Blockchain security control system accident tracing method and system

Abstract

The application discloses a kind of blockchain security control system accident traceability method and system, by the modification and uploading data record in local traceability chain when each node of blockchain is carried out data modification and upload, using the asymmetric encryption mechanism and transaction traceability characteristics of blockchain, guarantee the unmodifiable and traceability of data, traceability chain can lock accident source data, accurately locate to fault node and then lock modification initiator and account book notary, guarantee the reliability of traceability, second, when accident traceability is carried out in the past, the relevant information of entire blockchain needs to be traced back, blockchain data is more and more miscellaneous with time running, the time complexity of entire information amount is big, possibly cause the jam of communication channel.After introducing traceability chain, after determining accident node by the block header data comparison of traceability chain, only need to call the account book information of accident node to confirm specific accident person in charge, greatly reduce the time cost of accident traceability.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of risk control technology related to blockchain security control systems, and particularly relates to a method and system for tracing accidents in blockchain security control systems. Background Technology

[0002] Blockchain technology is a chain-like data structure that combines data blocks sequentially according to time. The underlying structure of blockchain is a systematic combination of many technologies and concepts, including multi-party operation, distributed databases, cryptographic tools, and consensus mechanisms. It boasts advantages such as tamper-proofing, traceability, multi-point consensus, and distributed storage, driving the development of various industries.

[0003] Blockchain technology is naturally compatible with the network attributes of security control systems. By scheduling a large number of security control devices connected to the data network as blockchain participating nodes, the consensus mechanism and distributed ledger technology of blockchain provide strong technical support for the management and control of security control systems. Only data that has reached a reliable consensus stored on the blockchain can be put into actual use in the production system, ensuring the correctness of key parameters, eliminating the possibility of tampering, and also providing an effective technical means for post-event accountability and abnormal behavior analysis.

[0004] With the development of blockchain technology and the promotion of blockchain applications, the following issues are receiving increasing attention. First, for consortium blockchains using the Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) consensus mechanism, considering that the system's block generation speed is close to its information transmission speed and that the system operates asynchronously, the system may experience forks where blocks are generated simultaneously or data requested first is uploaded later. This results in data inconsistencies between different nodes within a certain timeframe. This creates room for data tampering; an intruder can upload incorrect data, causing data modification errors, then create a blockchain fork and rapidly extend the forked chain. The erroneous data may not be recorded due to chain length issues, thus compromising system consistency. In this situation, relying solely on on-chain data for incident tracing can significantly impact the accuracy of the tracing results, leading to misleading incident attribution and making it difficult to accurately identify the incident node and thus the responsible party. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The purpose of this invention is to provide a method and system for tracing incidents in a blockchain security control system, so as to overcome the shortcomings of the prior art.

[0006] A method for tracing incidents in a blockchain-based security control system includes the following steps:

[0007] S1 records the modifications and uploads made by each node in the blockchain during data modification and upload in the local traceability chain;

[0008] S2, when an accident occurs, the blockchain system sends a traceability request to each blockchain node, and each blockchain node uploads the block header record of its local traceability chain;

[0009] S3 compares the block header records of each node in the blockchain, obtains and broadcasts the block header number corresponding to the abnormal data modification behavior to each node in the blockchain;

[0010] S4, each node in the blockchain determines the location of the corresponding data modification behavior in the original blockchain system based on the broadcast block header number, and uploads the block information in the original blockchain system;

[0011] S5 uses block information provided by each node in the blockchain to compare and analyze the data to identify the corresponding node involved in the incident.

[0012] Preferably, when modifying or uploading data locally, a data traceability chain is generated through a contract. Each block's block body records the user ID, parameter number, and block position of the modification behavior in the original blockchain.

[0013] Preferably, the data traceability chain is used to record three types of data: parameter number, parameter changes, and information about the block in which they are located.

[0014] Preferably, the security control system adopts a consortium blockchain or a private blockchain organizational form, and uses the Raft algorithm or PBFT algorithm as the consensus algorithm for the private blockchain or consortium blockchain.

[0015] Preferably, one or more nodes with computing power are randomly selected from the original blockchain security control system according to the consensus mechanism.

[0016] Preferably, the block header of each block in the traceability chain is generated by hashing and encrypting the traceability chain block body data and then concatenating it with the block header of the previous block.

[0017] Preferably, abnormal data modification behavior is determined by comparing the source chain block header data.

[0018] Preferably, if an incident occurs due to a malicious fork attack, the traceability chain block header data of the corresponding node will differ from that of other nodes, and the location of the abnormal data modification can be located based on the different data positions; if there is no malicious fork and all node data is the same, then the fault is caused by the last modification to the corresponding node data.

[0019] Preferably, the block header data corresponding to the abnormal data modification and the last block header data of the faulty node are recorded simultaneously.

[0020] A blockchain-based security control system accident tracing system includes a data collection module, a data comparison module, and a tracing module;

[0021] The data collection module is used to record the modifications and uploaded data made by each node in the blockchain in the local traceability chain;

[0022] The data comparison module is used to send traceability requests to each node of the blockchain in the event of an accident to obtain the block header records of the local traceability chain uploaded by each node of the blockchain.

[0023] The tracing module is used to compare the block header records of each node in the blockchain, obtain and broadcast the block header number corresponding to the abnormal data modification behavior to each node in the blockchain. Each node in the blockchain determines the location of the corresponding data modification behavior in the original blockchain system based on the broadcast block header number, and uploads the block information in the original blockchain system. The corresponding node of the incident is obtained by comparing and analyzing the block information provided by each node in the blockchain.

[0024] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial technical effects:

[0025] This invention discloses a method for tracing incidents in a blockchain security control system. By recording the modifications and uploads made by each node in the blockchain during data modification and upload in a local traceability chain, and utilizing the asymmetric encryption mechanism and transaction traceability characteristics of the blockchain, the immutability and traceability of the data are guaranteed. The traceability chain can then pinpoint the source data of the incident, accurately locate the faulty node, and thus identify the initiator of the modification and the ledger notary, ensuring the reliability of the traceability. Secondly, in the past, incident tracing often required tracing back the relevant information of the entire blockchain. Blockchain data becomes increasingly complex and redundant over time, leading to high information volume and time complexity, potentially causing communication channel congestion. With the introduction of the traceability chain, after identifying the incident node by comparing the block header data, only the ledger information of the incident node needs to be retrieved to confirm the specific person responsible for the incident, greatly reducing the time cost of incident tracing.

[0026] Applying traceability blockchain to the traceability process of blockchain security control systems can help overcome the problems of low traceability accuracy and large workload of data comparison under malicious attacks, thus providing reliable protection for the security of blockchain system transactions.

[0027] This invention achieves system tracing through two interactions between the system and nodes when a system accident occurs. Considering that if the consensus mechanism proceeds smoothly, the data modification records of all nodes are identical, and the block body data of the data tracing chain should be the same; and since the block header data of the data tracing chain does not contain a timestamp, the block header data is also identical; during data tracing, only the block header data needs to be compared. After locking the location of the fault information, each node only needs to upload the block information of that single block during the second interaction. The amount of data transmitted during the information transmission process is extremely small, ensuring smooth channel operation and improving the speed of tracing. Attached Figure Description

[0028] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the interaction between nodes and the system during the accident tracing process in this embodiment of the invention.

[0029] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the data traceability chain in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0030] To enable those skilled in the art to better understand the present invention, the technical solutions of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings of the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0031] It should be noted that the terms "first," "second," etc., in the specification, claims, and accompanying drawings of this invention are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that such data can be interchanged where appropriate so that the embodiments of the invention described herein can be implemented in orders other than those illustrated or described herein. Furthermore, the terms "comprising" and "having," and any variations thereof, are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion; for example, a process, method, system, product, or apparatus that comprises a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to those steps or units explicitly listed, but may include other steps or units not explicitly listed or inherent to such processes, methods, products, or apparatus.

[0032] Reference Figure 1 As shown, this invention is a method for tracing incidents in a blockchain security control system. It utilizes the asymmetric encryption mechanism and transaction traceability characteristics of blockchain to ensure the immutability and traceability of data, and includes the following steps:

[0033] 1) When each node in the blockchain modifies and uploads data, it records the modified and uploaded data in the local traceability chain; the blockchain adopts a security control system in the form of a consortium chain or a private chain, and uses the Raft algorithm or PBFT algorithm as the consensus algorithm for the private chain or consortium chain.

[0034] Traceability chain structure such as Figure 2As shown, when data is modified or uploaded locally, a data traceability chain is generated through a contract. Each block's block body records the user ID, parameter number, and the block position of the modification in the original blockchain. This contract has no corresponding output interface, meaning that external parties cannot prevent the data traceability chain from being written during data modification. Furthermore, apart from traceability, the data traceability chain remains silent externally, avoiding malicious attacks and human intervention.

[0035] The data traceability chain records three types of data: parameter number, parameter changes, and the block information, ensuring data simplicity. Traceability chain blocks are linked through hash references in the block headers, i.e., BH. i+1 =SHA256(BH) i +BB i+1 ), of which BH i With BB i These are the block header and block body of the i-th block in the traceability chain, respectively. SHA256 is a collision-resistant, irreversible encryption algorithm that can convert any string into a 64-bit hexadecimal encrypted result. This data recording process occurs only locally, without any consensus process in the system, resulting in minimal computation and extremely fast generation speed.

[0036] 2) In the event of an accident, the blockchain system sends a traceability request to each blockchain node, and each blockchain node uploads the block header record of its local traceability chain; the blockchain system is one or more nodes with computing power randomly selected from the original blockchain security control system according to the consensus mechanism.

[0037] The block header of each block in the traceability chain is generated by hashing and encrypting the traceability chain block body data and then concatenating it with the block header of the previous block.

[0038] 3) The blockchain system determines and broadcasts the block header number corresponding to the abnormal data modification behavior to all nodes by comparing the block header records of each node. If an incident is caused by a malicious fork attack, the traceability chain block header data of the corresponding node will differ from that of other nodes. The location of the abnormal data modification can be located based on the difference in data position. If there is no malicious fork and all node data is the same, it indicates that the failure was caused by the last modification to the corresponding node's data. Since the existence of abnormal data modification does not necessarily mean that the incident was caused by this attack, it is necessary to record both the block header data corresponding to the abnormal data modification and the last set of block header data of the faulty node.

[0039] By comparing the source chain block header data, abnormal data modification behavior can be identified, specifically including the following steps:

[0040] 1) The system compares the traceability chain block header data of all nodes in the blockchain. When some nodes' block header data is inconsistent with other nodes, the system records the information of the first traceability chain block header with inconsistent data.

[0041] 2) The system records the header information of the last block of the traceability chain of the relevant nodes where the accident occurred.

[0042] 3) The system broadcasts the traceability chain block header information recorded during the comparison process to the entire network.

[0043] 4) Each node determines the location of the corresponding data modification behavior in the original blockchain system based on the broadcast traceability chain block number; each node first searches for the corresponding block header data in the local traceability chain. If there is a corresponding record, since the traceability chain records the number of the modification information and the location of the block, the location of the corresponding record in the blockchain system can be directly obtained by querying the traceability chain record.

[0044] 5) Each node in the blockchain uploads the information of that block from the original blockchain system.

[0045] 6) The blockchain system compares the information provided by each node in the blockchain to analyze and determine the cause of the accident and the corresponding node that caused it. Based on the tracing results, an accident analysis report is generated and broadcast to all nodes in the system.

[0046] The blockchain system sorts the information uploaded by users from largest to smallest timestamp, i.e., y time =timestamp(x time ), where x time With y time To convert the time information before and after the change, a timestamp is a timestamp conversion algorithm that can convert time into a 10-digit decimal number. The system then searches for and locates the last modification of relevant data based on the incident information; this modification is the source of the incident. The system determines the initiator of the modification based on the incident source, generates an incident analysis report and a responsibility analysis report, and broadcasts them to all nodes in the network.

[0047] This invention discloses a blockchain security control system accident tracing method based on the characteristic of contracts being automatically executed without human intervention. It features a traceability chain structure that automatically records data modifications when modifications occur, silently recording data modification behavior of all nodes in the system. No node has modification authority over the generated data chain, avoiding data loss or misalignment caused by local ledger modifications leading to blockchain forks. This effectively ensures the immutability and traceability of the data, thereby ensuring the accuracy of accident tracing.

[0048] This invention achieves its effect through two interactions between the blockchain system and its nodes when a system failure occurs. In the first interaction, each node only uploads the block header data of the traceability chain. Considering that if the consensus mechanism proceeds smoothly, the data modification records of all nodes will be identical, the block body data of the traceability chain should also be the same. Since the block header data of the traceability chain does not include a timestamp, the block header data is also identical. During data traceability, only the block header data needs to be compared. After locating the fault information, each node only needs to upload the block information of that single block during the second interaction. The amount of data transmitted is minimal, ensuring smooth channel operation and improving the speed of traceability.

Claims

1. A method for accident tracing in a blockchain security control system, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: S1 records the modifications and uploads made by each node in the blockchain in the local traceability chain; S2, when an accident occurs, the blockchain system sends a traceability request to each blockchain node, and each blockchain node uploads the block header record of its local traceability chain; S3 compares the block header records of each node in the blockchain, obtains and broadcasts the block header number corresponding to the abnormal data modification behavior to each node in the blockchain; S4, each node in the blockchain determines the location of the corresponding data modification behavior in the original blockchain system based on the broadcast block header number, and uploads the block information in the original blockchain system; S5: Based on the block information provided by each node in the blockchain, the corresponding node of the incident is obtained through comparison and analysis. By comparing the source chain block header data, abnormal data modification behavior can be determined; if there is an incident caused by a malicious fork attack, the source chain block header data of the corresponding node will be different from that of other nodes, and the location of the abnormal data modification can be located based on the different positions of the data. If there is no malicious fork and all nodes have identical data, the failure is due to the last modification to the corresponding node's data.

2. The method for accident tracing in a blockchain security control system according to claim 1, characterized in that, When data is modified or uploaded locally, a data traceability chain is generated through a contract. Each block's block body records the user ID, parameter number, and block position of the modification behavior in the original blockchain.

3. The method for accident tracing in a blockchain security control system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The data traceability chain is used to record three types of data: parameter number, parameter changes, and information about the block in which they are located.

4. The method for accident tracing in a blockchain security control system according to claim 1, characterized in that, Blockchain security control systems that adopt consortium blockchains or private blockchains use Raft or PBFT algorithms as consensus algorithms for private or consortium blockchains.

5. The method for accident tracing in a blockchain security control system according to claim 4, characterized in that, Based on the consensus mechanism, one or more nodes with computing power are randomly selected from the original blockchain security control system.

6. The method for accident tracing in a blockchain security control system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The block header of each block in the traceability chain is generated by hashing and encrypting the traceability chain block body data and then concatenating it with the block header of the previous block.

7. The method for accident tracing in a blockchain security control system according to claim 1, characterized in that, Simultaneously, record the block header data corresponding to the abnormal data modification and the last block header data of the faulty node.

8. A blockchain-based security control system for accident tracing, characterized in that, It includes a data collection module, a data comparison module, and a traceability module; The data collection module is used to record the modifications and uploaded data made by each node in the blockchain in the local traceability chain; The data comparison module is used to send traceability requests to each node of the blockchain in the event of an accident to obtain the block header records of the local traceability chain uploaded by each node of the blockchain. The traceability module compares the block header records of each node in the blockchain, obtains and broadcasts the block header number corresponding to the abnormal data modification behavior to each node. Each node determines the location of the corresponding data modification behavior in the original blockchain system based on the broadcast block header number, and uploads the block information in the original blockchain system. By comparing and analyzing the block information provided by each node, the corresponding node of the incident can be identified. By comparing the block header data of the traceability chain, the abnormal data modification behavior is determined. If the incident is caused by a malicious fork attack, the traceability chain block header data of the corresponding node will be different from that of other nodes. The location of the abnormal data modification can be located based on the different positions of the data. If there is no malicious fork and all nodes have identical data, the failure is due to the last modification to the corresponding node's data.

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