A decentralized key management method based on blockchain and quantum key

By adopting the decentralized key management method of blockchain and quantum key in automotive mobile network communication, using smart contracts and quantum keys to realize automatic management and security update of public and private key pairs, the existing technology is solved The centralized vulnerability of key management and insufficient dynamic management capabilities improve the efficiency and security of key management.

CN118574120BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-05AN HUI GUAN DUN KE JI YOU XIAN GONG SI
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411039666.8
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-07-31
Publication Date
2024-11-05
Estimated Expiration
2044-07-31

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing key management solution in automotive mobile network communication has a centralized model that is susceptible to single point of failure, and cannot effectively support fast and dynamic key management and key updates, and cannot achieve efficient and secure decentralized keys. manage.

Method used

Adopt a decentralized key management method based on blockchain and quantum keys, and automatically manage public and private key pairs through the deployment of smart contracts from blockchain nodes, and use quantum random numbers and quantum key encryption to achieve key updates and Undo and lightweight bidirectional authentication and key negotiation through bilinear mapping and binary polynomial functions.

Benefits of technology

Improve the efficiency and security of key management, prevent data tampering, solve the problem of single point of failure, realize the distributed storage of public and private key pairs, enhance the security of session keys, and reduce the computing overhead, and support passwords. Regular updates and revocations of keys.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The present invention relates to the field of vehicle networking technology, and discloses a decentralized key management method based on blockchain and quantum key. The method comprises: an automobile service provider receives an encryption update request from a user for a public-private key pair, and retrieves the validity period of the user's public-private key pair on the blockchain according to the user's identity; the user includes a roadside unit and a vehicle; when the automobile service provider determines that the validity period of the user's public-private key pair is about to expire, an updated public-private key pair and an updated validity period are generated, and the user's identity information and the updated public-private key pair are sent to the blockchain, and a smart contract deployed on the blockchain node is called to add the update record to the blockchain; the automobile service provider encrypts the user's identity information, the updated public-private key pair and the updated validity period and sends them to the user. The present invention effectively improves the efficiency and security of key management for vehicle mobile network communications.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of Internet of Vehicles, and specifically to a decentralized key management method based on blockchain and quantum key. Background Art

[0002] In recent years, the development of wireless communication technology and automobiles has promoted the development of intelligent transportation systems, which solve various vehicle traffic problems such as traffic congestion, information dissemination, accidents, etc. Vehicular Ad-hoc Network (VANET) is an important component of intelligent transportation systems, in which moving vehicles connect and communicate with each other wirelessly. Wireless access standards in vehicle environments have promoted the development of vehicle networks. The maturity of 5G technology has injected great potential into VANET. With the higher reliability and lower latency of 5G, the layout of autonomous driving, intelligent transportation and smart cities will be realized in the near future. Although the development of VANET is driven by the formulation of wireless communication technology, some communication security issues remain unresolved, and one of the most serious problems is key management.

[0003] The most popular key management solution is the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) technology, which can achieve large-scale key management. There are many PKI-based key management schemes in VANET. However, such schemes adopt a centralized management mode, and their security must rely on the Trust Authority (TA). The main drawback of this model is that it is susceptible to single point failure. In addition, there is also the problem of high communication overhead. Therefore, the key management mechanism based on PKI is not suitable for VANET with distributed and dynamic topology.

[0004] As a distributed platform, blockchain has become one of the feasible solutions for storing user keys. Recently, researchers have proposed some blockchain-based key management schemes for VANET. However, among these schemes, some cannot support automatic key management of some fast and dynamic applications in VANET and do not support key updates, and some do not implement key agreement for direct protection of data transmission. Blockchain technology can be regarded as a double-edged sword for key management in VANET. On the one hand, the tamper-proof feature of the block can be used to construct a public key trust chain. On the other hand, this feature brings some troubles to key management, such as key update and revocation. Therefore, how to achieve efficient and secure decentralized key management is an urgent problem to be solved in vehicle mobile network communications. Summary of the invention

[0005] In order to avoid and overcome the technical problems existing in the prior art, the present invention provides a decentralized key management method based on blockchain and quantum key. The present invention uses smart contracts deployed on blockchain nodes to realize automatic management of users' public and private key pairs and validity periods, thereby improving the efficiency and security of key management.

[0006] To achieve the above object, the present invention provides the following technical solutions:

[0007] The present invention discloses a decentralized key management method based on blockchain and quantum key, comprising:

[0008] The automobile service provider receives an encrypted update request from a user for a public-private key pair, and retrieves the validity period of the user's public-private key pair on the blockchain according to the user's identity; the user includes a roadside unit and a vehicle; the update request is encrypted using a pre-negotiated quantum key QK.

[0009] When the automobile service provider determines that the validity period of the user's public-private key pair is about to expire, it generates an updated public-private key pair and an updated validity period, sends the user's identity information and the updated public-private key pair to the blockchain, and calls the smart contract deployed on the blockchain node to add the update record to the blockchain.

[0010] The automobile service provider encrypts the user identity information, the updated public-private key pair and the updated validity period to the user using the quantum key QK.

[0011] As a further improvement of the above solution, the decentralized key management method also includes:

[0012] When the RSU detects malicious behavior from a vehicle, it sends a voting transaction to the blockchain to trigger the smart contract to start voting on the vehicle’s behavior.

[0013] If the vehicle continues to perform malicious operations, the roadside unit uploads the ticket to the blockchain; when the number of votes exceeds the set threshold, the smart contract notifies the automotive service provider.

[0014] The automotive service provider sends a key revocation command to the blockchain to remove the malicious vehicle’s identity and public-private key pair.

[0015] As a further improvement of the above solution, the decentralized key management method also includes:

[0016] The automotive service provider actively checks the validity period of the user's public-private key pair regularly, and sends a transaction to the blockchain to trigger a smart contract when it expires to remove the user's expired identity and public-private key pair in the blockchain.

[0017] As a further improvement of the above solution, before the automobile service provider receives the user's encryption update request for the public-private key pair, the decentralized key management method further includes: S1. System initialization phase. S1 includes the following steps, namely S11 to S14.

[0018] S11. The car service provider sets the global parameters {G1, g, n, P, h1, h2, h3}; where G1 is the multiplication cyclic group of the n-order elliptic curve; g is the generator, P is the p-order generating point of the generator g, and p is a prime number; h1, h2, and h3 are hash functions, and h1: {0, 1} * →{0,1} l ,h2:{0,1} * →{0,1} l , h3:{0,1} * →{0,1} l , superscript l Represents the output length of the hash function.

[0019] S12. The automotive service provider selects multiple polynomials and packages each polynomial and the corresponding label and stores them on the blockchain; wherein each polynomial is represented as:

[0020] ;

[0021] In the formula, q is a prime number, a ij is a positive integer randomly selected over the prime field GF(q); the value range of i and j is [0, t], t is the degree of the binary polynomial; f(·) is a polynomial function with · as input variable, and x, y and the output of f(x, y) are all elements in the prime field GF(q).

[0022] S13. The automotive service provider creates a blockchain account for each blockchain node and uses the account private key and address to create a smart contract to manage the user's public key through the smart contract.

[0023] S14. The car service provider generates a quantum random number as its own private key sk N , and thereby generate the public-private key pair {pk N ,sk N}, .

[0024] As a further improvement of the above solution, after S1, the decentralized key management method further includes: S2. Vehicle registration stage. S2 includes the following steps, namely S21 to S24.

[0025] S21. The vehicle submits a registration request and the vehicle's own identity VID to the automotive service provider through a secure channel.

[0026] S22. When the car service provider receives the registration request, it generates quantum random numbers vi, si and ri, calculates the anonymous identity information of the vehicle AID=h1(VID||ri||t0), and generates a tag 、Public-private key pair {pk v ,sk v} and the public-private key pair {pk v ,sk v}Validity period T v .

[0027] Among them, sk v =vi, ;|| represents a separator; t0 is the timestamp when the registration request is received; the public and private key pair {pk v ,sk v}Validity period T v The calculation formula is: v =(xc)·T; T is the unit time period; x is the time used to determine the validity period T v The preset parameter of the upper limit; c represents the safety index corresponding to the type of vehicle;

[0028] S23. Automotive service provider encapsulation data {AID, pk v ,T v} and sent to the blockchain.

[0029] S24. When the blockchain receives {AID,pk v ,T v}, the automotive service provider provides {AID,pk v ,sk v ,T v ,h1,h2,h3,sig v ,pk N ,g,P}, and randomly select m polynomials from multiple polynomials, m>1, and provide the m polynomials and the corresponding labels to the vehicle to complete the vehicle registration.

[0030] As a further improvement of the above solution, after S2, the decentralized key management method further includes: S3. Roadside unit registration phase. S3 includes the following steps, namely S31 to S34.

[0031] S31. The roadside unit, i.e., the roadside unit, submits a registration application to the automobile service provider via a wired connection.

[0032] S32. The automobile service provider generates a unique identity information RID and a public-private key pair {pk R ,sk R} and the public-private key pair {pk R ,sk R}Validity period T R ; where T R Is a fixed value.

[0033] S33. The car service provider randomly selects a prime number bi and generates a label .

[0034] S34. Automotive service provider encapsulation data {RID, pk R ,T R} and uploads this data to the blockchain, triggering the smart contract, which adds the transaction record to the blockchain and then provides {RID, pk R ,sk R ,T R ,h1,h2,h3,pk N ,sig r ,g,bi,P}.

[0035] As a further improvement of the above solution, after S3, the decentralized key management method further includes: S4. Authentication phase of vehicle and roadside unit. S4 includes the following steps, namely S41 to S43.

[0036] S41. The roadside unit periodically broadcasts the message {RID, pk R ,sig r ,bi,T R};

[0037] S42. The vehicle receives the message {RID, pk R ,sig r ,bi,T R}, check T R Is it expired? If yes, the authentication fails and the roadside unit submits a key update request to the car service provider. Otherwise, calculate h r =h1(bi||RID), and h r Substitute into the equation to determine e(sig r ,g)=e(h r ,pk N ) is true; if the equation e(sig r ,g)=e(h r ,pk N ) is established, it means that the roadside unit has the public key of the car service provider and the roadside unit identity is legitimate. Then the vehicle calculates And send EV to the roadside unit; where t1 is the timestamp when the vehicle calculates EV; En (·)represents an encryption function using · as the key; e(·) represents the operation of a bilinear map.

[0038] S43. After receiving the EV sent by the vehicle, the roadside unit uses the private key sk R Decrypt EV to get (AID||sig v ||pk v ||si||t1), after the roadside unit verifies that the timestamp t1 is valid, according to pk v Retrieve the validity period T on the blockchain v And check T v Is it expired? If yes, the authentication fails and the vehicle submits a key update request to the automotive service provider. Otherwise, the roadside unit calculates h v =h1(si||AID), and use the public key of the car service provider as pk' N , then judge the equation e(sig v ,g)=e(h v ,pk' N ) is true; if the equation e(sig v ,g)=e(h v ,pk' N ) is established, the vehicle has the public key of the automotive service provider and the vehicle identity is legitimate.

[0039] As a further improvement of the above solution, after S4, the decentralized key management method further includes: S5. Session key negotiation phase. S5 includes the following steps, namely S51 to S54.

[0040] S51. The roadside unit generates quantum random numbers k1, m', using the public key pk v Generate encrypted message , and generate a hash value H C1 =h2(AID||C1||M||t2), and then send a message {AID,H C1 ,C1,t2,M}; where M=m'·P; t2 is the generated hash value H C1 The timestamp of the time; Represents an encryption function that uses a public key as the key.

[0041] S52. The vehicle receives the message {AID,H C1 ,C1,t2,M}, after verifying that timestamp t2 is valid, the hash value H is calculated C1 '=h2(AID||C1||M||t2), and verify H C1 and H C1 'Are they equal.

[0042] If H C1 and HC1 'Equal, the vehicle uses its own private key sk v Decrypt C1 to obtain the parameters (RID, AID, k1, M) for establishing the session key, then generate quantum random numbers k2 and z, and calculate Z, Z = z·P; the vehicle randomly selects a polynomial from the m polynomials to calculate K v , K v =f(k1,k2), and obtain the label f* corresponding to the polynomial.

[0043] S53. Vehicle calculates session key SK V , S.K. V =h3(K v ||M·z), using the public key pk R Generate encrypted message , and generate a hash value H C2 =h2(RID||C2||f*||t3), then the vehicle sends a message {RID,H C2 ,C2,f*,t3}; t3 is the generated hash value H C2 The timestamp of the time.

[0044] S54. The roadside unit receives the message {RID,H C2 ,C2,f*,t3}, after verifying that timestamp t3 is valid, the hash value H is calculated C2 '=h2(RID||C2||f*||t3), and verify H C2 and H C2 'Are they equal.

[0045] If H C2 and H C2 ' is equal, the roadside unit uses its own private key sk R Decrypt C2 to get the parameters for establishing the session key (RID, AID, k2, Z), and query the polynomial corresponding to f* on the blockchain to calculate K rsu , K rsu =f*(k1,k2), so that the roadside unit calculates the session key SK RSU =h3(K rsu ||Z·m'), at this time SK V =SK RSU That is, the session key negotiation is successful.

[0046] As a further improvement of the above solution, after step S54, the session key negotiation phase further includes the following steps, namely S55-S56.

[0047] S55. The roadside unit and the automobile service provider negotiate the quantum key QK through the BB84 protocol. The roadside unit uses the session key to encrypt the quantum key QK and sends the encrypted quantum key to the vehicle.

[0048] S56. The vehicle uses the session key to decrypt and obtain the quantum key QK.

[0049] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0050] 1. The decentralized key management method based on blockchain and quantum key disclosed in the present invention utilizes smart contracts deployed on nodes on the blockchain to realize automatic update of user public and private key pairs on the blockchain. The blockchain has the function of distributed ledger, which can prevent attackers from tampering with data, solves the single point failure problem of the existing centralized key management model, and realizes the distributed storage of public and private key pairs, thereby effectively improving the efficiency and security of vehicle mobile network communication key management.

[0051] 2. This method designs a lightweight two-way authentication and key negotiation protocol based on bilinear mapping. It is used to prevent illegal access by unregistered users and malicious users. At the same time, the vehicle and the road test unit use the symmetry of the binary polynomial function to establish the session key. The vehicle and the road side unit can obtain the same parameters through different calculation processes, which reduces the calculation overhead and can be used to realize the negotiation of the session key and enhance the security of the session key.

[0052] 3. This method can realize the update and revocation of keys, regularly update keys, revoke key lists, and prevent attacks caused by insecure keys. The blockchain technology used in it accelerates the propagation of updated or revoked keys to the entire network. The scheme also uses quantum random numbers and quantum keys. The superior randomness of quantum random numbers and the non-cloning of quantum keys make the key management process more secure. In the subsequent key update stage, quantum keys are used to issue public and private keys, thereby ensuring the security of public and private keys in the transmission process.

[0053] 4. This method realizes the update and revocation of the public keys of the car and the roadside unit by setting the validity period for the public keys of the car and the roadside unit. The car service provider determines the validity period of the distributed public key based on the attributes of the vehicle, because vehicles with high security and confidentiality requirements are more likely to be attacked, have a higher risk of information leakage, and need to frequently change keys. Designing different validity periods for vehicle public keys with different security requirements can reasonably utilize computing resources and reduce system computing overhead.

[0054] 5. The bilinear mapping method set in the authentication stage of the vehicle and the roadside unit enables the roadside unit and the vehicle to achieve lightweight two-way authentication by verifying whether the other party has the VSP public key. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0055] Figure 1 This is a framework diagram of a decentralized key management system based on blockchain and quantum key in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0056] Figure 2 This is a flow chart of a decentralized key management method based on blockchain and quantum key in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0057] Figure 3 The figure is a schematic diagram of two-way authentication and key negotiation between a vehicle and a roadside unit in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0058] Figure 4 Flow chart of the key update phase in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0059] Figure 5 Schematic diagram of vehicle key update in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0060] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0061] See also Figures 1 to 3 An embodiment of the present invention provides a decentralized key management method based on blockchain and quantum key, and a decentralized key management system applying the method, the system including an automobile service provider, a blockchain, a vehicle, and a roadside unit.

[0062] Automotive service providers for the deployment of blockchain and smart contracts, identity review of vehicle users, publication of transaction data, and registration, update, and revocation of user public keys.

[0063] Roadside units, which can communicate with vehicles and also access the blockchain.

[0064] The vehicle is equipped with an on-board unit, a wireless communication module that supports V2V (vehicle-to-vehicle) and V2I (vehicle-to-infrastructure) communications, and a hardware security module for storing cryptographic materials.

[0065] Blockchain, which is jointly maintained by the roadside unit and the automotive service provider, records the public key information of the vehicle and the roadside unit (anonymous identity, public key and validity period), and stores the mapping table of binary polynomials and their labels. Blockchain nodes can deploy smart contracts, which are automated contracts executed on the blockchain. They are written in code and automatically executed when specific conditions are met without the intervention of a third party. Smart contracts are usually used to execute and manage the exchange of digital assets, data or information.

[0066] In this embodiment, the blockchain-based decentralized key management method includes the following steps, namely steps S1 to S6.

[0067] S1. System initialization phase.

[0068] Step S1 may include the following specific steps, namely S11 to S14.

[0069] S11. The car service provider sets the global parameters {G1, g, n, P, h1, h2, h3}; where G1 is the multiplication cyclic group of the n-order elliptic curve; g is the generator, P is the p-order generating point of the generator g, and p is a prime number; h1, h2, and h3 are hash functions, and h1: {0, 1} * →{0,1} l ,h2:{0,1} * →{0,1} l , h3:{0,1} * →{0,1} l , superscript l Represents the output length of the hash function.

[0070] S12. The automotive service provider selects multiple polynomials and packages each polynomial and the corresponding label and stores them on the blockchain; wherein each polynomial is represented as:

[0071] ;

[0072] In the formula, q is a prime number, a ij is a positive integer randomly selected over the prime field GF(q); the value range of i and j is [0, t], t is the degree of the binary polynomial; f(·) is a polynomial function with · as input variable, and x, y and the output of f(x, y) are all elements in the prime field GF(q).

[0073] According to the symmetry of binary t-order polynomials, vehicles and roadside units can obtain the same parameters through different calculation processes, which reduces the calculation overhead and can be used to implement the negotiation of session keys and enhance the security of session keys.

[0074] S13. The automotive service provider creates a blockchain account for each blockchain node and uses the account private key and address to create a smart contract to manage the user's public key through the smart contract.

[0075] S14. The car service provider generates a quantum random number as its own private key sk N , and thereby generate the public-private key pair {pk N ,sk N}, .

[0076] S2. Vehicle registration stage.

[0077] Step S2 may include the following specific steps, namely S21 to S24.

[0078] S21. The vehicle submits a registration request and the vehicle's own identity VID to the automotive service provider through a secure channel.

[0079] S22. When the car service provider receives the registration request, it generates quantum random numbers vi, si and ri, calculates the anonymous identity information of the vehicle AID=h1(VID||ri||t0), and generates a tag 、Public-private key pair {pk v ,sk v} and the public-private key pair {pk v ,sk v}Validity period T v .

[0080] Among them, sk v =vi, ;|| represents a separator; t0 is the timestamp when the registration request is received; the public and private key pair {pk v ,sk v}Validity period T v The calculation formula is: v =(xc)·T; T is the unit time period; x is the time used to determine the validity period T v The preset parameter of the upper limit; c represents the safety index corresponding to the type of vehicle; in this embodiment, the safety indexes c of several common vehicles on the road are shown in Table 1.

[0081] Table 1: Vehicle safety index table

[0082] ;

[0083] S23. Automotive service provider encapsulation data {AID, pk v ,T v} and sent to the blockchain.

[0084] S24. When the blockchain receives {AID,pk v ,T v}, the automotive service provider provides {AID,pk v ,sk v ,T v ,h1,h2,h3,sig v ,pk N ,g,P}, and randomly select m polynomials from multiple polynomials, m>1, and provide the m polynomials and the corresponding labels to the vehicle to complete the vehicle registration.

[0085] S3. Roadside unit registration phase.

[0086] Step S3 may include the following specific steps, namely S31 to S34.

[0087] S31. The roadside unit, i.e., the roadside unit, submits a registration application to the automobile service provider via a wired connection.

[0088] S32. The automobile service provider generates a unique identity information RID and a public-private key pair {pk R ,sk R} and the public-private key pair {pk R ,sk R}Validity period T R ; where T R Is a fixed value.

[0089] The present invention realizes the updating and revocation of the public keys of the automobile and the roadside unit by setting the validity period for the public keys of the automobile and the roadside unit. The automobile service provider determines the validity period of the distributed public keys according to the attributes of the vehicle, because vehicles with high security and confidentiality requirements are more likely to be attacked, have a higher risk of information leakage, and need to frequently replace the keys. Designing different validity periods for the public keys of vehicles with different security requirements can reasonably utilize computing resources and reduce system computing overhead. At the same time, the use of binary t-order polynomials reduces the computing overhead, making the authentication process and key negotiation process of the vehicle and the roadside unit more lightweight.

[0090] S33. The car service provider randomly selects a prime number bi and generates a label .

[0091] S34. Automotive service provider encapsulation data {RID, pk R ,T R} and uploads this data to the blockchain, triggering the smart contract, which adds the transaction record to the blockchain and then provides {RID, pk R ,sk R ,TR ,h1,h2,h3,pk N ,sig r ,g,bi,P}.

[0092] S4. Authentication phase of vehicle and roadside unit.

[0093] Step S4 may include the following specific steps, namely S41 to S43.

[0094] S41. The roadside unit periodically broadcasts the message {RID, pk R ,sig r ,bi,T R}.

[0095] S42. The vehicle receives the message {RID, pk R ,sig r ,bi,T R}, check T R Is it expired? If yes, the authentication fails and the roadside unit submits a key update request to the car service provider. Otherwise, calculate h r =h1(bi||RID), and h r Substitute into the equation to determine e(sig r ,g)=e(h r ,pk N ) is true; if the equation e(sig r ,g)=e(h r ,pk N ) is established, it means that the roadside unit has the public key of the car service provider and the roadside unit identity is legitimate. Then the vehicle calculates And send EV to the roadside unit; where t1 is the timestamp when the vehicle calculates EV; En (·) represents an encryption function using · as the key; e(·) represents the operation of a bilinear map.

[0096] It should be noted that a bilinear map is: Let G0 and G1 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p, and the generators of G0 and G1 are g0 and g1 respectively. A bilinear map G0 × G1 → G T There are the following 3 attributes.

[0097] 1. Bilinear: For any u∈G0, v∈G1, a, b∈Zp, there is e(u a , v b ) = e(u,v) ab .

[0098] 2. Non-degeneracy: There exist u∈G0, v∈G1 such that e(u, v)≠1.

[0099] 3. Computability: For any u∈G0, v∈G1, there exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(u, v).

[0100] The above bilinear mapping e: G0×G1→GT is called an asymmetric bilinear mapping. If G0=G1, the mapping is: G0×G0→GT, which is called a symmetric bilinear mapping.

[0101] In the present invention, bilinear mapping enables the roadside unit and the vehicle to implement lightweight two-way authentication by verifying whether the other party has the VSP public key.

[0102] S43. After receiving the EV sent by the vehicle, the roadside unit uses the private key sk R Decrypt EV to get (AID||sig v ||pk v ||si||t1), after the roadside unit verifies that the timestamp t1 is valid, according to pk v Retrieve the validity period T on the blockchain v And check T v Is it expired? If yes, the authentication fails and the vehicle submits a key update request to the automotive service provider. Otherwise, the roadside unit calculates h v =h1(si||AID), and use the public key of the car service provider as pk' N (When the roadside unit is registered, the car service provider sends its public key to the roadside unit, and the roadside unit uses this public key to calculate whether the following equation is true), and then judge the equation e(sig v ,g)=e(h v ,pk' N ) is true; if the equation e(sig v ,g)=e(h v ,pk' N ) is established, the vehicle has the public key of the automotive service provider and the vehicle identity is legitimate.

[0103] S5. Session key negotiation phase.

[0104] Step S5 may include the following specific steps, namely S51 to S56.

[0105] S51. The roadside unit generates quantum random numbers k1, m', using the public key pk v Generate encrypted message

[0106] , and generate a hash value H C1 =h2(AID||C1||M||t2), and then send a message {AID,H C1,C1,t2,M}; where M=m'·P; t2 is the generated hash value H C1 The timestamp of the time; Represents an encryption function that uses a public key as the key.

[0107] S52. The vehicle receives the message {AID,H C1 ,C1,t2,M}, after verifying that timestamp t2 is valid, the hash value H is calculated C1 '=h2(AID||C1||M||t2), and verify H C1 and H C1 'Are they equal.

[0108] If H C1 and H C1 'Equal, the vehicle uses its own private key sk v Decrypt C1 to obtain the parameters (RID, AID, k1, M) for establishing the session key, then generate quantum random numbers k2 and z, and calculate Z, Z = z·P; the vehicle randomly selects a polynomial from the m polynomials to calculate K v , K v =f(k1,k2), and obtain the label f* corresponding to the polynomial.

[0109] S53. Vehicle calculates session key SK V , S.K. V =h3(K v ||M·z), using the public key pk R Generate encrypted message , and generate a hash value H C2 =h2(RID||C2||f*||t3), then the vehicle sends a message {RID,H C2 ,C2,f*,t3}; t3 is the generated hash value H C2 The timestamp of the time.

[0110] S54. The roadside unit receives the message {RID,H C2 ,C2,f*,t3}, after verifying that timestamp t3 is valid, the hash value H is calculated C2 '=h2(RID||C2||f*||t3), and verify H C2 and H C2 'Are they equal.

[0111] If H C2 and H C2 ' is equal, the roadside unit uses its own private key sk R Decrypt C2 to get the parameters for establishing the session key (RID, AID, k2, Z), and query the polynomial corresponding to f* on the blockchain to calculate K rsu, K rsu =f*(k1,k2), so that the roadside unit calculates the session key SK RSU =h3(K rsu ||Z·m), at this time SK V =SK RSU That is, the session key negotiation is successful.

[0112] S55. The roadside unit and the automobile service provider negotiate the quantum key QK through the BB84 protocol. The roadside unit uses the session key to encrypt the quantum key QK and sends the encrypted quantum key to the vehicle.

[0113] S56. The vehicle uses the session key to decrypt and obtain the quantum key QK.

[0114] S6. Key update phase.

[0115] See also Figure 4 , the automobile service provider receives the user's encrypted update request for the public-private key pair, and retrieves the validity period of the user's public-private key pair on the blockchain according to the user's identity; the user includes a roadside unit and a vehicle.

[0116] When the automobile service provider determines that the validity period of the user's public-private key pair is about to expire, it generates an updated public-private key pair and an updated validity period, sends the user's identity information and the updated public-private key pair to the blockchain, and calls the smart contract deployed on the blockchain node to add the update record to the blockchain.

[0117] The automobile service provider encrypts the user identity information, the updated public-private key pair, and the updated validity period and sends them to the user.

[0118] It should be noted that each pair of public and private keys has a validity period, which is managed by a digital certificate, which has a start date and an end date.

[0119] Specifically, see Figure 5 ,The automobile service provider publishes a new public key by using a smart contract.,The following contents, i.e., S61~S63, are the specific steps for updating the vehicle key.

[0120] S61. The vehicle regularly checks the validity period of its public and private key pair T v , and at T v Before expiration, use the quantum key QK to encrypt the key material {AID, pk v ,sk v ,T v} and update request quest, thereby obtaining the encrypted message QUEST,

[0121] QUEST=En QK (AID||pkv ||T v ||quest), then the vehicle sends {QUEST,T q}, T q Indicates the timestamp when the message was sent.

[0122] S62. The car service provider receives {QUEST,T q}, verify the timestamp T q After it is valid, the quantum key QK is used to decrypt (AID||pk v ||sk v ||T v ||quest), then check the update request quest, and retrieve the validity period T on the blockchain based on the anonymous identity and public key of the vehicle v If the vehicle public key is about to expire, a new public-private key pair (newpk v ,newsk v ) and the new validity period newT v , then the car service provider re-randomly selects m polynomials from the n polynomials.

[0123] S63. Automotive service provider encapsulation data {AID, newpk v ,newsk v} and sent to the blockchain, then the smart contract is called to add the updated record of the vehicle public key and validity period to the blockchain, and the relevant materials of the newly generated key are encrypted with the quantum key QK to obtain the encrypted message NEWK, NEWK=En QK (AID||newpk v ||newsk v ||newT v ), and then NEWK and m randomly selected polynomials and corresponding labels are sent to the vehicle.

[0124] The principle of roadside unit key update is similar to the above-mentioned vehicle key update, which will not be repeated here.

[0125] S7. Key revocation phase.

[0126] S71. When the roadside unit detects malicious behavior of the vehicle, the roadside unit sends a voting transaction to the blockchain to trigger the smart contract to start voting on the vehicle's behavior.

[0127] S72. If the vehicle continues to perform malicious operations, the roadside unit uploads the ticket to the blockchain; once the number of votes Vot v Exceeding the set number threshold Thr, that is, Vot v >Thr, the smart contract notifies the car service provider.

[0128] S73. The automotive service provider sends a key revocation command to the blockchain to remove the identity and public-private key pair of the malicious vehicle.

[0129] At the same time, automotive service providers can periodically check the validity period of the public-private key pairs of users (including vehicles and roadside units), and send transactions to the blockchain to trigger smart contracts when they expire, so as to remove the user's expired identity and public-private key pairs in the blockchain.

[0130] The present invention uses smart contracts to realize the automatic management of public keys. It realizes the registration and update of keys, and the roadside unit can vote on the malicious behavior of the vehicle. If the number of votes reaches a certain amount, the smart contract is triggered to revoke the malicious vehicle key. At the same time, the automobile service provider also regularly revokes expired public keys. This makes key management more convenient and efficient.

[0131] The present invention uses blockchain to store the public key and validity period of the vehicle, which can realize decentralized key management and prevent the key information of the vehicle from being tampered with. Both the roadside unit and the automobile service provider can directly search for the public key and validity period of the vehicle in the blockchain.

[0132] During the key update phase, vehicles can use quantum keys to exchange information with automotive service providers, thereby ensuring the security of new keys during the issuance process.

[0133] In summary, the present invention has the following advantages:

[0134] 1. This method realizes the distributed storage of public and private key pairs. Blockchain has the function of distributed ledger, which can prevent attackers from tampering with data and solve the single point failure problem of the existing centralized key management model.

[0135] 2. This method realizes the automatic management of public and private key pairs. The smart contract deployed on the node on the blockchain is used to realize the automatic registration, update and revocation of the user's public key on the blockchain. The use of smart contracts to manage keys greatly improves the efficiency of key management.

[0136] 3. This method designs a lightweight two-way authentication and key agreement protocol based on bilinear mapping to prevent illegal access by unregistered users and malicious users. At the same time, the vehicle and the road test unit use the symmetry of the binary polynomial function to establish the session key.

[0137] 4. This method realizes the update and revocation of keys. By regularly updating keys and revoking key lists, attacks caused by insecure keys can be prevented. The blockchain technology used accelerates the propagation of updated or revoked keys to the entire network. Quantum random numbers and quantum keys are used in this scheme. The superior randomness of quantum random numbers and the non-cloning of quantum keys make the key management process more secure. In the subsequent key update stage, quantum keys are used to issue public and private keys, thereby ensuring the security of public and private keys in the transmission process.

[0138] The above description is only a preferred specific implementation manner of the present invention, but the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any technician familiar with the technical field can make equivalent replacements or changes according to the technical scheme and inventive concept of the present invention within the technical scope disclosed by the present invention, which should be covered by the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A decentralized key management method based on blockchain and quantum key, It is characterized in that include: The automobile service provider receives the user's request to update the public-private key pair, and retrieves the validity period of the user's public-private key pair on the blockchain according to the user's identity; The users include roadside units and vehicles; the update request is encrypted using a pre-negotiated quantum key QK; When the automobile service provider determines that the validity period of the user's public-private key pair is about to expire, it generates an updated public-private key pair and an updated validity period, sends the user's identity information and the updated public-private key pair to the blockchain, and calls the smart contract deployed on the blockchain node to add the update record to the blockchain; The car service provider encrypts the user's identity information, the updated public-private key pair, and the updated validity period with the quantum key QK and sends it to the user. Before the automobile service provider receives the encryption update request from the user for the public-private key pair, the decentralized key management method further includes: S1. System initialization phase, which includes the following steps: S11. The car service provider sets the global parameters {G1,g,n,P,h 1 ,h 2 ,h 3 }; where G1 is the multiplicative cyclic group of the n-th order elliptic curve; g is the generator, P is the p-th order generating point of the generator g, and p is a prime number; h 1 、h 2 、h 3 is the hash function, h 1 :{0,1} * →{0,1} l ,h 2 :{0,1} * →{0,1} l ,h 3 :{0,1} * →{0,1} l , superscript l Indicates the output length of the hash function; S12. The automotive service provider selects multiple polynomials and packages each polynomial and the corresponding label and stores them on the blockchain; wherein each polynomial is represented as: ; In the formula, q is a prime number, a ij is a positive integer randomly selected from the prime field GF(q); the value range of i and j is [0, t], t is the degree of the binary polynomial; f(·) is a polynomial function with · as input variable, and x, y and the output of f(x, y) are all elements in the prime field GF(q); S13. The automotive service provider creates a blockchain account for each blockchain node, and uses the account private key and address to create a smart contract, and manages the user's public key through the smart contract; S14. The car service provider generates a quantum random number as its own private key sk N , and thereby generate the public-private key pair {pk N ,sk N }, .

2. According to the decentralized key management method based on blockchain and quantum key according to claim 1, It is characterized in that Also includes: When the RSU detects malicious behavior from a vehicle, it sends a voting transaction to the blockchain to trigger the smart contract to start voting on the vehicle’s behavior; If the vehicle continues to perform malicious operations, the roadside unit uploads the ticket to the blockchain; When the number of votes exceeds the set threshold, the smart contract notifies the car service provider; The automotive service provider sends a key revocation command to the blockchain to remove the malicious vehicle’s identity and public-private key pair.

3. According to the decentralized key management method based on blockchain and quantum key according to claim 2, It is characterized in that Also includes: The automotive service provider proactively checks the validity period of the user's public-private key pair regularly and sends a transaction to the blockchain to trigger a smart contract when it expires to remove the user's expired identity and public-private key pair in the blockchain.

4. According to claim 1, a decentralized key management method based on blockchain and quantum key, It is characterized in that After S1, decentralized key management methods also include: S2. Vehicle registration phase, which includes the following steps: S21. The vehicle submits a registration request and the vehicle's own identity VID to the automotive service provider through a secure channel; S22. When the car service provider receives the registration request, it generates quantum random numbers vi, si and ri and calculates the anonymous identity information AID=h of the vehicle 1 (VID||ri||t 0 ), and generate tags 、Public-private key pair {pk v ,sk v } and the public-private key pair {pk v ,sk v }Validity period T v ; Among them, sk v =vi, ;|| represents a separator; t 0 The timestamp when the registration request is received; the public-private key pair {pk v ,sk v }Validity period T v The calculation formula is: v =(xc)·T; T is the unit time period; x is the time used to determine the validity period T v The preset parameter of the upper limit; c represents the safety index corresponding to the type of vehicle; S23. Automotive service provider encapsulation data {AID, pk v ,T v } and sent to the blockchain; S24. When the blockchain receives {AID,pk v ,T v }, the automotive service provider provides {AID,pk v ,sk v ,T v ,h 1 ,h 2 ,h 3 ,sig v ,pk N ,g,P}, and randomly select m polynomials from multiple polynomials, m>1, and provide the m polynomials and the corresponding labels to the vehicle to complete the vehicle registration.

5. According to claim 4, a decentralized key management method based on blockchain and quantum key, It is characterized in that After S2, decentralized key management methods also include: S3. The roadside unit registration phase includes the following steps: S31. The roadside unit, i.e., the roadside unit, submits a registration application to the automobile service provider via a wired connection; S32. The automobile service provider generates a unique identity information RID and a public-private key pair {pk R ,sk R } and the public-private key pair {pk R ,sk R }Validity period T R ; where T R is a fixed value; S33. The car service provider randomly selects a prime number bi and generates a label ; S34. Automotive service provider encapsulation data {RID, pk R ,T R } and uploads this data to the blockchain, triggering the smart contract, which adds the transaction record to the blockchain and then provides {RID, pk R ,sk R ,T R ,h 1 ,h 2 ,h 3 ,pk N ,sig r ,g,bi,P}.

6. According to claim 5, a decentralized key management method based on blockchain and quantum key, It is characterized in that After S3, decentralized key management methods also include: S4. The vehicle and roadside unit authentication phase includes the following steps: S41. The roadside unit periodically broadcasts the message {RID, pk R ,sig r ,bi,T R }; S42. The vehicle receives the message {RID, pk R ,sig r ,bi,T R }, check T R Is it expired? If yes, the authentication fails and the roadside unit submits a key update request to the vehicle service provider. Otherwise, calculate h r =h 1 (bi||RID), and h r Substitute into the equation to determine e(sig r ,g)=e(h r ,pk N ) is true; if the equation e(sig r ,g)=e(h r ,pk N ) is established, it means that the roadside unit has the public key of the car service provider and the roadside unit identity is legitimate. Then the vehicle calculates And send the EV to the roadside unit; where t 1 The timestamp when the EV is calculated for the vehicle; En (·) represents the encryption function with · as the key; e(·) represents the operation of bilinear mapping; S43. After receiving the EV sent by the vehicle, the roadside unit uses the private key sk R Decrypt EV to get (AID||sig v ||pk v ||si||t 1 ), roadside unit verification timestamp t 1 After it is effective, according to pk v Retrieve the validity period T on the blockchain v And check T v Is it expired? If yes, the authentication fails and the vehicle submits a key update request to the automotive service provider. Otherwise, the roadside unit calculates h v =h 1 (si||AID), and the public key of the car service provider as pk' N , then judge the equation e(sig v ,g)=e(h v ,pk' N ) is true; if the equation e(sig v ,g)=e(h v ,pk' N ) is established, the vehicle has the public key of the automotive service provider and the vehicle identity is legitimate.

7. According to claim 6, a decentralized key management method based on blockchain and quantum key, It is characterized in that After S4, decentralized key management methods also include: S5. Session key negotiation phase, which includes the following steps: S51. The roadside unit generates quantum random numbers k1, m', using the public key pk v Generate encrypted message , and generate a hash value H C1 =h 2 (AID||C 1 ||M||t 2 ), and then sends a message {AID,H C1 ,C1,t 2 ,M}; where M=m'·P; t 2 To generate a hash value H C1 The timestamp of the time; Represents an encryption function that uses a public key as a key; S52. The vehicle receives the message {AID,H C1 ,C1,t 2 ,M}, verify the timestamp t 2 Calculate the hash value H after it is valid C1 '=h 2 (AID||C 1 ||M||t 2 ), and verify that H C1 and H C1 'Equal? If H C1 and H C1 'Equal, the vehicle uses its own private key sk v Decrypt C1 to obtain the parameters (RID, AID, k1, M) for establishing the session key, then generate quantum random numbers k2 and z, and calculate Z, Z = z·P; the vehicle randomly selects a polynomial from the m polynomials to calculate K v , K v =f(k1,k2), and obtain the label f* corresponding to the polynomial; S53. Vehicle calculates session key SK V , S.K. V =h 3 (K v ||M·z), using the public key pk R Generate encrypted message , and generate a hash value H C2 =h 2 (RID||C2||f*||t 3 ), then the vehicle sends a message {RID,H C2 ,C2,f*,t 3 }; t 3 To generate a hash value H C2 The timestamp of the time; S54. The roadside unit receives the message {RID,H C2 ,C2,f*,t 3 }, verify the timestamp t 3 Calculate the hash value H after it is valid C2 '=h 2 (RID||C2||f*||t 3 ), and verify that H C2 and H C2 'Equal? If H C2 and H C2 ' is equal, the roadside unit uses its own private key sk R Decrypt C2 to get the parameters for establishing the session key (RID, AID, k2, Z), and query the polynomial corresponding to f* on the blockchain to calculate K rsu , K rsu =f(k1,k2), so that the roadside unit calculates the session key SK RSU =h 3 (K rsu ||Z·m'), at this time SK V =SK RSU That is, the session key negotiation is successful.

8. According to claim 7, a decentralized key management method based on blockchain and quantum key, It is characterized in that After step S54, the session key negotiation phase further includes the following steps: S55. The roadside unit and the vehicle service provider negotiate the quantum key QK through the BB84 protocol, and the roadside unit encrypts the quantum key QK using the session key and sends the encrypted quantum key to the vehicle; S56. The vehicle uses the session key to decrypt and obtain the quantum key QK.

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