Anonymous communication method and system for quantum computing-resistant digital currency based on ID cryptography

Through an anonymous communication method of anti-quantum computing digital currency based on ID cryptography, the problem of inability to resist quantum computing and privacy leakage in the existing technology is solved, and a secure and low-cost digital currency communication system is realized, ensuring user privacy and system Security.

CN114529273BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-05RUBAN QUANTUM TECH CO LTD +1
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202011204483.9
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2020-11-02
Publication Date
2024-11-05
Estimated Expiration
2040-11-02

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing digital currency system cannot resist quantum computing. The cost of quantum confidential communication is high, and the asymmetric key management is complex, which increases the storage cost and operation workload of key fuses. The switching cost of traditional CA authentication and IBC authentication systems is high, and the user identity is Publicity leads to privacy leakage.

Method used

Using anonymous communication method for anti-quantum computing digital currency based on ID cryptography, public and private keys are issued through a key management server to realize identity authentication and anonymous transactions, and hash functions and message authentication codes to generate and verify keys to ensure that users are updated anonymously and communication security.

Benefits of technology

Reduces the storage cost and operation complexity of key fobs, enhances user privacy protection, realizes a digital currency communication system that is resistant to quantum computing, avoids the high cost and complexity of CA communication systems, and ensures the security of the system and user identity. anonymity.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The present invention discloses a quantum computing-resistant digital currency anonymous communication method and system based on ID cryptography, the method comprising the following steps: S1, using a key management server to issue public and private keys and system public and private keys to users, commercial bank digital currency systems and central bank digital currency systems respectively; S2, using an identity authentication method to authenticate the commercial bank digital currency system and the central bank digital currency system; S3, using an identity authentication method to authenticate the user and the commercial bank digital currency system, and obtain the user's new anonymous identity; S4, realizing anonymous transactions of digital currencies between different users through a digital currency transaction method. Beneficial effects: The present invention establishes a quantum computing-resistant digital currency communication system, and the user of the present invention can protect the user's privacy information by using a frequently updated anonymous identity to communicate with the commercial bank digital currency system, making transactions safer.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of identity authentication, and in particular to a quantum computing-resistant digital currency anonymous communication method and system based on ID cryptography. Background Art

[0002] The core elements of the digital currency D-RMB system of the People's Bank of China are one currency, two types of libraries and three centers. One currency, namely "D-RMB" (DC / EP), referred to as D currency, specifically refers to a string of encrypted digital strings representing a specific amount signed by the central bank. Two types of libraries: the D-RMB issuance library and the bank library (central bank digital currency database, commercial bank digital currency database). Digital currency in the issuance library is the central bank's digital currency fund; digital currency in the bank library is the commercial bank's inventory of digital cash. Three centers: one is the registration center (recording the entire process of currency generation, circulation, counting and verification, and extinction); the other two are certification centers, namely CA certification center (based on the PKI system, centralized management of institutional and user certificates, such as CFCA) and IBC certification center [that is, the certification center established based on identity-based cryptographic technology (Identity-Based Cryptograph)]. Two tables can be designed in the registration center, one is the digital currency ownership registration table, which records the ownership of digital currency, and the other is the transaction flow table.

[0003] The D-RMB system is a hierarchical system, which is jointly built by the central bank and commercial banks. The central bank digital currency system is a computer system operated and maintained by the central bank or an institution designated by the central bank to process information about digital currency. Its main functions include being responsible for the issuance and verification monitoring of digital currency. The commercial bank digital currency system is a computer system operated and maintained by commercial banks or institutions designated by commercial banks to process information about digital currency. It performs various currency-related functions of existing banks, namely banking functions, mainly including being directly responsible for meeting various needs of providing digital currency circulation services to the society after applying for digital currency from the central bank.

[0004] As most people know, quantum computers have great potential in password cracking. Most of the current mainstream asymmetric (public key) encryption algorithms, such as the RSA encryption algorithm, are based on two mathematical problems: factorization of large integers or calculation of discrete logarithms over finite fields. The difficulty of their cracking depends on the efficiency of solving these problems. On traditional computers, solving these two mathematical problems takes exponential time (that is, the cracking time increases exponentially with the increase of the length of the public key), which is unacceptable in practical applications. The Shor algorithm, which is tailor-made for quantum computers, can perform integer factorization or discrete logarithm calculation in polynomial time (that is, the cracking time increases with the increase of the length of the public key at a rate of k, where k is a constant independent of the length of the public key), thus making it possible to crack the RSA and discrete logarithm encryption algorithms.

[0005] Problems with existing technologies:

[0006] 1. CA certification and IBC certification in the existing digital currency system are not resistant to quantum computing;

[0007] 2. The existing quantum computing-resistant communication systems based on quantum secure communication are too costly for users and the symmetric key management is complicated;

[0008] 3. In the existing quantum computing-resistant communication system based on asymmetric key pool, it is necessary to generate an asymmetric key pool from the public keys of all members and store it in each key card, which increases the storage cost and operation workload of the client key card;

[0009] 4. The existing quantum computing-resistant communication system based on asymmetric key pool has changed the overall process and data structure of the traditional CA authentication and IBC authentication system, resulting in excessive cost for the CA authentication and IBC authentication system and its corresponding user application system to switch to quantum computing-resistant solutions;

[0010] 5. In the existing digital currency communication system, the identities of the sender and the payee are public, which can easily lead to user privacy leakage. Summary of the invention

[0011] In response to the problems in the related technology, the present invention proposes a quantum computing-resistant digital currency anonymous communication method and system based on ID cryptography to overcome the above-mentioned technical problems existing in the existing related technology.

[0012] To this end, the specific technical solution adopted by the present invention is as follows:

[0013] According to one aspect of the present invention, a quantum computing-resistant digital currency anonymous communication method based on ID cryptography is provided, the method comprising the following steps:

[0014] S1. Use the key management server to issue public and private keys and system public and private keys to users, commercial bank digital currency systems and central bank digital currency systems respectively;

[0015] S2. Authenticate the commercial bank digital currency system and the central bank digital currency system using an identity authentication method;

[0016] S3. Using an identity authentication method to authenticate the user and the commercial bank digital currency system, and obtaining a new anonymous identity of the user;

[0017] S4. Realize anonymous transactions of digital currencies between different users through digital currency transaction methods;

[0018] Wherein, when the key management server corresponding to the central bank digital currency system issues the system public and private keys for the central bank digital currency system, a random number is taken as the system private key, and then the system public key is calculated according to the system private key, and the system private key and the system public key are stored in the anti-quantum computing device of the central bank digital currency system;

[0019] When the key management server corresponding to the central bank digital currency system issues public and private keys to the central bank digital currency system, it calls the hash function to calculate the public key, then calculates the corresponding private key based on the public key, and stores the ID of the central bank digital currency system and the public and private keys in the anti-quantum computing device of the central bank digital currency system;

[0020] When the key management server corresponding to the central bank digital currency system issues the system public and private keys to the commercial bank digital currency system, it calculates the message authentication code to obtain the corresponding system private key, and then calculates the system public key based on the system private key, and stores the system private key in the quantum-resistant computing device of the central bank digital currency system, and stores the system public key in the quantum-resistant computing device corresponding to the commercial bank digital currency system;

[0021] When the key management server corresponding to the central bank digital currency system issues public and private keys to the commercial bank digital currency system, it calls the hash function to calculate the public key, and then calculates the private key based on the key management server corresponding to the central bank digital currency system according to the public key, and stores the ID of the commercial bank digital currency system and the public and private keys in the anti-quantum computing device of the commercial bank digital currency system;

[0022] When the key management server corresponding to the commercial bank digital currency system issues the system public and private keys to the user, it calculates the message authentication code to obtain the corresponding system private key, and then calculates the system public key based on the system private key, and stores the system private key in the anti-quantum computing device of the commercial bank digital currency system, and stores the system public key in the anti-quantum computing device of the corresponding user end;

[0023] When the key management server corresponding to the commercial bank digital currency system issues public and private keys to the user, it calls the hash function to calculate the public key, and then calculates the private key based on the key management server corresponding to the commercial bank digital currency system based on the public key, and stores the user's anonymous identity and the public and private keys in the user's quantum-resistant computing device. At the same time, the key management server corresponding to the commercial bank digital currency system records the correspondence between the user's real identity and his anonymous identity.

[0024] Furthermore, the S2 uses an identity authentication method to authenticate the commercial bank digital currency system and the central bank digital currency system, including the following steps:

[0025] S21. Send the identity information of the commercial bank digital currency system to be authenticated to the central bank digital currency system;

[0026] S22, the central bank digital currency system receives the identity information and performs authentication, and returns the authentication result to the commercial bank digital currency system, and when the authentication result is successful, it contains the session key;

[0027] S23. The commercial bank digital currency system receives the authentication result and verifies the authentication result, wherein when the authentication result is successful, the session key is received.

[0028] Furthermore, the S21 also includes using a private key of a key management server corresponding to the central bank digital currency system to digitally sign the first sent information based on ID cryptography, and the digital signature specifically includes the following steps:

[0029] A first random number parameter is selected, and a first product between the first random number parameter and the public key of the commercial bank digital currency system is calculated. A preset function is then applied to the first sent message and the first product to obtain a first signature parameter, and the first signature parameter is used to obtain a first signature of the first sent message.

[0030] Furthermore, the S22 also includes using another private key of the central bank digital currency system to digitally sign the second sent information based on ID cryptography, and the digital signature specifically includes the following steps:

[0031] Select a second random number parameter, and calculate the second product between the second random number parameter and the public key of the central bank digital currency system, then use a preset function to act on the second sending message and the second product to obtain a second signature parameter, and use the second signature parameter to obtain a second signature of the second sending message.

[0032] Furthermore, the S3 uses an identity authentication method to authenticate the user and the commercial bank digital currency system, and obtains the user's new anonymous identity, specifically including the following steps:

[0033] S31, sending the anonymous identity information of the user to be authenticated to the commercial bank digital currency system, and applying for updating and generating a new anonymous identity for the user;

[0034] S32, the commercial bank digital currency system receives the user's information with an anonymous identity, verifies whether the identity information to be authenticated is the real identity corresponding to the anonymous identity, and returns the authentication result to the user;

[0035] Among them, when the verification is successful, the commercial bank digital currency system generates a new anonymous identity for the user, and calculates the system public and private keys and public and private keys of the user's new anonymous identity, and the commercial bank digital currency system generates a session key, and combines the session key, the authentication success message, the new anonymous identity and the system public key and private key information to obtain the change information. At the same time, the key management server corresponding to the commercial bank digital currency system records the corresponding relationship between the real identity of the user and the new anonymous identity; when the verification fails, the authentication failure message is called the change information, and the timestamp is obtained to obtain the third sent message;

[0036] S33. The user receives the authentication result and verifies the authentication result. When the signature verification of the user is successful and the change information carries the message that the signature verification by the commercial bank digital currency system is successful, the session key, the new anonymous identity, the system public key and the private key in the change information are taken out. The user replaces the anonymous identity, the system public key and the private key originally stored in the quantum-resistant computing device with the new anonymous identity, the system public key and the private key, and uses the new anonymous identity as the anonymous identity to be used next time.

[0037] Furthermore, the S31 also includes using a private key of the key management server corresponding to the commercial bank digital currency system to digitally sign the third sent information based on ID cryptography, and the digital signature specifically includes the following steps:

[0038] A third random number parameter is selected, and a third product between the third random number parameter and the public key of the user is calculated, and then a preset function is applied to the third sending message and the third product to obtain a third signature parameter, and the third signature parameter is used to obtain a third signature of the third sending message.

[0039] Furthermore, the S32 also includes using another private key of the commercial bank digital currency system to digitally sign the fourth sent information based on ID cryptography, and the digital signature specifically includes the following steps:

[0040] A fourth random number parameter is selected, and a fourth product between the fourth random number parameter and the public key of the commercial bank digital currency system is calculated, and then a preset function is applied to the fourth sending message and the fourth product to obtain a fourth signature parameter, and the fourth signature parameter is used to obtain a fourth signature of the fourth sending message.

[0041] Furthermore, the S4 implements anonymous transactions of digital currencies between different users through a digital currency transaction method, specifically comprising the following steps:

[0042] S41, the user of the payer initiates a payment request, and signs the payment request based on ID cryptography, and encrypts it using the session key negotiated between the user and the first commercial bank digital currency system, and then sends the encrypted payment request information to the first commercial bank digital currency system;

[0043] S42, the first commercial bank digital currency system receives the payment request information, decrypts and verifies it using the session key negotiated between the user and the first commercial bank digital currency system, and after the verification is passed, trusts the anonymous identity of the user on the payer side, and obtains its real identity, and verifies the payment amount of the user on the payer side, and after the verification is passed, combines the digital currency string information to be paid with the payment request to obtain a new payment request, and signs the new payment request based on ID cryptography, and encrypts it using the session key negotiated between the central bank digital currency system and the first commercial bank digital currency system, and then sends the encrypted new payment request information and the ID of the first commercial bank digital currency system to the central bank digital currency system;

[0044] S43, the central bank digital currency system receives the information of the new payment request, and uses the session key negotiated between the central bank digital currency system and the first commercial bank digital currency system to perform decryption verification. After the verification is passed, the central bank digital currency system parses the new payment request information and transfers and registers the digital currency. After completion, the payment result is generated, and the payment result is signed based on ID cryptography. The session key negotiated between the central bank digital currency system and the first commercial bank digital currency system is used to encrypt the first result message, and then the first result message is sent to the first commercial bank digital currency system. Similarly, a second result message between the central bank digital currency system and the second commercial bank digital currency system is generated and sent to the second commercial bank digital currency system;

[0045] S44. The first commercial bank digital currency system receives the first result message, uses the session key negotiated between the central bank digital currency system and the first commercial bank digital currency system to decrypt and verify the first result message, records the transaction information after verification, and signs the payment result based on ID cryptography, and encrypts it using the session key negotiated between the user of the payee and the first commercial bank digital currency system, and then sends the encrypted information and the ID of the first commercial bank digital currency system to the user of the payee. Similarly, after receiving the second result message, the second commercial bank digital currency system also verifies the signature and records the transaction information, then generates a message and sends the message and the ID of the second commercial bank digital currency system to the user of the payee;

[0046] S45. The user on the payee's side and the user on the payee's side respectively receive the corresponding message and perform decryption verification to obtain the corresponding digital currency transaction result message.

[0047] According to another aspect of the present invention, a quantum computing-resistant digital currency communication system based on ID cryptography is provided, the system comprising a central bank digital currency system, a commercial bank digital currency system and a user, the identity authentication between the central bank digital currency system and the commercial bank digital currency system, and the identity authentication between the commercial bank digital currency system and the user are both authenticated based on the theory of ID cryptography;

[0048] The central bank digital currency system is used to produce and issue digital currency, and is also used to register the ownership of the digital currency;

[0049] The commercial bank digital currency system is used to perform banking functions for digital currency;

[0050] The user is the user of the digital currency.

[0051] Furthermore, both the central bank digital currency system and the commercial bank digital currency system are equipped with corresponding anti-quantum computing devices, and corresponding ID cryptography-based key management servers are deployed in the anti-quantum computing devices. The users are also equipped with corresponding anti-quantum computing devices, and the users have anonymous identities that can be updated by the corresponding commercial bank digital currency systems.

[0052] The beneficial effects of the present invention are:

[0053] 1) In the present invention, the key management server issues an anonymous identity to the user. The user uses the frequently updated anonymous identity to communicate with the commercial bank digital currency system to protect the user's privacy information and make the transaction safer;

[0054] 2) The present invention can realize a digital currency communication system based on ID cryptography that is resistant to quantum computing;

[0055] 3) The present invention does not need to generate an asymmetric key pool from the public keys of all members and then store it in each key card. The client key card only needs to store the key related to itself, so the storage cost and operation workload of the key card are small;

[0056] 4) The present invention does not change the overall process and data structure of identity authentication and transaction communication of the traditional digital currency system, but only adds protection based on ID cryptography symmetric keys on the basis of the existing technology. Therefore, the cost of switching the digital currency communication system to a quantum computing-resistant solution is not high; the present invention does not use a CA communication system that cannot resist quantum computing, but instead uses a key issuance service based on ID cryptography, which not only reduces the complexity of system construction and upgrade, but also enhances the central bank's control over commercial banks;

[0057] 5) The key issuing server based on ID cryptography of the present invention has different system public and private keys for each different user. Even if the system public key of a user is lost and the corresponding system private key is cracked by a quantum computer, it will not endanger the system public and private keys of other users. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0058] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0059] Figure 1is a flow chart of an anonymous communication method for quantum computing-resistant digital currency based on ID cryptography according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0060] Figure 2 It is a flow chart of a digital currency transaction between a commercial bank digital currency system and a user involved in a quantum computing-resistant digital currency anonymous communication method based on ID cryptography according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0061] Figure 3 It is a basic structural diagram of a quantum computing-resistant digital currency communication system based on ID cryptography according to an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0062] To further illustrate each embodiment, the present invention provides drawings, which are part of the disclosure of the present invention and are mainly used to illustrate the embodiments and can be used in conjunction with the relevant descriptions in the specification to explain the operating principles of the embodiments. With reference to these contents, ordinary technicians in the field should be able to understand other possible implementations and advantages of the present invention. The components in the figures are not drawn to scale, and similar component symbols are generally used to represent similar components.

[0063] According to an embodiment of the present invention, a quantum computing-resistant digital currency anonymous communication method and system based on ID cryptography are provided.

[0064] The present invention is further described with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments. Figure 1-2 As shown, according to one embodiment of the present invention, a quantum computing-resistant digital currency anonymous communication method based on ID cryptography is provided, and the method includes the following steps:

[0065] S1. Use the key management server to issue public and private keys and system public and private keys to users, commercial bank digital currency systems and central bank digital currency systems respectively;

[0066] Among them, when the key management server KMS corresponding to the central bank digital currency system issues the system public and private keys to the central bank digital currency system S, it takes a random number as the system private key SK MS , and then according to the system private key SK MS Calculate the system public key PK MS =SK MS *P, and the system private key SK MS And the system public key PK MS A quantum-resistant computing device T stored in the central bank digital currency system S S inside;

[0067] When the key management server KMS corresponding to the central bank digital currency system issues the public and private keys to the central bank digital currency system S, the hash function H1 is called to calculate the public key PK S =H1(ID S ), and then according to the public key PK S Calculate the corresponding private key SK S =SK MS *PK S , and the ID of the central bank digital currency system and the public and private keys, i.e., ID S ,PK S SK S A quantum-resistant computing device T deposited in the central bank digital currency system S S ;

[0068] When the key management server KMS corresponding to the central bank digital currency system issues the system public and private keys to the commercial bank digital currency system A, the message authentication code is calculated to obtain the corresponding system private key SK MSA(KMS) =MAC(ID A ,SK MS )[MAC(m,k) is the message authentication code calculated for message m using key k], and then based on the system private key SK MSA(KMS) Calculate the system public key PK MSA(KMS) =SK MSA(KMS) *P, and the system private key SK MSA(KMS) The public key PK of the central bank digital currency system is stored in the quantum-resistant computing device of the central bank digital currency system. MSA(KMS) Stored in the quantum-resistant computing device corresponding to the commercial bank digital currency system A, namely PK MSA(KMS) Save in T A PK MSB(KMS) Save in T B middle;

[0069] When the key management server KMS corresponding to the central bank digital currency system issues public and private keys to the commercial bank digital currency system A, the hash function H1 is called to calculate the public key PK A =H1(ID A ), and then according to the public key PK A Calculate the private key SK of the key management server KMS corresponding to the central bank digital currency system A(KMS) =SK MSA(KMS) *PK A , and the ID of the commercial bank digital currency system A and the public and private keys, i.e., ID A ,PK A SK A(KMS)The quantum-resistant computing device T deposited in the commercial bank digital currency system A A ;

[0070] When the key management server KMSA corresponding to the commercial bank digital currency system issues the system public and private keys to the user A1, the message authentication code is calculated to obtain the corresponding system private key SK MSA1 =MAC(ID A1 ,SK MSA ), and then according to the system private key SK MSA1 Calculate the system public key PK MSA1 =SK MSA1 *P, and the system private key SK MSA1 The quantum-resistant computing device T stored in the commercial bank digital currency system A A In the system public key PK MSA1 Stored in the quantum-resistant computing device on the corresponding user side, namely PK MSA1 Save in T A1 PK MSA2 Save in T A2 middle;

[0071] When the key management server KMSA corresponding to the commercial bank digital currency system issues the public and private keys to the user A1, the hash function H1 is called to calculate the public key PK A1 =H1(ID A1 ), and then according to the public key PK A1 Calculate the private key SK of the key management server KMSA corresponding to the commercial bank digital currency system A1 =SK MSA1 *PK A1 , and the anonymous identity of user A1 and the public and private keys, i.e., ID A1 ,PK A1 SK A1 Stored in the quantum-resistant computing device T of user A1 A1 At the same time, the key management server KMSA corresponding to the commercial bank digital currency system records the real identity of the user A1 and his anonymous identity ID A1 The corresponding relationship;

[0072] S2. The commercial bank digital currency system and the central bank digital currency system S perform identity authentication (the commercial bank digital currency system and the central bank digital currency system S are authenticated using an identity authentication method);

[0073] The following takes the identity authentication between commercial bank digital currency system A and central bank digital currency system S as an example. The identity authentication process between other commercial bank digital currency systems and central bank digital currency system S is similar.

[0074] S21. A sends its own identity information to S (sends the identity information of the commercial bank digital currency system to be authenticated to the central bank digital currency system);

[0075] AAccording to ID S Calculate PK S =H1(ID S ), take out your own KMS-based private key SK A(KMS) Calculate the symmetric key K between A and S A-S =e(SK A(KMS) , PK S ). Get timestamp T1 and use K A-S Calculate the message authentication code for T1 and get K1=MAC(T1,K A-S ). Set the combination IDA||IDS||T1||AINFO as MSG A , where AINFO is the identity information of A to be used for authentication.

[0076] Use SK A(KMS) About MSG A To make a digital signature based on ID cryptography, the process is as follows: take the random number parameter r1, obtain r1 and PK A The product of r1*PK A , and then use function H1 to act on MSG A and r1*PK A , we can get the signature parameter h1=H1(MSG A ,r1*PK A ). Then you can get MSG A Signature

[0077] SIGN(MSG A ,SK A(KMS) )=(r1*PK A ,(r1+h1)*SK A(KMS) ).

[0078] Use K1 to AINFO and SIGN (MSG A ,SK A(KMS) ) encrypted to obtain {AINFO||SIGN(MSG A ,SK A(KMS) )}K1, together with ID A 、ID S and T1 are sent to S. The message sent can be represented by ID A ||ID S ||T1|{AINFO||SIGN(MSG A ,SK A(KMS))}K1.

[0079] S22, S sends the authentication result (including the session key if the authentication is successful) to A (the central bank digital currency system receives the identity information and performs authentication, and returns the authentication result to the commercial bank digital currency system);

[0080] S receives the message ID from A A ||ID S ||T1|{AINFO||SIGN(MSG A ,SK A(KMS) )}K1. The KMS in S calculates its system private key to A as SK MSA(KMS) =MAC(ID A ,SK MS ), according to PK S =H1(ID S )Get SK S(KMS) =SK MSA(KMS) *PK S . Further obtain the symmetric key K between S and A S-A =

[0081] e(SK S(KMS) , PK A ). According to ID cryptography, we can get: K A-S =e(SK A(KMS) , PK S )=

[0082] e(SK MSA(KMS) *PK A , PK S )=e(PK A , S.K. MSA(KMS) *PK S )=e(PK A , S.K. S(KMS) )=

[0083] e(SK S(KMS) , PK A )=K S-A . Use K S-A Calculate the message authentication code for T1 and get K ′ 1=MAC(T1,K S-A ). Use K ′ 1Decryption{AINFO||SIGN(MSG A ,SK A(KMS) )}K1, get A's identity information AINFO and SIGN(MSG A ,SK A(KMS) ).

[0084] S According to IDA Calculate PK A =H1(ID A ), according to the SK calculated above MSA(KMS) Calculate the system public key of KMS to A as PK MSA(KMS) =SK MSA(KMS) *P, use PK A and PK MSA(KMS) To verify the signature SIGN(MSG A ,SK A(KMS) ). To verify the signature, you only need to verify (P,PK MSA(KMS) ,r1*PK A +h1*

[0085] PK A ,(r1+h1)*SK A(KMS) ) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple. If the verification succeeds, S generates the session key KS S-A It is combined with the authentication success message and is called RET S ; If the verification fails, the authentication failure message is called RET S . Get timestamp T2 and combine IDS||IDA||T2||RET S As MSG S .

[0086] Use SK S(KMS) About MSG S To make a digital signature based on ID cryptography, the process is as follows: take the random number parameter r2, calculate r2 and PK S The product of r2*PK S , and then use function H1 to act on MSG S and r2*PK S , we can get the signature parameter h2=H1(MSG S ,r2*PK S ). Then you can get MSG S Signature

[0087] SIGN(MSG S ,SK S(KMS) )=(r2*PK S ,(r2+h2)*SK S(KMS) ).

[0088] Use K S-A Calculate the message authentication code for T2 and get K2 = MAC (T2, K S-A ), use K2 to RET S and SIGN(MSG S ,SK S(KMS) ) encrypted to obtain {RETS ||SIGN(MSG S ,SK S(KMS) )}K2, together with ID S 、ID A and T2 are sent to A. The message sent can be represented by ID S ||ID A ||T2|{RET S ||SIGN(MSG S ,SK S(KMS) )}K2.

[0089] S23, A receives the authentication result (the commercial bank digital currency system receives the authentication result and verifies the authentication result, wherein, when the authentication result is successful, the session key is received);

[0090] A receives the message ID from S S ||ID A ||T2|{RET S ||SIGN(MSG S ,SK S(KMS) )}K2. Use K A-S Calculate the message authentication code for T2 to get K ′ 2=MAC(T2,K A-S ), using K ′ 2Decryption

[0091] {RET S ||SIGN(MSG S ,SK S(KMS) )}K2, get RET S and SIGN(MSG S ,SK S(KMS) ).

[0092] A uses PK S and from T A PK taken out MSA(KMS) To verify the signature SIGN(MSG S ,SK S(KMS) ). To verify the signature, you only need to verify (P,PK MSA(KMS) ,r2*PK S +h2*PK S ,(r2+h2)*SK S(KMS) ) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple. If A successfully verifies the signature, and RET S If the message carried in the message is also a successful signature verification by S, then RET can be taken out. S The session key KS in S-A, so A and S can use the session key for confidential communication; in other cases, the session key cannot be obtained.

[0093] From the above process, we can see that the public key of the system based on ID cryptography is not disclosed, and the digital signature based on ID cryptography is protected by a symmetric key. Therefore, this process can resist the attack of quantum computers on ID cryptography. In addition, the KMS based on ID cryptography has different system public and private keys for different users such as A, B, and C. Even if A's system public key PK MSA(KMS) Loss of the corresponding system private key SK MSA(KMS) Even if it is cracked by a quantum computer, it will not endanger the system public and private keys of other users such as B and C.

[0094] S3. The user performs identity authentication with the commercial bank digital currency system (using an identity authentication method to authenticate the user with the commercial bank digital currency system, and obtain the user's new anonymous identity);

[0095] The following takes the identity authentication of user A1 and commercial bank digital currency system A as an example. The process of identity authentication of other users and the corresponding commercial bank digital currency system is similar.

[0096] S31, A1 sends its own identity information to A, and applies for updating and generating a new anonymous identity (sends the anonymous identity information of the user to be authenticated to the commercial bank digital currency system, and applies for updating and generating a new anonymous identity for the user);

[0097] A1 According to ID A Calculate PK A =H1(ID A ), take out your own KMSA-based private key SK A1 Calculate the symmetric key K between A1 and A A1-A =e(SK A1 , PK A ). Get timestamp T3, using K A1-A Calculate the message authentication code for T3 and get K3 = MAC (T3, K A1-A ). Set the combination IDA1||IDA||T3||A1INFO as MSG A1 , where A1INFO is the identity information of A1 to be used for authentication.

[0098] Use SK A1 About MSG A1 To make a digital signature based on ID cryptography, the process is as follows: take the random number parameter r3, obtain r3 and PK A1 The product of r3*PK A1 , and then use function H1 to act on MSG A1and r3*PK A1 , we can get the signature parameter h3=H1(MSG A1 ,r3*PK A1 ). Then you can get MSG A1 Signature SIGN(MSG A1 ,SK A1 )=(r3*PK A1 ,(r3+h3)*SK A1 ).

[0099] Use K3 to A1INFO and SIGN (MSG A1 ,SK A1 ) encrypted to obtain {A1INFO||SIGN(MSG A1 ,SK A1 )}K3, together with A1's anonymous ID A1 、ID A and T3 are sent to A. The message sent can be represented by ID A1 ||ID A ||T3|{A1INFO||SIGN(MSG A1 ,SK A1 )}K3.

[0100] S32, A sends the authentication result (including the session key if the authentication is successful) to A1 (the commercial bank digital currency system receives the user's information with an anonymous identity, verifies whether the identity information to be authenticated is the real identity corresponding to the anonymous identity, and returns the authentication result to the user);

[0101] A receives the message ID from A1 A1 ||ID A ||T3|{A1INFO||SIGN(MSG A1 ,SK A1 )}K3. KMSA in A calculates its private key to A1 as SK MSA1 =MAC(ID A1 ,SK MSA ), according to PK A =H1(ID A )Get SK A(MSA1) =SK MSA1 *PK A . Further obtain the symmetric key K between A and A1 A-A1 =e(SK A(MSA1) , PK A1 ). According to ID cryptography, we can get: K A1-A =e(SK A1 , PK A )=e(SKMSA1 *PK A1 , PK A )=e(PK A1 , S.K. MSA1 *PK A )=e(PK A1 , S.K. A(MSA1) )=e(SK A(MSA1) , PK A1 )=K A-A1 . Use K A-A1 Calculate the message authentication code for T3 and get K ′ 3=MAC(T3,K A-A1 ). Use K ′ 3Decrypt {A1INFO||SIGN(MSG A1 ,SK A1 )}K3, get A1's identity information A1INFO and SIGN(MSG A1 ,SK A1 ). A verifies whether A1INFO is ID A1 The corresponding real identity.

[0102] AAccording to ID A1 Calculate PK A1 =H1(ID A1 ), according to the SK calculated above MSA1 Calculate the system public key of KMSA for A1 as PK MSA1 =SK MSA1 *P, use PK A1 and PK MSA1 To verify the signature SIGN(MSG A1 ,SK A1 ). To verify the signature, you only need to verify (P,PK MSA1 ,r3*PK A1 +h3*PK A1 ,(r3+h3)*SK A1 ) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple.

[0103] If the verification is successful, A generates a new anonymous identity ID for A1 A1new , calculate the KMSA pair ID A1new The system private key SK MSA1new =MAC(ID A1new ,SK MSA ), system public key PK MSA1new =SK MSA1new *P, calculation ID A1new The public key PK A1new =H1(ID A1new ), private key SKA1new =SK MSA1new *PK A1new , and A generates a session key KS A-A1 And KS A-A1 , Authentication success message and ID A1new ||PK MSA1new ||SK A1new The combination is called RET A At the same time, KMSA records A1’s real identity and its anonymous ID A1new If the verification fails, the authentication failure message is called RET A . Get timestamp T4 and combine ID A ||ID A1 ||T4||RET A As MSG ′ A .

[0104] Use SK A(MSA1) About MSG ′ A To make a digital signature based on ID cryptography, the process is as follows: take the random number parameter r4, obtain r4 and PK A The product of r4*PK A , and then use function H1 to act on MSG ′ A and r4*PK A , we can get the signature parameter h4=H1(MSG ′ A ,r4*PK A ). Then you can get MSG ′ A Signature SIGN(MSG ′ A ,SK A(MSA1) )=(r4*PK A ,(r4+h4)*SK A(MSA1) ).

[0105] Use K A-A1 Calculate the message authentication code for T4 and get K4 = MAC (T4, K A-A1 ), use K4 to RET A and SIGN(MSG ′ A ,SK A(MSA1) ) encrypted to obtain {RET A ||SIGN(MSG ′ A ,SK A(MSA1) )}K4, together with ID A 、ID A1and T4 are sent to A1. The message sent can be represented by ID A ||ID A1 ||T4||{RET A ||SIGN(MSG ′ A ,SK A(MSA1) )}K4.

[0106] S33, A1 receives the authentication result (the user receives the authentication result and verifies the authentication result);

[0107] A1 receives the message ID from A A ||ID A1 ||T4||{RET A ||SIGN(MSG ′ A ,SK A(MSA1) )}K4. Use K A1-A Calculate the message authentication code for T4 and get K ′ 4=MAC(T4,K A1-A ), using K ′ 4Decryption {RET A ||SIGN(MSG ′ A ,SK A(MSA1) )}K4, get RET A and SIGN(MSG ′ A ,SK A(MSA1) ).

[0108] A1 uses PK A and from T A1 PK taken out MSA1 To verify the signature SIGN(MSG ′ A ,SK A(MSA1) ). To verify the signature, you only need to verify (P,PK MSA1 ,r4*PK A +h4*PK A ,(r4+h4)*SK A(MSA1) ) is a valid Diffie-Hellman tuple. If A1 successfully verifies the signature, and RET A If the message carried in the message is also a successful signature verification by A, then RET can be taken out. A The session key KS in A-A1 and ID A1new ||PK MSA1new ||SK A1new , A1 will use the new anonymous identity, system public key and private key, namely ID A1new||PK MSA1new ||SK A1new Replacement of quantum-resistant computing devices T A1 The ID originally stored in A1 ||PK MSA1 ||SK A1 and use the ID A1new As a new anonymous identity; and A1 and A can use the session key KS A-A1 In other cases, the session key cannot be obtained.

[0109] From the above process, we can see that the public key of the system based on ID cryptography is not disclosed, and the digital signature based on ID cryptography is protected by a symmetric key, so this process can resist the attack of quantum computers on ID cryptography. In addition, the public and private keys of the system based on ID cryptography are different for different users such as A1, A2, and A3. Even if A1's system public key PK MSA1 Loss of the corresponding system private key SK MSA1 Even if it is cracked by a quantum computer, it will not endanger the public and private keys of other users such as A2 and A3. In addition, the user's anonymous identity is frequently updated, and then the user uses the anonymous identity to communicate, which makes the communication more secure.

[0110] S4. Anonymous transactions of digital currency between different users (anonymous transactions of digital currency between different users are realized through digital currency transaction methods);

[0111] The following takes the digital currency transaction between user A1 and user B1 as an example. The digital currency transaction process between other different users is similar.

[0112] S41, A1 sends payment request information to A (the user on the payer sends information with payment request to the first commercial bank digital currency system);

[0113] A1, as the payer, initiates a payment request REQ A1 , including payer information A1INFO, payer digital currency wallet identifier WALLET A1 , payment amount Payment, recipient digital currency wallet logo WALLET B1 , that is REQ A1 =A1INFO||WALLET A1 ||Payment||WALLET B1 Then follow the method in S31 and use SK A1 REQ A1 Make a signature based on ID cryptography and get SIGN A1-A . Use the session key KS between A and A1A-A1 REQ A1 ||SIGN A1-A Encryption is performed to obtain (REQ A1 ||SIGN A1-A )KS A-A1 Then, set the ID A1 and payment request information (REQ A1 ||SIGN A1-A )KS A-A1 Send to A.

[0114] S42, A sends payment request information to S (the first commercial bank digital currency system sends the information with the payment request and the ID of the first commercial bank digital currency system to the central bank digital currency system);

[0115] A receives the payment request message (REQ A1 ||SIGN A1-A )KS A-A1 First, use KS A-A1 Decrypt to get REQ A1 and SIGN A1-A Then, according to the method in S32, use PK A1 About SIGN A1-A Verify. If the verification is successful, the anonymous ID of the message sender A1 can be trusted A1 , and obtain the true identity of A1, thus obtaining REQ A1 A1INFO||WALLET A1 ||Payment||WALLET B1 .

[0116] AAccording to A1INFO and WALLET A1 The information provided by A1 is used to check the digital currency safe deposit box corresponding to the bank account of user A1, and verify the payment amount Payment, that is, to confirm that the digital currency balance in the digital currency safe deposit box must be greater than or equal to Payment, otherwise the payment fails. After the verification is passed, A obtains the digital currency string information Word to be paid, and compares Word with REQ A1 Combine them to get the payment request REQ A =REQ A1 ||Word. Then follow the method in S21, use SK A(KMS) REQ A Make a signature based on ID cryptography and get SIGN A-S . Use the session key KS between S and A S-A REQ A ||SIGN A-SEncryption is performed to obtain (REQ A ||SIGN A-S )KS S-A , then the ID A and request information (REQ A ||SIGN A-S )KS S-A Send to S.

[0117] S43, S performs digital currency transaction processing and returns the result to A and B (the central bank digital currency system receives the information with the payment request and performs digital currency transaction processing, and returns the processing result to the first commercial bank digital currency system and the second commercial bank digital currency system);

[0118] S receives A's request message (REQ A ||SIGN A-S )KS S-A , using KS S-A Decrypt to get REQ A and SIGN A-S , and then follow the method in S22, using PK A About SIGN A-S Verify. If the verification is successful, the identity of the message sender A can be trusted, and REQ can be obtained. A A1INFO||WALLET A1 ||Payment||WALLET B1 ||Word. S parses the payer, payee, and payment information including Payment and Word in the request information and transfers and registers digital currency, and generates the payment result Result after completion.

[0119] S Follow the method in S22, using SK S(KMS) Sign the payment result Result based on ID cryptography to get SIGN S-A Then use KS S-A Result||SIGN S-A Encrypt to get (Result||SIGN S-A )KS S-A , and the result message (Result||SIGN S-A )KS S-A Send to A. Similarly, generate result message (Result||SIGN S-B )KS S-B And sent to the commercial bank digital currency system B.

[0120] S44, A returns the transaction result to A1, and B returns the transaction result to B1 (the first commercial bank digital currency system returns the transaction result to the user of the payer, and the second commercial bank digital currency system returns the transaction result to the user of the payee);

[0121] A receives a message from S (Result||SIGN S-A )KS S-A , using KS S-A After decryption, we get Result and SIGN S-A According to the method in S23, PK S About SIGN S-A After verification, record the transaction information and use SK A(MSA1) Sign the Result based on ID cryptography to get SIGN A-A1 Then use KS A-A1 Result||SIGN A-A1 Encrypt to get (Result||SIGN A-A1 )KS A-A1 , and the ID A and the message (Result||SIGN A-A1 )KS A-A1 Similarly, after receiving the message, B also verifies the signature, records the transaction information, and then sends the ID B and message (Result||SIGN B-B1 )KS B-B1 And send it to B1.

[0122] S45, A1 and B1 receive the result information of the digital currency transaction (the user on the payee side and the user on the payee side receive the result information of the digital currency transaction at the same time).

[0123] A1 receives the message from A (Result||SIGN A-A1 )KS A-A1 , using KS A-A1 After decryption, we get Result and SIGN A-A1 According to the method in S33, PK A About SIGN A-A1 After verification, the result of the digital currency transaction is obtained. Similarly, after B1 receives the message, it can also obtain the result of the digital currency transaction after verifying the signature.

[0124] From the above process, we can see that the system public key based on ID cryptography is not disclosed, and the digital signature based on ID cryptography is protected by a symmetric key. Therefore, this process can resist the attack of quantum computers on ID cryptography.

[0125] At the same time, after each transaction, A1 and B1 can perform identity authentication in step S3 with their respective commercial banks to obtain new anonymous identities. In this way, they can use the new anonymous identities for the next transaction, and finally achieve a different identity for each transaction. Therefore, this process can protect user privacy and make user transactions safer.

[0126] According to another aspect of the present invention, Figure 3 As shown, a quantum computing-resistant digital currency communication system based on ID cryptography is provided. The basic structure of the digital currency system mainly includes a central bank digital currency system, a commercial bank digital currency system (in practice, it can be multiple commercial bank digital currency systems) and users, wherein the identity authentication between the central bank digital currency system and the commercial bank digital currency system, and the identity authentication between the commercial bank digital currency system and the user are all based on the theory of ID cryptography. The central bank digital currency system is used to generate and issue digital currency, and to register the ownership of digital currency; the commercial bank digital currency system is used to perform banking functions for digital currency; and the user is the subject of digital currency use.

[0127] Assume that the ID of the central bank digital currency system S is ID S , S has a quantum-resistant computing device T S , T S A key management server KMS based on ID cryptography is deployed in the system; the IDs of commercial bank digital currency systems A, B, C… are ID A 、ID B 、ID C ..., each with a quantum-resistant computing device T A , T B , T C …, while T A , T B , T C ...and the key management servers KMSA, KMSB, KMSC based on ID cryptography are deployed respectively; the commercial bank digital currency system A includes users A1, A2, A3..., the commercial bank digital currency system B includes users B1, B2, B3..., the commercial bank digital currency system C includes users C1, C2, C3..., and all users also have anti-quantum computing devices T A1 , T A2 , T A3 , T B1 , T B2 , TB3 , T C1 , T C2 , T C3 …. Among them, users A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, B3, C1, C2, C3… have variable anonymous identity IDs A1 、ID A2 、ID A3 、ID B1 、ID B2 、ID B3 、ID C1 、ID C2 、ID C3 …, these anonymous identities can be updated by the user’s corresponding commercial bank digital currency system to achieve the purpose of confidential communication.

[0128] The anti-quantum computing device can be a key card, a mobile terminal, a cipher machine, a gateway, etc., which can communicate with the bank currency system or each user end through the mainboard interface, short-range wireless communication, controllable intranet communication, etc., to ensure that information will not be stolen by quantum computers within the communication range. For example, the anti-quantum computing device can be a key card plugged into the host motherboard of the bank currency system, or the anti-quantum computing device can be a mobile terminal that conducts NFC communication with two mobile terminals, or the anti-quantum computing device can be a cipher machine or a gateway that conducts secure intranet communication with both user hosts in the same intranet.

[0129] In order to facilitate understanding of the above technical solution of the present invention, the method of establishing a set of system parameters based on ID cryptography in the actual process of the present invention is described in detail below.

[0130] (1) G1, G2 are GDH (Diffie–Hellman) groups of order q, where q is a large prime number, G1 is an additive cyclic group consisting of points on an elliptic curve, and P is the generator of group G1; G2 is a multiplicative cyclic group; and the bilinear map e: G1×G1→G2.

[0131] (2) Randomly select SK MS ∈Z p * As the system private key of the central bank digital currency system, SK MS The system public key PK of the central bank digital currency system is only stored in the quantum-resistant computing device of the central bank digital currency system. MS =SK MS *P,PK MS Quantum-resistant computing device T stored in central bank digital currency system S KMS has different public and private keys for each commercial bank digital currency system. The system private key of A is SK MSA(KMS)=MAC(ID A ,SK MS )(MAC(m,k) is the message authentication code calculated for message m using key k), the system public key of A is PK MSA(KMS) =SK MSA(KMS) *P; the system private key for B is SK MSB(KMS) =

[0132] MAC(ID B ,SK MS ), the system public key of B is PK MSB(KMS) =SK MSB(KMS) *P, KMS calculates the system public and private keys of other commercial bank digital currency systems in a similar way. The system private key based on KMS is stored in the quantum-resistant computing device of the central bank digital currency system, and the system public key based on KMS is stored in the quantum-resistant computing device of the corresponding commercial bank, that is, PK MSA(KMS) Save in T A PK MSB(KMS) Save in T B middle.

[0133] (3) When KMS issues public and private keys to S, it calls the hash function H1 to calculate the public key PK S =H1(ID S ), and then according to the public key PK S Calculate the private key SK S =SK MS *PK S , S's ID and public-private key, namely ID S ,PK S SK S A quantum-resistant computing device T stored in S S When KMS issues a public and private key to A, it calls the hash function H1 to calculate the public key PK A =H1(ID A ), and then according to the public key PK A Calculate the KMS-based private key SK A(KMS) =SK MSA(KMS) *PK A , A's ID and public and private keys, namely ID A ,PK A SK A(KMS) A quantum-resistant computing device T stored in A A The process of KMS issuing public and private keys to other commercial banks such as B, C, etc. is similar.

[0134] (4) Randomly select SK MSA ∈Z p * As the system private key of the commercial bank digital currency system, SKMSA The quantum-resistant computing device T is only stored in the commercial bank digital currency system A Calculate the system public key PK of the commercial bank digital currency system MSA =SK MSA *P,PK MSA The quantum computing device T stored in the commercial bank digital currency system A KMSA has different public and private keys for each user. The system private key for A1 is SK MSA1 =MAC(ID A1 ,SK MSA ), the system public key of A1 is PK MSA1 =SK MSA1 *P; the system private key for A2 is SK MSA2 =MAC(ID A2 ,SK MSA ), the system public key of A2 is PK MSA2 =SK MSA2 *P, KMSA calculates the system public and private keys of other users in a similar way. The system private key based on KMSA is stored in the quantum-resistant computing device T of the commercial bank digital currency system. A In the KMSA-based system, the public key is stored in the quantum-resistant computing device of the corresponding user end, namely PK MSA1 Save in T A1 PK MSA2 Save in T A2 The calculation methods of KMSB, KMSC, etc. for the system public and private keys of different users are similar.

[0135] (5) When KMSA issues public and private keys to user A1, it calls hash function H1 to calculate the public key PK A1 =

[0136] H1(ID A1 ), and then according to the public key PK A1 Calculate the private key SK based on KMSA A1 =SK MSA1 *PK A1 , A1's anonymous identity and public and private keys, i.e. ID A1 ,PK A1 SK A1 A quantum-resistant computing device T stored in A1 A1 At the same time, KMSA records A1's real identity and its anonymous identity ID A1 The process of KMSA issuing public and private keys to other users such as A1, A2, etc. is similar. The methods of other key management servers KMSB, KMSC, etc. issuing public and private keys to their respective users are similar.

[0137] In summary, with the help of the above technical solution of the present invention, the key management server in the present invention issues an anonymous identity to the user, and the user uses the frequently updated anonymous identity to communicate with the commercial bank digital currency system to protect the user's privacy information and make the transaction safer; in addition, the present invention can realize a quantum computing-resistant digital currency communication system based on ID cryptography; the present invention does not need to generate an asymmetric key pool from the public keys of all members and then store it in each key card. The client key card only needs to store the key related to itself, so the storage cost and operation workload of the key card are small; in addition, the present invention does not change the overall identity authentication and transaction communication of the traditional digital currency system The process and data structure only add the protection of symmetric keys based on ID cryptography on the basis of existing technologies. Therefore, the cost of switching the digital currency communication system to a quantum computing-resistant solution is not high. The present invention does not adopt the CA communication system that cannot resist quantum computing, but replaces it with a key issuance service based on ID cryptography, which not only reduces the complexity of system construction and upgrade, but also enhances the central bank's control over commercial banks. In addition, the key issuance server based on ID cryptography of the present invention has different system public and private keys for each different user. Even if the system public key of a user is lost and the corresponding system private key is cracked by a quantum computer, it will not endanger the system public and private keys of other users.

[0138] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A quantum computing-resistant digital currency anonymous communication method based on ID cryptography, characterized in that: The method comprises the following steps: S1. Use the key management server to issue public and private keys and system public and private keys to users, commercial bank digital currency systems and central bank digital currency systems respectively; S2. Authenticate the commercial bank digital currency system and the central bank digital currency system using an identity authentication method; S3. Using an identity authentication method to authenticate the user and the commercial bank digital currency system, and obtaining a new anonymous identity of the user; S4. Realize anonymous transactions of digital currencies between different users through digital currency transaction methods; Wherein, when the key management server corresponding to the central bank digital currency system issues the system public and private keys for the central bank digital currency system, a random number is taken as the system private key, and then the system public key is calculated according to the system private key, and the system private key and the system public key are stored in the anti-quantum computing device of the central bank digital currency system; When the key management server corresponding to the central bank digital currency system issues public and private keys to the central bank digital currency system, it calls the hash function to calculate the public key, then calculates the corresponding private key based on the public key, and stores the ID of the central bank digital currency system and the public and private keys in the anti-quantum computing device of the central bank digital currency system; When the key management server corresponding to the central bank digital currency system issues the system public and private keys to the commercial bank digital currency system, it calculates the message authentication code to obtain the corresponding system private key, and then calculates the system public key based on the system private key, and stores the system private key in the quantum-resistant computing device of the central bank digital currency system, and stores the system public key in the quantum-resistant computing device corresponding to the commercial bank digital currency system; When the key management server corresponding to the central bank digital currency system issues public and private keys to the commercial bank digital currency system, it calls the hash function to calculate the public key, and then calculates the private key based on the key management server corresponding to the central bank digital currency system according to the public key, and stores the ID of the commercial bank digital currency system and the public and private keys in the anti-quantum computing device of the commercial bank digital currency system; When the key management server corresponding to the commercial bank digital currency system issues the system public and private keys to the user, it calculates the message authentication code to obtain the corresponding system private key, and then calculates the system public key based on the system private key, and stores the system private key in the anti-quantum computing device of the commercial bank digital currency system, and stores the system public key in the anti-quantum computing device of the corresponding user end; When the key management server corresponding to the commercial bank digital currency system issues public and private keys to the user, it calls the hash function to calculate the public key, and then calculates the private key based on the key management server corresponding to the commercial bank digital currency system based on the public key, and stores the user's anonymous identity and the public and private keys in the user's quantum-resistant computing device. At the same time, the key management server corresponding to the commercial bank digital currency system records the correspondence between the user's real identity and his anonymous identity.

2. The method for anonymous communication of quantum computing-resistant digital currency based on ID cryptography according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The S2 uses the identity authentication method to authenticate the commercial bank digital currency system and the central bank digital currency system, including the following steps: S21. Send the identity information of the commercial bank digital currency system to be authenticated to the central bank digital currency system; S22, the central bank digital currency system receives the identity information and performs authentication, and returns the authentication result to the commercial bank digital currency system, and when the authentication result is successful, it contains the session key; S23. The commercial bank digital currency system receives the authentication result and verifies the authentication result, wherein when the authentication result is successful, the session key is received.

3. The method for anonymous communication of quantum computing-resistant digital currency based on ID cryptography according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The S21 also includes using a private key of the key management server corresponding to the central bank digital currency system to digitally sign the first sent information based on ID cryptography, and the digital signature specifically includes the following steps: A first random number parameter is selected, and a first product between the first random number parameter and the public key of the commercial bank digital currency system is calculated. A preset function is then applied to the first sent message and the first product to obtain a first signature parameter, and the first signature parameter is used to obtain a first signature of the first sent message.

4. The method for anonymous communication of quantum computing-resistant digital currency based on ID cryptography according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The S22 also includes using another private key of the central bank digital currency system to digitally sign the second sent information based on ID cryptography, and the digital signature specifically includes the following steps: Select a second random number parameter, and calculate the second product between the second random number parameter and the public key of the central bank digital currency system, then use a preset function to act on the second sending message and the second product to obtain a second signature parameter, and use the second signature parameter to obtain a second signature of the second sending message.

5. The method for anonymous communication of quantum computing-resistant digital currency based on ID cryptography according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The S3 uses an identity authentication method to authenticate the user and the commercial bank digital currency system, and obtains the user's new anonymous identity, specifically including the following steps: S31, sending the anonymous identity information of the user to be authenticated to the commercial bank digital currency system, and applying for updating and generating a new anonymous identity for the user; S32, the commercial bank digital currency system receives the user's information with an anonymous identity, verifies whether the identity information to be authenticated is the real identity corresponding to the anonymous identity, and returns the authentication result to the user; Among them, when the verification is successful, the commercial bank digital currency system generates a new anonymous identity for the user, and calculates the system public and private keys and public and private keys of the user's new anonymous identity, and the commercial bank digital currency system generates a session key, and combines the session key, the authentication success message, the new anonymous identity and the system public key and private key information to obtain the change information. At the same time, the key management server corresponding to the commercial bank digital currency system records the corresponding relationship between the real identity of the user and the new anonymous identity; when the verification fails, the authentication failure message is called the change information, and the timestamp is obtained to obtain the third sent message; S33. The user receives the authentication result and verifies the authentication result. When the signature verification of the user is successful and the change information carries the message that the signature verification by the commercial bank digital currency system is successful, the session key, the new anonymous identity, the system public key and the private key in the change information are taken out. The user replaces the anonymous identity, the system public key and the private key originally stored in the quantum-resistant computing device with the new anonymous identity, the system public key and the private key, and uses the new anonymous identity as the anonymous identity to be used next time.

6. The method for anonymous communication of quantum computing-resistant digital currency based on ID cryptography according to claim 5 is characterized in that: The S31 also includes using the private key of the commercial bank digital currency system corresponding to the key management server to perform a digital signature based on ID cryptography on the third sent information, and the digital signature specifically includes the following steps: A third random number parameter is selected, and a third product between the third random number parameter and the public key of the user is calculated, and then a preset function is applied to the third sending message and the third product to obtain a third signature parameter, and the third signature parameter is used to obtain a third signature of the third sending message.

7. The method for anonymous communication of quantum computing-resistant digital currency based on ID cryptography according to claim 5 is characterized in that: The S32 also includes using another private key of the commercial bank digital currency system to digitally sign the fourth sent information based on ID cryptography, and the digital signature specifically includes the following steps: A fourth random number parameter is selected, and a fourth product between the fourth random number parameter and the public key of the commercial bank digital currency system is calculated, and then a preset function is applied to the fourth sending message and the fourth product to obtain a fourth signature parameter, and the fourth signature parameter is used to obtain a fourth signature of the fourth sending message.

8. The method for anonymous communication of quantum computing-resistant digital currency based on ID cryptography according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The S4 realizes anonymous transactions of digital currencies between different users through a digital currency transaction method, specifically comprising the following steps: S41, the user of the payer initiates a payment request, and signs the payment request based on ID cryptography, and encrypts it using the session key negotiated between the user and the first commercial bank digital currency system, and then sends the encrypted payment request information to the first commercial bank digital currency system; S42, the first commercial bank digital currency system receives the payment request information, decrypts and verifies it using the session key negotiated between the user and the first commercial bank digital currency system, and after the verification is passed, trusts the anonymous identity of the user on the payer side, and obtains its real identity, and verifies the payment amount of the user on the payer side, and after the verification is passed, combines the digital currency string information to be paid with the payment request to obtain a new payment request, and signs the new payment request based on ID cryptography, and encrypts it using the session key negotiated between the central bank digital currency system and the first commercial bank digital currency system, and then sends the encrypted new payment request information and the ID of the first commercial bank digital currency system to the central bank digital currency system; S43, the central bank digital currency system receives the information of the new payment request, and uses the session key negotiated between the central bank digital currency system and the first commercial bank digital currency system to perform decryption verification. After the verification is passed, the central bank digital currency system parses the new payment request information and transfers and registers the digital currency. After completion, the payment result is generated, and the payment result is signed based on ID cryptography. The session key negotiated between the central bank digital currency system and the first commercial bank digital currency system is used to encrypt the first result message, and then the first result message is sent to the first commercial bank digital currency system. Similarly, a second result message between the central bank digital currency system and the second commercial bank digital currency system is generated and sent to the second commercial bank digital currency system; S44. The first commercial bank digital currency system receives the first result message, uses the session key negotiated between the central bank digital currency system and the first commercial bank digital currency system to decrypt and verify the first result message, records the transaction information after verification, and signs the payment result based on ID cryptography, and encrypts it using the session key negotiated between the user of the payee and the first commercial bank digital currency system, and then sends the encrypted information and the ID of the first commercial bank digital currency system to the user of the payee. Similarly, after receiving the second result message, the second commercial bank digital currency system also verifies the signature and records the transaction information, then generates a message and sends the message and the ID of the second commercial bank digital currency system to the user of the payee; S45. The user on the payee's side and the user on the payee's side respectively receive the corresponding message and perform decryption verification to obtain the corresponding digital currency transaction result message.

9. A quantum computing-resistant digital currency communication system based on ID cryptography, to implement the steps of the quantum computing-resistant digital currency anonymous communication method based on ID cryptography as described in any one of claims 1 to 8, characterized in that: The system includes a central bank digital currency system, a commercial bank digital currency system and a user, and the identity authentication between the central bank digital currency system and the commercial bank digital currency system, and the identity authentication between the commercial bank digital currency system and the user are both based on the theory of ID cryptography for authentication; The central bank digital currency system is used to produce and issue digital currency, and is also used to register the ownership of the digital currency; The commercial bank digital currency system is used to perform banking functions for digital currency; The user is the user of the digital currency.

10. The quantum computing-resistant digital currency communication system based on ID cryptography according to claim 9 is characterized in that: Both the central bank digital currency system and the commercial bank digital currency system are equipped with corresponding anti-quantum computing devices, and corresponding ID cryptography-based key management servers are deployed in the anti-quantum computing devices. The users are also equipped with corresponding anti-quantum computing devices, and the users have anonymous identities that can be updated for them by the corresponding commercial bank digital currency systems.