Peripheral access control method for power monitoring system terminal

Through DIKW knowledge graph and blockchain data, a security evaluation model for power monitoring systems and peripherals is built, which solves the problem that the existing technology cannot effectively evaluate peripheral security, and realizes security evaluation and threat protection of power monitoring systems.

CN119652770APending Publication Date: 2025-03-18HAINAN POWER GRID CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411683205.4
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-11-22
Publication Date
2025-03-18

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing power safety monitoring system cannot effectively evaluate the security of the peripherals when the peripheral is connected, resulting in the system being in a threat state and affecting the power production and supply process.

Method used

Using the DIKW knowledge graph, a peripheral DIKW model is constructed by obtaining peripheral blockchain data, and a monitoring system DIKW model is constructed based on the basic information of the power monitoring system, and security evaluation is carried out to reject peripheral access with poor security.

Benefits of technology

Effectively evaluate the safety of peripherals, avoid putting the power monitoring system in a threatened state, and ensure the normal progress of the power production, transportation and supply processes.

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Abstract

The invention provides a peripheral access management and control method for a power monitoring system terminal, and the method comprises the following steps: S1, obtaining the block chain data of a peripheral in response to an access request of the peripheral; step S2, constructing a peripheral DIKW model based on the block chain data; s3, acquiring basic information of the power monitoring system, and constructing a monitoring system DIKW model; step S4, performing security assessment on the peripheral DIKW model by the monitoring system DIKW model; step S5, rejecting the access request of the peripheral with poor security; a block chain technology and a DIKE knowledge graph are introduced into peripheral management and control of a power monitoring system, historical access information and basic data of peripherals are stored in a block chain, and two constructed DIKW models can integrate fragmented data and convert the fragmented data between the fragmented data. After the safety of the peripheral DIKW model is evaluated through the monitoring system DIKW model, threats caused by the fact that peripherals are connected into the monitoring system can be avoided, and normal production and supply of electric power are guaranteed.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of power monitoring system control, and in particular to a method for controlling access of peripherals to a power monitoring system terminal. Background Art

[0002] The power safety monitoring system is a highly integrated automation system designed specifically to monitor and control the power production and supply process. The system is widely used in power infrastructure such as power plants, transmission networks, substations, and distribution networks. Its main purpose is to ensure the stable, safe, and efficient operation of the power system. In the daily use of the power safety monitoring system, it is often necessary to connect peripherals such as optical drives or USB flash drives for information exchange, software upgrades, data backup, and system configuration. When peripherals are connected to the power safety monitoring system, there will be some potential risks. Therefore, the power safety monitoring system will manually control the access of peripherals, and control is achieved by recording the information and source of the accessed peripherals, and the access of peripherals is allowed by permission configuration. However, the manual control of peripherals cannot evaluate the security of peripherals, and most of them are judged based on experience, which causes the power monitoring system to be in a threatening state, ultimately affecting the production and supply process of electricity. Summary of the invention

[0003] In view of this, the present invention proposes a peripheral access control method for a power monitoring system terminal, which combines the DIKW knowledge graph to realize the security assessment of the peripherals, and can avoid putting the power monitoring system in a threatened state.

[0004] The technical solution of the present invention is achieved in this way:

[0005] A method for controlling access of peripherals to a power monitoring system terminal comprises the following steps:

[0006] Step S1: Responding to an access request from a peripheral device, obtaining blockchain data of the peripheral device;

[0007] Step S2: construct a peripheral DIKW model based on blockchain data;

[0008] Step S3: Obtain basic information of the power monitoring system and construct a DIKW model of the monitoring system;

[0009] Step S4, the monitoring system DIKW model performs a security assessment on the peripheral DIKW model;

[0010] Step S5: Reject access requests from peripherals with poor security.

[0011] Preferably, in step S1, after responding to the access request of the peripheral device, a virtual system with a lower protection capability than the power monitoring system is constructed, and the access of the peripheral device is allowed, and the operation records during the access of the peripheral device are monitored in real time.

[0012] Preferably, the blockchain data includes basic data of the peripheral and several blocks, the basic data includes the type of peripheral, technical specifications, security certification report and supplier, each block contains the time when the peripheral requests access to other systems, the request result, the security check summary and the purpose of access, and the blockchain data uploads a new block to the access request issued by the peripheral.

[0013] Preferably, the specific steps of step S2 are:

[0014] Step S21: Map blockchain data into typed resources, where the typed resources include data resources, information resources, and knowledge resources;

[0015] Step S22: construct a peripheral DIKW model according to the typed resources.

[0016] Preferably, the typed resources also include intention resources, and the intention resources include subjective intention, objective intention and simulated intention. The subjective intention is obtained from basic data, the objective intention is obtained from the information contained in each block in the blockchain, and the simulated intention is obtained from operation records.

[0017] Preferably, the specific steps of step S3 are:

[0018] Step S31, obtaining basic information and protection information of the power monitoring system, wherein the protection information includes security protection strategies, peripheral management methods, and data security measures;

[0019] Step S32: Map the basic information and security information of the power monitoring system into typed resources;

[0020] Step S33: construct a monitoring system DIKW model according to the typed resources.

[0021] Preferably, the specific steps of step S4 are:

[0022] Step S41, the monitoring system DIKW model obtains the intention resource in the peripheral DIKW model;

[0023] Step S42: convert the intended resources into matching data, information and resources;

[0024] Step S43: The monitoring system DIKW model performs a security assessment based on the data, information and resources combined with its protection information.

[0025] Preferably, when selecting the intention resource in step S41, the selection is performed in the order of simulated intention, objective intention and subjective intention.

[0026] Preferably, the specific steps of step S5 are:

[0027] Step S51, quantifying the safety assessment result of step S4 to obtain a safety assessment value;

[0028] Step S52: Compare the safety assessment value with the safety threshold set in the power monitoring system, and reject the access request of the peripheral device whose safety assessment value is lower than the safety threshold.

[0029] Preferably, the safety threshold is adjusted in real time according to the protection capability of the power monitoring system.

[0030] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0031] The present invention provides a method for peripheral access control of a power monitoring system terminal. When a peripheral initiates an access request, the blockchain data of the peripheral is obtained, wherein the blockchain data includes basic information of the peripheral and historical access data. A DIKW model of the peripheral can be constructed according to the blockchain data of the peripheral. At the same time, the power monitoring system will also construct a monitoring system DIKW model, introduce the DIKW knowledge graph into the peripheral control of the power monitoring system, integrate and transform the fragmented information by the DIKW knowledge graph, and finally, after the security assessment of the peripheral DIKW model is performed through the monitoring system DIKW model, the access request of the peripheral with poor security can be rejected, so as to avoid putting the power monitoring system under threat and ensure the normal progress of the power production, transmission and supply process. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0032] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings required for use in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only preferred embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative work.

[0033] Figure 1 It is a flow chart of a method for controlling access of peripherals of a power monitoring system terminal according to the present invention;

[0034] Figure 2 This is a flow chart of step S2 of a method for controlling access of peripherals to a power monitoring system terminal of the present invention;

[0035] Figure 3 It is a flow chart of step S3 of a method for controlling access of peripherals of a power monitoring system terminal of the present invention;

[0036] Figure 4 It is a flow chart of step S4 of a method for controlling access of peripherals of a power monitoring system terminal of the present invention;

[0037] Figure 5 It is a flowchart of step S5 of a method for controlling access of peripherals of a power monitoring system terminal of the present invention; DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0038] In order to better understand the technical content of the present invention, a specific embodiment is provided below, and the present invention is further described in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0039] See also Figures 1 to 5 The present invention provides a method for controlling access of peripherals of a power monitoring system terminal, comprising the following steps:

[0040] Step S1: Responding to an access request from a peripheral device, obtaining blockchain data of the peripheral device;

[0041] Step S2: construct a peripheral DIKW model based on blockchain data;

[0042] Step S3: Obtain basic information of the power monitoring system and construct a DIKW model of the monitoring system;

[0043] Step S4, the monitoring system DIKW model performs a security assessment on the peripheral DIKW model;

[0044] Step S5: Reject access requests from peripherals with poor security.

[0045] The invention discloses a method for controlling access of peripherals of a power monitoring system terminal, and the object of application is a power monitoring system. The power monitoring system is mainly used to monitor multiple links in the power production process to avoid abnormalities in power production and transmission caused by problems in one of the links, so as to ensure normal power consumption. In order to avoid external threats, the power monitoring system itself generally does not communicate with the external network, but exchanges information through the internal network. In order to cope with different threats, the power monitoring system also needs to be regularly upgraded, backed up and configured, so it is necessary to transmit data through peripherals. Due to the importance of the power monitoring system, strict control is required when peripherals are accessed. If there are threats, When a threatening peripheral device is connected to the power monitoring system and escapes the protection of the power monitoring system, the entire power production, transmission and distribution system will be threatened. At present, the control of peripheral devices is basically carried out manually, through empirical judgment of the source and transmission method of the peripheral device, and recording when receiving the peripheral device to facilitate tracing. However, the manual control method mostly stays at the source of the peripheral device and the personnel related to it, and cannot obtain information about the peripheral device itself and some historical operations. If some peripheral devices are connected to other systems before being connected to the power monitoring system and are infected with viruses that are difficult to detect, it will pose a great threat to the power monitoring system, and ultimately affect the normal production and transmission of electricity.

[0046] To this end, the present invention controls access to the peripheral itself and its historical access data. First, when the peripheral initiates an access request, the blockchain data of the peripheral is obtained. The information stored in the blockchain data of the peripheral is public and verified by multiple parties, and cannot be falsified. Therefore, after building a blockchain for the peripheral, its access information can be stored. After obtaining the blockchain data of the peripheral, a DIKW model of the peripheral is built based on the blockchain data. At the same time, after obtaining the basic information of the power monitoring system, a DIKW model of the monitoring system is built, and the DIKW knowledge graph is introduced into the peripheral management and control. Fragmented and mass information can be integrated and converted to each other, so that the monitoring system DIKW model can perform security assessment on the peripheral DIKW model. After obtaining the assessment result, the peripheral with poor security is denied access to the system, so as to avoid the power monitoring system being under threat and ensure that the production and transmission of electricity can proceed normally.

[0047] Preferably, in step S1, after responding to the access request of the peripheral device, a virtual system with a lower protection capability than the power monitoring system is constructed, and the access of the peripheral device is allowed, and the operation records during the access of the peripheral device are monitored in real time.

[0048] After receiving the access request of the peripheral device, a virtual system is first constructed, wherein the protection capability of the virtual system is lower than that of the power monitoring system. Then, the operation records of the peripheral device accessing the virtual system are monitored, wherein the operation records include the writing and writing of data and the modification of permissions. Through the operation records, it can be determined whether the peripheral device poses a threat to the power monitoring system. The purpose of setting the protection capability of the virtual system to be lower than that of the power monitoring system is to ensure that the subsequent power safety system can effectively protect the peripheral device.

[0049] Preferably, the blockchain data includes basic data of the peripheral and several blocks, the basic data includes the type of peripheral, technical specifications, security certification report and supplier, each block contains the time when the peripheral requests access to other systems, the request result, the security check summary and the purpose of access, and the blockchain data uploads a new block to the access request issued by the peripheral.

[0050] For each peripheral that needs to be connected to the power safety system, a blockchain is built. Each blockchain contains the basic data of the peripheral and multiple blocks. Each block represents an access record of the peripheral. Therefore, the block will contain the access time of the peripheral to each system, the result of the access request, the security check summary and the purpose of the access, etc. In addition, the basic data of the peripheral includes the type of peripheral, technical specifications, safety certification report and supplier, etc. The basic data can be used to make a simple assessment of the security status of the peripheral, and the data contained in the blockchain can determine whether the peripheral has previously engaged in some illegal behavior or has been denied access by other systems, etc.

[0051] Preferably, the specific steps of step S2 are:

[0052] Step S21: Map blockchain data into typed resources, where the typed resources include data resources, information resources, and knowledge resources;

[0053] Step S22: construct a peripheral DIKW model according to the typed resources.

[0054] Preferably, the typed resources also include intention resources, and the intention resources include subjective intention, objective intention and simulated intention. The subjective intention is obtained from basic data, the objective intention is obtained from the information contained in each block in the blockchain, and the simulated intention is obtained from operation records.

[0055] After obtaining the blockchain data of the peripheral, it is necessary to build a peripheral DIKW model. After mapping the basic information contained in the blockchain data and the information in the block into typed resources, the peripheral DIKW model can be built through typed resources. The typed resources for building the peripheral DIKW model are composed of data resources, information resources, knowledge resources and intention resources. Data resources, information resources and knowledge resources can be transformed and combined with each other, and the intention resources are obtained by transforming and combining the other three resources. They are divided into three categories, namely subjective intention, objective intention and simulated intention. The subjective intention is obtained based on the basic data of the peripheral and represents the security level of the peripheral itself. The objective intention is obtained based on the historical access data in the blockchain. Due to its open and fair characteristics, the content stored on the blockchain cannot be easily tampered with. Therefore, the objective intention obtained through the historical access data in the blockchain represents the security assessment of other systems on the peripheral, and the simulated intention is obtained from the operation record of the peripheral in the virtual system. Since the structure of the virtual system is basically similar to that of the power monitoring system, but the protection capability is lower, the operation record of the peripheral access to the virtual system can be regarded as the actual operation record when the peripheral is allowed to access the power monitoring system.

[0056] Preferably, the specific steps of step S3 are:

[0057] Step S31, obtaining basic information and protection information of the power monitoring system, wherein the protection information includes security protection strategies, peripheral management methods, and data security measures;

[0058] Step S32: Map the basic information and security information of the power monitoring system into typed resources;

[0059] Step S33: construct a monitoring system DIKW model according to the typed resources.

[0060] For the construction of the DIKW model of the monitoring system, the main thing is to obtain the basic information and protection information of the power monitoring system. The security protection strategy, peripheral management method and data security measures contained in the protection information represent the protection capability of the power monitoring system. After obtaining the protection information and basic information, they can be mapped into typed resources and the monitoring system DIKW model can be constructed based on the typed resources.

[0061] Preferably, the specific steps of step S4 are:

[0062] Step S41, the monitoring system DIKW model obtains the intention resource in the peripheral DIKW model, wherein the intention is selected in the order of simulation intention, objective intention and subjective intention;

[0063] Step S42: convert the intended resources into matching data, information and resources;

[0064] Step S43: The monitoring system DIKW model performs a security assessment based on the data, information and resources combined with its protection information.

[0065] After obtaining the peripheral DIKW model and the monitoring system DIKW model, the monitoring system DIKW model is used as the leading factor to conduct a security assessment on the peripheral DIKW model. The security assessment is mainly based on the intention resources, which include three types of intentions. The priority of the selected intentions is simulation intention, objective intention and subjective intention. The simulation intention represents the operation process of the peripheral in the virtual system, which is closely related to the power monitoring system. Therefore, the simulation intention is selected for security assessment first, and the objective intention is the interaction record between other systems and peripherals. The access process of other systems to the peripherals is used to determine whether it is some malicious peripherals for security assessment. Finally, the subjective intention is the data of the peripheral itself, which cannot be used to evaluate whether the peripheral access to the system causes a threat, but the peripheral's own data can evaluate its ability to be breached and tampered with. Therefore, after converting the intention resources, data, information and resources can be obtained, and then combined with the protection information of the power monitoring system, the security of the peripheral can be evaluated. Since the security assessment is carried out on the peripheral itself, other systems and the current power monitoring system, the accuracy of the security assessment results can be guaranteed, thereby avoiding some peripherals with potential threats from being connected to the power monitoring system to cause threats.

[0066] Preferably, the specific steps of step S5 are:

[0067] Step S51, quantifying the safety assessment result of step S4 to obtain a safety assessment value;

[0068] Step S52: Compare the safety assessment value with the safety threshold set in the power monitoring system, and reject access requests from peripherals whose safety assessment value is lower than the safety threshold. The safety threshold is adjusted in real time according to the protection capability of the power monitoring system.

[0069] After conducting a security assessment on the peripherals, the security assessment results need to be quantified. The quantification method is to use the expert scoring method and obtain the security assessment value, and then compare the security assessment value with the security threshold. If the security assessment value is lower than the security threshold, the access request of the peripheral is rejected, and the peripheral with a security assessment value higher than the security threshold can be allowed to access. For the security threshold, it is dynamically adjustable. Since the coverage of each power monitoring system and the number of monitored areas and equipment are different, the data processed and monitored are also quite different. At the same time, according to the different construction progress, the power system will also expand or shrink in scale. Therefore, the security threshold of the power monitoring system is dynamic. The overall structure, coverage, scale and number of equipment of the power monitoring system can be obtained to obtain its protection capability, and then the specific data of the security threshold can be determined according to the protection capability. If there is a change in the power monitoring system, the security threshold can be adjusted in real time to ensure the accuracy of the security assessment results and avoid the threat of peripherals to the power monitoring system and then affect the production and transmission of electricity.

[0070] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for controlling access of peripherals to a power monitoring system terminal, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: Step S1: Responding to an access request from a peripheral device, obtaining blockchain data of the peripheral device; Step S2: construct a peripheral DIKW model based on blockchain data; Step S3: Obtain basic information of the power monitoring system and construct a DIKW model of the monitoring system; Step S4, the monitoring system DIKW model performs a security assessment on the peripheral DIKW model; Step S5: Reject access requests from peripherals with poor security.

2. A method for controlling access of peripherals of a power monitoring system terminal according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S1, after responding to the access request of the peripheral device, a virtual system with a lower protection capability than the power monitoring system is constructed, and the access of the peripheral device is allowed, and the operation records of the access process of the peripheral device are monitored in real time.

3. A method for controlling access of peripherals of a power monitoring system terminal according to claim 2, characterized in that: The blockchain data includes basic data of the peripheral and several blocks. The basic data includes the type of peripheral, technical specifications, security certification report and supplier. Each block contains the time when the peripheral requests access to other systems, the request result, the security check summary and the purpose of access. The blockchain data uploads a new block to the access request issued by the peripheral.

4. A method for controlling access of peripherals of a power monitoring system terminal according to claim 3, characterized in that: The specific steps of step S2 are: Step S21: Map blockchain data into typed resources, where the typed resources include data resources, information resources, and knowledge resources; Step S22: construct a peripheral DIKW model according to the typed resources.

5. A method for controlling access of peripherals of a power monitoring system terminal according to claim 4, characterized in that: The typed resources also include intention resources, which include subjective intention, objective intention and simulated intention. The subjective intention is obtained from basic data, the objective intention is obtained from the information contained in each block in the blockchain, and the simulated intention is obtained from operation records.

6. A method for controlling access of peripherals to a power monitoring system terminal according to claim 5, characterized in that: The specific steps of step S3 are: Step S31, obtaining basic information and protection information of the power monitoring system, wherein the protection information includes security protection strategies, peripheral management methods, and data security measures; Step S32: Map the basic information and security information of the power monitoring system into typed resources; Step S33: construct a monitoring system DIKW model according to the typed resources.

7. A method for controlling access of peripherals to a power monitoring system terminal according to claim 6, characterized in that: The specific steps of step S4 are: Step S41, the monitoring system DIKW model obtains the intention resource in the peripheral DIKW model; Step S42: convert the intended resources into matching data, information and resources; Step S43: The monitoring system DIKW model performs a security assessment based on the data, information and resources combined with its protection information.

8. A method for controlling access of peripherals to a power monitoring system terminal according to claim 7, characterized in that: In step S41, when selecting intention resources, selection is performed in the order of simulated intention, objective intention and subjective intention.

9. The method for controlling access of peripherals of a power monitoring system terminal according to claim 1, characterized in that: The specific steps of step S5 are: Step S51, quantifying the safety assessment result of step S4 to obtain a safety assessment value; Step S52: Compare the safety assessment value with the safety threshold set in the power monitoring system, and reject the access request of the peripheral device whose safety assessment value is lower than the safety threshold.

10. A method for controlling access of peripherals of a power monitoring system terminal according to claim 9, characterized in that: The safety threshold is adjusted in real time according to the protection capability of the power monitoring system.