Two-wheeled robot safety control method and system facing periodic Markov DoS attack
By converting the networked two-wheel robot system into a circular Markov system with modal dwell time, using the switching system theory for security control, the problem of defending periodic Markov DoS attacks in the existing technology is solved, and the system is realized Robustness and efficiency.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411023813.2
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-07-29
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-22
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-07-29
AI Technical Summary
The prior art is difficult to effectively defend against the threat of periodic Markov DoS attacks to networked two-wheeled robot systems, especially to ensure system robustness without switching constraints.
By establishing discrete linearized state space expressions of networked two-wheeled robots, the attacked system is transformed into a circular Markov system with modal dwell time, using the switching system theory, designing the controller based on subsystem constraints, and realizing Safety control without additional switching signal constraints.
The design complexity of the security control algorithm is reduced, the robustness of the system is improved, and the practicality and efficiency of the method are verified through experiments, and it can effectively defend against periodic Markov DoS attacks.
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Figure CN119002555A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present disclosure relates to the technical field of robot safety control, and in particular to a two-wheel robot safety control method and system for periodic Markov DoS attacks. Background Art
[0002] The statements in this section merely provide background information related to the present disclosure and do not necessarily constitute prior art.
[0003] With the increasing maturity of communication networks, networked control systems (NCSs) that integrate physical systems with computers through actuators, sensors, and communication networks have developed rapidly. To date, NCSs have been widely used in various fields such as autonomous driving, aerospace, and smart grids. Two-wheeled robots are controlled by computers through wireless communication networks and feed information back to computers through sensors, which also belong to the category of NCSs. However, while the openness of communication networks improves efficiency and convenience, it also increases the threat of malicious attacks on NCSs. According to the attack method, there are mainly spoofing attacks and denial of service (DoS) attacks. The former harms NCSs by intercepting, modifying, and injecting transmission signals, while the latter causes significant performance degradation by causing delays and signal loss in the communication channel.
[0004] From the perspective of traditional control of two-wheeled robots, developing accurate attack models is crucial for defense or attack. In recent years, periodic DoS attacks have attracted widespread attention in both industry and academia due to their destructiveness and ease of implementation, such as low-rate DoS attacks in TCP protocol. However, the fixed launch pattern of periodic attacks is easy to be identified and defended by NCSs. Therefore, such attacks launched randomly are more attractive to attackers due to their high flexibility. In this context, Bernoulli DoS attack and Markov DoS attack can be regarded as special cases with a period of one.
[0005] In recent years, NCSs subject to DoS attacks are usually modeled as switched systems consisting of stable (silent attack) and unstable (active attack) subsystems. It is worth noting that the stability between subsystems and switched systems is rarely directly related. Even if all subsystems are stable, the closed-loop system may still diverge if the switching rules are not applied correctly. Therefore, it remains challenging to transform NCSs subject to DoS attacks into switched systems and ensure the robustness of the system without switching constraints. Summary of the invention
[0006] In order to solve the above problems, the present invention proposes a two-wheeled robot safety control method and system for periodic Markov DoS attacks, and establishes a discrete linearized state space expression of a networked two-wheeled robot. Based on the switching system theory, the system mode with (without) attack can be regarded as an unstable (stable) sub-mode of the switching system, and then the networked two-wheeled robot system under DoS attack is converted into a cyclic Markov switching system with MDT. The proposed method does not require additional switching signal constraints, which effectively reduces the design complexity of the safety control algorithm.
[0007] According to some embodiments, the present disclosure adopts the following technical solutions:
[0008] A two-wheel robot safety control method for periodic Markov DoS attacks includes:
[0009] Construct a two-wheeled robot kinematic model, integrate the two-wheeled robot kinematic model and system signals through a communication network, and construct a networked two-wheeled robot control system NCSs;
[0010] Linearize and discretize the networked two-wheeled robot control system NCSs to obtain a discrete-time linear state space model and construct the motion target of the two-wheeled robot.
[0011] Determine the type of attack, and use the switching system theory to transform the attacked networked two-wheeled robot control system NCSs into a cyclic Markov system with modal residence time. Set up a controller based on the subsystem constraints of the switching system, calculate its control gain to control the two-wheeled robot, track the target trajectory of the two-wheeled robot, and achieve safe control of the networked two-wheeled robot system under periodic Markov DoS attacks.
[0012] According to some embodiments, the present disclosure adopts the following technical solutions:
[0013] A two-wheeled robot safety control system for periodic Markov DoS attacks, including:
[0014] System building module, used to build the kinematic model of the two-wheeled robot, integrate the two-wheeled robot kinematic model and system signals through the communication network, and build a networked two-wheeled robot control system NCSs;
[0015] The linearization and discretization module is used to linearize and discretize the networked two-wheeled robot control system NCSs, obtain a discrete-time linear state space model, and construct the motion target of the two-wheeled robot;
[0016] The safety control module is used to determine the type of attack. By using the switching system theory, the attacked networked two-wheeled robot control system NCSs is converted into a cyclic Markov system with modal residence time. A controller is set up to calculate its control gain based on the subsystem constraints of the switching system to control the two-wheeled robot and track the target trajectory of the two-wheeled robot, thereby achieving safe control of the networked two-wheeled robot system under periodic Markov DoS attacks.
[0017] According to some embodiments, the present disclosure adopts the following technical solutions:
[0018] A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium is used to store computer instructions. When the computer instructions are executed by a processor, the two-wheeled robot safety control method for periodic Markov DoS attacks is implemented.
[0019] According to some embodiments, the present disclosure adopts the following technical solutions:
[0020] An electronic device comprises: a processor, a memory and a computer program; wherein the processor is connected to the memory, the computer program is stored in the memory, and when the electronic device is running, the processor executes the computer program stored in the memory, so that the electronic device executes the two-wheel robot safety control method for periodic Markov DoS attacks.
[0021] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:
[0022] The disclosed two-wheeled robot safety control method for periodic Markov DoS attacks studies the safety control of two-wheeled robots under denial of service (DoS) attacks with Markov characteristics and in periodic form. Firstly, the signals of the two-wheeled robot and the computer are fused with the help of a communication network to form a networked two-wheeled robot control system NCSs, and its dynamic mathematical model is constructed and the continuous system is discretized to obtain a discrete time state space model; secondly, the attacked NCSs is converted into a cyclic Markov system with a modal dwell time (MTD) by using the switching system theory. This new safety control method only requires subsystem constraints but not switching constraints. The practicality, efficiency and superiority of the proposed method are verified through the networked two-wheeled robot experiment.
[0023] The two-wheel robot safety control method for periodic Markov DoS attacks disclosed in the present invention considers a more general and practical form of periodic Markov DoS attacks compared with traditional periodic DoS attacks and Markov DoS attacks. It transforms the attacked NCSs into cyclic Markov systems based on MDT, and adopts an innovative safety control method that only relies on subsystem constraints without switching constraints. It has significant improvement over the existing robustness analysis based on switching constraints.
[0024] The disclosed two-wheeled robot safety control method for periodic Markov DoS attacks proposes a new safety control method with MDT constraints based on the switching system theory. First, a discrete linearized state space expression of the networked two-wheeled robot is established; based on the switching system theory, the system mode with (without) attack can be regarded as the unstable (stable) sub-mode of the switching system, and then the networked two-wheeled robot system under DoS attack is converted into a cyclic Markov switching system with MDT; on this basis, a safety control method for the MDT constraints of the switching subsystem is proposed. Compared with the traditional method, the proposed method does not require additional switching signal constraints, which effectively reduces the design complexity of the safety control algorithm. Finally, the trajectory tracking experiment of the two-wheeled robot verifies the practicality and efficiency of the proposed method.
[0025] The disclosed two-wheeled robot safety control method for periodic Markov DoS attacks uses switching system theory to transform the attacked NCSs into a cyclic Markov system with modal dwell time (MTD). Compared with the existing robustness analysis based on switching rules, this method only relies on subsystem constraints and eliminates the need for switching constraints. The effectiveness, efficiency and advancement of the proposed method are verified through experiments on two-wheeled robots. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0026] The accompanying drawings constituting a part of the present disclosure are used to provide a further understanding of the present disclosure. The illustrative embodiments of the present disclosure and their descriptions are used to explain the present disclosure and do not constitute an improper limitation on the present disclosure.
[0027] Figure 1 The system architecture of a networked two-wheeled robot under periodic Markov DoS attack according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;
[0028] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a periodic Markov DoS attack according to an embodiment of the present disclosure;
[0029] Figure 3 The actual and reference trajectories of the robot under computer-free control according to the embodiment of the present disclosure;
[0030] Figure 4 is the state trajectory of the error system (1) under DoS attack of the embodiment of the present disclosure;
[0031] Figure 5 The state trajectory of the error system (1) under DoS attack of the embodiment of the present disclosure is the running trajectory of the lateral, longitudinal and yaw angle errors of the two-wheeled robot under DoS attack;
[0032] Figure 6 The reference trajectory and actual running trajectory of the two-wheeled robot under DoS attack according to the embodiment of the present disclosure. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0033] The present disclosure is further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments.
[0034] It should be noted that the following detailed descriptions are all illustrative and are intended to provide further explanation of the present disclosure. Unless otherwise specified, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meanings as those commonly understood by those skilled in the art to which the present disclosure belongs.
[0035] It should be noted that the terms used herein are only for describing specific embodiments and are not intended to limit the exemplary embodiments according to the present disclosure. As used herein, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the singular form is also intended to include the plural form. In addition, it should be understood that when the terms "comprising" and / or "including" are used in this specification, it indicates the presence of features, steps, operations, devices, components and / or combinations thereof.
[0036] Example 1
[0037] In one embodiment of the present disclosure, a two-wheel robot safety control method for periodic Markov DoS attacks is provided, comprising:
[0038] Step 1: Construct a two-wheel robot kinematic model, integrate the two-wheel robot kinematic model and system signals through a communication network, and construct a networked two-wheel robot control system NCSs;
[0039] Step 2: Linearize and discretize the networked two-wheel robot control system NCSs to obtain a discrete-time linear state space model and construct the motion target of the two-wheel robot;
[0040] Step 3: Determine the type of attack, and use the switching system theory to transform the attacked networked two-wheeled robot control system NCSs into a cyclic Markov system with modal residence time. Set up a controller, calculate its control gain based on the subsystem constraints of the switching system, control the two-wheeled robot, track the target trajectory of the two-wheeled robot, and achieve safe control of the networked two-wheeled robot system under periodic Markov DoS attacks.
[0041] As an embodiment, a two-wheeled robot safety control method for periodic Markov DoS attacks disclosed in the present invention studies the safety control of the two-wheeled robot under a denial of service (DoS) attack with Markov characteristics and appearing in a periodic form. The specific implementation process is as follows:
[0042] Step 1: Networked Two-wheeled Robot Model
[0043] Specifically, through the wireless communication network, the two-wheeled mobile robot is controlled by a computer and feeds information back to the computer through sensors, thereby forming Figure 1 The networked two-wheeled robot control system NCSs is shown. The robot's behavior can be represented by the vector [x, y, θ], where (x(m), y(m)) represents the coordinate position and θ(rad) represents the heading angle.
[0044] The kinematic model of the robot is described as follows:
[0045]
[0046] where v and Represent the linear velocity and angular velocity of the robot respectively. d ,y d ,θ d ] indicates disturbance, which may be caused by many factors. For example, the actuator’s precision is not enough, which causes the car’s actual speed to be not equal to the given speed input; or the car may slide due to uneven road surface or too little friction.
[0047] The goal of the robot is to follow a circular trajectory as follows:
[0048]
[0049] where [x o ,y o ,θ o ] is the parameter vector of the target trajectory.
[0050] To obtain the tracking error system, let:
[0051] e x =(yy o )sinθ+(xxo )cosθ,e y =(yy o )cosθ-(xx o )sinθ,e θ =θ-θ o .
[0052] Accordingly, let the sampling period be T s , the following discrete-time state-space model can be obtained through linearization and discretization:
[0053]
[0054] in,
[0055]
[0056] C=[T s ],D=[d ij ] 3×3 ,
[0057]
[0058] in, is the system status; is the control input; is the control output, is interference, d ij is a given constant. and denote the set of real numbers and the set of natural numbers respectively.
[0059] Step 2: Construct a periodic Markov DoS attack model and determine the attack type;
[0060] Specifically, in the networked two-wheeled robot control system NCSs, the vulnerability of the wireless network makes the control channel vulnerable to malicious DoS attacks. The single non-attack time is defined as And the duration of a single DoS attack is Then define is the model indicator at time k. Therefore, the DoS attack indicator can be expressed as follows:
[0061]
[0062] For example, let T on =2, T off =3, then For each k, d(k), and The relationship between Figure 2 shown.
[0063] Consider the Markov transition probability (MTP) under different modes as follows:
[0064] Prob{d(k+1)=j|d(k)=i}=π ij ,
[0065] Where 0≤π ij ≤1 and For all More specifically, there are,
[0066] Prob{d(k+1)=i+1|d(k)=i}=1,
[0067] Prob{d(k+1)=Tof f +1|d(k)=Tof f}=p,
[0068] Prob{d(k+1)=1|d(k)=Tof f +To n}=q,
[0069] Prob{d(k+1)=1|d(k)=Tof f}=1-p,
[0070] Prob{d(k+1)=Tof f +1|d(k)=Tof f +To n}=1-q,
[0071] where i∈{1,2,...,Tof f -1,Tof f +1,Tof f +2,...,Tof f +To n -1}.
[0072] If the transition probability p = q = 1, then it is a periodic DoS attack; if Tof f =To n =1, it is a Markov DoS attack.
[0073] Step 3: Using the switching system theory, the attacked networked two-wheeled robot control system NCSs is transformed into a recurrent Markov system with modal residence time to achieve safe control of the two-wheeled robot.
[0074] The following controller can be designed:
[0075]
[0076] Therefore, the original system can be transformed into a switching system in the following form:
[0077]
[0078] y(k)=Cx(k).8(2)
[0079] The derivation process is as follows, with assumptions and definitions.
[0080] Assumption 1: x k It is measurable;
[0081] Assumption 2: (A, B) is controllable;
[0082] Definition 1: For any k2>k1≥0, let represents the number of subsystem switching in the non-attack (attack) case within [k1, k2], represents the total residence time of the subsystem in [k1, k2] in non-attack (attack) situations. If there is a Tof f ,To n >0, so that
[0083]
[0084]
[0085] Then T off (T on ) is called the modal dwell time (MDT) of the stable (unstable) switching subsystem.
[0086] Definition 2: For γ>0, if it satisfies:
[0087] 1) For w(k)≡0 and each Yes.
[0088]
[0089] 2) For And zero initial condition, we have
[0090]
[0091] Then formula (1) is said to have H ∞ Stochastic stability of performance indicators.
[0092] The security control problem of NCSs under DoS attacks is solved based on the subsystem constraints of the switching system. Different from the previous studies that need to satisfy both subsystem constraints and switching constraints, this section only focuses on subsystem constraints and eliminates the need for switching constraints. Subsequently, sufficient conditions for the security of NCSs are derived.
[0093] Theorem: For a given real number 0<α1<1,α2>0, if there exists a matrix L and a positive definite matrix So that,
[0094]
[0095]
[0096]
[0097] Among them, α p =-(p-1)α1+pα2,α q =-qα1+(1-q)α2, then system (1) has H ∞ Random stability of performance indicators, A, B, C, D are all coefficient matrices in formula (1), and I is the identity matrix;
[0098] In addition, the controller gain K can be obtained as follows:
[0099]
[0100] Proof: Remember For the switching time.
[0101] For the case w(k)≡0, consider the following Lyapunov function,
[0102] E(V(x(k)))=E(x T (k)Px(k)).
[0103] For p(k-1)∈{1,2,...,T off -1}, If the conditions are met,
[0104]
[0105] Then the following formula holds,
[0106] E(ΔV(x(k)))≤-α1V(x(k)).
[0107] For p(k-1)∈{T off +1,...,T off +T on -1}, if the condition is met,
[0108]
[0109] Then the following formula holds,
[0110] E(ΔV(x(k)))≤α2V(x(k)).
[0111] Since 0≤p,q≤1, the following two equations also hold:
[0112]
[0113]
[0114] For p(k i -1)=T off , the following formula holds,
[0115]
[0116] where α p =-(1-p)α1+pα2.
[0117] For p(k j -1)=T off +T on , the following formula holds,
[0118]
[0119] where α q =-qα1+(1-q)α2.
[0120] Note that for w(k)≡0, (3)-(4) satisfy the condition
[0121] Therefore, for have,
[0122]
[0123] When condition (5) is satisfied, system (1) is stochastically stable.
[0124] For w(k)≠0, let Γ(k)=E(y(k) T y(k))-γ 2 w(k) T w(k). is the switching time. If the above formulas (3)-(4) hold,
[0125] Using Schur's complement lemma, we can derive the following inequality:
[0126] For p(k-1)∈{1,2,...,T off -1}, yes,
[0127]
[0128] where ψ(k)=[x(k) T,w(k) T ] T .
[0129] For p(k-1)∈{T off +1,...,T off +T on -1}, yes,
[0130]
[0131] For p(k i -1)=T off ,have,
[0132]
[0133] in For p(k j -1)=T off +T on ,have,
[0134]
[0135] in Since α2 ≥ α p ,α q ≥-α1, yes,
[0136] E(V(x(k+1)))<(1+α2)E(V(x(k)))-Γ(k).
[0137] Iterating from 0 to k, we get,
[0138]
[0139] Under zero initial conditions, E(V(x0))=0 and E(V(x(k+1)))≥0, then,
[0140]
[0141] make have,
[0142]
[0143] Combining the transformation of double summation and the limit calculation of geometric series, the following formula can be derived,
[0144]
[0145] Therefore, according to Definition 1, the system (1) with H ∞ Stochastic stability of performance indicators.
[0146] For subsequent simulations and experiments, the initial parameters are selected as [x, y, θ] = [-1.9, -1.2, -0.2], [x o ,y o ,θ o ]=[0.1,-0.2,π / 4], and [v o ,ω o ]=[1.1,0.3]. Then system (1) can be written as
[0147]
[0148]
[0149]
[0150] When no controller is applied, the robot's actual trajectory and reference trajectory are as follows: Figure 3 As shown in Figure 2, it can be seen that when no controller is designed, the robot cannot track the target trajectory.
[0151] Let α1=0.1, α2=0.2, p=0.5, q=0.8, γ=5. Using Theorem 1, we can calculate that α p =0.05,α q =-0.04,T off =2>1.4631,T on =1<1.2239,γ=5.
[0152] By solving the linear matrix inequality (LMI) of equations (3)-(4), the control gain is obtained as follows:
[0153]
[0154] The state trajectory diagram of the error system (1) is as follows: Figure 4 As shown in the figure. The gray area indicates the period when the DoS attack is launched. It can be seen that the tracking error can quickly converge to 0, that is, H is achieved under periodic Markov DoS attacks and external interference. ∞ Stochastic stability of performance indicators.
[0155] In addition, in the actual experiment, the trajectory diagrams of the robot's lateral, longitudinal and yaw angle errors are shown in Figure 5 The actual and tracked trajectories of the robot are also shown in Figure 6 As shown, it can be seen that the robot can perfectly track the target trajectory.
[0156] Example 2
[0157] In one embodiment of the present disclosure, a two-wheeled robot safety control system for periodic Markov DoS attacks is provided, comprising:
[0158] System building module, used to build the kinematic model of the two-wheeled robot, integrate the two-wheeled robot kinematic model and system signals through the communication network, and build a networked two-wheeled robot control system NCSs;
[0159] The linearization and discretization module is used to linearize and discretize the networked two-wheeled robot control system NCSs, obtain a discrete-time linear state space model, and construct the motion target of the two-wheeled robot;
[0160] The safety control module is used to determine the type of attack. By using the switching system theory, the attacked networked two-wheeled robot control system NCSs is converted into a cyclic Markov system with modal residence time. A controller is set up to calculate its control gain based on the subsystem constraints of the switching system to control the two-wheeled robot and track the target trajectory of the two-wheeled robot, thereby achieving safe control of the networked two-wheeled robot system under periodic Markov DoS attacks.
[0161] Example 3
[0162] In one embodiment of the present disclosure, a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium is provided, wherein the non-transitory computer-readable storage medium is used to store computer instructions. When the computer instructions are executed by a processor, the two-wheeled robot safety control method for periodic Markov DoS attacks is implemented.
[0163] Example 4
[0164] In one embodiment of the present disclosure, an electronic device includes: a processor, a memory, and a computer program; wherein the processor is connected to the memory, the computer program is stored in the memory, and when the electronic device is running, the processor executes the computer program stored in the memory, so that the electronic device executes the two-wheel robot safety control method for periodic Markov DoS attacks.
[0165] The present disclosure is described with reference to the flowcharts and / or block diagrams of the methods, devices (systems), and computer program products according to the embodiments of the present disclosure. It should be understood that each process and / or box in the flowchart and / or block diagram, as well as the combination of the processes and / or boxes in the flowchart and / or block diagram, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to generate a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device generate instructions for implementing the processes in the flowchart and / or block diagram. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in a block or multiple blocks.
[0166] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device so that a series of operating steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions for implementing the process. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A step that specifies a function in one or more boxes.
[0167] Although the above describes the specific implementation methods of the present disclosure in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, it is not intended to limit the scope of protection of the present disclosure. Technical personnel in the relevant field should understand that on the basis of the technical solution of the present disclosure, various modifications or variations that can be made by those skilled in the art without creative work are still within the scope of protection of the present disclosure.
Claims
1. A two-wheel robot safety control method for periodic Markov DoS attacks, characterized in that: include: Construct a two-wheeled robot kinematic model, integrate the two-wheeled robot kinematic model and system signals through a communication network, and construct a networked two-wheeled robot control system NCSs; Linearize and discretize the networked two-wheeled robot control system NCSs to obtain a discrete-time linear state space model and construct the motion target of the two-wheeled robot. Determine the type of attack, and use the switching system theory to transform the attacked networked two-wheeled robot control system NCSs into a cyclic Markov system with modal residence time. Set up a controller based on the subsystem constraints of the switching system, calculate its control gain to control the two-wheeled robot, track the target trajectory of the two-wheeled robot, and achieve safe control of the networked two-wheeled robot system under periodic Markov DoS attacks.
2. The two-wheeled robot safety control method for periodic Markov DoS attacks as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: Through the wireless communication network, the two-wheeled robot is controlled by the controller system and the information is fed back to the controller system through the sensor to build a networked two-wheeled robot control system NCSs. The kinematic model of the two-wheeled robot is described as: Among them, v and Respectively represent the linear velocity and angular velocity of the two-wheeled robot, [x d ,y d ,θ d ] represents the disturbance, and the robot's behavior is represented by the vector [x, y, θ].
3. The two-wheeled robot safety control method for periodic Markov DoS attacks as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: The goal of the robot is to follow a circular trajectory as follows: Among them, [x o ,y o ,θ o ] is the parameter vector of the target trajectory.
4. The two-wheeled robot safety control method for periodic Markov DoS attacks as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: To obtain the tracking error system, let: e x =(yy o )sinθ+(xx o )cosθ,e y =(yy o )cosθ-(xx o )sinθ,e θ =θ-θ o Assume the sampling period is T s , through linearization and discretization, the following discrete-time state-space model is obtained: x(k+1)=Ax(k)+Bu(k)+Dw(k), y(k)=Cx(k), in, C=[T s ],D=[d ij ] 3×3 , in, is the system status; is the control input; is the control output, is interference, d ij is a given constant.
5. The two-wheeled robot safety control method for periodic Markov DoS attacks as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: In the networked two-wheeled robot control system NCSs, the vulnerability of the wireless network makes the control channel vulnerable to malicious DoS attacks. The single non-attack time is defined as And the duration of a single DoS attack is Then define is the model indicator at time k, and the DoS attack indicator is expressed as follows:
6. The two-wheeled robot safety control method for periodic Markov DoS attacks as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: If the transition probability p = q = 1, it is a periodic DoS attack; if T off =T on =1, it is a MarkovDoS attack, and then the following controller is designed: Convert the attacked NCSs into a recurrent Markov system with modal residence time:
7. The two-wheeled robot safety control method for periodic Markov DoS attacks as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: The controller gain K is obtained by: Where K is the controller gain.
8. A two-wheeled robot safety control system for periodic Markov DoS attacks, characterized by comprising: System building module, used to build the kinematic model of the two-wheeled robot, integrate the two-wheeled robot kinematic model and system signals through the communication network, and build a networked two-wheeled robot control system NCSs; The linearization and discretization module is used to linearize and discretize the networked two-wheeled robot control system NCSs, obtain a discrete-time linear state space model, and construct the motion target of the two-wheeled robot; The safety control module is used to determine the type of attack. By using the switching system theory, the attacked networked two-wheeled robot control system NCSs is converted into a cyclic Markov system with modal residence time. A controller is set up to calculate its control gain based on the subsystem constraints of the switching system to control the two-wheeled robot and track the target trajectory of the two-wheeled robot, thereby achieving safe control of the networked two-wheeled robot system under periodic Markov DoS attacks.
9. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium is used to store computer instructions. When the computer instructions are executed by the processor, the two-wheeled robot safety control method for periodic Markov DoS attacks as described in any one of claims 1 to 7 is implemented.
10. An electronic device, characterized in that: include: A processor, a memory and a computer program; wherein the processor is connected to the memory, the computer program is stored in the memory, and when the electronic device is running, the processor executes the computer program stored in the memory so that the electronic device executes the two-wheeled robot safety control method for periodic Markov DoS attacks as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.
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