Freight market game simulation method for multimodal transport new line

By constructing a dynamic game model between shipper and carrier, the market behavior in the new multimodal transport route is simulated, and the ignorance of static analysis and dynamic interaction relationship in the existing technology is solved, and the accurate simulation of the freight market is achieved. Decision-making support has promoted the promotion of new multimodal transport routes.

CN118982300APending Publication Date: 2024-11-19SOUTHEAST UNIV +1
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411120407.8
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-08-15
Publication Date
2024-11-19

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing freight market game simulation research is usually analyzed from a static perspective, ignoring the dynamic behavioral interaction between different stakeholders in the multimodal transport route, making it difficult to accurately simulate the dynamic evolution of the market and the effectiveness of subsidy measures, and failing to provide stable and effective decision-making. support.

Method used

A freight market game simulation method for new multimodal transport routes is proposed. By obtaining basic attribute parameters, the shipper utility function and market competition model are constructed, and the evolution game model composed of carriers and multimodal transport route managers are established. The stability of the strategy equilibrium point is used to simulate the strategy evolution process through numerical simulation.

Benefits of technology

It realizes a dynamic portrayal of the behavioral strategies of multi-stakeholders in the freight market, provides accurate decision-making support, and helps promote new multimodal transport routes and sustainable development of the freight market.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention discloses a freight market game simulation method for new multimodal transport lines. The method comprises the following steps: 1, acquiring parameter information of each multimodal transport line; 2, constructing a shipper utility function, and solving the transportation demand of each line; thirdly, constructing a multimodal transport line market competition model, and solving the market share and the optimal profit of the carrier under Nash equilibrium; 4, constructing a two-party evolutionary game model composed of a carrier and a multimodal transport line manager; 5, calculating the stability of the equilibrium point to obtain a final stability strategy of the game; and 6, obtaining the strategy evolution process of the two game parties through numerical simulation. According to the method, behavior decisions of a plurality of subjects such as a shipper, a carrier and a multimodal transport line manager are analyzed, and a freight market game simulation method is provided for a new multimodal transport line, so that a complex operation scene of a real freight market is simulated, and a decision basis is provided for each decision subject.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The invention discloses a freight market game simulation method for a new multimodal transport route, relates to freight market game analysis research, and belongs to the technical field of calculation, estimation or counting. Background Art

[0002] With the sharp growth of freight demand and the rapid expansion of supply chains, a large number of new multimodal transport routes have emerged around the world. In the initial development stage of new multimodal transport routes, they often face many challenges such as limited supply, low operational efficiency and low marketization. Generally, multimodal transport route managers need to provide subsidies and other support measures to stimulate the expansion of the initial transportation market of new routes.

[0003] The freight market of new intermodal transport routes involves the behavioral interactions between multiple entities such as shippers, carriers, and intermodal transport route managers. Intermodal transport managers need to comprehensively consider the behavioral choices of shippers and carriers, while ensuring the effectiveness of subsidies without affecting the normal competition and operation of the freight market. How to accurately simulate the dynamic impact and evolution mechanism of behavioral decisions among various entities to analyze the market game situation of intermodal transport routes and the effectiveness of subsidy measures is of great significance to the promotion of new intermodal transport routes.

[0004] Current research on freight market game simulation usually considers single entities such as shippers, carriers or multimodal transport line managers, and lacks consideration of the decision-making relationship between different stakeholders in the freight market. It is difficult to effectively portray the complex scenarios and behavioral interactions in the real freight market. Most of the analysis is conducted from a static perspective, ignoring the dynamic changes in the freight market environment and the strategies of various stakeholders. It is impossible to accurately analyze the dynamic evolution of the freight market and it is difficult to provide stable and effective decision-making support for various stakeholders. Summary of the invention

[0005] The purpose of the present invention is to propose a freight market game simulation method for a new multimodal transport route to overcome the defects of the existing research described in the background technology.

[0006] To achieve the above object, the present invention provides the following technical solution: a freight market game simulation method for a new multimodal transport route, the method comprising the following steps:

[0007] Step 1: Obtain the basic attribute parameters of multimodal transport routes in the freight market;

[0008] Step 2: Construct the shipper utility function and solve the transportation demand of each route;

[0009] Step 3: Based on the transportation demand described in step 2, a multimodal transport route market competition model is constructed to obtain the market share and optimal profit of the carrier under Nash equilibrium;

[0010] Step 4: Based on the market share and optimal profit of the carrier described in step 3, a two-party evolutionary game model consisting of the carrier and the multimodal transport line manager (hereinafter referred to as the manager) is constructed;

[0011] Step 5: Calculate the stability of the strategic equilibrium point of the two-party evolutionary game model and obtain the final stable strategy of the game between the carrier and the manager;

[0012] Step 6: Through numerical simulation, the strategy evolution process of both parties in the game between the carrier and the manager is obtained.

[0013] As a further optimization scheme of the freight market game simulation method for new intermodal transport routes, in step 1, two intermodal transport routes with the same starting and ending cities are considered: the existing intermodal transport route with the highest market share, denoted as NR, and the newly opened intermodal transport route, denoted as ER;

[0014] The freight market considers three entities: shippers, carriers, and managers;

[0015] Determine the basic attribute parameters of multimodal transport line i, i = {n, e}, n is NR, e is ER, and the basic attribute parameters include:

[0016] The total transportation time t of multimodal transport route i i ;

[0017] Reliability σ of multimodal transport route i i ;

[0018] The time value of the goods transported by the shipper, δ;

[0019] The maximum profit V that a shipper can earn by transporting a unit of cargo;

[0020] The carrier's transportation cost c for transporting a unit of cargo via multimodal transport route i i ;

[0021] The carrier's price for multimodal transport route i, i.e., the price p for the shipper to purchase the transport service i ;

[0022] Management fee that the carrier needs to pay for transporting unit cargo through multimodal transport route i i ;

[0023] The manager of multimodal transport line i provides a subsidy r to the carrier for choosing NR to transport unit cargo.

[0024] As a further optimization scheme of the freight market game simulation method for new multimodal transport routes, the shipper utility model in step 2 is:

[0025] U n =σ n Vt n δχ-p n

[0026] U e =σ e Vt e δ(1-χ)-p e

[0027] Among them, U i represents the utility of the shipper when choosing route i, χ represents the shipper's route preference (0≤χ≤1); when U n =U e When , we can solve the utility equilibrium point χ of the shipper. * ,[0,χ * ] shippers tend to choose NR, [χ * ,1] shippers tend to choose ER; further, the transportation demand of NR is obtained ER Transportation Needs

[0028] As a further optimization scheme for the freight market game simulation method for new intermodal transport routes, the intermodal transport route market competition model in step 3 is:

[0029]

[0030] Among them, π i is the carrier’s profit from transporting a unit of cargo from route i;

[0031] When π n and π e When the maximum value is reached at the same time, the market competition of multimodal transport routes achieves Nash equilibrium, and the optimal pricing is obtained by solving

[0032] The best price Substituting the transportation demand obtained in step 2 into the market share under Nash equilibrium

[0033]

[0034] The best price and market share Substitute the multimodal transport route market competition model described in step 3 to obtain the carrier's optimal profit

[0035]

[0036] When the manager does not provide subsidies, the market share and the carrier's optimal profit are Substituting r = 0 into You can get

[0037] As a further optimization scheme for the freight market game simulation method for new multimodal transport routes, in the two-party evolutionary game model in step 4, the carrier's strategy set is route selection, that is, {NR, ER}, and the proportion of choosing NR is defined as x, and the proportion of choosing ER is defined as 1-x, x∈[0,1]; the manager's strategy set is whether to subsidize, that is, {subsidy, no subsidy}, and the proportion of choosing subsidy is defined as y, and the proportion of choosing no subsidy is defined as 1-y, y∈[0,1];

[0038] In the two-party evolutionary game model in step 4, carriers and managers can choose different strategies, including four scenarios:

[0039] Scenario 1: The carrier chooses "NR" and the manager chooses "Subsidy". In this case, the carrier's revenue is Manager's benefits

[0040] Scenario 2: The carrier chooses "NR" and the manager chooses "No Subsidy"; in this case, the carrier's revenue is Manager's benefits

[0041] Scenario 3: The carrier chooses "ER" and the manager chooses "Subsidy". In this case, the carrier's profit is Manager's benefits

[0042] Scenario 4: The carrier chooses "ER" and the manager chooses "no subsidy". In this case, the carrier's revenue is Manager's benefits

[0043] The expected return U of the carrier when choosing “NR” NR =C 11 y+C 12 (1-y), the expected return U of the carrier choosing “ER” ER =C 21 y+C 22 (1-y), the average expected return of the carrier

[0044] The expected benefit U of the manager choosing “subsidy” S =G 11x+G 21 (1-x); the expected benefit of the manager choosing “no subsidy” is U NS =G 21 x+G 22 (1-x), the average expected return of managers

[0045] The replication dynamic equations F(x) and F(y) are used to represent the size evolution of the population where the carrier chooses the "subsidy" strategy and the size evolution of the population where the manager chooses the "subsidy" strategy:

[0046]

[0047] As a further optimization scheme for the freight market game simulation method for new multimodal transport routes, the stability of the strategic equilibrium point of the two parties in the evolutionary game is calculated in step 5, specifically:

[0048] Let F(x) = 0, F(y) = 0, and solve for the equilibrium point E of both sides of the evolutionary game j (x j ,y j ), where j = 1, 2, ..., N, N depends on the number of roots of the equations F(x) = 0, F(y) = 0;

[0049] Constructing the Jacobian matrix The equilibrium point E j (x j ,y j ) is substituted into the matrix J. When the determinant det(J)>0 and the trace tr(J)<0 is satisfied, the equilibrium point E j (x j ,y j ) is the evolutionary stable point, and the corresponding strategy choice of both parties is the final stable strategy after the game.

[0050] As a further optimization scheme for the freight market game simulation method for new intermodal transport routes, the strategy evolution process of the carrier and the intermodal transport route manager in the game process can be obtained through numerical simulation in step 6, which is as follows:

[0051] Enter the basic attribute parameters described in step 1;

[0052] Initialize the population configuration of carriers and managers, that is, the initial proportion of carriers choosing NR is x0, and the initial proportion of managers choosing subsidies is y0;

[0053] By numerically simulating the replicated dynamic equations F(x) and F(y), the change process of the group size of carriers and managers choosing each strategy is obtained; that is, the change process of the group size obtained by numerical simulation (intuitive change curve or precise abstract numerical expression) can show the change process of the group proportion of carriers and managers choosing each strategy over time, which can assist carriers and managers in making decisions;

[0054] Preferably, by adjusting the basic attribute parameters described in step 1 and performing numerical simulations respectively, the differences in the evolution process of the strategy selection of carriers and managers under different parameter backgrounds can be compared and analyzed to assist carriers and managers in making decisions.

[0055] The present invention adopts the above technical solution, and the beneficial effects brought by the provided technical solution include at least:

[0056] The present invention comprehensively considers the three stakeholders in the multimodal transport market, namely, shippers, carriers, and managers of multimodal transport routes, analyzes the influence of behavioral strategies among multiple stakeholders based on game theory, and realizes joint modeling of multi-stakeholder decision-making, which helps to accurately characterize the actual scenario of freight market game. The method proposed in the present invention comprehensively considers various parameters of the actual freight market, can accurately analyze and simulate the freight market game situation for new multimodal transport routes, and accurately depicts the dynamic evolution of the behavioral strategies of various stakeholders in the freight market through a model based on evolutionary game. At the same time, it can predict future changes in the freight market by adjusting the changes in various parameters, and provide effective decision support for decision makers of various stakeholders, which is conducive to the promotion of new multimodal transport routes and the sustainable development of the freight market. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0057] Figure 1 is a flow chart of the method of the present invention;

[0058] Figure 2 The process of changing the size of the group for carriers and managers to select various strategies for application examples of the present invention;

[0059] Figure 3 The evolution process of the strategy selection of the carrier of the application example of the present invention under different r values;

[0060] Figure 4 The evolution process of strategy selection of the manager of the application example of the present invention under different r values; DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0061] The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be described clearly and completely below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, rather than all the embodiments.

[0062] Step 1: Obtain the basic attribute parameters of multimodal transport routes in the freight market;

[0063] Step 2: Construct the shipper utility function and solve the transportation demand of each route;

[0064] Step 3: Based on the transportation demand described in step 2, a multimodal transport route market competition model is constructed to obtain the market share and optimal profit of the carrier under Nash equilibrium;

[0065] Step 4: Based on the market share and optimal profit of the carrier described in step 3, a two-party evolutionary game model consisting of the carrier and the multimodal transport line manager (hereinafter referred to as the manager) is constructed;

[0066] Step 5: Calculate the stability of the strategic equilibrium point of the two-party evolutionary game model and obtain the final stable strategy of the game between the carrier and the manager;

[0067] Step 6: Obtain the strategy evolution process of both parties during the game between the carrier and the manager through numerical simulation;

[0068] As a further optimization scheme for the freight market game simulation method for new intermodal transport routes, two intermodal transport routes with the same starting and ending cities are considered in step 1: the intermodal transport route with the highest existing market share (denoted as NR) and the newly opened intermodal transport route (denoted as ER); the freight market considers three entities: shippers, carriers, and managers; the basic attribute parameters of the intermodal transport route include: the total transportation time t of the intermodal transport route n =528 hours, t e = 528 hours, where i = {n, e}, n is the multimodal route NR, e is the multimodal route ER;

[0069] Reliability σ of multimodal transport route i n =0.88,σ e =0.75;

[0070] The time value of the shipper's cargo δ = 14.04 yuan / (TEU·hour), TEU is the international standard container unit;

[0071] The maximum profit that a shipper can obtain by transporting a unit of cargo is V = 10,800 yuan / TEU;

[0072] The carrier's transportation cost c for transporting a unit of cargo via route i n =7012.8 yuan / TEU, c e =2390.4 yuan / TEU;

[0073] The management fee that the carrier needs to pay for transporting unit goods through route i is b n=698.4 yuan / TEU, b e =237.6 yuan / TEU;

[0074] The subsidy that the multimodal transport line manager provides to the carrier for using NR to transport unit cargo is r = 2088 yuan / TEU;

[0075] As a further optimization scheme of the freight market game simulation method for new multimodal transport routes, the shipper utility model in step 2 is:

[0076] U n =σ n Vt n δχ-p n

[0077] U e =σ e Vt e δ(1-χ)-p e

[0078] Where χ represents the shipper’s route preference (0≤χ≤1). Specifically, shippers in [0,χ] tend to choose NR, and shippers in [χ,1] tend to choose ER. n =U e When , we can solve the utility equilibrium point χ of the shipper. * , get the transportation demand of NR ER Transportation Needs

[0079] As a further optimization scheme for the freight market game simulation method for new intermodal transport routes, the intermodal transport route market competition model in step 3 is:

[0080]

[0081] Among them, π i is the carrier’s profit from transporting a unit of cargo from route i;

[0082] When π n and π e When the maximum value is reached at the same time, the market competition of multimodal transport routes achieves Nash equilibrium, and the optimal pricing is obtained by solving

[0083] The best price Substituting the transportation demand obtained in step 2 into the market share under Nash equilibrium

[0084]

[0085] The best price and market share Substitute the multimodal transport route market competition model described in step 3 to obtain the carrier's optimal profit

[0086]

[0087] When the manager does not provide subsidies, the market share and the carrier's optimal profit are Substituting r = 0 into You can get

[0088] As a further optimization scheme for the freight market game simulation method for new multimodal transport routes, in the two-party evolutionary game model in step 4, the carrier's strategy set is route selection, that is, *NR,ER+, and the proportion of choosing NR is defined as x, and the proportion of choosing ER is defined as 1-x, x∈[0,1]; the manager's strategy set is whether to subsidize, that is, {subsidy, no subsidy}, and the proportion of choosing subsidy is defined as y, and the proportion of choosing no subsidy is defined as 1-y, y∈[0,1];

[0089] Carriers and managers can choose different strategies, covering four scenarios:

[0090] Scenario 1: The carrier chooses "NR" and the manager chooses "Subsidy". In this case, the carrier's revenue is Manager's benefits

[0091] Scenario 2: The carrier chooses "NR" and the manager chooses "No Subsidy"; in this case, the carrier's revenue is Manager's benefits

[0092] Scenario 3: The carrier chooses "ER" and the manager chooses "Subsidy". In this case, the carrier's profit is Manager's benefits

[0093] Scenario 4: The carrier chooses "ER" and the manager chooses "no subsidy". In this case, the carrier's revenue is Manager's benefits

[0094] The expected return U of the carrier when choosing “NR” NR =C 11 y+C 12 (1-y), the expected return U of the carrier choosing “ER” ER =C 21 y+C 22 (1-y), the average expected return of the carrier

[0095] The expected benefit U of the manager choosing “subsidy” S =G 11 x+G 21 (1-x); the expected benefit of the manager choosing “no subsidy” is U NS =G 21 x+G 22 (1-x), the average expected return of managers

[0096] The replication dynamic equations F(x) and F(y) are used to represent the size evolution of the population where the carrier chooses the "subsidy" strategy and the size evolution of the population where the manager chooses the "subsidy" strategy:

[0097]

[0098] As a further optimization scheme for the freight market game simulation method for new multimodal transport routes, the stability of the strategic equilibrium point of the two parties in the evolutionary game is calculated in step 5, specifically:

[0099] Let F(x) = 0, F(y) = 0, and solve for the equilibrium points of both sides of the evolutionary game: E1(0,0), E2(1,0), E3(0,1), E4(1,1), E5(0.167,0.610);

[0100] Constructing the Jacobian matrix The equilibrium point E j (x j ,y j ) is substituted into the matrix J. Only E4(1,1) satisfies the determinant det(J)>0 and the trace tr(J)<0. Then the equilibrium point E4(1,1) is the evolutionary stable point, that is, the final stable strategy after the game is: the carrier chooses "NR" and the manager chooses "subsidy".

[0101] As a further optimization scheme for the freight market game simulation method for new intermodal transport routes, the strategy evolution process of the carrier and the intermodal transport route manager in the game process can be obtained through numerical simulation in step 6, which is as follows:

[0102] Enter the basic attribute parameters described in step 1;

[0103] Initialize the population configuration of carriers and managers: the initial proportion of carriers choosing NR is x0=0.31, and the initial proportion of managers choosing subsidies is y0=0.6;

[0104] By numerically simulating the replication dynamic equations F(x) and F(y), the change process of the group size of carriers and managers choosing various strategies is obtained, such as Figure 2 ;

[0105] Preferably, by adjusting the basic attribute parameters described in step 1 and performing numerical simulations respectively, the differences in the evolution of the strategic choices of carriers and managers under different parameter backgrounds can be compared and analyzed to assist carriers and managers in making decisions;

[0106] Specifically, the value of r is adjusted to 240, 245, 250, 255, 260, 265, and 270, and the evolution of the strategic choices of carriers and managers is obtained, as shown in Figure 3 , Figure 4 shown.

[0107] The above description is only a preferred specific implementation manner of the present invention, but the protection scope of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any technician familiar with the technical field can make equivalent replacements or changes according to the technical scheme and inventive concept of the present invention within the technical scope disclosed by the present invention, which should be covered by the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A freight market game simulation method for new multimodal transport routes, characterized by: Step 1: Obtain the basic attribute parameters of multimodal transport routes in the freight market; Step 2: Construct the shipper utility function and solve the transportation demand of each route; Step 3: Based on the transportation demand described in step 2, a multimodal transport route market competition model is constructed to obtain the market share and optimal profit of the carrier under Nash equilibrium; Step 4: Based on the market share and optimal profit of the carrier described in step 3, a two-party evolutionary game model consisting of the carrier and the multimodal transport line manager is constructed; Step 5: Calculate the stability of the strategic equilibrium point of the two-party evolutionary game model and obtain the final stable strategy of the game between the carrier and the manager; Step 6: Through numerical simulation, the strategy evolution process of both parties in the game between the carrier and the manager is obtained.

2. A freight market game simulation method for a new multimodal transport route according to claim 1, characterized in that: In the step 1, two intermodal transport routes with the same starting and ending cities are considered: the existing intermodal transport route with the highest market share, denoted as NR, and the newly opened intermodal transport route, denoted as ER; The freight market considers three entities: shippers, carriers, and managers; Determine the basic attribute parameters of multimodal transport line i, i = {n, e}, n is NR, e is ER, and the basic attribute parameters include: The total transportation time t of multimodal transport route i i ; Reliability σ of multimodal transport route i i ; The time value of the goods transported by the shipper, δ; The maximum profit V that a shipper can earn by transporting a unit of cargo; The carrier's transportation cost c for transporting a unit of cargo via multimodal transport route i i ; The carrier's price for multimodal transport route i, i.e., the price p for the shipper to purchase the transport service i ; Management fee that the carrier needs to pay for transporting unit cargo through multimodal transport route i i ; The manager of multimodal transport line i provides a subsidy r to the carrier for choosing NR to transport unit cargo.

3. A freight market game simulation method for a new multimodal transport route according to claim 2, characterized in that: The utility function of the shipper in step 2 is: U n =s n Vt n dx-p n U e =s e Vt e δ(1-x)-p e Among them, U i represents the utility of the shipper when choosing route i, χ represents the shipper's route preference (0≤χ≤1); when U n =U e When , we can solve the utility equilibrium point χ of the shipper. * ,[0,χ * ] shippers tend to choose NR, [χ * ,1] shippers tend to choose ER; further, the transportation demand of NR is obtained ER Transportation Needs 4. A freight market game simulation method for a new multimodal transport route according to claim 3, characterized in that: The multimodal transport route market competition model in step 3 is: Among them, π i is the carrier’s profit from transporting a unit of cargo from multimodal route i; When π n and π e When the maximum value is reached at the same time, the market competition of multimodal transport routes achieves Nash equilibrium, and the optimal pricing is obtained by solving The best price Substituting the transportation demand obtained in step 2 into the market share under Nash equilibrium The best price and market share Substitute the multimodal transport route market competition model described in step 3 to obtain the carrier's optimal profit When the manager does not provide subsidies, the market share and the carrier's optimal profit are Substituting r = 0 into You can get 5. A freight market game simulation method for a new multimodal transport route according to claim 4, characterized in that: In the two-party evolutionary game model in step 4, the carrier's strategy set is route selection, i.e., {NR, ER}, and the proportion of NR selection is defined as x, and the proportion of ER selection is defined as 1-x, x∈[0,1]; the manager's strategy set is whether to subsidize, i.e., {subsidy, no subsidy}, and the proportion of subsidy selection is defined as y, and the proportion of no subsidy selection is defined as 1-y, y∈[0,1]; In the two-party evolutionary game model in step 4, the carrier and the manager can choose different strategies, including four scenarios: Scenario 1: The carrier chooses "NR" and the manager chooses "Subsidy". In this case, the carrier's revenue is Manager's benefits Scenario 2: The carrier chooses "NR" and the manager chooses "No Subsidy"; in this case, the carrier's revenue is Manager's benefits Scenario 3: The carrier chooses "ER" and the manager chooses "Subsidy". In this case, the carrier's profit is Manager's benefits Scenario 4: The carrier chooses "ER" and the manager chooses "no subsidy"; in this case, the carrier's revenue is Manager's benefits The expected return U of the carrier when choosing "NR" NR =C 11 y+C 12 (1-y), the expected return U of the carrier when choosing "ER" ER =C 21 y+C 22 (1-y), the average expected return of the carrier The expected return U of the manager choosing "subsidy" S =G 11 x+G 21 (1-x); the expected return of the manager choosing "no subsidy" is U NS =G 21 x+G 22 (1-x), the average expected return of managers The replication dynamic equations F(x) and F(y) are used to represent the size evolution of the population where the carrier chooses the "subsidy" strategy and the size evolution of the population where the manager chooses the "subsidy" strategy:

6. A freight market game simulation method for a new multimodal transport route according to claim 5, characterized in that: The stability of the strategic equilibrium point of both parties in the evolutionary game is calculated in step 5, specifically: Let F(x) = 0, F(y) = 0, and solve for the equilibrium point E of both sides of the evolutionary game j (x j ,y j ), where j = 1, 2, ..., N, N depends on the number of roots of the equations F(x) = 0, F(y) = 0; Constructing the Jacobian matrix The equilibrium point E j (x j ,y j ) is substituted into the matrix J. When the determinant det(J)>0 and the trace tr(J)<0 is satisfied, the equilibrium point E j (x j ,y j ) is the evolutionary stable point, and the corresponding strategy choice of both parties is the final stable strategy after the game.

7. A freight market game simulation method for a new multimodal transport route according to claim 6, characterized in that: In step 6, the strategy evolution process of the carrier and the multimodal transport line manager in the game process can be obtained through numerical simulation, which is specifically: Enter the basic attribute parameters described in step 1; Initialize the population configuration of carriers and managers, that is, the initial proportion of carriers choosing NR is x0, and the initial proportion of managers choosing subsidies is y0; By numerically simulating the replicated dynamic equations F(x) and F(y), the changing process of the group size of carriers and managers choosing various strategies is obtained; by adjusting the basic attribute parameters described in step 1 for numerical simulation, the differences in the evolution process of the strategy selection of carriers and managers under different parameter backgrounds can be compared and analyzed to assist carriers and managers in making decisions.

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