A new arbitration quantum signature method based on XOR encryption and GHZ state

By using GHZ state and control NATO operation in quantum signatures, combined with one-way hash function and eavesdropping detection technology, the existing quantum signature technology has high complexity and long-term quantum memory problems are solved, and efficient and secure signature verification is achieved. Enhanced the non-forgery and non-refutability of signatures.

CN114553390BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-19ZHENGZHOU UNIVERSITY OF LIGHT INDUSTRY
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202210253452.5
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2022-03-15
Publication Date
2024-11-19
Estimated Expiration
2042-03-15

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing quantum signature technology complex unitary operation and quantum state comparison algorithms increase computational complexity, reduce efficiency, and require long-term quantum memory, making it difficult to achieve efficient and secure signature verification in practical applications.

Method used

A new arbitration quantum signature method based on GHZ state is adopted, and a control NAG gate operation and one-way hash function is used to omit the quantum state comparison algorithm, and does not require long-term quantum memory, ensuring security through eavesdropping detection technology.

Benefits of technology

It simplifies encryption operations, improves signature generation and verification efficiency, enhances security, can effectively resist forgery and denial attacks, and has relatively simple and practical operations.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The present invention proposes a novel arbitration quantum signature method based on XOR encryption and GHZ state, including three steps of initialization, signature generation and signature verification; first, the arbitrator and the signer use a set of one-way hash functions and share a shared key; second, the signer uses the key-controlled hash function to quantum encode the quantum message, and uses the control bit of the GHZ state to control the quantum message to generate a quantum signature; finally, the verifier uses the control bit of the GHZ state to perform a similar XOR operation to verify the signature. Compared with other arbitration quantum signature methods, the key distribution and encryption of the method of the present invention do not involve complex encryption methods or quantum operations, and can effectively resist forgery attacks and denial attacks; on the basis of meeting security, non-forgeability and non-repudiation, the method of the present invention is more practical and efficient.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The invention relates to the technical field of quantum communication, and in particular to a novel arbitration quantum signature method based on XOR encryption and GHZ state. Background Art

[0002] Digital signature is a digital simulation of traditional manual signature. It can ensure the authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation of electronic information sent by the source of the message. The security of most traditional digital signatures based on mathematical problems relies on the assumption of mathematical difficulty and cannot cope with the security threat of quantum computers. One of the great advantages of quantum signature is that its security relies on the basic principles of quantum mechanics, which can theoretically cope with the security threat of quantum computers. In 2001, Gottesman and Chuang first proposed the concept of quantum signature and proposed a design scheme for quantum signature. However, in their scheme, the signer's public key can only be used once. In order to make quantum signature more practical, Zeng and Keitel proposed the first arbitration quantum signature scheme. In this scheme, there are three participants: the signer, the verifier (signature receiver) and the arbitrator. The signer generates a quantum signature on a classical message or a quantum message, and the verifier verifies the quantum signature with the help of the arbitrator. Moreover, the arbitrator can also resolve some disputes between the signer and the verifier in the event of a dispute. The design of this scheme can make arbitration quantum signature more applicable to real life, and also provide valuable ideas for the research of arbitration quantum signature.

[0003] Based on Zeng and Keitel's arbitration quantum signature idea, people have proposed various quantum signatures. Most quantum signature technologies require complex unitary operations, quantum state comparison algorithms, and even long-term quantum memory. Complex unitary operations increase the complexity of the algorithm. The quantum state comparison algorithm is a probabilistic algorithm that requires the signer to generate a large number of quantum signature samples for the quantum state comparison algorithm test. This algorithm can only guarantee the correctness of the comparison result with a certain probability when most samples are successfully compared; this undoubtedly reduces the efficiency and practicality of the quantum signature algorithm. In addition, in some quantum signature schemes, participants need to use long-term quantum memory to save some unknown quantum states. However, this still has difficulties in current technical implementation and application.

[0004] In order to improve the computational efficiency, practicality and security of quantum signatures, it is very necessary to study new quantum signature schemes, simplify the unitary operations required for encryption to reduce computational complexity; at the same time, minimize the quantum state comparison algorithm to improve the efficiency of quantum signature generation and verification; in addition, try to avoid the use of long-term quantum memory technology to increase the practicality of quantum signatures. Summary of the invention

[0005] In view of the deficiencies in the above-mentioned background technology, the present invention provides a novel arbitration quantum signature method based on XOR encryption and GHZ state. In the arbitration quantum signature scheme based on GHZ state, the controlled NOT gate operation is mainly used, and no quantum state comparison algorithm is required in the signature verification process; in addition, the present invention does not need to use long-term quantum memory technology to save unknown quantum states; the quantum signature designed in the present invention can effectively resist forgery attacks and denial attacks.

[0006] The technical solution of the present invention is achieved in this way:

[0007] A new arbitration quantum signature method based on XOR encryption and GHZ state uses quantum encryption technology to construct a quantum signature method including a signer, an arbitrator and a verifier; the steps are as follows:

[0008] Initialization steps include:

[0009] S11. The arbitrator and the signer use a set of one-way hash functions G 1 and G 2 ;

[0010] S12. The arbitrator shares the key K with the signer through the quantum key distribution protocol A ;

[0011] S13, the signer, the receiver and the arbitrator all securely share n entangled particles |GHZ>′ through eavesdropping detection technology ABT sequence, where the signer has an entangled particle |GHZ>′ ABT The particle sequence marked with subscript A in the middle, the receiver has the entangled particle |GHZ>′ ABT In the particle sequence marked with subscript B, the arbitrator has the entangled particle |GHZ>′ ABT The particle sequence is marked with T in the subscript;

[0012] The steps to generate a signature include:

[0013] S21. The signer sends the classic information m and the key K A As the hash function G 1 and G 2 According to the output of the hash function and the encoding rule, m is encoded into two identical quantum messages {P A >,P A >};

[0014] S22, the signer applies the controlled NOT gate operation to the sequence A and the quantum message {P A >,|P A >}Get

[0015] S23. The signer securely sends At the same time, the signer sends the message m to the verifier through the classic channel, and the verifier as a quantum signature;

[0016] The signature verification steps include:

[0017] S31. The receiver applies the controlled NOT gate operation to sequence B and the quantum signature get And through eavesdropping detection technology, the sequence Send securely to the arbitrator;

[0018] S32, the arbiter controls the NOT gate operation applied to the sequence T and get And Make measurements and record the measurement results, and decode the quantum message into m' according to the decoding rules;

[0019] S33. The arbitrator measures |m> and records the result as m, and compares m with m' to see if they are consistent. If they are consistent, verification is passed.

[0020] Preferably, the set of one-way hash functions G in step S11 1 :{0,1} * →{0,1} n and G 2 :{0,1} * →{0,1} n are two secure and distinct one-way hash functions.

[0021] Preferably, the quantum key distribution protocol in step S12 includes the BB84 protocol, and the key k A ∈{0,1} n The length of is n.

[0022] Preferably, the n entangled states |GHZ>′ in step S13 ABT The particle allocation method is as follows: particles marked as A are allocated to the signer Alice, particles marked as B are allocated to the verifier Bob, and particles marked as T are kept by the arbitrator Trent himself.

[0023] Preferably, the security of the eavesdropping detection technology is determined by: the sender prepares a sufficient number of decoy particles, and the decoy particles are randomly in one of the four states {|0>,|1>,|+>,|->}, where and The decoy particles are randomly inserted into the quantum sequence to be transmitted; when the receiver receives the sequence mixed with the decoy particles, the sender tells the receiver the state and position of the decoy particles; the receiver uses the correct basis to measure the received decoy particles and checks the correctness of the measurement results. If the error rate of the measurement results of the decoy particles is lower than the established threshold, it proves that the quantum channel is secure.

[0024] Preferably, the encoding rule in step S21 is: the message to be signed m=(m 1 ,m 2 ,...,m n )∈{0,1} n is a classical message of n bits, signed by using the hash function G 1 , G 2 and key k A Perform quantum encoding on m.

[0025] Preferably, the control NOT gate operation in step S22 is performed with sequence A as the control bit and sequence P as the control bit. A As the control NOT gate operation of the target position; the expression is:

[0026] Preferably, the control NOT gate operation in step S31 is performed with sequence B as the control bit and sequence As the control NOT gate operation of the target position; the expression is:

[0027] Preferably, the control NOT gate operation in step S32 is performed with sequence T as the control bit and sequence As the target position to control the NOT gate operation; the expression is:

[0028] Preferably, the decoding rule in step S32 is: the arbitrator uses the shared key k A With the hash function G 1 , G 2 Will Decoded as message m′=(m′ 1 , m′ 2 , ..., m′ n ).

[0029] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects produced by the present invention are as follows: the present invention uses hash functions and signature keys to encode classical messages into non-orthogonal quantum state sequences, and uses quantum entangled states and controlled NOT gates to sign and verify the sequences; there is no need for complex quantum operations, a large number of quantum state comparison tests, or long-term quantum memory technology; the present invention is relatively simple to operate, can generate quantum signatures for classical message bits, and the signatures are unforgeable and non-repudiable, and are safe, efficient, and relatively practical. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0030] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0031] Figure 1 is a flow chart of the present invention;

[0032] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the specific operations of the three parties involved in the signature provided by the present invention;

[0033] Figure 3 It is a schematic diagram of the process of using the present invention for eavesdropping detection technology. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0034] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0035] like Figure 1 As shown in the figure, a new arbitration quantum signature method based on XOR encryption and GHZ state is constructed using quantum encryption technology to construct a quantum signature method including a signer, an arbitrator and a verifier; the signer is the generator of the signature, and in this method, it mainly performs the generation process of the quantum signature; the arbitrator is the trusted center, and in this method, it shares the key with the signer and participates in the verification process of the signature; the verifier is the signature verification party, and in this method, it mainly performs the reception and verification process of the signature. The specific implementation steps are as follows:

[0036] Initialization steps include:

[0037] S11. The arbitrator and the signer use a set of one-way hash functions G 1 and G 2 ; Among them, the one-way hash function G 1 :{0,1} * →{0,1} n and G 2 :{0,1} * →{0,1} n are two secure and distinct one-way hash functions.

[0038] S12. The arbitrator shares the key K with the signer through the quantum key distribution protocol A ; Quantum key distribution protocol includes BB84 protocol, key k A ∈{0,1} n The length of is n.

[0039] S13, the signer, the receiver and the arbitrator all securely share n entangled particles |GHZ>′ through eavesdropping detection technology ABT sequence, where the signer has an entangled particle |GHZ>′ ABT The particle sequence marked with subscript A in the middle, the receiver has the entangled particle |GHZ>′ ABT In the particle sequence marked with subscript B, the arbitrator has the entangled particle |GHZ>′ ABT The particle sequence with subscript T in the middle; n entangled states |GHZ>′ ABT The particle allocation method is as follows: particles marked as A are allocated to the signer Alice, particles marked as B are allocated to the verifier Bob, and particles marked as T are kept by the arbitrator Trent himself.

[0040] like Figure 3 As shown in the figure, the security of the eavesdropping detection technology is determined as follows: the sender prepares a sufficient number of decoy particles, and the decoy particles are randomly in one of the four states {|0>,|1>,|+>,|->}, where and The decoy particles are randomly inserted into the quantum sequence to be transmitted; when the receiver receives the sequence mixed with the decoy particles, the sender tells the receiver the state and position of the decoy particles; the receiver uses the correct basis to measure the received decoy particles and checks the correctness of the measurement results. If the error rate of the measurement results of the decoy particles is lower than the established threshold, it proves that the quantum channel is secure.

[0041] The steps to generate a signature include:

[0042] S21. The signer sends the classic information m and the key K A As the hash function G 1 and G 2 According to the output of the hash function and the encoding rule, m is encoded into two identical quantum messages {P A >,P A >}; The encoding rule is: the message to be signed m = (m 1 ,m 2 ,...,m n )∈{0,1} n is a classical message of n bits, signed by using the hash function G 1 , G 2 and key kA Perform quantum encoding on m.

[0043] S22. The signer applies a controlled NOT gate operation (CNOT operation) to the sequence A and the quantum message {P A >,|P A >}Get The CNOT operation here uses sequence A as the control bit and sequence P as the A As the control NOT gate operation of the target position; the expression is:

[0044] S23. The signer securely sends At the same time, the signer sends the message m to the verifier through the classic channel, and the verifier as a quantum signature;

[0045] The signature verification steps include:

[0046] S31. The receiver applies the CNOT operation to sequence B and the quantum signature get And through eavesdropping detection technology, the sequence Safely sent to the arbitrator; the CNOT operation here uses sequence B as the control bit and sequence As the control NOT gate operation of the target position; the expression is:

[0047] S32, the arbitrator obtains security through eavesdropping detection technology Afterwards, the arbiter is applied to the sequence T and get And Measure and record the measurement results, and decode the quantum message into m' according to the decoding rule; the CNOT operation here uses the sequence T as the control bit and the sequence As the target position to control the NOT gate operation; the expression is: The decoding rule is: the arbitrator uses the shared key k A With the hash function G 1 , G 2 Will Decoded as message m′=(m′ 1 , m′ 2 , ..., m′ n ).

[0048] S33. The arbitrator measures |m> and records the result as m, and compares m with m' to see if they are consistent. If they are consistent, verification is passed.

[0049] like Figure 2As shown, a specific example of the present invention uses the signer Alice, the verifier Bob and the trusted third party Trent (arbitrator) as participants to perform a detailed description of the three steps of initialization, signature generation and signature verification.

[0050] The initialization step mainly includes three steps:

[0051] Let G 1 : {0, 1} * →{0, 1} n and G 2 : {0, 1} * →{0,1} n are two secure and different one-way hash functions. By executing the secure quantum key distribution protocol (QKDP), Alice and Trent share an n-bit key k A ∈{0, 1} n .set up Expressed as GHZ state, is a Hadamard operator, X=|0><1|+|1><0| is a NOT gate operator, and I=|0><0|+|1><1| is an identity operator. Through eavesdropping detection technology, Trent, Alice and Bob securely share n entangled states:

[0052]

[0053] Alice, Bob, and Trent each have particle sequences labeled by subscripts A, B, and T. In the following, "sequence A", "sequence B", and "sequence T" are used to represent particle sequences labeled by A, B, and T, respectively.

[0054] The signature generation process mainly includes four steps:

[0055] Assume m=(m 1 ,m 2 ,...,m n )∈{0,1} n is an n-bit message. Alice generates a signature on message m by performing the following steps.

[0056] Step 1: Use hash function G 1 , G 2 and key k A , Alice calculates t A1 and t A2 :

[0057]

[0058] Alice then encodes the message m into two identical quantum messages {|P A >,|P A >}. The encoding rules are implemented according to the rules shown in Table 1. For example, if m i =1 and When m i Encoded as particle state of particles.

[0059] Table 1 Coding rules

[0060]

[0061] Example 1: m = {011} is a 3-bit message. Assume that by using a hash function and a key k A Calculate t A1 =G 1 (m||k A )={010} and t A2 =G 2 (m||k A )={101}. According to the encoding rules shown in Table 1, we can get in

[0062] Step 2 Alice uses sequence A as the control bit and sequence P A As the target site, CNOT operation was performed to obtain

[0063]

[0064] Example 2: Assume that all data are as described in Example 1. According to Example 1 and step 2, we can get

[0065]

[0066]

[0067]

[0068] Step 3: Through eavesdropping detection technology, Alice securely On the other hand, Alice sends message m to Bob through a classical channel.

[0069] Step 4: Using eavesdropping detection technology, Bob securely receives On the other hand, Bob receives message m through the classical channel. Finally, Bob As Alice's signature.

[0070] The signature verification process mainly includes four steps:

[0071] Bob checks the signature by following verification steps Effectiveness:

[0072] Step 5 Bob uses sequence B as the control bit and sequence As the target bit, the control NOT gate operation CNOT is performed. This operation can be expressed as

[0073] Example 3: Assume that all data are as described in Example 2. According to Example 2 and verification step 5, we can get

[0074]

[0075]

[0076]

[0077] Step 6Bob sends a message to Trent using eavesdropping detection technology. where |m>=|m 1 m 2 ...m n >.

[0078] Example 4: Assume that all data are as described in Example 1. From Example 1, we can see that |m>=|011>.

[0079] Step 7 Using eavesdropping detection technology, Trent securely obtains Then, Trent uses the sequence T as the control bit and the sequence As the target bit, the control NOT gate CNOT operation is performed. This operation can be expressed as:

[0080]

[0081] Example 5: Assume that all data are as described in Examples 3 and 4. Then according to verification step 7, we can get

[0082]

[0083]

[0084]

[0085] Easy to prove Here, for simplicity, we use express On the other hand, Bob can easily obtain m from |m> by measuring each |m with an orthogonal basis {|0>, |1>} i >.

[0086] Step 8: By formula Trent uses the shared key k A Calculate t A1 and t A2 Then, Trent used t A1 and t A2 |P′ A >Decoded as message m′=(m′ 1 , m′ 2 , ..., m′ n ). This process refers to the rules listed in Table 1. For example, referring to Table 1, if and Trent uses the orthogonal basis {|+>, |->} to measure If the measurement result is |->, Trent sets m′ i =1, otherwise let m′ i =0.

[0087] Example 6: Assuming all data are as described in Example 5, we know that t A1 =G 1 (m||k A )={010} and t A2 =G 2 (m||k A )={101}. According to the encoding rules shown in Table 1, Decoded as m' = 011. Trent compares and finds that m' = m', so the signature is valid.

[0088] Finally, Trent compares m and m′. If m = m′, Trent declares the quantum signature valid and retains the sequence {|P′ A >, m} as verification evidence, otherwise Trent will declare this quantum signature invalid.

[0089] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A novel arbitration quantum signature method based on XOR encryption and GHZ state, characterized in that: Using quantum encryption technology to build a quantum signature method including a signer, an arbitrator and a verifier; The steps are as follows: Initialization steps include: S11, the arbitrator and the signer use a set of one-way hash functions G1 and G2; S12. The arbitrator shares the key K with the signer through the quantum key distribution protocol A ; S13, the signer, the receiver and the arbitrator all securely share n entangled particles |GHZ>′ through eavesdropping detection technology ABT Sequence, where the signer has an entangled particle |GHZ|>′ ABT The particle sequence marked with subscript A in the middle, the receiver has an entangled particle |GHZ|>′ ABT In the particle sequence marked with subscript B, the arbitrator has an entangled particle |GHZ|>′ ABT The particle sequence with subscript T in the figure. The receiver is the verifier. The steps to generate a signature include: S21. The signer sends the classic information m and the key K A As the input of hash functions G1 and G2, m is encoded into two identical quantum messages {P A >,|P A >}; S22, the signer applies the controlled NOT gate operation to the sequence A and the quantum message {P A >,|P A >}Get S23. The signer securely sends At the same time, the signer sends the message m to the verifier through the classic channel, and the verifier as a quantum signature; The signature verification steps include: S31. The receiver applies the controlled NOT gate operation to sequence B and the quantum signature get And through eavesdropping detection technology, the sequence Send securely to the arbitrator; S32, the arbiter controls the NOT gate operation applied to the sequence T and get And Make measurements and record the measurement results, and decode the quantum message into m' according to the decoding rules; S33. The arbitrator measures |m> and records the result as m, and compares m with m' to see if they are consistent. If they are consistent, verification is passed.

2. The novel arbitration quantum signature method based on XOR encryption and GHZ state according to claim 1 is characterized in that: A set of one-way hash functions G1 in step S11: {0,1} * →{0,1} n and G2:{0,1} * →{0,1} n are two secure and distinct one-way hash functions.

3. The novel arbitration quantum signature method based on XOR encryption and GHZ state according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The quantum key distribution protocol in step S12 includes the BB84 protocol, the key k A ∈{0,1} n The length of is n.

4. The novel arbitration quantum signature method based on XOR encryption and GHZ state according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The n entangled states |GHZ>′ in step S13 ABT The particle allocation method is as follows: particles marked as A are allocated to the signer Alice, particles marked as B are allocated to the verifier Bob, and particles marked as T are kept by the arbitrator Trent himself.

5. The novel arbitration quantum signature method based on XOR encryption and GHZ state according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that: The security of eavesdropping detection technology is judged as follows: the sender prepares a sufficient number of decoy particles, and the decoy particles are randomly in one of the four states {|0>,|1>,|+>,|->}, where and The decoy particles are randomly inserted into the quantum sequence to be transmitted; when the receiver receives the sequence mixed with the decoy particles, the sender tells the receiver the state and position of the decoy particles; the receiver uses the correct basis to measure the received decoy particles and checks the correctness of the measurement results. If the error rate of the measurement results of the decoy particles is lower than the established threshold, it proves that the quantum channel is secure.

6. The novel arbitration quantum signature method based on XOR encryption and GHZ state according to claim 5 is characterized in that: The encoding rule in step S21 is: the message to be signed m = (m1, m2, ..., m n )∈{0,1} n is a classical message of n bits, signed by using hash functions G1, G2 and key k A Perform quantum encoding on m.

7. The novel arbitration quantum signature method based on XOR encryption and GHZ state according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The control NOT gate operation in step S22 is performed with sequence A as the control bit and sequence P as the control bit. A As the control NOT gate operation of the target position; the expression is:

8. The novel arbitration quantum signature method based on XOR encryption and GHZ state according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The control NOT gate operation in step S31 is based on sequence B as the control bit and sequence As the control NOT gate operation of the target position; the expression is:

9. The novel arbitration quantum signature method based on XOR encryption and GHZ state according to claim 1, 7 or 8, characterized in that: The control NOT gate operation in step S32 is based on the sequence T as the control bit and the sequence As the target position to control the NOT gate operation; the expression is:

10. The novel arbitration quantum signature method based on XOR encryption and GHZ state according to claim 1 or 6, characterized in that: The decoding rule in step S32 is: the arbitrator uses the shared key k A With hash functions G1 and G2 Decoded into message m′=(m′1, m′2, ..., m′ n ).