Industrial internet intelligent terminal data management method based on alliance chain

Through alliance chain and proxy re-encryption technology, combined with key generation center and cloud service provider, the risk of leakage and tampering of industrial Internet data when stored in the cloud is solved, and the data is securely stored and shared, reducing risks and improving Access efficiency.

CN118981799AInactive Publication Date: 2024-11-19BEIJING INSTITUTE OF GRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202410954674.9
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-07-16
Publication Date
2024-11-19
Estimated Expiration
Not applicable · inactive patent

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

There is a risk of leakage and tampering when industrial Internet data is stored in the cloud, and how to achieve secure storage and sharing has become a challenge.

Method used

Adopt the data management method of industrial Internet smart terminals based on alliance chains, through the collaborative work of key generation center, cloud service provider and alliance chain, and use proxy re-encryption technology and bilinear mapping verification to ensure data security and controllability. to realize secure storage and sharing of data.

Benefits of technology

It effectively reduces the risk of data leakage and tampering, ensures the security and privacy of user data, and improves the efficiency and controllability of data access.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention discloses an alliance chain-based industrial internet intelligent terminal data management method, and relates to the technical field of block chains, the method is applied to an alliance chain-based industrial internet intelligent terminal data management system, and the method comprises the following steps: when a cloud service provider receives an IID check request sent by a data requester, sending the IID check request to a data requester; determining a target IID according to the IID viewing request; performing tampering verification on the target IID to obtain a tampering verification result; when the tampering verification result is that the data requester is not tampered, performing permission verification on the data requester to obtain a permission verification result; and whether the target IID is sent to the data requester is determined based on the permission verification result, the industrial internet data is managed based on the alliance chain, and the leakage and tampering risks existing during industrial internet data management can be reduced.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of blockchain technology, and in particular to an industrial Internet intelligent terminal data management method based on alliance chain. Background Art

[0002] With the integration of new-generation information technology represented by the Internet of Things, cloud computing, big data, 5G, etc. and traditional manufacturing, a new round of scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation is accelerating, and the Industrial Internet has emerged. The Industrial Internet is a new ecological industry and application formed by the comprehensive integration of the Internet and the new-generation information technology with the industrial system, in order to achieve industrial networking, digitalization and intelligent development. The data generated in the information application field of the Industrial Internet is industrial big data. Industrial big data is the core element of the Industrial Internet and a key element in the development of industrial intelligence. As one of the classifications of industrial big data, field equipment data is data from industrial production line equipment or machines. The continuous influx of a large amount of machine equipment data and Internet data has made the data set of large industrial enterprises reach the PB level. Massive data has been derived from the fields of the Industrial Internet such as smart home, smart grid, smart manufacturing, and smart transportation. These Industrial Internet Data (IID) usually contain the privacy of users. In order to safely store, view and share these huge IIDs, cloud servers can be used. Cloud servers are easy to deploy and flexible to use. They can share data among multiple devices and store IIDs in the cloud. Users can view the data stored in the cloud and use the services provided by the cloud anytime and anywhere. In addition, the cloud provides almost unlimited storage capacity to meet the growing demand for data storage.

[0003] Blockchain has the characteristics of decentralization and immutability. Blockchain technology can be used to determine whether user data has been tampered with. Alliance chain is a kind of blockchain between public chain and private chain. Only alliance members can participate in bookkeeping. Data can be shared between pre-selected nodes, achieving privacy while ensuring the efficiency of transaction processing.

[0004] Proxy Re-encryption (PRE) technology can effectively encrypt files and then securely transmit them to recipients through a third-party agent. It is suitable for flexible sharing scenarios. User A does not need to use the public keys of other authorized users to encrypt files multiple times. He only needs to encrypt the file once and upload it, then use his own private key and the public keys of other users to generate a re-encryption key. The agent uses the re-encryption key to encrypt the original ciphertext file and then transmits it to other authorized users. The authorized users use their own private keys to decrypt the file.

[0005] The cloud can realize both big data storage and data sharing, but when all these private IIDs are stored in cloud servers, there may be a risk of leakage and tampering. Therefore, how user IIDs can be securely stored, viewed and shared is an unresolved problem. Summary of the invention

[0006] The purpose of this application is to provide an industrial Internet intelligent terminal data management method based on an alliance chain, which can reduce the risks of leakage and tampering in industrial Internet data management.

[0007] To achieve the above objectives, this application provides the following solutions:

[0008] A method for managing data of an industrial Internet intelligent terminal based on a consortium chain, wherein the method for managing data of an industrial Internet intelligent terminal based on a consortium chain is applied to a data management system for an industrial Internet intelligent terminal based on a consortium chain, wherein the data management system for an industrial Internet intelligent terminal based on a consortium chain comprises:

[0009] Key generation center, cloud service provider, alliance chain and multiple user terminals;

[0010] Any of the user terminals is respectively connected to the key generation center, the cloud service provider and the alliance chain;

[0011] The cloud service provider is also connected to the alliance chain;

[0012] When the user terminal acts as a data uploader, it uploads one or more IIDs to the cloud service provider;

[0013] When the user terminal is a data requester, it sends an IID query request to the cloud service provider, requesting to query the target IID;

[0014] The industrial Internet intelligent terminal data management method based on alliance chain includes:

[0015] When the cloud service provider receives the IID query request sent by the data requester, it determines the target IID according to the IID query request;

[0016] The cloud service provider performs tamper verification on the target IID and obtains a tamper verification result;

[0017] When the tampering verification result is that the data has not been tampered with, the cloud service provider performs authority verification on the data requester to obtain an authority verification result;

[0018] The cloud service provider determines whether to send the target IID to the data requester based on the authority verification result.

[0019] Optionally, when the cloud service provider receives the IID query request sent by the data requester, before determining the target IID according to the IID query request, the cloud service provider further includes:

[0020] When the data uploader receives the registration key, it determines that the registration key is a file signature private key; the registration key is generated by the key generation center according to the registration information uploaded by the data uploader; the registration key corresponds to the user end one by one;

[0021] The data uploader determines the file signature public key based on the file signature private key, and sends the file signature public key to the alliance chain; the file signature public key corresponds to the user end one by one;

[0022] The data uploader uses the file signature private key to encrypt the IID to be uploaded, obtains an encrypted IID, and sends the encrypted IID to the cloud service provider;

[0023] When receiving the encrypted IID, the cloud service provider generates a hash value of the encrypted IID and sends the hash value of the encrypted IID to the alliance chain.

[0024] Optionally, the cloud service provider performs tamper verification on the target IID to obtain a tamper verification result, including:

[0025] The cloud service provider obtains the file signature public key of the data uploader corresponding to the target IID from the consortium chain;

[0026] The cloud service provider determines the tampering verification result as not tampered with when the target IID meets the non-tampering condition based on the file signature public key;

[0027] The cloud service provider determines that the tampering verification result is tampered when the target IID does not meet the non-tampering condition based on the file signature public key.

[0028] Optionally, the non-tampering condition is:

[0029] e(Sig2,H1(F))·e(spk,s)=e(g,Sig1)

[0030] Sig1=s ssk ·H1(F) r

[0031] Sig2=g r

[0032] spk=g ssk

[0033] Where e(*,*) represents a bilinear mapping, Sig2 represents a variable name, H1(F) represents a hash value, spk represents the file signature public key of the data uploader corresponding to the target IID, s represents the first random number, s∈Z p * , Z p * represents a non-zero integer field with order p-1, g is the generator of the bilinear mapping multiplication cyclic group G, Sig1 represents the signature of the data user on the file, ssk represents the file signature private key of the data uploader corresponding to the target IID, r represents the second random number, r∈Z p * .

[0034] Optionally, performing authority verification on the data requester to obtain an authority verification result includes:

[0035] The cloud service provider obtains any one-time encrypted IID uploaded by the data requester as a first verification file;

[0036] The cloud service provider obtains the file signature public key of the data requester from the alliance chain, and obtains the hash value of the first verification file from the alliance chain as the first hash value;

[0037] The cloud service provider encrypts the first verification file using the file signature public key of the data requester to obtain a second verification file, and sends the second verification file to the data requester;

[0038] The data requester uses the local file signature private key to decrypt the second verification file to obtain a third verification file, and sends the third verification file to the cloud service provider;

[0039] The cloud service provider performs a hash operation on the third verification file to obtain a second hash value;

[0040] Determine whether the second Hash value is equal to the first Hash value, and obtain a first determination result;

[0041] If the first judgment result is yes, then the authority verification result is determined to be "the data requester is the data uploader of the target IID";

[0042] If the first judgment result is no, the authority verification result is determined to be "the data requester is not the data uploader of the target IID".

[0043] Optionally, the industrial Internet intelligent terminal data management method based on alliance chain also includes:

[0044] When receiving all sharing requests sent by any data uploader, the cloud service provider parses all sharing requests and obtains the IDs of all first sharing users specified by the data uploader;

[0045] The cloud service provider generates a unique update factor for the data uploader, and sends the update factor to all first sharing users designated by the data uploader.

[0046] Optionally, the update factor is:

[0047]

[0048] Where uf represents the update factor, H2(*) represents the second hash function, spk DU Indicates the file signature public key of the data sender, spk B represents the file signature public key of the data receiver, t' represents the system time when the data sender decides to share the data with the data receiver, y represents a random number, y∈Z p * , t represents the system time when the data sender uploads the file, and ||*|| represents the string concatenation operator.

[0049] Optionally, after determining that the authority verification result is "the data requester is not the data uploader of the target IID", it also includes:

[0050] When the cloud service provider has an encrypted update factor in the IID check request, the update factor of the data uploader corresponding to the target IID is determined as the verification update factor; the encrypted update factor is obtained by encrypting the update factor of the data uploader corresponding to the target IID using the local file signature private key when the data requester stores the update factor of the data uploader corresponding to the target IID;

[0051] The cloud service provider obtains the file signature public key of the data requester from the consortium chain;

[0052] The cloud service provider uses the file signature public key of the data requester to decrypt the encrypted update factor to obtain a decrypted update factor;

[0053] Determine whether the decryption update factor is equal to the verification update factor to obtain a second determination result;

[0054] If the second judgment result is yes, the authority verification result is determined as "the data requester is the first shared user of the data uploader of the target IID";

[0055] If the second judgment result is no, the authority verification result is determined to be "the data requester is a non-first shared user of the data uploader of the target IID".

[0056] Optionally, after determining that the authority verification result is "the data requester is a non-first shared user of the data uploader of the target IID", the method further includes:

[0057] When receiving a partial sharing request sent by any data uploader, the cloud service provider parses the partial sharing request to obtain multiple re-encryption keys; any of the re-encryption keys is generated by the data uploader according to the local file signature private key and the file signature public key of any second sharing user; the re-encryption key corresponds to the second sharing user one by one;

[0058] The cloud service provider determines that the target IID corresponds to the data uploader sending multiple re-encryption keys as the target re-encryption key;

[0059] The cloud service provider determines whether a target re-encryption key corresponding to the data requester exists, and obtains a third determination result;

[0060] If the third judgment result is yes, the authority verification result is determined to be "the data requester is the second shared user of the data uploader of the target IID";

[0061] If the third judgment result is no, then the authority verification result is determined to be "the data requester is an unauthorized user."

[0062] Optionally, the cloud service provider determines whether to send the target IID to the data requester based on the authority verification result, including:

[0063] The cloud service provider rejects the IID viewing request when the data requester is an unauthorized user;

[0064] When the data requester is the second shared user of the data uploader of the target IID, the cloud service provider sends all the once encrypted IIDs uploaded by the data uploader of the target IID to the data requester;

[0065] The data requester uses the local file signature private key to decrypt the received multiple one-time encrypted IIDs to obtain all IIDs uploaded by the data uploader of the target IID;

[0066] When the data requester is the second shared user of the data uploader of the target IID, the cloud service provider determines that the once encrypted IID corresponding to all data that the data uploader of the target IID allows the data requester to access is partially accessible data;

[0067] The cloud service provider uses the target re-encryption key corresponding to the data requester to re-encrypt the partially accessible data to obtain partially accessible encrypted data, and sends the partially accessible encrypted data to the data requester;

[0068] The data requester uses the local re-encryption key to decrypt part of the accessible encrypted data and obtains all the data that the data uploader of the target IID allows the data requester to access.

[0069] According to the specific embodiments provided in this application, this application discloses the following technical effects:

[0070] The present application provides a data management method for an industrial Internet intelligent terminal based on a consortium chain. According to the registration information sent by the data user (DU), the private key generator (PKG) issues a registration key to the DU. The DU uses the received registration key as its own file signature private key and generates a signature public key based on the signature private key. The DU calculates the file signature of the file to be uploaded based on the signature private key and uploads the file signature to the consortium chain. The DU encrypts the file and uploads it to the cloud service provider (CSP). The CSP obtains the target file and verifies whether the target file has been tampered with based on the signature public key combined with the properties of the bilinear mapping. The CSP checks the identity of the DU and determines whether the DU has the right to access the data. The DU shares the industrial Internet data with other users. Combining cloud servers and consortium chains to store the massive data of the industrial Internet intelligent terminal, and using proxy re-encryption technology to achieve secure and convenient data sharing, can not only ensure the safe sharing and storage of user data, but also improve the efficiency of obtaining the original file. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0071] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0072] Figure 1 This is a structural diagram of an industrial Internet intelligent terminal data management system based on a consortium chain in one embodiment of the present application;

[0073] Figure 2 This is a flow chart of an industrial Internet intelligent terminal data management method based on alliance chain in one embodiment of the present application;

[0074] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the structure of a computer device provided in one embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0075] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present application, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0076] In order to make the above-mentioned objects, features and advantages of the present application more obvious and easy to understand, the present application is further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific implementation methods.

[0077] In an exemplary embodiment, a method for managing data of an industrial Internet intelligent terminal based on a consortium chain is applied to a data management system for an industrial Internet intelligent terminal based on a consortium chain, such as Figure 1 , the industrial Internet intelligent terminal data management system based on alliance chain includes: a key generation center, a cloud service provider, an alliance chain and multiple user terminals. Any user terminal is connected to the key generation center, the cloud service provider and the alliance chain respectively. The cloud service provider is also connected to the alliance chain. When the user terminal is the data uploader, it uploads one or more IIDs to the cloud service provider. When the user terminal is the data requester, it sends an IID viewing request to the cloud service provider to request to view the target IID.

[0078] like Figure 2 , an industrial Internet intelligent terminal data management method based on alliance chain, including: steps 201 to 204.

[0079] Step 201: When receiving an IID query request sent by a data requester, the cloud service provider determines a target IID according to the IID query request.

[0080] Step 202: The cloud service provider performs tamper verification on the target IID and obtains a tamper verification result.

[0081] Step 203: When the tampering verification result is that the data has not been tampered with, the cloud service provider performs permission verification on the data requester to obtain a permission verification result.

[0082] Step 204: The cloud service provider determines whether to send the target IID to the data requester based on the authority verification result.

[0083] Before step 201, the method for the data uploader to upload the IID is also included, that is, according to the registration information sent by the DU, the PKG issues a registration key to the DU, the DU uses the received registration key as its own file signature private key, and generates a signature public key according to the signature private key, the DU calculates the file signature of the file to be uploaded according to the signature private key, and uploads the file signature to the alliance chain. Specifically, it includes steps 205 to 208.

[0084] Step 205: When the data uploader receives the registration key, it determines that the registration key is the file signature private key. The registration key is generated by the key generation center based on the registration information uploaded by the data uploader. The registration key corresponds to the user end one by one.

[0085] Step 206: The data uploader determines the file signature public key based on the file signature private key, and sends the file signature public key to the alliance chain. The file signature public key corresponds to the user end one by one.

[0086] Step 207: The data uploader uses the file signature private key to encrypt the IID to be uploaded, obtains an encrypted IID, and sends the encrypted IID to the cloud service provider.

[0087] Step 208: When receiving the encrypted IID, the cloud service provider generates a hash value of the encrypted IID and sends the hash value of the encrypted IID to the alliance chain.

[0088] Step 202 includes: step 202-1 to step 202-3.

[0089] Step 202-1: The cloud service provider obtains the file signature public key of the data uploader corresponding to the target IID from the alliance chain.

[0090] Step 202-2: The cloud service provider determines that the tampering verification result is not tampered with when the target IID meets the non-tampering condition based on the file signature public key.

[0091] Step 202-3: The cloud service provider determines that the tampering verification result is tampered when the target IID does not meet the non-tampering condition based on the file signature public key.

[0092] The non-tampering conditions are:

[0093] e(Sig2,H1(F))·e(spk,s)=e(g,Sig1)

[0094] Sig1=s ssk ·H1(F) r

[0095] Sig2=g r

[0096] spk=g ssk

[0097] Among them, e(*,*) represents a bilinear mapping, Sig2 represents a variable name, and Sig2 represents the mapping of g r A new variable name for the public parameter, H1(F) represents the hash value, spk represents the file signature public key of the data uploader corresponding to the target IID, s represents the first random number, s∈Z p * , Z p * represents a non-zero integer field with order p-1, g is the generator of the bilinear mapping multiplication cyclic group G, Sig1 represents the signature of the data user on the file, ssk represents the file signature private key of the data uploader corresponding to the target IID, r represents the second random number, r∈Z p * .s ssk is the custom intermediate parameter value of Sig1, g r For custom public parameters, g ssk The public key of the party that uploaded the data.

[0098] DU encrypts the file and uploads it to CSP. CSP obtains the target file and verifies whether the target file has been tampered with based on the signature public key and the properties of bilinear mapping. Specifically, DU encrypts the IID and uploads it to CSP. CSP returns a calculated file hash value H(F) to the consortium chain. When DU initiates a request to CSP to view the uploaded IID, CSP needs to first verify whether the target IID has been tampered with: if e(Sig2,H1(F))·e(spk,s)=e(g,Sig1) holds, the target IID has not been tampered with; otherwise, the target IID has been tampered with.

[0099] In addition, the industrial Internet intelligent terminal data management method based on the alliance chain also includes: the entire data sharing process, namely step 209 to step 2010 and the partial data sharing process, namely step 209 to step 2010.

[0100] Step 209: When receiving all sharing requests sent by any data uploader, the cloud service provider parses all sharing requests to obtain the IDs of all first sharing users specified by the data uploader.

[0101] Step 2010: The cloud service provider generates a unique update factor for the data uploader, and sends the update factor to all first sharing users designated by the data uploader.

[0102] The update factor is:

[0103]

[0104] Where uf represents the update factor, H2(*) represents the second hash function, spk DU Indicates the file signature public key of the data sender, spk B represents the file signature public key of the data receiver, t' represents the system time when the data sender decides to share the data with the data receiver, y represents a random number, y∈Z p * , t represents the system time when the data sender uploads the file, and ||*|| represents the string concatenation operator.

[0105] Step 211: When receiving a partial sharing request sent by any data uploader, the cloud service provider parses the partial sharing request and obtains multiple re-encryption keys. Any re-encryption key is generated by the data uploader based on the local file signature private key and the file signature public key of any second sharing user. The re-encryption key corresponds to the second sharing user one by one.

[0106] Specifically, step 203 includes: step 203-1 to step 203-18.

[0107] Step 203-1: The cloud service provider obtains any one-time encrypted IID uploaded by the data requester as a first verification file.

[0108] Step 203-2: The cloud service provider obtains the file signature public key of the data requester from the alliance chain, and obtains the hash value of the first verification file from the alliance chain as the first hash value.

[0109] Step 203-3: The cloud service provider encrypts the first verification file using the file signature public key of the data requester to obtain a second verification file, and sends the second verification file to the data requester.

[0110] Step 203-4: The data requesting party uses the local file signature private key to decrypt the second verification file to obtain a third verification file, and sends the third verification file to the cloud service provider.

[0111] Step 203 - 5 : The cloud service provider performs a hash operation on the third verification file to obtain a second hash value.

[0112] Step 203-6: Determine whether the second Hash value is equal to the first Hash value, and obtain a first determination result. If the first determination result is yes, execute step 203-7; if the first determination result is no, execute step 203-8.

[0113] Step 203-7: Determine that the authority verification result is "the data requester is the data uploader of the target IID".

[0114] Step 203-8: Determine that the result of the authority verification is "the data requester is not the data uploader of the target IID".

[0115] Step 203-9: When the cloud service provider finds an encrypted update factor in the IID check request, it determines the update factor of the data uploader corresponding to the target IID as the verification update factor. The encrypted update factor is obtained by encrypting the update factor of the data uploader corresponding to the target IID using the local file signature private key when the data requester stores the update factor of the data uploader corresponding to the target IID.

[0116] Step 203-10: The cloud service provider obtains the file signature public key of the data requester from the consortium chain.

[0117] Step 203-11: The cloud service provider uses the file signature public key of the data requester to decrypt the encrypted update factor to obtain the decrypted update factor.

[0118] Step 203-12: Determine whether the decryption update factor is equal to the verification update factor to obtain a second determination result. If the second determination result is yes, execute step 203-13; if the second determination result is no, execute step 203-14.

[0119] Step 203-13: Determine that the result of the authority verification is "the data requester is the first shared user of the data uploader of the target IID".

[0120] Step 203-14: Determine that the result of the authority verification is "the data requester is a non-first shared user of the data uploader of the target IID".

[0121] Step 203-15: The cloud service provider determines that the target IID corresponds to the data uploader sending multiple re-encryption keys as target re-encryption keys.

[0122] Step 203-16: The cloud service provider determines whether the target re-encryption key corresponding to the data requester exists, and obtains a third determination result. If the third determination result is yes, step 203-17 is executed; if the third determination result is no, step 203-18 is executed.

[0123] Step 203-17: Determine that the authority verification result is "the data requester is the second shared user of the data uploader of the target IID".

[0124] Step 203-18: Determine that the authority verification result is "the data requester is an unauthorized user."

[0125] Specifically, step 204 includes: step 204-1 to step 204-6.

[0126] Step 204-1: When the data requester is an unauthorized user, the cloud service provider rejects the IID viewing request.

[0127] Step 204 - 2 : When the data requester is the second shared user of the data uploader of the target IID, the cloud service provider sends all the once encrypted IIDs uploaded by the data uploader of the target IID to the data requester.

[0128] Step 204-3: The data requesting party uses the local file signature private key to decrypt the received multiple one-time encrypted IIDs to obtain all IIDs uploaded by the data uploader of the target IID.

[0129] Step 204-4: When the data requester is the second sharing user of the data uploader of the target IID, the cloud service provider determines that the once encrypted IID corresponding to all data that the data uploader of the target IID allows the data requester to access is partially accessible data.

[0130] Step 204 - 5 : The cloud service provider uses the target re-encryption key corresponding to the data requester to re-encrypt the partially accessible data to obtain partially accessible encrypted data, and sends the partially accessible encrypted data to the data requester.

[0131] Step 204-6: The data requester uses the local re-encryption key to decrypt the partially accessible encrypted data, and obtains all the data that the data uploader of the target IID allows the data requester to access.

[0132] The CSP checks the identity of the DU and determines whether the DU has the authority to access the data, including:

[0133] Since the relevant IID is not stored locally, all IIDs are stored in the cloud, and the IID contains the user's privacy data, so the CSP needs to verify the identity of the DU first, and only after the identity is verified can it have access to the IID.

[0134] The DU authentication process is as follows:

[0135] Step 1: CSP obtains a file F uploaded by this DU, encrypts this file F with the DU signature public key on the alliance chain, and returns the new file F' to this DU.

[0136] Step 2: The DU uses its own local signature private key to decrypt the file F' to obtain a new file F".

[0137] Step 3: This DU will temporarily upload the decrypted new file F” to CSP again for verification. First, CSP performs a hash operation on F” to obtain the file hash value H1(F”). Secondly, CSP obtains the correct file hash value H(F) from the alliance chain. Finally, if H1(F”) = H(F), the identity of this DU is verified and this DU is the data uploader. Otherwise, the user identity authentication fails and this DU is an ordinary user.

[0138] After verification by CSP, if DU is the data uploader, it can access the relevant IID stored in CSP.

[0139] After CSP verification, if the DU is a common user, the CSP has not stored the DU-related IID. At this time, the IIDs that the DU can access are divided into two cases:

[0140] Case 1: This DU uses its own signature private key to access part of the IID shared by other DUs.

[0141] Case 2: CSP checks whether the update factor of this DU has been stored. If the record contains the update factor of this DU, this DU can access all IIDs shared by other DUs through the update factor.

[0142] DU shares industrial Internet data with other users, including:

[0143] Industrial Internet data sharing is divided into three types of sharing: DU accesses uploaded IIDs, DU shares all IIDs, and DU shares part of the IIDs.

[0144] When DU applies to access the IID uploaded by itself, DU, as a node of the alliance chain, needs to verify its identity and prove that it is the uploader of the data before it can access the data. The verification process is as follows:

[0145] Step 1: CSP obtains a file F uploaded by this DU, encrypts this file F with the DU signature public key on the alliance chain, and returns the new file F' to this DU.

[0146] Step 2: The DU uses its own local signature private key to decrypt the file F' to obtain a new file F".

[0147] Step 3: This DU will temporarily upload the decrypted new file F” to CSP again for verification. First, CSP performs a hash operation on F” to obtain the file hash value H1(F”). Secondly, CSP obtains the correct file hash value H(F) from the alliance chain. Finally, if H1(F”) = H(F), the identity of this DU is verified and can access IID. Otherwise, the user identity authentication fails and cannot access IID.

[0148] When DU decides to share all its IIDs with user B (or even more users), that is, when adding data owners, the CSP calculates the update factor And send it to the data recipient - user B. User B can use this update factor to request CSP to allow access to DU data verification, and CSP will save the record of the update factor.

[0149] When user B applies to access all IIDs of DU, he encrypts the update factor uf with his own signature private key. B The obtained uf B 'Send to CSP, CSP obtains user B's signature public key from the alliance chain to decrypt uf B 'Get uf B If uf B ”=uf B , proving that user B is indeed an authorized node in the alliance chain and can verify access to data. Otherwise, CSP will not verify access to data.

[0150] The specific verification process for accessing data is as follows:

[0151] e(Sig2,H1(F) uf )·e(spk uf ,s)=e(g,Sig1 uf )

[0152] Among them, e() is a bilinear mapping, Sig2=g r ,spk DU Data sender - DU signature public key, spk B is the data receiver - user B's signature public key, H1(F) is the hash value, g is the generator of the bilinear mapping multiplication cyclic group G, s, r, y are all random numbers, s∈Z p * , r∈Z p * , y∈Z p * , Z p * It is a multiplicative cyclic group with prime number p as the order, t' is the system time when DU decides to share data with user B, and t is the system time when DU uploads the file.

[0153]

[0154] When DU decides to share part of its IID with user C (or even more users), CSP, as an intermediate agent, generates a re-encryption key for user C who has access to the shared data. CSP uses this re-encryption key to encrypt the file in CSP and sends the encrypted file to user C. User C uses his own signature private key to decrypt the original file. Specifically, the following steps are performed:

[0155] In the first step, DU uses its own signature private key and the signature public key of user C in the alliance chain to calculate the re-encryption key prekey, and sends the re-encryption key prekey to the agent - CSP.

[0156] In the second step, CSP obtains the encrypted file F', encrypts the file again with the re-encryption key to obtain a new file F", and sends the new file F" to user C.

[0157] In the third step, user C uses his own signature private key to decrypt the new file F" to obtain the original file F.

[0158] The present application also provides an application scenario, which applies the above-mentioned industrial Internet intelligent terminal data management method based on alliance chain. Specifically: The industrial Internet intelligent terminal data management method based on alliance chain provided in this embodiment can be applied in enterprise management scenarios. Enterprise management scenarios include task publishing links, data task links, and task processing links. The industrial Internet intelligent terminal data management method based on alliance chain provided in this embodiment belongs to the data management link in the task processing link.

[0159] In an exemplary embodiment, a computer device is provided. The computer device may be a server or a terminal. The internal structure diagram thereof may be as follows: Figure 3 As shown. The computer device includes a processor, a memory, an input / output interface (Input / Output, referred to as I / O) and a communication interface. Among them, the processor, the memory and the input / output interface are connected through a system bus, and the communication interface is connected to the system bus through the input / output interface. Among them, the processor of the computer device is used to provide computing and control capabilities. The memory of the computer device includes a non-volatile storage medium and an internal memory. The non-volatile storage medium stores an operating system, a computer program and a database. The internal memory provides an environment for the operation of the operating system and the computer program in the non-volatile storage medium. The input / output interface of the computer device is used to exchange information between the processor and an external device. The communication interface of the computer device is used to communicate with an external terminal through a network connection. When the computer program is executed by the processor, a method for managing data of an industrial Internet intelligent terminal based on an alliance chain is implemented.

[0160] Those skilled in the art will understand that Figure 3The structure shown in the figure is only a block diagram of a part of the structure related to the solution of the present application, and does not constitute a limitation on the computer device to which the solution of the present application is applied. The specific computer device may include more or fewer components than those shown in the figure, or combine certain components, or have a different arrangement of components. In an exemplary embodiment, a computer device is provided, including a memory and a processor, wherein a computer program is stored in the memory, and the processor implements the steps in the above-mentioned method embodiments when executing the computer program.

[0161] In an exemplary embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, storing a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps in the above method embodiments are implemented.

[0162] In an exemplary embodiment, a computer program product is provided, including a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps in the above method embodiments are implemented.

[0163] It should be noted that the user information (including but not limited to user device information, user personal information, etc.) and data (including but not limited to data used for analysis, stored data, displayed data, etc.) involved in this application are all information and data authorized by the user or fully authorized by all parties, and the collection, use and processing of relevant data must comply with relevant regulations.

[0164] Those of ordinary skill in the art can understand that all or part of the processes in the above-mentioned embodiment methods can be completed by instructing the relevant hardware through a computer program, and the computer program can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium. When the computer program is executed, it can include the processes of the embodiments of the above-mentioned methods. Among them, any reference to the memory, database or other medium used in the embodiments provided in the present application can include at least one of non-volatile and volatile memory. Non-volatile memory can include read-only memory (ROM), magnetic tape, floppy disk, flash memory, optical memory, high-density embedded non-volatile memory, resistive random access memory (ReRAM), magnetic random access memory (MRAM), ferroelectric random access memory (FRAM), phase change memory (PCM), graphene memory, etc. Volatile memory can include random access memory (RAM) or external cache memory, etc. By way of illustration and not limitation, RAM may be in various forms, such as static random access memory (SRAM) or dynamic random access memory (DRAM).

[0165] The database involved in each embodiment provided in this application may include at least one of a relational database and a non-relational database. The non-relational database may include a distributed database based on blockchain, etc., but is not limited thereto. The processor involved in each embodiment provided in this application may be a general-purpose processor, a central processing unit, a graphics processor, a digital signal processor, a programmable logic device, a data processing logic device based on quantum computing, etc., but is not limited thereto.

[0166] The technical features of the above embodiments may be combined arbitrarily. To make the description concise, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this specification.

[0167] This article uses specific examples to illustrate the principles and implementation methods of this application. The description of the above embodiments is only used to help understand the method and core ideas of this application. At the same time, for those skilled in the art, according to the ideas of this application, there will be changes in the specific implementation methods and application scope. In summary, the content of this specification should not be understood as limiting this application.

Claims

1. A data management method for industrial Internet intelligent terminals based on alliance chain, characterized in that: The industrial Internet intelligent terminal data management method based on the alliance chain is applied to an industrial Internet intelligent terminal data management system based on the alliance chain. The industrial Internet intelligent terminal data management system based on the alliance chain includes: Key generation center, cloud service provider, alliance chain and multiple user terminals; Any of the user terminals is respectively connected to the key generation center, the cloud service provider and the alliance chain; The cloud service provider is also connected to the alliance chain; When the user terminal acts as a data uploader, it uploads one or more IIDs to the cloud service provider; When the user terminal is a data requester, it sends an IID query request to the cloud service provider, requesting to query the target IID; The industrial Internet intelligent terminal data management method based on alliance chain includes: When the cloud service provider receives the IID query request sent by the data requester, it determines the target IID according to the IID query request; The cloud service provider performs tamper verification on the target IID and obtains a tamper verification result; When the tampering verification result is that the data has not been tampered with, the cloud service provider performs authority verification on the data requester to obtain an authority verification result; The cloud service provider determines whether to send the target IID to the data requester based on the authority verification result.

2. According to the method for managing data of industrial Internet intelligent terminals based on alliance chain according to claim 1, it is characterized in that: When the cloud service provider receives the IID query request sent by the data requester, before determining the target IID according to the IID query request, the cloud service provider further includes: When the data uploader receives the registration key, it determines that the registration key is a file signature private key; the registration key is generated by the key generation center according to the registration information uploaded by the data uploader; the registration key corresponds to the user end one by one; The data uploader determines the file signature public key based on the file signature private key, and sends the file signature public key to the alliance chain; the file signature public key corresponds to the user end one by one; The data uploader uses the file signature private key to encrypt the IID to be uploaded, obtains an encrypted IID, and sends the encrypted IID to the cloud service provider; When receiving the encrypted IID, the cloud service provider generates a hash value of the encrypted IID and sends the hash value of the encrypted IID to the alliance chain.

3. The method for managing data of an industrial Internet intelligent terminal based on an alliance chain according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The cloud service provider performs tamper verification on the target IID to obtain a tamper verification result, including: The cloud service provider obtains the file signature public key of the data uploader corresponding to the target IID from the consortium chain; The cloud service provider determines the tampering verification result as not tampered with when the target IID meets the non-tampering condition based on the file signature public key; The cloud service provider determines that the tampering verification result is tampered when the target IID does not meet the non-tampering condition based on the file signature public key.

4. The method for managing data of an industrial Internet intelligent terminal based on an alliance chain according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The non-tampering conditions are: e(Sig2,H1(F))·e(spk,s)=e(g,Sig1) Sig1=s ssk ·H1(F) r Sig2=g r spk=g ssk Where e(*, *) represents a bilinear mapping, Sig2 represents a variable name, H1(F) represents a hash value, spk represents the file signature public key of the data uploader corresponding to the target IID, s represents the first random number, s∈Z p * , Z p * represents a non-zero integer field with order p-1, g is the generator of the bilinear mapping multiplication cyclic group G, Sig1 represents the signature of the data user on the file, ssk represents the file signature private key of the data uploader corresponding to the target IID, r represents the second random number, r∈Z p * .

5. The method for managing data of an industrial Internet intelligent terminal based on an alliance chain according to claim 4 is characterized in that: Performing authority verification on the data requester to obtain an authority verification result, including: The cloud service provider obtains any one-time encrypted IID uploaded by the data requester as a first verification file; The cloud service provider obtains the file signature public key of the data requester from the alliance chain, and obtains the hash value of the first verification file from the alliance chain as the first hash value; The cloud service provider encrypts the first verification file using the file signature public key of the data requester to obtain a second verification file, and sends the second verification file to the data requester; The data requester uses the local file signature private key to decrypt the second verification file to obtain a third verification file, and sends the third verification file to the cloud service provider; The cloud service provider performs a hash operation on the third verification file to obtain a second hash value; Determine whether the second Hash value is equal to the first Hash value, and obtain a first determination result; If the first judgment result is yes, the authority verification result is determined to be "the data requester is the data uploader of the target IID"; If the first judgment result is no, the authority verification result is determined to be "the data requester is not the data uploader of the target IID".

6. The method for managing data of an industrial Internet intelligent terminal based on an alliance chain according to claim 5 is characterized in that: The industrial Internet intelligent terminal data management method based on the alliance chain also includes: When receiving all sharing requests sent by any data uploader, the cloud service provider parses all sharing requests and obtains the IDs of all first sharing users specified by the data uploader; The cloud service provider generates a unique update factor for the data uploader, and sends the update factor to all first sharing users designated by the data uploader.

7. The method for managing data of an industrial Internet intelligent terminal based on an alliance chain according to claim 6 is characterized in that: The update factor is: Where uf represents the update factor, H2(*) represents the second hash function, spk DU Indicates the file signature public key of the data sender, spk B represents the file signature public key of the data receiver, t' represents the system time when the data sender decides to share the data with the data receiver, y represents a random number, y∈Z p * , t represents the system time when the data sender uploads the file, and ||*|| represents the string concatenation operator.

8. The method for managing data of an industrial Internet intelligent terminal based on an alliance chain according to claim 6 is characterized in that: After determining that the result of the authority verification is "the data requester is not the data uploader of the target IID", it also includes: When the cloud service provider has an encrypted update factor in the IID check request, the update factor of the data uploader corresponding to the target IID is determined as the verification update factor; the encrypted update factor is obtained by encrypting the update factor of the data uploader corresponding to the target IID using the local file signature private key when the data requester stores the update factor of the data uploader corresponding to the target IID; The cloud service provider obtains the file signature public key of the data requester from the consortium chain; The cloud service provider uses the file signature public key of the data requester to decrypt the encrypted update factor to obtain a decrypted update factor; Determine whether the decryption update factor is equal to the verification update factor to obtain a second determination result; If the second judgment result is yes, the authority verification result is determined to be "the data requester is the first shared user of the data uploader of the target IID"; If the second judgment result is no, the authority verification result is determined to be "the data requester is not the first shared user of the data uploader of the target IID".

9. The method for managing data of an industrial Internet intelligent terminal based on an alliance chain according to claim 8 is characterized in that: After determining that the authority verification result is "the data requester is a non-first shared user of the data uploader of the target IID", the method further includes: When receiving a partial sharing request sent by any data uploader, the cloud service provider parses the partial sharing request to obtain multiple re-encryption keys; any of the re-encryption keys is generated by the data uploader according to the local file signature private key and the file signature public key of any second sharing user; the re-encryption key corresponds to the second sharing user one by one; The cloud service provider determines that the target IID corresponds to the data uploader sending multiple re-encryption keys as the target re-encryption key; The cloud service provider determines whether a target re-encryption key corresponding to the data requester exists, and obtains a third determination result; If the third judgment result is yes, the authority verification result is determined to be "the data requester is the second shared user of the data uploader of the target IID"; If the third judgment result is no, the authority verification result is determined to be "the data requester is an unauthorized user".

10. The method for managing data of an industrial Internet intelligent terminal based on alliance chain according to claim 9 is characterized in that: The cloud service provider determines, based on the authority verification result, whether to send the target IID to the data requester, including: The cloud service provider rejects the IID viewing request when the data requester is an unauthorized user; When the data requester is the second shared user of the data uploader of the target IID, the cloud service provider sends all the once encrypted IIDs uploaded by the data uploader of the target IID to the data requester; The data requester uses the local file signature private key to decrypt the received multiple one-time encrypted IIDs to obtain all IIDs uploaded by the data uploader of the target IID; When the data requester is the second shared user of the data uploader of the target IID, the cloud service provider determines that the once encrypted IID corresponding to all data that the data uploader of the target IID allows the data requester to access is partially accessible data; The cloud service provider uses the target re-encryption key corresponding to the data requester to re-encrypt the partially accessible data to obtain partially accessible encrypted data, and sends the partially accessible encrypted data to the data requester; The data requester uses the local re-encryption key to decrypt part of the accessible encrypted data and obtains all the data that the data uploader of the target IID allows the data requester to access.