A multi-signature method based on SM2
The SM2-based multi-signature method addresses inefficiencies and security gaps in existing methods by ensuring simultaneous user participation and utilizing zero-knowledge proof, resulting in compact and efficient signatures with reduced storage overhead.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202211578120.0
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2022-12-06
- Publication Date
- 2024-12-03
- Estimated Expiration
- 2042-12-06
AI Technical Summary
Existing multi-signature methods lack efficiency and security, particularly in decentralized systems, and result in excessive storage overhead due to lengthy signature lengths.
A multi-signature method based on the SM2 elliptic curve cryptography algorithm, involving a signer, verifier, and trusted institution, ensures simultaneous participation of users and uses zero-knowledge proof for data authenticity, reducing signature length by half and enhancing security.
The method achieves compact and efficient signatures with reduced storage overhead while maintaining security, requiring all users to participate simultaneously and utilizing zero-knowledge proof for verification.
Smart Images

Figure CN115941205B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to information security technology, and in particular to a multi-signature method based on SM2. Background Art
[0002] Digital signature is the application of asymmetric key encryption technology and digital summary technology, mainly including the message signature of the sender and the message signature authentication of the receiver. As an important technology for signature authentication, digital signature can provide security services such as identity authentication, data integrity, and non-repudiation.
[0003] The multi-signature scheme enables a group of signers to generate a compact joint signature for a public message, which has many potential uses. For example, in decentralized currency transactions, when a multi-signature address is used, that is, the address is associated with multiple private keys, multiple parties need to sign a transaction at the same time before the account assets corresponding to the multi-signature address can be used. In addition, when a transaction may have multiple transaction inputs, the users corresponding to each transaction input need to make joint payments for the transaction, and multi-signatures are also needed at this time. Therefore, multi-signatures have become a research hotspot.
[0004] The SM2 elliptic curve public key cryptography algorithm includes a digital signature algorithm, a key exchange protocol, and a public key encryption algorithm. Its security is based on the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem of elliptic curves over a finite field. The SM2 algorithm plays an important role in ensuring security in commercial cryptographic systems, including the financial sector. Summary of the invention
[0005] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a multi-signature method based on SM2 in view of the defects in the prior art.
[0006] The technical solution adopted by the present invention to solve its technical problem is:
[0007] A multi-signature method based on SM2 includes the following entities: a signer, a verifier, and an institution that generates and distributes system parameters, namely a trusted institution TA. The signer is a set S consisting of t users. Assume that the i-th user is U i , where t≥2,1≤i≤t, specifically includes the following steps:
[0008] (1): Global settings
[0009] TA runs the algorithm based on the initial safety parameter λ to generate the system parameter Δ;
[0010] (2): Initialization
[0011] Each user generates his own private key d i 、Public key Q i , hash value Zi ;
[0012] (3): Signature
[0013] The signer generates SM2 multi-signature (r, s1, ..., s t );
[0014] (4) Verification
[0015] The verifier verifies the validity of this SM2 multi-signature;
[0016] According to the above scheme, in step (3), the communication between the participants uses zero-knowledge proof to prove that the sent data comes from the sender.
[0017] The present invention realizes a multi-signature function based on SM2, which not only requires that users in the set must participate at the same time when generating a signature, but also ensures the security of the signature; and the length of the multi-signature generated by the present invention is roughly half of the total signature length formed by directly concatenating all signatures, which reduces the storage overhead of the total signature to a certain extent, and ensures the compactness and efficiency of the signature. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0018] Figure 1 It is the signature flow chart of the present invention;
[0019] Figure 2 It is a verification flow chart of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0020] The present invention is described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.
[0021] See also Figure 1 The present invention provides a multi-signature method based on SM2, including the following entities: a signer, a verifier, and an institution for generating and distributing system parameters, namely a trusted institution TA. The signer is a set S consisting of t users. Assume that the i-th user is U i , where t≥2,1≤i≤t, specifically includes the following steps:
[0022] (1): Global settings
[0023] Enter a security parameter λ, and TA performs the following steps according to λ:
[0024] 1) Select a finite field Where q is an odd prime number or a power of 2; when q is an odd prime number p, p>2 191 , the elliptic curve equation is: 2 =x 3 +ax+b, where And 4a 3+27b 2 modp≠0; when q is a power of 22 m When m>192 and is a prime number, the elliptic curve equation is: 2 +xy=x 3 +ax 2 +b, where And b≠0; elliptic curve group is the additive finite group consisting of all integer points on the elliptic curve, including the point O at infinity, A base point is G, and the coordinates of G are (x G ,y G ), and the order of G is n;
[0025] 2) Select a cryptographic hashing algorithm whose message digest length is an integer
[0026] 3) Select a cryptographic hash algorithm H with a message digest length of v bits v :{0,1} * →{0,1} v ;
[0027] 4) Select a one-way conversion function f is defined as: f(Q) = x Q modn, where Q is A point on top, x Q is the integer representation of the x-coordinate of point Q;
[0028] 5) TA public system parameters: Δ = (G, n, q, a, b, x G ,y G ,H,H v ,f);
[0029] (2): Initialization
[0030] UserU i Perform the following steps:
[0031] 1) Take any integer d i As the private key, and 1≤d i ≤n-2;
[0032] 2) Calculate the public key Q based on the private key i =d i G, where Q i The coordinates of (x i ,y i );
[0033] 3) Calculate and broadcast the hash value Z i =H v (ENTL i||ID i ||a||b||x G ||y G ||x i ||y i ), where ID i Each signer has a length of entlen i The distinguishable identifier of the bit, ENTL i is the integer entlen i The converted two bytes;
[0034] (3): Signature
[0035] Step 1: User U i Perform the following steps:
[0036] 1) Place
[0037] 2) Calculation
[0038] 3) Take any integer k i , and 1≤k i ≤n-1;
[0039] 4) Calculate k i G
[0040] 5) Broadcast k i G or broadcast k i G's Promise C i ;
[0041] 6) If the first step 5) broadcasts k i G's Promise C i , then when user U i Receive commitments from all other users C j After that, j≠i, and 1≤j≤t, broadcast k i G; if the first step 5) broadcasts k i G, then directly execute the second step;
[0042] Step 2: User U i Receive k from all other users j After G, j≠i, and 1≤j≤t, perform the following steps:
[0043] 1) If the broadcast in step 5) is k i G's Promise C i , then recalculate the k of other users according to the commitment method j G's Promise C j ', and verify that C j =C j'Is it true? If not, return to step 3); if step 5) broadcasts k i G, then directly execute the second step 2);
[0044] 2) Calculation
[0045] 3) Calculate the first part of the multi-signature r = (e + x) mod n, if r = 0, return to the first step 3);
[0046] 4) Calculate and broadcast s i =((1+d i ) -1 (k i -rd i ))modn, if s i =0, return to step 3);
[0047] 5) The final signature is σ=(r,s1,...,s t );
[0048] (4) Verification
[0049] See also Figure 2 , the received signature is: σ'=(r′,s′1,...,s′ t ), the verifier performs the following steps:
[0050] 1) Check whether r'∈[1,n-1] holds. If it holds, continue verification. If not, it is an invalid signature.
[0051] 2) Inspections i '∈[1,n-1], 1≤i≤t, whether it holds true, if it holds true, continue to verify, if not, it is an invalid signature;
[0052] 3) Place
[0053] 4) Calculation
[0054] 5) Calculation
[0055] 6) Calculate R = e' + x' mod n;
[0056] 7) Check whether R=r' holds. If it holds, it is a valid multi-signature. If not, it is an invalid signature.
Claims
1. A multi-signature method based on SM2, including the following entities: a signer, a verifier, and an institution that generates and distributes system parameters, namely a trusted institution TA. The signer is a set S consisting of t users. Assume that the i-th user is U i , where t≥2,1≤i≤t, characterized in that, The specific steps are as follows: Step 1: Global Settings TA runs the algorithm based on the initial safety parameter λ to generate the system parameter Δ; Step 2: Initialization Each user generates his own private key d i 、Public key Q i and hash value Z i ; Step 3: Signature The signer generates SM2 multi-signature (r, s1, ..., s t ); Step 4: Verification The verifier verifies the validity of this SM2 multi-signature; among them: The step 1 specifically includes: Enter a security parameter λ, and TA performs the following steps according to λ: 1) Select a finite field Where q is an odd prime number or a power of 2; when q is an odd prime number p, p>2 191 , the elliptic curve equation is: 2 =x 3 +ax+b, where And 4a 3 +27b 2 modp≠0; when q is a power of 22 m When m>192 and is a prime number, the elliptic curve equation is: 2 +xy=x 3 +ax 2 +b, where And b≠0; elliptic curve group is the additive finite group consisting of all integer points on the elliptic curve, including the point O at infinity, A base point is G, and the coordinates of G are (x G ,y G ), and the order of G is n; 2) Select a cryptographic hashing algorithm whose message digest length is an integer 3) Select a cryptographic hash algorithm H with a message digest length of v bits v :{0,1} * →{0,1} v ; 4) Select a one-way conversion function f is defined as: f(Q) = x Q modn, where Q is A point on top, x Q is the integer representation of the x-coordinate of point Q; 5) TA public system parameters: Δ = (G, n, q, a, b, x G ,y G ,H,H v ,f); The step 2 specifically includes: UserU i Perform the following steps: 1) Take any integer d i As the private key, and 1≤d i ≤n-2; 2) Calculate the public key Q based on the private key i =d i G, where Q i The coordinates of (x i ,y i ); 3) Calculate and broadcast the hash value Z i =H v (ENTL i ||ID i ||a||b||x G ||y G ||x i ||y i ), where ID i Each signer has a length of entlen i The distinguishable identifier of the bit, ENTL i is the integer entlen i The converted two bytes; The step 3 specifically includes: Step 1: User U i Perform the following steps: 1) Place 2) Calculation 3) Take any integer k i , and 1≤k i ≤n-1; 4) Calculate k i G 5) Broadcast k i G or broadcast k i G's Promise C i ; 6) If the first step 5) broadcasts k i G's Promise C i , then when user U i Receive commitments from all other users C j After that, j≠i, and 1≤j≤t, broadcast k i G; if the first step 5) broadcasts k i G, then directly execute the second step; Step 2: User U i Receive k from all other users j After G, j≠i, and 1≤j≤t, perform the following steps: 1) If the broadcast in step 5) is k i G's Promise C i , then recalculate the k of other users according to the commitment method j G's Promise C j ', and verify that C j =C j 'Is it true? If not, return to step 3); if step 5) broadcasts k i G, then directly execute the second step 2); 2) Calculation 3) Calculate the first part of the multi-signature r = (e + x) mod n, if r = 0, return to the first step 3); 4) Calculate and broadcast s i =((1+d i ) -1 (k i -rd i ))modn, if s i =0, return to step 3); 5) The final signature is σ=(r,s1,...,s t ); The step 4 specifically includes: The received signature is: σ'=(r',s'1,...,s' t ), the verifier performs the following steps: 1) Check whether r'∈[1,n-1] holds. If it holds, continue verification. If not, it is an invalid signature. 2) Inspections i '∈[1,n-1], 1≤i≤t, whether it holds true, if it holds true, continue to verify, if not, it is an invalid signature; 3) Place 4) Calculation 5) Calculation 6) Calculate R = e' + x' mod n; 7) Check whether R=r' holds. If it holds, it is a valid multi-signature. If not, it is an invalid signature.
2. The multi-signature method based on SM2 according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step 3, each user's communication uses zero-knowledge proof to prove that the sent data comes from the sender.
