A bidding method based on encryption mutual recognition

By monitoring the key generation time in real time and establishing a key recognition model, the problem of insufficient key randomness is solved, efficient generation of high-quality random keys is achieved, and the security and information integrity of the bidding process are enhanced.

CN118590227BActive Publication Date: 2024-12-03HUACHUN CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING PROJECT MANAGEMENT CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202410646799.5
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-05-23
Publication Date
2024-12-03
Estimated Expiration
2044-05-23

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In the bidding process based on encryption mutual recognition, the short key generation time may lead to insufficient randomness of the key, which in turn affects the security of the system. It is difficult for the prior art to effectively identify and improve the randomness of the key.

Method used

By monitoring and recording the key generation time in real time, combining statistical analysis methods, a key recognition model is established, and data is analyzed using key sequence autocorrelation and hash distribution, and hash iteration process is automatically enabled to improve the randomness of the key.

Benefits of technology

Ensure that high-quality random keys are generated in a short period of time, reduce security risks caused by insufficient randomness of keys, enhance the system's ability to respond to potential risks, and ensure the security and integrity of information during the bidding process.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The present invention discloses a bidding method based on encryption mutual recognition, which relates to the technical field of bidding, and includes the following steps: determining the shortest time benchmark required for key generation, monitoring and recording the actual generation time spent on each key generation in real time during the key generation process, analyzing the recorded key generation time data, and preliminarily identifying the hidden danger of insufficient randomness of the key. The present invention establishes a key identification model and utilizes the analysis data of key sequence autocorrelation and key hash distribution to more accurately evaluate the randomness of the key. When the key random coefficient does not reach a preset threshold, the system automatically enables the hash iteration process, and improves the randomness of the key through multiple iterations, which not only improves the quality of the key, but also enhances the system's ability to respond to potential risks, ensures the security and integrity of information in the bidding process, and greatly reduces the security risks caused by insufficient randomness of the key.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of bidding, and in particular to a bidding method based on encryption mutual recognition. Background Art

[0002] Tendering based on encryption mutual recognition means that in the tendering process, the security and authenticity of tendering information are ensured by applying encryption technology and authentication mechanisms. Specifically, this method uses encryption technology to encrypt tender documents and data to ensure that only authorized personnel can access and view them. At the same time, the identities of all parties involved are verified through authentication mechanisms to prevent identity fraud and information tampering. This not only improves the security of the tendering process, but also enhances transparency and fairness, and avoids fraud in tendering.

[0003] In bidding based on mutual recognition of encryption, encryption technologies such as public key infrastructure (PKI) and digital certificates are widely used. These technologies ensure that the confidentiality and integrity of bidding documents are maintained during transmission and storage. All parties involved in the bidding need to authenticate their identities through the authentication mechanism to ensure that only legally authorized tenderers, bidders and bid evaluation committee members can participate in the corresponding activities. This mechanism not only prevents unauthorized access, but also records each operation step, providing a reliable basis for subsequent audits.

[0004] In the bidding process based on encryption mutual recognition, key generation refers to the creation of keys for encrypting and decrypting information in the bidding system to ensure the security and confidentiality of data transmission and storage during the bidding process. Through the generated keys, the system can encrypt bidding documents, bidding information and evaluation results to prevent unauthorized access and information leakage, while ensuring that only authenticated participants can decrypt and access relevant data.

[0005] The prior art has the following deficiencies:

[0006] During the bidding process, a short key generation time may result in insufficient randomness in key generation. Key generation relies on high-quality random numbers, which require sufficient entropy to be collected from various entropy sources (such as hardware noise, system activity, user input, etc.). The randomness provided by the entropy source requires time to accumulate. If the key generation time is too short, the system may not be able to collect enough entropy to generate a truly random key. In addition, high-quality random number generators require a certain amount of initialization time at startup to collect entropy and perform necessary preparations. If the time is insufficient, these generators may not be fully ready, and the output random number quality will be poor. If the random number generator is defective or not random enough, the generated key may be easily predicted or cracked, causing the security of the entire system to be threatened.

[0007] The above information disclosed in this Background section is only for enhancement of understanding of the background of the present disclosure and therefore it may contain information that does not constitute the prior art that is already known to one of ordinary skill in the art. Summary of the invention

[0008] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a bidding method based on encryption mutual recognition, by real-time monitoring and recording the key generation time, and in combination with a statistical analysis method, quickly identify the key generation process that may have insufficient randomness. By comparing the mean and standard deviation of the generation time with a preset benchmark, potential risks can be preliminarily screened out, thereby improving the efficiency of key generation, and timely discovering and warning of possible safety hazards, ensuring that high-quality random keys are generated in a short time. In addition, by establishing a key identification model, the randomness of the key can be accurately evaluated by using the analysis data of the key sequence autocorrelation and key hash distribution. When the key random coefficient does not reach the preset threshold, the system will automatically enable the hash iteration process, and improve the randomness of the key through multiple iterations, thereby not only improving the quality of the key, but also enhancing the system's ability to respond to potential risks, ensuring the security and integrity of information in the bidding process, and significantly reducing the security risks caused by insufficient key randomness, so as to solve the problems in the above-mentioned background technology.

[0009] In order to achieve the above object, the present invention provides the following technical solution: a bidding method based on encryption mutual recognition, comprising the following steps:

[0010] Determine the shortest time benchmark required to generate a key. During the key generation process, monitor and record the actual generation time of each key in real time. Analyze the recorded key generation time data to preliminarily identify the hidden danger of insufficient randomness of the key.

[0011] When the potential risk of insufficient randomness of the key is initially identified, characteristic parameter information after key generation is obtained, abnormal analysis is performed on the obtained information, and a key identification model is established based on the data after abnormal analysis;

[0012] The keys are divided into high randomness keys and low randomness keys through the key identification model;

[0013] For low-randomness keys, multiple independent entropy sources are used and merged, mixed through a cryptographic hash function, and high-randomness keys are dynamically generated to replace the low-randomness keys.

[0014] Preferably, the steps for initially identifying the potential risk of insufficient randomness of the key are as follows:

[0015] During the key generation process, the timestamp when key generation starts and the timestamp when key generation ends are monitored and recorded in real time to obtain the actual generation time spent on each key generation;

[0016] The actual generation time spent on the generation of several keys is obtained to establish a data set, and the mean generation time and the standard deviation of the generation time are calculated through the actual generation time in the data set;

[0017] The mean generation time and the standard deviation of the generation time are compared and analyzed with the pre-set minimum time benchmark and the standard deviation reference threshold respectively. If the mean generation time is greater than or equal to the shortest time benchmark and the standard deviation of the generation time is less than the standard deviation reference threshold, an efficient signal is generated. If the mean generation time is greater than or equal to the shortest time benchmark and the standard deviation of the generation time is less than the standard deviation reference threshold, a hidden danger signal is generated.

[0018] Preferably, when there are hidden danger signals in the key generation process, characteristic parameter information after key generation is obtained, and the characteristic parameter information after key generation includes key sequence autocorrelation and key hash distribution. After acquisition, the key sequence autocorrelation and key hash distribution are subjected to abnormal analysis and processing, and a key sequence autocorrelation high index and a key hash distribution uneven index are generated. A key identification model is established through the key sequence autocorrelation high index and the key hash distribution uneven index, and a key random coefficient is generated. The quality of key generation is evaluated through the key random coefficient.

[0019] Preferably, after obtaining the secret key random coefficient generated by the key, the secret key random coefficient is compared and analyzed with a preset secret key random coefficient reference threshold. If the secret key random coefficient is greater than or equal to the secret key random coefficient reference threshold, the key is classified as a high-randomness key; if the secret key random coefficient is less than the secret key random coefficient reference threshold, the key is classified as a low-randomness key.

[0020] Preferably, for low randomness keys, multiple independent entropy sources are used and combined, and the specific steps of mixing through a cryptographic hash function are as follows:

[0021] Get multiple independent entropy sources S i , where i = 1, 2, 3, n, n is the number of entropy sources;

[0022] Collect sample data D from each entropy source i , where D i Represents the sample data of the i-th entropy source;

[0023] The sample data of all entropy sources are merged into an overall data D. The merging formula is: D = D1||D2||D3||…||D n ||, where *|| represents a connection operation;

[0024] Use the hash function to perform preliminary hash processing on the combined data D to generate an intermediate hash value H0, and the generated formula is: H0 = SHA-256 (D);

[0025] Perform u hash iterations to increase the complexity and randomness of the hash result. The hash value H of the vth iteration is v The calculation formula is: v =SHA-256(H v-1 ||v), where v = 1, 2, 3, u, H v Represents the hash value of the vth iteration.

[0026] Preferably, the secret key random coefficient generated after each hash iteration is compared with the key random coefficient reference threshold. If the secret key random coefficient after the hash iteration is greater than or equal to the key random coefficient reference threshold, a hash iteration completion signal is generated, the hash iteration of the key is stopped, and the low-random key is replaced with a high-random key. If the key random coefficient does not appear to be greater than or equal to the key random coefficient reference threshold within the upper limit of the number of hash iterations, a hash iteration failure signal is generated, the bidding and certification is stopped, and an early warning prompt is issued to notify relevant personnel.

[0027] Preferably, after performing abnormal analysis on the key sequence autocorrelation, a high autocorrelation index of the key sequence is generated, and the specific steps are:

[0028] Set the key sequence {x t}, where t = 1, 2, 3, N, N is the length of the key sequence;

[0029] Calculate the key sequence mean and key sequence standard deviation. The calculation expression is: in, represents the mean of the key sequence, used to centralize data, σ x Represents the standard deviation of the key sequence, which is used to standardize the data;

[0030] Calculate the autocorrelation coefficient of lag k. The expression for calculation is: Among them, r k represents the autocorrelation coefficient at lag k, where k is the number of lag steps, i.e., the distance between bits in the key sequence;

[0031] The high autocorrelation index of the key sequence is calculated by the autocorrelation coefficient of lag k. The calculation expression is: Among them, I high represents the high autocorrelation index of the key sequence, m is the upper limit of the lag step number, and w k is the autocorrelation coefficient r of lag k k The weight of .

[0032] Preferably, after performing abnormal analysis on the key hash distribution, a key hash distribution unevenness index is generated, and the specific steps are:

[0033] Decompose the key into several subsequences and use the hash function to generate the hash value of the key;

[0034] Assume the output space size of hash values ​​is G, and map the hash values ​​to finite buckets;

[0035] For each frequency in bucket j, calculate the ratio of its occurrence count to the total hash value length. The calculation expression is: Among them, n j is the number of bytes of the hash value in bucket j, L is the total number of bytes of the hash value, and p j represents the frequency in bucket j;

[0036] Calculate the expected frequency of each bucket. The calculation expression is: Where E represents the expected frequency of each bucket, and B represents the number of hash buckets;

[0037] Calculate the chi-square statistic, the expression is: In the formula, χ 2 represents the chi-square statistic;

[0038] The chi-square statistic χ 2 The key hash distribution uneven index is calculated using the number of hash buckets B. The calculation expression is: In the formula, I uneven Indicates the key hash distribution unevenness index.

[0039] In the above technical solution, the technical effects and advantages provided by the present invention are:

[0040] The present invention can quickly identify key generation processes that may lack randomness by real-time monitoring and recording of key generation time in combination with statistical analysis methods, and preliminarily screen out potential risks by comparing the generation time mean and standard deviation with a preset benchmark, thereby providing a basis for subsequent processing. This not only improves the efficiency of key generation, but also can promptly discover and warn of possible security risks, ensuring that the system can generate high-quality random keys in a relatively short period of time.

[0041] The present invention establishes a key identification model and utilizes the analysis data of key sequence autocorrelation and key hash distribution to more accurately evaluate the randomness of the key. When the key random coefficient does not reach a preset threshold, the system will automatically enable the hash iteration process to improve the randomness of the key through multiple iterations, which not only improves the quality of the key, but also enhances the system's ability to respond to potential risks, ensures the security and integrity of information in the bidding process, and greatly reduces the security risks caused by insufficient key randomness. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0042] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments recorded in the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can also be obtained based on these drawings.

[0043] Figure 1 The present invention is a method flow chart of a bidding method based on encryption mutual recognition. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0044] Example embodiments will now be described more fully with reference to the accompanying drawings. However, example embodiments can be implemented in a variety of forms and should not be construed as limited to the examples set forth herein; rather, these example embodiments are provided so that the description of the present disclosure will be more comprehensive and complete, and the concept of the example embodiments will be fully conveyed to those skilled in the art.

[0045] The present invention provides Figure 1 A bidding method based on encryption mutual recognition is shown, comprising the following steps:

[0046] Determine the shortest time benchmark required to generate a key. During the key generation process, monitor and record the actual generation time of each key in real time. Analyze the recorded key generation time data to preliminarily identify the hidden danger of insufficient randomness of the key.

[0047] The shortest time benchmark required to generate a key can be obtained based on actual application scenarios and system performance evaluation, which usually involves the need for entropy source collection and random number generation.

[0048] The steps to initially identify the potential risk of insufficient randomness in the key are as follows:

[0049] During the key generation process, the timestamp when key generation starts and the timestamp when key generation ends are monitored and recorded in real time to obtain the actual generation time spent on each key generation;

[0050] The actual generation time of each key generation can be obtained by subtracting the timestamp at the start of key generation from the timestamp at the end of key generation.

[0051] The actual generation time spent on the generation of several keys is obtained to establish a data set, and the mean generation time and the standard deviation of the generation time are calculated through the actual generation time in the data set;

[0052] The mean generation time and the standard deviation of the generation time are compared and analyzed with the pre-set minimum time benchmark and the standard deviation reference threshold respectively. If the mean generation time is greater than or equal to the shortest time benchmark and the standard deviation of the generation time is less than the standard deviation reference threshold, it means that the actual generation times obtained are generally greater than or equal to the shortest time benchmark, and an efficient signal is generated, indicating that the key can be generated efficiently. If the mean generation time is not greater than or equal to the shortest time benchmark and the standard deviation of the generation time is less than the standard deviation reference threshold, it means that the actual generation times obtained are not generally greater than or equal to the shortest time benchmark, and a hidden danger signal is generated, indicating that the key has a hidden danger of insufficient randomness.

[0053] When the potential risk of insufficient randomness of the key is initially identified, characteristic parameter information after key generation is obtained, abnormal analysis is performed on the obtained information, and a key identification model is established based on the data after abnormal analysis;

[0054] When there are hidden danger signals in the key generation process, characteristic parameter information after key generation is obtained, and the characteristic parameter information after key generation includes key sequence autocorrelation and key hash distribution. After obtaining, the key sequence autocorrelation and key hash distribution are subjected to abnormal analysis and processing, and a key sequence autocorrelation high index and a key hash distribution uneven index are generated. A key recognition model is established through the key sequence autocorrelation high index and the key hash distribution uneven index, and a key random coefficient is generated. The quality of key generation is evaluated through the key random coefficient.

[0055] When the key sequence of a key has high autocorrelation, it will result in insufficient randomness of the key. High autocorrelation means that there is a significant correlation between certain bits in the key sequence, rather than independent random distribution. This correlation indicates that there are repetitive patterns or predictable regularities in the key generation process, which reduces the randomness of the key. High autocorrelation weakens the unpredictability of the key, making it easier for attackers to guess or infer part or all of the key. For example, if there is a strong correlation between adjacent bits, knowing the values ​​of certain bits, an attacker can more easily infer the values ​​of other bits. Therefore, high autocorrelation not only affects the security of the key, but also increases the risk of the key being cracked, weakening the overall defense capability of the encryption system.

[0056] After performing abnormal analysis on the key sequence autocorrelation, a high autocorrelation index of the key sequence is generated. The specific steps are as follows:

[0057] Set the key sequence {x t}, where t = 1, 2, 3, N, N is the length of the key sequence;

[0058] Calculate the key sequence mean and key sequence standard deviation. The calculation expression is: in, represents the mean of the key sequence, used to centralize data, σ x Represents the standard deviation of the key sequence, which is used to standardize the data;

[0059] Calculate the autocorrelation coefficient of lag k. The expression for calculation is: Among them, r k represents the autocorrelation coefficient at lag k, where k is the number of lag steps, i.e., the distance between bits in the key sequence;

[0060] The high autocorrelation index of the key sequence is calculated by the autocorrelation coefficient of lag k. The calculation expression is: Among them, I high represents the high autocorrelation index of the key sequence, m is the upper limit of the lag step number (usually a smaller number of steps is selected, such as 10 or 20), and w k is the autocorrelation coefficient r of lag k k The weight is usually chosen or to give higher weights to smaller lag steps.

[0061] It can be seen from the high autocorrelation index of the key sequence that the larger the performance value of the high autocorrelation index of the key sequence generated by the key, the stronger the autocorrelation in the key sequence, that is, there are significant correlations and patterns between certain bits or bytes in the key, rather than independent random distributions, indicating that the lower the randomness of the key, the greater the risk of being predicted or cracked, and vice versa. The higher the randomness of the key, the smaller the risk of being predicted or cracked.

[0062] Uneven key hash distribution of keys can lead to insufficient key randomness. An important property of a hash function is that it should evenly map the input key to the output space. If the hash value distribution of a key is uneven, this indicates that there are certain rules or patterns in the input key sequence, making some hash values ​​appear more frequently than other hash values, which violates the principle of uniform distribution. This uneven distribution indicates that the key sequence has low entropy, that is, insufficient randomness. Attackers can use this pattern to infer the original key by analyzing the distribution of hash values, thereby increasing the possibility of cracking the key. Therefore, uneven hash distribution not only reduces the security of the key, but also makes the encryption system more vulnerable to attack.

[0063] After performing abnormal analysis on the key hash distribution, the key hash distribution unevenness index is generated. The specific steps are as follows:

[0064] Decompose the key into several subsequences (for example, each subsequence is one byte), and use a hash function to generate a hash value of the key;

[0065] The calculation formula for the hash value H(K) of the key generated by the hash function can be expressed in the following form: H(K)=Hash(K), where: K is the key, H(K) is the hash value generated by the key K through the hash function Hash. The specific hash function depends on the hash algorithm used. Common hash functions include SHA-256, SHA-1, MD5, etc.

[0066] Let the output space of hash values ​​be G (for example, the output space of SHA-256 is 2 256 ), mapping hash values ​​to finite buckets (bins);

[0067] Each byte (8 bits) of the hash value can be used as a bucket.

[0068] For each frequency in bucket j, calculate the ratio of its occurrence count to the total hash value length. The calculation expression is: Among them, n j is the number of bytes of the hash value in bucket j, L is the total number of bytes of the hash value, and p j represents the frequency in bucket j;

[0069] Calculate the expected frequency of each bucket. The calculation expression is: Where E represents the expected frequency of each bucket, and B represents the number of hash buckets;

[0070] Calculate the chi-square statistic, the expression is: In the formula, χ 2 represents the chi-square statistic;

[0071] The chi-square statistic χ 2 The key hash distribution uneven index is calculated using the number of hash buckets B. The calculation expression is: In the formula, I uneven Indicates the key hash distribution unevenness index.

[0072] It can be seen from the key hash distribution unevenness index that the larger the performance value of the key hash distribution unevenness index of key generation, the more uneven the distribution of hash values ​​between different buckets. This means that there is a significant concentration or deviation in the generated hash values, rather than being evenly distributed in the entire hash space. This unevenness usually indicates that there is a certain pattern in the key sequence or lacks sufficient randomness, which reduces the security and anti-attack ability of the key and makes the encryption system more vulnerable to predictive attacks or collision attacks. The larger the performance value of the key hash distribution unevenness index, the lower the randomness of the key and the greater the risk of being predicted or cracked. Conversely, the higher the randomness of the key, the lower the risk of being predicted or cracked.

[0073] The key identification model is not specifically limited here, and can achieve the key sequence autocorrelation high index Ihigh and key hash distribution uneven index I uneven Perform comprehensive analysis to generate the key random coefficient MY μ In order to realize the technical solution of the present invention, the present invention provides a specific implementation method;

[0074] Key random coefficient MY μ The calculation formula generated is: MY μ =α*I high -1 +β*I uneven -1 , where α and β are the high autocorrelation index of the key sequence I high and key hash distribution uneven index I uneven The preset proportional coefficient, and α and β are both greater than 0.

[0075] It can be seen from the key random coefficient that the larger the performance value of the high autocorrelation index of the key sequence generated by the key, the larger the performance value of the generated key hash distribution uneven index, that is, the smaller the generated secret key random coefficient, the lower the randomness of the key, and the greater the risk of being predicted or cracked. Conversely, the higher the randomness of the key, the smaller the risk of being predicted or cracked.

[0076] The keys are divided into high randomness keys and low randomness keys through the key identification model;

[0077] After obtaining the secret key random coefficient generated by the key, the secret key random coefficient is compared and analyzed with the pre-set secret key random coefficient reference threshold. If the secret key random coefficient is greater than or equal to the secret key random coefficient reference threshold, the key is classified as a high-randomness key. If the secret key random coefficient is less than the secret key random coefficient reference threshold, the key is classified as a low-randomness key.

[0078] For low-randomness keys, multiple independent entropy sources are used and merged, mixed through a cryptographic hash function, and high-randomness keys are dynamically generated to replace low-randomness keys;

[0079] For low-randomness keys, the specific steps of using multiple independent entropy sources and combining them and mixing them through a cryptographic hash function are as follows:

[0080] Get multiple independent entropy sources S i , where i = 1, 2, 3, n, n is the number of entropy sources;

[0081] Entropy sources may include hardware noise S1, system timestamp S2, user input S3, network traffic S4, etc.

[0082] Collect sample data D from each entropy source i , where Di Represents the sample data of the i-th entropy source;

[0083] Each D i Can be represented as a sequence of binary strings or bytes.

[0084] The sample data of all entropy sources are merged into an overall data D. The merging formula is: D = D1||D2||D3||…||D n ||, where *|| represents a connection operation;

[0085] Use a hash function (such as SHA-256) to perform preliminary hash processing on the combined data D to generate an intermediate hash value H0, and the generated formula is: H0 = SHA-256 (D);

[0086] Perform u hash iterations to increase the complexity and randomness of the hash result. The hash value H of the vth iteration is v The calculation formula is: v =SHA-256(H v-1 ||v), where v = 1, 2, 3, u, H v Represents the hash value of the vth iteration.

[0087] A cryptographic hash function is a special type of hash function that is used to convert data input of any length into a hash value of a fixed length. Common cryptographic hash functions include MD5 (Message-Digest Algorithm 5), SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm 1), SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, and so on.

[0088] The secret key random coefficient generated after each hash iteration is compared with the key random coefficient reference threshold. If the secret key random coefficient after the hash iteration is greater than or equal to the key random coefficient reference threshold, a hash iteration completion signal is generated, the hash iteration of the key is stopped, and the low-random key is replaced with a high-random key. If the key random coefficient does not exceed or equal to the key random coefficient reference threshold within the upper limit of the hash iteration number, a hash iteration failure signal is generated, the bidding and certification is stopped, and an early warning prompt is issued to notify relevant personnel.

[0089] The present invention can quickly identify key generation processes that may lack randomness by real-time monitoring and recording of key generation time in combination with statistical analysis methods, and preliminarily screen out potential risks by comparing the generation time mean and standard deviation with a preset benchmark, thereby providing a basis for subsequent processing. This not only improves the efficiency of key generation, but also can promptly discover and warn of possible security risks, ensuring that the system can generate high-quality random keys in a relatively short period of time.

[0090] The present invention establishes a key identification model and utilizes the analysis data of key sequence autocorrelation and key hash distribution to more accurately evaluate the randomness of the key. When the key random coefficient does not reach a preset threshold, the system will automatically enable the hash iteration process to improve the randomness of the key through multiple iterations, which not only improves the quality of the key, but also enhances the system's ability to respond to potential risks, ensures the security and integrity of information in the bidding process, and greatly reduces the security risks caused by insufficient key randomness.

[0091] The above formulas are all dimensionless and numerical calculations. The formula is a formula for the most recent real situation obtained by collecting a large amount of data and performing software simulation. The preset parameters and thresholds in the formula are set by technicians in this field according to actual conditions.

[0092] The above embodiments can be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, firmware or any other combination. When implemented using software, the above embodiments can be implemented in whole or in part in the form of a computer program product. The computer program product includes one or more computer instructions or computer programs. When the computer instructions or computer programs are loaded or executed on a computer, the process or function described in the embodiment of the present application is generated in whole or in part. The computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable devices. The computer instructions can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium. For example, the computer instructions can be transmitted from one website site, computer, server or data center to another website site, computer, server or data center by wired (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.). The computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium that a computer can access or a data storage device such as a server or data center that contains one or more available media sets. The available medium can be a magnetic medium (e.g., a floppy disk, a hard disk, a tape), an optical medium (e.g., a DVD), or a semiconductor medium. The semiconductor medium can be a solid-state hard disk.

[0093] Those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that the units and algorithm steps of each example described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are performed in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Professional and technical personnel can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered to be beyond the scope of this application.

[0094] Those skilled in the art can clearly understand that, for the convenience and brevity of description, the specific working processes of the systems, devices and units described above can refer to the corresponding processes in the aforementioned method embodiments and will not be repeated here.

[0095] In the several embodiments provided in the present application, it should be understood that the disclosed systems, devices and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device embodiments described above are only schematic. For example, the division of the units is only one. There may be other division methods in actual implementation. For example, multiple units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. Another point is that the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed can be through some interfaces, indirect coupling or communication connection of devices or units, which can be electrical, mechanical or other forms.

[0096] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed on multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment.

[0097] In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit.

[0098] If the functions are implemented in the form of software functional units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present application can be essentially or partly embodied in the form of a software product that contributes to the prior art. The computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions for a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of the present application. The aforementioned storage media include: various media that can store program codes, such as USB flash drives, mobile hard disks, read-only memories (ROM), random access memories (RAM), magnetic disks or optical disks.

[0099] The above is only a specific implementation of the present application, but the protection scope of the present application is not limited thereto. Any person skilled in the art who is familiar with the present technical field can easily think of changes or substitutions within the technical scope disclosed in the present application, which should be included in the protection scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application should be based on the protection scope of the claims.

[0100] Finally: The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A bidding method based on encrypted mutual recognition, It is characterized in that The following steps are involved: Determine the shortest time benchmark required to generate a key. During the key generation process, monitor and record the actual generation time of each key in real time. Analyze the recorded key generation time data to preliminarily identify the hidden danger of insufficient randomness of the key. When the potential risk of insufficient randomness of the key is initially identified, characteristic parameter information after key generation is obtained, abnormal analysis is performed on the obtained information, and a key identification model is established based on the data after abnormal analysis; The keys are divided into high randomness keys and low randomness keys through the key identification model; For low-randomness keys, multiple independent entropy sources are used and merged, mixed through a cryptographic hash function, and high-randomness keys are dynamically generated to replace the low-randomness keys.

2. A bidding method based on encryption mutual recognition according to claim 1, It is characterized in that The steps to initially identify the potential risk of insufficient randomness in the key are as follows: During the key generation process, the timestamp when key generation starts and the timestamp when key generation ends are monitored and recorded in real time to obtain the actual generation time spent on each key generation; The actual generation time spent on the generation of several keys is obtained to establish a data set, and the mean generation time and the standard deviation of the generation time are calculated through the actual generation time in the data set; The mean generation time and the standard deviation of the generation time are compared and analyzed with the pre-set minimum time benchmark and the standard deviation reference threshold respectively. If the mean generation time is greater than or equal to the shortest time benchmark and the standard deviation of the generation time is less than the standard deviation reference threshold, an efficient signal is generated. If the mean generation time is greater than or equal to the shortest time benchmark and the standard deviation of the generation time is less than the standard deviation reference threshold, a hidden danger signal is generated.

3. A bidding method based on encryption mutual recognition according to claim 2, It is characterized in that When there are hidden danger signals in the key generation process, characteristic parameter information after key generation is obtained, and the characteristic parameter information after key generation includes key sequence autocorrelation and key hash distribution. After obtaining, the key sequence autocorrelation and key hash distribution are subjected to abnormal analysis and processing, and a key sequence autocorrelation high index and a key hash distribution uneven index are generated. A key recognition model is established through the key sequence autocorrelation high index and the key hash distribution uneven index, and a key random coefficient is generated. The quality of key generation is evaluated through the key random coefficient.

4. A bidding method based on encryption mutual recognition according to claim 3, It is characterized in that After obtaining the secret key random coefficient generated by the key, the secret key random coefficient is compared and analyzed with the pre-set secret key random coefficient reference threshold. If the secret key random coefficient is greater than or equal to the secret key random coefficient reference threshold, the key is classified as a high-randomness key. If the secret key random coefficient is less than the secret key random coefficient reference threshold, the key is classified as a low-randomness key.

5. A bidding method based on encryption mutual recognition according to claim 4, It is characterized in that For low-randomness keys, the specific steps of using multiple independent entropy sources and combining them and mixing them through a cryptographic hash function are as follows: Get multiple independent entropy sources S i , where i = 1, 2, 3, n, n is the number of entropy sources; Collect sample data D from each entropy source i , where D i Represents the sample data of the i-th entropy source; The sample data of all entropy sources are merged into an overall data D. The merging formula is: D = D 1 ||D 2 ||D 3 ||…||D n ||, where *|| represents a connection operation; Use the hash function to perform preliminary hash processing on the merged data D to generate an intermediate hash value H 0 , the generated formula is: H 0 = SHA-256(D); Perform u hash iterations to increase the complexity and randomness of the hash result. The hash value H of the vth iteration is v The calculation formula is: v =SHA-256(H v-1 ||v), where v = 1, 2, 3, u, H v Represents the hash value of the vth iteration.

6. A bidding method based on encryption mutual recognition according to claim 5, It is characterized in that The key random coefficient generated after each hash iteration is compared with the key random coefficient reference threshold. If the secret key random coefficient after the hash iteration is greater than or equal to the key random coefficient reference threshold, a hash iteration completion signal is generated, the hash iteration of the key is stopped, and the low-random key is replaced with a high-random key. If the key random coefficient does not appear to be greater than or equal to the key random coefficient reference threshold within the upper limit of the hash iteration number, a hash iteration failure signal is generated, the bidding and certification is stopped, and an early warning prompt is issued to notify relevant personnel.

7. A bidding method based on encryption mutual recognition according to claim 3, It is characterized in that After performing abnormal analysis on the key sequence autocorrelation, a high autocorrelation index of the key sequence is generated. The specific steps are as follows: Set the key sequence {x t }, where t = 1, 2, 3, N, N is the length of the key sequence; Calculate the key sequence mean and key sequence standard deviation. The calculation expression is: in, represents the mean of the key sequence, used to centralize data, σ x Represents the standard deviation of the key sequence, which is used to standardize the data; Calculate the autocorrelation coefficient of lag k. The expression for calculation is: Among them, r k represents the autocorrelation coefficient at lag k, where k is the number of lag steps, i.e., the distance between bits in the key sequence; The high autocorrelation index of the key sequence is calculated by the autocorrelation coefficient of lag k. The calculation expression is: Among them, I high represents the high autocorrelation index of the key sequence, m is the upper limit of the lag step number, and w k is the autocorrelation coefficient r of lag k k The weight of .

8. A bidding method based on encryption mutual recognition according to claim 3, It is characterized in that After performing abnormal analysis on the key hash distribution, the key hash distribution unevenness index is generated. The specific steps are as follows: Decompose the key into several subsequences and use the hash function to generate the hash value of the key; Assume the output space size of hash values ​​is G, and map the hash values ​​to finite buckets; For each frequency in bucket j, calculate the ratio of its occurrence count to the total hash value length. The calculation expression is: Among them, n j is the number of bytes of the hash value in bucket j, L is the total number of bytes of the hash value, and p j represents the frequency in bucket j; Calculate the expected frequency of each bucket. The calculation expression is: Where E represents the expected frequency of each bucket, and B represents the number of hash buckets; Calculate the chi-square statistic, the expression is: In the formula, χ 2 represents the chi-square statistic; The chi-square statistic χ 2 The key hash distribution uneven index is calculated using the number of hash buckets B. The calculation expression is: In the formula, I uneven Indicates the key hash distribution unevenness index.