A network attack dynamic tracing method based on RPKI trusted routing issuance system

By using the RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system in the Internet routing system, network topology portrait is built and network intrusion detection information is combined, precise traceability of network attack traffic is achieved, and the problem of low efficiency of network attack source positioning in the existing technology is solved. , improves cyber attack defense capabilities.

CN118337468BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-08QUAN CHENG LABORATORY +1
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202410510814.3
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-04-26
Publication Date
2024-11-08
Estimated Expiration
2044-04-26

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing technology is difficult to achieve accurate traceability of network attack traffic in the Internet routing system, especially under the RPKI trusted routing issuance system, the source location efficiency of malicious traffic and flood traffic is low, resulting in the harm of network attacks to the current network. Difficult to reduce effectively.

Method used

By supporting the RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system in the routing network, collecting and analyzing trusted routing prefix information in the autonomous domain, building a network topology image, combining the information of the network intrusion detection system, tracing the source of network attack traffic and locating the source of attacks Location. Specific steps include initializing the network topology image matrix and ROA information table, processing network attack alert messages, updating and scanning related records, and locating the attack source.

Benefits of technology

It realizes accurate traceability of large-scale flood attacks and malicious traffic, improves the accuracy and efficiency of network attack source location, solves the problem of collaborative utilization of network attack information across multiple autonomous domains, and provides an automated dynamic traceability algorithm. , enhances cyber attack defense capabilities.

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Abstract

The present invention relates to a network attack dynamic tracing method based on an RPKI trusted routing issuance system, and belongs to the field of Internet security technology. The RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system characterizes the current routing network topology portrait matrix after analyzing and sorting the collected trusted routing prefix information of each autonomous domain. For large-scale flooding attack traffic and malicious access traffic in the network, the RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system locates the network location of the network attack source based on the source IP address and other information of the attack traffic reported by the network intrusion detection system after traversing the topology portrait in the local database, thereby realizing the tracing function of the network attack traffic. The present invention realizes the tracing of large quantities of flooding traffic and malicious traffic discovered by the network intrusion detection system through the RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system supported in the routing network, so as to achieve the purpose of accurately obtaining the location of the attack source.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The invention relates to a network attack dynamic tracing method based on an RPKI trusted routing issuance system, and belongs to the technical field of Internet security. Background Art

[0002] The Internet Assigned Number Resource Authority is an organization responsible for managing global Internet number resources, including IP addresses, Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs), domain names, etc. Its main responsibility is to formulate global Internet number resource allocation rules and standards to ensure the stability and security of the Internet. It divides the world's Internet into multiple ASs, each of which has many network devices. The IP address segments assigned to the AS will be configured on these network devices.

[0003] There is a vertical subordinate management relationship between the Internet number resource allocation agencies. Except for the top-level Internet number resource allocation agency, the IP address segments, AS numbers and other resources of each layer of Internet resource allocation agencies are obtained from the resource pool of the superior allocation agency. From top to bottom, they are: Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), five major Internet registries (RIR), National Internet Registry (NIR) / Local Internet Registry (LIR), Internet Service Provider (ISP), and the trusted routing issuance system of Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) follows this vertical management architecture.

[0004] To enhance the security of the inter-domain routing system, the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) relies on the Resource Certificate Authority (CA) to authenticate the use of Internet basic number resources, and adds Route Origin Attestation (ROA) to BGP protocol routing to verify whether the routing announcement of an AS for a specific IP address prefix is ​​legal. The signature and certificate are stored independently in the RPKI resource library, which is periodically obtained and verified by the Relying Party (RP) and sent to the BGP process of the router under its jurisdiction to guide routing selection. RPKI is widely deployed in the network due to its lightness and security.

[0005] Therefore, when the routing-based network data forwarding system is attacked maliciously, how to use the RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system to accurately locate the source of network attack traffic and reduce or even eliminate the harm of the attack to the current network through network defense measures is an urgent problem to be solved in the Internet routing system. Summary of the invention

[0006] In view of the shortcomings of the prior art, the present invention provides a network attack dynamic tracing method based on the RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system. By supporting the RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system in the routing network, the large-scale flooding traffic and malicious traffic discovered by the network intrusion detection system can be traced, so as to achieve the purpose of accurately obtaining the location of the attack source.

[0007] Specifically, the RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system analyzes and organizes the collected information such as the trusted routing prefixes of each autonomous domain to depict an accurate topological portrait of the current routing network. For large-scale flooding attack traffic and malicious access traffic in the network, the RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system locates the network location of the source of the network attack based on the source IP address of the attack traffic reported by the network intrusion detection system, after traversing the topological portrait in the local database, thereby tracing the source of the network attack traffic.

[0008] The technical solution of the present invention is as follows:

[0009] A method for dynamic tracing of network attacks based on the RPKI trusted routing issuance system, the steps are as follows:

[0010] (1) The RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system initializes the network topology portrait matrix;

[0011] (2) The RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system initializes the ROA information table;

[0012] (3) The Internet operator (ISP) ROA management system initiates ROA information reporting;

[0013] (4) The network attack monitoring probe performs network attack monitoring. After discovering a network attack, it sends a network attack warning message to the RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system;

[0014] (5) The RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system monitors network data and prepares to receive messages;

[0015] (6) The RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system receives the ROA information reporting message of step (3) and determines the execution steps according to the content of the message;

[0016] (7) Using the autonomous domain number and network device number of the ROA obtained from the message in step (6), scan the network topology portrait matrix and retrieve detailed records of network devices;

[0017] (8) Using the ROA prefix and ROA prefix mask obtained from the message in step (6) to synthesize the IP address prefix, and using the interface index obtained from the message in step (6) to fill the IP address prefix and interface index fields of the network device detailed record, and returning to execute step (4);

[0018] (9) The RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system receives the network attack warning message of step (4) and determines the execution process according to the message;

[0019] (10) When the system generates a prompt message, return to step (4) to continue execution.

[0020] Preferably, according to the present invention, in step (1), the network topology portrait matrix is ​​a two-dimensional array, the superscript of the two-dimensional array represents ASN, and the subscript represents the network device number inside the AS, and each network topology portrait matrix unit stores detailed information of multiple network devices, and the detailed information includes an interface index and a corresponding IP address prefix, wherein the interface index is the index value of the interface in the current network device, and the IP address prefix is ​​the IP network segment information allocated to the interface in the current network device.

[0021] Preferably, according to the present invention, in step (1), the initialization process is that the RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system creates a network topology portrait matrix with a maximum superscript value of 4096 and a maximum subscript value of 4096, and the network device detailed information record stored in each network topology portrait matrix unit is empty.

[0022] The maximum values ​​of the superscript (autonomous domain number) and subscript (network device number) of the network topology portrait matrix are the maximum storage space reserved for the matrix. In actual applications, there may be a situation where the number of autonomous domains and network devices is less than 4096. At this time, the network topology portrait matrix is ​​partially used, but the situation where the maximum value is exceeded will not occur, resulting in incomplete network topology portrait records.

[0023] Preferably, according to the present invention, in step (2), the ROA information table includes a ROA record number, a ROA prefix, a ROA prefix mask, a ROA autonomous domain number, and a network device number, wherein the ROA record number is the index value of the ROA record in the ROA information table, the ROA prefix is ​​the trusted routing information prefix value, the ROA prefix mask is the mask value of the trusted routing information prefix, the ROA autonomous domain number is the autonomous domain number value to which the trusted routing prefix belongs, and the network device number is the index value of the network device configured by the current ROA prefix, and the RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system initializes the ROA information table to empty.

[0024] Preferably, in step (3) of the present invention, the ROA information reporting process is to retrieve the local trusted prefix allocation information from the local configuration file, assemble a trusted prefix registration message, and fill the ROA prefix, ROA prefix mask, ROA autonomous domain number, network device number and interface index read from the configuration file into the ROA prefix, ROA prefix mask, ROA autonomous domain number, network device number and interface index fields of the message, and the destination address of the message is the server address where the RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system is located.

[0025] Preferably, according to the present invention, step (4) is specifically as follows: after detecting the network attack traffic, extracting the source IP address of the message from the network attack traffic, taking out the attack processing method and the network attack monitoring probe IP address from the local configuration file, assembling the network attack alarm message, filling the extracted attack traffic source IP address into the attack network segment IP information of the network attack alarm message, and filling the destination address of the message with the network attack monitoring probe IP address taken out from the local configuration file.

[0026] Preferably, step (6) is as follows: extract the ROA prefix, the ROA prefix mask, the autonomous domain number to which the ROA belongs, the network device number to which the ROA belongs, and the interface index from the reported message, and traverse the ROA information table according to the ROA prefix and the ROA prefix mask. If a record is found, step (6.1) is executed; if no record is found, step (6.2) is executed.

[0027] (6.1) using the matching item obtained from step (6) and the autonomous domain number and network device number of the ROA obtained from the message in step (6), updating the autonomous domain number and network device number of the ROA in the matching item;

[0028] (6.2) Create a ROA information table entry, fill the ROA record number field with the value of the current maximum ROA record number plus one, and use the ROA prefix, ROA prefix mask, ROA autonomous domain number, and network device number obtained from the report message in step (6) to fill in the ROA prefix, ROA prefix mask, ROA autonomous domain number, and network device number fields in the ROA information table entry.

[0029] Preferably, step (9) is specifically to extract the attacking network segment IP information from the message, scan the ROA information table, and if a record is found, execute step (9.1), step (9.2) and step (9.3); if no record is found, execute step (9.4);

[0030] (9.1) Using the record found in step (9), extract the network device number B and the autonomous domain number C to which the ROA belongs from the record;

[0031] (9.2) Using the network device number B and the autonomous domain number C of the ROA obtained in step (9.1) to scan the network topology image matrix, and retrieve the detailed information record of the network device;

[0032] (9.3) Using the attack network segment IP information obtained in step (9), scan the network device detailed information record, extract the interface index A, and use the autonomous domain number B and network device number C of the ROA obtained in step (9.1) to record the log prompt to locate the A interface of the network device C in the autonomous domain B where the origin of this network attack is located;

[0033] (9.4) The log records indicate that the origin of this network attack has failed to be located.

[0034] The beneficial effects of the present invention are:

[0035] 1. The present invention uses the RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system supported in the routing network to trace the source of large-scale flooding traffic and malicious traffic discovered by the network intrusion detection system, thereby achieving the purpose of accurately obtaining the location of the attack source.

[0036] Specifically, the RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system analyzes and organizes the collected information such as the trusted routing prefixes of each autonomous domain to depict an accurate topological portrait of the current routing network. For large-scale flooding attack traffic and malicious access traffic in the network, the RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system locates the network location of the source of the network attack based on the source IP address of the attack traffic reported by the network intrusion detection system, after traversing the topological portrait in the local database, thereby tracing the source of the network attack traffic.

[0037] 2. The present invention is a more refined and automated dynamic tracing algorithm under network attacks, which balances and coordinates the contradiction between the dynamic tracing of network attacks and the efficiency of the trusted routing issuance system, and can be used as an effective means of dynamic tracing of network attacks in the field of large-scale flooding traffic and malicious access traffic attack tracing.

[0038] 3. The present invention can effectively solve the problem that network attack information cannot be used collaboratively when tracing network attacks across multiple autonomous domains and the network attack tracing accuracy is poor. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0039] Figure 1 It is a topological schematic diagram of the present invention;

[0040] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a network topology image matrix of the present invention;

[0041] Figure 3 It is intended to represent the ROA information of the present invention;

[0042] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of a trusted prefix registration message of the present invention;

[0043] Figure 5 Schematic diagram of network attack warning message of the present invention

[0044] Figure 6 It is a schematic diagram of the process of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0045] The present invention will be further described below by way of embodiments in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, but is not limited thereto.

[0046] Embodiment 1:

[0047] like Figure 6 As shown, this embodiment provides a network attack dynamic tracing method based on the RPKI trusted routing issuance system, the steps are as follows:

[0048] S100: Start the RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system, create a network topology portrait matrix and configure initial values.

[0049] See the network topology matrix diagram for details. Figure 2 :The network topology portrait matrix is ​​a 4096 by 4096 two-dimensional array. The superscript of the two-dimensional array represents the autonomous domain number (ASN), and the subscript represents the network device number inside the autonomous domain (AS). Each network topology matrix unit stores multiple network device detailed information records of the corresponding relationship between the interface index and IP address prefix of the network device, which are composed of the index value field of the interface in the current network device occupying 16 bits and the IP address prefix field occupying 128 bits.

[0050] S200: Create a ROA information table and configure initial values.

[0051] See the ROA information table for a schematic diagram. Figure 3 Each ROA information occupies one table entry. In each table entry, there are an 8-bit ROA information number field, a 32-bit ROA prefix field, a 32-bit ROA prefix mask field, a 16-bit ROA autonomous domain number field, and a 16-bit network device number field.

[0052] S300: The ROA management system of the Internet operator (ISP) sends a trusted prefix registration message to the RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system;

[0053] See the diagram of the trusted prefix registration message for details. Figure 4 , which are the ROA prefix field occupying 32 bits, the ROA prefix mask field occupying 32 bits, the ROA autonomous domain number occupying 16 bits, the network device number field occupying 16 bits, and the interface index field occupying 16 bits.

[0054] S400: The network attack monitoring probe starts the network attack monitoring program, and after discovering the network attack, sends a network attack warning message to the RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system;

[0055] S500: The RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance program monitors network data and prepares to receive messages;

[0056] S600: The RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance program receives the trusted prefix registration message sent in step S300, retrieves relevant information, scans the ROA information table, and executes step S601 if there is a record, and executes step S602 if there is no record;

[0057] S601: According to the message information obtained in step S600, the autonomous domain number and the network device number of the ROA in the matching item are updated;

[0058] S602: Create a ROA information table entry according to the message information obtained in step S600.

[0059] S700: Scan the network topology portrait matrix according to the autonomous domain number and the network device number of the ROA obtained in step S600, and retrieve the detailed record of the network device;

[0060] S800: Update the IP address prefix and interface index fields in the network device detailed record obtained in step S700 according to the information obtained from the message in step S600, and return to step S400 to continue execution;

[0061] S900: The RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance program receives the network attack warning message sent in step S400, scans the ROA information table according to the message information, and executes steps S901, S902, and S903 if there is a record, and executes step S904 if there is no record;

[0062] S901: According to the record obtained in step S900, the network device number and the autonomous domain number of the ROA are obtained;

[0063] S902: Scan the network topology image matrix according to the information obtained in step S901, and retrieve detailed information of network devices;

[0064] S903: According to the message information obtained in step S900, scan the detailed information of the network device, locate the specific interface number of the network device, and record the tracing result of this network attack.

[0065] S904: The log is recorded to indicate that the origin of the network attack has failed to be located.

[0066] S1000: When the system generates a prompt message, the system returns to S400 to continue execution.

[0067] The topology diagram of this embodiment is shown in Figure 1 , Figure 1 The left side is the RPKI trusted routing issuance system architecture, which is used to mark the role of the trusted routing issuance function in the architecture in this embodiment; Figure 1 The right side shows the actual process of dynamic tracing of network attacks in this embodiment. The network intrusion detection system checks the traffic at the boundary of the autonomous domain for malicious traffic. After discovering malicious traffic, it reports it to the network attack dynamic tracing system. The system searches the local information database based on the reported attack information to determine the source network of the network attack.

[0068] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. For those skilled in the art, the present invention may have various modifications and variations. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present invention shall be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A network attack dynamic tracing method based on RPKI trusted routing issuance system, characterized in that: Here are the steps: (1) The RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system initializes the network topology portrait matrix; (2) The RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system initializes the ROA information table; (3) The Internet operator's ROA management system starts reporting ROA information; (4) The network attack monitoring probe performs network attack monitoring. After discovering a network attack, it sends a network attack warning message to the RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system; (5) The RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system monitors network data and prepares to receive messages; (6) The RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system receives the ROA information reporting message of step (3) and determines the execution steps according to the content of the message; (7) Using the autonomous domain number and network device number of the ROA obtained from the message in step (6), scan the network topology portrait matrix and retrieve detailed records of network devices; (8) Using the ROA prefix and ROA prefix mask obtained from the message in step (6) to synthesize the IP address prefix, and using the interface index obtained from the message in step (6) to fill the IP address prefix and interface index fields of the network device detailed record, and return to execute step (4); (9) The RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system receives the network attack warning message in step (4) and determines the execution process based on the message, which is as follows: Extract the attacking network segment IP information from the message, scan the ROA information table, and if a record is found, execute steps (9.1), (9.2), and (9.3); if no record is found, execute step (9.4); (9.1) Using the record found in step (9), extract the network device number B and the autonomous domain number C to which the ROA belongs from the record; (9.2) Using the network device number B and the autonomous domain number C of the ROA obtained in step (9.1), scan the network topology image matrix and retrieve the detailed information record of the network device; (9.3) Using the attack network segment IP information obtained in step (9), scan the network device detailed information record, extract the interface index A, and use the autonomous domain number B and network device number C of the ROA obtained in step (9.1) to record the log prompt to locate the A interface of the network device C in the autonomous domain B where the network attack originated; (9.4) The log records indicate that the origin of this network attack has failed to be located; (10) When the system generates a prompt message, return to step (4) to continue execution.

2. The method for dynamic tracing of network attacks based on the RPKI trusted routing issuance system as claimed in claim 1 is characterized in that: In step (1), the network topology portrait matrix is ​​a two-dimensional array, the superscript of the two-dimensional array represents ASN, and the subscript represents the network device number inside the AS. Each network topology portrait matrix unit stores detailed information of multiple network devices, and the detailed information includes an interface index and a corresponding IP address prefix, wherein the interface index is the index value of the interface in the current network device, and the IP address prefix is ​​the IP network segment information allocated to the interface in the current network device.

3. The network attack dynamic tracing method based on the RPKI trusted routing issuance system as claimed in claim 2 is characterized in that: In step (1), the initialization process is that the RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system creates a network topology portrait matrix with a maximum superscript value of 4096 and a maximum subscript value of 4096. The network device detailed information record stored in each network topology portrait matrix unit is empty.

4. The method for dynamic tracing of network attacks based on the RPKI trusted routing issuance system as claimed in claim 3 is characterized in that: In step (2), the ROA information table includes the ROA record number, the ROA prefix, the ROA prefix mask, the ROA autonomous domain number, and the network device number, wherein the ROA record number is the index value of the ROA record in the ROA information table, the ROA prefix is ​​the trusted routing information prefix value, the ROA prefix mask is the mask value of the trusted routing information prefix, the ROA autonomous domain number is the autonomous domain number value to which the trusted routing prefix belongs, and the network device number is the index value of the network device configured by the current ROA prefix. The RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system initializes the ROA information table to be empty.

5. The method for dynamic tracing of network attacks based on the RPKI trusted routing issuance system as claimed in claim 4 is characterized in that: In step (3), the ROA information reporting process is to retrieve the local trusted prefix allocation information from the local configuration file, assemble a trusted prefix registration message, and fill the ROA prefix, ROA prefix mask, ROA autonomous domain number, network device number and interface index read from the configuration file into the ROA prefix, ROA prefix mask, ROA autonomous domain number, network device number and interface index fields of the message. The destination address of the message is the server address where the RPKI trusted routing prefix issuance system is located.

6. The method for dynamic tracing of network attacks based on the RPKI trusted routing issuance system as claimed in claim 5 is characterized in that: Step (4) specifically includes, after detecting the network attack traffic, extracting the source IP address of the message from the network attack traffic, taking out the attack handling method and the network attack monitoring probe IP address from the local configuration file, assembling the network attack alarm message, filling the extracted attack traffic source IP address into the attack network segment IP information of the network attack alarm message, and filling the destination address of the message with the network attack monitoring probe IP address taken out from the local configuration file.

7. The method for dynamic tracing of network attacks based on the RPKI trusted routing issuance system as claimed in claim 6 is characterized in that: Step (6) specifically comprises: extracting the ROA prefix, the ROA prefix mask, the autonomous domain number to which the ROA belongs, the network device number to which it belongs, and the interface index from the reported message, traversing the ROA information table according to the ROA prefix and the ROA prefix mask, and if a record is found, executing step (6.1); if no record is found, executing step (6.2); (6.1) using the matching item obtained from step (6) and the autonomous domain number and network device number of the ROA obtained from the message in step (6), updating the autonomous domain number and network device number of the ROA in the matching item; (6.2) Create a ROA information table entry, fill the ROA record number field with the value of the current maximum ROA record number plus one, and use the ROA prefix, ROA prefix mask, ROA autonomous domain number, and network device number obtained from the report message in step (6) to fill in the ROA prefix, ROA prefix mask, ROA autonomous domain number, and network device number fields in the ROA information table entry.