A method for anti-deception jamming based on track distance

Abstract

The application discloses a kind of anti-deception jamming methods based on track distance, comprising: obtaining the first radar echo signal about k different targets received by first radar, and the second radar echo signal about k different targets received by second radar;K different targets include real target and false target;First radar echo signal and second radar echo signal are processed respectively, and k first tracks and k second tracks are obtained respectively;Each track includes multiple point tracks;Based on k first tracks and k second tracks, the average value of the Euclidean distance between each first track and the point track in each second track is determined, to obtain k*k values;The minimum value in k*k values corresponds to a first track, which is determined as the real target track obtained by the first radar, and the minimum value corresponds to a second track, which is determined as the real target track obtained by the second radar.The application can significantly reduce the amount of calculation and improve the anti-interference effect.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of radar technology, specifically relating to an anti-deception jamming method based on track distance. Background Technology

[0002] Radar boasts advantages such as long detection range, all-weather / daytime operation, and strong penetration, making it widely used in military fields such as precision guidance, early warning and detection, military remote sensing, and reconnaissance and surveillance, as well as in fields like meteorological observation, intelligent transportation, life-saving, and medical imaging. However, under complex electromagnetic conditions, the operational effectiveness of radar can be significantly impacted. Therefore, strong anti-jamming capabilities are essential for the survival of radar systems. Furthermore, the anti-jamming capability of a single radar is inherently limited by its single detection perspective and insufficient data acquisition. Therefore, researching anti-jamming methods based on multi-radar collaboration is crucial.

[0003] Regarding radar anti-deception jamming techniques, numerous researchers have proposed technical solutions. For example, one method based on a site error fusion algorithm to combat deceptive targets involves transforming radar measurements to calculate the target's positioning error covariance matrix, thereby obtaining a correlated measurement sequence. The Mahalanobis distance between two measurements is calculated using the target positioning error covariance matrix, and hypothesis testing is performed on the Mahalanobis distance to eliminate false targets and distinguish between true and false targets. Another example is a networked radar system anti-deception jamming method that estimates the correlation coefficient between slow-time random complex envelope sequences of point targets detected by each node radar, calculates and selects a test threshold, and performs an active false target correlation test on any two point targets based on the test threshold, eliminating active false targets and thus achieving anti-deception jamming.

[0004] However, existing methods for suppressing deceptive interference are complex, computationally intensive, and have poor anti-interference effects. Summary of the Invention

[0005] To address the aforementioned problems in related technologies, this invention provides an anti-spoofing interference method based on flight path distance. The technical problem to be solved by this invention is achieved through the following technical solution:

[0006] This invention provides a method for resisting deceptive interference based on flight path distance, comprising:

[0007] Acquire first radar echo signals received by a first radar for k different targets, and second radar echo signals received by a second radar for the same k different targets; the k different targets include real targets and false targets; k is an integer greater than 1;

[0008] The first radar echo signal and the second radar echo signal are processed respectively to obtain k first tracks and k second tracks respectively; each track includes multiple point traces;

[0009] Based on the k first tracks and the k second tracks, determine the average Euclidean distance between the points in each first track and each second track, and obtain k*k values;

[0010] The first track corresponding to the minimum value among the k*k values ​​is determined as the true target track obtained by the first radar, and the second track corresponding to the minimum value is determined as the true target track obtained by the second radar.

[0011] In some embodiments, the step of determining the average Euclidean distance between points in each of the k first tracks and the k second tracks, based on the k first tracks and the k second tracks, to obtain k*k values, includes:

[0012] Transform the k first tracks and the k second tracks to the same coordinate system to obtain k first transformed tracks and k second transformed tracks.

[0013] Calculate the average Euclidean distance between the points in each of the first transformed tracks and each of the second transformed tracks, and obtain k*k values.

[0014] In some embodiments, each first-transformed track and each second-transformed track include w points; the average Euclidean distance between the points in each first-transformed track and each second-transformed track is calculated to obtain k*k values, including:

[0015] Determine the difference between the coordinates of the i-th point in the m-th first transformed track and the coordinates of the i-th point in the n-th second transformed track to obtain the i-th coordinate difference;

[0016] Calculate the sum of squares of the i-th coordinate difference to obtain the sum of squares of the i-th coordinate;

[0017] By traversing the w points, we obtain the sum of w squared coordinates;

[0018] Determine the mean of the sum of squares of the w coordinates, and use the mean as the average of the Euclidean distances between the points in the m-th first transformed track and the n-th second transformed track;

[0019] By traversing the k first-transformed tracks and the k second-transformed tracks, the k*k values ​​are obtained.

[0020] In some embodiments, the expression for the average Euclidean distance between the points in the m-th first transformed track and the n-th second transformed track is as follows:

[0021]

[0022] Where i represents the i-th point in each transformed track, i = 1, 2, ..., w. This represents the m-th track after the first transformation. This represents the nth track after the second transformation. This represents the coordinates of the i-th point in the m-th transformed track.

[0023] This represents the coordinates of the i-th point in the nth transformed track.

[0024] This represents the average Euclidean distance between the points in the m-th first transformed track and the n-th second transformed track.

[0025] In some embodiments, transforming the k first tracks and the k second tracks to the same coordinate system to obtain k first transformed tracks and k second transformed tracks includes:

[0026] Based on the position coordinates of the first radar, the radial distance from each target to the first radar, and the relative angle between each target and the first radar in two-dimensional space, the k first tracks are transformed into a rectangular coordinate system with the position coordinates of the first radar as the origin, thus obtaining the k first transformed tracks.

[0027] Based on the position coordinates of the second radar, the radial distance from each target to the second radar, and the relative angle between each target and the second radar in two-dimensional space, the k second tracks are transformed into a rectangular coordinate system with the position coordinates of the second radar as the origin, resulting in k initially transformed second tracks.

[0028] The k initially transformed second tracks are converted to a Cartesian coordinate system with the position coordinates of the first radar as the origin, to obtain the k second transformed tracks.

[0029] In some embodiments, the step of processing the first radar echo signal and the second radar echo signal respectively to obtain k first tracks and k second tracks includes:

[0030] The first radar echo signal is sequentially subjected to matched filtering, point correlation, Kalman filtering, temporal and spatial alignment, and track management to obtain the k first tracks;

[0031] The second radar echo signal is sequentially subjected to matched filtering, point correlation, Kalman filtering, temporal and spatial alignment, and track management to obtain the k second tracks.

[0032] In some embodiments, the k different targets include one real target and k-1 false targets generated around the real target.

[0033] In some embodiments, the expression for the radar echo signal associated with each target is as follows:

[0034] S r (t)=s r (t)+J(t)+n(t);

[0035] Among them, S r (t) represents the radar echo signal, s r J(t) represents the target reflected signal, J(t) represents the range deception jamming signal, and n(t) represents Gaussian noise.

[0036] In some embodiments, s r The expression for (t) is as follows:

[0037]

[0038] in, R0 is the distance between the target and the radar receiver, c is the speed of light, f0 is the carrier frequency of the radar transmitted signal, k' is the frequency modulation slope of the radar transmitted signal, and T p The definition of rect() is: (This is the pulse width of the radar transmitted signal.)

[0039] In some embodiments, J(t) is expressed as follows:

[0040] J(t)=As(tt j );

[0041] in, t j R represents the time delay of the interference relative to the radar's transmitted detection signal. j Let be the distance between the false target and the radar receiver, c be the speed of light, A be the interference modulus, and s(t) be the detection signal emitted by the radar.

[0042] The present invention has the following beneficial technical effects:

[0043] This invention achieves anti-spoofing interference by selecting the track corresponding to the average value of the minimum Euclidean distance as the real target track. Since it does not require excessive other calculations or subjective selection of threshold values, it can not only significantly reduce the amount of calculation and simplify the scheme, but also achieve better anti-interference effect.

[0044] The present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. Attached Figure Description

[0045] Figure 1 A flowchart of an anti-spoofing interference method based on track distance provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0046] Figure 2 An exemplary map showing the actual location distribution of radar site 1 and radar site 2 provided for embodiments of the present invention;

[0047] Figure 3 A schematic diagram illustrating the motion trajectory of an exemplary real target provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0048] Figure 4 This is an exemplary schematic diagram of three tracks obtained after processing the radar echo signal of radar 1, provided as an embodiment of the present invention.

[0049] Figure 5 A schematic diagram illustrating three tracks obtained after processing the radar echo signal of radar 2, as provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0050] Figure 6 An exemplary result diagram of anti-jamming processing applied to three tracks obtained by radar 1, provided as an embodiment of the present invention;

[0051] Figure 7 An exemplary comparison diagram of the result of anti-jamming processing of the track obtained by radar 1 and the actual target's trajectory, provided for an embodiment of the present invention;

[0052] Figure 8 An exemplary result diagram of the anti-jamming processing applied to the three tracks obtained by radar 2, provided as an embodiment of the present invention.

[0053] Figure 9 A comparison diagram of the result of anti-jamming processing of the track obtained by radar 2 and the actual target's trajectory, provided as an example of an embodiment of the present invention;

[0054] Figure 10 This is an exemplary comparison diagram of the results of anti-jamming processing of the three tracks obtained by radar 1 and radar 2 respectively, provided for embodiments of the present invention, and the actual trajectory of the target. Detailed Implementation

[0055] The present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to specific embodiments, but the implementation of the present invention is not limited thereto.

[0056] In the description of this invention, the terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly specifying the number of indicated technical features. Thus, a feature defined as "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of that feature. In the description of this invention, "a plurality of" means two or more, unless otherwise explicitly specified.

[0057] In the description of this specification, the references to terms such as "one embodiment," "some embodiments," "example," "specific example," or "some examples," etc., indicate that a specific feature, structure, material, or characteristic described in connection with that embodiment or example is included in at least one embodiment or example of the invention. In this specification, the illustrative expressions of the above terms do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Furthermore, the specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics described may be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments or examples. In addition, those skilled in the art can combine and integrate the different embodiments or examples described in this specification.

[0058] Although the invention has been described herein in conjunction with various embodiments, those skilled in the art will understand and implement other variations of the disclosed embodiments by reviewing the accompanying drawings, disclosure, and appended claims in carrying out the claimed invention. In the claims, the word "comprising" does not exclude other components or steps, and "a" or "an" does not exclude a plurality. A single processor or other unit can implement several functions listed in the claims. While different dependent claims may recite certain measures, this does not mean that these measures cannot be combined to produce good results.

[0059] The inventors of this case discovered that in existing technologies, the "method for countering deceptive false targets based on station error fusion algorithm" processes target echo data at each time moment for anti-jamming, without considering that the measured Mahalanobis distance of the false target may be smaller than that of the real target. This situation, if it occurs, will have a significant negative impact on the radar's anti-jamming effectiveness. The "method for countering deceptive jamming in networked radar systems" compares the correlation coefficients between the echo envelope sequences of each node radar and each point target with a set threshold to perform anti-jamming. Similar to the "method for countering deceptive false targets based on station error fusion algorithm," this method only considers the target echo data at each time moment for processing, without considering the possibility that the echo information of a few false targets may also be below the threshold. Furthermore, this method has certain difficulties and complexities in terms of hardware implementation and data acquisition. Based on this, this invention provides an anti-deceptive jamming method based on track distance to improve radar anti-jamming performance and combat performance, addressing the shortcomings of existing technologies, such as the possibility that the measured distance of false targets in multi-station radars may be smaller than that of the real target, thus affecting the radar's anti-jamming effectiveness, and the large computational load of Mahalanobis distance calculation, requiring the calculation of threshold values.

[0060] This invention can be performed by any of the radars mentioned in the following methods, or by ground equipment; the embodiments of this invention do not limit this.

[0061] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of an anti-spoofing interference method based on track distance provided in an embodiment of the present invention, as follows: Figure 1 As shown, the method includes the following steps:

[0062] S101. Obtain the first radar echo signal received by the first radar for k different targets, and the second radar echo signal received by the second radar for k different targets; the k different targets include real targets and false targets; k is an integer greater than 1.

[0063] Specifically, the k different targets include one real target and k-1 false targets generated around the real target. For example, when a jammer is used to perform range deception jamming on the first and second radars at the location of the real target, two false targets can be generated in front of and behind the real target, with a deception range of 5km each. In this way, the first radar can receive radar echo signals about these three targets, and the second radar can also receive radar echo signals about these three targets.

[0064] Specifically, assuming the waveform of the detection signal transmitted by the radar is a linear frequency modulated signal, the expression for this detection signal is: Where f0 is the carrier frequency of the radar transmitted signal, k' is the frequency modulation slope of the radar transmitted signal, and T pThe definition of rect() is: (This is the pulse width of the radar transmitted signal.) If there is a target at a distance R0, then the expression for the reflected signal of that target received by the radar is: in, R0 is the distance between the target and the radar receiver, and c is the speed of light; then the expression for the range deception jamming signal is: J(t) = As(tt) j ),in, t j R represents the time delay of the interference relative to the radar's transmitted detection signal. j Let A be the distance between the false target and the radar receiver, and let A represent the interference modulus. Then, the expression for the radar echo signal received by the radar related to this target can be expressed as: S r (t)=s r (t)+J(t)+n(t), where n(t) represents a variable with zero mean and variance of 1 / n. Gaussian noise.

[0065] S102. Process the first radar echo signal and the second radar echo signal respectively to obtain k first tracks and k second tracks respectively; each track includes multiple points.

[0066] Specifically, by sequentially performing matched filtering, point correlation, Kalman filtering, temporal and spatial alignment, and track management on the first radar echo signal, k first tracks can be obtained. Similarly, by sequentially performing matched filtering, point correlation, Kalman filtering, temporal and spatial alignment, and track management on the second radar echo signal, k second tracks can be obtained. Each target corresponds one-to-one with one first track and one second track.

[0067] S103. Based on k first tracks and k second tracks, determine the average Euclidean distance between points in each first track and each second track, and obtain k*k values.

[0068] Specifically, k first tracks and k second tracks can be transformed to the same coordinate system to obtain k first-transformed tracks and k second-transformed tracks. Then, the average Euclidean distance between the points in each first-transformed track and each second-transformed track is calculated to obtain k*k values.

[0069] For example, the method for transforming k first tracks and k second tracks to the same coordinate system is as follows: Based on the position coordinates of the first radar, the radial distance r1 from each target to the first radar, and the relative angle θ1 between each target and the first radar in two-dimensional space, the k first tracks are transformed to a Cartesian coordinate system with the position coordinates of the first radar as the origin, resulting in k first transformed tracks; based on the position coordinates of the second radar, the radial distance r2 from each target to the second radar, and the relative angle θ2 between each target and the second radar in two-dimensional space, the k second tracks are transformed to a Cartesian coordinate system with the position coordinates of the second radar as the origin, resulting in k initially transformed second tracks; the k initially transformed second tracks are then transformed to a Cartesian coordinate system with the position coordinates of the first radar as the origin, resulting in k second transformed tracks. For example, for a single target, the transformation formula at each moment is: Where, x i' Let y be the x-coordinate of the target at each time step in a rectangular coordinate system with the radar position coordinates as the origin. i' Let i' be the ordinate of the target in a rectangular coordinate system with the radar position coordinates as the origin at each time step, i' = 1, 2.

[0070] For example, each first-transformed track and each second-transformed track includes w points. Based on this, the method to obtain k*k values ​​is as follows: determine the difference between the coordinates of the i-th point in the m-th first-transformed track and the coordinates of the i-th point in the n-th second-transformed track, and obtain the i-th coordinate difference; calculate the sum of squares of the i-th coordinate differences, and obtain the i-th coordinate sum of squares; when traversing w points, obtain w coordinate sums of squares; determine the mean of the w coordinate sums of squares, and use the mean as the average of the Euclidean distances between the points in the m-th first-transformed track and the n-th second-transformed track; when traversing k first-transformed tracks and k second-transformed tracks, obtain k*k values.

[0071] For example, when w = 200 and k = 3, the p-th track after the first transformation or the p-th track after the second transformation can be represented as:

[0072] In this formula, i = 1, 2. For the p-th track after the first transformation, This is the track after the second transformation of the p-th line.

[0073] For example, the expression for the average Euclidean distance between the points in the m-th track after the first transformation and the n-th track after the second transformation is as follows:

[0074]

[0075] Where i represents the i-th point in each transformed track. This represents the m-th track after the first transformation. This represents the nth track after the second transformation. Let represent the coordinates of the i-th point in the m-th transformed track. This represents the coordinates of the i-th point in the n-th transformed track. This represents the average Euclidean distance between the points in the m-th track after the first transformation and the n-th track after the second transformation.

[0076] Here, each track converted by the first radar is associated with each track converted by the second radar, forming an association pair. For example, when each radar station obtains three tracks, a total of nine sets of associated tracks can be generated, corresponding to nine average Euclidean distances.

[0077] S104. The first track corresponding to the minimum value among the k*k values ​​is determined as the true target track obtained by the first radar, and the second track corresponding to the minimum value is determined as the true target track obtained by the second radar.

[0078] Because false targets generated by range deception jamming differ from real targets in terms of spatial dispersion, real targets possess spatial position correlation characteristics. Measurement values ​​generated by different radar seekers are relatively concentrated when converted to a unified coordinate system, existing within an error ellipse determined by measurement error. In contrast, measurements of false targets are relatively dispersed when converted to a unified coordinate system and do not possess spatial position correlation characteristics. Therefore, the track corresponding to the minimum value can be considered as the track of the real target.

[0079] This invention uses the method of selecting the minimum value to complete the anti-deception interference. This idea, as a hard logic decision, is different from other hypothesis testing ideas that calculate and set thresholds. It does not require manual calculation of parameters to determine the threshold, significantly reducing the amount of calculation, making it more easy to understand, and avoiding the subjectivity that may occur in steps such as selecting the threshold.

[0080] This invention achieves anti-spoofing interference through the nearest neighbor method of the track. Compared with the existing method of calculating the Mahalanobis distance measured by radar and comparing it with a threshold, this method does not require the calculation of Mahalanobis distance, which can significantly reduce the amount of computation. Furthermore, it does not need to consider the error covariance matrix, and the obtained target motion trajectory is more accurate.

[0081] This invention achieves anti-spoofing interference by selecting the track corresponding to the minimum Euclidean distance as the target's true track. Compared with current anti-interference methods, it does not require calculating and selecting a threshold, eliminates subjective factors in the threshold selection process, and is simpler in principle, easier to operate, and has a better anti-interference effect.

[0082] The technical effects of the embodiments of the present invention will be further illustrated below using simulation experimental data.

[0083] Taking two radars as an example, such as Figure 2 As shown, radar station 1 (radar 1) has coordinates [10km, 20km], and radar station 2 (radar 2) has coordinates [30km, 10km]. The jammer is located at the actual target location and performs range deception jamming on both radars, generating two false targets in front of and behind the actual target, each with a deception range of 5km. Assume the waveform of the detection signal transmitted by the radar is a linear frequency modulated signal, such as... Figure 3 As shown, the target undergoes uniformly accelerated curvilinear motion in a two-dimensional plane, with an initial position of [10km, 30km], an initial velocity of [500m / s, 100m / s], and an acceleration of [-15m / s²]. 2 15m / s 2 The above method is used to suppress deceptive jamming on radars 1 and 2.

[0084] Figure 4 The three tracks are obtained after processing the radar echo signal acquired by radar 1. Figure 5 These are the three tracks obtained after processing the radar echo signals acquired by radar 2. According to... Figure 4 and Figure 5 As shown, at this time, the jammer successfully deceived radar 1 and radar 2 in range. The real target is one target, and the corresponding track should be one. However, after directly processing the radar echo signal, three tracks are obtained. Therefore, radar 1 and radar 2 cannot distinguish the real target track. Thus, multi-radar cooperative anti-range deception jamming is required. Figure 6 The result of anti-jamming processing on the three tracks obtained by radar 1 is as follows: Figure 6 It can be seen that after collaborative identification processing, the three tracks obtained by radar 1 become one track. Figure 7 The image shows a comparison between the anti-jamming processing result of the track obtained by radar 1 and the actual target's trajectory. The comparison clearly shows that the track obtained after anti-jamming processing of the three tracks obtained by radar 1 is the actual target's track, thus proving the effectiveness of this method. Figure 8 The result of anti-interference processing on the track obtained by radar 2 shows that after collaborative identification processing, the three tracks obtained by radar 2 become one track. Figure 9The image shows a comparison between the anti-jamming processing result of the track obtained by radar 2 and the actual target's trajectory. The comparison clearly shows that the track obtained by radar 2 after anti-jamming processing is the actual target's trajectory, thus proving the effectiveness of this method.

[0085] Figure 10 The image shows a comparison between the anti-jamming processing results of the three tracks obtained by radar 1 and radar 2 and the actual target's trajectory. The comparison shows that the tracks obtained by radar 1 and radar 2 after anti-jamming processing are both the actual target's tracks. This means that radar 1 and radar 2 have successfully achieved anti-range deception interference using this method, thus proving the effectiveness of this method.

[0086] The above description, in conjunction with specific preferred embodiments, provides a further detailed explanation of the present invention. It should not be construed that the specific implementation of the present invention is limited to these descriptions. For those skilled in the art, various simple deductions or substitutions can be made without departing from the concept of the present invention, and all such modifications and substitutions should be considered within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method of anti-deception jamming based on track distance, characterized in that, The method comprises the following steps: acquiring first radar echo signals of k different targets received by a first radar and second radar echo signals of the k different targets received by a second radar; the k different targets include real targets and false targets; k is an integer greater than 1; processing the first radar echo signals and the second radar echo signals respectively to obtain k first tracks and k second tracks; each track includes a plurality of point tracks; based on the k first tracks and the k second tracks, determining an average value of the Euclidean distance between each point track in each first track and each second track to obtain k*k values; determining a first track corresponding to the minimum value in the k*k values as a real target track obtained by the first radar, and determining a second track corresponding to the minimum value as a real target track obtained by the second radar.

2. The track-while-range based anti-decoy jamming method of claim 1, wherein, The step of determining the average value of the Euclidean distance between each point track in each first track and each second track based on the k first tracks and the k second tracks to obtain k*k values comprises the following steps: converting the k first tracks and the k second tracks to the same coordinate system to obtain k first converted tracks and k second converted tracks; calculating the average value of the Euclidean distance between each point track in each first converted track and each second converted track to obtain k*k values.

3. The track-while-range based anti-decoy jamming method of claim 2, wherein, Each first converted track and each second converted track includes w point tracks; the step of calculating the average value of the Euclidean distance between each point track in each first converted track and each second converted track to obtain k*k values comprises the following steps: determining the difference between the coordinates of the i th point track in the m th first converted track and the coordinates of the i th point track in the n th second converted track to obtain an i th coordinate difference; calculating the sum of squares of the i th coordinate difference to obtain an i th coordinate square sum; obtaining w coordinate square sums by traversing the w point tracks; determining the average value of the w coordinate square sums, and taking the average value as the average value of the Euclidean distance between each point track in the m th first converted track and the n th second converted track; obtaining the k*k values by traversing the k first converted tracks and the k second converted tracks.

4. The track-while-range based anti-decoy jamming method of claim 3, wherein, The expression of the average value of the Euclidean distance between each point track in the m th first converted track and the n th second converted track is as follows: wherein i represents the i-th point in each converted track, i = 1, 2,..., w, denotes the m-th first converted track, denotes the n-th second converted track, denotes the coordinates of the i-th point in the m-th first converted track, denotes the coordinates of the i-th point in the n-th second converted track, denotes the average of the Euclidean distances between the points in the m-th first converted track and the n-th second converted track.

5. The track-while-range based anti-decoy jamming method of claim 2, wherein, The step of converting the k first tracks and the k second tracks to the same coordinate system to obtain k first converted tracks and k second converted tracks comprises the following steps: converting the k first tracks to a rectangular coordinate system with the position coordinates of the first radar as the origin according to the position coordinates of the first radar, the radial distance of each target to the first radar, and the relative angle of each target to the first radar in the two-dimensional space to obtain the k first converted tracks; According to the position coordinates of the second radar, the radial distance of each target to the second radar, and the relative angle of each target with the second radar in two-dimensional space, the k second tracks are converted into a rectangular coordinate system with the position coordinates of the second radar as the origin, to obtain k initial converted second tracks; The k initial converted second tracks are converted into a rectangular coordinate system with the position coordinates of the first radar as the origin, to obtain the k second converted tracks.

6. The track-while-range based anti-decoy jamming method of claim 1, wherein, The processing of the first radar echo signal and the second radar echo signal respectively to obtain k first tracks and k second tracks includes: The first radar echo signal is sequentially subjected to matched filtering, plot association, Kalman filtering, time and space alignment, and track management, to obtain the k first tracks; The second radar echo signal is sequentially subjected to matched filtering, plot association, Kalman filtering, time and space alignment, and track management, to obtain the k second tracks.

7. The track-while-range based anti-decoy jamming method of claim 1, wherein, The k different targets include one real target and k-1 false targets generated around the real target.

8. The track-while-range based anti-decoy jamming method of claim 1, wherein, The expression of the radar echo signal related to each target is as follows: S r (t) = s r (t) + J(t) + n(t); where S r (t) denotes the radar echo signal, s r (t) denotes the target reflection signal, J(t) denotes the range deception jamming signal, and n(t) denotes the Gaussian noise.

9. The track-while-range based anti-decoying jamming method according to claim 8, wherein, s r The expression of (t) is as follows: wherein, R0is the distance between the target and the radar receiver, c is the speed of light, f0is the radar transmitted signal carrier frequency, k' is the frequency modulation slope of the radar transmitted signal, T p is the radar transmitted signal pulse width, and rect() is defined as:

10. The track distance based anti-deception jamming method according to claim 8, characterized in that, The expression of J(t) is as follows: J(t) = As(t - t j ); wherein t j denotes the time delay of the jamming with respect to the radar transmitted probe signal, R j is the distance between the false target and the radar receiver, c is the speed of light, A denotes the jamming modulus, s(t) denotes the radar transmitted probe signal.

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