Dynamic trusted measurement method and device for accessing equipment to trusted switch, equipment, medium and program product

Through the dynamic trustworthy measurement method of the device accessing a trusted switch, the access device is continuously measured using the trustworthy verification model of the security management terminal, and the problem of insufficient trustworthy measurement after the device access in traditional technology is solved, and the problem of "insufficient trustworthy measurement" is realized. Continuous security guarantee for industrial control system networks.

CN118972290APending Publication Date: 2024-11-15NINGBO HOLLYSHI INFORMATION SECURITY RES INST CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202410937857.X
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-07-12
Publication Date
2024-11-15

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Traditional device access methods have security risks, especially in industrial control systems, trustworthy verification before equipment access switches fails to effectively solve the continuous trustworthy measurement problem after equipment access, making it difficult to ensure network security.

Method used

Provide a dynamic trustworthy metric method for the device to access a trusted switch. By obtaining the trustworthy verification model of the target device sent by the security management terminal, the dynamic trustworthy metric is repeatedly executed, the current to be measured information of the target device is obtained, and the verification is based on the verification. The model measures the connection and disconnects when the measurement fails to pass, ensuring the identity legitimacy of the device and the security of data transmission.

Benefits of technology

It realizes continuous and reliable measurement of access device behavior, prevents malicious behavior, enhances the security of the industrial control network, and ensures the legality of the device identity and the security of data transmission.

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Abstract

The invention discloses a dynamic trusted measurement method and device for accessing equipment to a trusted switch, the equipment, a medium and a program product, and relates to the field of accessing the equipment to the trusted switch, and the method comprises the following steps: obtaining a trusted verification model of target equipment sent by a security management terminal; wherein the credible verification model represents communication characteristics between the target device and other devices; the credible verification model comprises a logical combination of one or more sub-verification models; after the target equipment is accessed, the following steps are repeatedly executed to carry out dynamic trusted measurement: obtaining current to-be-measured information of the target equipment; performing credibility measurement on the current to-be-measured information according to the credibility verification model; when the measurement is passed, returning to the step of acquiring the current to-be-measured information of the target equipment; when the measurement is not passed, disconnecting the connection between the trusted switch and the target equipment; according to the invention, credibility measurement can be continuously carried out on behaviors of the access equipment, malicious behaviors are effectively prevented, and the whole industrial control network is ensured to be safe and credible.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of device access to a trusted switch, and in particular relates to a dynamic trust measurement method, device, equipment, medium and program product for device access to a trusted switch. Background Art

[0002] As an important basic strategic resource, Industrial Control System (ICS) is used in more than 80% of critical infrastructure. It has the ability to control the switches of hydropower stations, detect the status of power grids, or control the pressure of fuel and gas pipelines, and plays an important role in the national infrastructure.

[0003] With the rapid development of network technology, the demand for device access to the network is growing. However, traditional device access methods often have security risks, such as device identity forgery, data transmission leakage, etc. In order to solve these problems, it is necessary to perform security detection on device access to the network to ensure the legitimacy of the identity of the access device and the security of data transmission. For trusted access of industrial control system equipment, the following patents have been studied:

[0004] In the publication number "CN105933245A", the invention name is "A secure and trusted access method in a software-defined network", a secure access method in a software-defined network is disclosed, which introduces trusted access technology into the access process in the SDN network; by combining with trusted computing technology, it can effectively prevent unsafe devices from accessing the network.

[0005] In the publication number "CN104468606A", the invention name is "A trusted connection system and method based on power production control systems", which involves a trusted connection system and method based on power production control systems. It adopts trusted computing technologies such as dynamic measurement to ensure the trustworthiness of connection objects in the system, prevent illegal external connections and illegal tampering of business processes, effectively prevent the spread of viruses in the network, and improve the security of system services.

[0006] The above patent focuses on the trust verification before the device is connected to the switch, and does not perform continuous trust measurement after the device is connected to the switch. Summary of the invention

[0007] In order to solve the above problems, the present invention provides a dynamic trust measurement method, device, equipment, medium and program product for device access to a trusted switch, which can continuously perform trust measurement on the behavior of the access device, effectively prevent the occurrence of malicious behavior, and ensure the security and trustworthiness of the entire industrial control network.

[0008] In a first aspect, a dynamic trust measurement method for device access to a trusted switch provided by the present invention is applied to a trusted switch, wherein the trusted switch is respectively connected to a security management terminal, a target device, and other devices in communication; wherein the target device is connected to the other devices in communication; and the method comprises:

[0009] Acquire a trusted verification model of a target device sent by a security management terminal; wherein the trusted verification model is used to characterize the communication characteristics between the target device and the other devices; the trusted verification model includes a logical combination of one or more sub-verification models;

[0010] When the target device is connected, repeat the following steps to perform dynamic trust measurement:

[0011] Acquire current information to be measured of the target device;

[0012] The current information to be measured is trusted measured according to the trusted verification model; when the measurement passes, returning to the step of obtaining the current information to be measured of the target device; when the measurement fails, disconnecting the connection between the trusted switch and the target device.

[0013] In an optional implementation manner, when obtaining the trusted verification model of the target device sent by the security management terminal, it also includes:

[0014] Obtaining identity authentication information of the target device sent by the security management terminal;

[0015] Updating the whitelist of the trusted switch according to the identity authentication information;

[0016] and / or,

[0017] Authentication is performed according to the authentication information and the white list, and when the authentication is passed, the target device is connected to the trusted switch.

[0018] In an optional implementation, the identity authentication information includes MAC address information.

[0019] In an optional implementation manner, after obtaining the trusted verification model of the target device sent by the security management terminal, the method further includes:

[0020] The threshold range corresponding to each sub-verification model is determined to determine the threshold line of the trusted verification model.

[0021] In an optional implementation manner, before obtaining the current information to be measured of the target device, the method further includes:

[0022] Obtaining a trust report generated by the trusted switch according to the target device;

[0023] forwarding the trustworthy report to the security management terminal so that the security management terminal verifies the trustworthy report;

[0024] Obtaining a verification result of a trustworthy report sent by the security management terminal;

[0025] Determine whether the trusted report verification result is passed, if not, disconnect the connection between the trusted switch and the target device; if yes, connect the target device and perform the dynamic trusted measurement step.

[0026] In an optional implementation, the target device is an engineer station in an industrial control system, the other devices include a PLC controller in the industrial control system, and the trusted verification model of the engineer station includes:

[0027] A logical combination of one or more sub-verification models among the long-term bandwidth sub-verification model, the burst bandwidth sub-verification model, the high bandwidth duration sub-verification model, and the high bandwidth occurrence times per unit time sub-verification model.

[0028] In a second aspect, the present invention provides a dynamic trust measurement device for accessing a trusted switch, which is applied to a trusted switch, wherein the trusted switch is respectively connected to a security management terminal, a target device, and other devices in communication; wherein the target device is connected to the other devices in communication; and the device comprises:

[0029] A model acquisition module, used to acquire a trusted verification model of a target device sent by a security management terminal; wherein the trusted verification model is used to characterize the communication characteristics between the target device and the other devices; the trusted verification model includes a logical combination of multiple sub-verification models;

[0030] The dynamic trusted measurement module is used to repeatedly execute the measurement information acquisition submodule and the trusted measurement submodule to perform dynamic trusted measurement after the target device is connected:

[0031] The measurement information acquisition submodule is used to obtain the current to-be-measured information of the target device;

[0032] The trusted measurement submodule is used to perform trusted measurement on the current information to be measured according to the trusted verification model; when the measurement passes, return to the step of obtaining the current information to be measured of the target device; when the measurement fails, disconnect the connection between the trusted switch and the target device.

[0033] In a third aspect, the present invention provides an electronic device, comprising:

[0034] one or more processors;

[0035] a memory for storing executable instructions;

[0036] The one or more processors are configured to call the executable instructions stored in the memory to execute the above method.

[0037] In a fourth aspect, the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium having computer program instructions stored thereon, wherein the computer program instructions implement the above method when executed by a processor.

[0038] In a fifth aspect, the present invention provides a computer program product, including a computer-readable code, or a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium carrying a computer-readable code. When the computer-readable code runs in an electronic device, the processor in the electronic device executes the above method.

[0039] The technical solution provided by the present invention has the following beneficial effects: the dynamic trusted measurement method, apparatus, device, medium and program product of the device accessing the trusted switch of the present invention obtains the trusted verification model of the target device sent by the security management terminal; the trusted verification model is used to characterize the communication characteristics between the target device and other devices. After detecting the access of the target device, the dynamic trusted measurement is performed by repeatedly executing the steps of "obtaining the current information to be measured of the target device; performing trusted measurement on the current information to be measured according to the trusted verification model; when the measurement passes, returning to the step of obtaining the current information to be measured of the target device; when the measurement fails, disconnecting the connection between the trusted switch and the target device", thereby realizing continuous trusted measurement of the behavior and trusted state of the target device, ensuring the identity legitimacy of the target device and the security of data transmission, and enhancing the identity authentication and security measurement capabilities of the target device. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0040] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of a flow chart of a method for dynamic trust measurement of a device access switch provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0041] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the connection relationship between a trusted switch, a security management terminal and a device in a dynamic trust measurement method for device access switch provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0042] Figure 3 Another schematic diagram of a flow chart of a method for dynamic trust measurement of a device access switch provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0043] Figure 4 A system schematic diagram of a dynamic trust measurement device for a device access switch provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0044] Figure 5A system schematic diagram of an electronic device provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0045] In the figure: 10-model acquisition module; 20-dynamic trusted measurement module; 21-measurement information acquisition submodule; 22-trusted measurement submodule; 201-trusted switch; 202-security management terminal; 203-target device; 204-other devices; 205-trusted report; 206-trusted verification model; 500-electronic device; 510-processing component; 520-power supply component; 530-memory; 540-network interface; 550-input / output interface. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0046] The present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and in conjunction with embodiments.

[0047] This embodiment provides a method for dynamic trust measurement of a device access switch. The method of this embodiment is applied to a trusted switch in an industrial control system, such as Figure 2 As shown, the trusted switch 201 is respectively connected to the security management terminal 202, the target device 203 and the other device 204 in communication; wherein, the target device 203 and the other device 204 are connected in communication (through the trusted switch). In different industrial control systems, the types of equipment are different. Taking the PLC system (Programmable Logic Controller) as an example, the equipment types generally include engineer stations, operator stations and PLC controllers. In this embodiment, the engineer station is used as the target device. The communication relationship of the engineer station is relatively simple, and usually includes communication with the PLC controller (i.e., the aforementioned other devices) within a fixed range. The security management terminal in this embodiment can be used as a trusted third-party adjudication system, responsible for formulating and issuing trusted verification models and adjudicating trusted reports.

[0048] See also Figure 1 The device access switch dynamic trust measurement method of this embodiment includes steps S110 to S120.

[0049] Step S110, obtaining a trusted verification model of the target device sent by the security management terminal; wherein the trusted verification model is used to characterize the communication characteristics between the target device and other devices; the trusted verification model includes a logical combination of one or more sub-verification models. Here, the communication characteristics refer to the characteristics of the network behavior of the target device, such as communication relationship, data bandwidth, communication duration, communication direction and data packet size. Among them, the communication relationship refers to the communication relationship between the target device and other devices.

[0050] Preferably, when the target device is an engineer station in an industrial control system and the other devices are PLC controllers in the industrial control system, the trusted verification model of the engineer station includes a logical combination of one or more sub-verification models in the long-term bandwidth sub-verification model, the burst bandwidth sub-verification model, the high bandwidth duration sub-verification model, and the high bandwidth occurrence times per unit time sub-verification model. In some possible embodiments, these sub-verification models are all provided with a threshold range; therefore, after obtaining the trusted verification model of the target device sent by the security management terminal, it is also necessary to determine the threshold range corresponding to each sub-verification model to determine the threshold line of the trusted verification model.

[0051] When configuring the threshold line, consider that the engineer station is usually only monitoring the status and the data volume is small. A large amount of data will be sent only when performing engineering configuration or upgrading the firmware. The modification of engineering configuration and firmware must be very low frequency. Therefore, the threshold line can be set as follows: the long-term bandwidth is less than the first threshold, the burst bandwidth increases, the high bandwidth duration is less than the second threshold, and the number of high bandwidth occurrences per unit time is less than the third threshold.

[0052] "Logic" includes AND logic and OR logic. Therefore, the logical combination can be that the first sub-verification model and the second sub-verification model simultaneously satisfy their respective corresponding threshold ranges, or it can be that the first sub-verification model, the second sub-verification model, or only two of the second sub-verification model satisfy their respective corresponding threshold ranges.

[0053] Step S120: After the target device is connected, the following steps S121 to S124 are executed to perform dynamic trust measurement:

[0054] Step S121, obtaining the current information to be measured of the target device, wherein the current information to be measured is sent by the target device to the trusted switch. The information to be measured refers to the communication characteristics of the target device, such as the communication characteristics of the engineer station including communication bandwidth and communication duration.

[0055] Step S122, perform trustworthy measurement on the current information to be measured according to the trusted verification model. Since the trusted verification model includes a logical combination of multiple sub-verification models, the value of each sub-verification model is calculated using the current information to be measured. For example, in the burst bandwidth sub-verification model, the value of the burst bandwidth is calculated using the current information to be measured. For some sub-verification models, it is necessary to record and store information to be measured for a certain duration, such as the long-term bandwidth sub-verification model and the high-bandwidth duration sub-verification model. The long-term bandwidth sub-verification model needs to record the bandwidth of a preset duration and then calculate the bandwidth of the preset duration; the high-bandwidth duration sub-verification model needs to record the duration of the bandwidth that meets the preset bandwidth threshold to obtain the duration value.

[0056] Step S123, determine whether the measurement passes; when the measurement passes, return to step S121; when the measurement does not pass, execute the next step. Specifically, determine whether the measurement passes by the threshold line, the threshold line includes a threshold range corresponding to multiple sub-verification models, and determine whether each sub-verification model exceeds the corresponding threshold range by the threshold range corresponding to the multiple sub-verification models. If so, the measurement fails, and if it does not exceed the corresponding threshold range, the measurement passes.

[0057] For example, whether the long-term bandwidth value obtained by the long-term bandwidth sub-verification model is less than the first threshold, whether the high bandwidth duration value obtained by the high bandwidth duration sub-verification model is less than the second threshold, whether the high bandwidth occurrence times per unit time value obtained by the high bandwidth occurrence times per unit time sub-model is less than the third threshold, and whether the burst bandwidth value obtained by the burst bandwidth sub-verification model is greater than the fourth threshold. If any of the above exceeds the threshold range, the measurement fails, and if all meet the threshold range, the measurement passes.

[0058] Step S124, disconnecting the connection between the trusted switch and the target device. When the measurement fails, disconnecting the connection between the trusted switch and the target device.

[0059] In some possible embodiments, before the target device accesses, it is necessary to authenticate the target device; therefore, step S110 also includes the following steps (1)-(2) and / or step (3).

[0060] (1) Obtain the identity authentication information of the target device sent by the security management terminal.

[0061] (2) Update the whitelist of trusted switches based on the identity authentication information.

[0062] (3) Authentication is performed based on the authentication information and the whitelist. When the authentication passes, the target device is connected to the trusted switch.

[0063] Preferably, before executing step (1), the target device needs to be registered in the security management terminal. The identity authentication information includes MAC address information, that is, in this embodiment, the MAC address of the target device itself is used as the identity authentication information to register in the security management terminal. After registration, the security management terminal sends the MAC address of the target device to the trusted switch.

[0064] Among them, the MAC address (Media Access Control Address), also known as the physical address, hardware address or link layer address, is a unique identifier used to identify network devices in a local area network (LAN). The MAC address is designed to work on the physical layer (Layer 2) in the network to ensure that data packets can be correctly sent to specific devices in the network. The MAC address is unique. The whitelist (also known as the access MAC address table) used in this embodiment includes the MAC addresses of multiple authenticated devices. Through identity authentication, the trusted switch only allows devices with known MAC addresses to connect to the trusted switch, thereby utilizing the uniqueness of the MAC address to prevent unauthorized access, thereby enhancing the security of the industrial control system.

[0065] Here, steps (1)-(2) and / or (3) mean: if the target device has not been registered, then steps (1), (2) and (3) need to be executed; if the target device has been registered but disconnected in the middle, when it is connected again, only step (3) needs to be executed.

[0066] In some possible embodiments, the following steps are also included before step S121:

[0067] Obtain a trusted report generated by a trusted switch based on the target device;

[0068] Forwarding the trust report to the security management terminal so that the security management terminal can verify the trust report;

[0069] Obtain the verification results of the trusted report sent by the security management terminal;

[0070] It is determined whether the result of the trusted report verification is passed. If not, the connection between the trusted switch and the target device is disconnected and the security management terminal is notified; if yes, step S120 is executed to perform dynamic trusted measurement.

[0071] Here, the target device of this embodiment has the ability of trust measurement, can perform trust measurement on itself, and form a trust report with the measurement result, and report it to the trusted switch. The trusted switch forwards the trust report to the security management terminal, and the security management terminal verifies the trust report. If there is a measurement failure item in the trust report, the verification fails, and the trusted switch does not allow the target device to access. At this time, the security management terminal will send the decision result to the trusted switch, and the trusted switch will execute the decision result of the security management terminal, that is, take isolation, alarm and other measures on the target device.

[0072] like Figure 2As shown, after receiving the trusted verification model 206 sent by the security management terminal 202, the trusted switch 201 of this embodiment performs dynamic trust measurement on the connected target device 203. By real-time monitoring of the network behavior and data transmission of the device, isolation, alarm and other measures are taken in time when abnormal behavior is found. At the same time, the trusted switch 201 periodically obtains the trusted report 205 of the target device 203 and sends it to the security management terminal 202 for judgment.

[0073] In some embodiments, Figure 3 As shown, the specific process of the aforementioned steps may be the following steps S301-S312.

[0074] Step S301, start.

[0075] Step S302: register the target device on the security management terminal.

[0076] Step S303: The security management terminal determines a trusted verification model according to the device type, and sends the trusted verification model together with the device MAC address to the trusted switch; the trusted switch determines a threshold line of the trusted verification model of the target device;

[0077] Step S304: The target device is connected to the trusted switch; the trusted switch updates the whitelist.

[0078] Step S305, determine whether the MAC address of the target device is in the whitelist, if yes, proceed to the next step; otherwise, go to step S310.

[0079] Step S306: The target device sends a trust report to the trusted switch, and the trusted switch forwards the trust report to the security management terminal.

[0080] Step S307, the trusted switch determines whether the trusted report is verified. If so, proceed to the next step; otherwise, go to step S310.

[0081] Step S308: The target device is connected and the dynamic trust measurement step is entered.

[0082] Step S309: The trusted switch determines whether the measurement is passed. If yes, the process goes to step S306; if no, the process goes to step S311.

[0083] Step S310: The trusted switch does not allow the target device to access.

[0084] Step S311: The trusted switch disconnects the target device and notifies the security management terminal.

[0085] Step S312, end.

[0086] This embodiment uses trusted computing technology to achieve continuous trust measurement of the behavior and trusted state of the access device (i.e., the aforementioned target device), ensuring the legitimacy of the access device's identity and the security of data transmission; and enhancing the device's identity authentication and security measurement capabilities. These innovations make this embodiment have broad application prospects in the field of industrial control network security.

[0087] Reference Figure 4 The present embodiment of the invention provides a dynamic trust measurement device for a device to access a trusted switch, which is applied to the trusted switch. The trusted switch is respectively connected to a security management terminal, a target device, and other devices in communication; wherein the target device and other devices are connected in communication; the device includes a model acquisition module 10 and a dynamic trust measurement module 20.

[0088] The model acquisition module 10 is used to acquire the trusted verification model of the target device sent by the security management terminal; wherein the trusted verification model is used to characterize the communication characteristics between the target device and other devices; the trusted verification model includes a logical combination of multiple sub-verification models.

[0089] The dynamic trusted measurement module 20 is used to repeatedly execute the measurement information acquisition submodule and the trusted measurement submodule to perform dynamic trusted measurement after the target device is connected. Among them, the measurement information acquisition submodule 21 is used to obtain the current information to be measured of the target device. The trusted measurement submodule 22 is used to perform trusted measurement on the current information to be measured according to the trusted verification model; when the measurement passes, return to the step of obtaining the current information to be measured of the target device; when the measurement fails, disconnect the connection between the trusted switch and the target device and notify the security management terminal.

[0090] In an optional embodiment, the model acquisition module 10 further includes an identity authentication information acquisition module, a whitelist update module, and / or an identity authentication module. The identity authentication information acquisition module is used to acquire the identity authentication information of the target device sent by the security management terminal. The whitelist update module is used to update the whitelist of the trusted switch according to the identity authentication information. The identity authentication module is used to perform identity authentication according to the identity authentication information and the whitelist, and when the identity authentication is passed, the target device is connected to the trusted switch.

[0091] In an optional embodiment, the identity authentication information includes MAC address information.

[0092] In an optional embodiment, a threshold module is further included between the model acquisition module 10 and the dynamic trust metric module 20, and the threshold module is used to determine a threshold range corresponding to each sub-verification model to determine a threshold line of the trusted verification model.

[0093] In an optional embodiment, before the measurement information acquisition submodule 21, it also includes a trusted report acquisition module, a trusted report sending module, a trusted report verification module and a verification result determination module. The trusted report acquisition module is used to obtain a trusted report generated by the trusted switch according to the target device. The trusted report sending module is used to forward the trusted report to the security management terminal so that the security management terminal verifies the trusted report. The trusted report verification module is used to obtain the trusted report verification result sent by the security management terminal. The verification result determination module is used to determine whether the trusted report verification result is passed. If not, the connection between the trusted switch and the target device is disconnected; if yes, the dynamic trusted measurement module 20 is executed.

[0094] In an optional embodiment, the target device is an engineer station in an industrial control system, and other devices include a PLC controller in the industrial control system. The trusted verification model of the engineer station includes: a logical combination of one or more sub-verification models in the long-term bandwidth sub-verification model, the burst bandwidth sub-verification model, the high-bandwidth duration sub-verification model, and the high-bandwidth occurrence number per unit time sub-verification model.

[0095] The device provided in the embodiment of the present application is adopted. Since the device adopts the same inventive concept as the above-mentioned method provided in the embodiment of the present application, on the premise that the method can solve the technical problem, the device can also solve the technical problem, which will not be repeated here.

[0096] This embodiment also provides a computer-readable storage medium on which computer program instructions are stored. When the computer program instructions are executed by a processor, the above method is implemented.

[0097] This embodiment also provides a computer program product, including a computer-readable code, or a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium carrying the computer-readable code. When the computer-readable code runs in an electronic device, a processor in the electronic device executes the above method.

[0098] This embodiment also provides an electronic device, including: one or more processors; a memory for storing executable instructions; wherein the one or more processors are configured to call the executable instructions stored in the memory to execute the above method. The electronic device can be provided as a terminal, a server or other form of device.

[0099] Reference Figure 5 , a block diagram of an electronic device 500 provided in this embodiment. For example, the electronic device 500 can be provided as a server or a terminal. Figure 5, the electronic device 500 includes a processing component 510, which further includes one or more processors, and a memory resource represented by a memory 530 for storing instructions executable by the processing component 510, such as an application. The application stored in the memory 530 may include one or more modules each corresponding to a set of instructions. In addition, the processing component 510 is configured to execute instructions to perform the above method. The electronic device 500 may also include a power component 520 configured to perform power management of the electronic device 500, a wired or wireless network interface 540 configured to connect the electronic device 500 to a network, and an input / output interface 550 (I / O interface). The electronic device 500 can operate based on an operating system stored in the memory 530, such as Microsoft Server Operating System (Windows ServerTM), Apple Inc.'s graphical user interface-based operating system (MacOS XTM), a multi-user multi-process computer operating system (UnixTM), a free and open source Unix-like operating system (LinuxTM), an open source Unix-like operating system (FreeBSDTM) or the like.

[0100] It is known from common technical knowledge that the present invention can be implemented by other embodiments that do not deviate from its spirit or essential features. Therefore, the above disclosed embodiments are only illustrative in all respects and are not exclusive. All changes within the scope of the present invention or within the scope equivalent to the present invention are included in the present invention.

Claims

1. A dynamic trust measurement method for a device accessing a trusted switch, characterized in that: Applied to a trusted switch, the trusted switch is respectively connected to a security management terminal, a target device and other devices in communication; wherein the target device is connected to the other devices in communication; the method comprises: Acquire a trusted verification model of a target device sent by a security management terminal; wherein the trusted verification model is used to characterize the communication characteristics between the target device and the other devices; the trusted verification model includes a logical combination of one or more sub-verification models; When the target device is connected, repeat the following steps to perform dynamic trust measurement: Acquire current information to be measured of the target device; The current information to be measured is trusted measured according to the trusted verification model; when the measurement passes, returning to the step of obtaining the current information to be measured of the target device; when the measurement fails, disconnecting the connection between the trusted switch and the target device.

2. The dynamic trust measurement method for device access to a trusted switch according to claim 1, characterized in that: When obtaining the trusted verification model of the target device sent by the security management terminal, it also includes: Obtaining identity authentication information of the target device sent by the security management terminal; Updating the whitelist of the trusted switch according to the identity authentication information; and / or, Authentication is performed according to the authentication information and the white list, and when the authentication is passed, the target device is connected to the trusted switch.

3. The dynamic trust measurement method for device access to a trusted switch according to claim 2, characterized in that: The identity authentication information includes MAC address information.

4. The dynamic trust measurement method for device access to a trusted switch according to claim 1, characterized in that: After obtaining the trusted verification model of the target device sent by the security management terminal, the method further includes: The threshold range corresponding to each sub-verification model is determined to determine the threshold line of the trusted verification model.

5. The dynamic trust measurement method for device access to a trusted switch according to claim 1, characterized in that: Before obtaining the current information to be measured of the target device, the method further includes: Obtaining a trust report generated by the trusted switch according to the target device; forwarding the trustworthy report to the security management terminal so that the security management terminal verifies the trustworthy report; Obtaining a verification result of a trustworthy report sent by the security management terminal; Determine whether the trusted report verification result is passed, if not, disconnect the connection between the trusted switch and the target device; if yes, connect the target device and perform the dynamic trusted measurement step.

6. The dynamic trust measurement method for device access to a trusted switch according to claim 1, characterized in that: The target device is an engineer station in an industrial control system, and the other devices include a PLC controller in the industrial control system. The trusted verification model of the engineer station includes: A logical combination of one or more sub-verification models among the long-term bandwidth sub-verification model, the burst bandwidth sub-verification model, the high bandwidth duration sub-verification model, and the high bandwidth occurrence times per unit time sub-verification model.

7. A dynamic trust measurement device for connecting a device to a trusted switch, characterized in that: Applied to a trusted switch, the trusted switch is respectively connected to a security management terminal, a target device and other devices in communication; wherein the target device is connected to the other devices in communication; the device comprises: A model acquisition module, used to acquire a trusted verification model of a target device sent by a security management terminal; wherein the trusted verification model is used to characterize the communication characteristics between the target device and the other devices; the trusted verification model includes a logical combination of multiple sub-verification models; The dynamic trusted measurement module is used to repeatedly execute the measurement information acquisition submodule and the trusted measurement submodule to perform dynamic trusted measurement after the target device is connected: The measurement information acquisition submodule is used to obtain the current to-be-measured information of the target device; The trusted measurement submodule is used to perform trusted measurement on the current information to be measured according to the trusted verification model; when the measurement passes, return to the step of obtaining the current information to be measured of the target device; when the measurement fails, disconnect the connection between the trusted switch and the target device.

8. An electronic device, characterized in that: include: one or more processors; a memory for storing executable instructions; The one or more processors are configured to call executable instructions stored in the memory to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.

9. A computer-readable storage medium having computer program instructions stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program instructions are executed by a processor, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6 is implemented.

10. A computer program product comprising computer readable code, or a non-volatile computer readable storage medium carrying computer readable code, characterized in that: When the computer readable code is executed in an electronic device, a processor in the electronic device executes the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.