A method for converting deniable editing to pre-planned deniable encryption

By introducing a symmetric encryption scheme in denial encryption, a pre-planned denial encryption conversion method is designed, which solves the problem of low efficiency of private key denial encryption scheme in the prior art, and realizes the short ciphertext length and short key length. An efficient encryption solution with fast encryption speed, suitable for large file encryption.

CN114139174BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-26BEIJING ACAD OF INFORMATION SCI & TECH
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202111315403.1
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2021-09-29
Filing Date
2021-11-08
Publication Date
2024-11-26
Estimated Expiration
2041-11-08

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing denial encryption schemes have shortcomings in efficiency and design, especially the private key denial encryption schemes are low in terms of ciphertext length and encryption and decryption speed, and have not fully considered the efficiency of specific applications.

Method used

A conversion method that can be denied edited to pre-planned denial encryption is proposed. Through two sets of encryption methods: normal mode and denial mode, the symmetric encryption scheme is used to achieve the characteristics of short ciphertext length, short denial key length, and fast encryption and decryption speed. , supports large file encryption, and the length of the private key has nothing to do with the length of the plaintext.

Benefits of technology

It realizes an efficient and decryptable encryption solution with short ciphertext length, short key length and fast encryption and decryption speed. It can deny that ciphertext is arbitrary plaintext, which is suitable for large file encryption, and eliminates the limitation of denial ability.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The present invention discloses a method for converting deniable editing to pre-planned deniable encryption. The present invention can deny a plaintext encrypted under a deniable algorithm as another pre-planned plaintext encrypted under a normal algorithm when a random number or a private key is provided to an attacker for key generation. The conversion method proposed by the present invention is universal and supports any receiver deniable editing scheme that meets the requirements, including those known and those designed in the future. The pre-planned receiver deniable encryption scheme proposed by the present invention allows multiple deniable plaintexts to be pre-planned before encryption, supports encryption of large-scale files, and can be converted to a pre-planned sender deniable encryption scheme by a known method.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of cryptography, specifically the field of encryption, and relates to related technologies in symmetric encryption and repudiable editing. Specifically, it is a method for converting repudiable editing into pre-planned repudiable encryption. Given a repudiable editing scheme, a pre-planned repudiable encryption scheme can be obtained by using a symmetric encryption scheme. This scheme can repudiate plaintext in ciphertext into any other plaintext, but the number of repudiations is limited. Background Technology

[0002] At the 1997 USMC conference, Canetti et al. introduced the concept of deniable encryption, which allows the sender / receiver to generate a "denying" (but indistinguishable from the real) random number / private key after encrypted communication, revealing a different plaintext. Deniable encryption strengthens traditional secure communication by ensuring the confidentiality of messages even if the sender / receiver is subsequently forced to reveal the plaintext, random number, or private key. A direct application of deniable encryption is suppressing vote-buying; its deniability guarantees that even if a malicious entity bribes a voter, it cannot be confirmed whether the vote meets the specified requirements. Deniable encryption satisfies non-committing, thus making it applicable to adaptive secure multi-party computation protocols. Furthermore, deniable encryption guarantees security under choose-open attacks and also implies the existence of incoercible secure multi-party computation (MPC).

[0003] Canetti et al. proposed two types of repudiation: the first is complete repudiation, where the sender and receiver run a pre-specified set of key generation and encryption / decryption algorithms, after which the ciphertext can be repudiated as a different plaintext; the second is bi-scheme repudiation (also known as multi-distribution repudiation), which allows two sets of key generation and encryption / decryption algorithms, one repudiable and the other normal, such that plaintext encrypted with the repudiable algorithm can be repudiated as another plaintext encrypted with the normal algorithm. Naturally, we aspire to design repudiation encryption schemes that satisfy complete repudiation. However, designing such schemes has been a long-standing open problem. It wasn't until 2014 that Sahai and Waters solved this open problem, designing a sender-completely-repudiation public-key repudiation encryption scheme based on indistinguishable obfuscation. In 2011, Bendlin et al. gave an impossible result regarding receiver-complete repudiation: no repudiation public-key encryption scheme satisfies this type of repudiation, meaning any receiver-completely-repudiation scheme requires interactive communication. In 2020, Canetti et al. solved the disclosure problem of designing fully repudiable interaction schemes based on exponentially secure indistinguishable obfuscation. Although the disclosure problem of repudiable encryption schemes satisfying full repudiability has been initially solved, known constructs all rely on indistinguishable obfuscation, that is, they only provide a theoretical solution to fully repudiable schemes without considering their efficiency. This invention focuses on designing practically efficient repudiable encryption schemes that consider weaker repudiability, namely, bi-scheme repudiability. All repudiations mentioned below refer to bi-scheme repudiation.

[0004] In 1997, Canetti et al. designed a sender-repudiable repudiable public-key encryption scheme based on semi-transparent sets, which can be constructed using trapdoor permutations and hard-core predicates. If we instantiate this repudiable encryption scheme using RSA trapdoor permutations, then for a 128-bit security level, the scheme requires 800 bytes of communication and 256 RSA encryption operations to encrypt one bit. Therefore, the efficiency of this repudiable encryption scheme remains relatively low. In 2011, O'Neill et al. generalized this design idea, designing a two-party repudiable repudiable public-key encryption scheme based on two semi-transparent sets, and proposed an instance of two semi-transparent sets based on the LWE hard assumption. While their scheme achieved stronger repudiability (i.e., allowing both the sender and receiver to deny the ciphertext), their scheme was still less efficient than the scheme proposed by Canetti et al.

[0005] Compared to sender-repudiable encryption schemes, receiver-repudiable encryption schemes are perhaps more desirable but also more difficult to design. According to Nielsen's impossible result in 2002, the private key of a receiver-repudiable encryption scheme must be at least as long as the plaintext. To address this problem, two methods exist: one is the deniable edit method proposed by Goldwasser et al.; the other is the plan-ahead deniable encryption method proposed by Canetti et al. This invention primarily considers the plan-ahead deniable encryption method, which is derived by transforming the deniable edit method. Plan-ahead deniable encryption allows the sender / receiver to pre-plan a certain number of deniable plaintexts before encrypting the plaintext, and then denigrat the ciphertext as these pre-planned plaintexts. Although plan-ahead deniable encryption has certain limitations in terms of deniability, this method allows encryption of plaintexts of arbitrary polynomial lengths, thus supporting the encryption of large files, and its private key length is independent of the plaintext length.

[0006] Repudiable encryption can be divided into public-key repudiable encryption (the sender only knows the public key, and the receiver generates both the public and private keys) and private-key repudiable encryption (the sender and receiver share the same key). Generally speaking, private-key repudiable encryption is more efficient than public-key repudiable encryption. However, most of the aforementioned impossibilities apply not only to public-key repudiable encryption but also to private-key repudiable encryption, making private-key repudiable encryption no easier to design than public-key repudiable encryption. Currently, all known repudiable encryption schemes are designed theoretically without considering their specific efficiency. This invention aims to design a specific and efficient pre-planned repudiable encryption scheme. Summary of the Invention

[0007] The purpose of this invention is to provide a specific and efficient method for converting deniable editing into pre-planned deniable encryption, which has the characteristics and advantages of short ciphertext length, short deniability key length, fast encryption and decryption speed, and high computational efficiency of the deniability algorithm.

[0008] The technical solution of this invention is as follows:

[0009] A method for converting deniable editing to pre-planned deniable encryption, characterized by comprising the following two encryption methods:

[0010] The private key encryption method in normal mode consists of the following algorithms:

[0011] 1) Normal key generation algorithm PADE.Gen(1 λ ): Input security parameter 1 λThe sender outputs a private key sk; the receiver runs a normal key generation algorithm to obtain the private key sk and securely shares it with the sender.

[0012] 2) Normal encryption algorithm PADE.Enc(sk,m): Input private key sk and plaintext m∈{0,1} n Output a ciphertext ct, where a positive integer n represents the length of the plaintext m; the sender runs a normal encryption algorithm to encrypt the plaintext m to obtain the ciphertext ct, and sends it to the receiver.

[0013] 3) Normal decryption algorithm PADE.Dec(sk,ct): Input private key sk and ciphertext ct, output plaintext m; after receiving the ciphertext ct, the receiver uses the private key sk to run the normal decryption algorithm to obtain the plaintext m.

[0014] The private key encryption method in denial mode consists of the following algorithms:

[0015] 1) Denial key generation algorithm PADE.DenGen(1 λ ): Input security parameter 1 λ The sender outputs a denial key dk; the receiver runs a denial key generation algorithm to obtain dk and securely shares it with the sender.

[0016] 2) Denial encryption algorithm PADE.DenEnc(dk,m,{m i} i∈[t] Input denial key dk, real plaintext m∈{0,1} n And t pre-planned denial plaintexts m1,…,m t ∈{0,1} n Output a deniable ciphertext ct, where a positive integer n represents the plaintext length, a positive integer t represents the number of pre-planned deniable plaintexts, and [t] represents the set {1,2,…,t}; the sender runs the deniability encryption algorithm to obtain the ciphertext ct and sends it to the receiver;

[0017] 3) Denial decryption algorithm PADE.DenDec(dk,ct): Input denial key dk and ciphertext ct, output plaintext m; the receiver obtains plaintext m by running the denial decryption algorithm without coercion.

[0018] 4) The denial algorithm PADE.Deny(dk,ct,q): Input the denial key dk, the ciphertext ct, and the denial plaintext index q∈[t], and output a random number r. ct,q Satisfy: sk ct,q ←PADE.Gen(1 λ ;r ct,q ) and m q =PADE.Dec(skct,q ,ct), where PADE.Gen(1 λ ;r ct,q ) indicates using a random number r ct,q Generate a private key sk that satisfies the security parameter λ. ct,q m q This represents the q-th pre-planned denial plaintext; under duress, the receiver runs the denial algorithm to obtain a random number r. ct,q and handed it over to the coercer; in obtaining r ct,q Then, the coercer runs the normal key generation algorithm PADE.Gen(1) λ ;r ct,q Obtain the private key sk ct,q Then run the normal decryption algorithm PADE.Dec(sk) ct,q ,ct) obtain the denial plaintext m q Therefore, it is believed that the ciphertext ct is the plaintext m. q Encryption result in normal mode.

[0019] In the denial mode, the sender pre-plans t denial plaintexts m1,…,m t The PADE.DenEnc algorithm is used to encrypt the plaintext m with the key dk, and then the ciphertext ct is sent to the recipient. Under normal circumstances, the recipient can run the PADE.DenDec algorithm to decrypt the plaintext m with the key dk and obtain the real plaintext m. Under duress, when the duresser demands the recipient hand over the random number generated by the key, the recipient runs the PADE.Deny algorithm and outputs a denial random number r. ct,q It can deny that the ciphertext ct is the qth pre-planned plaintext m in normal mode. q Encryption.

[0020] Furthermore, the pre-planned receiver-debunkable encryption method can be obtained by transforming the receiver-debunkable edit method; define the following edit function:

[0021]

[0022] Where the strings K0, K1, ..., K t k∈{0,1} λ Integer p∈[0,t], Edit description e∈{0,1} λ+log(t+1) Index q∈[t] The symbols [0,t] represent the set {0,1,…,t}, [t] represent the set {1,2,…,t}, and || is a known string concatenation symbol. In the case of private key encryption (i.e., the sender and receiver share the same private key), given the receiver-debunkable editing scheme DE = (Gen,Enc,Dec,DenGen,DenEnc,DenDec,Denny) for the above edit function Edit and the known private key encryption scheme SE = (Gen,Enc,Dec), the pre-planned receiver-debunkable encryption method is constructed as follows:

[0023] • Normal key generation algorithm PADE.Gen(1 λ ): Run the algorithm sk←DE.Gen(1 λ Output the private key sk;

[0024] • Normal encryption algorithm PADE.Enc(sk,m): randomly selects K0∈{0,1} λ And p∈[0,t], run the algorithm Execute the algorithm c0←SE.Enc(K0,m), and randomly select for each i∈[t]. Output ciphertext ct = (c, c′0, c′1, ..., c′) t )satisfy

[0025] c′ i =c i+1 i∈[0,p-1]

[0026] c′ i =c0,i=p,

[0027] c′ i =c i i∈[p+1,t]

[0028] Where |c0| represents the length of the ciphertext c0, and for any integers a, b (a≤b), [a,b] represents the set {a,…,b};

[0029] The normal decryption algorithm PADE.Dec(sk,ct) first parses ct=(c,c′0,c′1,...,c′) t Then run the algorithm K0||K1||…||K t ||k||p←DE.Dec(sk,c), run algorithm m←SE.Dec(K0,c′) p Finally, output the plaintext m;

[0030] • The denial key generation algorithm PADE.DenGen(1 λ ): Run dk←DE.DenGen(1λ Output the denial key dk;

[0031] • Denial encryption algorithm PADE.DenEnc(dk,m,{m i} i∈[t] ): Randomly select strings K0, K1, ..., K t k∈{0,1} λ And p∈[0,t], then run the algorithm c←DE.DenEnc(dk,K0||K1||…||K t ||k||p), further run algorithm c0←SE.Enc(K0,m), for each i∈[t] run algorithm c i ←SE.Enc(K i ,m i The output ciphertext ct = (c, c′0, c′1, ..., c′) t )satisfy

[0032] c′ i =c i+1 i∈[0,p-1]

[0033] c′ i =c0,i=p;

[0034] c′ i =c i i∈[p+1,t]

[0035] • The denial decryption algorithm PADE.DenDec(dk,ct) first parses ct=(c,c′0,c′1,...,c′) t Then run the algorithm K0||K1||…||K t ||k||p←DE.DenDec(dk,c), run the algorithm m←SE.Dec(K0,c′) p Output plaintext m;

[0036] The denial algorithm PADE.Deny(dk,ct,q) first parses the ciphertext ct=(c,c′0,c′1,...,c′) t Then run the algorithm K0||K1||…||K t ||k||p←DE.DenDec(dk,c), calculate and edit description Further run algorithm r ct,q ←DE.Deny(dk,c,e) outputs a random number r generated by a normal key generation algorithm. ct,q When the receiver is coerced, he can assign a random number r. ct,qHand it over to the coercer; then the coercer can run the normal key generation algorithm PADE.Gen(1) λ ;r ct,q Obtain the private key sk ct,q The normal decryption algorithm PADE.Dec(sk) is executed. ct,q Decrypting ciphertext ct=(c,c′0,c′1,...,c′) t ) Obtaining the pre-planned plaintext m after denial q Therefore, believe r ct,q and m q The authenticity of PADE.Dec(sk ct,q ,ct) will run algorithm DE.Dec(sk ct,q ,c)=Edit(K0||K1||…||K t ||k||p,e), obtained according to the definition of the Edit function above. Then the coercer used K q Decryption Obtain plaintext in

[0037] Furthermore, in the case of private key encryption, regarding whether the recipient of the above edit function Edit can deny the edit scheme DE = (Gen, Enc, Dec, DenGen, DenEnc, DenDec, Deny), it can be designed by a known method and needs to satisfy the following definition:

[0038] 1) Normal key generation algorithm DE.Gen(1) λ ): Input security parameter 1 λ The sender outputs a private key sk; the receiver runs a normal key generation algorithm to obtain the private key sk and securely shares it with the sender.

[0039] 2) Normal encryption algorithm DE.Enc(sk,m): Input private key sk and plaintext Output a ciphertext c; The sender runs a normal encryption algorithm to encrypt the plaintext m to obtain the ciphertext c, and sends it to the receiver.

[0040] 3) Normal decryption algorithm DE.Dec(sk,c): Input private key sk and ciphertext c, output plaintext m; after receiving ciphertext c, the receiver uses private key sk to run the normal decryption algorithm to obtain plaintext m.

[0041] 4) Denial key generation algorithm DE.DenGen(1) λ ): Input security parameter 1 λ The sender outputs a denial key dk; the receiver runs a denial key generation algorithm to obtain dk and securely shares it with the sender.

[0042] 5) Denial encryption algorithm DE.DenEnc(dk,m): Input denial key dk and plaintext m = K0||K1||…||K t ||k||p, outputs the deniable ciphertext c; the sender runs the deniability encryption algorithm to obtain the ciphertext c and sends it to the receiver;

[0043] 6) Denial decryption algorithm DE.DenDec(dk,c): Input denial key dk and ciphertext c, output plaintext m; the receiver obtains plaintext m by running the denial decryption algorithm without coercion.

[0044] 7) Denial Algorithm DE.Deny(dk,c,e): Input denial key dk, ciphertext c, and edit description Output a random number r c,e Satisfy: sk c,e ←DE.Gen(1 λ ;r c,e )where DE.Gen(1 λ ;r c,e ) indicates using a random number r c,e Generate a private key sk that satisfies the security parameter λ. c,e ,as well as

[0045]

[0046] Under duress, the receiver runs the denial algorithm to obtain a random number r. c,e and hand it over to the coercer; upon obtaining a random number r c,e Then, the coercer runs the normal key generation algorithm DE.Gen(1) λ ;r c,e Obtain a private key sk c,e Then run the normal decryption algorithm DE.Dec(sk) c,e c) Obtain the edited plaintext Here, the random number r c,e and private key sk c,e The random number r mentioned earlier ct,q and private key sk ct,q The definitions are the same.

[0047] Regarding the above-mentioned private key recipient's denial of the edit scheme for the Edit function, it can be designed and obtained by known methods, such as the scheme proposed by Goldwasser et al. at the TCC 2017 conference (Goldwasser S., Klein S., Wichs D. The Edited Truth. In: Kalai Y., Reyzin L. (eds) Theory of Cryptography. TCC2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 10677. Springer, Cham.).

[0048] Compared with the prior art, the positive effects of the present invention are as follows:

[0049] This invention is universal; given any receiver-denying editing scheme that meets the conditions, a corresponding pre-planned receiver-denying encryption scheme can be obtained, eliminating the limitation of denial capability and allowing the denial of ciphertext as any plaintext. The pre-planned receiver-denying encryption scheme has advantages such as short ciphertext length (capable of encrypting large files) and short key length (independent of plaintext length). Attached Figure Description

[0050] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of the algorithm in the normal mode of the present invention.

[0051] Figure 2 This is a flowchart of the algorithm in the denial mode of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0052] Specifically, the present invention includes the following two aspects:

[0053] I. Preliminary Knowledge

[0054] 1. Symbols

[0055] This invention uses λ to represent the security parameter. For two strings a and b, a||b represents their concatenation. The symbol |x| represents the length of string x. The symbol x←S represents uniformly random sampling of x from a finite set S. For a (random) algorithm A, this invention uses y←A(x) to represent running algorithm A with respect to input x and obtaining output y; the symbol y←A(x; r) specifies the random number r used by algorithm A. This invention uses negl(·) to represent an unspecified, negligible function, that is, for any constant c≥0, negl(λ)=o(λ). -c ), where o represents the well-known asymptotic symbol for higher-order infinitesimals. For any two integers a and b satisfying a ≤ b, the symbol [a, b] represents the set {a, ..., b}. For any positive integer t, [t] represents the set {1, 2, ..., t}.

[0056] 2. Private key encryption scheme

[0057] Currently, there are many well-known private-key encryption schemes (also known as symmetric encryption schemes). A private-key encryption scheme SE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) consists of the following polynomial-time algorithms:

[0058] 1) Key generation algorithm SE.Gen(1 λ ): Input security parameter 1 λ Output a private key sk;

[0059] 2) Encryption algorithm SE.Enc(sk,m): Input private key sk and plaintext m∈{0,1} n Output a ciphertext c, where a positive integer n represents the length of the plaintext m;

[0060] 3) Decryption algorithm SE.Dec(sk,c): Input private key sk and ciphertext c, output plaintext m.

[0061] Regarding correctness, for each security parameter λ and plaintext m∈{0,1} n The private key encryption scheme SE needs to satisfy the following correctness definition:

[0062] Pr[SE.Dec(sk,SE.Enc(sk,m))=m|sk←SE.Gen(1 λ )]=1.

[0063] Regarding plaintext security, the private key encryption scheme SE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) needs to satisfy the well-known definition of plaintext security: when an attacker can choose any number of plaintexts of any polynomial and then obtain the corresponding ciphertexts, the attacker still cannot distinguish between the challenge ciphertexts encrypted from plaintexts m0 and m1, where m0 and m1 are chosen by the attacker.

[0064] In terms of pseudo-random security, a private key encryption scheme SE must satisfy the following security definition: Even if an attacker can choose any polynomial number of plaintexts and obtain the corresponding ciphertext, the attacker still cannot distinguish between normally encrypted ciphertext and randomly selected ciphertext. A private key encryption scheme that satisfies this security requirement can be constructed using a known pseudo-random function.

[0065] 3. Private key recipient can deny editing scheme

[0066] A recipient-repudiable edit scheme allows the recipient to deny the plaintext in the ciphertext as a different edited plaintext, requiring the recipient and sender to share the same private key. Recipient-repudiable edit schemes can be designed using well-known methods, such as the one proposed by Goldwasser et al. in 2017 based on a single-key private key function encryption method (see references below).

[0067] Goldwasser S.,Klein S.,Wichs D.The Edited Truth.In:Kalai Y.,Reyzin L.(eds)Theory of Cryptography.TCC 2017.Lecture Notes in Computer Science,vol10677.Springer,Cham.

[0068] Let Edit:{0,1} n ×{0,1} l →{0,1} n For polynomial-time editing functions: Input plaintext m∈{0,1} n And edit description e∈{0,1} l Output the edited plaintext Edit(m,e), where the positive integer n represents the length of the plaintext and the positive integer l represents the length of the edit description. For the polynomial-time edit function Edit, a private key recipient can deny the edit scheme DE = (Gen,Enc,Dec,DenGen,DenEnc,DenDec,Deny) which consists of the following algorithm:

[0069] 1) Normal key generation algorithm DE.Gen(1) λ ): Input security parameter 1 λ Output a private key sk;

[0070] 2) Normal encryption algorithm DE.Enc(sk,m): Input private key sk and plaintext m∈{0,1} n Output a ciphertext c;

[0071] 3) Normal decryption algorithm DE.Dec(sk,c): Input private key sk and ciphertext c, output plaintext m;

[0072] 4) Denial key generation algorithm DE.DenGen(1) λ ): Input security parameter 1 λ Output a denial key dk;

[0073] 5) Denial encryption algorithm DE.DenEnc(dk,m): Input denial key dk and plaintext m∈{0,1} n Output a deniable ciphertext c;

[0074] 6) Denial decryption algorithm DE.DenDec(dk,c): Input denial key dk and ciphertext c, output plaintext m;

[0075] 7) Denial Algorithm DE.Deny(dk,c,e): Input denial key dk, ciphertext c, and edit description e∈{0,1} l Output a random number r c,e Satisfy: sk c,e ←DE.Gen(1 λ ;r c,e Edit(m,e) = DE.Dec(sk) c,e ,c).

[0076] Regarding correctness, for each security parameter λ and plaintext m∈{0,1} n For the private key recipient to deny editing the scheme DE, the following correctness definition must be satisfied:

[0077] Pr[DE.Dec(sk,DE.Enc(sk,m))=m|sk←DE.Gen(1 λ )]=1-negl(λ),

[0078] Pr[DE.DenDec(dk,DE.DenEnc(dk,m))=m|dk←DE.DenGen(1 λ )]=1-negl(λ).

[0079] Regarding the security of chosen plaintext, the two private key encryption schemes (DE.Gen, DE.Enc, DE.Dec) and (DE.DenGen, DE.DenEnc, DE.DenDec) need to satisfy the well-known definition of security of chosen plaintext: when an attacker can choose any polynomial number of plaintexts and then obtain the corresponding ciphertexts, the attacker still cannot distinguish between the challenge ciphertexts encrypted from plaintext m0 and m1.

[0080] Regarding receiver edit deniability, the private key receiver deniable edit scheme DE needs to satisfy the following security definition: even if an attacker can choose any polynomial number of plaintexts and then obtain the corresponding normal ciphertext or deniable ciphertext, and can obtain the random number / private key generated by the key, the attacker still cannot distinguish between the normal ciphertext obtained by directly encrypting Edit(m,e) and the deniable ciphertext of plaintext m.

[0081] II. Pre-planned receiver-debunked encryption scheme

[0082] To demonstrate the advantages and features of this invention, the following detailed description uses a specific and efficient pre-planned receiver-deniable encryption scheme as an example. The pre-planned receiver-deniable encryption scheme proposed in this invention is obtained by converting a receiver-deniable editing scheme.

[0083] In a private key encryption scenario (i.e., the sender and receiver share the same private key), a pre-planned receiver-debunkable encryption method PADE = (Gen, Enc, Dec, DenGen, DenEnc, DenDec, Deny) is characterized by including the following two encryption methods:

[0084] The private key encryption method in normal mode consists of the following algorithms:

[0085] 1) Normal key generation algorithm PADE.Gen(1 λ ): Input security parameter 1 λ Output a private key sk;

[0086] 2) Normal encryption algorithm PADE.Enc(sk,m): Input private key sk and plaintext m∈{0,1} n Output a ciphertext ct, where the positive integer n represents the plaintext length;

[0087] 3) Normal decryption algorithm PADE.Dec(sk,ct): Input private key sk and ciphertext ct, output plaintext m.

[0088] The private key encryption method in denial mode consists of the following algorithms:

[0089] 1) Denial key generation algorithm PADE.DenGen(1 λ ): Input security parameter 1 λ Output a denial key dk;

[0090] 2) Denial encryption algorithm PADE.DenEnc(dk,m,{m i} i∈[t] Input denial key dk, real plaintext m∈{0,1} n And t pre-planned denial plaintexts m1,…,m t ∈{0,1} n Output a deniable ciphertext ct, where the positive integer n represents the plaintext length and the positive integer t represents the pre-planned number of deniable plaintexts.

[0091] 3) The denial decryption algorithm PADE.DenDec(dk,ct): Input the denial key dk and the ciphertext ct, and output the plaintext m;

[0092] 4) The denial algorithm PADE.Deny(dk,ct,q): Input the denial key dk, the ciphertext ct, and the denial plaintext index q∈[t], and output a random number r. ct,q Satisfy: sk ct,q ←PADE.Gen(1 λ ;r ct,q ) and m q =PADE.Dec(sk ct,q ,ct).

[0093] Regarding correctness, for each security parameter λ, the true plaintext m∈{0,1} n And denial of plaintext m1,...,m t ∈{0,1} n The pre-planned receiver-debunkable encryption scheme PADE needs to satisfy the following correctness definition:

[0094] Pr[PADE.Dec(sk,PADE.Enc(sk,m))=m|sk←PADE.Gen(1 λ )]=1-negl(λ),

[0095] Pr[PADE.DenDec(dk,PADE.DenEnc(dk,m,{m i} i∈[t] ))=m|dk←PADE.DenGen(1 λ )]=1-negl(λ).

[0096] Regarding the security of chosen plaintext, the private key encryption schemes (PADE.Gen, PADE.Enc, PADE.Dec) and (PADE.DenGen, PADE.DenEnc, PADE.DenDec) need to satisfy the well-known definition of chosen plaintext security: when an attacker can choose any polynomial number of plaintexts and then obtain the corresponding ciphertexts, the attacker still cannot distinguish between the challenge ciphertexts encrypted from plaintext m0 and m1.

[0097] Regarding receiver deniability, the pre-planned receiver deniability encryption scheme PADE needs to satisfy the following security definition: even if an attacker can choose any polynomial number of plaintexts and then obtain the corresponding normal ciphertext or deniable ciphertext, and can obtain the random number / private key generated by the key, the attacker still cannot distinguish the directly encrypted plaintext m. q The obtained normal ciphertext and encrypted plaintext m and m1,...,m t The repudiable ciphertext, where m q ∈{m1,...,m t}

[0098] Below, this invention presents an efficient conversion method from receiver-deniable edits to pre-planned receiver-deniable encryption, which employs a "hybrid encryption" approach. The following edit function is defined:

[0099]

[0100] Where K0, K1, ..., K t k∈{0,1} λ p∈[0,t], e∈{0,1} λ+log(t+1) , q∈[t] and In the context of private key encryption, given the receiver-debunkable editing scheme DE = (Gen, Enc, Dec, DenGen, DenEnc, DenDec, Deny) for the Edit function above and the known private key encryption scheme SE = (Gen, Enc, Dec), the pre-planned receiver-debunkable encryption method is constructed as follows:

[0101] 1) Normal key generation algorithm PADE.Gen(1 λ ): Run the algorithm sk←DE.Gen(1 λ Output the private key sk;

[0102] 2) Normal encryption algorithm PADE.Enc(sk,m): randomly selects K0∈{0,1} λ And p∈[0,t], run the algorithm Execute the algorithm c0←SE.Enc(K0,m), and randomly select for each i∈[t]. Output ciphertext ct = (c, c′0, c′1, ..., c′) t )satisfy

[0103] c′ i =c i+1 i∈[0,p-1]

[0104] c′ i =c0,i=p,

[0105] c′ i =c i i∈[p+1,t]

[0106] Where |c0| represents the length of the ciphertext c0;

[0107] 3) Normal decryption algorithm PADE.Dec(sk,ct): First, parse ct=(c,c′0,c′1,...,c′) t Then run the algorithm K0||K1||…||K t||k||p←DE.Dec(sk,c), run algorithm m←SE.Dec(K0,c′) p Finally, output the plaintext m;

[0108] 4) Denial key generation algorithm PADE.DenGen(1 λ ): Run dk←DE.DenGen(1 λ Output the denial key dk;

[0109] 5) Denial encryption algorithm PADE.DenEnc(dk,m,{m i} i∈[t] ): Randomly select K0, K1, ..., K t k∈{0,1} λ And p∈[0,t], then run the algorithm c←DE.DenEnc(dk,K0||K1||…||K t ||k||p), further run algorithm c0←SE.Enc(K0,m), for each i∈[t] run algorithm c i ←SE.Enc(K i ,m i The output ciphertext ct = (c, c′0, cv′1, ..., c′) is given. t )satisfy

[0110] c′ i =c i+1 i∈[0,p-1]

[0111] c′ i =c0,i=p;

[0112] c′ i =c i i∈[p+1,t]

[0113] 6) Denial decryption algorithm PADE.DenDec(dk,ct): First, parse ct = (c, c′0, c′1, ..., c′) t Then run the algorithm K0||K1||…||K t ||k||p←DE.DenDec(dk,c), run the algorithm m←SE.Dec(K0,c′) p Output plaintext m;

[0114] 7) The denial algorithm PADE.Deny(dk,ct,q): First, it parses the ciphertext ct=(c,c′0,c′1,...,c′) t Then run the algorithm K0||K1||…||K t||k||p←DE.DenDec(dk,c), calculate and edit description Further run algorithm r ct,q ←DE.Deny(dk,c,e) outputs a random number r generated by a normal key generation algorithm. ct,q .

[0115] In the above algorithm, the plaintext of the edit scheme DE that the receiver can deny is m = K0||K1||…||K t ||k||p, where K0,K1,…,K t k∈{0,1} λ For strings, their edit descriptions It is calculated from k, p, and q. The conversion method proposed in this invention is universal, that is, any receiver-repudiable editing scheme that meets the requirements can be converted into a pre-planned receiver-repudiable encryption scheme by the method proposed in this invention, supporting the denial plaintext to be any other plaintext (the number of denials is limited), and can encrypt large-scale files.

[0116] By utilizing the well-known conversion method proposed by Canetti et al., this invention can convert a pre-planned receiver-denied encryption scheme into a pre-planned sender-denied encryption scheme, but requires an additional round of communication.

[0117] This invention is not limited to the embodiments described above. Those skilled in the art can make various improvements or modifications without departing from the principles and methods of this invention, and these improvements and modifications are also considered within the scope of protection of this invention. Content not described in detail in this specification belongs to prior art known to those skilled in the art.

Claims

1. A method for converting deniable editing to pre-planned deniable encryption, characterized in that: include: 1) Private key encryption method in normal mode: i. The receiver runs the normal key generation algorithm PADE.Gen(1 λ ): Enter security parameter 1 λ , output a private key sk; Securely share the private key sk with the sender; ii. The sender runs the normal encryption algorithm PADE.Enc(sk,m): input private key sk and plaintext m∈{0,1} n , output a ciphertext ct and send ct to the receiver; the positive integer n represents the length of the plaintext m; iii. After the receiver receives the ciphertext ct, it runs the normal decryption algorithm PADE.Dec(sk,ct): input the private key sk and the ciphertext ct, and output a plaintext m; 2) Private key encryption method in denial mode: i. The receiver runs the denial key generation algorithm PADE.DenGen(1 λ ): Enter security parameter 1 λ , output the denial key dk; securely share the denial key dk with the sender; ii. The sender runs the denial encryption algorithm PADE.DenEnc(dk,m,{m i } i∈[t] ): Input denial key dk, real plaintext m∈{0,1} n and t pre-set denial plaintexts m1,…,m t ∈{0,1} n , output a deniable ciphertext ct and send the ciphertext ct to the receiver; where the positive integer n represents the length of the plaintext, the positive integer t represents the number of pre-planned deniable plaintexts, and [t] represents the set {1,2,…,t}; iii. Without duress, the receiver runs the denial decryption algorithm PADE.DenDec(dk,ct): inputs the denial key dk and the ciphertext ct, and outputs the plaintext m; iv. Under duress, the receiver runs the denial algorithm PADE.Deny(dk,ct,q): inputs the denial key dk, the ciphertext ct and the denial plaintext index q∈[t], and outputs the random number r ct,q Meet: sk ct,q ←PADE.Gen(1 λ ; r ct,q ) and m q =PADE.Dec(sk ct,q ,ct), where PADE.Gen(1 λ ; r ct,q ) indicates that a random number r is used ct,q Generate a private key sk that satisfies the security parameter λ ct,q , m q represents the qth pre-planned denial plaintext; the random number r ct,q Hand it over to the coercer; ct,q After that, the coercer runs the normal key generation algorithm PADE.Gen(1 λ ; r ct,q )Get the private key sk ct,q , and then run the normal decryption algorithm PADE.Dec(sk ct,q ,ct) obtains the denial plaintext m q .

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Normal key generation algorithm PADE.Gen(1 λ ) is as follows: Run the normal key generation algorithm sk←DE.Gen(1 λ ), and then output the private key sk; the algorithm flow of the normal encryption algorithm PADE.Enc(sk,m) is: first randomly select K0∈{0,1} λ and p∈[0,t], run the algorithm Execute the algorithm c0←SE.Enc(K0,m), randomly select c for each i∈[t] i ∈{0,1} |c0| , output ciphertext ct = (c, c0′, c1′, …, c t ')satisfy Where || is the string concatenation symbol, SE.Enc() represents the symmetric encryption algorithm, and |c0| represents the length of the ciphertext c0.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The algorithm flow of the normal decryption algorithm PADE.Dec(sk,ct) is as follows: First, parse ct=(c,c0′,c1′,…,c t ′), and then run the algorithm K0||K1||…||K t ||k||p←DE.Dec(sk,c), further run the algorithm SE.Dec(K0,c′ p ), output plaintext m, where SE.Dec() represents the symmetric decryption algorithm.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Denial of key generation algorithm PADE.DenGen(1 λ ) is as follows: Run the algorithm dk←DE.DenGen(1 λ ), output denial key dk; deny encryption algorithm PADE.DenEnc(dk,m,{m i } i∈[t] ) is as follows: first randomly select K0, K1, ..., K t ,k∈{0,1} λ and p∈[0,t], then run the algorithm c←DE.DenEnc(dk,K0||K1||…||K t ||k||p), further run algorithm c0←SE.Enc(K0,m), and run algorithm c for each i∈[t] i ←SE.Enc(K i ,m i ), output ciphertext ct = (c, c′0, c′1, …, c′ t )satisfy:

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The algorithm flow of the denial decryption algorithm PADE.DenDec(dk,ct) is as follows: First, parse ct = (c, c0′, c1′, ..., c t ′), and then run the algorithm K0||K1||…||K t ||k||p←DE.DenDec(dk,c), further run the algorithm m←SE.Dec(K0,c′ p ), output plaintext m.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The algorithm flow of the denial algorithm PADE.Deny(dk,ct,q) is as follows: First, parse the ciphertext ct = (c,c0′,c1′,...,c t ′), and then run the algorithm K0||K1||…||K t ||k||p←DE.DenDec(dk,c), calculate the edit description e:=(k,p)⊕(0 λ ,q), and further run the algorithm r ct,q ←DE.Deny(dk,c,e), output the random number r of the normal key generation algorithm ct,q ; When under duress, the recipient will send the random number r ct,q to the coercer; the coercer then runs the normal key generation algorithm PADE.Gen(1 λ ; r ct,q )Get the private key sk ct,q , run the normal decryption algorithm PADE.Dec(sk ct,q ,ct) decrypted ciphertext ct=(c,c′0,c1′,...,c t ′) Get the pre-planned plaintext m after denial q .

7. A method for converting deniable editing to pre-planned deniable encryption, characterized in that: Define the following editing functions: where K0, K1, ..., K t ,k∈{0,1} λ , p∈[0,t], e∈{0,1} λ+log(t+1) , q∈[t] and represents the set {0,1,…,t}; 1) Private key encryption method in normal mode: i. The receiver runs the normal key generation algorithm DE.Gen(1 λ ): Enter security parameter 1 λ , output a private key sk; Securely share the private key sk with the sender; ii. The sender runs the normal encryption algorithm DE.Enc(sk,m): input private key sk and plaintext Output ciphertext c; Send the ciphertext c to the receiver; iii. After the receiver receives the ciphertext c, it runs the normal decryption algorithm DE.Dec(sk,c): input the private key sk and the ciphertext c, and output the plaintext m; 2) Private key encryption method in denial mode: i. The receiver runs the denial key generation algorithm DE.DenGen(1 λ ): Enter security parameter 1 λ , output a denial key dk; securely share the denial key dk with the sender; ii. The sender runs the denial encryption algorithm DE.DenEnc(dk,m): input the denial key dk and the plaintext m = K0||K1||…||K t ||k||p, output the deniable ciphertext c; send the ciphertext c to the receiver; iii. Without duress, the receiver runs the deniability decryption algorithm DE.DenDec(dk,c): inputs the deniability key dk and the ciphertext c, and outputs the plaintext m; iv. Under duress, the receiver runs the denial algorithm DE.Deny(dk,c,e): inputs the denial key dk, the ciphertext c and the edit description e = (k,p⊕q), and outputs a random number r c,e Meet: sk c,e ←DE.Gen(1 λ ; r c,e ) where DE.Gen(1 λ ; r c,e ) indicates that a random number r is used c,e Generate a security parameter 1 λ The private key sk c,e ,as well as The receiver sends the random number r c,e Hand it over to the coercer; c,e After that, the coercer runs the normal key generation algorithm DE.Gen(1 λ ; r c,e )Get a private key sk c,e , and then run the normal decryption algorithm DE.Dec(sk c,e ,c) Get the edited plaintext