Symptom-based design method for integrity control strategy of primary system in pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant
Through the sign-based design method, the degree of compressed thermal shock classification and control strategy design of the main system of the pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant, solving the problem of handling different severity in complex systems, improving the efficiency and safety of accident handling, and ensuring that The safety of nuclear power plants and the isolation of radioactive materials.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202010418095.4
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2020-05-18
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-19
- Estimated Expiration
- 2040-05-18
AI Technical Summary
In nuclear power plants, the integrity control of the main system of the pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant has the problem of complexity and mutual influence between multiple systems in accident handling. It is difficult for the existing technology to effectively classify and deal with compressed thermal shock states of different severity, which affects the impact of the thermal shock states of different severity. Efficiency and safety of accident handling.
The design method based on signs is adopted to classify the degree of compressed thermal shocks of the main system, which is divided into unexpected compressed thermal shocks and expected compressed thermal shocks. The accident list and control strategy are determined separately, and through accident analysis, simulation calculation and simulation verification. Form treatment strategies for different severity.
It improves the processing efficiency and policy targeting, ensures the safety and effectiveness of the integrity control of the main system, and is suitable for pressurized water reactor nuclear power plants of different types, ensuring that the radioactive substances in the accident are not released outward.
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Figure CN111768070B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The invention belongs to the technical field of nuclear power plant design, and in particular relates to a symptom-based design method for a main system integrity control strategy of a pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant. Background Art
[0002] Defense in depth is a safety design requirement that is implemented throughout the nuclear power plant design safety regulations (HAF102). As the third line of defense of the defense in depth principle, the accident handling procedures play a vital role in limiting the development of accidents and ensuring the safety of reactors. The symptom-oriented accident handling strategy combines the advantages of both the event-oriented accident handling strategy and the state-oriented accident handling strategy. It takes symptom-oriented accident handling as the main trunk, provides multi-level diagnosis and multi-means countermeasures, and focuses on key safety functions. It can not only quickly mitigate and handle accidents through event-oriented optimal recovery strategies when accident signs are clear, but also can guide the key safety function state tree to the function recovery strategy to mitigate function deterioration when unexpected accidents or superimposed accidents occur, ensuring the safety of each barrier of the power plant to achieve the purpose of minimizing the radioactivity released into the environment. Ensuring that contained radionuclides are not released is one of the three major safety functions to ensure the safety of nuclear power plants. The reactor coolant system (main system) is an extremely important barrier for nuclear power plants to prevent the spread of radioactive substances in accident handling. Ensuring the integrity of the main system is an important goal in accident handling.
[0003] Nuclear power plants are highly complex. For pressurized water reactor nuclear power plants, in addition to nuclear steam supply systems and thermal systems, several dedicated safety facilities are also set up to ensure safety. If various auxiliary systems and support systems are taken into account, the number of systems in nuclear power plants reaches hundreds. The main system control in the symptom-based accident strategy involves a large number of systems and equipment in the nuclear power plant. The various steps of the strategy are mutually influential and related, and need to be analyzed and determined based on scientific and reasonable design methods. Summary of the invention
[0004] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a symptom-based design method for the main system integrity control strategy of a pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the main system integrity control strategy of the pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant.
[0005] The technical solution of the present invention is as follows: A symptom-based method for designing a main system integrity control strategy for a pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant comprises the following steps:
[0006] (1) The degree of pressure thermal shock of the main system is classified into accidental pressure thermal shock of the main system and expected pressure thermal shock of the main system; accidental pressure thermal shock of the main system means that the state of the main system exceeds the material and structural limits of the main system, and the integrity is seriously threatened; expected pressure thermal shock of the main system means that the state of the main system is close to the material and structural limits of the main system, and the integrity is potentially threatened;
[0007] (2) Determine the list of accidents that the main system integrity control needs to deal with for the unexpected pressurized thermal shock state of the main system and the expected pressurized thermal shock state of the main system;
[0008] (3) Analyze the main system integrity control strategy for the main system integrity accident conditions corresponding to the main system accidental pressure thermal shock and the main system expected pressure thermal shock;
[0009] (4) Verify and confirm the analyzed main system integrity control strategy to form a symptom-based main system integrity control strategy.
[0010] Furthermore, in the symptom-based PWR nuclear power plant main system integrity control strategy design method as described above, in step (1), the main system integrity status is reflected according to the main system cooling rate, main system temperature and main system pressure, and the degree of pressure thermal shock of the main system is classified.
[0011] Furthermore, the accidental pressure thermal shock of the main system in step (1) includes the following accident signs:
[0012] Accident sign A1: The cooling rate of the main system exceeds the limit G (the allowable limit of cooling of the main system), and the pressure and temperature of the cold section of the main system is on the left side of the PT limit curve (i.e., low temperature overpressure state);
[0013] Accident sign A2: The cooling rate of the main system exceeds the limit value G, the main system meets the PT limit curve but the temperature of the cold section loop is lower than the limit value T1;
[0014] Accident sign A3: The main system meets the cooling rate limit G, but when the main system pressure limit P is above the limit, the temperature of the cold section loop is lower than the limit T1;
[0015] When the main system status shows any of the above accident signs, it is considered that the above status exceeds the material and structural limits of the main system, the integrity is seriously threatened, and the main system is in an unexpected pressure thermal shock state;
[0016] The expected pressure thermal shock of the main system includes the following accident signs:
[0017] Accident sign B1: The cooling rate of the main system exceeds the limit value G, the main system meets the PT limit curve and all cold segment temperatures meet the limit value T1, but the temperature of a cold segment loop is lower than the limit value T2;
[0018] Accident sign B2: The main system meets the cooling rate limit G, the cold loop temperature meets the limit T1, but the main system pressure exceeds the limit P;
[0019] When the main system status shows any of the above accident signs, it is considered that the above status is close to the material and structural limits of the main system, there is a potential threat to its integrity, and the main system is in an expected pressurized thermal shock state.
[0020] Furthermore, in the symptom-based design method for the integrity control strategy of the main system of a pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant as described above, in step (2), the accident safety analysis, probability analysis and related simulation calculations are combined to screen out a list of accident conditions that threaten the integrity of the main system from the initiating event list, wherein the unexpected pressurized thermal shock state includes: local or overall overcooling of the main system caused by a single accident or multiple accidents (such as LOCA, secondary side rupture or SGTR, etc.), and cold overpressure caused by excessive charging or injection; the expected pressurized thermal shock state includes: expected excessive cooling of the main system (such as pressurized thermal shock), and cold overpressure conditions in a controllable cooling process (such as overpressure cooling).
[0021] Furthermore, in the symptom-based PWR nuclear power plant main system integrity control strategy design method as described above, in step (3), for each type of main system integrity accident condition, the main system integrity control strategy is analyzed from the perspectives of accident handling objectives, diagnostic strategies, available systems and equipment (dedicated systems, auxiliary systems, support systems, etc.), available recovery means and applicable conditions, reliability and redundancy.
[0022] Furthermore, for the accident condition of unexpected pressure thermal shock, the main system integrity control strategy includes at least the following parts:
[0023] Determine the cause of overcooling whenever possible and terminate or limit cooling;
[0024] The injection system of the pressurized water reactor will cause the temperature of the cold section of the main system to drop significantly and may cause overpressure. Therefore, early inspection and termination of the injection system can eliminate its adverse effects on pressurized thermal shock.
[0025] Reduce the primary circuit pressure to reduce the stress on the pressure vessel;
[0026] Re-establish control of the power plant for subsequent restoration;
[0027] For the expected pressurized thermal shock accident conditions, the main system integrity control strategy shall include at least the following parts:
[0028] Identify overcooling and terminate or limit cooling whenever possible;
[0029] Reduce the pressure of the main system within the limit of the main system cooling rate to establish normal pressure-temperature conditions for the main system.
[0030] Furthermore, in the symptom-based PWR nuclear power plant main system integrity control strategy design method as described above, the verification of the control strategy in step (4) is to review the correctness of the written strategy; the control strategy is confirmed by using reactor simulation software to simulate the initial operating conditions of a typical accident, and the accident is handled according to the accident handling strategy to confirm the control effect of the main system integrity and other parameters to confirm whether the main system integrity control strategy meets the design requirements. If not, the main system integrity control strategy is redesigned.
[0031] The beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows:
[0032] 1) This method is applicable to pressurized water reactor nuclear power plants of different reactor types and is a design method for the main system integrity control strategy of pressurized water reactor nuclear power plants that is widely applicable.
[0033] 2) A method is proposed to classify the symptoms based on the severity of the main system's pressurized thermal shock and to treat them separately. This method can adopt more targeted treatment strategies for different severities and improve treatment efficiency.
[0034] 3) The present invention proposes a strategy for the signs of abnormal integrity of the main system, based on the severity classification of the main system's pressurized thermal shock, and analyzes the inclusiveness and compatibility of the strategy for other typical working conditions. This method has a wide range of implementable significance for the design of the main system integrity control strategy.
[0035] 4) This method ensures the safety and effectiveness of the symptom-based main system integrity control strategy of the PWR nuclear power plant. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0036] Figure 1 A flow chart of a design method for a symptom-based integrity control strategy for a main system of a pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant according to the present invention;
[0037] Figure 2 It is a schematic diagram of the integrity control strategy of the main system of a pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant based on symptoms in a specific embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0038] The present invention is described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments.
[0039] The present invention starts from the accident signs, classifies the main system control methods according to the degree of pressure thermal shock of the main system, determines the main system control strategies respectively, and determines the correctness of the control strategies through strategy verification. The specific analysis method is as follows Figure 1 As shown, the following steps are included:
[0040] (1) Classification of main system integrity accidents
[0041] The rapid and severe cooling of the descending section of the pressure vessel caused by the accident will cause thermal shock to the wall of the pressure vessel, which will cause the cracks that may exist on the wall to grow and evolve into larger ruptures. The growth of cracks may lead to the loss of integrity of the pressure vessel. Based on the material and structural characteristics of the main system of the nuclear power plant, the main system cooling rate, main system temperature and main system pressure reflect the integrity of the main system, and the degree of thermal shock of the main system is classified:
[0042] a) Accidental pressure and thermal shock of the main system
[0043] Accident sign A: When the main system status of a nuclear power plant violates the combined operating conditions of the main system cooling rate limit G, the main system cold section temperature limit T1 and the main system pressure limit P, it is considered that the main system status exceeds the material and structural limits of the main system, the integrity is seriously threatened, and the main system is in an unexpected pressurized thermal shock state.
[0044] b) The main system is expected to be subjected to pressure thermal shock
[0045] Accident Sign B: When the main system status of the nuclear power plant does not show Accident Sign A, but violates the main system cooling rate limit G, and the main system cold section temperature limits T1 and T2 combined operating conditions, it is considered that the main system status is close to the material and structural limits of the main system, and there is a potential threat to its integrity. The main system is in the expected pressurized thermal shock state.
[0046] The above-mentioned G limit is the allowable limit for cooling of the main system, which is related to the material and system design. The T1 and T2 limits are both derived from the PT limit curve, which is calculated based on the material properties of the pressure vessel; the PT limit curve is defined as the combination of the lower boundaries of the step cooldown crack initiation limit and the isothermal wall crack initiation limit as the left boundary curve, and the reactor main system safety valve pressure plus a certain uncertainty pressure as the upper boundary curve. T1 is the intersection of the left boundary curve and the upper boundary curve, which is called the "full repressurization limit" in some materials, and T2 is T1 plus a margin (usually 17 degrees Celsius). The P limit is a fixed value of the main system pressure under specific operating conditions, which is related to the system design. This is common knowledge in the field.
[0047] (2) Determine the list of accidents that need to be addressed by the core main system integrity control
[0048] Based on the list of initiating events of nuclear power plants determined by determinism and probability theory, combined with accident safety analysis, probability analysis and related simulation calculations, a list of accident conditions that threaten the integrity of the main system is screened out from the list of initiating events. Including:
[0049] a) Accidental pressure and thermal shock of the main system
[0050] Accident conditions such as unexpected overcooling of the main system or cold overpressure during controlled cooling may cause accidental pressurized thermal shock accidents, such as loss of coolant accidents, secondary side breach accidents or steam generator heat transfer tube rupture accidents in the accident list. They may also be caused by multiple accident superposition conditions involving these single accidents, which may lead to partial or overall overcooling of the main system. In addition, excessive top-up or injection during accident handling may lead to cold overpressure.
[0051] b) The main system is expected to be subjected to pressure thermal shock
[0052] The expected main system cooling too fast (such as pressure thermal shock) or the cold overpressure condition during the controlled cooling process (such as overpressure cooling) may cause the expected pressure thermal shock accident. The accident sequence that causes the main system to be unexpectedly pressure thermal shock may cause the expected pressure thermal shock condition from the development of the accident. Enter different accident handling scopes according to the accident signs.
[0053] (3) Analysis of the main system integrity control strategy
[0054] In order to analyze the accident conditions of abnormal main system integrity, firstly, according to the severity of the threat to the integrity of the main system and the related signs, the main system integrity-related accident conditions that need to be dealt with are classified, namely, accidental pressure thermal shock of the main system and expected pressure thermal shock of the main system. For each type of main system integrity accident condition, analysis and evaluation are carried out from the perspectives of accident handling objectives, diagnostic strategies, available systems and equipment (dedicated systems, auxiliary systems, support systems, etc.), available recovery means and applicable conditions, reliability and redundancy to ensure that the control strategy can meet the handling requirements of the accident conditions.
[0055] For accident conditions of unexpected pressurized thermal shock, the integrity of the main system has been seriously threatened. According to the accident analysis, its control strategy should at least include the following parts:
[0056] Determine the cause of overcooling as much as possible and terminate or limit cooling;
[0057] The injection system of the pressurized water reactor will cause the temperature of the cold section of the main system to drop significantly and may cause overpressure. Therefore, early inspection and termination of the injection system can eliminate its adverse effects on pressurized thermal shock.
[0058] Reduce the primary circuit pressure to reduce the stress on the pressure vessel;
[0059] Re-establish control of the plant for subsequent recovery.
[0060] For the expected pressurized thermal shock accident condition, the integrity of the main system is potentially threatened. According to the accident analysis, its control strategy should at least include the following parts:
[0061] - distinguish overcooling and terminate or limit it as far as possible;
[0062] - Reduce the pressure of the main system within the main system cooling rate limit to establish normal pressure-temperature conditions for the main system.
[0063] The main system integrity control strategy is classified according to the severity of the accident, which is divided into accident conditions of accidental pressurization thermal shock of the main system and expected pressurization thermal shock of the main system, which can cover the full range of pressurization thermal shock accidents.
[0064] (4) Verification and confirmation of the main system integrity control strategy
[0065] After completing the main system integrity control strategy, verification and confirmation work needs to be carried out. Verification is the correctness of the written review strategy. Confirmation is carried out by using reactor simulation software to simulate the initial operating conditions of typical accidents, handle them according to the accident handling strategy, confirm the control effect of the main system integrity and other parameters, and confirm whether the main system integrity control strategy meets the design requirements. If not, the main system integrity control strategy is redesigned.
[0066] (5) Form the final main system integrity control strategy
[0067] Based on the above analysis and verification and validation results, a symptom-based primary system integrity control strategy is formed.
[0068] Example
[0069] Taking a pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant as an example, the design method of the symptom-based primary system integrity control strategy is described in detail.
[0070] (1) Classification of main system integrity accidents
[0071] Based on the instruments that reflect the integrity of the main system, the degree of pressure thermal shock of the main system is classified. The classification is explained by taking a pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant as an example:
[0072] Based on the material and structural characteristics of the main system of a pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant, the main system integrity status is reflected according to the main system cooling rate, main system temperature and main system pressure:
[0073] a) Accidental pressure and thermal shock of the main system
[0074] Accident sign A1: When the cooling rate of the main system exceeds the limit G (the allowable limit of the cooling of the main system), the pressure and temperature of the cold section of the main system is on the left side of the PT limit curve (the pressure-temperature limit curve is a combination of the lower boundary of the step cooling crack initial limit curve and the isothermal wall crack initial limit curve, which depends on the material properties of the pressure vessel);
[0075] Accident sign A2: The cooling rate of the main system exceeds the limit value G, and the main system meets the PT limit curve but the temperature of the cold section loop is lower than the limit value T1;
[0076] Accident sign A3: The main system meets the cooling rate limit G, but when the main system pressure limit P is above, the temperature of the cold section loop is lower than the limit T1;
[0077] When the main system status appears any of the above conditions, it is considered that the above conditions exceed the material and structural limits of the main system, the integrity is seriously threatened, and the main system is in an unexpected pressurized thermal shock state.
[0078] b) The main system is expected to be subjected to pressure thermal shock
[0079] Accident sign B1: When the cooling rate of the main system exceeds the limit value G, the main system meets the PT limit curve and all cold segment temperatures meet the limit value T1, but the temperature of a cold segment loop is lower than the limit value T2;
[0080] Accident sign B2: The main system meets the cooling rate limit G, the cold loop temperature meets the limit T1, but the main system pressure exceeds the limit P;
[0081] When the main system status appears in any of the above working conditions, it is considered that the above conditions are close to the material and structural limits of the main system, the integrity is potentially threatened, and the main system is in the expected pressurized thermal shock state.
[0082] (2) Determine the list of accidents that the main system integrity control needs to deal with
[0083] Accidental pressurized thermal shock: partial or overall overcooling of the main system caused by a single accident or multiple accidents (such as LOCA, secondary side rupture or SGTR, etc.); excessive charging or injection may lead to cold overpressure.
[0084] Expected pressure thermal shock: expected main system cooling too fast (such as pressure thermal shock); cold overpressure condition during controlled cooling (such as overpressure cooling).
[0085] (3) Analysis of the main system integrity control strategy
[0086] For unexpected pressure thermal shock accidents, the general accident response strategy is determined after analysis:
[0087] ·Terminate primary cooling circuit;
[0088] ·Terminate the security injection when the conditions are met;
[0089] ·One circuit voltage reduction;
[0090] Establish normal operation status and stabilize the primary circuit status.
[0091] And the corresponding setting values for the execution of relevant measures are obtained through calculation.
[0092] Similarly, the general response strategy for expected pressurized thermal shock accidents is analyzed:
[0093] Stop cooling the main system;
[0094] Reduce the main system pressure within the technical specification limit.
[0095] Further analysis of the inclusiveness of the main system pressurized thermal shock mitigation strategy to other working conditions:
[0096] The main system integrity control strategy is classified according to the severity of the accident, which is divided into accident conditions of accidental pressurization thermal shock of the main system and expected pressurization thermal shock of the main system, which can cover the full range of pressurization thermal shock accidents.
[0097] (4) Perform strategy verification and confirmation.
[0098] -Written checks verify the correctness of the strategy.
[0099] -By using confirmation tools, simulating typical accident initial conditions, handling them according to the accident handling strategy, confirming the integrity of the main system and the control effect of other parameters, and then confirming the correctness of the accident handling strategy under typical accident conditions.
[0100] After verification and confirmation, it is shown that the above strategies can meet the requirements of accident handling.
[0101] (5) Form the final main system integrity control strategy.
[0102] Based on the above analysis and verification and confirmation results, the symptom-based main system integrity control strategy is completed as follows: Figure 2 shown.
[0103] Obviously, those skilled in the art can make various changes and modifications to the present invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. Thus, if these modifications and variations of the present invention fall within the scope of the claims of the present invention and their equivalents, the present invention is also intended to include these modifications and variations.
Claims
1. A symptom-based design method for the integrity control strategy of the main system of a pressurized water reactor nuclear power plant, comprising the following steps: (1) The degree of pressure thermal shock of the main system is classified into accidental pressure thermal shock of the main system and expected pressure thermal shock of the main system; accidental pressure thermal shock of the main system means that the state of the main system exceeds the material and structural limits of the main system, and the integrity is seriously threatened; expected pressure thermal shock of the main system means that the state of the main system is close to the material and structural limits of the main system, and the integrity is potentially threatened; The accidental thermal shock of the main system under pressure includes the following accident signs: Accident sign A1: The cooling rate of the main system exceeds the limit G, and the pressure and temperature of the cold section of the main system is on the left side of the PT limit curve; Accident sign A2: The cooling rate of the main system exceeds the limit value G, the main system meets the PT limit curve but the temperature of the cold section loop is lower than the limit value T1; Accident sign A3: The main system meets the cooling rate limit G, but when the main system pressure limit P is above the limit, the temperature of the cold section loop is lower than the limit T1; When the main system status shows any of the above accident signs, it is considered that the above status exceeds the material and structural limits of the main system, the integrity is seriously threatened, and the main system is in an unexpected pressure thermal shock state; The expected pressure thermal shock of the main system includes the following accident signs: Accident sign B1: The cooling rate of the main system exceeds the limit value G, the main system meets the PT limit curve and all cold segment temperatures meet the limit value T1, but the temperature of a cold segment loop is lower than the limit value T2; Accident sign B2: The main system meets the cooling rate limit G, the cold loop temperature meets the limit T1, but the main system pressure exceeds the limit P; When the main system status shows any of the above accident signs, it is considered that the above status is close to the material and structural limits of the main system, there is a potential threat to the integrity, and the main system is in the expected pressurized thermal shock state; (2) Determine the list of accidents that the main system integrity control needs to deal with for the unexpected pressurized thermal shock state and the expected pressurized thermal shock state of the main system; (3) Analyze the main system integrity control strategy for the main system integrity accident conditions corresponding to the main system accidental pressure thermal shock and the main system expected pressure thermal shock; (4) Verify and confirm the analyzed main system integrity control strategy to form a symptom-based main system integrity control strategy.
2. The symptom-based PWR nuclear power plant main system integrity control strategy design method according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step (1), the degree of pressure thermal shock of the main system is classified according to the main system cooling rate, the main system temperature and the main system pressure reflecting the integrity state of the main system.
3. The symptom-based PWR nuclear power plant main system integrity control strategy design method according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step (2), the accident safety analysis, probability analysis and related simulation calculations are combined to screen out a list of accident conditions that threaten the integrity of the main system from the initiating event list, where the unexpected pressurized thermal shock state includes: local or overall overcooling of the main system caused by a single accident or multiple accidents, and cold overpressure caused by excessive charging or injection; the expected pressurized thermal shock state includes: expected excessive cooling of the main system, and cold overpressure during the controllable cooling process.
4. The symptom-based PWR nuclear power plant main system integrity control strategy design method according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step (3), for each type of main system integrity accident condition, the main system integrity control strategy is analyzed from the perspectives of accident handling objectives, diagnostic strategies, available systems and equipment, available recovery means and applicable conditions, reliability and redundancy.
5. The symptom-based PWR nuclear power plant main system integrity control strategy design method according to claim 4, characterized in that: For accident conditions of unexpected pressurized thermal shock, the main system integrity control strategy shall include at least the following parts: Determine the cause of overcooling and terminate or limit cooling; The safety injection system of the pressurized water reactor will cause the temperature of the cold section of the main system to drop significantly and cause overpressure, so the safety injection is checked and terminated to eliminate the adverse effects of pressurized thermal shock; Reduce the primary circuit pressure to reduce the stress on the pressure vessel; Re-establish control of the plant for subsequent restoration; For the expected pressurized thermal shock accident conditions, the main system integrity control strategy shall include at least the following parts: Distinguish overcooling and terminate or limit cooling; Reduce the pressure of the main system within the limit of the main system cooling rate to establish normal pressure-temperature conditions for the main system.
6. The symptom-based PWR nuclear power plant main system integrity control strategy design method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The verification of the control strategy in step (4) is to review the correctness of the written strategy; the confirmation of the control strategy is carried out by using reactor simulation software to simulate the initial operating conditions of typical accidents, handle them according to the accident handling strategy, confirm the control effect of the main system integrity and other parameters, so as to confirm whether the main system integrity control strategy meets the design requirements. If not, the main system integrity control strategy is redesigned.
