Implementation method for reverse tracking of hacker intrusion of external field intelligent facility special line
By deploying switches and real-time monitoring devices at the edge of the private network, analyzing and comparing the device fingerprint information, the problem of in real-time and inaccurate network security monitoring in the existing technology is solved, and the rapid identification and response to hacker intrusions are achieved to ensure the security of the private network is ensured. and stable operation.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411074418.7
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-08-07
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-29
- Estimated Expiration
- Not applicable · inactive patent
AI Technical Summary
The existing technology lacks real-time and accuracy in network security monitoring and protection, resulting in slow intrusion detection and response speeds, and is unable to effectively prevent external attacks from threats to the private network.
Deploy switches at the edge of the private network, and connect real-time monitoring devices directly to the switch. The packets are obtained through mirroring, the device fingerprint information is analyzed and extracted, and the pre-stored database is compared and matched to determine whether there is a hacker intrusion, and corresponding measures are taken. Such as triggering alarms and blocking commands.
It achieves a high degree of real-time and accuracy, provides comprehensive and meticulous network security monitoring and protection, improves the accuracy and response speed of intrusion detection, ensures the security and stability of the private network, and prevents external attacks in a timely manner.
Smart Images

Figure CN119051910A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The invention belongs to the field of data security, and in particular relates to a method for realizing reverse tracking of hacker intrusion into a dedicated line of an outfield intelligent facility. Background Art
[0002] With the rapid development of information technology and network applications, all walks of life are increasingly relying on field intelligent facilities, which are connected to private networks through dedicated lines to achieve remote monitoring and data transmission. These field intelligent facilities include various sensors, cameras, remote terminal devices, etc., which are usually deployed in unattended environments and have important functions and values. However, since these devices are exposed to the external environment, they are easily targeted by hackers. Once hackers successfully invade field intelligent facilities, they may invade the private network through their dedicated line connections. Although the existing technology has protection technology, the existing technology lacks real-time and accuracy in network security monitoring and protection, and it is difficult to provide comprehensive and detailed monitoring without affecting the normal operation of the network, resulting in slow intrusion detection and response speed, and unable to effectively prevent external attacks on the private network. Threats.
[0003] In view of this, the present invention is proposed. Summary of the invention
[0004] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to overcome the deficiencies of the prior art and provide a method for implementing reverse tracking of hacker intrusions into dedicated lines of outdoor intelligent facilities, thereby solving the problems raised in the above-mentioned background technology.
[0005] In order to solve the above technical problems, the basic concept of the technical solution adopted by the present invention is:
[0006] A method for implementing reverse tracking of hacker intrusion on a dedicated line of an outfield intelligent facility comprises the following steps:
[0007] Step S1: deploy a switch at the edge of the private network, and the private network edge switch will obtain each message data packet of the device;
[0008] Step S2: The real-time monitoring device is directly connected to the switch, and obtains the message data packet obtained by the private network edge switch through the switch mirroring;
[0009] Step S3: The real-time monitoring device analyzes each message data packet, identifies and extracts device fingerprint information;
[0010] Step S4: The real-time monitoring device compares and matches the extracted device fingerprint information with the device fingerprint pre-stored in the database;
[0011] Step S5: Determine whether there is hacker intrusion based on the comparison and matching results, and take corresponding measures based on the judgment results.
[0012] Optionally, in step S1, a switch is deployed at the edge of the private network, and the private network edge switch obtains each message data packet of the device in the following steps:
[0013] Step S1.1: deploy switches at the edge of the private network to receive message data packets sent by all external intelligent facilities and equipment;
[0014] Step S1.2: Through the port monitoring and mirroring functions, capture and copy each network data packet passing through and transmit each captured message data packet to the real-time monitoring device through the mirroring port.
[0015] Optionally, the device fingerprint information in step S2 includes but is not limited to IP address, MAC address, traffic characteristics, device type, hardware manufacturer, and operating system.
[0016] Optionally, the step S3 in which the real-time monitoring device analyzes each message data packet, identifies and extracts device fingerprint information is as follows:
[0017] Step S3.1: receiving each message data packet transmitted by the private network edge switch mirror and preprocessing each received message data packet to extract the effective load data;
[0018] Step S3.2: Parse each field in the message data packet, including but not limited to source IP address, destination IP address, source MAC address, destination MAC address, transport protocol type, and data packet length;
[0019] Step S3.3: Extract the characteristic information of the device from the parsed message data packet, form a device fingerprint information set and store the extracted device fingerprint information in a temporary storage area, ready to be compared and matched with the device fingerprint information pre-stored in the database.
[0020] Optionally, in step S4, the step in which the real-time monitoring device compares and matches the extracted device fingerprint information with the device fingerprint pre-stored in the database is:
[0021] Step S4.1: Obtain fingerprint information when the device is secure, and send the acquired fingerprint information to a database for storage;
[0022] Step S4.2: Identify the correct application protocol from the network data packet, and then extract the device fingerprint matching various protocols;
[0023] Step S4.3: comparing the extracted device fingerprint information with the device fingerprint stored in the database item by item;
[0024] Step S4.4: Based on the comparison result, determine whether the extracted device fingerprint information completely matches a device fingerprint in the database.
[0025] Optionally, the protocol in step S4.2 includes but is not limited to DHCP, TCP / UDP, HTTP, HTTPS, SIP, and FTP.
[0026] Optionally, when the data matching result is received in step S5, it is determined that the network is operating normally and there is no hacker intrusion, and the data packet processing is terminated.
[0027] Optionally, in step S5, when a data mismatch signal is received, the device fingerprint information is marked as suspicious, and multiple identification analyses are performed. Based on the final result, it is determined that there is a hacker intrusion and an alarm mechanism is triggered; after the alarm mechanism is triggered, the real-time monitoring device will record the information of the hacker intrusion tool and issue a blocking command.
[0028] Optionally, after sending the blocking command, the real-time monitoring device will also upload the fingerprint information of the hacker's intrusion device to the alarm server for reverse tracking.
[0029] After adopting the above technical solution, the present invention has the following beneficial effects compared with the prior art. Of course, any product implementing the present invention does not necessarily need to achieve all the advantages described below at the same time:
[0030] The present invention has high real-time and accuracy, and can provide comprehensive and detailed network security monitoring and protection without affecting the normal operation of the network, thereby ensuring the security and stability of the private network. At the same time, through device fingerprint recognition and comparison matching, the accuracy and response speed of intrusion detection are improved. The real-time monitoring device is directly connected to the switch, and uses the mirroring function to obtain each message data packet, and performs detailed analysis and processing, so that intrusion detection can respond in the first time. The system can quickly identify abnormal devices and potential security threats, and take timely measures, such as triggering alarms, recording intrusion tool information, and issuing blocking commands. Through these measures, the threat of external attacks to the private network is effectively prevented, the continuous and stable operation of the network is guaranteed, and potential security risks and data losses are reduced.
[0031] The specific implementation modes of the present invention are further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0032] The drawings described below are only some embodiments. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative work.
[0033] In the figure:
[0034] Figure 1 This is a framework diagram for implementing reverse tracking of hacker intrusion into the dedicated line of an outfield smart facility;
[0035] Figure 2 A diagram of the basic implementation steps for hackers to break into private networks and intrude forwarding hardware;
[0036] Figure 3 This is a simplified diagram of the deployment of outdoor smart facility cameras.
[0037] It should be noted that these drawings and textual descriptions are not intended to limit the conceptual scope of the present invention in any way, but are intended to illustrate the concept of the present invention for those skilled in the art by referring to specific embodiments. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0038] The present invention will now be described in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.
[0039] See also Figure 1-3 As shown, in this embodiment, a method for implementing reverse tracking of hacker intrusion of an external intelligent facility dedicated line is provided, including the following steps:
[0040] Step S1: deploy switches at the edge of the private network. The switches at the edge of the private network will obtain each message data packet of the device. By deploying switches at the edge of the private network, comprehensive acquisition of each message data packet is ensured. The real-time monitoring device obtains the data packet through the mirror port, ensuring the real-time and integrity of data transmission.
[0041] Step S2: The real-time monitoring device is directly connected to the switch, and obtains the message data packet obtained by the private network edge switch through the switch mirroring;
[0042] Step S3: The real-time monitoring device analyzes each message data packet, identifies and extracts device fingerprint information; the real-time monitoring device performs a detailed analysis on the message data packet, extracts device fingerprint information, and ensures accurate identification of network device features;
[0043] Step S4: The real-time monitoring device compares and matches the extracted device fingerprint information with the device fingerprint pre-stored in the database; by comparing and matching with the pre-stored device fingerprint, abnormal devices and potential hacker intrusion behaviors can be effectively detected; corresponding measures are taken according to the matching results, such as triggering an alarm, recording intrusion tool information and issuing a blocking command, so as to respond to and handle network security threats in a timely manner;
[0044] Step S5: Determine whether there is hacker intrusion based on the comparison and matching results, and take corresponding measures based on the judgment results.
[0045] It should be noted that the present invention is highly real-time and accurate, and can provide comprehensive and detailed network security monitoring and protection without affecting the normal operation of the network, ensuring the security and stability of the private network. At the same time, through precise device fingerprint recognition and comparative matching, it improves the accuracy and response speed of intrusion detection, and effectively prevents the threat of external attacks to the private network.
[0046] In this embodiment, the step S1 deploys a switch at the edge of the private network, and the step in which the private network edge switch acquires each message data packet of the device is as follows:
[0047] Step S1.1: Deploy switches at the edge of the private network to receive message packets sent by all external intelligent facilities and equipment; by deploying switches at the edge of the private network, it is possible to effectively receive and manage message packets sent by all external intelligent facilities and equipment, ensuring the comprehensiveness and accuracy of data collection; the application of port monitoring and mirroring functions enables the switch to capture and copy each network data packet passing through in real time, and efficiently transmit these data packets to the real-time monitoring device through the mirroring port, thereby ensuring the real-time and integrity of data transmission.
[0048] Step S1.2: Through the port monitoring and mirroring functions, capture and copy each network data packet passing through and transmit each captured message data packet to the real-time monitoring device through the mirroring port. The real-time monitoring device can instantly obtain and process all mirrored data packets, perform in-depth analysis and device fingerprint identification, and ensure accurate identification of network device characteristics.
[0049] It should be noted that the capture and transmission process of the data packets in this application will not have any impact on the normal operation of the network, thereby ensuring the efficient and stable operation of the network; by carefully analyzing the network data packets acquired in real time and extracting fingerprint information, any abnormal devices and potential hacker intrusion behaviors can be quickly identified, ensuring the comprehensiveness and efficiency of network security monitoring; in addition, by comparing and matching the captured device fingerprint information with the pre-stored database, the accuracy and timeliness of intrusion detection can be further improved, ensuring that potential security threats are responded to and processed in the shortest time, thereby effectively protecting the security and stable operation of the private network and avoiding security risks and losses caused by hacker attacks.
[0050] In this embodiment, the device fingerprint information in step S2 includes but is not limited to IP address, MAC address, traffic characteristics, device type, hardware manufacturer, and operating system.
[0051] In this embodiment, the step S3 of the real-time monitoring device analyzing each message data packet, identifying and extracting the device fingerprint information is as follows: by receiving each message data packet transmitted by the private network edge switch mirror, ensuring that the real-time monitoring device can obtain all data flows passing through the network, and ensuring the comprehensiveness and real-time nature of data collection;
[0052] Step S3.1: Receive each message data packet transmitted by the private network edge switch mirror and pre-process each received message data packet to extract the effective load data; pre-process each received message data packet to extract the effective load data, filter out redundant information, and improve the efficiency and accuracy of data processing;
[0053] Step S3.2: Parse each field in the message data packet, including but not limited to source IP address, destination IP address, source MAC address, destination MAC address, transport protocol type, and data packet length;
[0054] Step S3.3: Extract the characteristic information of the device from the parsed message data packet, form a device fingerprint information set and store the extracted device fingerprint information in a temporary storage area, ready to be compared and matched with the device fingerprint information pre-stored in the database.
[0055] In this embodiment, the step in step S4 where the real-time monitoring device compares and matches the extracted device fingerprint information with the device fingerprint pre-stored in the database is:
[0056] Step S4.1: Obtain the fingerprint information when the device is safe, and send the acquired fingerprint information to the database for storage; by obtaining the fingerprint information of the device in a safe state and storing it in the database, a reliable benchmark data is provided for subsequent comparison and matching.
[0057] Step S4.2: Identify the correct application protocol from the network data packet, and then extract the device fingerprints that match various protocols; this ensures that the extracted device fingerprint information is highly consistent with the actual device features and improves the accuracy of the match.
[0058] Step S4.3: Compare the extracted device fingerprint information with the device fingerprint stored in the database item by item; by comparing the extracted device fingerprint information with the device fingerprint information in the database item by item, the characteristic information of each device can be analyzed in detail to ensure that the comparison process is meticulous and comprehensive.
[0059] Step S4.4: Based on the comparison results, determine whether the extracted device fingerprint information completely matches a device fingerprint in the database. By comparing the results, determine whether the extracted device fingerprint information completely matches a device fingerprint in the database, and quickly identify abnormal devices and potential security threats.
[0060] It should be noted that: through the detailed extraction and precise matching of device fingerprint information, real-time monitoring and security detection of network equipment are achieved, and the accuracy and timeliness of intrusion detection are improved; when the device fingerprint information matches, the legitimacy of the device can be confirmed to ensure the normal operation of the network; when the device fingerprint information does not match, potential intrusion behaviors can be quickly identified, and corresponding security measures can be taken in time, such as triggering alarms, recording intrusion tool information, issuing blocking commands, etc., to effectively prevent the further spread of security threats; through this solution, the status of network equipment can be comprehensively and accurately monitored, the security and stability of the network can be guaranteed, the security risks and losses caused by hacker intrusions can be reduced, and the overall defense capabilities of the network can be improved.
[0061] In this embodiment, the protocol in step S4.2 includes but is not limited to DHCP, TCP / UDP, HTTP, HTTPS, SIP, and FTP.
[0062] In the present embodiment, when the data matching result is received in step S5, it is determined that the network is operating normally and there is no hacker intrusion, and the data packet processing is terminated.
[0063] In this embodiment, in step S5, when a signal of data mismatch is received, the device fingerprint information is marked as suspicious, and multiple identification and analysis are performed. According to the final result, it is determined that there is a hacker intrusion behavior and the alarm mechanism is triggered; after the alarm mechanism is triggered, the real-time monitoring device will record the information of the hacker intrusion tool and issue a blocking command. After sending the blocking command, the real-time monitoring device will also upload the hacker intrusion device fingerprint information to the alarm server for reverse tracking.
[0064] It should be noted that: by marking the device fingerprint information as suspicious when receiving a data mismatch signal, it is ensured that potential security threats can be identified in time; the process of multiple identification and analysis increases the accuracy of the judgment and avoids the occurrence of false alarms and missed alarms; according to the final analysis results, it is determined that there is a hacker intrusion behavior and the alarm mechanism is triggered, ensuring a rapid response and processing of the intrusion behavior; after the alarm mechanism is triggered, the real-time monitoring device will record the information of the hacker intrusion tool in detail, providing important clues for subsequent security analysis and tracking; a blocking command is issued to immediately cut off the hacker intrusion channel to prevent further security threats and data leakage; after sending the blocking command, the hacker intrusion device fingerprint information is uploaded to the alarm server for reverse tracking, which can accurately locate the hacker's attack source and enhance the network security defense capability; this multi-level security monitoring and response mechanism ensures the comprehensiveness and efficiency of network security, and can continuously optimize and improve network security strategies by recording and analyzing intrusion behaviors in real time; in addition, the solution realizes real-time monitoring and rapid response to intrusion behaviors without affecting the normal operation of the network, improves the protection level and stability of the overall network, effectively prevents the threats and losses brought to the network by hacker attacks, and provides a solid guarantee for network security.
[0065] More specifically:
[0066] There are three types of device fingerprints: 1. Information provided by browsers and extensions; 2. Dynamic fingerprints of communication behavior characteristics; 3. Information provided by network and protocol-level technical data packets.
[0067] 1. Information provided by browsers and extensions: The browser explicitly provides (e.g. JavaScript) a variety of system information, such as: major software and hardware details, WebGL information, system time and clock drift, battery information, Evercookie, WebRTC, password autofill, etc. The browser also provides extension information, such as: browser plug-in fingerprint, browser extension fingerprint, system fingerprint plug-in.
[0068] 2. Dynamic fingerprint of communication behavior characteristics: By observing the device's external network communication behavior, you can obtain the device's dynamic characteristic fingerprint. By observing the running effect of specific Javascript code in the browser, you can obtain information about the device such as measuring execution time or analyzing output, including: HTML5 canvas fingerprint, system performance, hardware sensors, wheel fingerprint, CSS feature monitoring, JavaScript standard consistency, URL scheme handler, graphics card RAM monitoring, font monitoring, audio processing. By observing traffic analysis, you can determine the applications installed on the device and the application running characteristics.
[0069] 3. Information provided by network and protocol-level technical data packets: including: MAC address, IP address, Geolocation, IP protocol stack fingerprint, TCP protocol stack fingerprint, protocol fingerprint, DNS resolution, clock offset, ad blocker monitoring, etc.
[0070] All components of a device fingerprint will change, but some components (such as time zones on desktops or rarely mobile devices) may change much less frequently than others (such as browser versions). In particular, field smart facilities implement a single function, and the device fingerprints of these field smart facilities basically do not change except in operation and maintenance scenarios. Significant changes in device fingerprints can effectively identify hacker network intrusions on the dedicated line of field smart facilities. The device fingerprint has enough stable vectors within the private network. By combining multiple vectors to implement a changing scoring mechanism, the stability of the overall fingerprint can be improved. Factors that affect the stability of the overall fingerprint include: operating system upgrades, application upgrades, IP address changes, system configuration modifications, etc.
[0071] Each device fingerprint vector is distinguishable. The distinguishability depends on the size of the user device space and the diversity of fingerprint attributes. The distinguishability of a vector may depend on the device distribution of a website's clients.
[0072] See also Figure 3 As shown, embodiment 1: taking a camera as an example;
[0073] See also Figure 2 As shown in the figure, the basic implementation steps for hackers to invade forwarding hardware through a private network.
[0074] The hacker private network intrusion forwarding hardware has three physical ports, which are connected to the field intelligent facilities, the private network edge switch, and the hacker intrusion device. This description uses the camera as the field intelligent facility, and the intrusion forwarding hardware implements the logic in the Linux kernel. The NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING API interface is inserted into the Linux driver hook queue principle. The API receives the underlying network data packet, checks the physical port where the data packet is obtained, and implements the specific logical routing of the data packet.
[0075] When the struct nf_hook_state parameter in of the Linux driver shows that the source physical port of the data packet is the physical port connected to the external intelligent facility (301), it is normal traffic of the camera, and the intrusion forwarding hardware kernel routes the data packet out of the switch physical port (302).
[0076] When the struct nf_hook_state parameter in of the Linux driver shows that the source physical port of the data packet is the physical WiFi port invaded by the hacker (303), after the intrusion forwarding hardware is activated, the data received by this port is the special traffic of the hacker attacking the private network server. Take SrcIP / SrcPort / DstIP / DstPort to form a tuple and search the Session table. If not, generate a new Session and save this tuple. If yes, skip the repeated application of Session. SrcIP / SrcMac is replaced with the Src IP / Src MAC of the camera device (304). After the data packet information is replaced, it can be routed out from the physical port of the switch (305). After the edge private network switch receives the data packet, it checks that the binding of MAC / IP / physical port meets the private network access protection configuration, and the edge private network switch does not block it, so that the hacker successfully invades the private network.
[0077] When the struct nf_hook_state parameter in of the Linux driver shows that the source physical port of the data packet is the physical port of the edge private network switch (306), the Session table is searched based on the SrcIP / SrcPort / DstIP / DstPort tuple (307). If it does not exist, it is a return data packet of the normal traffic of the original field smart facility camera, and the data packet is routed out from the physical port of the camera (308). If it does not exist, it is a return data packet of hacker intrusion, and DstIP / DstMAC is replaced with the IP / MAC of the hacker intrusion tool (309), and is routed out from the Wifi physical port to the hacker attack device (310).
[0078] The private network edge switch binds the IP address, MAC address and physical port of the switch network of the outdoor intelligent facility to provide access protection for the outdoor intelligent facility. The outdoor intelligent facility equipment is connected to the private network with a dedicated optical fiber line.
[0079] The present invention is not limited to the above-mentioned embodiments. Anyone should be aware that any structural changes made under the enlightenment of the present invention, and any technical solutions that are the same or similar to the present invention, fall within the protection scope of the present invention. The technology, shape, and structural parts not described in detail in the present invention are all well-known technologies.
Claims
1. A method for implementing reverse tracking of hacker intrusion on a dedicated line of an outfield intelligent facility, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: Step S1: deploy a switch at the edge of the private network, and the private network edge switch will obtain each message data packet of the device; Step S2: The real-time monitoring device is directly connected to the switch, and obtains the message data packet obtained by the private network edge switch through the switch mirroring; Step S3: The real-time monitoring device analyzes each message data packet, identifies and extracts device fingerprint information; Step S4: The real-time monitoring device compares and matches the extracted device fingerprint information with the device fingerprint pre-stored in the database; Step S5: Determine whether there is hacker intrusion based on the comparison and matching results, and take corresponding measures based on the judgment results.
2. According to claim 1, a method for implementing reverse tracking of hacker intrusion on a dedicated line of an outfield intelligent facility is characterized in that: In step S1, a switch is deployed at the edge of the private network. The steps for the private network edge switch to obtain each message data packet of the device are as follows: Step S1.1: deploy switches at the edge of the private network to receive message data packets sent by all external intelligent facilities and equipment; Step S1.2: Through the port monitoring and mirroring functions, capture and copy each network data packet passing through and transmit each captured message data packet to the real-time monitoring device through the mirroring port.
3. According to claim 1, a method for implementing reverse tracking of hacker intrusion on an off-site intelligent facility dedicated line, characterized in that: The device fingerprint information in step S2 includes but is not limited to IP address, MAC address, traffic characteristics, device type, hardware manufacturer, and operating system.
4. According to claim 1, a method for implementing reverse tracking of hacker intrusion of an external intelligent facility dedicated line is characterized in that: The step S3 in which the real-time monitoring device analyzes each message data packet, identifies and extracts device fingerprint information is as follows: Step S3.1: receiving each message data packet transmitted by the private network edge switch mirror and preprocessing each received message data packet to extract the effective load data; Step S3.2: Parse each field in the message data packet, including but not limited to source IP address, destination IP address, source MAC address, destination MAC address, transport protocol type, and data packet length; Step S3.3: Extract the characteristic information of the device from the parsed message data packet, form a device fingerprint information set and store the extracted device fingerprint information in a temporary storage area, ready to be compared and matched with the device fingerprint information pre-stored in the database.
5. The method for implementing reverse tracking of hacker intrusion on an outfield intelligent facility dedicated line according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The step in step S4 where the real-time monitoring device compares and matches the extracted device fingerprint information with the device fingerprint pre-stored in the database is: Step S4.1: Obtain fingerprint information when the device is secure, and send the acquired fingerprint information to a database for storage; Step S4.2: Identify the correct application protocol from the network data packet, and then extract the device fingerprint matching various protocols; Step S4.3: comparing the extracted device fingerprint information with the device fingerprint stored in the database item by item; Step S4.4: Based on the comparison result, determine whether the extracted device fingerprint information completely matches a device fingerprint in the database.
6. A method for implementing reverse tracking of hacker intrusion on an off-site intelligent facility dedicated line according to claim 5, characterized in that: The protocols in step S4.2 include but are not limited to DHCP, TCP / UDP, HTTP, HTTPS, SIP, and FTP.
7. A method for implementing reverse tracking of hacker intrusion into an off-site intelligent facility dedicated line according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S5, when the data matching result is received, it is determined that the network is operating normally and there is no hacker intrusion, and the data packet processing is terminated.
8. The method for implementing reverse tracking of hacker intrusion into a dedicated line of an outfield intelligent facility according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S5, when a signal indicating data mismatch is received, the device fingerprint information is marked as suspicious, and multiple identification and analysis are performed. Based on the final result, it is determined that there is a hacker intrusion and an alarm mechanism is triggered. After the alarm mechanism is triggered, the real-time monitoring device will record the information of the hacker intrusion tool and issue a blocking command.
9. A method for implementing reverse tracking of hacker intrusion on an off-site intelligent facility dedicated line according to claim 8, characterized in that: After sending the blocking command, the real-time monitoring device will also upload the fingerprint information of the hacker's intrusion device to the alarm server for reverse tracking.
