Collaborative signature method and device, equipment and storage medium

By broadcasting verification parameters and signature information components in the collaborative signature system, each device verifies the legality of the signature information, preventing malicious user equipment from stealing private keys, and improving the security and reliability of the system.

CN118921173APending Publication Date: 2024-11-08BEIJING PUSH TIMES TECH CO LTD +1

Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411061144.8
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-08-02
Publication Date
2024-11-08

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In a collaborative signature system, malicious user equipment may steal the complete private key by calculating shared parameters, resulting in a system security threat.

Method used

By broadcasting signature information components and verification parameters between user devices, each device performs verification to ensure that the signature information components are generated based on randomly generated key parameters calculations rather than malicious designs, thereby preventing theft of private keys.

Benefits of technology

It effectively prevents malicious user equipment from stealing private keys and improves the security and reliability of the collaborative signature system.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The embodiment of the invention provides a collaborative signature method and device, equipment and a storage medium. The method comprises the following steps: randomly generating a first key parameter; determining a first signature information component based on the first key parameter and a preset elliptic curve base point coordinate; determining a first verification parameter based on the first key parameter; broadcasting a first signature information component and a first verification parameter to other user equipment, and receiving a second signature information component and a second verification parameter broadcasted by each of the other user equipment; verifying the second signature information component and the second verification parameter corresponding to each device; and if any one of the devices does not pass the verification, exiting the signature process. The user equipment verifies the corresponding signature information component based on the received verification parameter so as to ensure that the received signature information component is calculated based on a randomly generated integer key parameter.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of confidential communication technology, and in particular to a collaborative signature method, device, equipment and storage medium. Background Art

[0002] In the related art, in order to protect the security of the private key, the private key can be split into multiple private key components, and then each private key component is distributed to different user devices. When a private key signature is required, multiple user devices holding the private key components need to collaborate to complete the signing process. Simply put, the collaborative signing process includes: any user device i calculates a first parameter and broadcasts the first parameter, the central device calculates a shared parameter based on the first parameter broadcast by all user devices and the message to be signed and shares the shared parameter among all user devices participating in the signing process, user device i calculates a second parameter based on the shared parameter and the private key component held by user device i and sends the second parameter to the central device, and finally the central device determines the signature result based on the second parameter sent by all user devices.

[0003] In the above process, if there is a malicious user device among the user devices participating in the signing process, the malicious user device calculates its own first parameter R based on the first parameters of all other user devices after receiving the first parameters broadcast by all other user devices. x , and use this first parameter R x Participating in the process of the central device calculating the shared parameters will cause malicious user devices to infer the entire private key based on the signature result after receiving the signature result, thereby posing a security threat to the collaborative signature system. Summary of the invention

[0004] The embodiments of the present invention provide a collaborative signature method, apparatus, device and storage medium to improve the security and reliability of a collaborative signature system.

[0005] In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a collaborative signature method, which is applied to a target user device, wherein the target user device belongs to a collaborative signature system, and the collaborative signature system also includes other user devices participating in the signature process. The method includes:

[0006] Randomly generate a first key parameter, wherein the first key parameter is an integer;

[0007] Determine a first signature information component based on the first key parameter and preset elliptic curve base point coordinates;

[0008] Determining a first verification parameter based on the first key parameter;

[0009] broadcasting the first signature information component and the first verification parameter to the other user equipments, and receiving the second signature information component and the second verification parameter broadcasted by each of the other user equipments;

[0010] Verifying the second signature information component and the second verification parameter corresponding to each of the devices to determine whether the second signature information component broadcast by each device is calculated based on the second key parameter, the coordinates of the elliptic curve base point and a preset calculation method, wherein the second key parameter is a randomly selected integer;

[0011] If any of the devices fails the verification, the signing process is exited.

[0012] Optionally, determining a first verification parameter based on the first key parameter includes:

[0013] Obtaining a first verification coefficient;

[0014] A first verification parameter is determined based on the first key parameter and the first verification coefficient.

[0015] Optionally, obtaining a first verification coefficient includes:

[0016] Randomly select the first parameter;

[0017] Determine a second parameter based on the first parameter and the coordinates of the elliptic curve base point;

[0018] Determine a hash value of the second parameter and the first signature information component to obtain a first verification coefficient.

[0019] Optionally, the verifying the second signature information component and the second verification parameter corresponding to each of the devices includes:

[0020] For any device among the devices, obtaining a second verification coefficient corresponding to the any device;

[0021] The second verification coefficient, the second signature information component and the second verification parameter corresponding to any one of the devices are verified.

[0022] Optionally, obtaining a second verification coefficient corresponding to any one of the devices includes:

[0023] Determining a third parameter based on the second verification parameter;

[0024] Determine the third parameter and the hash value of the second signature information component corresponding to any one of the devices, and obtain a second verification coefficient corresponding to any one of the devices.

[0025] Optionally, the verifying the second verification coefficient, the second signature information component, and the second verification parameter corresponding to any one of the devices includes:

[0026] Determine a product of a second verification coefficient corresponding to any one of the devices and the second signature information component to obtain a first value;

[0027] Determine the sum of the first value and the third parameter to obtain a second value;

[0028] Based on the second verification parameter, determining a fourth parameter;

[0029] Determine the product of the fourth parameter and the coordinates of the base point of the elliptic curve to obtain a third value;

[0030] determining whether the second value is equal to the third value;

[0031] If the second value is equal to the third value, it is determined that the verification is passed;

[0032] If the second value is not equal to the third value, it is determined that the verification fails.

[0033] In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a collaborative signature device, which is arranged on a target user device, wherein the target user device belongs to a collaborative signature system, and the collaborative signature system also includes other user devices participating in the signature process, wherein the device includes:

[0034] A generating module, configured to randomly generate a first key parameter, wherein the first key parameter is an integer;

[0035] a determination module, configured to determine a first signature information component based on the first key parameter and a preset elliptic curve base point coordinate; and determine a first verification parameter based on the first key parameter;

[0036] a broadcast module, configured to broadcast the first signature information component and the first verification parameter to the other user equipments, and receive the second signature information component and the second verification parameter broadcasted by each of the other user equipments;

[0037] A verification module is used to verify the second signature information component and the second verification parameter corresponding to each of the devices to determine whether the second signature information component broadcast by each device is calculated based on the second key parameter, the coordinates of the elliptic curve base point and a preset calculation method, wherein the second key parameter is a randomly selected integer; if any of the devices fails the verification, the signing process is exited.

[0038] Optionally, the determining module is used to:

[0039] Obtaining a first verification coefficient;

[0040] A first verification parameter is determined based on the first key parameter and the first verification coefficient.

[0041] Optionally, the determining module is used to:

[0042] Randomly select the first parameter;

[0043] Determine a second parameter based on the first parameter and the coordinates of the elliptic curve base point;

[0044] Determine a hash value of the second parameter and the first signature information component to obtain a first verification coefficient.

[0045] Optionally, the verification module is used to:

[0046] For any device among the devices, obtaining a second verification coefficient corresponding to the any device;

[0047] The second verification coefficient, the second signature information component and the second verification parameter corresponding to any one of the devices are verified.

[0048] Optionally, the verification module is used to:

[0049] Determining a third parameter based on the second verification parameter;

[0050] Determine the third parameter and the hash value of the second signature information component corresponding to any one of the devices, and obtain a second verification coefficient corresponding to any one of the devices.

[0051] Optionally, the verification module is used to:

[0052] Determine a product of a second verification coefficient corresponding to any one of the devices and the second signature information component to obtain a first value;

[0053] Determine the sum of the first value and the third parameter to obtain a second value;

[0054] Based on the second verification parameter, determining a fourth parameter;

[0055] Determine the product of the fourth parameter and the coordinates of the base point of the elliptic curve to obtain a third value;

[0056] determining whether the second value is equal to the third value;

[0057] If the second value is equal to the third value, it is determined that the verification is passed;

[0058] If the second value is not equal to the third value, it is determined that the verification fails.

[0059] In a third aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides an electronic device, comprising a processor and a memory, wherein the memory stores executable code, and when the executable code is executed by the processor, the processor can at least implement the collaborative signature method in the first aspect.

[0060] In a fourth aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a non-temporary machine-readable storage medium having executable code stored thereon. When the executable code is executed by a processor of an electronic device, the processor can at least implement the collaborative signature method in the first aspect.

[0061] In the present invention, while each user device broadcasts the signature information component to the outside, it also needs to broadcast the verification parameters calculated by each user device. Each user device will verify the corresponding signature information component based on the received verification parameters to ensure that the received signature information component is calculated based on a randomly generated integer key parameter, rather than being generated by malicious design. In this way, malicious user devices in the collaborative signature system can be prevented from using special means to steal the complete private key, preventing the security of the private key from being threatened, and ensuring the security and reliability of the collaborative signature system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0062] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the description of the embodiments. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative work.

[0063] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of a collaborative signature method provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0064] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the structure of a collaborative signature device provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0065] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0066] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solution in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0067] The terms used in the embodiments of the present invention are only for the purpose of describing specific embodiments, and are not intended to limit the present invention. The singular forms "a", "said" and "the" used in the embodiments of the present invention and the appended claims are also intended to include plural forms, unless the context clearly indicates other meanings, and "multiple" generally includes at least two.

[0068] As used herein, the words "if" and "if" may be interpreted as "at the time of" or "when" or "in response to determining" or "in response to detecting", depending on the context. Similarly, the phrases "if it is determined" or "if (stated condition or event) is detected" may be interpreted as "when it is determined" or "in response to determining" or "when detecting (stated condition or event)" or "in response to detecting (stated condition or event)", depending on the context.

[0069] In addition, the step sequence in the following method embodiments is only an example and not a strict limitation.

[0070] The embodiment of the present invention provides a collaborative signature method, which can be applied to a target user device. The target user device can be a user device participating in a signature process in a collaborative signature system, and other user devices also participate in the signature process in the collaborative signature system, and these user devices work together to complete the signature process.

[0071] In order to ensure the security of the private key, the entire private key can be split into N private key components, and each user device holds a separate private key component. When signing, M user devices holding private key components can participate in the signing process, where M≤N.

[0072] It is worth noting that the calculation process of each user device participating in the signing process is similar. In the embodiment of the present invention, the calculation process in a single user device is explained by taking the target user device as an example. The calculation process in other user devices can be implemented with reference to the calculation process in the target user device, and will not be repeated here.

[0073] The following is a method for generating private key components.

[0074] Assumption d A is the private key, P Ais the corresponding public key, P A =d A G. Where G can be the base point coordinates of the elliptic curve, n G The order of the base point.

[0075] Set the threshold to t, and assume that the private key needs to be split into n parts.

[0076] You can randomly select a i , and a i satisfy We can construct a polynomial p(x), You can randomly choose x i , and x i satisfy Then we can calculate {p(x i )|i=1,2…n},(x i ,p(x i )) is the user device u i The private key component held.

[0077] It should be noted that the polynomial p(x) can be a Lagrange interpolation polynomial, where p(x) is a polynomial passing through n points (u1,v1)...(u n ,v n ) and the degree is not greater than (n-1). The general formula of Lagrange interpolation polynomial can be: in,

[0078] The collaborative signature method provided by the embodiment of the present invention will be specifically described below. Figure 1 FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a collaborative signature method provided by an embodiment of the present invention, and the method includes the following steps:

[0079] 101. Randomly generate a first key parameter, where the first key parameter is an integer.

[0080] 102. Determine a first signature information component based on a first key parameter and a preset elliptic curve base point coordinate.

[0081] 103. Determine a first verification parameter based on the first key parameter.

[0082] 104. Broadcast the first signature information component and the first verification parameter to other user equipments, and receive the second signature information component and the second verification parameter broadcasted by each of the other user equipments.

[0083] 105. Verify the second signature information component and the second verification parameter corresponding to each device to determine whether the second signature information component broadcast by each device is calculated based on the second key parameter, the coordinates of the elliptic curve base point and a preset calculation method, wherein the second key parameter is a randomly selected integer.

[0084] 106. If any of the devices fails the verification, the signing process is exited.

[0085] Assume the target user device is u i , the target user equipment can randomly select the first key parameter r i , and there is Next, the target user equipment may use the first key parameter r i And preset the elliptic curve base point coordinates G, determine the first signature information component R i In one possible implementation, R can be calculated by referring to the following expression: i : R i =r i G.

[0086] Subsequently, the target user equipment may also use the first key parameter r i , determine the first verification parameter π i .

[0087] Optionally, determine a first verification parameter π i The process can be implemented as follows: Get the first verification coefficient c i ; Based on the first key parameter r i And the first verification coefficient c i , determine the first verification parameter π i .

[0088] Among them, optionally, the above-mentioned acquisition of the first verification coefficient c i The process can be implemented as follows: randomly selecting a first parameter; determining a second parameter based on the first parameter and the coordinates of a preset elliptic curve base point; determining the second parameter and the first signature information component R i The hash value of the first verification coefficient c is obtained i .

[0089] The above process of determining the second parameter can be expressed by the following expression: i ′=ri′G. Among them, r i ′ is the first parameter, and there is

[0090] The above determination of the first verification coefficient c i The process can be expressed by the following expression: i =HASH(R i ,Ri ′).

[0091] In determining the first verification coefficient c i Afterwards, based on the first verification coefficient c i , the first parameter r i ' and the first key parameter r i Calculate the first verification parameter π i .

[0092] In a possible implementation, z can be calculated by referring to the following expression: i :z i =r i ′+c i × i Then we can let π i =(R i ′,z i ), thus obtaining the first verification parameter.

[0093] After the target user equipment calculates the first verification parameter, the first signature information component and the first verification parameter can be broadcast to other user equipments, that is, (R i ,π i ). Similarly, other user devices may also generate their own signature information components and verification parameters in the manner described above, which may be referred to as second signature information components and second verification parameters. The specific process of generating the second signature information component and the second verification parameter is similar to the process of generating the first signature information component and the first verification parameter, and will not be elaborated here.

[0094] It should be noted that, as can be seen from the above process description, for the target user device, what needs to be broadcasted externally is the first signature information component and the first verification parameter. Among them, the first signature information component is originally a fixed type of parameter that needs to be broadcast externally, and the first verification parameter is a parameter added in the embodiment of the present invention to prevent malicious user devices from stealing the complete private key in the collaborative signature system. The target user device exposes the first verification parameter to the outside, but does not need to expose the first key parameter to the outside, which ensures the security of the first key parameter, avoids exposing information that can damage the security of the target user device itself, and at the same time can prove R through the first verification parameter. i =r i G. That is, it can be proved by the first verification parameter that R i Indeed, it is a random integer r i It is calculated rather than generated by cheating, which prevents malicious user devices from stealing the complete private key within the collaborative signature system.

[0095] After other user devices generate the second signature information component and the second verification parameter, they can also broadcast the second signature information component and the second verification parameter externally, so that the target user device can receive the second signature information component and the second verification parameter. In this way, the target user device can verify the second signature information component and the second verification parameter corresponding to each other user device to determine whether the second signature information component broadcast by each device is calculated based on the second key parameter, the coordinates of the elliptic curve base point and the preset calculation method, wherein the second key parameter is a randomly selected integer.

[0096] It is worth noting that if the second signature information component received by the target user device contains a maliciously designed second signature information component in a cheating manner, it cannot be verified based on its corresponding second verification parameter. In this way, each user device can verify the signature information components generated by each other, ensure the security of the private key, and then ensure the security and reliability of the collaborative signature system.

[0097] The specific verification process is introduced below.

[0098] Optionally, the process of verifying the second signature information component and the second verification parameter corresponding to each device can be implemented as follows: for any device among the devices, obtain the second verification coefficient corresponding to any device; verify the second verification coefficient, the second signature information component and the second verification parameter corresponding to any device.

[0099] It can be understood that the target user equipment can receive as many sets of second signature information components and second verification parameters as the number of other user equipments. j For example, assuming that the target user equipment receives u j The second signature information component and the second verification parameter sent are (R j ,π j ). During the verification process, the target user device can obtain u j The corresponding second verification coefficient c j , based on u j The corresponding second verification coefficient c j , the second signature information component R j And the second verification parameter π j to verify.

[0100] Optionally, get u j The corresponding second verification coefficient c j The process can be implemented as follows: Determine u j The corresponding third parameter R j ' and the second signature information component Rj The hash value of u j The corresponding second verification coefficient c j .

[0101] The above determination of the second verification coefficient c j The process can be expressed by the following expression: j =HASH(R j ,R j ′). Among them, R j ′ is the second verification parameter π j Get, π j =(R j ′,z j ).

[0102] After determining the second verification coefficient c j Afterwards, the target user device can j The corresponding second verification coefficient c j , the second signature information component R j And the second verification parameter π j Specifically, optionally, the process can be implemented as follows: determine u j The corresponding second verification coefficient c j and u j The corresponding second signature information component R j The product of the first value is obtained; determine the first value and u j The corresponding third parameter R j ′ and the second value is obtained; based on the second verification parameter π j , determine the fourth parameter z j ; Determine z j The third value is obtained by multiplying the second value with the preset elliptic curve base point coordinate G; determining whether the second value is equal to the third value; if the second value is equal to the third value, determining that the verification is successful; if the second value is not equal to the third value, determining that the verification is unsuccessful.

[0103] In practical applications, u can be calculated j The corresponding c j and R j The product of , so that the first value can be obtained. Then the first value and R j ' and the second value. Then, we can calculate z j The product of G and the third value is obtained. The second value and the third value can be compared. If the two values ​​are equal, it proves that u j The broadcast R j is based on a randomly chosen integer r j In other words, it represents R jThe possibility of being generated by malicious design is extremely small, so the verification is confirmed to pass, otherwise the verification will fail.

[0104] Since there are multiple other user devices in the collaborative signature system, the above verification method can be used to verify each other user device. The specific verification process is the same and will not be elaborated here.

[0105] For the target user device, if it is found that any of the other user devices cannot pass the verification, the signing process can be exited. It is understandable that if it is found that a device among the other user devices cannot pass the verification, it means that the device is likely to maliciously design and generate the second signature information component for external broadcasting. Therefore, in order to ensure the security of the private key and the reliability of the collaborative signature system, the signing process can be exited immediately.

[0106] Accordingly, if each user device in the collaborative signature system passes the verification, the subsequent signing process can continue. Specifically, optionally, the collaborative signature system also includes a central device. The target user device broadcasts a first signature information component to other user devices and the central device; the central device receives the first signature information component broadcast by the target user device and the second signature information component broadcast by all devices in the other user devices; the central device determines the shared parameters based on the first signature information component, the second signature information component and the message to be signed; the central device shares the shared parameters with the target user device and other user devices; the target user device determines the first target information based on the shared parameters and the private key component corresponding to the target user device, and sends the first target information to the central device; the central device determines the signature result based on the first target information sent by the target user device and the second target information sent by all devices in the other user devices.

[0107] In actual applications, the target user device can broadcast the first signature information component externally, including the central device. Based on this, the central device can also receive the first signature information component broadcast by the target user device. At the same time, other user devices also need to broadcast their own second signature information components externally, so the central device can eventually collect the first signature information component broadcast by the target user device, as well as the second signature information component broadcast by all user devices in other user devices. Then, the central device can determine the shared parameters based on the above-mentioned received signature information components, in collaboration with the first signature information component, the second signature information component and the message to be signed.

[0108] In some optional embodiments, the process of determining the shared parameters can be implemented as follows: the central device calculates R, where R = ∑R iThat is, the central device calculates R based on the first signature information component broadcast by the target user device and the second signature information component broadcast by all user devices in other user devices. Then, the central device can calculate the shared parameters based on R, the message to be signed, and the public key PK. The process of calculating the shared parameters can be expressed as: e=H(PK||R||M).

[0109] After the central device calculates the shared parameters, the shared parameters can be shared internally, that is, the shared parameters are shared with the target user equipment and other user equipment. In this way, the target user equipment can obtain the shared parameters.

[0110] After the target user equipment obtains the shared parameter, the first target information can be determined based on the first key parameter, the shared parameter, and the private key component corresponding to the target user equipment. The process can be specifically implemented as follows: Calculate S i =r i +e*p(x i )c i,{1,2…t} (0). Among them, S i is the first target information, r i is the first key parameter, e is the shared parameter, p(x i ) is the private key component held by the target user device, c i,{1,2…t} (0) is c j,{1,…n} (u) is a deformation of

[0111] After the target user device calculates the first target information, it can broadcast the first target information externally. Similarly, the way other user devices calculate their respective second target information is similar to the way they calculate the first target information, and the process of calculating the second target information can be implemented with reference to the description of the way they calculate the first target information. After other user devices each calculate the corresponding second target information, they can broadcast the second target information externally. In this way, the central device can receive the first target information broadcast by the target user device and the second target information broadcast by all user devices in other user devices. The central device can then calculate the signature result based on the above received target information. Among them, the process of calculating the signature result can be expressed as: S = ∑S i Among them, S i Any target information among the first target information broadcasted by the target user equipment and the second target information broadcasted by all the user equipments in other user equipments. Finally, (R, S) is the signature result.

[0112] In the above process, it is assumed that there is a malicious user device u x , the malicious user device u x In the process of collaboratively calculating R, after receiving the R calculated by all other user devices,i After that, select And calculate R x =r x G-∑ i=1,2…t and i≠x R i , using R x Participate in the collaborative calculation of R. In this case, the collaborative calculation will result in R = r x G. After the central device generates the signature result, the malicious user device u x Get the signature result and calculate (Sr x )*e -1 The entire private key d can be deduced A It can be seen that if malicious user devices are allowed to participate in the signing process, it does not prevent malicious user devices from generating specific R x , then a malicious user device can steal the complete private key.

[0113] In order to avoid the above problems, in the embodiment of the present invention, when each user device broadcasts the signature information component to the outside, it is also necessary to broadcast the verification parameters calculated by each user device. Each user device will verify the corresponding signature information component based on the received verification parameters to ensure that the received signature information component is calculated based on a randomly generated integer key parameter, rather than being generated by malicious design. In this way, malicious user devices in the collaborative signature system can be prevented from using special means to steal the complete private key, the security of the private key can be prevented from being threatened, and the security and reliability of the collaborative signature system can be guaranteed.

[0114] The following will describe in detail the collaborative signature device of one or more embodiments of the present invention. Those skilled in the art will appreciate that these collaborative signature devices can be configured using commercially available hardware components through the steps taught in this solution.

[0115] Figure 2 The structure diagram of a collaborative signature device provided by an embodiment of the present invention is shown in FIG. 1 . The collaborative signature device can be set in a target user device, and the target user device belongs to a collaborative signature system, and the collaborative signature system also includes other user devices participating in the signature process. Figure 2 As shown, the device comprises:

[0116] A generating module 21, configured to randomly generate a first key parameter, wherein the first key parameter is an integer;

[0117] A determination module 22, configured to determine a first signature information component based on the first key parameter and a preset elliptic curve base point coordinate; and determine a first verification parameter based on the first key parameter;

[0118] A broadcast module 23, configured to broadcast the first signature information component and the first verification parameter to the other user equipments, and receive the second signature information component and the second verification parameter broadcasted by each of the other user equipments;

[0119] The verification module 24 is used to verify the second signature information component and the second verification parameter corresponding to each of the devices to determine whether the second signature information component broadcast by each device is calculated based on the second key parameter, the coordinates of the elliptic curve base point and a preset calculation method, wherein the second key parameter is a randomly selected integer; if any of the devices fails the verification, the signing process is exited.

[0120] Optionally, the determining module 22 is used to:

[0121] Obtaining a first verification coefficient;

[0122] A first verification parameter is determined based on the first key parameter and the first verification coefficient.

[0123] Optionally, the determining module 22 is used to:

[0124] Randomly select the first parameter;

[0125] Determine a second parameter based on the first parameter and the coordinates of the elliptic curve base point;

[0126] Determine a hash value of the second parameter and the first signature information component to obtain a first verification coefficient.

[0127] Optionally, the verification module 24 is used to:

[0128] For any device among the devices, obtaining a second verification coefficient corresponding to the any device;

[0129] The second verification coefficient, the second signature information component and the second verification parameter corresponding to any one of the devices are verified.

[0130] Optionally, the verification module 24 is used to:

[0131] Determining a third parameter based on the second verification parameter;

[0132] Determine the third parameter and the hash value of the second signature information component corresponding to any one of the devices, and obtain a second verification coefficient corresponding to any one of the devices.

[0133] Optionally, the verification module 24 is used to:

[0134] Determine a product of a second verification coefficient corresponding to any one of the devices and the second signature information component to obtain a first value;

[0135] Determine the sum of the first value and the third parameter to obtain a second value;

[0136] Based on the second verification parameter, determining a fourth parameter;

[0137] Determine the product of the fourth parameter and the coordinates of the base point of the elliptic curve to obtain a third value;

[0138] determining whether the second value is equal to the third value;

[0139] If the second value is equal to the third value, it is determined that the verification is passed;

[0140] If the second value is not equal to the third value, it is determined that the verification fails.

[0141] Figure 2 The device shown can perform the aforementioned Figure 1 The collaborative signature method provided in the illustrated embodiment, the detailed execution process and technical effects are described in the aforementioned embodiments and will not be repeated here.

[0142] In one possible design, the above Figure 2 The structure of the collaborative signature device shown can be implemented as an electronic device, which can be Figure 1 The target user equipment in the embodiment shown. Figure 3 As shown, the electronic device may include: a processor 91 and a memory 92. The memory 92 stores executable code, and when the executable code is executed by the processor 91, the processor 91 can at least implement the above-mentioned Figure 1 The collaborative signature method provided in the illustrated embodiment.

[0143] Optionally, the electronic device may further include a communication interface 93 for communicating with other devices.

[0144] In addition, an embodiment of the present invention provides a non-transitory machine-readable storage medium, wherein an executable code is stored on the non-transitory machine-readable storage medium. When the executable code is executed by a processor of an electronic device, the processor can at least implement the above-mentioned Figure 1 The collaborative signature method provided in the illustrated embodiment.

[0145] The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative, wherein the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the present embodiment. Those of ordinary skill in the art may understand and implement the present invention without creative effort.

[0146] Through the description of the above embodiments, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that each embodiment can be implemented by adding a necessary general hardware platform, and of course can also be implemented by combining hardware and software. Based on such an understanding, the above technical solution is essentially or the part that contributes to the prior art can be embodied in the form of a computer product, and the present invention can be in the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program codes.

[0147] The collaborative signature method provided in the embodiment of the present invention can be executed by a certain program / software, which can be provided by the network side. The electronic device mentioned in the above embodiment can download the program / software to a local non-volatile storage medium, and when it needs to execute the above collaborative signature method, the program / software is read into the memory by the CPU, and then the CPU executes the program / software to implement the collaborative signature method provided in the above embodiment. The execution process can refer to the above Figure 1 Instructions in .

[0148] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that they can still modify the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments, or make equivalent replacements for some of the technical features therein. However, these modifications or replacements do not deviate the essence of the corresponding technical solutions from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims

1. A collaborative signature method, characterized in that: Applied to a target user device, the target user device belongs to a collaborative signature system, the collaborative signature system also includes other user devices participating in the signing process, the method includes: Randomly generate a first key parameter, wherein the first key parameter is an integer; Determine a first signature information component based on the first key parameter and preset elliptic curve base point coordinates; Determining a first verification parameter based on the first key parameter; broadcasting the first signature information component and the first verification parameter to the other user equipments, and receiving the second signature information component and the second verification parameter broadcasted by each of the other user equipments; Verifying the second signature information component and the second verification parameter corresponding to each of the devices to determine whether the second signature information component broadcast by each device is calculated based on the second key parameter, the coordinates of the elliptic curve base point and a preset calculation method, wherein the second key parameter is a randomly selected integer; If any of the devices fails the verification, the signing process is exited.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The determining a first verification parameter based on the first key parameter includes: Obtaining a first verification coefficient; A first verification parameter is determined based on the first key parameter and the first verification coefficient.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The obtaining of the first verification coefficient comprises: Randomly select the first parameter; Determine a second parameter based on the first parameter and the coordinates of the elliptic curve base point; Determine a hash value of the second parameter and the first signature information component to obtain a first verification coefficient.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The verifying the second signature information component and the second verification parameter corresponding to each of the devices includes: For any device among the devices, obtaining a second verification coefficient corresponding to the any device; The second verification coefficient, the second signature information component and the second verification parameter corresponding to any one of the devices are verified.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The obtaining a second verification coefficient corresponding to any one of the devices includes: Determining a third parameter based on the second verification parameter; Determine the third parameter and the hash value of the second signature information component corresponding to any one of the devices, and obtain a second verification coefficient corresponding to any one of the devices.

6. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The verifying the second verification coefficient, the second signature information component, and the second verification parameter corresponding to any one of the devices includes: Determine a product of a second verification coefficient corresponding to any one of the devices and the second signature information component to obtain a first value; Determine the sum of the first value and the third parameter to obtain a second value; Based on the second verification parameter, determining a fourth parameter; Determine the product of the fourth parameter and the coordinates of the base point of the elliptic curve to obtain a third value; determining whether the second value is equal to the third value; If the second value is equal to the third value, it is determined that the verification is passed; If the second value is not equal to the third value, it is determined that the verification fails.

7. A collaborative signature device, characterized in that: Set on a target user device, the target user device belongs to a collaborative signature system, the collaborative signature system also includes other user devices participating in the signing process, the device includes: A generating module, configured to randomly generate a first key parameter, wherein the first key parameter is an integer; a determination module, configured to determine a first signature information component based on the first key parameter and a preset elliptic curve base point coordinate; and determine a first verification parameter based on the first key parameter; a broadcast module, configured to broadcast the first signature information component and the first verification parameter to the other user equipments, and receive the second signature information component and the second verification parameter broadcasted by each of the other user equipments; A verification module is used to verify the second signature information component and the second verification parameter corresponding to each of the devices to determine whether the second signature information component broadcast by each device is calculated based on the second key parameter, the coordinates of the elliptic curve base point and a preset calculation method, wherein the second key parameter is a randomly selected integer; if any of the devices fails the verification, the signing process is exited.

8. The device according to claim 7, characterized in that The determining module is used to: Obtaining a first verification coefficient; A first verification parameter is determined based on the first key parameter and the first verification coefficient.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that: include: A memory and a processor; wherein the memory stores executable code, and when the executable code is executed by the processor, the processor executes the collaborative signature method as described in any one of claims 1-6.

10. A non-transitory machine-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The non-transitory machine-readable storage medium stores executable code, and when the executable code is executed by a processor of an electronic device, the processor executes the collaborative signature method as described in any one of claims 1-6.

Citation Information

Patent Citations

  • Collaborative signature method and collaborative signature system

    CN117439737A

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