Intrinsic safety assessment method for pipeline equipment of chemical process flow system

By calculating the process logistics characteristic index and the inherent safety index of equipment, and combining them with event tree analysis, the systematic and accuracy problems of safety evaluation of chemical process flow systems in existing technologies have been solved. This has enabled the quantification of risk levels of key pipelines and equipment, thereby improving safety and stability.

CN119005671APending Publication Date: 2024-11-22SHANDONG DONGYUE POLYMER MATERIAL
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202410887182.2
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-07-03
Publication Date
2024-11-22

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing methods for assessing the inherent safety of chemical process systems lack systematicity and accuracy, making it difficult to quantify the safety level of individual processes. Furthermore, the assessment results are greatly influenced by subjective factors and cannot fully identify potential hazards and risks in the system.

Method used

By calculating the Process Logistics Characteristic Index (PSCI) and the Intrinsic Safety Index (IaEI) of process equipment, and combining them with event tree analysis, the accident consequence level and probability level of key pipelines and equipment are assessed, a risk level classification is established, and a quantitative safety assessment of chemical process systems is achieved.

Benefits of technology

It enables the quantification of risk levels for critical pipelines and equipment in chemical process systems, comprehensively identifies potential hazards and risks, provides effective safety measures and emergency plans, and ensures the safety and stability of the production process.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention belongs to the technical field of process safety assessment, and particularly relates to a chemical process flow system pipeline equipment intrinsic safety assessment method, which comprises the following steps of: establishing a function relationship between factors influencing pipeline danger and process logistics characteristic indexes, and calculating the process logistics characteristic indexes of each pipeline; the method is used for evaluating relative dangerousness of different pipelines so as to determine key pipelines. And establishing a function relationship between the factors influencing the dangerousness of the equipment and the process equipment intrinsic safety index, calculating the process equipment intrinsic safety index of each piece of equipment for evaluating the relative dangerousness of different pieces of equipment, and determining key equipment. And finally, the accident consequence grade and the accident probability grade of the key equipment and the key pipeline are calculated, and the risk grade is classified based on the accident consequence grade and the accident probability grade of the key equipment and the key pipeline, so that the risk grade of the key pipeline and the key equipment is determined. And the quantification of the intrinsic safety evaluation of the chemical process flow system is realized.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of process technology safety assessment, and in particular, the present invention relates to a method for assessing the intrinsic safety of pipeline equipment in a chemical process system. Background Art

[0002] Process safety in industrial production is an important issue. In the past few decades, many accidents involving chemicals have occurred, including explosions, leaks, fires, etc. These accidents have had a huge impact on humans, the environment and the economy. Therefore, industry insiders need an advanced risk response strategy to improve the level of safety. Intrinsic safety strategy as a risk response strategy is very important. Intrinsic safety means that in the design and operation process, the number and degree of hazardous substances are minimized to reduce the possibility and impact of accidents. The implementation of intrinsic safety strategy can greatly improve the safety of the production process.

[0003] Intrinsic safety strategies are mainly related to the early stages of the process life cycle. However, intrinsic safety itself is difficult to quantify, and many foreign scholars have conducted relevant research in this regard. At present, the quantitative methods of intrinsic safety are mainly divided into five categories: 1. Score index based on parameters; 2. Numerical index based on parameters; 3. Graphic method; 4. Risk analysis-based; 5. Method based on multi-objective evaluation. Different types of methods have different focuses.

[0004] First, imperfect safety indicators are a major problem facing the intrinsic safety evaluation method. The current evaluation method mainly focuses on risk assessment, but lacks a quantitative indicator system for safety measures, which makes it difficult to determine whether the evaluation process meets the intrinsic safety standards. Secondly, insufficient data and information are also a major challenge in the evaluation process. Due to factors such as commercial secrets and patented technologies, many companies are reluctant to disclose key data, which makes it very difficult for evaluators to obtain necessary information. Third, the difficulty in quantifying the evaluation results is also a problem that needs to be solved. The existing evaluation methods are greatly affected by experience and subjective factors, which makes it difficult to quantify the evaluation results, and the objectivity and accuracy are limited. Finally, the existing evaluation methods often only focus on a single risk source or a single measure, and lack comprehensive consideration of the impact of different factors on safety. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a more comprehensive and systematic intrinsic safety evaluation method to ensure the safety of industrial production processes.

[0005] In summary, the existing intrinsic safety evaluation methods still have many limitations, and they need to be continuously improved and perfected on the basis of the original methods to improve their applicability and accuracy, and provide better support for the safety management of the chemical industry. At the same time, the current evaluation methods also have the problem of being unable to quantify the intrinsic safety of a single process. Although many methods can compare the intrinsic safety of multiple process routes, few methods can conduct in-depth evaluation of a single process.

[0006] Chinese patent document CN113515720A (202110599750.5) discloses a method for identifying and assessing major safety risks in hazardous chemical enterprises. It includes dividing hazardous units by workshops and determining risk points within hazardous units; hazardous chemical enterprises divide risk units according to relatively independent process units, storage tank areas, and warehouses; forming a list of safety assessment units according to the divided risk units; identifying high-risk risk factors from high-risk items, high-risk processes, high-risk equipment, high-risk places, and high-risk operations; compiling inherent risk indicators and dynamic risk indicators of high-risk risk factors of risk units according to risk units and risk points; inherent risk evaluation of typical accident risks of risk points; unit actual safety risk assessment; aggregation of risks of each unit in the enterprise and aggregation of risks of each enterprise in the region. Although the above method is conducive to the dynamic control and continuous improvement of risks of hazardous chemical enterprises, and is also conducive to the hierarchical and classified intensive supervision of risks of hazardous chemical enterprises by government departments, it is not calculated based on the parameters in the actual operation of the system. The final calculation results of the relevant inherent risk points are based on the qualitative judgment in the review table (similar to HAZOP), and the subjective factors are strong. At the same time, the target scope of this method is relatively large, and the units divided in the scheme represent a certain chemical system, which does not provide guidance for the inherent safety design of the system.

[0007] Chinese patent document CN113283070A (202110550083.1) discloses a process intrinsic safety intelligent diagnosis method and system, the method comprising: obtaining the process flow of the target process, conducting a safety assessment on the process flow, obtaining the safety assessment result, obtaining the user's safety management process for the target process, diagnosing the safety management process, obtaining the management reliability diagnosis result, detecting the current equipment parameters of the process equipment required for the target process, obtaining the operating medium diagnosis result corresponding to the target process according to the current equipment parameters, simulating the working process of the target process when a fault occurs, obtaining the simulation result, confirming the implementation reliability diagnosis result of the target process according to the simulation result, and evaluating the intrinsic safety index of the target process in the working process according to multiple diagnosis results of the target process, so as to comprehensively evaluate the intrinsic safety index of the target process in the working process by taking into account the influencing factors of multiple aspects, thereby ensuring the accuracy and practicality of the evaluation data and improving safety. However, the method introduced in the above scheme does not focus on the unit structure, and the intrinsic safety index finally calculated can only reflect the overall level of the system, and cannot evaluate the process flow of a single process. Summary of the invention

[0008] The purpose of the present invention is to solve the above-mentioned problems and provide a method for evaluating the intrinsic safety of pipeline equipment in a chemical process system. The present invention targets the potential dangers and risks in the system, comprehensively considers various indicators and factors, and quantitatively analyzes the risk level of the pipelines and equipment inside the system, thereby improving the safety and stability of the system. Traditional safety assessment methods usually only consider a single factor or a single part, and the assessment results are not comprehensive and accurate enough, and it is easy to ignore the potential dangers and risks in the system. The method described in the present invention comprehensively considers multiple factors. The present invention focuses on the intrinsic safety level of different structures in a single system. The intrinsic safety index and risk level finally calculated will fall into each unit structure in the system, which can comprehensively evaluate the potential safety hazards and potential risks in the system, help to formulate effective safety measures and emergency plans, and ensure the normal operation of the production process.

[0009] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is achieved by adopting the following technical solution: A method for evaluating the intrinsic safety of pipeline equipment in a chemical process system comprises the following steps:

[0010] S1. Based on the factors that affect pipeline hazard, such as pressure, temperature, density, viscosity, calorific value and flammability, the Process Stream Characteristic Index (PSCI) is calculated to evaluate the relative hazard of different pipelines.

[0011] The process logistics characteristic index PSCI is a function that includes the above 6 factors. The specific function expression is as follows:

[0012] PSCI = f(pressure, temperature, density, viscosity, calorific value, flammability) (1)

[0013] According to the factors that affect the danger of equipment, such as the distance between equipment, the nature of the equipment itself and the failure rate of the equipment, the equipment type, ignition source type and inventory are used to characterize the equipment properties, and the process equipment intrinsic safety index (Inherent Safety Intra-equipment Index, abbreviated as IaEI) is obtained to evaluate the relative danger of different equipment;

[0014] The intrinsic safety index of process equipment IaEI is a function that includes the above three factors. The specific function expression is as follows:

[0015] I a EI=f(distance, property, failure rate) (2)

[0016] S2. Evaluate key pipelines and key equipment based on the process logistics characteristic index PSCI and the process equipment intrinsic safety index IaEI;

[0017] S3. Calculate the accident consequence level of key pipelines and key equipment

[0018] When a jet fire occurs due to damage to a critical pipeline, the radiation intensity of the fire is used to assess the level of accident consequences;

[0019] When damage to key equipment leads to an explosion, the explosion overpressure intensity is used to assess the accident consequence level; leakage can only be regarded as an initial event before the accident occurs, and cannot be regarded as an accident. This plan focuses on explosion and jet fire;

[0020] S4. Calculate the probability of accidents and accident probability levels of key pipelines and key equipment

[0021] Based on the accident data of pipelines and equipment, the probability of pipeline and equipment accidents is calculated through the Event Tree Analysis (ETA) method, and then the accident probability level is obtained;

[0022] S5. Determine the risk level of key pipelines and key equipment based on the accident consequence level and accident probability level of key pipelines and key equipment.

[0023] The technical solution of the present invention also includes: in step S2, the formula of the process logistics characteristic index is:

[0024] PSCI=A×(Ip ×I T ×I ρ ×I v ×I e ×I FL ) (3)

[0025] In formula (3), the pressure index of the pipeline is I p ; Temperature index is I T ; Density index is I ρ ; Viscosity index is I v ; Calorific value index is I e ; The flammability index is I FL ; The amplification factor is A;

[0026] For the priorities of different logistics, the concept of relative ranking is used to compare the calculated results to determine the relative ranking of logistics. The specific calculation formula is as follows:

[0027]

[0028]

[0029]

[0030]

[0031]

[0032]

[0033] In formulas (3-1)-(3-6), the pressure of a single logistics, the temperature of a single logistics, the density of a single logistics, and the heat of a single logistics are obtained by measurement and calculation. The combustion range of a single logistics is obtained by determining the upper and lower explosion limits of the mixture, and taking the difference as the combustion range. The specific numerical value of the explosion limit of a single substance is obtained by looking up relevant experimental measurement results. The method for obtaining the above parameters is existing technology and will not be elaborated here.

[0034] The technical solution of the present invention also includes: in step S2, the formula of the intrinsic safety index of the process equipment is:

[0035] I a EI=A×(I D ×I N ×I FR ) (4)

[0036] In formula (4), I D I is the distance index of the device; N I is the property index of the equipment; FR is the failure rate index; the amplification factor is A;

[0037] The distance index I of the device D By referring to the distance setting standards between different types of equipment, determine the distance that should be set with adjacent equipment, and select the maximum value of the distance that should be set with surrounding equipment; the specific calculation formula is as follows:

[0038]

[0039] The standard for determining the distance between different devices is shown in Table 1:

[0040] Table 1 Distance setting standards between different types of equipment

[0041]

[0042]

[0043] The criteria for “intermediate-risk pump, high-risk pump, high-risk reactor, medium-risk reactor, and relatively dangerous reactor” in Table 1 are set according to the actual process conditions;

[0044] Equipment property index I N It is a function of the equipment type, ignition source type and inventory quantity. The three factors related to properties correspond to the equipment type index I PS , Ignition source index I IS and Inventory Index I INV , the specific calculation method is as follows:

[0045] I N =I PS ×I IS ×I INV (4-2)

[0046] In formula (4-2),

[0047]

[0048]

[0049]

[0050] Based on the device type, the devices are divided into two types: static / non-mobile devices and mobile devices;

[0051] According to the type of ignition source, the ignition source is divided into four types: friction heat, electric spark, high temperature surface and open flame;

[0052] The equipment type and ignition source index should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis to determine the potential hazard level of different equipment. The determination of the potential hazard level can be found in Table 2:

[0053] Table 2 Potential hazard levels of equipment characteristics

[0054]

[0055]

[0056] In the event of an accident, stock leakage is the triggering event; the more stock involved, the more serious the consequences of the accident; the specific stock during the operation of the relevant equipment is calculated using the following formula:

[0057] Inventory volume = flow rate × residence time (4-2-3-1)

[0058] The flow rate inside the equipment refers to the flow rate value in the actual operation of the simulation software or the on-site equipment. The simulation software is a traditional chemical process simulation software. After investigation, the residence time of the internal materials of different types of equipment is obtained. For details, see Table 3:

[0059] Table 3 Material residence time in equipment

[0060]

[0061] In the preliminary design stage, the residence time is taken as the maximum value, and the residence time in the subsequent stages is determined according to the actual situation;

[0062] The failure rate of the equipment itself is related to the type of equipment itself and the size of the leakage aperture. Through the statistics of the specific scenarios of previous accidents, the relationship between the failure rate of the equipment itself and the type of equipment itself and the size of the leakage aperture is obtained; the failure rates of different types of equipment under different leakage apertures are shown in Table 4:

[0063] Table 4 Failure rate of process equipment

[0064]

[0065]

[0066] By referring to the above table, the failure rate of different equipment in the process when leakage occurs is obtained. Therefore, the failure rate of each equipment in the process is converted into the failure rate index I using the following formula Fr :

[0067]

[0068] The technical solution of the present invention also includes: in step S3, the radiation intensity is a function of the amount of chemical substances released by the pipeline, and the release rate of substances in different phases when the pipeline leaks is calculated by the following formula:

[0069] The release rate of the liquid is:

[0070]

[0071] In formula (5), m l is the release rate of the liquid, kg / s; C d is the flow coefficient of the fluid, which can be found in "Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, ISBN: 0-0408-10604-2"; A H is the area of ​​the leakage hole, m 2 ; ρ is the density of the material in the pipe, kg / m 3 ; Δp is the pressure difference between the inside and outside of the tube, Pa;

[0072] For gas phase leakage, if the pressure ratio between the inside and outside of the tube is between 0.5 and 0.9, the leakage is in a blocked condition, and vice versa. The leakage rate of gas phase substances is calculated by the following formula:

[0073] Under blocking conditions, the gas release rate is:

[0074]

[0075] In formula (6), m V is the gas release rate, kg / s; C D is the flow coefficient of the fluid; A h is the area of ​​the leakage hole, m 2 ; γ is the specific heat ratio; ρ is the density of the material in the pipe, kg / m 3 ; p is the actual pressure of the substance in the tube, Pa;

[0076] Under non-blocking conditions, the gas release rate is:

[0077]

[0078] In formula (7), m V is the gas release rate, kg / s; C D is the flow coefficient of the fluid; A h is the area of ​​the leakage hole, m 2 ; γ is the specific heat ratio; ρ is the density of the material in the pipe, kg / m 3 ; p is the actual pressure of the substance in the tube, Pa; p amb is the ambient pressure, Pa;

[0079] The extent of the jet fire consequences is defined using the radiation intensity and estimated by the following equation:

[0080] The flame height is related to:

[0081]

[0082] In formula (8), L is the flame height, m; d is the leakage hole diameter, m; C T is the molar concentration of the material; M a is the molar mass of air, g / mol; M f is the molar mass of the material, g / mol;

[0083] Radiation path length:

[0084]

[0085] In formula (9), x is the radiation path length, m; s is the height of the flame center from the ground, m; r is the actual distance between the leakage point and the flame radiation point, m;

[0086] The calculation formula of the point view source factor F is:

[0087]

[0088] In equation (10), F is the point view source factor; x is the radiation path length, m;

[0089] Finally, the radiation intensity is calculated, and the calculation formula is:

[0090] E r =τ a ηmΔH C F(11)

[0091] In formula (11), E r is the radiation intensity, kW / m 2 ; τ a is the atmospheric transmittance, which can be found in “GUIDELINESFORChemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis”; η is the ratio of total energy converted to radiation, which can be found in “Fire Hazard Calculations for Large Open Hydrocarbon Fires.”; m is the release rate, kg / s, specifically the gas release rate m V Or the liquid release rate m L ; ΔH C is the combustion energy of the material, kJ / kg; F is the point view source factor;

[0092] Table 5 Radiation intensity levels

[0093]

[0094]

[0095] The calculated radiation intensity needs to be converted into different degrees of consequence levels. Regarding the consequence levels, it is divided into six stages. The specific numerical divisions are shown in Table 5.

[0096] The technical solution of the present invention also includes: in step S3, the explosion overpressure is a function of the initial release amount, process and environmental conditions; the amount of released chemicals depends on the process conditions and equipment type, because each process equipment contains a specific inventory level; the calculation formula is as follows:

[0097] Similar to pipelines, the initial release volume when the equipment is damaged must be calculated first. The initial release volume when the equipment is damaged is calculated using formulas (5)-(7);

[0098] Then the combustible mass of the released combustible vapor cloud needs to be estimated using the following formula:

[0099]

[0100] In formula (12), E f represents the combustible mass of the vapor cloud, kg; E represents the mass of the vapor cloud released by the equipment, kg; c o Represents the actual volume percentage of the substance in the vapor cloud, %; c LFL Represents the lower explosion limit concentration of the leaked substance, %;

[0101] The explosion overpressure also depends on the energy released by the explosion and the scaled distance. The two parameters are calculated by referring to the TNT equivalent method; the calculation formula is as follows:

[0102]

[0103]

[0104] In formulas (13) and (14), E TNT Represents the equivalent TNT mass of the substance, kg; η ex Represents the explosion efficiency coefficient; E f Represents the combustible mass of the vapor cloud, kg; H V Represents the combustion energy of the leaked material, J / g; H V,TNT represents the combustion energy of TNT, J / g; z represents the actual distance, m; represents the scaling distance, m;

[0105] Finally, the explosion overpressure at different locations is calculated by the nonlinear regression equation fitted by the experiment. The specific calculation equation is as follows:

[0106]

[0107] In formula (15), p ovrrepresents explosion overpressure, kPa; a1, b1, c1 all represent overpressure constants, which are experimental fitting parameters;

[0108] Table 6 Explosion overpressure level

[0109] Explosion overpressure(kPa) Consequence level ≥138 6 69~138 5 34.5~69 4 21~34.5 3 14~21 2 7~14 1

[0110] After the specific value of the explosion overpressure is determined, the consequences corresponding to the explosion overpressure are divided into 6 levels. The specific numerical results are shown in Table 6.

[0111] The technical solution of the present invention also includes: in step S4, when an accident occurs in the pipeline, the accident is more likely to be a fire scenario, while relative to the equipment, the accident scenario is more likely to be an explosion;

[0112] The calculation formulas for the accident probability f corresponding to the fire and explosion are as follows:

[0113] f=[f IL ×P imm,ign ]+[f IL ×(1-P imm,ign )×(P del,ign )×(1-P exp / g / ign )](16)

[0114] f=f IL ×(1-P imm,ifn )×P del,ign ×P exp / g / ign (17)

[0115] In equations (16) and (17), f IL represents the initial leakage frequency, year-1; P imm,ign represents the probability of immediate ignition; P del,ign represents the probability of delayed ignition; P exp / p / ipn represents the explosion probability;

[0116] Wherein formula (16) is used to calculate the probability of fire in the pipeline, and formula (17) is used to calculate the probability of explosion in the equipment. In formulas (16) and (17), the initial leakage frequency is determined by consulting the database of leakage of related equipment;

[0117] The immediate ignition probability, delayed ignition probability and explosion probability are calculated using formulas; the specific calculation formulas are as follows:

[0118]

[0119] P del,ign =1-[(1-S 2 )×e -St ](19)

[0120]

[0121] In equations (18)-(20), T represents temperature, °C; AIT represents the autoignition temperature of the substance, °C; p represents pressure, kPa; MIE represents minimum ignition energy, mJ; S represents ignition intensity; t represents exposure time, min; m f Represents the leakage rate of the material, kg / s, specifically the release rate of the gas m V Or the liquid release rate m L ;

[0122] Table 7 Accident probability levels

[0123] Probability of accident Probability level <![CDATA[10 -0 >P>10 -1 ]]> 6 <![CDATA[10 -1 >P>10 -2 ]]> 5 <![CDATA[10 -2 >P>10 -3 ]]> 4 <![CDATA[10 -3 >P>10 -4 ]]> 3 <![CDATA[10 -4 >P>10 -5 ]]> 2 <![CDATA[10 -5 >P>10 -6 ]]> 1

[0124] The final calculated accident probability is determined by referring to the accident probability level table to determine the level of different accident probabilities, as shown in Table 7.

[0125] The technical solution of the present invention also includes: in step S5, the specific method for determining the risk level of the key pipeline and the key equipment according to the accident consequence level of the key pipeline and the key equipment and the accident probability level of the key pipeline and the key equipment is:

[0126] A judgment matrix table is established with the accident consequence level as the horizontal axis and the accident probability level as the vertical axis, or with the accident consequence level as the vertical axis and the accident probability level as the horizontal axis. The table contains the product of the accident consequence level and the accident probability level. The risk level is divided into acceptable, tolerable and unacceptable according to the size of the product.

[0127] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0128] The present invention identifies key process units based on process data and flammability data of production components, and determines key pipelines and key equipment involved in the process. Specifically, the present invention establishes a functional relationship between factors affecting pipeline danger and process logistics characteristic index, calculates the process logistics characteristic index of each pipeline, and is used to evaluate the relative danger of different pipelines, thereby determining key pipelines. In addition, a functional relationship is established between factors affecting equipment danger and process equipment intrinsic safety index, and the process equipment intrinsic safety index of each device is calculated, which is used to evaluate the relative danger of different equipment and determine key equipment.

[0129] Finally, the accident consequence level and accident probability level of key equipment and key pipelines are calculated, and the risk level of key pipelines and key equipment is classified based on the accident consequence level and accident probability level of key equipment and key pipelines, so as to determine the risk level of key pipelines and key equipment, and realize the quantification of the inherent safety assessment of the chemical process system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0130] Figure 1 It is a flow chart of a method for intrinsic safety assessment of pipeline equipment in a chemical process system according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0131] Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of an event tree model in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0132] Figure 3 Schematic diagram of the risk analysis assessment matrix of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0133] The specific implementation of the present invention is further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and technical solutions.

[0134] In order to conduct safety assessment on a certain type of chemical product preparation process, the present invention discloses an intrinsic safety assessment method for pipeline equipment in a chemical process system. Figure 1 The specific steps of the intrinsic safety assessment method for process systems are demonstrated.

[0135] (1) Calculate the intrinsic safety index of pipelines and equipment

[0136] There are many factors that affect the danger of pipelines and equipment, but since pipelines and equipment are two different devices, their dangers should be evaluated separately.

[0137] Factors that affect pipeline hazard include pressure, temperature, density, viscosity, calorific value and flammability. Therefore, the process logistics characteristic index PSCI was developed to evaluate the relative hazard of different pipelines. The index is a function of the above six factors. The specific function expression is as follows:

[0138] PSCI = f(pressure, temperature, density, viscosity, calorific value, flammability) (1)

[0139] Temperature, pressure and viscosity jointly determine the phase state of the fluid in the process pipeline, energy is defined by the lower heating value (LHV), and flammability is determined according to the upper and lower limits of flammability. For the priority of different logistics, the concept of relative ranking can be used to compare the calculated results to determine the relative ranking of logistics, i.e. pipelines, determine the key pipelines in the system, and eliminate units that have no risk assessment significance. Logistics are pipelines in the preliminary design stage of the process, and one logistics corresponds to one pipeline. The specific calculation formula is as follows:

[0140]

[0141]

[0142]

[0143]

[0144]

[0145]

[0146] PSCI=A×(I p ×I T ×I ρ ×I v ×I e ×I FL ) (3)

[0147] In the formula, the pressure index of the pipeline is I p ; Temperature index is I T ; Density index is I ρ ; Viscosity index is I v ; Calorific value index is I e ; The flammability index is I FL ; The amplification factor is A. The main function of the amplification factor A is to enhance the readability of the data. The size of this factor depends on the actual situation of the final calculation result of PSCI. The pressure of a single logistics, the temperature of a single logistics, the density of a single logistics, and the heat of a single logistics can all be obtained by measurement and calculation. The combustion range of a single logistics is determined by determining the upper and lower explosion limits of the mixture, and the difference is the combustion range. The specific value of the explosion limit of a single substance requires finding the relevant experimental measurement results. The method for obtaining the above parameters is prior art and will not be repeated here.

[0148] The larger the PSCI index, the greater the damage caused when the safety protection of the process pipeline fails, which may lead to accidents such as fire. Therefore, the index is used to identify the most critical process pipelines. The PSCI index is used to screen the pipelines, and the key pipelines finally determined are valuable for risk calculation. The determination of key pipelines is based on the ranking of the PSCI index and the needs of intrinsic safety design. In other words, there is no specific standard for the determination of key structures. The calculation of the index is mainly to rank the unit structure. The top-ranked ones are regarded as key structures. In actual operation, it may be necessary to comprehensively consider the needs of intrinsic safety design to determine which is the key structure.

[0149] Factors that affect the hazard of equipment include the distance between equipment, the nature of the equipment itself, and the failure rate of the equipment. The factors that affect the nature of the equipment are divided into equipment type, ignition source type, and inventory. Based on this, the process equipment intrinsic safety index I was developed. a EI, the specific function expression is as follows:

[0150] I aEI=f(distance, property, failure rate) (2)

[0151] The distance index I of the device D By referring to the distance setting standards between different types of equipment, determine the distance that should be set with adjacent equipment, and select the maximum value of the distance that should be set with surrounding equipment. The specific calculation formula is as follows:

[0152]

[0153] The standard for determining the distance between different equipment is shown in Table 1. For details, see the references "Guidelines for Facility Siting and Layout" and "Lees' process safety essentials: Hazard identification, assessment and control" and "Process plant layout" and "A new trend in designing plant layouts for the process industry". By referring to high-level foreign works, the content of equipment classification and spacing setting in the chemical industry in the reference books was collected and finally summarized into Table 1, which includes all equipment types in the leading chemical industry. For the equipment in the actual process, "intermediate-level dangerous pumps, high-risk pumps, high-risk reactors, medium-risk reactors, and relatively dangerous reactors" need to be discussed with engineers in the chemical field to determine. Since it only involves a preliminary equipment index assessment, a preliminary screening of all equipment is carried out first, and the final risk result can determine the actual degree of danger of the equipment. Here, the judgment standard is set according to the actual process conditions.

[0154] Table 1 Distance setting standards between different types of equipment

[0155]

[0156]

[0157] Equipment property index I N It is a function of the equipment type, ignition source type and inventory quantity. The three factors related to properties correspond to the equipment type index I PS , Ignition source index I IS and Inventory Index I INV , the specific calculation method is as follows:

[0158] I N =I PS ×I IS ×I INV (4-2)

[0159] Equipment type and ignition source index should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis to determine the potential hazard level of different equipment. The determination of potential hazard level can be found in Table 2 and in the reference "Process equipment common attributes for inherently safer process design at preliminary design stage".

[0160] Table 2 Potential hazard levels of equipment characteristics

[0161] Device Type Ignition source type Potential hazard level Static / non-mobile equipment Frictional heat generation 1 mobile device Electric Spark 2 hot surface 3 Open flame 4

[0162] According to the equipment type, the equipment can be divided into two types: static / non-mobile equipment and mobile equipment. According to the type of ignition source, the ignition source can be divided into four types: friction heat, electric spark, high temperature surface and open flame. Based on Table 2, the equipment type index I can be calculated. PS and ignition source index I IS , the calculation formula is as follows:

[0163]

[0164]

[0165] In the event of an accident, a stock leak is the triggering event. The more stock involved, the more serious the consequences of the accident. The specific stock during the operation of the equipment is calculated using the following formula:

[0166] Inventory volume = flow rate × residence time (4-2-3-1)

[0167] The flow rate inside the equipment refers to the flow rate value in the actual operation of the simulation software or the field equipment. The simulation software is a traditional chemical process simulation software. Aspen Plus, Aspen Hysys, gPFROM, etc. can all achieve data output. This embodiment uses Aspen Hysys as an example. The residence time of materials inside different equipment will vary greatly. After investigation, the residence time of internal materials of different types of equipment is shown in Table 3 below. In the preliminary design stage, the residence time takes the maximum value as a conservative value. The residence time in the subsequent stage needs to be determined based on actual conditions.

[0168] Table 3 Material residence time in equipment

[0169]

[0170] The classification in Table 3 is a broader summary of all the devices in Table 1, specifically:

[0171] Reactors (Table 3): high-risk reactors, medium-risk reactors, relatively dangerous reactors, incinerators, oxidizers, emergency exchangers, storage tanks (Table 1).

[0172] Gas-liquid separators, other gas-liquid separations (Table 3): some towers and barrels (Table 1).

[0173] Pumps and compressors (Table 3): Pumps and compressors of various grades (Table 1).

[0174] Heat exchanger (Table 3): Heat exchanger, air cooler (Table 1).

[0175] After calculating the inventory level of different equipment using formula (4-2-3-1), it can be converted into the corresponding inventory index. The inventory level is the inventory volume. The main calculation formula of the inventory index is as follows:

[0176]

[0177] The failure rate of the equipment itself is related to the type of equipment itself and the size of the leakage aperture. By statistically analyzing the specific scenarios of previous accidents and referring to foreign accident statistics databases, the relationship between the failure rate of the equipment itself and the type of equipment itself and the size of the leakage aperture is obtained. The failure rates of different types of equipment under different leakage apertures are shown in Table 4. For details, please refer to the literature "Development of algorithms for predicting ignition probabilities and explosion frequencies".

[0178] Table 4 Failure rate of process equipment

[0179]

[0180] Similarly, the classification of the equipment in Table 4 and the relationship in Table 1 are specifically shown as follows:

[0181] Pressure vessels (Table 4): high-risk reactors, medium-risk reactors, relatively dangerous reactors, incinerators, oxidizers, emergency exchangers (Table 1).

[0182] Storage tank (Table 4): Storage tank (Table 1)

[0183] Centrifugal pumps and reciprocating pumps (Table 4): Pumps of various grades (Table 1)

[0184] Centrifugal compressors and reciprocating compressors (Table 4): Compressors (Table 1).

[0185] Heat exchanger (Table 4): heat exchanger, air cooler (Table 1).

[0186] The process equipment can be further subdivided according to Table 4 based on specific circumstances.

[0187] By referring to the above table, the failure rate of different equipment in the process when leakage occurs can be obtained. Therefore, the failure rate of each equipment in the process is converted into the failure rate index I using the following formula FR :

[0188]

[0189] Through the above calculations, the distance index, equipment type index and failure rate index are calculated respectively, and the intrinsic safety index of process equipment I a EI is calculated using the following formula:

[0190] I a EI=A×(I D ×I N ×I FR ) (4)

[0191] Similar to the process stream characteristic index PSCI, this formula also establishes an amplification factor A. The main function of the amplification factor A is to enhance the readability of the data. The size of this factor depends on I a The actual situation of the final calculation result of EI is just a processing of the calculated data, which is the same as the principle of taking log of experimental data to enhance data readability. It is a conventional technical means in this field and will not be elaborated here.

[0192] Process Equipment Intrinsic Safety Index I a EI will be estimated for all equipment in the process. a The higher the value calculated by EI, the more critical the equipment located in the process, and vice versa. a The value calculated by EI determines the key equipment in the process.

[0193] (2) Calculate the accident consequence level of pipelines and equipment

[0194] By investigating and analyzing past accidents, it was concluded that in the case of process pipeline damage, fires tend to occur more than explosions, and jet fires are considered the most common accident scenario; conversely, when equipment is damaged, explosions are the most common accident, and vapor cloud explosions are considered the most common accident scenario.

[0195] When a critical pipeline is damaged and causes a jet fire, the level of accident consequences depends on the radiation intensity of the fire. At the same time, the radiation intensity is a function of the amount of chemical substances released by the pipeline. The release rate of different phases of substances when the pipeline leaks is calculated by the following formula:

[0196] The release rate of the liquid is:

[0197]

[0198] In formula (5), m L is the release rate of the liquid, kg / s; C D is the flow coefficient of the fluid; A h is the area of ​​the leakage hole, m 2 ; ρ is the density of the material in the pipe, kg / m 3 ; Δp is the pressure difference between the inside and outside of the tube, Pa.

[0199] For gas phase leakage, if the pressure ratio between the inside and outside of the pipe is between 0.5 and 0.9, the leakage is in a blocked condition, and vice versa. The leakage rate of gas phase is calculated by the following formula:

[0200] Under blocking conditions, the gas release rate is:

[0201]

[0202] In formula (6), is the gas release rate, kg / s; C D is the flow coefficient of the fluid; A h is the area of ​​the leakage hole, m 2 ; γ is the specific heat ratio; ρ is the density of the material in the pipe, kg / m 3 ; p is the actual pressure of the material in the tube, Pa.

[0203] Under non-blocking conditions, the gas release rate is:

[0204]

[0205] In formula (7), m v is the gas release rate, kg / s; C D is the flow coefficient of the fluid; A h is the area of ​​the leakage hole, m 2 ; γ is the specific heat ratio; ρ is the density of the material in the pipe, kg / m 3 ; p is the actual pressure of the substance in the tube, Pa; p amb is the ambient pressure, Pa. The area of ​​the leakage hole here is related to the probability behind. Different hole diameters correspond to different probabilities of occurrence. The role of safety assessment is not only to determine whether the equipment has failed, but also to consider the consequences and probabilities of the accident scenarios that may be caused in the event of equipment failure, and finally determine the risk level.

[0206] The radiation intensity is used to define the extent of the jet fire consequences and is estimated by the following equation:

[0207] The flame height is related to:

[0208]

[0209] In formula (8), L is the flame height, m; d is the leakage hole diameter, m; C T is the molar concentration of the material; M a is the molar mass of air, g / mol; M f is the molar mass of the material, g / mol.

[0210] Radiation path length:

[0211]

[0212] In formula (9), x is the radiation path length, m; s is the height of the flame center from the ground, m; and r is the actual distance between the leakage point and the flame radiation action point, m.

[0213] Point view source factor:

[0214]

[0215] In equation (10), F is the point view source factor; x is the radiation path length, m.

[0216] Finally, the radiation intensity is calculated, and the calculation formula is:

[0217] E r =τ a ηmΔH C F (11)

[0218] In formula (11), E r is the radiation intensity, kW / m 2 ; τ a is the atmospheric transmittance; η is the ratio of total energy converted to radiation; m is the release rate, kg / s, specifically the gas release rate m V Or the liquid release rate m L ; ΔH C is the combustion energy of the material, kJ / kg; F is the point view source factor.

[0219] The calculated radiation intensity needs to be converted into different degrees of consequence levels. The consequence levels are mainly divided into six stages. The specific numerical divisions are shown in Table 5. For details, please refer to the document "Inherent fire consequence estimation tool (IFCET) for preliminary design of process plant":

[0220] Table 5 Radiation intensity levels

[0221]

[0222] When damage to critical equipment results in a vapor cloud explosion, the level of consequence depends on the magnitude of the overpressure generated by the explosion. The explosion overpressure is a function of the initial release volume, process and environmental conditions. The amount of chemicals released depends on the process conditions and the type of equipment, as each process equipment contains specific inventory levels. The main calculation formula is as follows:

[0223] Similar to pipelines, the initial release volume when the equipment is damaged must be calculated first. The initial release volume when the equipment is damaged is calculated using formulas (5)-(7).

[0224] Then the combustible mass of the released combustible vapor cloud needs to be estimated. The main calculation formula is as follows:

[0225]

[0226] In formula (12), E f represents the combustible mass of the vapor cloud, kg; E represents the mass of the vapor cloud released by the equipment, kg; c o Represents the actual volume percentage of the substance in the vapor cloud, %; c LFL Represents the lower explosion limit of the leaked material, %.

[0227] The explosion overpressure also depends on the energy released by the explosion and the scaled distance. The two parameters are calculated by referring to the TNT equivalent method. The calculation formula is as follows:

[0228]

[0229]

[0230] In formulas (13) and (14), E TNT Represents the equivalent TNT mass of the substance, kg; η ex Represents the explosion efficiency coefficient; E f Represents the combustible mass of the vapor cloud, kg; H V Represents the combustion energy of the leaked material, J / g; H V,TNT represents the combustion energy of TNT, J / g; z represents the actual distance, m; Represents the scaling distance, m.

[0231] Finally, the explosion overpressure at different locations is estimated by the nonlinear regression equation fitted by the experiment. The specific calculation equation is as follows:

[0232]

[0233] In formula (15), p ovrrepresents explosion overpressure, kPa; a1, b1, c1 all represent overpressure constants, which are experimental fitting parameters and depend on the composition of the leaked material, refer to the reference “Inherent safety tool for explosion consequences study”.

[0234] After the specific value of the explosion overpressure is determined, it needs to be converted into the corresponding consequence level. Similar to the radiation intensity, the consequences corresponding to the explosion overpressure are also divided into 6 levels. The specific numerical results are shown in Table 6, reference "Guidelines for Vapor Cloud Explosion, Pressure Vessel Burst, BLEVE and Flash Fire Hazards".

[0235] Table 6 Explosion overpressure level

[0236]

[0237] (3) Calculate the probability of accidents and accident probability levels of pipelines and equipment

[0238] After the consequences of the relevant accidents are calculated, it is necessary to calculate the frequency of occurrence under the scenario. The probability of the accident is calculated by the event tree analysis (ETA) method. The event tree modeling of the accident scenario is as follows: Figure 2 All probability-related formulas are calculated using the ETA method. ETA has multiple models. This solution establishes an ETA model suitable for this assessment based on actual conditions. The model is shown in Figure 2 , reference “Guidelines for determining the probability of ignition of a released flammable mass”, is used to calculate the probability of an accident in a combustion scenario during a leak.

[0239] When an accident occurs in a pipeline, according to the above, the accident is more likely to be a fire scenario. Compared with the equipment, the accident scenario is more likely to be an explosion. Therefore, the calculation formulas for the accident probabilities corresponding to the fire and explosion are as follows:

[0240] f=[f IL ×P imm,ign ]+[f IL ×(1-P imm,ign )×(P del,ign )×(1-P exp / g / ign )] (16)

[0241] f=f IL ×(1-Pimm,ign )×P del,ign ×P exp / g / ign (17)

[0242] Formula (16) is used to calculate the probability of pipeline fire, and formula (17) is used to calculate the probability of equipment explosion. IL represents the initial leakage frequency, year-1; P imm,ign represents the probability of immediate ignition; P del,ign represents the probability of delayed ignition; P exp / g / ign Represents the explosion probability.

[0243] In formulas (16)-(17), the initial leakage frequency is determined by consulting the database of leakages of related equipment. The immediate ignition probability, delayed ignition probability and explosion probability are calculated using formulas. The specific calculation formula is as follows:

[0244]

[0245] P del,ign =1-[(1-S 2 )×e -St ](19)

[0246]

[0247] In equations (18)-(20), T represents temperature, °C; AIT represents the autoignition temperature of the substance, °C; p represents pressure, kPa; MIE represents minimum ignition energy, mJ; S represents ignition intensity; t represents exposure time, min; m f Represents the leakage rate of the material, kg / s, specifically the release rate of the gas m V Or the liquid release rate m L , calculated according to formulas (5)-(7).

[0248] The final calculated accident probability is determined by referring to the accident probability level table to determine the level of different accident probabilities. The specific table is shown below, refer to the reference "Inherent risk assessment methodology in preliminary design stage: A case study for toxic release".

[0249] Table 7 Accident probability levels

[0250] Probability of accident Probability level Description of what happened <![CDATA[10 -0 >P>10 -1 ]]> 6 Very high <![CDATA[10 -1 >P>10 -2 ]]> 5 high <![CDATA[10 -2 >P>10 -3 ]]> 4 medium <![CDATA[10 -3 >P>10 -4 ]]> 3 Low <![CDATA[10 -4 >P>10 -5 ]]> 2 Very low <![CDATA[10 -5 >P>10 -6 ]]> 1 impossible

[0251] (4) Determination of pipeline and equipment risk levels

[0252] Risk analysis is the final step in this assessment. Figure 3 The matrix shown is used to analyze the acceptability of fire and explosion risks, and the references are "Inherent safety for sustainable process design of process piping at the preliminary design stage" and "Process equipment common attributes for inherently safer process design at preliminary design stage". The horizontal axis is the accident consequence level based on radiation intensity and explosion overpressure, as shown in Tables 5 and 6. The vertical axis is the determination of the probability level of fire and explosion accidents, as shown in Table 7. The matrix is ​​divided into three areas, namely acceptable, tolerable and unacceptable. The specific division criteria are as follows Figure 3 As shown, the green area is acceptable, the yellow area is tolerable, and the red area is unacceptable. This matrix is ​​used to analyze the fire risk of key process flows in this work.

Claims

1. A method for intrinsic safety assessment of pipeline equipment in a chemical process system, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: S1. According to the factors that affect the danger of pipelines, such as pressure, temperature, density, viscosity, calorific value and flammability, the process logistics characteristic index PSCI is obtained to evaluate the relative danger of different pipelines; The process logistics characteristic index PSCI is a function that includes the above 6 factors. The specific function expression is as follows: PSCI = f(pressure, temperature, density, viscosity, calorific value, flammability) (1) According to the factors that affect the danger of equipment, such as the distance between equipment, the nature of the equipment itself and the failure rate of the equipment, the equipment type, ignition source type and inventory are used to characterize the equipment properties, and the intrinsic safety index IaEI of process equipment is obtained to evaluate the relative danger of different equipment; The intrinsic safety index of process equipment IaEI is a function that includes the above three factors. The specific function expression is as follows: I a EI=f(distance, property, failure rate) (2) S2. Evaluate key pipelines and key equipment based on the process logistics characteristic index PSCI and the process equipment intrinsic safety index IaEI; S3. Calculate the accident consequence level of key pipelines and key equipment When a jet fire occurs due to damage to a critical pipeline, the radiation intensity of the fire is used to assess the level of accident consequences; When damage to key equipment causes an explosion, the explosion overpressure intensity is used to assess the level of accident consequences; S4. Calculate the probability of accidents and accident probability levels of key pipelines and key equipment Based on the accident data of pipelines and equipment, the probability of pipeline and equipment accidents is calculated through event tree analysis, and then the accident probability level is obtained; S5. Determine the risk level of key pipelines and key equipment based on the accident consequence level and accident probability level of key pipelines and key equipment.

2. The method for intrinsic safety assessment of pipeline equipment in a chemical process system according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In step S2, the formula of the process logistics characteristic index is: PSCI=A×(I p ×I T ×I ρ ×I v ×I e ×I FL ) (3) In formula (3), the pressure index of the pipeline is I p ; Temperature index is I T ; Density index is I ρ ; Viscosity index is I v ; Calorific value index is I e ; The flammability index is I FL ; The amplification factor is A; For the priorities of different logistics, the concept of relative ranking is used to compare the calculated results to determine the relative ranking of logistics. The specific calculation formula is as follows: In formulas (3-1) to (3-6), the pressure, temperature, density, and heat of a single logistics stream are obtained by measurement and calculation. The combustion range of a single logistics stream is obtained by determining the upper and lower explosion limits of the mixture, and taking the difference as the combustion range. The specific numerical value of the explosion limit of a single substance is obtained by finding relevant experimental measurement results.

3. The method for intrinsic safety assessment of pipeline equipment in a chemical process system according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S2, the formula for the intrinsic safety index of the process equipment is: I a NO=A×(I D ×I N ×I FR ) (4) In formula (4), I D I is the distance index of the device; N I is the property index of the equipment; FR is the failure rate index; the amplification factor is A; The distance index I of the device D By referring to the distance setting standards between different types of equipment, determine the distance that should be set with adjacent equipment, and select the maximum value of the distance that should be set with surrounding equipment; the specific calculation formula is as follows: The standard for determining the distance between different devices is shown in Table 1: Table 1 Distance setting standards between different types of equipment The criteria for "intermediate-risk pumps, high-risk pumps, high-risk reactors, medium-risk reactors, and relatively dangerous reactors" in Table 1 are set according to the actual process conditions; Equipment property index I N is a function of the equipment type, ignition source type, and inventory size, and is related to the property index I N The three relevant factors correspond to the device type index I PS , Ignition source index I IS and Inventory Index I INV , the specific calculation method is as follows: I N =I PS ×I IS ×I INV (4-2) In formula (4-2), Based on the device type, the devices are divided into two types: static / non-mobile devices and mobile devices; According to the type of ignition source, the ignition source is divided into four types: friction heat, electric spark, high temperature surface and open flame; The equipment type and ignition source index should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis to determine the potential hazard level of different equipment. The determination of the potential hazard level can be found in Table 2: Table 2 Potential hazard levels of equipment characteristics In the event of an accident, the leakage of stock is the triggering event; the specific stock during the operation of the relevant equipment is calculated using the following formula: Inventory volume = flow rate × residence time (4-2-3-1) The flow rate inside the equipment refers to the flow rate value in the actual operation of the simulation software or the on-site equipment. The simulation software is a traditional chemical process simulation software. After investigation, the residence time of the internal materials of different types of equipment is obtained. For details, see Table 3: Table 3 Material residence time in equipment In the preliminary design stage, the residence time is taken as the maximum value, and the residence time in the subsequent stages is determined according to the actual situation; The failure rate of the equipment itself is related to the type of equipment itself and the size of the leakage aperture. Through the statistics of the specific scenarios of previous accidents, the relationship between the failure rate of the equipment itself and the type of equipment itself and the size of the leakage aperture is obtained; the failure rates of different types of equipment under different leakage apertures are shown in Table 4: Table 4 Failure rate of process equipment By referring to the above table, the failure rate of different equipment in the process when leakage occurs is obtained. Therefore, the failure rate of each equipment in the process is converted into the failure rate index I using the following formula FR :

4. The method for intrinsic safety assessment of pipeline equipment in a chemical process system according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S3, the radiation intensity is a function of the amount of chemical substances released from the pipeline. The release rate of substances in different phases when the pipeline leaks is calculated by the following formula: The release rate of the liquid is: In formula (5), m L is the release rate of the liquid, kg / s; C D is the flow coefficient of the fluid; A h is the area of ​​the leakage hole, m 2 ; ρ is the density of the material in the pipe, kg / m 3 ; Δp is the pressure difference between the inside and outside of the tube, Pa; For gas phase leakage, if the pressure ratio between the inside and outside of the tube is between 0.5 and 0.9, the leakage is in a blocked condition, and vice versa. The leakage rate of gas phase substances is calculated by the following formula: Under blocking conditions, the gas release rate is: In formula (6), m V is the gas release rate, kg / s; C D is the flow coefficient of the fluid; A h is the area of ​​the leakage hole, m 2 ; γ is the specific heat ratio; ρ is the density of the material in the pipe, kg / m 3 ; p is the actual pressure of the substance in the tube, Pa; Under non-blocking conditions, the gas release rate is: In formula (7), m V is the gas release rate, kg / s; C D is the flow coefficient of the fluid; A h is the area of ​​the leakage hole, m 2 ; γ is the specific heat ratio; ρ is the density of the material in the pipe, kg / m 3 ; p is the actual pressure of the substance in the tube, Pa; p amb is the ambient pressure, Pa; The extent of the jet fire consequences is defined using the radiation intensity and estimated by the following equation: The flame height is related to: In formula (8), L is the flame height, m; d is the leakage hole diameter, m; C T is the molar concentration of the material; M a is the molar mass of air, g / mol; M f is the molar mass of the material, g / mol; Radiation path length: In formula (9), x is the radiation path length, m; s is the height of the flame center from the ground, m; r is the actual distance between the leakage point and the flame radiation point, m; The calculation formula of the point view source factor F is: In equation (10), F is the point view source factor; x is the radiation path length, m; Finally, the radiation intensity is calculated, and the calculation formula is: E r =t a hmΔH C F(11) In formula (11), E r is the radiation intensity, kW / m 2 ; τ a is the atmospheric transmittance; η is the ratio of total energy converted to radiation; m is the release rate, kg / s, specifically the gas release rate m V Or the liquid release rate m L ; ΔH C is the combustion energy of the material, kJ / kg; F is the point view source factor; Table 5 Radiation intensity levels The calculated radiation intensity needs to be converted into different degrees of consequence levels. Regarding the consequence levels, it is divided into six stages. The specific numerical divisions are shown in Table 5.

5. The method for intrinsic safety assessment of pipeline equipment in a chemical process system according to claim 4, characterized in that: In step S3, the explosion overpressure is a function of the initial release volume, process and environmental conditions; the amount of released chemicals depends on the process conditions and the type of equipment, as each process equipment contains specific inventory levels; the calculation formula is as follows: Similar to pipelines, the initial release volume when the equipment is damaged must be calculated first. The initial release volume when the equipment is damaged is calculated using formulas (5)-(7); Then the combustible mass of the released combustible vapor cloud needs to be estimated using the following formula: In formula (12), E f represents the combustible mass of the vapor cloud, kg; E represents the mass of the vapor cloud released by the equipment, kg; c o Represents the actual volume percentage of the substance in the vapor cloud, %; c LFL Represents the lower explosion limit concentration of the leaked substance, %; The explosion overpressure also depends on the energy released by the explosion and the scaled distance. The two parameters are calculated by referring to the TNT equivalent method; the calculation formula is as follows: In formulas (13) and (14), E TNT Represents the TNT mass equivalent to the substance, kg; η ex Represents the explosion efficiency coefficient; E f Represents the combustible mass of the vapor cloud, kg; H V Represents the combustion energy of the leaked material, J / g; H V,TNT represents the combustion energy of TNT, J / g; z represents the actual distance, m; represents the scaling distance, m; Finally, the explosion overpressure at different locations is calculated by the nonlinear regression equation fitted by the experiment. The specific calculation equation is as follows: In formula (15), p ovr represents explosion overpressure, kPa; a1, b1, c1 all represent overpressure constants, which are experimental fitting parameters; Table 6 Explosion overpressure level After the specific value of the explosion overpressure is determined, the consequences corresponding to the explosion overpressure are divided into 6 levels. The specific numerical results are shown in Table 6.

6. The method for intrinsic safety assessment of pipeline equipment in a chemical process system according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S4, when an accident occurs in the pipeline, the accident is more likely to be a fire scenario, while the accident scenario is more likely to be an explosion than that of the equipment; The calculation formulas for the accident probability f corresponding to the fire and explosion are as follows: f=[f IL ×P imm,ign ]+[f IL ×(1-P imm,ign )×(P del,ign )×(1-P exp / g / ign )](16) f=f IL ×(1-P imm,ign )×P del,ign ×P exp / g / ign (17) In equations (16) and (17), f IL represents the initial leakage frequency, year-1; P imm,ign represents the probability of immediate ignition; P del,ign represents the probability of delayed ignition; P exp / g / ign represents the explosion probability; Wherein formula (16) is used to calculate the probability of fire in the pipeline, and formula (17) is used to calculate the probability of explosion in the equipment. In formulas (16) and (17), the initial leakage frequency is determined by consulting the database of leakage of related equipment; The immediate ignition probability, delayed ignition probability and explosion probability are calculated using formulas; the specific calculation formulas are as follows: P del,ign =1-[(1-S 2 )×e -St ](19) In equations (18)-(20), T represents temperature, °C; AIT represents the autoignition temperature of the substance, °C; p represents pressure, kPa; MIE represents minimum ignition energy, mJ; S represents ignition intensity; t represents exposure time, min; m f Represents the leakage rate of the material, kg / s, specifically the release rate of the gas m V Or the liquid release rate m L ; Table 7 Accident probability levels The final calculated accident probability is determined by referring to the accident probability level table to determine the level of different accident probabilities, as shown in Table 7.

7. The method for intrinsic safety assessment of pipeline equipment in a chemical process system according to claim 1, characterized in that: In step S5, the specific method for determining the risk level of the key pipeline and the key equipment according to the accident consequence level and the accident probability level of the key pipeline and the key equipment is: A judgment matrix table is established with the accident consequence level as the horizontal axis and the accident probability level as the vertical axis, or with the accident consequence level as the vertical axis and the accident probability level as the horizontal axis. The table contains the product of the accident consequence level and the accident probability level. The risk level is divided into acceptable, tolerable and unacceptable according to the size of the product.