A terminal network behavior sniffing monitoring method
By deploying monitoring devices and honeypot devices in the LAN, monitoring ARP request packets in real time and performing ARP hijacking detection, the problem of low ARP hijacking attacks and detection efficiency is solved, and higher security and detection efficiency is achieved, and networked devices are protected. privacy.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202210150450.3
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2022-02-18
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-05
- Estimated Expiration
- 2042-02-18
AI Technical Summary
The existing technology has the problem of low ARP hijacking attacks and detection efficiency in protecting local area networks, and cannot effectively protect the privacy of networked devices and improve detection efficiency.
Add monitoring devices and honeypot devices to the LAN. The monitoring devices are set to mixed mode, and honeypot devices are set to non-mix mode. They listen to ARP request packets in real time, simulate normal online activities, perform ARP hijacking and information forwarding, and combine cache tables and encryption Algorithms detect illegal content, prevent ARP hijacking attacks and improve detection efficiency.
It effectively improves the security and detection efficiency of the LAN, can quickly and accurately detect ARP hijacking attacks, protect the privacy of networked devices, and prevent attackers from turning off the monitoring device through dynamic management keys.
Smart Images

Figure CN114500083B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of network security, and in particular to a method for sniffing and monitoring terminal network behavior. Background Art
[0002] As attacks on the network become more and more complex, their impact on military and commercial aspects is also becoming more and more extensive. The complexity of attacks makes advanced persistent detection increasingly difficult. The development of this attack is specifically reflected in the attackers constantly using various attack methods, changing existing attack methods, and lying dormant for a long time after slowly and smoothly infiltrating the internal network, constantly obtaining relevant sensitive information in the network and trying to continue to improve permissions until important sensitive information is obtained. For highly concealed attacks, it is necessary to discover and deal with them in a timely manner to protect the main security of the operating system.
[0003] A patent document with application number: CN201610307127.7 discloses a method for detecting advanced persistent threats based on attack behavior analysis, including step 1: taking over all program execution pipelines of the system kernel; step 2: setting the network card to obfuscation mode, obtaining network data packets, and analyzing the behavior characteristics in combination with the local port. If malicious operation instructions of network attack behavior are included, the system will alarm; step 3: enumerating all network channels, if malicious operation instructions of network attack behavior are included, the system will alarm; step 4: monitoring file operations, judging key information, if it does not meet the requirements, the system will alarm; step 5: submitting the captured software execution API information from the kernel layer to the application layer to the behavior analysis engine, judging whether it is an attack behavior, if so, issuing an alarm, if not, continuing to return to execute step 2. The present invention can detect advanced persistent threats, has high detection efficiency, and comprehensively analyzes the behavior of attacks at the system level.
[0004] However, it still has the following shortcomings in practical application:
[0005] First, there is still room for improvement in security, because it cannot effectively protect against ARP hijacking attacks in the local area network, that is, it cannot effectively protect the privacy of communications between networked devices.
[0006] Second, there is still room for improvement in detection efficiency, because all channels need to be enumerated one by one and tested to see if they contain malicious operation instructions such as network attacks. Summary of the invention
[0007] Technical issues solved
[0008] In view of the above-mentioned shortcomings of the prior art, the present invention provides a terminal network behavior sniffing monitoring method, which can effectively solve the problems of poor security and low detection efficiency in the prior art.
[0009] Technical Solution
[0010] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention is implemented through the following technical solutions:
[0011] A method for sniffing and monitoring terminal network behavior, comprising the following steps:
[0012] Step 1, add a group of monitoring devices and a group of honeypot devices in the same local area network, and the monitoring devices and honeypot devices are both installed with monitoring software;
[0013] Step 2, the monitoring software instructs the gateways of the monitoring devices to be set to promiscuous mode, and the monitoring software instructs the gateways of the honeypot devices to be set to non-promiscuous mode, so that the monitoring devices can monitor the ARP request packet data in the local area network in real time;
[0014] Step 3, the monitoring software stores a memorandum record table recording the IP addresses and MAC addresses of all monitoring devices and honeypot devices;
[0015] Step 4, the monitoring software instructs the monitoring device and the honeypot device to simulate normal online communication activities. At the same time, the monitoring software also instructs the monitoring device to conduct normal online communication activities with other user network devices in the same local area network. This makes it difficult for attackers to distinguish the types of each device, thereby improving the overall security of the system;
[0016] Step 5, the monitoring software instructs the monitoring device to scan the networked devices in the local area network in real time, and the monitoring software instructs the monitoring device to send ARP request packets to all networked devices in the same local area network, and records the IP address and MAC address in the received ARP return packet in the first cache table;
[0017] Step 6, following Step 5, if the monitoring software detects that a device has been disconnected from the LAN, the monitoring software will delete the IP address and MAC address of the device in the first cache table. If the monitoring software detects that a new device has been connected to the LAN, the monitoring software will instruct the monitoring software to send an ARP request packet to the newly connected device, and record the IP address and MAC address in the ARP return packet of the device in the first cache table;
[0018] Step 7, the monitoring software instructs the monitoring device to perform ARP hijacking on any user networking device in the same LAN for a period of time, and the monitoring device will re-forward the hijacked information to the corresponding user networking device, so that the monitoring device can monitor the networking behavior of the user networking device;
[0019] Step 8, following Step 7, the monitoring software decrypts and cracks the hijacked information to detect whether the information contains illegal content, wherein the monitoring software detects whether the information is illegal by machine inspection in the form of keyword comparison;
[0020] Step 9, following Step 7, when the monitoring device completes the spot check of the user's networking device, the monitoring software releases the ARP hijacking of the user's networking device and records the IP address and MAC address of the user's networking device in the second cache table;
[0021] Step 10, following Step 9, the monitoring software instructs the monitoring device to perform ARP hijacking on another user's networking device for a period of time, and the monitoring device will re-forward the hijacked information to the corresponding user's networking device, thereby enabling the monitoring device to monitor the networking behavior of the user's networking device.
[0022] Furthermore, the monitoring software is automatically started in the background when the terminal device is started, and the shutdown of the monitoring software requires administrator privileges, and the uninstallation of the client monitoring software also requires administrator privileges.
[0023] Furthermore, the administrator authority refers to the management key, and the management key is dynamic, that is, the monitoring software will randomly give the parameters and the corresponding number of the encryption algorithm at the front end. The administrator needs to enter the corresponding parameters and the corresponding number into another computer (the computer has the corresponding decryption software installed), and then the computer calls out the corresponding encryption algorithm and enters the corresponding parameters, and then outputs the calculation result (that is, the management key) to the front end. This can effectively prevent attackers from remotely shutting down the monitoring software, thereby improving the reliability of monitoring equipment and honeypot equipment.
[0024] Furthermore, the monitoring device and the honeypot device are computers or smart phones; and there is at least one monitoring device and one honeypot device in the same local area network.
[0025] Furthermore, the normal online communication activity in Step 4 means that the communication between the two devices complies with the ARP protocol.
[0026] Furthermore, the IP addresses and MAC addresses of the monitoring device and the honeypot device stored in the memo record table in Step 3 are manually statically bound, which can effectively ensure that the communication between the monitoring device and the honeypot device will not be attacked by ARP hijacking.
[0027] Furthermore, the IP address and MAC address in the memo record table need to be manually changed by the administrator regularly, which can improve the reliability of the monitoring equipment and honeypot equipment.
[0028] Furthermore, in Step 7, the same user networking device can only be ARP hijacked by one monitoring device within the same time period, and before the monitoring software instructs the monitoring device to ARP hijack the next user networking device, the monitoring software will search and compare in the second cache table in the monitoring device, thereby preventing continuous ARP hijacking of the same user networking device.
[0029] Furthermore, the monitoring device and the honeypot device share a first cache table in real time, the first cache table is obtained by DHCP snooping, and the monitoring devices share a second cache table in real time.
[0030] Furthermore, when the user networking device sends an ARP request packet to the honeypot device, the honeypot device sends an ARP return packet to the user networking device, and the monitoring software on the honeypot device monitors in real time whether the information exchange activities between the user networking device and the honeypot device are legal.
[0031] Beneficial Effects
[0032] Compared with the known public technology, the technical solution provided by the present invention has the following beneficial effects:
[0033] The present invention adds a group of monitoring devices and a group of honeypot devices in a local area network, and uses the monitoring devices to sniff the communication content of user networking devices in the same local area network, thereby monitoring whether the user networking devices have illegal behaviors, and at the same time, the monitoring devices and the honeypot devices cooperate to quickly and accurately detect whether there are devices in the local area network that have ARP hijacking attack behaviors. This effectively makes the present invention have better security and efficiency. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0034] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the prior art descriptions are briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention, and for ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative work.
[0035] Figure 1 This is a connection relationship diagram of various devices in the local area network of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0036] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solution in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.
[0037] The present invention will be further described below in conjunction with the embodiments. Example
[0038] A terminal network behavior sniffing monitoring method of this embodiment refers to Figure 1 :Comprising the following steps:
[0039] Step 1, add a group of monitoring devices and a group of honeypot devices in the same local area network, and the monitoring devices and honeypot devices are both installed with monitoring software; the monitoring devices and honeypot devices are computers or smart phones; and in this embodiment, there are two monitoring devices and two honeypot devices in the same local area network.
[0040] It is worth noting that the monitoring software is automatically started in the background when the terminal device is started, so that the local area is always monitored by the monitoring software, and the shutdown of the monitoring software requires administrator privileges; and the uninstallation of the monitoring software also requires administrator privileges, which can effectively prevent attackers from remotely shutting down the monitoring software of the monitoring device and honeypot device, thereby effectively ensuring the normal operation of the monitoring device and honeypot device, thereby improving the safe operation of the terminal network.
[0041] Administrator authority refers to the management key, and the management key is dynamic, that is, the monitoring software will randomly give the parameters and the corresponding number of the encryption algorithm on the front end. The administrator needs to enter the corresponding parameters and the corresponding number into another computer (which has the corresponding decryption software installed). The computer then calls out the corresponding encryption algorithm and enters the corresponding parameters. The calculation result (that is, the management key) is then output to the front end. This can effectively increase the difficulty for attackers to crack the management key.
[0042] It is worth noting that the encryption algorithms of the parameters and corresponding numbers given by the monitoring software at the front end are all encrypted, that is, the parameters and corresponding numbers in the background are different from those in the front end, but need to be encrypted and converted.
[0043] Step 2. The monitoring software instructs the gateways of the monitoring devices to be set to promiscuous mode, and the monitoring software instructs the gateways of the honeypot devices to be set to non-promiscuous mode. In this way, the monitoring software can instruct the monitoring devices to always listen to the broadcast information of the switches in the LAN, thereby recording the IP address and MAC address of each user's networked device.
[0044] Step 3: The monitoring software stores a memo record table that records the IP addresses and MAC addresses of all monitoring devices and honeypot devices.
[0045] Among them, the IP addresses and MAC addresses of the monitoring device and the honeypot device stored in the memo record table are manually statically bound, so that the communication between the monitoring device and the honeypot device is not affected by ARP hijacking attacks.
[0046] It is worth noting that the memo record table is encrypted, which effectively prevents attackers from obtaining the contents of the memo record table.
[0047] The IP address and MAC address in the memo record table need to be manually changed by the administrator regularly. This can effectively prevent the attacker from recording the identity information of the monitoring device and the honeypot device and bypassing the monitoring device and the honeypot device in the next attack. There are two ways to modify the MAC address of the monitoring device and the honeypot device: hardware modification and software modification. In this embodiment, the software modification method is adopted to reduce costs.
[0048] Step 4, the monitoring software instructs the monitoring device and the honeypot device to simulate normal online communication activities. At the same time, the monitoring software also instructs the monitoring device to conduct normal online communication activities with other user network devices in the same LAN; among them, normal online communication activities refer to the communication between the two devices complying with the ARP protocol. This can effectively confuse attackers and make it impossible for attackers to accurately determine the type of networked devices, thereby effectively preventing attackers from bypassing monitoring devices and honeypot devices.
[0049] Step 5, the monitoring software instructs the monitoring device to scan the networked devices in the local area network in real time, and the monitoring software instructs the monitoring device to send ARP request packets to all networked devices in the same local area network, and record the IP address and MAC address in the received ARP return packet in the first cache table.
[0050] Step 6, following the above Step 5, if the monitoring software detects that a device in the LAN has disconnected from the network, the monitoring software will delete the IP address and MAC address corresponding to the device in the first cache table. If the monitoring software detects that a new device is connected to the network in the LAN, the monitoring software will instruct the monitoring software to send an ARP request packet to the newly connected device, and record the IP address and MAC address in the ARP return packet of the device in the first cache table.
[0051] Combined with Step 5 and Step 6, this allows the monitoring software to know in real time how many networked devices there are in the LAN, and know the IP address and MAC address of each networked device.
[0052] Step 7, the monitoring software instructs the monitoring device to perform ARP hijacking on any user networking device in the same LAN for a period of time, and the monitoring device will re-forward the hijacked information to the corresponding user networking device, so that the monitoring device can monitor the networking behavior of the user networking device. In this way, the monitoring software can monitor the network behavior of the user networking device without affecting the normal use of the user networking device.
[0053] It is worth noting that the same user networking device can only be ARP hijacked by one monitoring device in the same time period, and before the monitoring software instructs the monitoring device to ARP hijack the next user networking device, the monitoring software will search and compare in the second cache table in the monitoring device, thereby preventing continuous ARP hijacking of the same user networking device. Therefore, the monitoring device and the honeypot device must share the first cache table in real time. The first cache table is obtained by DHCP snooping. In addition, the second cache table must be shared between the monitoring devices in real time; only in this way, different monitoring devices will not monitor the same user networking device in the same time period.
[0054] Step 8, following Step 7, the monitoring software decrypts and cracks the hijacked information to detect whether the information contains illegal content. In order to protect the user's legal privacy, the monitoring software detects the information content based on the comparison of keywords, key words or key sentences.
[0055] Step 9, following Step 7, when the monitoring device completes the spot check of the user's networking device, the monitoring software releases the ARP hijacking of the user's networking device and records the IP address and MAC address of the user's networking device in the second cache table.
[0056] Step 10, following Step 9, the monitoring software instructs the monitoring device to perform ARP hijacking on another user's networking device for a period of time, and the monitoring device will re-forward the hijacked information to the corresponding user's networking device, thereby enabling the monitoring device to monitor the networking behavior of the user's networking device.
[0057] When a user network device sends an ARP request packet to a honeypot device, the honeypot device sends an ARP return packet to the user network device, and the monitoring software on the honeypot device monitors in real time whether the information exchange between the user network device and the honeypot device is legal. First of all, the honeypot device is a passive defense measure as a trap. If a non-monitored device wants to communicate with the honeypot device, it can be preliminarily determined that the device is an illegal device. If the device has illegal behavior when communicating with the honeypot device, the monitoring software on the honeypot device can determine that the device is an illegal device.
[0058] Among them, the monitoring equipment and the honeypot equipment simulate normal network communication activities. If the monitoring software detects that the IP address and MAC address data in the ARP request packet sent by the target device do not match the data recorded in the first cache table, the target device is determined to be an illegal device.
[0059] In addition, when an illegal device in the LAN launches an ARP hijacking attack on all other devices, that is, the illegal device disguises itself as everyone, the monitoring software on the monitoring device and the honeypot device will immediately detect the presence of a device with a different IP address but the same MAC address in the LAN, and the monitoring software will immediately determine that the device is an illegal device.
[0060] The above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than to limit the same. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments may still be modified, or some of the technical features may be replaced by equivalents. Such modifications or replacements will not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.
Claims
1. A method for sniffing and monitoring terminal network behavior, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: Step 1, add a group of monitoring devices and a group of honeypot devices in the same local area network, and the monitoring devices and honeypot devices are both installed with monitoring software; Step 2, the monitoring software instructs the gateways of the monitoring devices to be set to promiscuous mode, and the monitoring software instructs the gateways of the honeypot devices to be set to non-promiscuous mode; Step 3, the monitoring software stores a memorandum record table recording the IP addresses and MAC addresses of all monitoring devices and honeypot devices; Step 4, the monitoring software instructs the monitoring device and the honeypot device to simulate normal online communication activities, and at the same time, the monitoring software also instructs the monitoring device to conduct normal online communication activities with other user network devices in the same local area network; Step 5, the monitoring software instructs the monitoring device to scan the networked devices in the local area network in real time, and the monitoring software instructs the monitoring device to send ARP request packets to all networked devices in the same local area network, and records the IP address and MAC address in the received ARP return packet in the first cache table; Step 6, following Step 5, if the monitoring software detects that a device has been disconnected from the LAN, the monitoring software will delete the IP address and MAC address of the device in the first cache table. If the monitoring software detects that a new device has been connected to the LAN, the monitoring software will instruct the monitoring software to send an ARP request packet to the newly connected device, and record the IP address and MAC address in the ARP return packet of the device in the first cache table; Step 7, the monitoring software instructs the monitoring device to perform ARP hijacking on any user networking device in the same LAN for a period of time, and the monitoring device will re-forward the hijacked information to the corresponding user networking device, so that the monitoring device can monitor the networking behavior of the user networking device; Step 8, following Step 7, the monitoring software decrypts and cracks the hijacked information to detect whether the information contains illegal content; Step 9, following Step 7, when the monitoring device completes the spot check of the user's networking device, the monitoring software releases the ARP hijacking of the user's networking device and records the IP address and MAC address of the user's networking device in the second cache table; Step 10, following Step 9, the monitoring software instructs the monitoring device to perform ARP hijacking on another user's networking device for a period of time, and the monitoring device will re-forward the hijacked information to the corresponding user's networking device, thereby enabling the monitoring device to monitor the networking behavior of the user's networking device.
2. A method for sniffing and monitoring terminal network behavior according to claim 1, characterized in that: The monitoring and prevention software is automatically started in the background when the terminal device is started, and the shutdown of the monitoring and prevention software requires administrator privileges, and the uninstallation of the monitoring and prevention software also requires administrator privileges.
3. A method for sniffing and monitoring terminal network behavior according to claim 2, characterized in that: The administrator authority refers to the management key, and the management key is dynamic, that is, the monitoring software will randomly give the parameters and the corresponding number of the encryption algorithm at the front end. The administrator needs to enter the corresponding parameters and the corresponding number into another computer with the corresponding decryption software installed. Then the computer calls out the corresponding encryption algorithm and enters the corresponding parameters, and then outputs the calculation result management key to the front end.
4. A method for sniffing and monitoring terminal network behavior according to claim 1, characterized in that: The monitoring device and the honeypot device are computers or smart phones; and there is at least one monitoring device and one honeypot device in the same local area network.
5. A terminal network behavior sniffing monitoring method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The normal online communication activity in Step 4 means that the communication between the two devices complies with the ARP protocol.
6. A method for sniffing and monitoring terminal network behavior according to claim 1, characterized in that: The IP addresses and MAC addresses of the monitoring devices and honeypot devices stored in the memo record table in Step 3 are all manually statically bound.
7. A method for sniffing and monitoring terminal network behavior according to claim 6, characterized in that: The IP address and MAC address in the memo record table need to be manually changed by the administrator regularly.
8. A method for sniffing and monitoring terminal network behavior according to claim 1, characterized in that: In Step 7, the same user networking device can only be ARP hijacked by one monitoring device in the same time period, and before the monitoring software instructs the monitoring device to ARP hijack the next user networking device, the monitoring software will search and compare in the second cache table in the monitoring device, thereby preventing continuous ARP hijacking of the same user networking device.
9. A method for sniffing and monitoring terminal network behavior according to claim 8, characterized in that: The monitoring device and the honeypot device share a first cache table in real time, the first cache table is obtained by DHCP snooping, and the monitoring devices share a second cache table in real time.
10. A method for sniffing and monitoring terminal network behavior according to claim 1, characterized in that: When the user networking device sends an ARP request packet to the honeypot device, the honeypot device sends an ARP return packet to the user networking device, and the monitoring software on the honeypot device monitors in real time whether the information exchange activities between the user networking device and the honeypot device are legal.
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