Method and device for preventing unauthorized hardware starting of BIOS (Basic Input / Output System) of server
By introducing a key verification process during the BIOS boot process and using the key stored in the CPLD for legitimacy verification, the vulnerability of the BIOS to attacks on unauthorized hardware is solved, achieving hardware-level security protection and ensuring that the BIOS only boots on legitimate platforms.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411004877.8
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-07-25
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-15
AI Technical Summary
In existing technologies, the lack of BIOS verification of the legitimacy of the running hardware platform makes it vulnerable to software attacks and poses a risk of being illegally copied to unauthorized hardware and running.
The SPI interface is used to send a key read command to the programmable logic device CPLD. The key stored in the CPLD is used for verification. If the verification is successful, the BIOS will start. Otherwise, a self-destruct operation will be performed to ensure that the BIOS can only start on authorized hardware.
It effectively prevents the BIOS from booting illegally on unauthorized hardware, enhances system security, prevents software attacks, and ensures that the BIOS only runs in a legitimate environment.
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Figure CN118965362A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of computer security protection, and in particular to a method and device for preventing server BIOS from unauthorized hardware startup. Background Art
[0002] With the development of computer technology, servers are increasingly used in all walks of life. The security and reliability of servers are directly related to the data security and business continuity of users. As a key program for server startup and initialization, the security of BIOS is particularly important. In the prior art, BIOS usually takes corresponding measures to ensure its integrity and prevent malicious tampering. However, these measures are mainly aimed at the BIOS code itself, and lack the legitimacy verification of the hardware environment in which the BIOS runs. This leads to the risk of BIOS being illegally copied to unauthorized hardware and running. In this case, attackers can attack BIOS through software means, such as reverse engineering and malware interference, resulting in the leakage of important data and damage to system functions. Summary of the invention
[0003] The present application provides a method and device for preventing server BIOS from starting up with unauthorized hardware, aiming to solve the technical problem in the prior art that BIOS only implements its own integrity check, lacks legitimacy verification of the running hardware platform, and is vulnerable to software attacks on unauthorized hardware.
[0004] In view of the above problems, the present application provides a method and device for preventing unauthorized hardware startup in a server BIOS.
[0005] The first aspect disclosed in the present application provides a method for preventing unauthorized hardware startup of a server BIOS, the method comprising: when a startup instruction is received, sending a key read command to an editable logic device CPLD through an SPI interface, and the editable logic device CPLD returns the selected key through the SPI bus; verifying the selected key through a preset verification algorithm to obtain a key verification result; when the key verification result is verification passed, executing a BIOS startup program; when the key verification result is verification failed, executing a BIOS self-destruction operation.
[0006] Another aspect disclosed in the present application provides a server BIOS anti-unauthorized hardware startup device, which includes: a server BIOS, the server BIOS is used to receive startup instructions and send read commands, and perform key verification; an editable logic device CPLD, including: a built-in Flash, used to store key information of authorized hardware; wherein the editable logic device CPLD is used to receive the read command of the server BIOS and return the corresponding key information.
[0007] One or more technical solutions provided in this application have at least the following technical effects or advantages:
[0008] When a startup instruction is received, a key reading command is sent to the editable logic device CPLD through the SPI interface, and the editable logic device CPLD returns the selected key through the SPI bus. The CPLD device on the server motherboard is used as the hardware basis for key storage and provision, and the communication between BIOS and CPLD is realized through the SPI interface, so that BIOS can obtain the key pre-stored in the CPLD; the selected key is verified through a preset verification algorithm to obtain a key verification result, and the preset key verification algorithm is used to verify the legitimacy of the key read from the CPLD to determine whether the current hardware platform is an authorized and legal environment; when the key verification result is that the verification is passed, the BIOS startup program is executed, and after key verification, it is confirmed that After the legitimacy of the previous hardware platform is verified, the BIOS is allowed to continue to execute the subsequent startup process and complete the normal startup of the server; when the key verification result is a verification failure, the BIOS self-destruction operation is executed. If the key verification fails, it indicates that the current hardware environment is an unauthorized platform. In order to prevent the BIOS from being illegally used, the BIOS self-destruction operation is taken to completely prevent the BIOS from starting on this platform. The technical solution to protect the BIOS from being used on unauthorized platforms solves the technical problems in the prior art that the BIOS only implements its own integrity check, lacks verification of the legitimacy of the running hardware platform, and is vulnerable to software attacks on unauthorized hardware. It achieves the technical effect of effectively preventing the BIOS from illegally starting on unauthorized hardware through hardware-level key verification and significantly enhancing system security.
[0009] The above description is only an overview of the technical solution of the present application. In order to more clearly understand the technical means of the present application, it can be implemented in accordance with the contents of the specification. In order to make the above and other purposes, features and advantages of the present application more obvious and easy to understand, the specific implementation methods of the present application are listed below. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0010] Figure 1 A flow chart of a method for preventing unauthorized hardware from starting a server BIOS is provided for an embodiment of the present application;
[0011] Figure 2 A structural schematic diagram of a server BIOS anti-unauthorized hardware startup device is provided for an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0012] The overall idea of the technical solution provided by this application is as follows:
[0013] The embodiment of the present application provides a method and device for preventing server BIOS from being started by unauthorized hardware, which uses CPLD as a hardware protection measure and introduces a key verification process during the BIOS startup process, so that the BIOS can only be started on a certified hardware platform, effectively preventing the illegal operation of the BIOS on unauthorized hardware.
[0014] Specifically, when the BIOS receives a startup instruction, it first sends a key read command to the CPLD through the SPI interface, and the CPLD transmits the pre-stored key back to the BIOS through the SPI bus. Subsequently, the BIOS uses a preset verification algorithm to verify the legitimacy of the obtained key. If the verification passes, the BIOS is allowed to continue the startup process; if the verification fails, the BIOS self-destruction operation is triggered, completely preventing the BIOS from starting on an unauthorized platform.
[0015] Through verification and protection measures, the BIOS is effectively restricted to run only on authorized hardware platforms, improving the server system's ability to resist software attacks, achieving all-round security protection, and providing a solid guarantee for the safe operation of the server system.
[0016] After introducing the basic principles of the present application, various non-limiting implementation methods of the present application will be specifically described below in conjunction with the drawings in the specification.
[0017] Embodiment 1, as Figure 1 As shown, the embodiment of the present application provides a method for preventing unauthorized hardware startup in a server BIOS, which is applied to the server BIOS and includes:
[0018] S1: When a start instruction is received, a key read command is sent to the programmable logic device CPLD via the SPI interface, and the programmable logic device CPLD returns the selected key via the SPI bus.
[0019] Specifically, after receiving the startup instruction, the server BIOS sends a key read command to the programmable logic device through the serial peripheral interface (SPI). The SPI interface is a full-duplex, synchronous serial communication interface used to connect microcontrollers and peripheral devices. The programmable logic device (CPLD) contains a programmable logic cell array and macro cells. After receiving the key read command sent by the server BIOS, the CPLD retrieves the pre-stored selected key from its internal memory and transmits the selected key back to the server BIOS through the SPI bus, allowing the server BIOS to obtain the key for subsequent verification from the trusted hardware security module (i.e., CPLD), ensuring the security and reliability of the key. By using the SPI interface for communication, the high speed and integrity of data transmission are guaranteed.
[0020] S2: Verify the selected key using a preset verification algorithm to obtain a key verification result.
[0021] Specifically, after receiving the selected key from the editable logic device CPLD, the server BIOS will use a pre-verification algorithm to verify the selected key to confirm whether the received selected key is valid and complete. Among them, the preset verification algorithm can be designed and implemented according to actual needs and system environment. By applying the preset verification algorithm to the selected key, the server BIOS can determine whether the key comes from a trusted hardware security module (i.e., CPLD) and has not been tampered with during transmission and storage. The output result of the verification algorithm is the key verification result, including two situations: verification passed and verification failed. Verification passed means that the selected key meets the preset validity and integrity requirements and can be used in the subsequent BIOS startup process; verification failure means that there is a problem with the selected key, it comes from unauthorized hardware or has been tampered with, and the BIOS startup process needs to be terminated and corresponding security measures need to be taken.
[0022] By verifying the validity and integrity of the selected key, the security of the server system is improved and the illegal startup of unauthorized hardware is effectively prevented.
[0023] S3: When the key verification result is verification passed, execute the BIOS startup program.
[0024] Specifically, when the key verification result is verification passed, it indicates that the selected key meets the preset validity and integrity requirements, comes from a trusted hardware security module (i.e., CPLD), and has not been tampered with. In this case, the server BIOS will execute the BIOS startup program according to the normal process.
[0025] In order to further improve the reliability and fault tolerance of the system, it can be set that the BIOS startup program is allowed to execute only after multiple consecutive key verifications are passed, thereby avoiding misjudgment due to occasional factors and improving the stability of the system.
[0026] By executing the BIOS startup program when the key verification is passed, it is ensured that only authorized hardware can normally start the server, thereby achieving effective prevention of unauthorized hardware startup.
[0027] S4: When the key verification result is verification failure, executing a BIOS self-destruction operation.
[0028] Specifically, when the key verification result is a verification failure, it indicates that the selected key does not meet the preset validity and integrity requirements, and may come from unauthorized hardware or have been tampered with. In this case, in order to prevent illegal startup and potential security threats from unauthorized hardware, the server BIOS will perform a BIOS self-destruct operation. As a security protection mechanism, the purpose of the BIOS self-destruct operation is to destroy key data and programs inside the BIOS when security risks are discovered, so that the server cannot start and run normally. The specific self-destruct method can be designed according to actual needs and system environment, such as erasing BIOS memory, modifying key parameters, locking hardware, etc. By executing the BIOS self-destruct operation, unauthorized hardware can be effectively prevented from illegally accessing and controlling the server, protecting the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the system. In order to avoid misjudgment due to accidental factors, it can be set to execute the BIOS self-destruct operation only after multiple consecutive key verification failures, thereby improving the system's fault tolerance and reducing unnecessary self-destruction behavior.
[0029] By executing the BIOS self-destruct operation when key verification fails, an effective security protection mechanism is provided, which can actively prevent the illegal startup of unauthorized hardware and ensure the security and reliability of the server system.
[0030] Furthermore, the preset verification algorithm includes encryption algorithm matching and / or key integrity check.
[0031] In a feasible implementation, the preset verification algorithm includes two methods: encryption algorithm matching and / or key integrity check. In the encryption algorithm matching method, the server BIOS and the editable logic device CPLD predetermine the same asymmetric encryption algorithm, such as AES. When the CPLD sends the selected key to the server BIOS, it also sends the result of signing the selected key based on the predefined private key using the encryption algorithm. After receiving the selected key and the corresponding signature, the server BIOS uses the same encryption algorithm to verify the signature of the selected key based on the predefined public key. The characteristic of an asymmetric algorithm is that only a person with the corresponding private key can generate a valid signature. Therefore, if the signature verification passes, it indicates that the selected key is sent by the CPLD and the verification passes; otherwise, the verification fails.
[0032] In the key integrity check mode, when the CPLD sends the selected key, it also sends the integrity check value of the selected key, such as a hash value, digital signature, etc. After receiving the selected key and the integrity check value, the server BIOS uses the same integrity check algorithm to calculate the selected key and compares the calculation result with the integrity check value sent by the CPLD. If the two integrity check values are the same, it indicates that the selected key has not been tampered with during transmission and the verification is successful; otherwise, the verification fails.
[0033] Encryption algorithm matching and key integrity check can be used separately or in combination to improve the reliability and security of verification. For example, encryption algorithm matching is performed first to verify the source of the selected key, and then key integrity check is performed to verify the integrity of the selected key.
[0034] By introducing encryption algorithm matching and key integrity checking, a feasible, safe and reliable key verification solution is provided, which enhances the ability to prevent unauthorized hardware startup.
[0035] Furthermore, the embodiment of the present application also includes:
[0036] The built-in Flash of the programmable logic device CPLD stores a key database;
[0037] Obtain the first authorized hardware key update duration through the timer;
[0038] When the first authorized hardware key update duration meets the preset update period, dynamically updating the first authorized hardware key through the key database to obtain the first authorized hardware key update result;
[0039] and sending verification information of the update result of the first authorized hardware key to a designated server;
[0040] According to the key reading command, the selected key is retrieved, and the programmable logic device CPLD transmits it back through the SPI bus.
[0041] In a preferred embodiment, first, a key database is stored in the built-in Flash of the editable logic device CPLD. Different from the conventional storage of only one key, the CPLD in the embodiment of the present application stores multiple keys so that they can be replaced when a certain period is met, thereby improving the security of the system. Next, the BIOS obtains the first authorized hardware key update duration through the built-in timer to determine whether the key needs to be updated. The first authorized hardware key is the key currently in use; the first authorized hardware key update duration refers to the time elapsed from the last key update to the current moment; the preset update cycle refers to the key update time interval pre-set according to the system security requirements. When the first authorized hardware key update duration meets the preset update cycle, the BIOS dynamically updates the first authorized hardware key by accessing the key database of the CPLD to obtain the first authorized hardware key update result. This process is completed automatically in the background without manual intervention, ensuring the timeliness and reliability of key updates.
[0042] After obtaining the first authorized hardware key update result, the CPLD sends the verification information of the update result to the designated server. The verification information is the public key of the updated key, which is used to verify the validity of the update result. The designated server means that only the BIOS of this server can run on the current hardware, which further limits the scope of use of unauthorized hardware. Afterwards, when the server BIOS sends a key read command to the CPLD, the selected key is retrieved from the key database and sent back to the server BIOS via the SPI bus.
[0043] By introducing a key database and dynamic update mechanism, the security and flexibility of the system are further enhanced. The key database can effectively deal with risks such as key leakage and cracking, and the dynamic update mechanism can adjust the key update strategy according to actual needs to adapt to different application scenarios. At the same time, by sending the verification information of the update result to the designated server, it is ensured that only authorized servers can use the updated key to prevent illegal startup of unauthorized hardware.
[0044] Furthermore, the embodiment of the present application also includes:
[0045] According to the key database, randomly extracting a plurality of first keys;
[0046] Obtaining a plurality of matching frequency characteristics of the plurality of first keys and the first authorization hardware in a preset historical time zone;
[0047] According to the plurality of matching frequency characteristics, the plurality of first keys are sorted by minimum values to obtain the first authorized hardware key update result.
[0048] In a preferred embodiment, the CPLD stores a number of keys, including the first authorized hardware key and the key database currently used. When the update duration of the first authorized hardware key meets the preset update cycle, the BIOS specifies the number of keys to be selected, and randomly selects a specified number of keys from the spare key library of the CPLD through the SPI interface as a number of first keys. The first key refers to a candidate replacement key used to update the first authorized hardware key. Random extraction can increase the unpredictability of key selection and improve the security of the system. Next, the BIOS obtains a number of matching frequency characteristics of a number of first keys and a first authorized hardware in a preset historical time zone. The matching frequency characteristic refers to the number of matches or frequencies of each first key and the first authorized hardware in the preset historical time zone. Among them, the preset historical time zone is a fixed time period, such as the last month, the last year, etc. By analyzing the matching frequency characteristics, the historical usage and matching degree of different keys can be understood.
[0049] Then, the BIOS performs minimum value sorting on several first keys according to several matching frequency characteristics to obtain the first authorized hardware key update result. Minimum value sorting means selecting the first key with the smallest matching frequency characteristic as the update result, that is, selecting the key with the least number of matches with the first authorized hardware in history as the new authorized hardware key, thereby effectively reducing the reuse rate of the key, increasing the randomness and unpredictability of the key, and improving the security of the system. Afterwards, the BIOS uses the first authorized hardware key update result as the new authorized hardware key for subsequent key verification and hardware startup processes.
[0050] By introducing mechanisms such as random extraction, matching frequency feature analysis and minimum value sorting, the randomness, security and efficiency of key updates are improved, which can effectively deal with risks such as key leakage and cracking, and enhance the protection capability and reliability of the system.
[0051] Furthermore, the embodiment of the present application also includes:
[0052] According to the key database, randomly extracting a plurality of first keys;
[0053] Obtaining a plurality of similarity coefficients between the plurality of first keys and the first authorized hardware key;
[0054] According to the plurality of similarity coefficients, the plurality of first keys are sorted by minimum values to obtain the first authorized hardware key update result.
[0055] In another embodiment, first, when the update duration of the first authorized hardware key meets the preset update cycle, the BIOS will randomly extract several first keys from the key database as candidate keys for updating the first authorized hardware key. Next, the BIOS obtains several similarity coefficients between the several first keys and the first authorized hardware key. The similarity coefficient refers to the degree of similarity between two keys, which is calculated by comparing the bit pattern, numerical distribution and other characteristics of the keys. For example, using measurement methods such as Hamming distance and Euclidean distance, the difference between each first key and the first authorized hardware key is calculated, and then the difference is converted into a similarity coefficient. The larger the similarity coefficient, the more similar the two keys are; the smaller the similarity coefficient, the more different the two keys are.
[0056] Then, the BIOS performs minimum value sorting on several first keys according to several similarity coefficients to obtain the first authorized hardware key update result. Minimum value sorting means selecting the first key with the smallest similarity coefficient as the update result, that is, selecting the key with the largest difference from the current first authorized hardware key as the new authorized hardware key, thereby maximizing the difference between the new and old keys, improving the randomness and unpredictability of key updates, and thus enhancing the security of the system. Afterwards, the BIOS uses the first authorized hardware key update result as the new authorized hardware key for subsequent key verification and hardware startup processes.
[0057] By adopting the similarity coefficient and minimum value sorting method to select the updated key and measure the difference between the new and old keys, the randomness and security of the updated key can be better guaranteed.
[0058] Furthermore, the embodiment of the present application also includes:
[0059] Obtaining a plurality of similarity coefficients between the plurality of first keys and the first authorized hardware key;
[0060] A first weight is configured for the normalized value of the matching frequency feature, and a second weight is configured for the normalized value of the similarity coefficient;
[0061] Fitting a plurality of normalized values of similarity coefficients and a plurality of normalized values of matching frequency features according to the first weight and the second weight to generate a plurality of key sorting evaluation values;
[0062] According to the plurality of key sorting evaluation values, the plurality of first keys are sorted by minimum values to obtain the first authorized hardware key update result.
[0063] In a feasible implementation, first, the BIOS obtains several similarity coefficients between several first keys and the first authorized hardware key, and quantifies the degree of difference between each first key and the current authorized hardware key. Next, the BIOS configures a first weight for the normalized value of the matching frequency feature and a second weight for the normalized value of the similarity coefficient. Normalization refers to mapping values of different dimensions or ranges to the same scale for comparison and calculation. For example, both the matching frequency feature and the similarity coefficient are normalized to between 0 and 1. The first weight and the second weight refer to the importance coefficients assigned to the matching frequency feature and the similarity coefficient, which are used to balance the role of the two indicators in key selection. The value of the weight is set according to actual needs and experience. For example, based on historical data and expert knowledge, the relative importance of the matching frequency feature and the similarity coefficient in the key security assessment is given.
[0064] Then, the BIOS performs weighted summation on several normalized values of similarity coefficients and several normalized values of matching frequency features according to the first weight and the second weight, and generates several key sorting evaluation values. The key sorting evaluation value is a comprehensive indicator used to measure the suitability and priority of each first key. The calculation formula of the key sorting evaluation value can be expressed as: key sorting evaluation value = first weight × normalized value of matching frequency features + second weight × normalized value of similarity coefficient. The smaller the key sorting evaluation value, the more suitable the key is as the update result; the larger the key sorting evaluation value, the less suitable the key is as the update result. Afterwards, the BIOS performs minimum value sorting on several first keys according to several key sorting evaluation values, and obtains the first authorized hardware key update result. By selecting the first key with the smallest evaluation value as the first authorized hardware key update result, the optimal candidate key is selected based on the historical matching frequency and the current difference degree, thereby further improving the rationality and security of the key update.
[0065] By comprehensively considering the two indicators of matching frequency characteristics and similarity coefficient, the key sorting evaluation value is generated in a weighted summation manner, and the minimum value sorting is performed according to the evaluation value, thus achieving a balance and optimization of multiple factors to better adapt to different application scenarios and security requirements.
[0066] Furthermore, the embodiment of the present application also includes:
[0067] When the key verification result passes any one of the preset consecutive times, the key verification result is verified.
[0068] In a feasible implementation, a continuous preset number of times is introduced to improve the fault tolerance and reliability of the system. Specifically, when the key verification result passes any one of the preset consecutive times, the BIOS determines the key verification result as the final verification pass and executes the BIOS startup program. Among them, the continuous preset number of times refers to the threshold of continuous verification, which is set according to the security requirements and performance requirements of the system. For example, the continuous preset number of times is set to 3 times, that is, as long as any one of the three consecutive key verifications passes, the entire verification process is considered successful. By using the continuous preset number of times, the fault tolerance of the system can be improved and the verification failures caused by accidental factors can be reduced. In actual applications, individual verification failures may occur due to hardware failures, data transmission errors, etc., but this does not mean that the hardware is unauthorized. By requiring at least one of the multiple consecutive verifications to pass, misjudgments due to accidental factors can be avoided and the reliability of the system can be improved.
[0069] At the same time, the number of consecutive presets also provides a certain degree of flexibility and configurability. The number of consecutive presets can be adjusted according to actual conditions to balance security and convenience. For example, for systems with higher security requirements, the number of consecutive presets is set to a larger value to ensure that only truly authorized hardware can pass the verification; for systems with higher requirements for ease of use, the number of consecutive presets is set to a smaller value to reduce the number of verifications and time overhead.
[0070] By setting the number of consecutive preset times, the fault tolerance and reliability of the system are improved, while also providing a certain degree of flexibility and configurability, effectively reducing misjudgments caused by accidental factors, improving the practicality and robustness of the system, and providing space for adjustment according to actual needs.
[0071] Furthermore, the embodiment of the present application also includes:
[0072] When the key verification result fails to pass the verification for a preset number of consecutive times, the key verification result is a verification failure.
[0073] In a feasible implementation, when the key verification result fails to pass the verification for a preset number of consecutive times, the BIOS determines the key verification result as a final verification failure and executes a BIOS self-destruction operation. For example, the preset number of consecutive times is set to 5 times, that is, if the key verification fails for 5 consecutive times, the key verification result is a verification failure, and the hardware is considered unauthorized and a self-destruction operation needs to be executed. By setting the preset number of consecutive times, the security of the system can be improved to prevent unauthorized hardware from bypassing the verification mechanism through repeated attempts. In actual applications, attackers try to pass the verification by repeating the verification process and taking advantage of accidental factors or system vulnerabilities. By requiring multiple consecutive verification failures before executing the self-destruction operation, this type of attack behavior can be effectively prevented and the system's anti-attack capability can be improved.
[0074] At the same time, the continuous preset times also provide a certain fault tolerance space to avoid the direct execution of self-destruction operations due to individual verification failures, causing unnecessary losses. In actual applications, individual verification failures may occur due to hardware failures, data transmission errors, etc., but this does not mean that the hardware is necessarily unauthorized. By setting the threshold for continuous verification failures, the system is given a certain fault tolerance opportunity to reduce the possibility of misjudgment. The setting of the continuous preset times is determined according to specific security requirements and risk assessment. For systems with extremely high security requirements, the continuous preset times can be set to a smaller number to minimize the risk of unauthorized hardware; for systems with high availability requirements, the continuous preset times can be set to a larger number to reduce the possibility of misjudgment. At the same time, when setting the preset times, the attacker's capabilities and means should also be considered to avoid security risks caused by too large a continuous preset times.
[0075] In summary, the server BIOS anti-unauthorized hardware startup method provided by the embodiment of the present application has the following technical effects:
[0076] When receiving the startup instruction, a key read command is sent to the editable logic device CPLD through the SPI interface. The editable logic device CPLD transmits the selected key back through the SPI bus. The BIOS achieves the purpose of obtaining the preset key from the hardware level by sending the key read command to the CPLD. The key is stored in the hardware by using the CPLD device on the server motherboard, which enhances the security of the key and lays the foundation for subsequent key verification. The selected key is verified by the preset verification algorithm to obtain the key verification result, thereby ensuring that the BIOS will only be started in a trusted hardware environment. When the key verification result is verification passed, the BIOS startup program is executed. After confirming the legitimacy of the current hardware platform, the BIOS is allowed to continue to execute the subsequent startup code and complete the normal startup of the server. When the key verification result is verification failure, the BIOS self-destruction operation is executed. If the key verification fails, it indicates that the current hardware environment is an unauthorized platform. In order to prevent the BIOS from being illegally used, the BIOS self-destruction operation is immediately executed, which fundamentally prevents the BIOS from starting in an untrusted environment, maximizes the protection of the security of the BIOS code and the server system, and improves the security of the server system.
[0077] Embodiment 2, as Figure 2 As shown, an embodiment of the present application provides a server BIOS anti-unauthorized hardware startup device, which is used to implement a server BIOS anti-unauthorized hardware startup method, and the device includes:
[0078] Server BIOS, the server BIOS is used to receive a startup instruction and send a read command, and perform key verification;
[0079] Programmable logic device CPLD, including:
[0080] Built-in Flash, used to store key information of authorized hardware;
[0081] The programmable logic device CPLD is used to receive a read command from the server BIOS and return corresponding key information.
[0082] In a feasible implementation manner, any one of the authorization hardware stores one or more keys in the built-in Flash.
[0083] Any step of the method described above can be stored as a computer instruction or program in an unlimited computer memory, and can be called and recognized by an unlimited computer processor to implement any method in the embodiments of the present application, without any unnecessary restrictions.
[0084] Furthermore, the first or second mentioned above may not only represent an order relationship, but may also represent a specific concept, and / or refer to multiple elements that can be selected individually or in full. Obviously, those skilled in the art can make various changes and modifications to the present application without departing from the scope of the present application. Thus, if these modifications and variations of the present application fall within the scope of the present application and its equivalents, the present application intends to include these changes and variations.
Claims
1. A server BIOS anti-unauthorized hardware startup method, characterized in that: Applied to server BIOS, including: When receiving the start instruction, a key reading command is sent to the programmable logic device CPLD through the SPI interface, and the programmable logic device CPLD returns the selected key through the SPI bus; Verifying the selected key using a preset verification algorithm to obtain a key verification result; When the key verification result is verification passed, executing the BIOS startup program; When the key verification result is verification failure, a BIOS self-destruct operation is executed.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The selected key is verified by a preset verification algorithm to obtain a key verification result, including: the preset verification algorithm includes encryption algorithm matching and / or key integrity check.
3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The programmable logic device CPLD transmits back the selected key via the SPI bus, including: The built-in Flash of the programmable logic device CPLD stores a key database; Obtain the first authorized hardware key update duration through the timer; When the first authorized hardware key update duration meets the preset update period, dynamically updating the first authorized hardware key through the key database to obtain the first authorized hardware key update result; and sending verification information of the update result of the first authorized hardware key to a designated server; According to the key reading command, the selected key is retrieved, and the programmable logic device CPLD transmits it back through the SPI bus.
4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that When the first authorized hardware key update duration meets the preset update period, dynamically updating the first authorized hardware key through the key database to obtain the first authorized hardware key update result includes: According to the key database, randomly extracting a plurality of first keys; Obtaining a plurality of matching frequency characteristics of the plurality of first keys and the first authorization hardware in a preset historical time zone; According to the plurality of matching frequency characteristics, the plurality of first keys are sorted by minimum values to obtain the first authorized hardware key update result.
5. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that When the first authorized hardware key update duration meets the preset update period, dynamically updating the first authorized hardware key through the key database to obtain the first authorized hardware key update result includes: According to the key database, randomly extracting a plurality of first keys; Obtaining a plurality of similarity coefficients between the plurality of first keys and the first authorized hardware key; According to the plurality of similarity coefficients, the plurality of first keys are sorted by minimum values to obtain the first authorized hardware key update result.
6. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that According to the plurality of matching frequency characteristics, the plurality of first keys are sorted by minimum values to obtain the first authorized hardware key update result, including: Obtaining a plurality of similarity coefficients between the plurality of first keys and the first authorized hardware key; A first weight is configured for the normalized value of the matching frequency feature, and a second weight is configured for the normalized value of the similarity coefficient; Fitting a plurality of normalized values of similarity coefficients and a plurality of normalized values of matching frequency features according to the first weight and the second weight to generate a plurality of key sorting evaluation values; According to the plurality of key sorting evaluation values, the plurality of first keys are sorted by minimum values to obtain the first authorized hardware key update result.
7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that When the key verification result is verification passed, the BIOS startup procedure is executed, including: When the key verification result passes any one of the preset consecutive times, the key verification result is verified.
8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that When the key verification result is verification failure, executing a BIOS self-destruct operation includes: When the key verification result fails to pass the verification for a preset number of consecutive times, the key verification result is a verification failure.
9. A server BIOS anti-unauthorized hardware startup device, characterized in that: A server BIOS anti-unauthorized hardware startup method for implementing any one of claims 1 to 8, comprising: Server BIOS, the server BIOS is used to receive a startup instruction and send a read command, and perform key verification; Programmable logic device CPLD, including: Built-in Flash, used to store key information of authorized hardware; The programmable logic device CPLD is used to receive a read command from the server BIOS and return corresponding key information.
10. The device according to claim 9, characterized in that Any one of the authorization hardware stores one or more keys in the built-in Flash.
Citation Information
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