Method, device and system for authentication and authorization using edge data network
By using edge computing keys in communication networks for authentication and authorization of terminal devices, the security issues of authentication and authorization in multiple access edge computing environments are solved, efficient and robust terminal device authentication is achieved, and low latency and high Performance computing environment.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202180086428.0
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2021-01-18
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-12
- Estimated Expiration
- 2041-01-18
AI Technical Summary
In communication networks, it is difficult for the prior art to effectively authenticate and authorize terminal devices in a multi-access edge computing environment to ensure a secure and high-performance computing environment.
By generating and using edge computing keys between the terminal device and the edge computing network, unique identification and two-way authentication of the terminal device are realized to ensure the establishment and authorization process of secure communication links.
It realizes efficient and robust authentication of terminal devices in communication networks, ensures a trusted computing environment, reduces latency and improves computing performance, and is suitable for low-latency but high-performance applications such as virtual reality and IoT services.
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Figure CN116711387B_ABST
Abstract
Description
[0001] Technical Domain
[0002] The present disclosure is directed to terminal device authentication and authorization performed in a communication network using an edge data network. Background Art
[0003] In communication networks, various applications and services may require low-latency but high-performance computing such as virtual reality (VR) and gaming applications, as well as enterprise and Internet of Things (IoT) services. Such applications and services can rely on multi-access edge computing (MEC) or mobile edge computing, which brings applications to the edge of the network to reduce latency and achieve high bandwidth. Efficient and robust authentication on both ends of the user equipment (UE) and edge computing networks is essential to provide a trusted computing environment. Summary of the invention
[0004] The present disclosure relates to UE authentication and authorization utilizing an edge data network in a communication network, and in particular to generating and applying edge computing keys for a UE during the authentication and authorization process.
[0005] In some embodiments, a method for establishing a secure communication link between a terminal device and a computing network providing an application service is disclosed. The method may be performed by a terminal device in a communication network, and may include: generating a device computing key of the terminal device based on a unique identifier of the terminal device; generating a registration request signature based on raw data of a registration request to a configuration server of the computing network and an encryption key of an access server managing the terminal device; and sending a first message including the device computing key and the registration request signature to the configuration server for requesting service authorization from the computing network.
[0006] In some other embodiments, a method for authenticating a registration request from a terminal device managed by an access server is disclosed. The method may be performed by the access server and includes receiving a verification request from an open server in a computing network, wherein the verification request includes at least one of: a registration request initiated from the terminal device, the registration request being forwarded to the open server by a configuration server in the computing network and being used to request the terminal device to access the computing network; or a registration request signature encrypted based on raw data of the registration request, an encryption key of the access server, and a message counter recording a count of messages sent from the terminal device to the configuration server; generating a local copy of the registration request signature based on the raw data of the registration request and the encryption key of the access server; comparing the local copy of the registration request signature with the registration request signature in the verification request; and sending a verification response to the open server in response to the two signatures matching.
[0007] In some other embodiments, a method for authenticating a registration request from a terminal device, performed by a configuration server in a computing network, is disclosed. The method may include receiving a registration request from a terminal device, wherein the registration request includes at least one of the following: a registration request signature encrypted based on original data of the registration request, an encryption key of an access server that manages the terminal device, and a message counter that records a count of messages sent from the terminal device to the configuration server; or a device computing key of the terminal device for accessing the computing network; sending a verification request for verifying the registration request to an open server in the computing network based on the device computing key, the verification request including at least one of the following: a device computing key; an identifier of the configuration server; or a registration request signature; and receiving a verification response from the open server including a configuration server key of the configuration server, the verification response.
[0008] In some other embodiments, a device is disclosed. The device mainly includes one or more processors, wherein the one or more processors are configured to implement any one of the above methods.
[0009] In yet other embodiments, a computer program product is disclosed. The computer program product may include a non-transitory computer-readable program medium having computer code stored thereon, which, when executed by one or more processors, causes the one or more processors to implement any one of the above methods.
[0010] Further aspects and alternatives of the above-described embodiments and their implementation are explained in more detail in the following figures, the description and the claims. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0011] Figure 1 An exemplary communication network including terminal equipment, an operator network, a data network and service applications is shown.
[0012] Figure 2 Exemplary network functions or network nodes in a communication network are shown.
[0013] Figure 3 Exemplary network functions or network nodes in a wireless communication network are shown.
[0014] Figure 4 An exemplary communication network including terminal devices, a core network, and an edge data network (EDN) is shown.
[0015] Figure 5 and Figure 6 An exemplary logic flow for UE authentication using EDN is shown.
[0016] Figure 7 and Figure 8 Another exemplary logic flow for UE authentication using EDN is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0017] like Figure 1 The exemplary communication network shown in 100 in FIG. 1 may include terminal devices 110 and 112, an operator network 102, various service applications 140, and other data networks 150. For example, the operator network 102 may include an access network 120 and a core network 130. The operator network 102 may be configured to transmit voice, data, and other information (collectively referred to as data services) between the terminal devices 110 and 112, between the terminal devices 110 and 112 and the service application 140, or between the terminal devices 110 and 112 and other data networks 150. Communication sessions and corresponding data paths may be established and configured for such data transmission. The access network 120 may be configured to provide network access to the core network 130 to the terminal devices 110 and 112. The core network 130 may include various network nodes or network functions configured to control communication sessions and perform network access management and data service routing. The service application 140 may be hosted by various application servers, which are accessed by the terminal devices 110 and 112 through the core network 130 of the operator network 102. Service applications 140 may be deployed as data networks outside of core network 130. Likewise, other data networks 150 may be accessed by terminal devices 110 and 112 through core network 130 and may appear as a data destination or data source for a particular communication session instantiated in operator network 102.
[0018] Figure 1 The core network 130 may include various network nodes or functions that are geographically distributed and interconnected to provide network coverage for the service area of the operator network 102. These network nodes or functions may be implemented as dedicated hardware network elements. Alternatively, these network nodes or functions may be virtualized and implemented as virtual machines or software entities. Each network node may be configured with one or more types of network functions. These network nodes or network functions may jointly provide configuration and routing functions of the core network 130. The terms "network node" and "network function" may be used interchangeably in this disclosure.
[0019] Figure 2 Further shown is an exemplary division of network functions in the core network 130 of the communication network 200. Figure 2 Only a single instance of a network node or function is shown in FIG. 1 , but a person skilled in the art will appreciate that each of these network nodes may be instantiated as multiple instances of the network node distributed throughout the core network 130. Figure 2As shown, the core network 130 may include, but is not limited to, network nodes such as access management network node (AMNN) 230, authentication network node (AUNN) 260, network data management network node (NDMNN) 270, session management network node (SMNN) 240, data routing network node (DRNN) 250, policy control network node (PCNN) 220, and application data management network node (ADMNN) 210. Exemplary signaling and data exchanges between various types of network nodes through various communication interfaces are shown in FIG. Figure 2 The various solid connecting lines in FIG. Such signaling and data exchange may be performed via signaling or data messages that follow a predetermined format or protocol.
[0020] Above Figure 1 and Figure 2 The embodiments described in the present invention may be applied to a wireless communication system as well as a wired communication system. Figure 3 Shown based on Figure 2 An exemplary cellular wireless communication network 300 is shown as a general implementation of the communication network 200 . Figure 3 The wireless communication network 300 may include a user equipment (UE) 310 (used as Figure 2 Terminal equipment 110), radio access network (RAN) 320 (used as Figure 2 The access network 120 of the data network (DN) 150 and the core network 130 include an access management function (AMF) 330 (used as Figure 2 AMNN 230), Session Management Function (SMF) 340 (used as Figure 2 SMNN 240), application function (AF) 390 (used as Figure 2 ADMNN 210), user plane function (UPF) 350 (used as Figure 2 DRNN 250), policy control function 322 (used as Figure 2 PCNN 220), authentication server function (AUSF) 360 (used as Figure 2 AUNN 260), and Universal Data Management (UDM) function 370 (used as Figure 2 270). In addition, although Figure 3 Only single instances of some network functions or nodes of the wireless communication network 300 (especially the core network 130) are shown, but ordinary technicians in this field should understand that each of these network nodes or functions can have multiple instances distributed throughout the wireless communication network 300.
[0021] exist Figure 3In the present invention, UE 310 may be implemented as various types of mobile devices configured to access the core network 130 via RAN 320. UE 310 may include, but is not limited to, a mobile phone, a laptop computer, a tablet computer, an Internet of Things (IoT) device, a distributed sensor network node, a wearable device, etc. UE may also be a UE with multi-access edge computing (MEC) capabilities that supports edge computing. For example, RAN 320 may include multiple wireless base stations distributed in a service area of an operator network. Communication between UE 310 and RAN 320 may be performed in an over-the-air (OTA) wireless interface, such as Figure 3 As shown in 311.
[0022] continue Figure 3 , UDM 370 can form a permanent storage or database for user contract and subscription data. UDM can also include an authentication certificate repository and processing function (ARPF, such as Figure 3 370) for storing long-term security credentials for user authentication and for performing calculations of encryption keys using such long-term security credentials as input, as described in more detail below. To prevent unauthorized opening of UDM / ARPF data, UDM / ARPF 370 may be located in a secure network environment of a network operator or a third party.
[0023] AMF / SEAF 330 may communicate with RAN 320, SMF 340, AUSF 360, UDM / ARPF 370, and PCF 322 via communication interfaces indicated by various solid connection lines connecting these network nodes or functions. AMF / SEAF 330 may be responsible for UE to non-access stratum (NAS) signaling management, and for configuring UE 310 registration and access to core network 130 and allocation of SMF 340 to support communication requirements of specific UEs. AMF / SEAF 330 may also be responsible for UE mobility management. AMF may also include a security anchor function (SEAF, such as Figure 3 330), as described in more detail below, the security anchor function interacts with AUSF 360 and UE 310 for user authentication and management of encryption / decryption keys at various levels. AUSF 360 can terminate user registration / authentication / key generation requests from AMF / SEAF 330 and interact with UDM / ARPF 370 to complete such user registration / authentication / key generation.
[0024] The SMF 340 may be allocated by the AMF / SEAF 330 for a specific communication session instantiated in the wireless communication network 300. The SMF 340 may be responsible for allocating the UPF 350 to support the communication session and the data flow therein in the user data plane, and for configuring / adjusting the allocated UPF 350 (e.g., for formulating packet detection and forwarding rules for the allocated UPF 350). As an alternative to being allocated by the SMF 340, the UPF 350 may be allocated by the AMF / SEAF 330 for a specific communication session and data flow. The UPF 350 allocated and provided by the SMF 340 and the AMF / SEAF 330 may be responsible for data routing and forwarding, and for reporting network usage for a specific communication session. For example, the UPF 350 may be responsible for routing end-to-end data flows between the UE 310 and the DN 150, and between the UE 310 and the service application 140. The DN 150 and service applications 140 may include, but are not limited to, data networks and services provided by an operator of the wireless communication network 300 or by third-party data network and service providers.
[0025] The PCF 322 may be responsible for managing and providing various levels of policies and rules applicable to a communication session associated with the UE 310 to the AMF / SEAF 330 and the SMF 340. Thus, for example, the AMF / SEAF 330 may assign the SMF 340 for a communication session based on the policies and rules associated with the UE 310 and obtained from the PCF 322. Likewise, the SMF 340 may assign the UPF 350 based on the policies and rules obtained from the PCF 322 to handle data routing and forwarding for the communication session.
[0026] Although Figure 1-3 Various exemplary embodiments described below are based on a cellular wireless communication network, but the scope of the present disclosure is not limited thereto, and the basic principles may be applied to other types of wireless communication networks and wired communication networks.
[0027] Figure 3 The network identity and data security in the wireless communication network 300 of the present invention may be managed through the user authentication process provided by the AMF / SEAF 330, the AUSF 360 and the UDM / ARPF 370. Specifically, the UE 310 may first communicate with the AMF / SEAF 330 for network registration and may then be authenticated by the AUSF 360 based on the user contract and subscription data in the UDM / ARPF 370. After user authentication to the wireless communication network 300, the communication session established for the UE 310 may then be protected by various levels of encryption / decryption keys. The generation and management of the various keys may be coordinated by the AUSF 360 and other network functions in the communication network.
[0028] Figure 4 An example 5G system (5GS) with an edge data network (EDN) 410 is shown. The EDN 410 may include a local data network. The EDN may include an edge application server (EAS) 412 and an edge enablement server (EES) 414. An edge configuration server (ECS) 416 provides configuration related to the EES 414, as well as details of the EDN 410 hosting the EES 414. The EAS 412 is an application server that performs server functions hosted in the EDN. The UE includes an application client 420 and an edge enablement client 422. The edge application server, edge enablement server, and edge configuration server may interact with the 3GPP core network. The UE's application client 420 connects to the edge application server to run various applications and utilize edge computing.
[0029] A high-level process for initiating an edge computing communication session with multiple steps is described below.
[0030] Step 1
[0031] The UE starts the primary authentication with the AMF. The AMF can belong to the UE's home network or the UE's visited network. The protocol data unit (PDU) session is established after a successful authentication. The UE can obtain certain ECS-related information such as the ECS identifier or the ECS routing information through the primary authentication.
[0032] Step 2
[0033] The UE sends a registration request to the ECS identified by the ECS information received in step 1. The registration request is signed by the UE using a key and may also carry an identifier of the UE.
[0034] Step 3
[0035] After receiving the registration request from the UE, the ECS may authenticate the UE. The ECS may delegate the authentication request to the core network's network exposure function (NEF), which in turn forwards the authentication request to the AMF through which the UE has been primary authenticated in step 1.
[0036] Step 4
[0037] Once the AMF authenticates the Registration Request, the NEF forwards the result to the ECS. The ECS then sends a Registration Response message to the UE indicating a successful registration. After verifying that the Registration Response message is sent from a legitimate ECS, the UE proceeds to establish a secure IPsec tunnel with the ECS.
[0038] In the present disclosure, various example embodiments for authenticating a UE to an edge computing network are described. These embodiments provide at least the following technical features:
[0039] 1. Use a type of UE ID that has been provisioned or securely stored in the UE to uniquely identify the UE during the registration process. The UE ID also meets security and privacy requirements. In some embodiments, the UE's 5G-GUTI or SUPI can be used.
[0040] 2. A UE-specific edge computing key is disclosed. The UE-specific edge computing key can be based on the UE ID specified in (1) above and can be used to uniquely identify the AMF in the main authentication. The UE-specific edge computing key meets the randomness requirements between UEs. In addition, once authenticated with the edge configuration server, the UE-specific edge computing key can also be dynamically updated and used to identify the EES, EAS or other servers in the edge computing network as the UE continues to authenticate with the EES and EAS.
[0041] 3. When the UE authenticates to different edge computing servers (i.e., ECS, EES, and EAS), the key encrypted based on the unique identifier of the UE and each edge computing server is used for authentication on the edge computing server side and the UE side for two-way authentication. The key can be directly derived by the UE or edge computing server, or can be distributed from a trusted source such as AMF or NEF.
[0042] 4. During the registration process, the selection of the NEF can be based on the UE-specific edge computing key and be consistent during various stages of the authentication process, even when multiple NEFs exist in the network.
[0043] 5. NEF does not need to maintain the mapping relationship between UE ID and AMF, and NEF can be able to route authentication / verification requests from the edge computing network to the appropriate AMF.
[0044] 6. The authentication process supports dual registration mode, where the UE is registered with two different public land mobile networks
[0045] (PLMN) AMF connection.
[0046] UE registration with ECN (Example 1)
[0047] Figures 5 and 6 The following is an example logical flow for UE authentication and authorization to EDN. Figure 5 and Figure 6 Steps 1 to 28 are shown in FIG.
[0048] Step 1
[0049] The UE performs normal primary authentication and registers with the network. Specifically, the UE can start the authentication and registration process with the AMF / SEAF and UDM / ASUF of the core network. The UE may have multi-access edge computing (MEC) capabilities and may indicate this information in the MEC capabilities to the AMF / SEAF during the registration process.
[0050] Step 2
[0051] The AMF sends an identifier registration request including the UE's Universal Public Subscription Identifier (GPSI) to the NEF. The GPSI can be used to address the UE in different data networks such as ECN.
[0052] The GPSI may be configured in the UE and sent to the AMF in step 1, or it may be configured in the user data and provided to the UE after the PDU session is established (as described in step 5 below), or both.
[0053] Step 3
[0054] NEF stores both GPSI and AMF ID.
[0055] Step 4
[0056] NEF confirms identifier registration with AMF and can subscribe to AMF updates.
[0057] Step 5
[0058] The UE establishes a protocol data unit (PDU) session for IP connection with the AMF.
[0059] Step 6
[0060] If the UE has MEC capability, the UE and AMF shall use the AMF key K AMF Derived key K ECS , for authentication to ECS. Optionally, when exporting K ECS , UE and AMF initialize CounterECS to the message counter of ECS, and this counter is K ECS is stored during its life cycle.
[0061] Step 7
[0062] UE sends a MAC-I ECS MAC-I is calculated in a similar manner to, for example, SoR-MAC-IAUSF. ECS For example, MAC-I ECSThe value may be based on the payload of the registration request, the counter CounterECS of the ECS message as described in step 6, and the key K of the KDF algorithm. ECS (Edge computing configuration key), for example, using K ECS The KDF algorithm for the key, and the payload of the registration request and the ECS message counter as input to generate the output. ECS Identified by the 128 least significant bits of the output of the KDF encryption. For each additional MAC-IECS calculated, the UE monotonically increments CounterECS. In some embodiments, the use of the ECS message counter CounterECS may be optional.
[0063] Step 8
[0064] Since the UE is not authenticated at the ECS, the ECS sends a packet including a MAC-I ECS The ECS may determine the IP address / port of the NEF by performing a DNS query using the GPSI, or by using a locally configured NEF identifier / address.
[0065] Step 9
[0066] The NEF then authorizes the request from the ECS and identifies the AMF ID based on the GPSI. The NEF stores the ECS's contact information (e.g., the ECS's IP address, source Network Access Identifier (NAI), etc.) together with the GPSI in order to route the reply from the AMF back to the ECS.
[0067] Step 10
[0068] NEF forwards the key request including the registration request to AMF, which includes the MAC-I ECS and GPSI.
[0069] Step 11
[0070] AMF verifies the MAC-I of the Registration Request ECS AMF uses the key K in a manner similar to step 7. ECS Calculate the MAC-I in the registration request payload ECS The local copy of the MAC-I ECS The local copy of the MAC-I ECS If two MAC-I ECSIf the ECS message counter CounterECS matches, the message can be authenticated as being sent by the UE, and the AMF monotonically increments CounterECS. In some embodiments, the use of the ECS message counter CounterECS may be optional.
[0071] Step 12
[0072] AMF sends a key response to ECS, which includes the authentication result and K ECS .
[0073] Step 13
[0074] Based on the authentication result, the ECS decides whether to accept or reject the registration request from the UE. The ECS sends a registration response message including the authentication result to the UE and, in a similar manner to how the UE protects the payload of the registration request message in step 7, based on the received key K ECS , using MAC-I ECS to protect the message.
[0075] Step 14
[0076] UE Verification MAC-I ECS , and if the verification of the authentication result and the registration response message is successful, the UE ECS , an IPsec SA (security association) is established between the UE and the ECS. From now on, all messages are protected by the confidentiality and integrity of the IPsec tunnel.
[0077] Step 15
[0078] UE uses the MEC key identification flag as the input of KDF and calculates the value of the key K according to the key K. ECS Derived key K EES .
[0079] Step 16
[0080] UE sends a MAC-I EES Registration request of MAC-I EES The key K is based on the payload of the registration request and the KDF algorithm. EES MAC-I EES The 128 least significant bits (LSBs) of the output of the KDF encryption are chosen.
[0081] Step 17
[0082] Since the UE is not authenticated at the EES, the EES sends a key request to the ECS. The selection of the ECS may be based on the UE identifier.
[0083] Step 18
[0084] The ECS identifies the UE based on the UE identifier and derives the key K in a similar manner as the UE in step 6 or 15. EES Similar to step 11, ECS verifies MAC-I EES If the verification is successful, the Registration Request message can be authenticated as being sent by the UE.
[0085] Step 19
[0086] The ECS sends a key request response to the EES, which includes the authentication result and K EES .
[0087] Step 20
[0088] Based on the authentication result, the EES decides whether to accept or reject the registration request from the UE. The EES sends a registration response message including the authentication result to the UE and, in a similar manner to how the UE protects the payload of the registration request message in step 7, based on the received key K EES , using MAC-I EES Protect the message.
[0089] Step 21
[0090] UE Verification MAC-I EES If the authentication result and message verification are successful, the UE uses the EES key K EES , an IPsec SA is established between the UE and the EES. From now on, all messages are protected by the confidentiality and integrity of the IPsec tunnel.
[0091] Step 22
[0092] UE uses the MEC key identification flag as the input of KDF and calculates the value of the key K according to the key K. EES Export the application server key K EAS .
[0093] Step 23
[0094] UE sends a MAC-I EAS Registration request of MAC-I EAS It is based on the payload of the application registration request and the key K of the KDF EAS MAC-I EAS The 128 LSBs of the KDF output can be used to identify it.
[0095] Step 24
[0096] Since the UE is not authenticated at the EAS, the EAS sends a key request to the EES. The selection of the EES may be based on the UE identifier.
[0097] Step 25
[0098] The EES identifies the UE based on the UE identifier and derives the key K in a similar manner as the UE in step 22 EAS Similar to step 11, EES verifies MAC-I EAS If the verification is successful, the Registration Request message can be authenticated as being sent by the UE.
[0099] Step 26
[0100] EES sends a key request response to EAS, which includes the authentication result and K EAS .
[0101] Step 27
[0102] Based on the authentication result, the EAS decides whether to accept or reject the registration request from the UE. The EAS sends a registration response message including the authentication result to the UE and, in a similar manner to the way the UE protects the payload of the message in step 7, based on the received key K EAS , using MAC-I EAS to protect the message.
[0103] Step 28
[0104] UE Verification MAC-I EAS If the authentication result and message verification are successful, the UE uses the application server key K EAS , an IPsec SA is established between the UE and the EAS. From now on, all messages are protected by the confidentiality and integrity of the IPsec tunnel.
[0105] UE registration with ECN (Example 2)
[0106] Figures 7 and 8 The following is an example logical flow of the UE authentication and authorization process to the EDN based on the UE's unique identifier (such as 5G-GUTI or SUPI) when the UE has subscribed to the edge computing service. The 5G-GUTI or SUPI is provided or stored in the UE. The specific example steps of UE registration / authentication are as follows: Figure 7 and Figure 8 Steps 1 to 32 are shown in FIG.
[0107] Step 1
[0108] A UE seeking edge computing services may start by performing normal primary authentication and registration with the network. Specifically, the UE may start the authentication and registration process with the network's AMF or SEAF. The UE may have multi-access edge computing (MEC) capabilities and may indicate such MEC capabilities to the AMF / SEAF during the process.
[0109] The AMF / SEAF may be in the UE's home network or in the UE's visited network. Before primary authentication and registration, the UE may not know the edge computing server associated with the current AMF / SEAF.
[0110] Step 2
[0111] The UE establishes a protocol data unit (PDU) session for the IP connection. Information about the edge computing server including the ECS may be transmitted from the network to the UE via a protocol configuration option (PCO). The information may include the address, identifier, or other configuration information of the edge computing server. The UE may use this information in subsequent steps, for example, for routing messages to the edge computing server.
[0112] Step 3
[0113] AMF / SEAF can generate a temporary edge computing key identifier E-TID for the UE. For example, E-TID = KDF (5G-GUTI or SUPI, K AMF or K SEAF ). This formula can be interpreted as using K AMF or K SEAF As a key for encrypting 5G-GUTI or SUPI based on a KDF algorithm. The term "KDF" refers to an exemplary key generation algorithm involving HMAC-SHA-256 (a 256-bit hash-based message authentication code for a secure hash algorithm). For example, the output of KDF encryption may be a key having a length of 256 bits. In the present disclosure, there is no limitation on which algorithm may be used for encryption. K AMF or K SEAF Represents the basic key of AMF or SEAF respectively. 5G-GUTI is used to provide a clear identification of the UE, which does not expose the UE or the permanent identity of the UE in the network (such as a 5G system). As an example, the format of 5G-GUTI can be: <5G-GUTI> = <guami><5G-TMSI>, where <guami> = <mcc> <mnc><AMF Identifier>GUMAI stands for the globally unique AMF ID, which uniquely identifies the AMF globally. MCC stands for Mobile Country Code and MNC stands for Mobile Network Code. <amfidentifier>=<AMF Region ID><AMF Set ID><AMF Pointer> . 5G-TMSI (Temporary Mobile User Identity) uniquely identifies the UE within the AMF. SUPI (Subscription Permanent Identifier) is a globally unique 5G subscription permanent identifier assigned to each user in a network such as a 5G system.
[0114] In this embodiment, a unique key E-KID used as an edge computing key for the UE is disclosed. In some embodiments, the E-KID may be in a specified NAI (network access identifier) format, such as username@realm. The username portion may include a GUAMI and an E-TID, and the domain portion may include a local network identifier associated with the UE. By carrying the GUAMI and the E-TID, the E-KID may be used to uniquely identify the UE and the AMF associated with the UE, regardless of whether the AMF is in the UE's home network or in the UE's visited network. Also as described above, the E-TID contains a unique identifier for the UE, which is encrypted with the basic key of the AMS / SEAF. Encryption based on 5G-GUTI or SUPI contributes to the randomness of the E-TID (e.g., for avoiding key conflicts between UEs), and the randomness is also carried to the E-KID.
[0115] Step 4
[0116] Before the UE initiates the application registration procedure with the EDN, the UE generates an E-KID in the same way as the AMF, as described in step 3. In this way, both the AMF / SEAF and the UE maintain a copy of the same E-KID.
[0117] Step 5
[0118] UE sends a MAC to ECS AMF and E-KID registration request.
[0119] The MAC address may be set based on the payload (or alternatively referred to as raw data) of the registration request. AMF For example, encryption can be based on the AMF key or the SEAF key (respectively represented by K AMF and K SEAF ) and the payload (original data) of the registration request. The encryption can be based on the KDF algorithm. Optionally, the counter CounterECS of the ECS message can be combined with the encrypted payload data to prevent recurrence attacks. For each additionally calculated MAC AMF , UE monotonically increments CounterECS. In some embodiments, CounterECS may be a NAS (non-access stratum) uplink counter. In some embodiments, MAC AMF The 128 least significant bits (LSBs) or the 128 most significant bits (MSBs) of an encrypted output, such as the output of a KDF algorithm, may be included.
[0120] Step 6
[0121] Since the UE has not been authenticated at the ECS, the ECS sends a packet including a MAC AMF The ECS may determine the IP address / port of the NEF by performing a DNS query using the E-KID, or by using a locally configured NEF identifier / address.
[0122] Step 7
[0123] NEF forwards the registration request, MAC AMF As mentioned above, the E-KID carries the global identifier of the AMF (e.g., GUAMI), so the NEF can uniquely identify that specific AMF and route the authentication request accordingly.
[0124] Step 8
[0125] Upon receiving the verification request, the AMF verifies the MAC of the registration request AMF Specifically, the AMF uses the key K in a similar manner as the UE does in step 5. AMF or K SEAF , calculate the MAC on the registration request payload AMF The AMF then compares the calculated result with the MAC included in the Authentication Request message. AMF Compare (ie, compare MAC ECS The local copy of the received MAC ECS 14. AMF compares CounterECS with the UE's ACK. If they are the same, the verification request can be authenticated as being sent by the UE. Optionally, the AMF monotonically increments CounterECS.
[0126] Step 9
[0127] AMF / SEAF can be used for ECS =KDF(5G-GUTI or SUPI, ECS ID , K AMF or K SEAF ) generates the edge computing configuration key K ECS . K AMF and K SEAF Represents the basic keys of AMF and SEAF respectively. As mentioned above, 5G-GUTI or SUPI can be used to uniquely identify the UE in the network. ECS ID Is the identifier of the ECS and can be in FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name) format.
[0128] Step 10
[0129] AMF sends a verification response to NEF, which includes the authentication result and K calculated in step 9. ECS .
[0130] Step 11
[0131] NEF will include K ECS The verification response is forwarded to ECS.
[0132] Step 12
[0133] Based on the authentication result, the ECS decides whether to accept or reject the registration request from the UE. The ECS sends a registration response message including the authentication result to the UE and, in a similar manner to the way the UE protects the payload of the request message in step 5, based on the received key K ECS , using MAC ECS to protect the response message. Optionally, the EES as the respective identifier of the EES and ECS ID and / or EAS ID can be included in the message. ID Similar, EES ID and EAS ID FQDN format is also acceptable.
[0134] Step 13
[0135] Know ECS ID In this case, the UE can generate its edge computing configuration key K ECS =KDF(5G-GUTI or SUPI, ECS ID , K AMF or K SEAF ). AMF and K SEAF In some embodiments, ECS ID This can be the FQDN format of the ECS that identifies the ECS.
[0136] Step 14
[0137] Using the same concept as step 8, the UE verifies the MAC ECS To ensure that the registration response message is indeed sent by a legitimate ECS. In other words, the UE uses the key K through the registration response payload ECS To calculate MAC ECS local copy of the MAC ECS The local copy of the received MAC included in the request message ECS Make a comparison.
[0138] Step 15
[0139] Once the Registration Response message is successfully verified, the UE uses the ECS key K ECS , an IPsec SA (security association) is established between the UE and the ECS. From now on, all messages are protected by the confidentiality and integrity of the IPsec tunnel.
[0140] Step 16
[0141] Optionally, the UE may also attempt to establish a secure communication link with the EES.
[0142] The UE may send a message with its E-KID and MAC to the EES. ECS The registration request can be based on the payload of the registration request and the edge computing configuration key K ECS Come to MAC ECS In some embodiments, MAC ECS Includes the 128 least significant bits (LSBs) or the 128 most significant bits (MSBs) of an encrypted output (such as the output of a KDF algorithm).
[0143] Optionally, the UE can ID Add it to its E-KID, or use ECS ID Replace the GUAMI in the E-KID. After the E-KID is updated in this way, the E-KID can carry the identifier of the ECS for subsequent use to facilitate identification of the ECS.
[0144] Step 17
[0145] Since the UE has not yet been authenticated at the EES, the EES sends a verification request to the ECS with the MAC received from the registration request. ECS and E-KID, and EES as an identifier of EES ID The verification request also carries the registration request received by the EES in step 16. The selection of the ECS may be based on the ECS in the E-KID ID .
[0146] Step 18
[0147] The ECS receives the verification request from the EES. The ECS can identify the UE based on the E-KID. The ECS verifies the MAC of the registration request. ECS , similar to step 8 and step 14, which will not be described in detail here.
[0148] Step 19
[0149] ECS can generate edge computing enablement key K EES =KDF(EES ID , K ECS ). ECS represents the basic key of the ECS, which can be sent to the ECS in step 11 as described above. In some embodiments, the EES ID This can be the FQDN format of the EES that identifies the EES.
[0150] Step 20
[0151] If the verification is successful, the ECS sends a verification request response to the EES, which includes the authentication result and the K calculated in step 19. EES .
[0152] Step 21
[0153] Based on the authentication result, the EES decides whether to accept or reject the registration request from the UE. In step 19, the EES sends a registration response message including the authentication result to the UE, and based on the received key K in a similar manner as the UE protects the payload of the message in step 16. EES Using a Mac EES to protect the message. EAS identifier EAS ID May be included in a Registration Response message.
[0154] Step 22
[0155] UE can generate edge computing enabling key K EES =KDF(EES ID , K ECS ). ECS Represents the basic key of ECS. ID is the identifier of the EES and may be in FQDN format. The UE receives the EES as described above in step 12 ID .
[0156] Step 23
[0157] Using the same concept as step 8 or step 14, the UE verifies the MAC EES To ensure that the registration response message is indeed sent by a legitimate EES. In other words, the UE uses the key K through the registration response payload EES To calculate MAC EES local copy of the MAC EES The local copy is compared with the MAC included in the received message EES Make a comparison.
[0158] Step 24
[0159] Once the registration response message is successfully verified, the UE uses the edge computing activation key K EES , an IPsec SA is established between the UE and the EES. All messages are now protected by the confidentiality and integrity of the IPsec tunnel.
[0160] Step 25
[0161] Optionally, the UE may also attempt to establish a secure communication link with an edge application server (EAS).
[0162] UE sends a message with its E-KID and MAC to EAS. EES The registration request can be based on the payload of the registration request and the edge computing enabling key K EES For MAC EES In some embodiments, MAC EES Comprises the 128 LSBs or 128 MSBs of an encrypted output (such as the output of a KDF algorithm).
[0163] Optionally, the UE can ID Add to their E-KID, or use EES ID Replace ECS in E-KID ID (If in step 16 ECS ID After the E-KID is updated in this way, the E-KID can carry the identifier of the EES for subsequent use.
[0164] Step 26
[0165] Since the UE has not yet been authenticated at the EAS, the EAS sends a Verification Request to the EES with the MAC received from the Registration Request EES and E-KID and EAS as the identifier of EAS ID The authentication request also carries the registration request received by the EAS in step 25. The selection of the EES may be based on the EES in the E-KID. ID .
[0166] Step 27
[0167] EES receives the authentication request from EAS. EES can identify the UE based on the E-KID. EES uses the key K to register the UE in the registration request payload. EES To calculate MAC EES local copy of the MAC EES The local copy is compared with the MAC included in the received message EES Make a comparison.
[0168] Step 28
[0169] EES can generate edge computing application key K for EAS EAS =KDF(EAS ID , K EES ). EES Represents edge computing enablement key. In some embodiments, EAS ID It may be the FQDN format of the EAS that identifies the EAS.
[0170] Step 29
[0171] If the verification is successful, the EES sends a verification request response to the EAS, which includes the authentication result and the K calculated in step 28. EAS .
[0172] Step 30
[0173] Based on the authentication result, the EAS decides whether to accept or reject the registration request from the UE. The EAS sends a registration response message including the authentication result to the UE, and in a similar manner to the way the UE protects the payload of the message in step 25, based on the edge computing application key K received in step 29 EAS , using MAC EAS to protect the message.
[0174] Step 31
[0175] UE can generate edge computing application key K EAS =KDF(EAS ID , K EES ). EES Represents edge computing enablement key. In some embodiments, EAS ID This can be the FQDN format that identifies the EAS.
[0176] Step 32
[0177] UE verifies MAC EAS To ensure that the registration response message is indeed sent by a legitimate EAS. In other words, the UE uses the key K through the registration response payload EAS To calculate MAC EAS local copy of the MAC EAS The local copy of the MAC address included in the received registration response message ECS Make a comparison.
[0178] Step 33
[0179] UE uses the EAS key K EAS An IPsec SA is established between the UE and the EAS. All messages are now protected by the confidentiality and integrity of the IPsec tunnel.
[0180] In the above embodiment, in order to adapt to the edge computing environment, an edge computing key E-KID for UE is disclosed. E-KID includes a unique identifier of the UE encrypted with the basic encryption key of the AMF or SEAF that manages the UE. The unique identifier of the UE includes a 5G-GUTI or SUPI provided or stored in the UE. E-KID also includes a unique identifier for identifying AMF or SEAF globally. Optionally, E-KID may also include a local network identifier associated with the UE. Based on E-KID, the UE first establishes a secure communication link with the ECS of the computing network through a registration request to ECS. E-KID can be further updated during different stages of the authentication process. For example, after ECS verifies the UE, ECS can add identifiers of other servers (e.g., EES and ECS) in the ECN to the E-KID and return the E-KID to the UE. The UE can use the updated E-KID for subsequent registration with other servers. In addition, in some embodiments, AMF / SEAF may be involved only during the UE's registration with the ECS. After the UE and ECS have mutually authenticated each other, subsequent registrations of the UE with other servers in the ECN do not require further involvement of the AMF / SEAF.
[0181] The figures and descriptions above provide specific example embodiments and implementations. However, the subject matter described may be embodied in a variety of different forms, and therefore, the subject matter covered or claimed is intended to be interpreted as not being limited to any example embodiment set forth herein. The scope of the subject matter claimed or covered is quite broad. Among other things, for example, the subject matter may be embodied as a method, device, component, system, or non-transient computer-readable medium for storing computer code. Therefore, the embodiments may, for example, take the form of hardware, software, firmware, storage media, or any combination thereof. For example, the above method embodiments may be implemented by a component, device, or a system including a memory and a processor by executing a computer code stored in the memory.
[0182] Throughout the specification and claims, in addition to the meanings explicitly stated, terms may have slightly different meanings suggested or implied by the context. Likewise, the phrase "in one embodiment / implementation" used herein does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment, and the phrase "in another embodiment / implementation" used herein does not necessarily refer to a different embodiment. For example, the claimed subject matter includes a combination of all or part of the exemplary embodiments.
[0183] In general, terms may be understood, at least in part, from usage in context. For example, terms such as "and," "or," or "and / or," as used herein, may include a variety of meanings that may depend, at least in part, on the context in which the terms are used. Typically, "or," if used in an associative list, such as A, B, or C, means A, B, and C (used herein in an inclusive sense), as well as A, B, or C (used herein in an exclusive sense). Additionally, the term "one or more," as used herein, may be used to describe any feature, structure, or characteristic in a singular sense, or may be used to describe a combination of features, structures, or characteristics in a plural sense, depending, at least in part, on the context. Similarly, terms such as "a," "an," or "the," may be understood to indicate either singular usage or plural usage, depending, at least in part, on the context. Additionally, the term "based on" may be understood to not necessarily be intended to convey an exclusive set of factors, but rather may allow for the presence of other factors that are not necessarily explicitly described, depending, at least in part, on the context.
[0184] References to features, advantages, or similar language in this specification do not imply that all features and advantages that may be achieved by the present solution should be or are included in any single embodiment thereof. Rather, language referring to features and advantages is understood to mean that a particular feature, advantage, or characteristic described in connection with an embodiment is included in at least one embodiment of the present solution. Thus, discussion of features and advantages and similar language throughout this specification may, but need not, refer to the same embodiment.
[0185] Furthermore, the described features, advantages, and characteristics of the present solution may be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments. Based on the description herein, one of ordinary skill in the relevant art will recognize that the present solution may be implemented without one or more of the specific features or advantages of a particular embodiment. In other cases, additional features and advantages may be recognized in certain embodiments that may not be present in all embodiments of the present solution.< / amfidentifier> < / mnc> < / mcc> < / guami> < / guami>
Claims
1. A method for establishing a secure communication link between a terminal device and an edge computing network providing application services, the method being performed by a terminal device in a communication network, the method comprising: Generate an edge computing key for the terminal device based on a unique identifier of the terminal device and a globally unique access and mobility management function AMF ID (GUAMI) of an access server that manages the terminal device; Generate a registration request signature based on original data of a registration request to a configuration server of the edge computing network and an encryption key of the access server; as well as A first message is sent to the configuration server, where the first message includes the edge computing key and the registration request signature, so as to request service authorization from the edge computing network.
2. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The unique identifier of the terminal device includes at least one of the following: 5G Globally Unique Temporary Identifier (5G-GUTI); or Subscription Persistent Identifier (SUPI).
3. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The access server includes at least one of the following: Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF); or Security Anchor Function (SEAF).
4. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The unique identifier of the access server comprises a Globally Unique AMFID (GUAMI).
5. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The edge computing network includes at least one of the following: Configure the server; Enable the server; application server; or Open server.
6. The method according to claim 1, wherein: Generating the registration request signature includes: A registration request signature is generated based on a registration request message to a configuration server of the edge computing network, the encryption key of the access server, and a message counter recording a count of messages sent to the configuration server.
7. The method according to claim 6, wherein: The message counter comprises a non-access stratum (NAS) uplink counter.
8. The method according to claim 1, wherein: Before generating the edge computing key, the method further includes generating a temporary identifier of the terminal device using a hash-based security algorithm based on the encryption key of the access server and the unique identifier of the terminal device.
9. The method according to claim 8, wherein: Generating the edge computing key includes: The edge computing key is generated based on the temporary identifier of the terminal device within the communication network and the unique identifier of the access server.
10. The method according to claim 9, wherein: The edge computing key is in a network access identifier (NAI) format, and a username portion of the edge computing key includes the unique identifier of the access server and the temporary identifier of the terminal device.
11. The method according to claim 1, further comprising: A first response message is received from the configuration server, wherein the first response message includes a first registration response and a first registration response signature, wherein: The first registration response signature is encrypted and calculated based on the first registration response message and a configuration server key of the configuration server calculated by the access server, the access server is identified by the edge computing key, and the configuration server key is encrypted and calculated based on the unique identifier of the terminal device, the encryption key of the access server that manages the terminal device, and the identifier of the configuration server; Calculate a local configuration server key based on the unique identifier of the terminal device, the encryption key of the access server that manages the terminal device, and the identifier of the configuration server; generate a local first registration response signature based on the first registration response message and the local configuration server key; comparing the local first registration response signature with the first registration response signature in the first response message; and Based on the successful matching of the two signatures, the secure communication link is established between the terminal device and the configuration server.
12. The method according to claim 11, wherein: The first response message also includes at least one of an identifier of an enablement server in the edge computing network associated with the configuration server or an identifier of an application server in the edge computing network associated with the configuration server.
13. The method according to claim 11, further comprising: generating a second registration request signature based on a second registration request message to the activation server and the configuration server key; as well as A second message is sent to the enabling server, the second message including the edge computing key and the second registration request signature.
14. The method according to claim 13, wherein: Before sending the second message, the method further includes: updating the edge computing key by one of the following: adding the identifier of the configuration server to the edge computing key; or The unique identifier of the access server is replaced with the identifier of the configuration server.
15. The method according to claim 14, further comprising: A second response message is received from the enabling server, the second response message comprising a second registration response and a second registration response signature, wherein: The second registration response signature is cryptographically calculated based on the second registration response message and an enablement server key calculated by the configuration server, the configuration server is identified by the enablement server via the edge computing key, and the enablement server key is cryptographically calculated based on an identifier of the enablement server and the configuration server key; calculating a local enablement server key based on the identifier of the enablement server and the configuration server key; Generate a local second registration request signature based on the second registration response message and the local activation server key; comparing the local second registration request signature with the second registration response signature in the second message; and Based on the successful matching of the two signatures, the secure communication link is established between the terminal device and the activation server.
16. The method according to claim 15, wherein: The second response message also includes an identifier of an application server in the edge computing network associated with the configuration server.
17. The method according to claim 15, further comprising: generating a third registration request signature based on the third registration request message to the application server and the activation server key; as well as A third message is sent to the enabling server, wherein the third message includes the edge computing key and the third registration request signature.
18. The method according to claim 17, wherein: Before sending the third message, the method further includes: updating the edge computing key by one of the following: adding an identifier of the application server to the edge computing key; or The identifier of the configuration server is replaced with the identifier of the enablement server.
19. The method according to claim 17, further comprising: A third response message is received from the application server, wherein the third response message includes a third registration response and a third registration response signature, wherein: The third registration response signature is cryptographically calculated based on the third registration response message and an application server key calculated by the enabling server, the enabling server is identified by the application server via the edge computing key, and the application server key is cryptographically calculated based on an identifier of the application server and the enabling server key; Calculating a local application server key based on the identifier of the application server and the activation server key; Generate a local third registration request signature based on the third registration response message and the local application server key; comparing the local third registration request signature with the third registration response signature in the third message; and Based on the successful matching of the two signatures, the secure communication link for the application service is established between the terminal device and the application server.
20. The method according to claim 19, wherein: The identifier of the configuration server, the identifier of the enablement server, and the identifier of the application server include fully qualified domain name (FQDN) formatted identifiers of each corresponding server.
21. A method performed by an access server for authenticating a registration request from a terminal device, wherein: The terminal device is managed by the access server, and the method comprises: Receiving a verification request from an open server in an edge computing network, wherein the verification request includes: a registration request initiated from the terminal device, the registration request being forwarded by the configuration server in the edge computing network to the open server for requesting the terminal device to access the edge computing network, the registration request carrying an edge computing key generated by the terminal device based on a unique identifier of the terminal device and a globally unique access and mobility management function AMF ID (GUAMI) of the access server that manages the terminal device; and A registration request signature encrypted based on the registration request message and the encryption key of the access server; generating a local registration request signature based on the registration request message and the encryption key of the access server; comparing the local registration request signature with the registration request signature in the verification request; and Based on the successful matching of the two signatures, a verification response is sent to the open server.
22. The method according to claim 21, wherein: The verification request also includes at least one of the following: The edge computing key of the terminal device; or An identifier of the configuration server.
23. The method according to claim 22, wherein: Before receiving the verification request, the method further includes: Based on the encryption key of the access server and the unique identifier of the terminal device, using a hash-based security algorithm, generate a temporary identifier of the terminal device; and The edge computing key is generated based on the temporary identifier of the terminal device and the unique identifier of the access server.
24. The method of claim 23, wherein: Prior to sending the verification response, the method further comprises, based on the unique identifier of the terminal device, the encryption key of the access server, and the identifier of the configuration server, generating a configuration server key of the configuration server; as well as In response to the two signatures successfully matching, sending the verification response to the open server for responding to the two signatures successfully matching, including the configuration server key.
25. The method according to claim 23, wherein: The unique identifier of the terminal device includes at least one of the following: 5G Globally Unique Temporary Identifier (5G-GUTI); or Subscription Persistent Identifier (SUPI).
26. The method of claim 22, wherein: The open server routes the authentication request to the access server based on the edge computing key.
27. A method for authenticating a registration request from a terminal device, performed by a configuration server in an edge computing network, the method comprising: A registration request is received from the terminal device, wherein the registration request includes: A registration request signature encrypted based on the original data of the registration request and an encryption key of the access server managing the terminal device; and An edge computing key of the terminal device for accessing the edge computing network, the edge computing key being generated based on a unique identifier of the terminal device and a globally unique AMF ID (GUAMI) of the access server; Based on the edge computing key, a verification request is sent to an open server in the edge computing network, where the verification request is used to verify the registration request, and the verification request includes at least one of the following: The edge computing key; an identifier of the configuration server; or The registration request signature; and A verification response is received from the open server including a configuration server key of the configuration server.
28. The method according to claim 27, wherein: The configuration server key is generated by the access server based on a unique identifier of the terminal device, the encryption key of the access server that manages the terminal device, and the identifier of the configuration server.
29. The method of claim 27, further comprising: A registration response is sent to the terminal device, the registration response comprising a registration response signature encrypted based on original data of the registration response and the configuration server key of the configuration server.
30. The method of claim 29, wherein: The registration response also includes at least one of an identifier of an enablement server in the edge computing network or an identifier of an application server in the edge computing network.
31. A communication device, the device comprising one or more processors, wherein: The one or more processors are configured to implement a method according to any one of claims 1-30.
32. A computer program product comprising a non-transitory computer readable program medium having computer code stored thereon, which, when executed by one or more processors, causes the one or more processors to implement the method according to any one of claims 1-30.
