed by equation (1).
[0029]
[0030] The goal-achieving RSS introduces a program logic system called dFHL (differential Floyd-Hoare Logic), which adds a safety condition S to the Hoare triplet. The program logic system dFHL guarantees that "if the precondition P is true, the postcondition Q is true after executing program α, and the safety condition S is always true while program α is being executed." Here, P, α, Q, and S are Hoare quadruplets. The program logic system dFHL is expressed by equation (2).
[0031]
[0032] In this embodiment, a program logic system dFHL↓ is introduced in which the safety condition S in the program logic system dFHL is divided into a global assumption A and a global guarantee G. The program logic system dFHL↓ guarantees that "when an environmental assumption A is given, the precondition P is true, the postcondition Q is true after executing program α, and the safety condition G is always true while executing program α." Here, A, P, α, Q, and G are Hoare quintuples. The program logic system dFHL↓ is expressed by equation (3).
[0033]
[0034] A specific example of Hoare's quintuples is shown below. The environmental assumption A is, for example, "the maximum acceleration that another vehicle traveling ahead of the host vehicle can achieve." The precondition P is, for example, "the maximum acceleration that another vehicle can achieve at time t=t 0 The control strategy α is, for example, "a driving operation to maintain the distance between the own vehicle and the other vehicle." The control strategy α can be formulated based on the positions and velocities of the own vehicle and the other vehicle, as well as the braking performance of the own vehicle. The post-condition Q is, for example, "a driving operation to maintain the distance between the own vehicle and the other vehicle at time t=t 1 (>t 0 ) and the position and speed of the own vehicle and the other vehicle in the same direction. Safety condition G is, for example, "the own vehicle and the other vehicle do not collide."
[0035] <<Mechanical Resolution Rules>> Figure 1 shows the mechanical resolution rules that make up the program logic system dFHL↓. By using the mechanical resolution rules shown in Figure 1, it is possible to prove that the Hoare quintuple (i.e., RSS) satisfies the contract.
[0036] <<Safety Guarantee of Simplex Architecture>> The advanced controller is modeled as a control strategy α, and the baseline controller is modeled as a control strategy β. This means that the advanced controller is modeled as a control strategy α, and the baseline controller is modeled as a control strategy β. 1 , α], the baseline controller 2 , β]. 1 , P 2 are different preconditions.
[0037] The advanced controller may be a general autonomous driving control module, and therefore its safety rules are not self-evident. If the safety rules for the advanced controller are not defined, they may be provided based on general traffic regulations, the performance of autonomous vehicles, common sense, etc. Alternatively, the safety rules may be defined by analyzing the operation of the advanced controller. The safety rules for the baseline controller may be those defined at the time of design, but if the safety rules are unknown, they may be similarly defined based on assumptions, analysis, etc.
[0038] At this time, the safety rule [P 1 , α], we find a Hoare quintuple (A 1 , P 1 , α, Q 1 , G 1 ) can be derived. 2 , β], we find a Hoare quintuple (A 2 , P 2 , β, Q 2 , G 2 ) can be derived. 1 , A 2 are different environmental assumptions, and Q 1 , Q 2 are different postconditions, and G 1 , G 2 are different safety conditions.
[0039]
[0040] When equations (4) and (5) hold, if a simplex architecture is designed to satisfy equation (6), it is possible to always satisfy the safety condition G. In other words, the safety of a simplex architecture that satisfies equation (6) is guaranteed.
[0041]
[0042] Here, C 1 and D are the conditions for switching from control strategy α to control strategy β. 1 As long as the condition C is true, the control strategy α is executed.1 When the condition C becomes false, the control strategy α is interrupted and switched to the control strategy β. 1 This also means that when the control strategy α is terminated while the switching condition C remains true and the switching condition D becomes false, the control strategy β is executed. 1 As long as the condition C is satisfied, the advanced controller performs control. 1 Alternatively, it means that the controller is switched to the baseline controller when the switching condition D is no longer satisfied.
[0043] Also, C 2 is the condition for switching from control strategy β to control strategy α. Equation (6) shows that after switching to control strategy β, the switching condition C 2 When the switching condition C becomes false, the control strategy β is interrupted and the control strategy α is switched back to. In other words, the equation (6) satisfies the switching condition C 2 The baseline controller is maintained as long as the switching condition C 2 This means that when the condition is no longer satisfied, the controller switches back to the advanced controller.
[0044] <<Deriving the Switching Condition>> The switching conditions for the simplex architecture can be derived based on Hoare's quintuple. The switching conditions can be derived as conditions that provide strong guarantees under strong assumptions (strong simplex rules) or as conditions that provide weak guarantees under weak assumptions (weak simplex rules).
[0045] The switching condition based on the strong simplex rule is derived based on the Hoare quintuple (A, P, α, Q, G) so as to satisfy the following lemma. In this case, the switching condition C 1 , C 2 , D is guaranteed to satisfy the safety condition G.
[0046]
[0047] The switching condition based on the weak simplex rule is the Hoare quintuples (A 1 , P 1 , α, Q 1 , G 1 ), (A2 , P 2 , β, Q 2 , G 2 ) is derived to satisfy the following lemma. In this case, the switching condition C 1 , C 2 , D, the simplex architecture satisfies the safety condition G 2 is guaranteed to be satisfied.
[0048]
[0049] Note that int-ext (interruption-extension) is defined below.
[0050]
[0051] The switching condition C derived as above 1 , C 2 , D, if it can be proven that the formula (6) is satisfied, the safety of the control system is logically guaranteed. 1 , C 2 , D satisfies the formula (6), the safety of the control system can be verified.
[0052] <Hardware Configuration of Control System> The hardware configuration of the control system 1 in this embodiment will be described with reference to Fig. 2. The control system 1 in this embodiment can be realized by an embedded device such as an in-vehicle device. Fig. 2 is a block diagram showing an example of the hardware configuration of an embedded device 300 in this embodiment.
[0053] 2, the embedded device 300 includes a CPU (Central Processing Unit) 301, a ROM (Read Only Memory) 302, a RAM (Random Access Memory) 303, a flash memory 304, and a communication I / F (Interface) 305. The hardware components of the embedded device 300 are connected to each other via a bus line 306.
[0054] The CPU 301 is a computing device that controls the entire embedded device 300 and realizes its functions by reading programs and data from a storage device such as the ROM 302 or the flash memory 304 onto the RAM 303 and executing the processes.
[0055] The ROM 302 is an example of a non-volatile semiconductor memory (storage device) that can retain programs and data even when the power is turned off. The ROM 302 functions as a storage device that stores various programs and data necessary for the CPU 301 to execute the various programs installed in the flash memory 304.
[0056] The RAM 303 is an example of a volatile semiconductor memory (storage device) from which programs and data are erased when the power is turned off. The RAM 303 provides a working area into which various programs installed in the ROM 302 or the flash memory 304 are expanded when executed by the CPU 301.
[0057] The flash memory 304 is an example of a non-volatile semiconductor memory (storage device) that stores programs and data. The flash memory 304 functions as a storage device that stores various programs and data executed by the CPU 301. The flash memory 304 also provides a temporary storage area for storing data generated when various programs are executed.
[0058] The communication I / F 305 is an interface that connects to the communication network 9 and enables the control system 1 to perform data communication.
[0059] The embedded device 300 can realize various processes described below by having the hardware configuration shown in Fig. 2. Note that the hardware configuration shown in Fig. 2 is an example, and the embedded device 300 may have other hardware configurations. For example, the embedded device 300 may have multiple CPUs 301 and multiple RAMs 303.
[0060] <Functional Configuration of Control System> The functional configuration of the control system in this embodiment will be described with reference to Fig. 3. Fig. 3 is a block diagram showing an example of the functional configuration of the control system 1 in this embodiment.
[0061] 3, the control system 1 in this embodiment includes a plant 11, an advanced controller 12 (an example of a first controller), a baseline controller 13 (an example of a second controller), and a decision module 14. The control system 1 functions as the plant 11, the advanced controller 12, the baseline controller 13, and the decision module 14 by executing a program installed in advance.
[0062] The control system 1 is a control system that controls a controlled entity. In this embodiment, the control system 1 controls an autonomous vehicle as an example of the controlled entity. The control system 1 may be, for example, an in-vehicle system installed in the autonomous vehicle. For example, the control system 1 may be installed in the instrument panel or center console of the autonomous vehicle. The control system 1 may be implemented using cloud computing or the like that links with an information processing device installed in a remote location via a mobile phone network or the like.
[0063] The plant 11 controls the operation of the autonomous vehicle in accordance with the control strategy executed by the advanced controller 12 or the baseline controller 13. While controlling the operation of the autonomous vehicle, the plant 11 outputs state information indicating the state of the autonomous vehicle.
[0064] The advanced controller 12 instructs the plant 11 on the operation of the autonomous vehicle in accordance with predetermined safety rules. Hereinafter, the safety rules followed by the advanced controller 12 will also be referred to as "first safety rules."
[0065] In this embodiment, the first safety rule is a safety rule implemented by a general autonomous driving control module, and is configured to perform complex control that pursues not only safety but also various performance indexes, such as comfort, speed, and fuel efficiency.
[0066] The baseline controller 13 instructs the plant 11 on the operation of the autonomous vehicle in accordance with predetermined safety rules. Hereinafter, the safety rules followed by the baseline controller 13 will also be referred to as "second safety rules."
[0067] In this embodiment, the second safety rule is configured to perform relatively simple control that emphasizes safety. The second safety rule is an automated driving safety rule. The second safety rule may define stricter safety conditions than the first safety rule. The second safety rule may be, for example, a collision avoidance RSS or a goal achievement RSS.
[0068] The decision module 14 switches between the advanced controller 12 and the baseline controller 13. The decision module 14 determines whether the state information output by the plant 11 satisfies a predetermined switching condition C 1 (an example of a first switching condition), switching condition D (an example of a third switching condition), or switching condition C 2 (an example of a second switching condition) is satisfied.
[0069] Switching condition C 1 is determined based on the first safety rule and the second safety rule. The decision module 14 determines whether the switching condition C 1 The decision module 14 monitors the state information output by the plant 11 based on the switching condition C 1 When the switching condition C is satisfied 1 is true), the advanced controller 12 is executed. On the other hand, the decision module 14 executes the advanced controller 12 when the state information output by the plant 11 satisfies the switching condition C 1 When the switching condition C is not satisfied 1 is false), switch to the baseline controller 13.
[0070] The switching condition D is determined based on the first safety rule and the second safety rule. The decision module 14 monitors the switching condition D after the execution of the advanced controller 12 is completed. When the state information output by the plant 11 does not satisfy the switching condition D (when the switching condition D is false), the decision module 14 switches to the baseline controller 13.
[0071] Switching condition C 2 is determined based on the first and second safety rules. The decision module 14 determines whether the switching condition C 2 The decision module 14 monitors the state information output by the plant 11 based on the switching condition C 2 When the switching condition C is not satisfied 2 is false), the decision module 14 switches to the advanced controller 12. On the other hand, the decision module 14 determines whether the state information output by the plant 11 satisfies the switching condition C 2 When the switching condition C is satisfied 2 is true), continue running the baseline controller 13.
[0072] <Control Method by Control System> A control method by the control system in this embodiment will be described with reference to Fig. 4. Fig. 4 is a flowchart showing an example of the control method in this embodiment. The control method is a procedure by which the control system 1 controls an autonomously driven vehicle.
[0073] In step S1, the plant 11 of the control system 1 controls the operation of the autonomous vehicle. In an initial state, the decision module 14 selects the advanced controller 12. Therefore, the plant 11 controls the operation of the autonomous vehicle in accordance with the control strategy α executed by the advanced controller 12.
[0074] In step S2, the plant 11 of the control system 1 outputs state information indicating the state of the autonomous vehicle. The state information output from the plant 11 is sent to the advanced controller 12, the baseline controller 13, and the decision module 14.
[0075] In step S3, the control system 1 determines the currently selected controller. If the advanced controller 12 is selected (AC), the control system 1 proceeds to step S4. On the other hand, if the baseline controller 13 is selected (BC), the control system 1 proceeds to step S5.
[0076] In step S4, the decision module 14 of the control system 1 executes a first switching process. 1 and D, the process switches from the advanced controller 12 to the baseline controller 13.
[0077] <<First Switching Process>> The first switching process (step S4 in FIG. 4) in this embodiment will be described with reference to Fig. 5. Fig. 5 is a flowchart showing an example of the first switching process in this embodiment.
[0078] In step S4-1, the decision module 14 of the control system 1 determines whether the state information output from the plant 11 is a switching condition C 1 Whether the switching condition C is satisfied or not (in other words, 1 The truth or falsity of the switching condition C is determined. 1 If the answer is true (YES), the decision module 14 proceeds to step S4-2. 1 If it is false (NO), the decision module 14 proceeds to step S4-3.
[0079] In step S4-2, the decision module 14 of the control system 1 determines whether the state information output from the plant 11 satisfies the switching condition D (in other words, whether the switching condition D is true or false). If the switching condition D is false (NO), the decision module 14 proceeds to step S4-3. On the other hand, if the switching condition D is true (YES), the decision module 14 does not switch to the baseline controller 13 and ends the first switching process.
[0080] In step S4-3, the decision module 14 of the control system 1 switches control to the baseline controller 13. Thereafter, the plant 11 controls the operation of the autonomous vehicle in accordance with the control strategy β executed by the baseline controller 13.
[0081] Returning to FIG. 4, in step S5, the decision module 14 of the control system 1 executes the second switching process. 2This is a process of switching from the baseline controller 13 to the advanced controller 12 based on the above.
[0082] <<Second Switching Process>> The second switching process (step S5 in FIG. 4) in this embodiment will be described with reference to Fig. 6. Fig. 6 is a flowchart showing an example of the second switching process in this embodiment.
[0083] In step S5-1, the decision module 14 of the control system 1 determines whether the state information output from the plant 11 satisfies the switching condition C 2 Whether the switching condition C is satisfied or not (in other words, 2 The truth or falsity of the switching condition C is determined. 2 If the condition C is false (NO), the decision module 14 proceeds to step S5-2. 2 If the answer is true (YES), the decision module 14 does not switch to the advanced controller 12 and ends the second switching process.
[0084] In step S5-2, the decision module 14 of the control system 1 switches control to the advanced controller 12. Thereafter, the plant 11 controls the operation of the autonomous vehicle in accordance with the control strategy α executed by the advanced controller 12.
[0085] Returning to Fig. 4, in step S6, the plant 11 of the control system 1 determines whether or not to terminate automatic operation. If automatic operation is to be terminated (YES), the plant 11 terminates the processing of the control method. On the other hand, if automatic operation is not to be terminated (NO), the plant 11 returns the processing to step S1.
[0086] When the process returns to step S1, the control system 1 controls the operation of the autonomous vehicle in accordance with the control strategy executed by the controller selected by the decision module 14. The control system 1 then continues autonomous driving while switching control to a controller appropriate for the state of the autonomous vehicle until autonomous driving is terminated.
[0087] Effects of the First Embodiment The control system 1 according to the present embodiment is configured to detect whether the state information indicating the state of the autonomous vehicle satisfies the switching condition C. 1When the condition C is satisfied, the advanced controller 12 is executed. 1 When the condition C is not satisfied, the baseline controller 13 is executed. 1 is defined to ensure that predetermined safety conditions are met. Therefore, according to this embodiment, safety in autonomous driving can be guaranteed.
[0088] The control system 1 in this embodiment is configured to detect the state of the autonomous vehicle as a switching condition C. 2 If the condition C is not satisfied, the advanced controller 12 is executed. 2 is defined to ensure that predetermined safety conditions are met. Therefore, according to this embodiment, control can be performed taking into account the performance index while ensuring safety in autonomous driving.
[0089] Switching condition C in this embodiment 1 is determined so that the environmental assumption A, precondition P, control strategy α, postcondition Q, and safety condition G derived based on the safety rules satisfy a predetermined contract. The predetermined contract guarantees that, when the environmental assumption A is given, the precondition P is true, the postcondition Q is true while the control strategy α is being executed, and the safety condition G is true while the control strategy α is being executed. Therefore, according to this embodiment, safety in autonomous driving can be logically guaranteed.
[0090] According to one aspect, this embodiment makes it possible to design a control system that ensures safety in autonomous driving. Also, according to this embodiment, it is possible to verify the safety of a control system that controls an autonomously driven mobile object.
[0091] Second Embodiment In the first embodiment, a configuration has been described in which the control system 1 includes the advanced controller 12 and one baseline controller 13. In the second embodiment, a configuration will be described in which the control system 1 includes the advanced controller 12 and a plurality of baseline controllers 13.
[0092] The control system 1 of this embodiment will be described below, focusing on the differences from the first embodiment. The configuration of the control system 1 of this embodiment will be referred to as a "hierarchical simplex architecture."
[0093] <Safety Guarantee of Layered Simplex Architecture> The advanced controller is modeled as control strategy α, and the two baseline controllers are modeled as control strategy β. 1 , β 2 This is modeled as the first baseline controller β 1 is the safety rule [P 1 , β 1 ], and the second baseline controller β 2 is the safety rule [P 2 , β 2 ]. 1 , P 2 are different preconditions. In this embodiment, the advanced controller α does not take safety rules into consideration.
[0094] At this time, the safety rule [P 1 , β 1 ], we find a Hoare quintuple (A 1 , P 1 , β 1 , Q 1 , G 1 ) can be derived. 2 , β 2 ], we find a Hoare quintuple (A 2 , P 2 , β 2 , Q 2 , G 2 ) can be derived. Furthermore, the advanced controller α can be modeled by the equation (9). 1 , A 2 are different environmental assumptions, and Q 1 , Q 2 are different postconditions, G, G 1 , G 2 are different safety conditions.
[0095]
[0096] When equations (7) to (9) hold, if a hierarchical simplex architecture is designed to satisfy equation (10), it is possible to always satisfy the safety condition G. In other words, the safety of a simplex architecture that satisfies equation (10) is guaranteed.
[0097]
[0098] <<Derivation of Switching Condition>> Switching Condition C of Layered Simplex Architecture 1-1 , C 1-2 , C 2-1 , C 2-2 can be derived based on the Hoare quintuple. 1-1 , C 1-2 , C 2-1 , C 2-2 is a Hoare quintuplet (A 1 , P 1 , β 1 , Q 1 , G 1 ), (A 2 , P 2 , β 2 , Q 2 , G 2 ) can be derived to satisfy the following theorem. In this case, the switching condition C 1-1 , C 1-2 , C 2-1 , C 2-2 The layered simplex architecture using 2 is guaranteed to be satisfied.
[0099]
[0100] The switching condition C derived as above 1-1 , C 1-2 , C 2-1 , C 2-2 If it can be proven that the formula (10) is satisfied based on the above, the safety of the control system is logically guaranteed. 1-1 , C 1-2 , C 2-1 , C 2-2By verifying whether or not satisfies equation (10), the safety of the control system can be verified.
[0101] <Functional Configuration of Control System> The functional configuration of the control system in this embodiment will be described with reference to Fig. 7. Fig. 7 is a block diagram showing an example of the functional configuration of the control system 1 in this embodiment.
[0102] 7, the control system 1 in this embodiment includes a plant 11, an advanced controller 12 (an example of a first controller), a decision module 14-1, and a hierarchical baseline controller 15. The hierarchical baseline controller 15 includes a decision module 14-2 (an example of a second decision module), a baseline controller 13-1 (an example of a second controller), and a baseline controller 13-2 (an example of a third controller).
[0103] That is, the control system 1 in the second embodiment differs from the first embodiment in that it includes a hierarchical baseline controller 15 including a determination module 14-2 and two baseline controllers 13-1 and 13-2 instead of the baseline controller 13.
[0104] The baseline controller 13-1 instructs the plant 11 to operate the autonomous vehicle in accordance with a predetermined safety rule. Hereinafter, the safety rule followed by the baseline controller 13-1 will also be referred to as a "second safety rule."
[0105] The baseline controller 13-2 instructs the plant 11 on the operation of the autonomous vehicle in accordance with a predetermined safety rule. Hereinafter, the safety rule followed by the baseline controller 13-2 will also be referred to as a "third safety rule."
[0106] In this embodiment, the second safety rule and the third safety rule are both configured to perform relatively simple control that emphasizes safety. The second safety rule and the third safety rule are both automated driving safety rules, but have different environmental assumptions A and safety conditions G. The third safety rule may have stricter safety conditions than the second safety rule. For example, the second safety rule may be a goal achievement RSS, and the third safety rule may be a collision avoidance RSS.
[0107] The decision module 14-1 switches between the advanced controller 12 and the hierarchical baseline controller 15. The decision module 14-1 determines whether the state information output by the plant 11 satisfies a predetermined switching condition C 1-1 (an example of a first switching condition), switching condition D (an example of a third switching condition), or switching condition C 2-1 (an example of a second switching condition) is satisfied.
[0108] The function of the decision module 14-1 is the same as that of the decision module 14 in the first embodiment. 1-1 and switching condition C 2-1 is the switching condition C in the first embodiment. 1 and switching condition C 2 It is defined in the same way.
[0109] The decision module 14-2 switches between the baseline controller 13-1 and the baseline controller 13-2. The decision module 14-2 determines whether the state information output by the plant 11 satisfies a predetermined switching condition C 1-2 (An example of the fourth switching condition) or switching condition C 2-2 (an example of a fifth switching condition) is satisfied.
[0110] Switching condition C 1-2 is determined based on the second and third safety rules. The decision module 14-2 determines whether the switching condition C 1-2 The decision module 14-2 monitors the state information output by the plant 11 based on the switching condition C 1-2 When the switching condition C is satisfied 1-2is true), the baseline controller 13-1 is executed. On the other hand, the decision module 14-2 executes the baseline controller 13-1 when the state information output by the plant 11 satisfies the switching condition C 1-2 When the switching condition C is not satisfied 1-2 is false), switch to the baseline controller 13-2.
[0111] Switching condition C 2-2 is determined based on the second and third safety rules. The decision module 14-2 determines whether the switching condition C 2-2 The decision module 14-2 monitors the state information output by the plant 11 based on the switching condition C 2-2 When the switching condition C is not satisfied 2-2 is false), the decision module 14-2 switches to the baseline controller 13-1. 2-2 When the switching condition C is satisfied 2-2 is true), the execution of the baseline controller 13-2 continues.
[0112] <Control Method by Control System> A control method by the control system in this embodiment will be described with reference to Fig. 8. Fig. 8 is a flowchart showing an example of the control method in this embodiment. The control method is a procedure by which the control system 1 controls an autonomous vehicle. The control method is executed by the control system 1.
[0113] In step S11, the plant 11 of the control system 1 controls the operation of the autonomous vehicle. In an initial state, the decision module 14-1 selects the advanced controller 12. Therefore, the plant 11 controls the operation of the autonomous vehicle in accordance with the control strategy α executed by the advanced controller 12.
[0114] In step S12, the plant 11 of the control system 1 outputs state information indicating the state of the autonomous vehicle. The state information output from the plant 11 is sent to the advanced controller 12, the hierarchical baseline controller 15, and the decision module 14-1. The hierarchical baseline controller 15 sends the input state information to the baseline controller 13-1, the baseline controller 13-2, and the decision module 14-2.
[0115] In step S13, the control system 1 determines the currently selected controller. If the decision module 14-1 has selected the advanced controller 12 (AC), the control system 1 proceeds to step S14. If the decision module 14-1 has selected the hierarchical baseline controller 15 and the decision module 14-2 has selected the baseline controller 13-1 (BC1), the control system 1 proceeds to step S15. If the decision module 14-1 has selected the hierarchical baseline controller 15 and the decision module 14-2 has selected the baseline controller 13-2 (BC2), the control system 1 proceeds to step S16.
[0116] In step S14, the decision module 14-1 of the control system 1 executes a first switching process. 1-1 and D, the process switches from the advanced controller 12 to the baseline controller 13-1.
[0117] <<First Switching Process>> The first switching process (step S14 in FIG. 8) in this embodiment will be described with reference to Fig. 9. Fig. 9 is a flowchart showing an example of the first switching process in this embodiment.
[0118] In step S14-1, the decision module 14-1 of the control system 1 determines whether the state information output from the plant 11 is a switching condition C 1-1 Whether the switching condition C is satisfied or not (in other words, 1-1 The truth or falsity of the switching condition C is determined. 1-1If the answer is true (YES), the decision module 14-1 proceeds to step S14-2. 1-1 If it is false (NO), the decision module 14-1 proceeds to step S14-3.
[0119] In step S14-2, the decision module 14-1 of the control system 1 determines whether or not the state information output from the plant 11 satisfies the switching condition D (in other words, whether the switching condition D is true or false). If the switching condition D is false (NO), the decision module 14-1 proceeds to step S14-3. On the other hand, if the switching condition D is true (YES), the decision module 14-1 ends the first switching process without switching to the baseline controller 13-1.
[0120] In step S14-3, the decision module 14-1 of the control system 1 switches control to the hierarchical baseline controller 15. Next, the decision module 14-2 of the hierarchical baseline controller 15 selects the baseline controller 13-1. Thereafter, the plant 11 selects the control strategy β 1 The operation of the self-driving vehicle is controlled according to the
[0121] 8, in step S15, the decision module 14-2 of the control system 1 executes the second switching process. 2-1 This is a process of switching from the baseline controller 13-1 to the baseline controller 13-2 or the advanced controller 12 based on the above.
[0122] <<Second Switching Process>> The second switching process (step S15 in FIG. 8) in this embodiment will be described with reference to Fig. 10. Fig. 10 is a flowchart showing an example of the second switching process in this embodiment.
[0123] In step S15-1, the decision module 14-2 of the control system 1 determines whether the state information output from the plant 11 is a switching condition C 1-2 Whether the switching condition C is satisfied or not (in other words, 1-2 The truth or falsity of the switching condition C is determined.1-2 If the answer is true (YES), the decision module 14-2 proceeds to step S15-2. 1-2 If it is false (NO), the decision module 14-2 proceeds to step S15-4.
[0124] In step S15-2, the decision module 14-1 of the control system 1 determines whether the state information output from the plant 11 satisfies the switching condition C 2-1 Whether the switching condition C is satisfied or not (in other words, 2-1 The truth or falsity of the switching condition C is determined. 2-1 If the switching condition C is false (NO), the decision module 14-1 proceeds to step S15-3. 2-1 If the answer is true (YES), the decision module 14-1 ends the second switching process without switching the controller.
[0125] In step S15-3, the decision module 14-1 of the control system 1 switches control to the advanced controller 12. Thereafter, the plant 11 controls the operation of the autonomous vehicle in accordance with the control strategy α executed by the advanced controller 12.
[0126] In step S15-4, the decision module 14-2 of the control system 1 switches control to the baseline controller 13-2. Thereafter, the plant 11 switches control to the control strategy β 2 The operation of the self-driving vehicle is controlled according to the
[0127] 8, in step S16, the decision module 14-2 of the control system 1 executes the third switching process. 2-2 This is a process of switching from the baseline controller 13-2 to the baseline controller 13-1 based on the above.
[0128] <<Third Switching Process>> The third switching process (step S16 in FIG. 8) in this embodiment will be described with reference to Fig. 11. Fig. 11 is a flowchart showing an example of the third switching process in this embodiment.
[0129] In step S16-1, the decision module 14-2 of the control system 1 determines whether the state information output from the plant 11 is a switching condition C 2-2 Whether the switching condition C is satisfied or not (in other words, 2-2 The truth or falsity of the switching condition C is determined. 2-2 If the condition C is false (NO), the decision module 14-2 proceeds to step S16-2. 2-2 If the answer is true (YES), the decision module 14-2 does not switch to the baseline controller 13-1 and ends the third switching process.
[0130] In step S16-2, the decision module 14-2 of the control system 1 switches control to the baseline controller 13-1. Thereafter, the plant 11 switches control strategy β 1 The operation of the self-driving vehicle is controlled according to the
[0131] Returning to Fig. 8, the explanation will be given. In step S17, the plant 11 of the control system 1 determines whether or not to end the automatic operation. If the automatic operation is to be ended (YES), the plant 11 ends the processing of the control method. On the other hand, if the automatic operation is not to be ended (NO), the plant 11 returns the processing to step S11.
[0132] When the process returns to step S11, the control system 1 controls the operation of the autonomous vehicle in accordance with the control strategy executed by the controller selected by the decision module 14-1 or 14-2. The control system 1 then continues autonomous driving while switching control to a controller appropriate for the state of the autonomous vehicle until autonomous driving is terminated.
[0133] <Effects of the Second Embodiment> The control system 1 in this embodiment is configured such that the state information indicating the state of the autonomously driven vehicle satisfies the switching condition C. 1-2 When the condition C is satisfied, the baseline controller 13-1 is executed. 1-2 When the condition C is not satisfied, the layered baseline controller 15 controls the baseline controller 13-2. 1-2is defined to ensure that predetermined safety conditions are met. Therefore, according to this embodiment, safety in autonomous driving can be guaranteed in a control system including three or more controllers.
[0134] The control system 1 in this embodiment is configured to detect the state of the autonomous vehicle as a switching condition C. 2-2 If the condition C is not satisfied, the baseline controller 13-1 is executed. 2-2 is defined to ensure that predetermined safety conditions are met. Therefore, according to this embodiment, in a control system having three or more controllers, it is possible to perform control that takes into account the performance index while ensuring safety in autonomous driving.
[0135] [Supplementary Note] Each function of the above-described embodiments can be realized by one or more processing circuits. Here, the term "processing circuit" in this specification includes a processor programmed to execute each function by software, such as a processor implemented by an electronic circuit, as well as devices such as an ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit), a DSP (Digital Signal Processor), an FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array), and conventional circuit modules designed to execute each of the above-described functions.
[0136] Although the embodiments of the present invention have been described in detail above, the present invention is not limited to these embodiments, and various modifications and changes are possible within the scope of the gist of the present invention described in the claims.
[0137] This application claims priority from Japanese Patent Application No. 2023-90138, filed with the Japan Patent Office on May 31, 2023, the entire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference.
[0138] 1 Control system 11 Plant 12 Advanced controller 13 Baseline controller 14 Decision module 15 Hierarchical baseline controller
Claims
1. A control system comprising: a plant configured to control the operation of a controlled entity and output status information indicating the status of the controlled entity; a first controller configured to instruct the plant to operate the controlled entity in accordance with a first safety rule; a second controller configured to instruct the plant to operate the controlled entity in accordance with a second safety rule; and a decision module configured to execute the first controller when the status information satisfies a first switching condition determined based on the first safety rule and the second safety rule, and to execute the second controller when the status information does not satisfy the first switching condition.
2. A control system according to claim 1, wherein the decision module is configured to execute the first controller when the state information no longer satisfies a second switching condition defined based on the second safety rule while the second controller is being executed.
3. A control system according to claim 2, wherein the decision module is configured to execute the second controller when the state information no longer satisfies a third switching condition defined based on the safety condition of the first safety rule while the first controller is being executed.
4. A control system as described in claim 1, further comprising: a third controller configured to instruct the plant to operate the controlled entity in accordance with a third safety rule; and a second decision module configured to execute the second controller when the status information does not satisfy the first switching condition and satisfies a fourth switching condition determined based on the second safety rule and the third safety rule, and to execute the third controller when the status information does not satisfy the first switching condition and does not satisfy the fourth switching condition.
5. A control system according to claim 4, wherein the second decision module is configured to execute the second controller when the status information no longer satisfies a fifth switching condition defined based on the third safety rule while the third controller is being executed.
6. A control system according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the second safety rule is defined to execute a control strategy for controlling the controlled object when a predetermined precondition is true, and the first switching condition is defined so that an environmental assumption, a postcondition, and a safety condition derived based on the precondition and the control strategy satisfy a predetermined contract.
7. The control system of claim 6, wherein the contract ensures that, given the environmental assumptions, the pre-condition is true, the post-condition is true while executing the control strategy, and the safety condition is true while executing the control strategy.
8. A control method in which a control system comprising: a plant that controls the operation of a controlled entity and outputs status information indicating the status of the controlled entity; a first controller that instructs the plant to operate the controlled entity in accordance with a first safety rule; and a second controller that instructs the plant to operate the controlled entity in accordance with a second safety rule, executes the first controller when the status information satisfies a first switching condition determined based on the first safety rule and the second safety rule; and executes the second controller when the status information does not satisfy the first switching condition.
9. A program for causing a control system comprising: a plant that controls the operation of a controlled entity and outputs status information indicating the state of the controlled entity; a first controller that instructs the plant to operate the controlled entity in accordance with a first safety rule; and a second controller that instructs the plant to operate the controlled entity in accordance with a second safety rule, to execute the following steps: when the status information satisfies a first switching condition determined based on the first safety rule and the second safety rule, execute the first controller; and when the status information does not satisfy the first switching condition, execute the second controller.
Citation Information
Patent Citations
Safe path planning method for mechatronic systems
JP2023506652A
