Inter-domain source address filtering method, electronic equipment and computer readable medium

By adding time-related domain verification information to the data packets, using encryption keys and verification keys to filter the source address, the problem of poor source address filtering in the existing technology is solved, and effective response to DDOS attacks is achieved , improves network security and filtering effect.

CN119030723AInactive Publication Date: 2024-11-26ZTE CORP
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202310606026.X
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2023-05-25
Publication Date
2024-11-26
Estimated Expiration
Not applicable · inactive patent

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The existing source address filtering technology is not effective in the face of DDOS attacks, especially in IPV6 network environments, and it is difficult to effectively identify and filter attacks caused by forged source addresses.

Method used

通过在数据报文中添加与时间相关的域验证信息,利用加密密钥和验证密钥进行加密解密操作,嵌入源地址过滤规则,避免直接传递验证信息,减少对网络的冲击,并提高安全性 .

Benefits of technology

It realizes effective filtering of data packets, solves the problems of playback and reflection attacks, improves network security and filtering effect, reduces network oscillation, and enhances endogenous security capabilities.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention provides an inter-domain source address filtering method, electronic equipment and a computer readable medium, and the method comprises the steps: receiving a data message, and determining a source domain corresponding to a source address of the data message and a destination domain corresponding to a destination address; determining whether first domain verification information needs to be added into the data message or not according to the port type of the received data message, the source domain and the destination domain; under the condition that it is determined that the first domain verification information needs to be added in the data message, determining an encryption key corresponding to the destination domain; encrypting current first time information by adopting an encryption key corresponding to the destination domain to obtain first domain verification information; and adding the first domain verification information to the data message and sending the data message.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The embodiments of the present application relate to the field of communication technology, and in particular to an inter-domain source address filtering method, an electronic device, and a computer-readable medium. Background Art

[0002] When the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) / Internet Protocol (IP) was first designed, it was based on the principle of simplicity and ease of use, assuming that all networked devices could be trusted and that there were no malicious users in the network, and security factors were not considered too much. Currently, most distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks on the Internet are carried out by forging source addresses, which takes advantage of the fact that IP forwarding devices in the network only check the destination address in the message for forwarding, and do not check the source address. In addition, by using forged source addresses, attackers can hide their location and point the source of the attack to others for slander. DDOS attacks have become one of the most influential attacks on Internet security, and they urgently need to be solved in an effective way to form the network's inherent security capabilities.

[0003] With the gradual large-scale application of Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPV6) technology, source address filtering technology based on IPV6 network has also been developed in a flourishing manner. However, the current source address filtering technology still has the problem of poor filtering effect. Summary of the invention

[0004] Embodiments of the present application provide an inter-domain source address filtering method, an electronic device, and a computer-readable medium.

[0005] In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides an inter-domain source address filtering method, comprising: receiving a data packet, determining a source domain corresponding to the source address of the data packet and a destination domain corresponding to the destination address; determining whether it is necessary to add first domain verification information to the data packet based on the port type for receiving the data packet, the source domain and the destination domain; in the case where it is determined that the first domain verification information needs to be added to the data packet, determining an encryption key corresponding to the destination domain; using the encryption key corresponding to the destination domain to encrypt the current first time information to obtain the first domain verification information; adding the first domain verification information to the data packet and sending it.

[0006] In the second aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a method for inter-domain source address filtering, including: receiving a data packet, determining a source domain corresponding to the source address of the data packet and a destination domain corresponding to the destination address; determining whether it is necessary to perform source address filtering on the data packet based on the port type for receiving the data packet, the source domain and the destination domain; when it is determined that it is necessary to perform source address filtering on the data packet, determining a verification key corresponding to the source domain; using the verification key corresponding to the source domain to decrypt the first domain verification information in the data packet to obtain the first time information; and performing source address filtering on the data packet based on the first time information and the current fourth time information.

[0007] In a third aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides an electronic device, comprising: at least one processor; a memory, wherein at least one program is stored in the memory, and when the at least one program is executed by the at least one processor, any one of the above-mentioned inter-domain source address filtering methods is implemented.

[0008] In a fourth aspect, an embodiment of the present application provides a computer-readable medium having a computer program stored thereon, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the computer program implements any of the above-mentioned inter-domain source address filtering methods.

[0009] The inter-domain source address filtering method provided in the embodiment of the present application embeds source address filtering rules in data packets by adding time-related domain verification information in the data packets. There is no need to directly transmit verification information, which has less impact on existing networks, higher security, better filtering effects, and the domain verification information is time-sensitive, which fundamentally solves the problems of data packet replay and reflection attacks. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0010] Figure 1 A flowchart of an inter-domain source address filtering method provided by an embodiment of the present application;

[0011] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of processing when a data message enters from an ingress port in an embodiment of the present application;

[0012] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a message for sending domain base key information in an embodiment of the present application;

[0013] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of encryption key change in an embodiment of the present application;

[0014] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of changing the base key information in an embodiment of the present application;

[0015] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of option in the embodiment of the present application;

[0016] Figure 7 A flowchart of an inter-domain source address filtering method provided by another embodiment of the present application;

[0017] Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of processing when a data message enters from an egress port in an embodiment of the present application;

[0018] Fig. 9 A schematic diagram of a network in an example of an embodiment of the present application;

[0019] Fig.10 A block diagram of the composition of an electronic device provided in accordance with another embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0020] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the technical solution of the present application, the inter-domain source address filtering method, electronic device, and computer-readable medium provided by the present application are described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0021] Example embodiments will be described more fully below with reference to the accompanying drawings, but the example embodiments may be embodied in different forms and should not be construed as limited to the embodiments set forth herein. On the contrary, the purpose of providing these embodiments is to make this application thorough and complete and to enable those skilled in the art to fully understand the scope of this application.

[0022] In the absence of conflict, the embodiments of the present application and the features therein may be combined with each other.

[0023] As used herein, the term "and / or" includes any and all combinations of at least one of the associated listed items.

[0024] The terms used herein are only used to describe specific embodiments and are not intended to limit the present application. As used herein, the singular forms "a", "an" and "the" are also intended to include the plural forms, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. It will also be understood that when the terms "comprising" and / or "made of" are used in this specification, the presence of the features, wholes, steps, operations, elements and / or components is specified, but the presence or addition of at least one other feature, whole, step, operation, element, component and / or its group is not excluded.

[0025] Unless otherwise defined, all terms (including technical and scientific terms) used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by those of ordinary skill in the art. It will also be understood that terms such as those defined in commonly used dictionaries should be interpreted as having a meaning consistent with their meaning in the context of the relevant art and this application, and will not be interpreted as having an idealized or overly formal meaning unless explicitly defined herein.

[0026] Figure 1A flowchart of an inter-domain source address filtering method provided by one embodiment of the present application.

[0027] First, refer to Figure 1 An embodiment of the present application provides an inter-domain source address filtering method, which is applied to an edge node in a domain, such as an autonomous system border router (ASBR). The method includes:

[0028] Step 100, receiving a data message, determining a source domain corresponding to a source address of the data message and a destination domain corresponding to a destination address; determining whether first domain verification information needs to be added to the data message according to a port type, source domain, and destination domain of the received data message.

[0029] In some exemplary embodiments, determining the source domain corresponding to the source address of a data packet and the destination domain corresponding to the destination address includes: searching for the domain identifier corresponding to the address segment information to which the source address belongs in a first correspondence relationship between pre-set address segment information and domain identifiers, and the found domain identifier is the domain identifier of the source domain; searching for the domain identifier corresponding to the address segment information to which the destination address belongs in the first correspondence relationship, and the found domain identifier is the domain identifier of the destination domain.

[0030] In some exemplary embodiments, the source address may be a source Internet Protocol (IP) address, and the destination address may be a destination IP address.

[0031] In some exemplary embodiments, the first corresponding relationship may be stored in a table form, as shown in Table 1.

[0032] Table 1

[0033] Address segment information Domain ID 2001:da8:e1:2:: / 64 100 2001:da8:e1:12:: / 64 200 2001:e80:c200:2d3:: / 64 300

[0034] In some exemplary embodiments, Figure 2 As shown, determining whether it is necessary to add the first domain verification information in the data message based on the port type, source domain and destination domain of the received data message includes: when the port type is an ingress port, the source domain is the current domain, and the destination domain is another domain, determining that it is necessary to add the first domain verification information in the data message.

[0035] In some exemplary embodiments, Figure 2 As shown, determining whether it is necessary to add the first domain verification information in the data message based on the port type, source domain and destination domain of the received data message includes: when the port type is an ingress port (Ingress port), and the source domain is the current domain, and the destination domain is other domains, and the destination domain is a trusted domain, determining that it is necessary to add the first domain verification information in the data message.

[0036] In some exemplary embodiments, Figure 2 As shown, determining whether it is necessary to add the first domain verification information in the data message based on the port type, source domain and destination domain of the received data message includes: when the port type is an ingress port, the source domain is the current domain, the destination domain is other domains, and the destination domain is an untrusted domain, determining that it is not necessary to add the first domain verification information in the data message.

[0037] In some exemplary embodiments, Figure 2 As shown, determining whether it is necessary to add the first domain verification information in the data message based on the port type, source domain and destination domain of the received data message includes: when the port type is an ingress port, the source domain is the current domain, and the destination domain is the current domain, determining that it is not necessary to add the first domain verification information in the data message.

[0038] In some exemplary embodiments, Figure 2 As shown, determining whether it is necessary to add the first domain verification information in the data message based on the port type, source domain and destination domain of the received data message includes: when the port type is an ingress port and the source domain is other domains, determining that it is not necessary to add the first domain verification information in the data message.

[0039] In some exemplary embodiments, the current domain refers to the domain where the edge node that executes the inter-domain source address filtering method of the embodiment of the present application is located.

[0040] In some exemplary embodiments, the other domain refers to a domain different from the domain where the edge node executing the inter-domain source address filtering method according to the embodiment of the present application is located.

[0041] In some exemplary embodiments, the edge nodes in the trust domain support the inter-domain source address filtering method of the embodiments of the present application.

[0042] In some exemplary embodiments, edge nodes in the untrusted domain do not support the inter-domain source address filtering method of the embodiment of the present application.

[0043] In some exemplary embodiments, the ingress port refers to a port connected to a non-edge node in the domain, and is generally a port connected to an Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) router in the domain.

[0044] Step 101, when it is determined that the first domain verification information needs to be added to the data message, determine the encryption key corresponding to the destination domain; use the encryption key corresponding to the destination domain to encrypt the current first time information to obtain the first domain verification information; add the first domain verification information to the data message and send it.

[0045] In some exemplary embodiments, the first time information may be time information of any time system as long as the time within the communication range is unified, for example, it may be Greenwich Mean Time information or Beijing Time information.

[0046] In some exemplary embodiments, determining the encryption key corresponding to the destination domain includes searching for the encryption key corresponding to the domain identifier of the destination domain in a preset second correspondence between domain identifiers and encryption keys.

[0047] In some exemplary embodiments, before receiving the data message, the method also includes: for each other domain, generating an encryption key corresponding to the other domain based on the domain base key information of the current domain and the domain identifier of the other domain, and saving a second correspondence between the domain identifier of the other domain and the encryption key corresponding to the other domain.

[0048] In some exemplary embodiments, the encryption key corresponding to other domains refers to the key used for encryption by the edge node of this domain when the other domain is the destination domain corresponding to the destination address of the data message and the source domain corresponding to the source address is this domain.

[0049] In some exemplary embodiments, the second corresponding relationship may be stored in a table form, as shown in Table 2.

[0050] Table 2

[0051]

[0052] In some exemplary embodiments, the first correspondence relationship and the second correspondence relationship may be implemented in the same correspondence relationship. For example, Table 1 and Table 2 may be integrated into one table, as shown in Table 3.

[0053] Table 3

[0054]

[0055] In some exemplary embodiments, before receiving the data message, the method also includes: for each other domain, sending the domain base key information of the current domain to the edge nodes in the other domains, so that the edge nodes in the other domains generate the verification key corresponding to the current domain according to the domain base key information and the domain identifier of the other domain; wherein the verification key corresponding to the current domain corresponds to the encryption key corresponding to the other domains.

[0056] In some exemplary embodiments, the verification key corresponding to this domain refers to the key used for decryption by the edge nodes of other domains when this domain is the source domain corresponding to the source address of the data message and the destination domain corresponding to the destination address is other domains.

[0057] In some exemplary embodiments, the verification key corresponding to the current domain and the encryption keys corresponding to other domains correspond to each other, which means that the verification key corresponding to the current domain and the encryption keys corresponding to other domains are the same.

[0058] In some exemplary embodiments, when sending the domain base key information of the domain to the edge nodes in other domains, the following method can be used: Figure 3 The message structure shown is sent, and the message encapsulation format is shown in Table 4.

[0059] Table 4

[0060]

[0061] In some exemplary embodiments, the domain base key information includes: a base key and effective time information; generating encryption keys corresponding to other domains based on the domain base key information of the current domain and the domain identifiers of other domains includes: generating encryption keys corresponding to other domains based on the base key, effective time information and the domain identifiers of other domains.

[0062] In some exemplary embodiments, the effective time information refers to time information of a certain time in the future.

[0063] In some exemplary embodiments, the second correspondence further includes a base key, as shown in Table 2.

[0064] In some exemplary embodiments, the base key and validity time information configured for edge nodes in the same domain are the same.

[0065] In some exemplary embodiments, the base keys configured for edge nodes in different domains may be the same or different.

[0066] In some exemplary embodiments, the effective time information of the edge nodes configured in different domains may be the same or different.

[0067] In some exemplary embodiments, the domain base key information may be uniformly configured and issued by a domain controller, or may be issued by a command.

[0068] In some exemplary embodiments, when the domain controller uniformly configures and sends down the domain base key information, it may be encrypted using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol before sending it down.

[0069] In some exemplary embodiments, after the domain controller of the current domain configures the domain base key information for the edge nodes of the current domain, the edge nodes of the current domain can send the domain base key information of the current domain to the edge nodes in other domains, so that the edge nodes in other domains can generate the verification key corresponding to the current domain based on the domain base key information and the domain identifiers of other domains.

[0070] In some exemplary embodiments, the edge node of the domain may send the domain base key information of the domain to the edge nodes in other domains through a border routing protocol.

[0071] In some exemplary embodiments, Figure 4 As shown, generating encryption keys corresponding to other domains based on the domain base key information of the domain and the domain identifiers of other domains includes: for the i-th first key change period, generating encryption keys corresponding to the i-th first key change period of other domains based on the domain base key information, the time interval information between the start time of the i-th first key change period and the start time of the 1st first key change period, and the domain identifiers of other domains; wherein i is an integer greater than or equal to 1.

[0072] Saving the second correspondence between the domain identifiers of other domains and the encryption keys corresponding to the other domains includes: saving the second correspondence between the domain identifiers of other domains, the encryption keys of the i-th first key change period corresponding to the other domains (such as the new encryption keys in Table 2), and the encryption keys of the i-1-th first key change period corresponding to the other domains (such as the old encryption keys in Table 2) in the first time period before and the second time period after the start time of the i-th first key change period; after the second time period after the start time of the i-th first key change period, updating the second correspondence corresponding to the domain identifiers of other domains to the second correspondence between the domain identifiers of other domains and the encryption keys of the i-th first key change period corresponding to the other domains.

[0073] In some exemplary embodiments, the domain base key information of each first key change period is the latest domain base key information currently updated.

[0074] For example, assuming that the first key change cycle is 10 minutes and the start time of the first first key change cycle is 10:10, then one minute before the start time of the first first key change cycle, the encryption key of the first first key change cycle corresponding to the other domain is generated according to the domain base key information and the domain identifier of the other domain, and the effective time of the encryption key of the first first key change cycle is 10:09; one minute before the start time of the second first key change cycle, the encryption key of the second first key change cycle corresponding to the other domain is generated according to the domain base key information, the time interval information between the start time of the second first key change cycle and the start time of the first first key change cycle (i.e., 10 minutes) and the domain identifier of the other domain, and the encryption key of the first first key change cycle and the encryption key of the second first key change cycle are both valid from one minute before to one minute after the start time of the second first key change cycle, and the encryption key of the first first key change cycle is valid. The encryption key becomes invalid one minute after the start time of the second first key change cycle, and the encryption key of the second first key change cycle is valid throughout the second first key change cycle; one minute before the start time of the third first key change cycle, the encryption key of the third first key change cycle corresponding to the other domain is generated according to the domain base key information, the time interval information between the start time of the third first key change cycle and the start time of the first first key change cycle (i.e., 20 minutes) and the domain identifier of the other domain. The encryption key of the second first key change cycle and the encryption key of the third first key change cycle are valid from one minute before to one minute after the start time of the third first key change cycle, the encryption key of the second first key change cycle becomes invalid one minute after the start time of the third first key change cycle, and the encryption key of the third first key change cycle is valid throughout the third first key change cycle; the same applies to other first key change cycles.

[0075] In some exemplary embodiments, when the encryption key corresponding to the domain identifier of the found destination domain includes a new encryption key and an old encryption key, encrypting the current first time information using the encryption key corresponding to the destination domain to obtain the first domain verification information includes: encrypting the current first time information using the new encryption key corresponding to the destination domain to obtain the first domain verification information; or, encrypting the current first time information using the old encryption key corresponding to the destination domain to obtain the first domain verification information.

[0076] In some exemplary embodiments, the base key information is not always constant, and the domain controller may periodically update the domain base key information with the second key change period as a period. The second key change period may be set to be relatively long, which can reduce network transmission overhead and exposure risk.

[0077] In some exemplary embodiments, Figure 5 As shown, generating encryption keys corresponding to other domains based on the domain base key information of the current domain and the domain identifiers of other domains includes: for the j-th second key change period, generating encryption keys corresponding to other domains for the j-th second key change period based on the domain base key information of the j-th second key change period of the current domain and the domain identifiers of other domains; wherein j is an integer greater than or equal to 1.

[0078] Saving the second correspondence between the domain identifiers of other domains and the encryption keys corresponding to the other domains includes: saving the second correspondence between the domain identifiers of other domains, the encryption keys of the jth second key change period corresponding to the other domains, and the encryption keys of the j-1th second key change period corresponding to the other domains in the third time period before and the fourth time period after the start time of the jth second key change period; and updating the second correspondence corresponding to the domain identifiers of other domains to the second correspondence between the domain identifiers of other domains and the encryption keys of the jth second key change period corresponding to the other domains after the fourth time period after the start time of the jth second key change period.

[0079] For example, assuming that the second key change period is 10 minutes and the start time of the first second key change period is 10:10, then one minute before the start time of the first second key change period, the encryption key of the first second key change period corresponding to the other domain is generated according to the domain base key information of the first second key change period of this domain and the domain identifier of other domains, and the effectiveness time of the encryption key of the first second key change period is 10:09; one minute before the start time of the second first key change period, the encryption key of the second second key change period corresponding to the other domain is generated according to the domain base key information of the second second key change period of this domain and the domain identifier of other domains, and the encryption key of the first second key change period and the encryption key of the second second key change period are both valid within 1 minute before and 1 minute after the start time of the second second key change period, and the first second key change period is valid from 1 minute before to 1 minute after the start time of the second second key change period. The encryption key of the changed period shall expire 1 minute after the start time of the 2nd second key change period, and the encryption key of the 2nd second key change period shall be valid throughout the entire 2nd second key change period; 1 minute before the start time of the 3rd first key change period, the encryption key of the 3rd second key change period corresponding to other domains is generated according to the domain base key information of the 3rd second key change period of this domain and the domain identifier of other domains, the encryption key of the 2nd second key change period and the encryption key of the 3rd second key change period shall be valid 1 minute before and 1 minute after the start time of the 3rd second key change period, the encryption key of the 2nd second key change period shall expire 1 minute after the start time of the 3rd second key change period, and the encryption key of the 3rd second key change period shall be valid throughout the 3rd second key change period; the same applies to other second key change periods.

[0080] In some exemplary embodiments, when the first domain verification information is added to the data message, the first domain verification information may be added to the Figure 6 The option field is then added to the data message. The encapsulation format of the option is shown in Table 5.

[0081] Table 5

[0082]

[0083] In some exemplary embodiments, a symmetric encryption algorithm may be used to encrypt the current first time information to obtain the first domain verification information.

[0084] In some exemplary embodiments, the method further includes: forwarding the data message when the port type is an ingress port, the source domain is the local domain, and the destination domain is the local domain.

[0085] In some exemplary embodiments, the method further includes: forwarding the data message when the port type is an ingress port, the source domain is the local domain, the destination domain is another domain, and the destination domain is an untrusted domain.

[0086] In some exemplary embodiments, the method further includes: when the port type is an ingress port, the source domain is another domain, and the destination domain is the current domain, discarding the data message.

[0087] In some exemplary embodiments, the method further includes: discarding the data message when the port type is an ingress port, the source domain is another domain, the destination domain is another domain, and the destination domain is a trusted domain.

[0088] In some exemplary embodiments, the method further includes: when the port type is an ingress port, the source domain is another domain, the destination domain is another domain, and the destination domain is an untrusted domain, discarding or forwarding the data message.

[0089] In some exemplary embodiments, the method further includes: forwarding the data message when the port type is a trusted port (Trust port).

[0090] In some exemplary embodiments, the trusted port refers to a port connected to an edge node of the local domain.

[0091] In some exemplary embodiments, after determining the source domain corresponding to the source address of the data message and the destination domain corresponding to the destination address, the method also includes: determining whether it is necessary to perform source address filtering on the data message based on the port type, source domain and destination domain of the received data message; when it is determined that it is necessary to perform source address filtering on the data message, determining the verification key corresponding to the source domain; using the verification key corresponding to the source domain to decrypt the second domain verification information in the data message to obtain the second time information; and performing source address filtering on the data message based on the second time information and the current third time information.

[0092] The inter-domain source address filtering method provided in the embodiment of the present application embeds source address filtering rules in data packets by adding time-related domain verification information in the data packets. There is no need to directly transmit verification information, which has less impact on existing networks, higher security, better filtering effects, and the domain verification information is time-sensitive, which fundamentally solves the problems of data packet replay and reflection attacks.

[0093] In some exemplary embodiments, keys are independently generated in each inter-domain device by combining multiple factors, thereby reducing the burden of frequent label replacement and routing transfer.

[0094] In some exemplary embodiments, within a certain time range before and after the first key change cycle, the encryption key of the previous first key change cycle and the encryption key of the current first key change cycle are both valid, thereby avoiding network shocks caused by data plane misjudgment when the encryption keys of each edge node are replaced.

[0095] In some exemplary embodiments, within a certain time range before and after the second key change period, the encryption key of the previous second key change period and the encryption key of the current second key change period are both valid, thereby avoiding network shocks caused by data plane misjudgment when the domain base key information of each edge node is replaced.

[0096] Figure 7 A flowchart of an inter-domain source address filtering method provided by another embodiment of the present application.

[0097] Second, refer to Figure 7 The present application can provide an inter-domain source address filtering method in one embodiment, including:

[0098] Step 700, receiving a data message, determining a source domain corresponding to a source address of the data message and a destination domain corresponding to a destination address; and determining whether source address filtering of the data message is required according to the port type, source domain and destination domain of the received data message.

[0099] In some exemplary embodiments, determining the source domain corresponding to the source address of a data packet and the destination domain corresponding to the destination address includes: searching for the domain identifier corresponding to the address segment information to which the source address belongs in a first correspondence relationship between pre-set address segment information and domain identifiers, and the found domain identifier is the domain identifier of the source domain; searching for the domain identifier corresponding to the address segment information to which the destination address belongs in the first correspondence relationship, and the found domain identifier is the domain identifier of the destination domain.

[0100] In some exemplary embodiments, the first corresponding relationship may be stored in a table form, as shown in Table 1.

[0101] In some exemplary embodiments, Figure 8 As shown, determining whether source address filtering is required for data packets according to the port type, source domain and destination domain of the received data packet includes: when the port type is an egress port (Egress port) and the source domain is the local domain, determining that source address filtering is not required for the data packet.

[0102] In some exemplary embodiments, Figure 8 As shown, determining whether it is necessary to perform source address filtering on the data message according to the port type, source domain and destination domain of the received data message includes: when the port type is an egress port, the source domain is other domains, and the destination domain is this domain, determining that it is necessary to perform source address filtering on the data message.

[0103] In some exemplary embodiments, Figure 8 As shown, determining whether it is necessary to perform source address filtering on the data message based on the port type, source domain and destination domain of the received data message includes: when the port type is an egress port, and the source domain is other domains, and the source domain is a trusted domain, and the destination domain is this domain, determining that it is necessary to perform source address filtering on the data message.

[0104] In some exemplary embodiments, Figure 8 As shown, determining whether it is necessary to perform source address filtering on the data message based on the port type, source domain and destination domain of the received data message includes: when the port type is an egress port, and the source domain is other domains, and the source domain is a trusted domain, and the destination domain is other domains, determining that it is not necessary to perform source address filtering on the data message.

[0105] In some exemplary embodiments, Figure 8 As shown, determining whether it is necessary to perform source address filtering on the data message according to the port type, source domain and destination domain of the received data message includes: when the port type is an egress port, the source domain is other domains, and the source domain is an untrusted domain, determining that it is not necessary to perform source address filtering on the data message.

[0106] In some exemplary embodiments, the current domain refers to the domain where the edge node that executes the inter-domain source address filtering method of the embodiment of the present application is located.

[0107] In some exemplary embodiments, the other domain refers to a domain different from the domain where the edge node executing the inter-domain source address filtering method according to the embodiment of the present application is located.

[0108] In some exemplary embodiments, the edge nodes in the trust domain support the inter-domain source address filtering method of the embodiments of the present application.

[0109] In some exemplary embodiments, edge nodes in the untrusted domain do not support the inter-domain source address filtering method of the embodiment of the present application.

[0110] In some exemplary embodiments, an egress port refers to a port connected to other domains.

[0111] Step 701, when it is determined that source address filtering of the data message is required, determine the verification key corresponding to the source domain; use the verification key corresponding to the source domain to decrypt the first domain verification information in the data message to obtain the first time information; and perform source address filtering on the data message based on the first time information and the current fourth time information.

[0112] In some exemplary embodiments, determining the verification key corresponding to the source domain includes: searching for the verification key corresponding to the domain identifier of the source domain in a preset third correspondence between the domain identifier and the verification key.

[0113] In some exemplary embodiments, before receiving the data message, the method also includes: for each other domain, generating a verification key corresponding to the other domain based on the domain base key information of the other domain and the domain identifier of the current domain, and saving a third correspondence between the domain identifier of the current domain and the verification key corresponding to the other domain.

[0114] In some exemplary embodiments, the verification key corresponding to other domains refers to the key used by the edge node of this domain for decryption when the other domains are the source domains corresponding to the source addresses of the data packets and the destination domain corresponding to the destination address is this domain.

[0115] In some exemplary embodiments, the third corresponding relationship may be stored in a table form, as shown in Table 6.

[0116] Table 6

[0117]

[0118] In some exemplary embodiments, the first correspondence relationship and the third correspondence relationship may be implemented in the same correspondence relationship. For example, Table 1 and Table 6 may be integrated into one table, as shown in Table 7.

[0119] Table 7

[0120]

[0121] In some exemplary embodiments, the second correspondence relationship and the third correspondence relationship may be implemented in the same correspondence relationship. For example, Table 2 and Table 6 may be integrated into one table, as shown in Table 8.

[0122] Table 8

[0123]

[0124] In some exemplary embodiments, before generating verification keys corresponding to other domains according to domain base key information of other domains and the domain identifier of the current domain, the method further includes: receiving domain base key information sent by edge nodes in other domains.

[0125] In some exemplary embodiments, the domain base key information includes a base key and effective time information; generating verification keys corresponding to other domains based on the domain base key information of other domains and the domain identifier of the current domain includes: generating verification keys corresponding to other domains based on the base key, effective time information and the domain identifier of the current domain.

[0126] In some exemplary embodiments, the effective time information refers to time information of a certain time in the future.

[0127] In some exemplary embodiments, the third correspondence further includes a base key, as shown in Table 6.

[0128] In some exemplary embodiments, the base key and validity time information configured for edge nodes in the same domain are the same.

[0129] In some exemplary embodiments, the base keys configured for edge nodes in different domains may be the same or different.

[0130] In some exemplary embodiments, the effective time information of the edge nodes configured in different domains may be the same or different.

[0131] In some exemplary embodiments, the domain base key information may be uniformly configured and issued by a domain controller, or may be issued by a command.

[0132] In some exemplary embodiments, Figure 4 As shown, generating verification keys corresponding to other domains based on domain base key information of other domains and domain identifier of this domain includes: for the i-th first key change period, generating verification keys corresponding to other domains for the i-th first key change period based on domain base key information, time interval information between the start time of the i-th first key change period and the start time of the 1st first key change period, and domain identifier of this domain.

[0133] Preserving the third correspondence between the domain identifier of the current domain and the verification keys corresponding to other domains includes: preserving the third correspondence between the domain identifier of the current domain, the verification keys of the i-th first key change period corresponding to other domains, and the verification keys of the i-1-th first key change period corresponding to other domains in a first time period before and a second time period after the start time of the i-th first key change period; and updating the third correspondence corresponding to the domain identifier of the current domain to the third correspondence between the domain identifier of the current domain and the verification keys of the i-th first key change period corresponding to other domains after the second time period after the start time of the i-th first key change period.

[0134] In some exemplary embodiments, the domain base key information of each first key change period is the latest domain base key information currently updated.

[0135] For example, assuming that the first key change cycle is 10 minutes and the start time of the first first key change cycle is 10:10, then one minute before the start time of the first first key change cycle, the verification key of the first first key change cycle corresponding to the other domain is generated according to the domain base key information of the other domain and the domain identifier of the current domain, and the effectiveness time of the verification key of the first first key change cycle is 10:09; one minute before the start time of the second first key change cycle, the verification key of the second first key change cycle corresponding to the other domain is generated according to the domain base key information of the other domain, the time interval information between the start time of the second first key change cycle and the start time of the first first key change cycle (i.e., 10 minutes) and the domain identifier of the current domain, and the verification key of the first first key change cycle and the verification key of the second first key change cycle are both valid from one minute before to one minute after the start time of the second first key change cycle, and the verification key of the first first key change cycle is valid. The verification key becomes invalid one minute after the start time of the second first key change period, and the verification key of the second first key change period is valid throughout the second first key change period; one minute before the start time of the third first key change period, the verification key of the third first key change period corresponding to the other domain is generated according to the domain base key information of the other domain, the time interval information between the start time of the third first key change period and the start time of the first first key change period (i.e., 20 minutes) and the domain identifier of the current domain; the verification key of the second first key change period and the verification key of the third first key change period are both valid from one minute before to one minute after the start time of the third first key change period, the verification key of the second first key change period becomes invalid one minute after the start time of the third first key change period, and the verification key of the third first key change period is valid throughout the third first key change period; the same applies to other first key change periods.

[0136] In some exemplary embodiments, when the verification key corresponding to the domain identifier of the found source domain includes a new verification key and an old verification key, using the verification key corresponding to the source domain to decrypt the first domain verification information in the data message to obtain the first time information includes: using the new verification key corresponding to the source domain to decrypt the first domain verification information in the data message to obtain the first time information; or, using the old verification key corresponding to the source domain to decrypt the first domain verification information in the data message to obtain the first time information.

[0137] In some exemplary embodiments, the base key information is not always constant, and the domain controller may periodically update the domain base key information with the second key change period as a period. The second key change period may be set to be relatively long, which can reduce network transmission overhead and exposure risk.

[0138] In some exemplary embodiments, Figure 5 As shown, generating verification keys corresponding to other domains based on the domain base key information of other domains and the domain identifier of this domain includes: for the j-th second key change period, generating verification keys corresponding to other domains for the j-th second key change period based on the domain base key information of the j-th second key change period of other domains and the domain identifier of this domain; wherein j is an integer greater than or equal to 1.

[0139] Preserving the third correspondence between the domain identifier of the current domain and the verification keys corresponding to other domains includes: preserving the third correspondence between the domain identifier of the current domain, the verification keys of the jth second key change period corresponding to other domains, and the verification keys of the j-1th second key change period corresponding to other domains within the third time period before and the fourth time period after the start time of the jth second key change period; and updating the third correspondence corresponding to the domain identifier of the current domain to the third correspondence between the domain identifiers of other domains and the verification keys of the jth second key change period corresponding to other domains after the fourth time period after the start time of the jth second key change period.

[0140] For example, assuming that the second key change period is 10 minutes and the start time of the first second key change period is 10:10, then one minute before the start time of the first second key change period, the verification key of the first second key change period corresponding to the other domain is generated according to the domain base key information of the first second key change period of the other domain and the domain identifier of the other domain, and the effectiveness time of the verification key of the first second key change period is 10:09; one minute before the start time of the second first key change period, the verification key of the second second key change period corresponding to the other domain is generated according to the domain base key information of the second second key change period of the other domain and the domain identifier of this domain, and the verification key of the first second key change period and the verification key of the second second key change period are both valid within 1 minute before and 1 minute after the start time of the second second key change period, and the first second key The verification key of the change period shall expire 1 minute after the start time of the 2nd second key change period, and the verification key of the 2nd second key change period shall be valid throughout the 2nd second key change period; 1 minute before the start time of the 3rd first key change period, the verification key of the 3rd second key change period corresponding to the other domain is generated according to the domain base key information of the 3rd second key change period of the other domain and the domain identifier of this domain, the verification key of the 2nd second key change period and the verification key of the 3rd second key change period shall be valid 1 minute before and 1 minute after the start time of the 3rd second key change period, the verification key of the 2nd second key change period shall expire 1 minute after the start time of the 3rd second key change period, and the verification key of the 3rd second key change period shall be valid throughout the 3rd second key change period; the same applies to other second key change periods.

[0141] In some exemplary embodiments, source address filtering of data packets based on first time information and current fourth time information includes: receiving a data packet, stripping first domain verification information from the data packet, and forwarding the data packet stripped of the first domain verification information when the time interval between the time corresponding to the fourth time information and the time corresponding to the first time information is less than a preset threshold.

[0142] In some exemplary embodiments, performing source address filtering on data packets according to the first time information and the current fourth time information includes discarding the data packet when the time interval between the time corresponding to the fourth time information and the time corresponding to the first time information is greater than or equal to a preset threshold.

[0143] In some exemplary embodiments, Figure 8 As shown, the method further includes: when the port type is an egress port and the source domain is the local domain, discarding the data message.

[0144] In some exemplary embodiments, Figure 8 As shown, the method further includes: forwarding the data message when the port type is an egress port, the source domain is another domain, the source domain is a trusted domain, and the destination domain is another domain.

[0145] In some exemplary embodiments, Figure 8 As shown, the method further includes: forwarding the data message when the port type is an egress port, the source domain is another domain, and the source domain is an untrusted domain.

[0146] The inter-domain source address filtering method provided in the embodiment of the present application embeds source address filtering rules in data packets by adding time-related domain verification information in the data packets. There is no need to directly transmit verification information, which has less impact on existing networks, higher security, better filtering effects, and the domain verification information is time-sensitive, which fundamentally solves the problems of data packet replay and reflection attacks.

[0147] In some exemplary embodiments, keys are independently generated in each inter-domain device by combining multiple factors, thereby reducing the burden of frequent label replacement and routing transfer.

[0148] In some exemplary embodiments, within a certain time range before and after the first key change period, the verification key of the previous first key change period and the verification key of the current first key change period are both valid, thereby avoiding network shocks caused by data plane misjudgment when the verification keys of each edge node are replaced.

[0149] In some exemplary embodiments, within a certain time range before and after the second key change period, the verification key of the previous second key change period and the verification key of the current second key change period are both valid, thereby avoiding network shocks caused by data plane misjudgment when the domain base key information of each edge node is replaced.

[0150] In order to more clearly illustrate the specific implementation process of the inter-domain source address filtering method of the embodiment of the present application, an example is listed below for illustration. The listed example is not used to limit the protection scope of the embodiment of the present application.

[0151] Example

[0152] like Fig. 9 As shown, it is a typical inter-domain source address filtering hybrid networking diagram, in which AS-100, AS-200 and AS-300 are all trusted domains, and the ASBRs in AS-100, AS-200 and AS-300 support the time vector-based source address filtering method of the embodiment of the present application, and AS-500 is a non-trusted domain and does not support the time vector-based source address filtering method of the embodiment of the present application.

[0153] Control Surface:

[0154] The following takes the base key information transmission within the AS-100 domain as an example to describe the transmission of the control plane base key information and the generation process of the verification key of this solution.

[0155] The steps for transferring base key information are as follows:

[0156] 1) The domain AS-100 has ASBR-1 and ASBR-2, which are configured with the same 16-byte base key and validity time information, and the same second key change period.

[0157] 2) The ASBRs in the trust domain exchange key information with each other through the inter-domain routing protocol (EBGP, External Border Gateway Protocol). After the ASBR-1 node in AS-100 establishes a neighbor relationship with the ASBR-6 node in the AS-200 domain, ASBR-1 uses the following method to communicate: Figure 3 The type length value (TLV) message format shown is used to send the base key information to the ASBR-6. Since the base key information changes infrequently, its transmission needs to be encrypted using the keychain neighbor authentication key to ensure the confidentiality of the base key information transmission.

[0158] 3) After receiving the base key information, ASBR-6 forms the verification key to be used based on the base key, the effective time information and the domain identifier AS-200 of the domain through a multi-factor combination algorithm (which can be a simple bit XOR); and obtains all the network segment information of the opposite end AS-100 from the routing protocol interaction, and finally forms a cross-domain data reception key table <as shown in Table 7>.

[0159] 4) ASBR-1 obtains the same encryption key through the base key, effective time information and the domain identifier of the destination domain through the same algorithm, forming a cross-domain data transmission key table (as shown in Table 2).

[0160] The steps to change the base key information are as follows:

[0161] 1) ASBR-1 and ASBR-2 in domain AS-100 are configured with the same 16-byte base key and a future effective time.

[0162] 2) ASBR1 and ASBR-6 in the trust domain transmit base key information to each other through EBGP using TLV message format.

[0163] 3) When the time corresponding to the effective time information arrives, the sender ASBR-1 generates a new encryption key based on the new base key, the effective time information and the domain identifier AS-200 of ASBR-6, and replaces the old encryption key to encrypt the first time to obtain the first domain verification information.

[0164] 4) The receiving party ASBR-6 generates the verification key that needs to be changed in the future in advance based on the new base key, the effective time information and its own domain identifier AS-200. In a certain time range before and after the time corresponding to the effective time information, the old verification key generated by the old base key and the new verification key generated by the new base key will both be valid. In this way, the replacement process of the base key can be guaranteed, and the forwarding plane source address verification can be smoothly transitioned, and there will be no verification failure due to slight time difference.

[0165] For the verification key, when the first key change cycle arrives, it is also necessary to change it regularly. The steps for changing the verification key regularly are as follows:

[0166] 1) When the first key change cycle arrives, the sender ASBR-1 generates a new encryption key based on the base key, the effective time information and the domain identifier AS-200 of ASBR-6, and replaces the old encryption key to guide the first domain verification information encapsulation.

[0167] 2) The receiving party ASBR-6 generates the verification key that needs to be changed in the future in advance based on the base key, the effective time information and its own domain identifier AS-200. Since the base key obtained between ASBRs has the same effective time and change cycle, the new verification key obtained will also be the same. Within a time range of the old and new alternation, the old verification key generated by the old base key and the new verification key generated by the new base key are both valid to ensure that the forwarding plane source address verification can be smoothly transitioned. This mechanism is consistent with the change of the base key.

[0168] Forwarding side:

[0169] The following describes the overall process of source address filtering by taking the data message in the AS-100 domain that needs to be sent to the domain AS-200 as an example.

[0170] ASBR-1 in AS-100 receives a data packet sent to AS-200 from the R-1 router in the local domain through the Ingress port. The source address of the data packet belongs to the local domain AS-100, and the destination address belongs to another domain, and it belongs to the trusted domain. The first domain verification information needs to be added, as follows:

[0171] 1) ASBR-1 receives and determines that the data message to which the first domain authentication information needs to be added, obtains the destination IP address of the data message, and queries that the domain identifier of the destination domain corresponding to the destination IP address is AS-200.

[0172] 2) ASBR-1 queries Table 2 according to the domain identifier AS-200 of the destination domain to obtain the corresponding encryption key.

[0173] 3) ASBR-1 obtains the current first Greenwich Mean Time information, and uses the encryption key to encrypt the current first Greenwich Mean Time information using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 128 algorithm to obtain 16-byte first domain verification information.

[0174] 4)ASBR-1 based on Figure 6 The option field structure described in fills the first domain verification information, and fills the option field into the destination option header (Destination Option Header) of the sixth version of IP (IPv6, IP Version 6) (due to the rich extensibility of IPv6 option, the use of IPv6 option will not conflict with any existing mechanism), and queries the routing port according to the destination IP address, and sends a data message to the Egress port IF-4.

[0175] This solution performs end-to-end source address verification. The processing steps for the intermediate node of inter-domain forwarding are as follows:

[0176] 1) ASBR-3 of AS-300 receives a data packet. It determines that the packet is not sent to the local domain based on the destination IP address. Therefore, it does not filter the source address or strip the Option field. It directly forwards the packet based on the destination IP address and forwards it to ASBR-4 of the local domain through the Trust interface IF-2 of ASBR-3.

[0177] 2) ASBR-4 of AS-300 receives the data packet. Since it is a data packet from the Trust interface, it does not filter the source address and directly forwards it to ASBR-6 of AS200 through the Egress port IF-3 according to the destination IP address.

[0178] After the data message reaches the edge node ASBR-6 of the destination domain, if the ASBR-6 node determines that the received source domain is another domain and the trusted domain AS-100, and the destination domain is the local domain, the first domain verification information must be verified. The specific steps are described as follows:

[0179] 1) After receiving a data packet from another trusted domain, ASBR-6 obtains the domain identifier AS-100 of the source domain according to the source IP address.

[0180] 2) ASBR-6 queries Table 6 according to the domain identifier AS-100 to obtain the authentication key of AS-100.

[0181] 3) ASBR-6 obtains the first domain authentication information in the Option field of the data message, and uses the authentication key to decrypt the first domain authentication information using the AES 128 algorithm. If the decryption fails, the data message is discarded.

[0182] 4) If the decryption is successful, ASBR-6 obtains the current second Greenwich Mean Time information and determines whether the time interval between the decrypted time information and the current second Greenwich Mean Time information is greater than a preset threshold: if it is greater than the preset threshold, the data message is discarded; if it is less than the preset threshold, the verification is passed.

[0183] 5) For the data packets that pass the verification, ASBR-6 needs to strip the Option field and forward it to the intra-domain routing node R-2 according to the destination IP address.

[0184] In general, the control plane can stably form a unified verification key that changes over time based on <source AS, destination AS> between each ASBR through base key transmission and time-based verification key change. The forwarding plane can ensure that data traffic interactions within the trust domain are all trusted through the process of adding the above-mentioned first domain verification information to the data message sent by the ASBR in the sending domain and verifying the first domain verification information in the data message received by the ASBR in the receiving domain. The entire system verifies that this solution can solve various security issues caused by forged addresses at the network level and enhance the inherent security capabilities of the network.

[0185] Thirdly, refer to Fig.10 Another embodiment of the present application provides an electronic device, including: at least one processor 1001; a memory 1002, wherein at least one program is stored in the memory 1002, and when the at least one program is executed by at least one processor 501, any one of the above-mentioned inter-domain source address filtering methods is implemented.

[0186] In some exemplary embodiments, the electronic device further includes: one or more I / O interfaces 1003 connected between the processor 1001 and the memory 1002 , and configured to implement information interaction between the processor 1001 and the memory 1002 .

[0187] Among them, the processor 1001 is a device with data processing capabilities, including but not limited to a central processing unit (CPU); the memory 1002 is a device with data storage capabilities, including but not limited to random access memory (RAM, more specifically SDRAM, DDR, etc.), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory (FLASH); the I / O interface (read-write interface) 1003 is connected between the processor 1001 and the memory 1002, and can realize information interaction between the processor 1001 and the memory 1002, including but not limited to a data bus (Bus), etc.

[0188] In some embodiments, the processor 1001 , the memory 1002 , and the I / O interface 1003 are connected to each other via a bus 1004 , and further connected to other components of the computing device.

[0189] In a fourth aspect, another embodiment of the present application provides a computer-readable medium having a computer program stored thereon, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, any one of the above-mentioned inter-domain source address filtering methods is implemented.

[0190] It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that all or some of the steps, systems, and functional modules / units in the methods disclosed above may be implemented as software, firmware, hardware, and appropriate combinations thereof. In hardware implementations, the division between the functional modules / units mentioned in the above description does not necessarily correspond to the division of physical components; for example, a physical component may have multiple functions, or a function or step may be performed by several physical components in cooperation. Some or all physical components may be implemented as software executed by a processor, such as a central processing unit, a digital signal processor, or a microprocessor, or implemented as hardware, or implemented as an integrated circuit, such as an application-specific integrated circuit. Such software may be distributed on a computer-readable medium, which may include a computer storage medium (or non-transitory medium) and a communication medium (or temporary medium). As known to those skilled in the art, the term computer storage medium includes volatile and non-volatile, removable and non-removable media implemented in any method or technology for storing information (such as computer-readable instructions, data structures, program modules, or other data). Computer storage media include, but are not limited to, RAM, ROM, EEPROM, flash memory or other memory technology, CD-ROM, digital versatile disks (DVD) or other optical disk storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tapes, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage, or any other medium that can be used to store the desired information and can be accessed by a computer. In addition, it is well known to those skilled in the art that communication media typically contain computer-readable instructions, data structures, program modules, or other data in a modulated data signal such as a carrier wave or other transport mechanism, and may include any information delivery media.

[0191] Example embodiments have been disclosed herein, and although specific terms are employed, they are used and should be interpreted only in a general illustrative sense and not for limiting purposes. In some instances, it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that, unless otherwise expressly noted, features, characteristics, and / or elements described in conjunction with a particular embodiment may be used alone or in combination with features, characteristics, and / or elements described in conjunction with other embodiments. Therefore, those skilled in the art will appreciate that various changes in form and detail may be made without departing from the scope of the present application as set forth in the appended claims.

Claims

1. A method for filtering source addresses between domains, comprising: Receive a data message, and determine a source domain corresponding to a source address and a destination domain corresponding to a destination address of the data message; Determining whether it is necessary to add first domain verification information to the data message according to the port type for receiving the data message, the source domain, and the destination domain; In the case where it is determined that the first domain verification information needs to be added to the data message, determining an encryption key corresponding to the destination domain; encrypting the current first time information using the encryption key corresponding to the destination domain to obtain the first domain verification information; The first domain verification information is added to the data message and sent.

2. The method for filtering source addresses between domains according to claim 1, wherein: The determining of the source domain corresponding to the source address of the data message and the destination domain corresponding to the destination address includes: In the first correspondence between the pre-set address network segment information and the domain identifier, searching for the domain identifier corresponding to the address network segment information to which the source address belongs, the found domain identifier being the domain identifier of the source domain; The domain identifier corresponding to the address network segment information to which the destination address belongs is searched in the first corresponding relationship, and the found domain identifier is the domain identifier of the destination domain.

3. The method for filtering source addresses between domains according to claim 1, wherein: The determining whether it is necessary to add the first domain verification information to the data message according to the port type for receiving the data message, the source domain, and the destination domain comprises at least one of the following: When the port type is an ingress port, the source domain is the current domain, and the destination domain is another domain, determining that the first domain verification information needs to be added to the data message; When the port type is an ingress port, the source domain is the local domain, the destination domain is another domain, and the destination domain is a trusted domain, determining that the first domain verification information needs to be added to the data message; When the port type is an ingress port, the source domain is the local domain, the destination domain is another domain, and the destination domain is an untrusted domain, determining that the first domain verification information does not need to be added to the data message; When the port type is an ingress port, the source domain is the local domain, and the destination domain is the local domain, determining that the first domain verification information does not need to be added to the data message; When the port type is an ingress port and the source domain is another domain, it is determined that there is no need to add the first domain verification information to the data message.

4. The method for filtering source addresses between domains according to claim 1, wherein: Determining the encryption key corresponding to the destination domain includes: In the preset second correspondence between the domain identifier and the encryption key, the encryption key corresponding to the domain identifier of the destination domain is searched.

5. The method for filtering source addresses between domains according to claim 4, before receiving the data message, the method further comprises: For each other domain, an encryption key corresponding to the other domain is generated according to the domain base key information of the domain and the domain identifier of the other domain, and a second corresponding relationship between the domain identifier of the other domain and the encryption key corresponding to the other domain is saved.

6. The method for filtering source addresses between domains according to claim 5, before receiving the data message, the method further comprises: For each of the other domains, the domain base key information of the current domain is sent to the edge nodes in the other domains, so that the edge nodes in the other domains generate the verification key corresponding to the current domain according to the domain base key information and the domain identifier of the other domain; wherein the verification key corresponding to the current domain corresponds to the encryption key corresponding to the other domain.

7. The method for filtering source addresses between domains according to claim 5, wherein: The domain base key information includes: base key and effective time information; The step of generating the encryption key corresponding to the other domain according to the domain base key information of the current domain and the domain identifier of the other domain comprises: An encryption key corresponding to the other domain is generated according to the base key, the effective time information and the domain identifier of the other domain.

8. The method for filtering source addresses between domains according to claim 5, wherein: The step of generating the encryption key corresponding to the other domain according to the domain base key information of the current domain and the domain identifier of the other domain comprises: For the i-th first key change period, generating an encryption key for the i-th first key change period corresponding to the other domain according to the domain base key information, the time interval information between the start time of the i-th first key change period and the start time of the first first key change period, and the domain identifier of the other domain; wherein i is an integer greater than or equal to 1; The second correspondence between the domain identifier of the other domain and the encryption key corresponding to the other domain is stored, including: In a first time period before and a second time period after the start time of the i-th first key change period, save a second correspondence between the domain identifier of the other domain, the encryption key of the i-th first key change period corresponding to the other domain, and the encryption key of the i-1-th first key change period corresponding to the other domain; After a second time period after the start time of the i-th first key change cycle, the second corresponding relationship corresponding to the domain identifier of the other domain is updated to the second corresponding relationship between the domain identifier of the other domain and the encryption key of the i-th first key change cycle corresponding to the other domain.

9. The method for filtering source addresses between domains according to claim 5, wherein: The step of generating the encryption key corresponding to the other domain according to the domain base key information of the current domain and the domain identifier of the other domain comprises: For the j-th second key change period, generating an encryption key for the j-th second key change period corresponding to the other domain according to the domain base key information of the j-th second key change period of the current domain and the domain identifier of the other domain; wherein j is an integer greater than or equal to 1; The second correspondence between the domain identifier of the other domain and the encryption key corresponding to the other domain is stored, including: In a third time period before and a fourth time period after the start time of the j-th second key change period, save a second correspondence between the domain identifier of the other domain, the encryption key of the j-th second key change period corresponding to the other domain, and the encryption key of the j-1-th second key change period corresponding to the other domain; After the fourth time period after the start time of the j-th second key change period, the second corresponding relationship corresponding to the domain identifier of the other domain is updated to the second corresponding relationship between the domain identifier of the other domain and the encryption key of the j-th second key change period corresponding to the other domain.

10. The method for filtering source addresses between domains according to any one of claims 1 to 9, after determining the source domain corresponding to the source address of the data message and the destination domain corresponding to the destination address, the method further comprises: Determining whether it is necessary to perform source address filtering on the data message according to the port type for receiving the data message, the source domain, and the destination domain; In the case where it is determined that source address filtering needs to be performed on the data message, determining a verification key corresponding to the source domain; Decrypting the second domain verification information in the data message using the verification key corresponding to the source domain to obtain the second time information; The data message is subjected to source address filtering according to the second time information and the current third time information.

11. A method for filtering source addresses between domains, comprising: Receive a data message, and determine a source domain corresponding to a source address and a destination domain corresponding to a destination address of the data message; Determining whether it is necessary to perform source address filtering on the data message according to the port type for receiving the data message, the source domain, and the destination domain; When it is determined that source address filtering is required for the data message, determine the verification key corresponding to the source domain; use the verification key corresponding to the source domain to decrypt the first domain verification information in the data message to obtain the first time information; and perform source address filtering on the data message based on the first time information and the current fourth time information.

12. The method for filtering source addresses between domains according to claim 11, wherein: The determining of the source domain corresponding to the source address of the data message and the destination domain corresponding to the destination address includes: In the first correspondence between the pre-set address network segment information and the domain identifier, searching for the domain identifier corresponding to the address network segment information to which the source address belongs, the found domain identifier being the domain identifier of the source domain; The domain identifier corresponding to the address network segment information to which the destination address belongs is searched in the first corresponding relationship, and the found domain identifier is the domain identifier of the destination domain.

13. The method for filtering source addresses between domains according to claim 11, wherein: The determining whether to perform source address filtering on the data message according to the port type for receiving the data message, the source domain, and the destination domain includes at least one of the following: When the port type is an egress port and the source domain is the local domain, determining that source address filtering is not required for the data message; When the port type is an egress port, the source domain is another domain, and the destination domain is the current domain, determining that source address filtering needs to be performed on the data message; When the port type is an egress port, the source domain is another domain, the source domain is a trusted domain, and the destination domain is the local domain, determining that source address filtering needs to be performed on the data message; When the port type is an egress port, the source domain is another domain, the source domain is a trusted domain, and the destination domain is another domain, determining that source address filtering is not required for the data message; When the port type is an egress port, the source domain is another domain, and the source domain is an untrusted domain, it is determined that source address filtering does not need to be performed on the data message.

14. The method for filtering source addresses between domains according to claim 11, wherein: The determining the verification key corresponding to the source domain includes: In the preset third correspondence between the domain identifier and the verification key, the verification key corresponding to the domain identifier of the source domain is searched.

15. The method for filtering source addresses between domains according to claim 14, before receiving the data message, the method further comprises: For each other domain, a verification key corresponding to the other domain is generated according to the domain base key information of the other domain and the domain identifier of the current domain, and a third corresponding relationship between the domain identifier of the current domain and the verification key corresponding to the other domain is saved.

16. The method for filtering source addresses between domains according to claim 15, before generating the verification key corresponding to the other domain according to the domain base key information of the other domain and the domain identifier of the current domain, the method further comprises: Receive domain base key information sent by the edge node in the other domain.

17. The method for filtering source addresses between domains according to claim 15, wherein: The domain base key information includes a base key and effective time information; The step of generating the verification key corresponding to the other domain according to the domain base key information of the other domain and the domain identifier of the current domain comprises: Generate a verification key corresponding to the other domain according to the base key, the effective time information and the domain identifier of the current domain.

18. The method for filtering source addresses between domains according to claim 15, wherein: The step of generating the verification key corresponding to the other domain according to the domain base key information of the other domain and the domain identifier of the current domain comprises: For the i-th first key change period, generating the verification key of the i-th first key change period corresponding to the other domain according to the domain base key information, the time interval information between the start time of the i-th first key change period and the start time of the first first key change period, and the domain identifier of the local domain; The third correspondence between the domain identifier of the current domain and the verification key corresponding to the other domains includes: In a first time period before and a second time period after the start time of the i-th first key change period, save a third correspondence between the domain identifier of the local domain, the verification key of the i-th first key change period corresponding to the other domain, and the verification key of the i-1-th first key change period corresponding to the other domain; After a second time period after the start time of the i-th first key change cycle, the third corresponding relationship corresponding to the domain identifier of the current domain is updated to the third corresponding relationship between the domain identifier of the current domain and the verification key of the i-th first key change cycle corresponding to the other domains.

19. The method for filtering source addresses between domains according to claim 15, wherein: The step of generating the verification key corresponding to the other domain according to the domain base key information of the other domain and the domain identifier of the current domain comprises: For the j-th second key change period, generating a verification key for the j-th second key change period corresponding to the other domain according to the domain base key information of the j-th second key change period of the other domain and the domain identifier of the current domain; wherein j is an integer greater than or equal to 1; The third correspondence between the domain identifier of the current domain and the verification key corresponding to the other domains includes: In a third time period before and a fourth time period after the start time of the j-th second key change period, save a third correspondence between the domain identifier of the local domain, the verification key of the j-th second key change period corresponding to the other domain, and the verification key of the j-1-th second key change period corresponding to the other domain; After the fourth time period after the start time of the j-th second key change period, the third corresponding relationship corresponding to the domain identifier of the current domain is updated to the third corresponding relationship between the domain identifier of the other domain and the verification key of the j-th second key change period corresponding to the other domain.

20. The method for filtering source addresses between domains according to any one of claims 11 to 19, wherein: The performing source address filtering on the data message according to the first time information and the current fourth time information comprises at least one of the following: When the time interval between the time corresponding to the fourth time information and the time corresponding to the first time information is less than a preset threshold, receiving the data message, stripping the first domain verification information in the data message, and forwarding the data message stripped of the first domain verification information; When the time interval between the time corresponding to the fourth time information and the time corresponding to the first time information is greater than or equal to the preset threshold, the data packet is discarded.

21. An electronic device, comprising: at least one processor; A memory, wherein at least one program is stored in the memory, and when the at least one program is executed by the at least one processor, the inter-domain source address filtering method according to any one of claims 1 to 20 is implemented.

22. A computer-readable medium having a computer program stored thereon, wherein the computer program, when executed by a processor, implements the inter-domain source address filtering method according to any one of claims 1 to 20.