Innovation uncertainty and manufacturer over-confidence supply chain decision analysis method

By constructing a two-tier supply chain system, this study analyzes manufacturers' overconfidence and innovation uncertainty, reveals the impact of power structure on supply chain decision-making, provides suggestions for optimizing decisions, and improves the green innovation level and member profits of the supply chain.

CN119027175AInactive Publication Date: 2024-11-26HEFEI UNIV OF TECH
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411261898.8
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-09-10
Publication Date
2024-11-26
Estimated Expiration
Not applicable · inactive patent

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing technologies lack sufficient research on the impact of innovation uncertainty and overconfidence on green innovation decisions in the supply chain, especially the impact of power structure on manufacturers' decision-making behavior.

Method used

A two-tier supply chain system consisting of a single overconfident manufacturer and a single rational retailer was constructed. Considering market demand functions and innovation uncertainty, the impact of the manufacturer's overconfidence on supply chain decisions was analyzed, and the optimal strategies under different power structures were explored.

Benefits of technology

It reveals the impact of innovation uncertainty and overconfidence on supply chain innovation investment and product pricing, and provides effective decision-making recommendations to help manufacturers and retailers optimize decisions under different power structures and improve the overall efficiency of the supply chain.

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Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of shaping comparative analysis, in particular to a supply chain decision analysis method for innovation uncertainty and over-confidence of manufacturers. On the basis of construction of a secondary supply chain system composed of a single over-confidential manufacturer M and a single rational retailer R, a market demand function is assumed as D = 1-p + betax, p (p = w + m) represents the retail price of a product, the green research and development input cost is f + kx2 / 2, and due to the fact that the innovation process is full of risks and uncertainties, the market demand function is assumed as D = 1-p + betax. And manufacturers are invested in green innovation and do not certainly achieve expected effects. Through theoretical analysis and research on the model, an action mechanism of an over-confidence behavior of a manufacturer in a supply chain green innovation decision during innovation uncertainty is disclosed, and how the over-confidence behavior affects key decisions such as supply chain innovation investment and product pricing is explored; and corresponding optimal strategies and management enlightenments under different power structures are further discussed so as to provide effective decision suggestions for actual operation.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The invention relates to the technical field of stereotyped comparative analysis, in particular to a supply chain decision analysis method for innovation uncertainty and manufacturer overconfidence. Background Art

[0002] At present, research on green innovation in supply chains mainly focuses on the selection of innovative technologies, factors affecting innovation diffusion, and the distribution mechanism of innovation benefits. However, research on how innovation uncertainty and individual behavioral characteristics (such as overconfidence) affect supply chain decisions is still insufficient. For example, Yang Xiaohui and You Daming analyzed the driving factors and timing of green technology innovation based on consumer demand preferences. In addition, many scholars have combined government subsidies with green innovation. For example, Han et al. studied the optimal recovery strategy and related decisions by developing three models, and explored the impact of product quality and government subsidies on optimal decisions. Jung and Feng et al. studied government subsidies for corporate green technology and its impact on the environment and social welfare, and found that if the government only considers the environmental benefits and costs of technology, subsidies will be harmful to the environment.

[0003] Regarding overconfidence, many studies at home and abroad have shown that decision makers' overconfidence will have an impact on supply chain decisions. According to the research of MOORE et al., overconfidence can be divided into three categories: overestimation, overprecision and overpositioning. In the field of supply chain investment decisions, Liu et al. conducted in-depth research on the impact of double overconfidence behavior and demand updates on port service supply chain decisions, and found that there is an interaction between the two. In addition, Yan et al. found that an overconfident new entrant will overprice itself and existing companies, explaining why overconfident entrepreneurs are more popular in the industry; Du et al. studied the upstream innovation decisions of manufacturers under different contracts and found that the overconfidence of manufacturers under cost-sharing contracts is conducive to supply chain innovation.

[0004] Regarding innovation uncertainty, some literature has studied how innovation uncertainty affects investment decisions and profits of enterprises. For example, Tsai et al. confirmed that innovation uncertainty is one of the most important factors affecting investment decisions; Bloom et al. pointed out that when enterprises increase R&D investment, the marginal effect of innovation uncertainty may be negative; Hao et al. established a two-period model to study the product innovation investment and business strategy of enterprises under innovation uncertainty. They found that the relationship between the expected profit of enterprises and the probability of innovation success and the level of innovation is non-monotonic; Niu et al. mainly studied the impact of different power structures on uncertain green technology innovation and investment.

[0005] In summary, although the research results on green innovation and overconfidence are very rich, the mechanism by which innovation uncertainty and overconfidence jointly affect supply chain green innovation decisions needs to be further studied. In addition to internal influencing factors such as innovation randomness and overconfidence, power structure as an external influencing factor is also closely related to manufacturers' decision-making behavior. Summary of the invention

[0006] In order to make up for the shortcomings of the existing technology, the present invention proposes a supply chain decision analysis method for innovation uncertainty and manufacturer overconfidence. Through theoretical analysis and research on the model, the role mechanism of manufacturer's overconfidence behavior in supply chain green innovation decision-making under innovation uncertainty is revealed, and how it affects key decisions such as supply chain innovation investment and product pricing is explored. The corresponding optimal strategies and management inspirations under different power structures are further explored, in order to provide effective decision-making suggestions for actual operations.

[0007] The technical solution adopted by the present invention to solve the technical problem is: the supply chain decision analysis method of innovation uncertainty and manufacturer overconfidence described in the present invention is based on constructing a two-level supply chain system consisting of a single overconfident manufacturer M and a single rational retailer R.

[0008] The market demand function is assumed to be D = 1-p + βx, where p (p = w + m) represents the retail price of the product, w represents the wholesale price, m represents the retailer's marginal profit, β represents the consumer's green preference coefficient, and x represents the green innovation level; assuming that the unit production cost of the product is c, and the green R&D investment cost is f + kx 2 / 2(f≥0, k≥0),

[0009] The first item is the fixed investment cost, the second item is the variable investment cost, and k is the investment cost coefficient. The larger the k value, the higher the innovation difficulty and the higher the cost required.

[0010] As the innovation process is full of risks and uncertainties, manufacturers’ investments in green innovation may not necessarily achieve the expected results;

[0011] The uncertainty of innovation is taken into account and it is assumed that the probability of innovation success is ρ (0≤ρ≤1) and the probability of innovation failure is 1-ρ;

[0012] If the manufacturer's green innovation is successful, its demand function is: D S =1-p+βx,

[0013] If the manufacturer fails to innovate, the demand function is: D F =1-p;

[0014] Therefore, the expected market demand considering innovation uncertainty is E(D) = ρDS +(1-ρ)D F ;

[0015] Manufacturers are often influenced by subjective factors such as overconfidence when making innovation decisions. Manufacturers’ overconfidence is manifested as overestimating consumers’ preference for green products, that is, innovation over-promotes the increase in market demand;

[0016] If the manufacturer succeeds in innovation, it will think that the market demand is:

[0017] Taking into account the uncertainty of innovation, the market demand expectation can be rewritten as Where ε is the manufacturer's overconfidence level, and 0<ε≤1.

[0018] Preferably, two different power structures are considered, namely, manufacturer-dominated supply chain and retailer-dominated supply chain; at the same time, two situations, namely, manufacturer overconfidence and complete rationality, are considered, namely, the manufacturer-dominated and overconfident MO model, the manufacturer-dominated and rational MN model, the retailer-dominated and manufacturer overconfidence RO model, and the retailer-dominated and manufacturer rational RN model.

[0019] Preferably, the decision sequence includes

[0020] (1) Investment stage: The manufacturer conducts green innovation on its products and decides on its green innovation level x. After the investment is completed, both the manufacturer and the retailer have access to innovation information, i.e., whether the innovation is successful or not.

[0021] (2) Pricing stage: In the scenario where the manufacturer dominates the supply chain, the manufacturer first decides the wholesale price w, and then the retailer decides the retail price p; in the scenario where the retailer dominates the supply chain, the retailer first decides its marginal profit m, and then the manufacturer decides the wholesale price w.

[0022] Preferably, in the MO model, manufacturers dominate the supply chain and have overconfident behavior. Manufacturers make decisions based on overconfident market demand, while retailers make decisions based on actual market demand.

[0023] Preferably, in the MN model, manufacturers dominate the supply chain but are completely rational about green innovation.

[0024] Preferably, in the RO model, retailers dominate the supply chain and manufacturers are overconfident.

[0025] Preferably, in the RN model, the retailer dominates the supply chain and the manufacturer is completely rational.

[0026] Monitor word-of-mouth communication on the platform in real time, and continuously monitor and evaluate various indicators through data analysis tools; adjust marketing strategies and content directions in a timely manner based on monitoring results and market feedback; ensure that the reputation of landmark agricultural products on the platform always maintains a positive trend.

[0027] The beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows:

[0028] (1) Considering the uncertainty of innovation and the overconfidence of manufacturers, for supply chain members, the higher the probability of innovation success, the better. For manufacturers as innovation investors, when their overconfidence level is high, they tend to over-predict market demand, and then make blind investment decisions, resulting in high green investment costs, which will have an adverse impact on the manufacturer's profits; however, the over-estimation of market demand cannot always be converted into actual market demand. The large amount of green investment by manufacturers will lead to an increase in retail prices, thereby suppressing the actual market demand and damaging the profits of retailers.

[0029] (2) Manufacturers’ overconfidence does not always harm the profits of supply chain members. When the manufacturer’s overconfidence level is within a certain range, the retailer’s profits will increase as the overconfidence level increases. When manufacturers dominate the supply chain and are overconfident, they will continue to increase their investment in product innovation, drive an increase in market demand and an increase in retail prices, and thus increase the retailer’s profits. This shows that when manufacturers have a certain degree of overconfidence, although it is not conducive to their own decision-making and development, it is conducive to the increase of profits of other members of the supply chain, and it also has a positive impact on the green innovation of products, which can promote the improvement of the level of green innovation.

[0030] (3) When manufacturers act with overconfidence, the leader of the supply chain does not necessarily benefit from power. When manufacturers are rational, whether they are leading the supply chain or retailers, they can obtain higher profits than when they are followers; when manufacturers are overconfident, different degrees of overconfidence will have different effects on the profits of the leader, resulting in the leader not always being able to obtain positive benefits from power. In particular, when the manufacturer's overconfidence level is high, it is more likely that leading the supply chain will have an adverse impact on its own profits. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0031] The present invention is further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and implementation modes.

[0032] Figure 1 It is the decision sequence diagram of the present invention.

[0033] Figure 2 Graph showing the impact of overconfidence ε on the manufacturer's profit margin according to the present invention.

[0034] Figure 3 Graph showing the impact of overconfidence ε on retailer profit margins according to the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0035] In order to make the technical means, creative features, objectives and effects achieved by the present invention easy to understand, the present invention is further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and preferred embodiments.

[0036] like Figure 1 As shown in the figure, a supply chain decision analysis method for innovation uncertainty and manufacturer overconfidence is constructed based on a two-level supply chain system consisting of a single overconfident manufacturer M and a single rational retailer R.

[0037] The market demand function is assumed to be D = 1-p + βx, where p (p = w + m) represents the retail price of the product, w represents the wholesale price, m represents the retailer's marginal profit, β represents the consumer's green preference coefficient, and x represents the green innovation level; assuming that the unit production cost of the product is c, and the green R&D investment cost is f + kx 2 / 2(f≥0, k≥0),

[0038] The first item is the fixed investment cost, the second item is the variable investment cost, and k is the investment cost coefficient. The larger the k value, the higher the innovation difficulty and the higher the cost required.

[0039] As the innovation process is full of risks and uncertainties, manufacturers’ investments in green innovation may not necessarily achieve the expected results;

[0040] The uncertainty of innovation is taken into account and it is assumed that the probability of innovation success is ρ (0≤ρ≤1) and the probability of innovation failure is 1-ρ;

[0041] If the manufacturer's green innovation is successful, its demand function is: D S =1-p+βx,

[0042] If the manufacturer fails to innovate, the demand function is: D F =1-p;

[0043] Therefore, the expected market demand considering innovation uncertainty is E(D) = ρD S +(1-ρ)D F ;

[0044] Manufacturers are often influenced by subjective factors such as overconfidence when making innovation decisions. Manufacturers’ overconfidence is manifested as overestimating consumers’ preference for green products, that is, innovation over-promotes the increase in market demand;

[0045] If the manufacturer succeeds in innovation, it will think that the market demand is:

[0046] Taking into account the uncertainty of innovation, the market demand expectation can be rewritten as Where ε is the manufacturer's overconfidence level, and 0<ε≤1.

[0047] The decision sequence of the present invention includes

[0048] (1) Investment stage: The manufacturer conducts green innovation on its products and decides on its green innovation level x. After the investment is completed, both the manufacturer and the retailer have access to innovation information, i.e., whether the innovation is successful or not.

[0049] (2) Pricing stage: In the scenario where the manufacturer dominates the supply chain, the manufacturer first decides the wholesale price w, and then the retailer decides the retail price p; in the scenario where the retailer dominates the supply chain, the retailer first decides its marginal profit m, and then the manufacturer decides the wholesale price w.

[0050] The present invention considers two different power structures, namely, manufacturer-dominated supply chain and retailer-dominated supply chain; at the same time, two situations, namely, manufacturer overconfidence and complete rationality, are considered, namely, the manufacturer-dominated and overconfident MO model, the manufacturer-dominated and rational MN model, the retailer-dominated and manufacturer overconfidence RO model and the retailer-dominated and manufacturer rational RN model.

[0051] In the MO model, manufacturers dominate the supply chain and have overconfident behavior. Manufacturers make decisions based on overconfident market demand, while retailers make decisions based on actual market demand. The decision functions of manufacturers and retailers are:

[0052]

[0053] When green innovation is successful, the profit functions of manufacturers and retailers are different due to their cognitive differences, which are:

[0054]

[0055] When green innovation fails, the profit functions of manufacturers and retailers are:

[0056]

[0057] The superscripts MOS and MOF represent the scenarios of green innovation success or failure when the manufacturer dominates the supply chain and is overconfident. Taking the case of successful innovation as an example, the reverse induction method is used to solve formula (2).

[0058] In the pricing stage, Available Will Substitution Available make Available Substituting it into the expressions of each variable, we can get the optimal wholesale price, retail price, market demand, manufacturer's expected profit and retailer's actual profit of the supply chain when the innovation is successful:

[0059]

[0060] The calculation process of formula (3) is similar, and the optimal wholesale price, retail price, market demand, and profits of manufacturers and retailers when innovation fails are:

[0061]

[0062] In the innovation decision-making stage, substituting the above results into formula (1), we can obtain that under the condition of considering innovation uncertainty, the decision functions of manufacturers and retailers are:

[0063]

[0064] The above decision model is solved and analyzed by using the reverse induction method. Available Substitute it into the expressions of each variable and derive Proposition 1.

[0065] Proposition 1 When investment cost When , the product green innovation level, wholesale price, retail price, market demand, expected profit and actual profit of supply chain members are:

[0066] (1)

[0067] (2)

[0068]

[0069] From Proposition 1, we can see that the green innovation level of products, wholesale prices, retail prices, market demand and profits of supply chain members are all affected by innovation uncertainty and manufacturer overconfidence. The following is a sensitivity analysis of the probability of innovation success and overconfidence.

[0070] Corollary 1(1)

[0071] (2) When or hour, when And k>k 2 hour,

[0072] (3) When or hour, when And k>k 3 hour,

[0073] in,

[0074] Corollary 1 shows that when manufacturers dominate the supply chain and are overconfident, the green innovation level, wholesale price, and retail price of products are positively correlated with the success probability of innovation. The increase in the probability of innovation success will inevitably enhance manufacturers' confidence in innovation activities and increase their investment in green innovation. This means that the higher the probability of innovation success, the more likely manufacturers will raise wholesale prices to make up for the investment costs of innovation. Since innovative products meet consumers' green preference needs, retailers will respond to changes within the supply chain by raising retail price strategies while maintaining established profit targets, which is a reflection of their market adaptability.

[0075] However, the increase in innovation level and price does not mean that member profits also increase with the probability of success. When considering the overconfidence of manufacturers, for manufacturers, when their overconfidence level is high, the greater the probability of innovation success, the more unfavorable their actual profits. The reason is that a higher level of overconfidence will help manufacturers actively invest in green innovation. When the probability of innovation success increases, manufacturers are very likely to over-innovate. However, the expected market demand growth has not been fully realized. The benefits of manufacturers from innovation may be lower than the investment cost caused by over-innovation, so their profits decrease with the probability of success. For retailers, when the manufacturer's overconfidence level is high and the investment cost coefficient is large, its profit is also negatively correlated with the probability of innovation success. The manufacturer's overconfidence level will lead to an increase in the level of green innovation and retail prices of products, but at the same time, in order to make up for their high investment costs, manufacturers are also constantly raising the wholesale prices of products, resulting in retailers' profits from increasing retail prices being less than the losses caused by manufacturers raising wholesale prices, and the overall profit decreases with the increase in the probability of success.

[0076] Corollary 2(1)

[0077] (2) when or hour, when or hour,

[0078] Corollary 2 shows that there is a positive correlation between the manufacturer's overconfidence level and the product's green innovation level, wholesale price, and retail price. Manufacturers who overestimate the impact of green innovation on market demand will inevitably increase their green innovation R&D investment, and thus prices will increase. However, overconfidence in market demand does not mean actual demand growth. The higher the manufacturer's overconfidence level, the greater the deviation between its expected market demand and actual market demand. Investing high R&D costs in over-innovation only obtains part of the expected benefits, so overconfidence behavior will damage the manufacturer's profits.

[0079] When the manufacturer's overconfidence level is within a certain range and the investment cost coefficient does not exceed a certain threshold, the retailer's profit is positively correlated with the manufacturer's overconfidence level. Not only overconfidence behavior but also the uncertainty of innovation is taken into account. A lower investment cost coefficient will enhance the manufacturer's investment motivation and promote the increase in market demand to a certain extent. On the other hand, as the manufacturer's overconfidence level increases, the level of green innovation also rises. Retailers will increase retail prices and expand their profit margins, so that the manufacturer's overconfidence behavior has a positive impact on the retailer's profits.

[0080] In the MN model, manufacturers dominate the supply chain, but they are completely rational about green innovation. This model can be regarded as a special form of the above MO model, that is, manufacturers do not have overconfidence behavior. Let ε = 0 in formulas (2) and (3) and solve the pricing stage. It can be obtained that under the condition of considering innovation uncertainty, the decision functions of manufacturers and retailers are:

[0081]

[0082] By solving the innovation decision-making stage through reverse induction, the product green innovation level, wholesale price, retail price, market demand, and supply chain member profits are shown in Table 1.

[0083] Table 1 Optimal decision results of MN model and RN model

[0084]

[0085] In the RO model, retailers dominate the supply chain and manufacturers are overconfident, which redefines the decision-making order of manufacturers and retailers in the pricing stage, that is, retailers first decide on the marginal profit m, and then manufacturers decide on the wholesale price w, to reflect the shift in power structure. The decision functions of manufacturers and retailers are:

[0086]

[0087] When green innovation is successful, the profit functions of manufacturers and retailers are:

[0088]

[0089] When green innovation fails, the profit functions of manufacturers and retailers are:

[0090]

[0091] The superscripts ROS and ROF represent the scenarios of green innovation success or failure when retailers dominate the supply chain but manufacturers are overconfident. By solving formulas (7) and (8) respectively using the reverse induction method, we can obtain the optimal wholesale price, retail price, market demand, manufacturer's expected profit and retailer's actual profit of the supply chain when the innovation is successful:

[0092]

[0093] The optimal wholesale price, retail price, market demand, and profits of manufacturers and retailers when innovation fails are:

[0094]

[0095] Substituting the above optimal decision into formula (6), we can obtain that, under the condition of considering innovation uncertainty, the decision functions of manufacturers and retailers are:

[0096]

[0097] We use the backward induction method again to solve Proposition 2.

[0098] Proposition 2 The optimal product green innovation level, wholesale price, retail price, market demand, expected profit and actual profit of supply chain members in the supply chain are:

[0099] (1)

[0100]

[0101] (2)

[0102]

[0103] We conduct a sensitivity analysis on the innovation success probability ρ based on the results in Proposition 2, and obtain Corollary 3.

[0104] Corollary 3(1)

[0105] (2) When ε 1 <ε≤1 and k 1 <k<k 4 hour, When 0<ε≤ε1 or (ε 1 <ε≤1,k>k 4 )hour,

[0106] where ε 1 Satisfy 533ε 5 +2369ε 4 +2762ε 3 +1174ε 2 +157ε-3=0,

[0107]

[0108] Corollary 3(1) shows that when retailers dominate the supply chain and manufacturers are overconfident, the green innovation level of products, wholesale prices, and retailers’ marginal profits are all positively correlated with the success probability of green innovation. This is because as the possibility of improving the greenness of products increases, manufacturers are more willing to set a higher green innovation level to meet consumers’ green preferences, thereby driving market demand. At this time, retailers will increase their marginal profits to increase their own profits.

[0109] Comparing Corollary 3(2) with Corollary 1(2), we find that only when the manufacturer's overconfidence level is high and the investment cost coefficient is below a certain threshold, the manufacturer's profit will be negatively correlated with the probability of success. This shows that retailers dominating the supply chain is not completely unfavorable to manufacturers, and to a certain extent can reduce the occurrence of situations that are unfavorable to manufacturers; at the same time, compared with Corollary 1(3), the conclusion is also different. When retailers dominate the supply chain, their profits are always positively correlated with the probability of innovation success, indicating that the benefits of retailers from power are greater than the loss of profits caused by manufacturers raising wholesale prices.

[0110] Corollary 4(1)

[0111] (2) When And k>k 5 hour, when or hour,

[0112] (3) When or hour, when and hour,

[0113] in,

[0114] The results of Corollary 4 show that when retailers dominate the supply chain, the green innovation level of products, wholesale prices, and retailers’ marginal profits are all positively correlated with the manufacturer’s overconfidence level, which is similar to Corollary 2. In other words, regardless of whether the manufacturer dominates the supply chain, overconfidence can always help it invest in green innovation, thereby leading to price increases.

[0115] However, compared with Corollary 2, a different conclusion is drawn from when the manufacturer dominates the supply chain. When the level of overconfidence is low and the investment cost coefficient is large, the manufacturer's profit increases with the increase of its overconfidence level. Moderate overconfidence is conducive to the increase of green innovation level, but a large investment cost coefficient can effectively suppress the manufacturer's investment motivation and avoid overinvestment caused by overconfidence. At the same time, from the perspective of retailer profits, it is found that when retailers dominate the supply chain, if the manufacturer's overconfidence level is low, regardless of the size of the investment cost coefficient, the retailer's profit is positively correlated with the overconfidence level; if the manufacturer's overconfidence level is high, the retailer's profit situation is similar to that when the manufacturer dominates, and is affected by the investment cost coefficient. The reason is that retailers can gain benefits from dominant power, but the manufacturer's extreme overconfidence will damage some of the power benefits, resulting in different relationships between the retailer's profit and the manufacturer's overconfidence level under different power structures.

[0116] In the RN model, retailers dominate the supply chain and manufacturers are completely rational. This model can be regarded as a special form of the RO model, that is, the manufacturer does not have overconfidence. Let ε = 0 in formulas (7) and (8) and solve the pricing stage. It can be obtained that under the condition of considering innovation uncertainty, the decision functions of manufacturers and retailers are:

[0117]

[0118] By solving the innovation decision-making stage through reverse induction, the product green innovation level, wholesale price, retail price, market demand, and supply chain member profits are shown in Table 1.

[0119] The power structure in the supply chain is not only an important factor affecting investment decisions, but also one of the factors that determine the profit distribution of supply chain members. This section compares and analyzes the optimal decisions under the two power structures, reveals the differences in the optimal decisions under different power structures, and draws the following conclusions.

[0120] First, by comparing and analyzing the optimal decisions of manufacturer-led and retailer-led when the manufacturer is rational, we can draw Inference 5.

[0121] Corollary 5(1)x MN >x RN , w MN >w RN , pMN >p RN ;

[0122] (2)

[0123] Corollary 5 shows that, in the scenario where supply chain members are completely rational, the manufacturer as a leader will set a higher level of green innovation and wholesale price than when it is a follower, in order to achieve higher market demand and thus bring more profits. It is also found that when retailers act as followers, although the products have higher retail prices, their profit margins are limited by the manufacturer's wholesale price strategy, and their profits are lower than when they are supply chain leaders.

[0124] When the manufacturer is overconfident, the optimal decisions under the two power structures are compared, and Corollary 6 is obtained.

[0125] Inference 6x MO >x RO , w MO >w RO , p MO >p RO ;

[0126] Similar to the conclusion of Corollary 5, when overconfidence behavior is taken into account, the level of green innovation, wholesale price and retail price will be higher in the manufacturer-dominated scenario.

[0127] At the same time, since the profit analysis of manufacturers and retailers under two different power structures is more complicated, in order to deeply study the impact of different power structures on their profits when manufacturers are overconfident, numerical analysis will be used to conduct in-depth research. Let c = 0.5, ρ = 0.6, β = 0.5, and because 0 < ε ≤ 1 and the investment cost coefficient We can get k≥0.0375, and take k=0.34, k=0.4 and k=0.6 respectively. Perform numerical analysis and draw Figure 2 And the following conclusions were obtained.

[0128] Through Figure 2 Based on observations, it is found that there is an overconfidence level threshold. Once the manufacturer's overconfidence level is higher than this threshold, its profit when it is dominant will be lower than that when the retailer is dominant. The increase in the investment cost coefficient will raise this threshold. Considering the impact of the manufacturer's overconfidence behavior, if the manufacturer is overconfident in the innovation effect, it will invest more in innovation as a leader than when the retailer is the dominant player, thereby incurring more investment costs, which weakens its profits. On the other hand, if the investment cost coefficient increases, then only when the manufacturer adopts more extreme overconfidence behavior will its profits be damaged.

[0129] Through Figure 3 Based on observations, it is found that in most cases, retailers' profits as followers are generally lower than when they are leaders. Only in special circumstances where manufacturers show extreme overconfidence and the investment cost coefficient is low, retailers will obtain higher profits than when they are leaders. Most studies believe that power can bring more profits to supply chain members, but it is found that when manufacturers who invest in innovation are overconfident about the market demand brought about by innovation, retailers handing over supply chain dominance to manufacturers will enhance their investment confidence, and retailers will benefit more from innovation activities than when they are leaders.

[0130] The symbols involved in the present invention are shown in Table 2.

[0131] Table 2 Symbols

[0132]

[0133]

[0134] For a manufacturer with high overconfidence, the present invention cannot blindly increase green innovation investment just because of the high success rate of innovation, because once the innovation fails, the high investment cost will lead to a large loss of profit. Moderate overconfidence is not only conducive to the green innovation of products, but also conducive to the increase of profits of supply chain members. Therefore, whether manufacturers are investors in green innovation of products or leaders in the supply chain, they should avoid blind decision-making, maintain moderate but not blind confidence in the innovation effect, and make considerations for the supply chain system to achieve optimal decision-making and development.

[0135] When a manufacturer is overconfident, supply chain members should make corresponding decisions based on the degree of overconfidence. For retailers, choosing to cooperate with manufacturers with lower overconfidence levels is more likely to put themselves in a favorable position. Different power structures in the supply chain often have different impacts on the profits and overall development of supply chain members.

[0136] This invention only considers the situation of manufacturer overconfidence. Future research can further consider the impact of retailers' overconfidence on green innovation decisions under the context of innovation uncertainty. It can also regard the overconfidence of supply chain members as a kind of asymmetric information and study the pricing decisions of the supply chain under the context of information asymmetry and innovation uncertainty.

[0137] The above shows and describes the basic principles, main features and advantages of the present invention. It should be understood by those skilled in the art that the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments. The above embodiments and descriptions are only for explaining the principles of the present invention. Without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, the present invention may have various changes and improvements, which fall within the scope of the present invention. The scope of protection of the present invention is defined by the attached claims and their equivalents.

Claims

1. The supply chain decision analysis method of innovation uncertainty and manufacturer overconfidence is based on the construction of a two-level supply chain system consisting of a single overconfident manufacturer M and a single rational retailer R, which is characterized by: The market demand function is assumed to be D = 1-p + βx, where p (p = w + m) represents the retail price of the product, w represents the wholesale price, m represents the retailer's marginal profit, β represents the consumer's green preference coefficient, and x represents the green innovation level; assuming that the unit production cost of the product is c, and the green R&D investment cost is f + kx 2 / 2(f≥0, k≥0), The first item is the fixed investment cost, the second item is the variable investment cost, and k is the investment cost coefficient. The larger the k value, the higher the innovation difficulty and the higher the cost required. As the innovation process is full of risks and uncertainties, manufacturers’ investments in green innovation may not necessarily achieve the expected results; The uncertainty of innovation is taken into account and it is assumed that the probability of innovation success is ρ (0≤ρ≤1) and the probability of innovation failure is 1-ρ; If the manufacturer's green innovation is successful, its demand function is: D S =1-p+βx, If the manufacturer fails to innovate, the demand function is: D F =1-p; Therefore, the expected market demand considering innovation uncertainty is E(D) = ρD S +(1-ρ)D F ; Manufacturers are often influenced by subjective factors such as overconfidence when making innovation decisions. Manufacturers’ overconfidence is manifested as overestimating consumers’ preference for green products, that is, innovation over-promotes the increase in market demand; If the manufacturer succeeds in innovation, it will think that the market demand is: Taking into account the uncertainty of innovation, the market demand expectation can be rewritten as Where ε is the manufacturer's overconfidence level, and 0<ε≤1.

2. The supply chain decision analysis method for innovation uncertainty and manufacturer overconfidence according to claim 1 is characterized by: Two different power structures are considered, namely the manufacturer-dominated supply chain and the retailer-dominated supply chain; at the same time, two situations, namely the manufacturer-dominated and overconfident MO model, the manufacturer-dominated and rational MN model, the retailer-dominated and manufacturer overconfident RO model and the retailer-dominated and manufacturer rational RN model, are considered.

3. The supply chain decision analysis method for innovation uncertainty and manufacturer overconfidence according to claim 1 is characterized by: The decision sequence includes (1) Investment stage: The manufacturer conducts green innovation on its products and decides on its green innovation level x. After the investment is completed, both the manufacturer and the retailer have access to innovation information, i.e., whether the innovation is successful or not. (2) Pricing stage: In the scenario where the manufacturer dominates the supply chain, the manufacturer first decides the wholesale price w, and then the retailer decides the retail price p; in the scenario where the retailer dominates the supply chain, the retailer first decides its marginal profit m, and then the manufacturer decides the wholesale price w.

4. The supply chain decision analysis method for innovation uncertainty and manufacturer overconfidence according to claim 2 is characterized by: In the MO model, manufacturers dominate the supply chain and have overconfident behavior. Manufacturers make decisions based on overconfident market demand, while retailers make decisions based on actual market demand.

5. The supply chain decision analysis method for innovation uncertainty and manufacturer overconfidence according to claim 2 is characterized by: In the MN model, manufacturers dominate the supply chain but are completely rational about green innovation.

6. The supply chain decision analysis method for innovation uncertainty and manufacturer overconfidence according to claim 2, characterized in that: In the RO model, retailers dominate the supply chain and manufacturers are overconfident.

7. The supply chain decision analysis method for innovation uncertainty and manufacturer overconfidence according to claim 2 is characterized by: In the RN model, retailers dominate the supply chain and manufacturers are completely rational.