Lightweight certificateless signcryption method based on block chain in Internet of Vehicles

By adopting a lightweight, certificate-free encryption method based on blockchain in the Internet of Vehicles environment, using pseudonyms and key pairs to sign secrets, and combining offline computing and aggregation encryption algorithms, the efficiency of encryption secrets in environments with limited resources is solved. and security issues, achieving efficient data encryption and privacy protection.

CN119095031APending Publication Date: 2024-12-06CHONGQING UNIV OF POSTS & TELECOMM
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411153415.2
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-08-21
Publication Date
2024-12-06

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The prior art is difficult to achieve efficient secret signing operations under limited resources in the Internet of Vehicles environment, resulting in high computing and communication overhead and difficulty in ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of data.

Method used

Adopt a lightweight certificate-free encryption method based on blockchain, generate pseudonyms and key pairs through the key generation center, and use the blockchain network to encrypt and decrypt the signed data, combining offline computing and aggregation of the signed encryption algorithm to reduce Compute complexity and storage pressure.

Benefits of technology

It realizes the privacy protection of vehicle identity, improves the security and efficiency of communication data, reduces the storage pressure of equipment, and significantly reduces computing and communication overhead.

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Abstract

The invention belongs to the field of digital signcryption in the Internet of Vehicles, and particularly relates to a blockchain-based lightweight certificateless signcryption method in the Internet of Vehicles, which comprises the following steps: constructing an Internet of Vehicles system comprising a KGC, a roadside unit, a blockchain network, a DC and a vehicle, and publishing initialization system parameters of the Internet of Vehicles system; the vehicle applies for a kana identity from the KGC in advance to complete vehicle registration, and the KGC generates a key for the vehicle and issues the key; obtaining a vehicle signcryption parameter through calculation, and obtaining a secret key from a block chain by using a pseudonym applied by a vehicle to encrypt data to obtain a signcryption text; and carrying out decryption operation by using the received signcryption ciphertext, and verifying the validity of the signature. According to the method, the data security in the communication process of the Internet of Vehicles system can be ensured, the calculation overhead and the communication overhead are reduced, the efficient communication requirement is met, and the security of Internet of Vehicles communication is improved.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of digital signcryption in the Internet of Vehicles, and specifically relates to a lightweight certificateless signcryption method based on blockchain in the Internet of Vehicles. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of Internet of Vehicles technology, more and more in-vehicle services such as assisted driving, navigation suggestions, and in-vehicle entertainment systems have emerged, making the entire transportation system more efficient and convenient. However, the openness and complexity of Internet of Vehicles communications have also caused serious security issues. In this environment, communication data is extremely vulnerable to malicious attacks such as eavesdropping, tampering, and forgery. Considering that these data often contain key content such as sensitive information of car owners, vehicle control instructions, real-time location, and sensor data, once their security and privacy are compromised, the consequences will be disastrous.

[0003] In order to effectively deal with the severe challenges of data integrity and confidentiality in IoV communications, digital signcryption technology has been introduced as an important security measure. However, traditional signcryption schemes have many difficulties in IoV environments. Certificate-based schemes are difficult to apply in practice due to the complexity of certificate management; identity-based signcryption schemes simplify certificate management but introduce the problem of key escrow; and certificateless signcryption schemes solve the drawbacks of the first two to a certain extent, but due to their large computational and storage overheads, they are difficult to be widely used in IoV environments with limited resources.

[0004] In summary, none of the existing technical solutions considers how to streamline cryptographic operations in a resource-limited Internet of Vehicles environment while pre-processing the signcryption content and adopting an aggregate signcryption algorithm, so as to reduce the system's computing and communication overhead and improve the security of communication, thereby ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of communication data, and enabling the Internet of Vehicles system to communicate more securely and efficiently. Summary of the invention

[0005] In order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention proposes a lightweight certificateless signcryption method based on blockchain in the Internet of Vehicles, comprising:

[0006] S1. Build a vehicle networking system, which includes: a key generation center KGC, a roadside unit RSU, a blockchain network, a data center DC and a vehicle. The vehicle networking system generates and publishes its initialization system parameters through KGC;

[0007] S2. The vehicle applies for a pseudonym identity from KGC in advance. KGC generates a pseudonym and a pseudonym validity period and stores them in the KGC database in the form of a pseudonym warehouse. The vehicle obtains a valid pseudonym to complete vehicle registration.

[0008] S3. The vehicle sends a pseudonym and key generation request to KGC. KGC generates a key pair consisting of a public key and a private key for the vehicle and issues it, and saves the vehicle's public key in the blockchain network maintained by RSU.

[0009] S4. Calculate the signcrypted data using the preset algorithm and parameters, use the pseudonym applied for by the vehicle to obtain the key from the blockchain network to encrypt the data, obtain the signcrypted ciphertext, and decrypt the received signcrypted ciphertext to verify the validity of the signature.

[0010] Beneficial effects of the present invention:

[0011] The present invention realizes the privacy protection of vehicle identity through an anonymous communication mechanism based on pseudonym, and encrypts data during the communication process to ensure the privacy and security of communication data. By streamlining cryptographic operations, the computational complexity is reduced. Through the joint design of offline and online computing, the traditional assembly signature work is improved, the communication efficiency is improved, and the aggregated signcryption algorithm designed by the present invention is used to reduce the device storage pressure in a many-to-one communication scenario. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0012] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of a system model of a lightweight certificateless signcryption method based on blockchain in a connected vehicle network of the present invention;

[0013] Figure 2 This is a flowchart of a lightweight certificateless signcryption method based on blockchain in the Internet of Vehicles of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0014] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0015] The present invention provides an embodiment involving a lightweight certificateless signcryption method for the Internet of Vehicles in a resource-limited environment. The Internet of Vehicles system constructed in this method involves three types of entities, namely a key generation center KGC (Key Generation Center), a road side unit RSU (Road Side Unit), a blockchain network, a data center DC (Datacenter) and a vehicle.

[0016] In the embodiment provided by the present invention, considering the communication data security and computing overhead in the context of the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) system, a signcryption scheme system for the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) environment is constructed, such as Figure 1 As shown, where:

[0017] As a public trust entity, KGC is responsible for generating system parameters, vehicle registration, generating some public and private keys for vehicles, and uploading and updating the public keys of vehicles in the blockchain.

[0018] The roadside unit RSU acts as an intermediary between the vehicle and the DC. It is located at the edge of the vehicle road and is responsible for receiving or forwarding the aggregated signature information of the vehicle.

[0019] The blockchain network is maintained by RSUs. Each RSU stores a copy of the ledger information, participates in the consensus process of the blockchain, and is responsible for providing public key query services to users.

[0020] The data center DC is responsible for receiving and analyzing the data transmitted by the RSU to optimize traffic information and improve traffic efficiency.

[0021] The vehicle is the main part of the Internet of Vehicles, equipped with wireless communication modules, various sensors and OBUs capable of performing cryptographic operations.

[0022] like Figure 2 As shown, a lightweight certificateless signcryption method based on blockchain in the Internet of Vehicles specifically includes the following steps:

[0023] S1. Build a vehicle networking system, which includes a key generation center KGC, a roadside unit RSU, a blockchain network, a data center DC and a vehicle, and generate and publish its initialization system parameters through the public trust entity KGC; S2. The vehicle applies for a pseudonym identity from KGC in advance, KGC generates a pseudonym and a pseudonym validity period and stores them in the KGC database in the form of a pseudonym warehouse, and the vehicle obtains a valid pseudonym to complete vehicle registration;

[0024] S3. The vehicle sends a pseudonym and key generation request to KGC. KGC generates a key pair consisting of a public key and a private key for the vehicle and issues it, and saves the vehicle's public key in the blockchain network maintained by RSU.

[0025] S4. Calculate the signcrypted data using the preset algorithm and parameters, use the pseudonym applied for by the vehicle to obtain the key from the blockchain network to encrypt the data, obtain the signcrypted ciphertext, and decrypt the received signcrypted ciphertext to verify the validity of the signature.

[0026] Preferably, in step S1, the initialization system parameters of the Internet of Vehicles system specifically include:

[0027] The key generation center KGC selects a security factor k to generate the public parameters required by the system, which mainly include the cyclic group G with a large prime number q and its generator P, and five anti-collision hash functions.

[0028] H5:{0,1} * →G; KGC randomly selects the system master key The system public key is P pub = sP, the final public system parameters Params = {G, P, q, P pub ,H1,H2,H3,H4,H5}, where l T is the length of the timestamp, l m is the length of the message to be sent, l ID is the length of the user's real identity information, is the multiplicative cyclic group of q, and P is the generator of G.

[0029] The Internet of Vehicles system publishes the above parameters to other legal entities participating in the signcryption process of the Internet of Vehicles system.

[0030] Preferably, step S2 specifically includes:

[0031] Specifically, the vehicle in the Internet of Vehicles system applies for multiple pseudonymous identities from KGC and stores them in the KGC database in the form of a pseudonym warehouse. The vehicle obtains a valid pseudonym and completes the registration. The specific process is as follows:

[0032] S201. Real identity is ID i Vehicle V i Randomly select num p Parameters Where 1≤j≤num p , calculate its corresponding The generated Sent to KGC, where V i The first pseudonymous identification set of G, vehicles use pseudonyms instead of real identities during the interaction process of IoV, and P is a generator of G.

[0033] S202.KGC received vehicle V i After calculating in is the vehicle V i The validity period of the jth pseudonym, V i The second pseudonymous identification set, vehicle V i The valid pseudonyms for The calculation process generates The validity period of the corresponding pseudonym The KGC stores the information confidentially. After the pseudonym generation process is completed, a vehicle V is returned through a secure channel. i Valid pseudonyms If the vehicle V i The pseudonym has exceeded its validity period or has been leaked, the vehicle V i You need to reapply to KGC to update your pseudonym.

[0034] Preferably, step S3 specifically includes:

[0035] S31. When the vehicle V i In the Internet of Vehicles scenario, the vehicle V i Randomly select the first secret number calculate And give the vehicle a fake name The key generation request is sent to KGC through a secure channel, where: As the user's public key;

[0036] S32.KGC receives the V i Key generation request Then, randomly select the second secret number Calculate the vehicle's partial public key And part of the private key The secret number selected by S31 and S32 and are two numbers randomly selected from the same number group as keys, where According to the common parameters and vehicle V i The hash value calculated based on the identity information is the key parameter for verifying the legitimate source of the public and private keys of the vehicle. And send the key pair through a secure channel Return to vehicle V i ; Vehicle V i By equation Verify the legitimacy of the public and private keys created by KGC. Once the verification is passed, the vehicle V i The public key is represented as The private key is At the same time, KGC establishes a mapping of the public key corresponding to the vehicle pseudonym And upload it to the blockchain network maintained by RSU.

[0037] Preferably, step S4 specifically includes:

[0038] S41. Use the idle computing resources of the vehicle to pre-calculate the signcrypted data and store the results. The vehicles exchange information, encrypt and sign the messages, and obtain the signcrypted ciphertext σ s ;

[0039] S42. Receive message vehicle V r Receive vehicle V s Signcrypted ciphertext σ s After receiving the message, vehicle Vr Perform decryption operation;

[0040] S43. For the situation where the vehicle or network coverage in a certain area is limited or the bandwidth is restricted and it is necessary to use relay nodes to receive multiple ciphertext messages sent from different vehicles, an aggregate signcryption algorithm is proposed.

[0041] Preferably, step S41 specifically includes:

[0042] S411. The system will collect and analyze the computing resource usage of the vehicle. During the idle time of the vehicle, according to the preset algorithm and parameters, the signcrypted data will be calculated offline: Vehicle V s Randomly select a third secret number Calculate U s =u s P, and {u s ,U s}Stored in the list of vehicle OBUs that can generate vehicle partial pseudonyms, vehicle partial public and private keys, and calculate message signatures OBU , which is used to quickly assemble the signature later; among them, U s A key parameter set for offline computing;

[0043] S412. First, when the vehicle V s (The real identity is ID s ) needs to be sent to the vehicle V r (The real identity is ID r ) sends message m, then vehicle V s The following operations are required: If the list If not empty, use {u s ,U s} as the subsequent signcryption parameter, and remove the corresponding secret number after the signcryption is completed. Otherwise, the vehicle V s Randomly select a secret number Calculate U s =u s P; Vehicle V s By vehicle V r pseudonym Get the corresponding vehicle public key from the blockchain calculate Vehicle V s calculate And encrypt the message to get Vehicle V s calculate Last Vehicle V s Towards vehicle V r Send the signcrypted ciphertext σ s={w s ,U s ,C s} and timestamp T s , where Q s To send vehicle V s The asymmetric encryption algorithm is used to combine the local secret number of the sending vehicle and the receiving vehicle V r The signcryption parameters for the public key calculation, For a receiving vehicle V r pseudonym and public key, and send the vehicle V s The encryption parameters calculated by the timestamp and some signcryption parameters are used to encrypt the real message, C s is the encrypted message, m is the vehicle V s Towards vehicle V r The message sent, is the bitwise XOR sign, To include the sending vehicle V s A parameter to be signed, w s To send vehicle V s Treat signature parameters with private key The signcryption parameters after signing. To send vehicle V s The private key of , mod is the modulus operation;

[0044] Preferably, step S42 specifically includes:

[0045] Vehicle V r Determine the timestamp T based on the time when the message was received s Is it timed out? If it meets the requirements, go to the next step, otherwise refuse to receive this information; Vehicle V r Calculate separately and The vehicle then recovers the plaintext message calculate Determine whether the conditions are met If it satisfies the condition, the message m′ is received. Otherwise, the received signature is invalid. s To receive the vehicle V r Using asymmetric encryption algorithm to send vehicle V s Provided by U s and receiving vehicle V r Signcryption parameters for private key calculation, is the private key of vehicle V1, To receive the vehicle V r Pseudonym and public key, and send vehicle V sThe encryption parameters calculated by the timestamp and some signcryption parameters are used to decrypt the real message. To send vehicle V s Pseudonym, public key, plaintext message, and send vehicle V s The encryption parameters calculated together with some signcryption parameters, and The vehicle V r pseudonym and public key, For vehicle V s 's pseudonym, For vehicle V s The public key, w s For vehicle V s The verification factor.

[0046] Preferably, step S43 specifically includes:

[0047] S431. Assume that there is a vehicle set {V1, V2, …, V n}, the corresponding pseudonym set is Each vehicle entity in the set runs the signcryption algorithm to obtain its corresponding signcryption secret text σ and sends it to the relay node; the relay node V j After receiving the signed ciphertext σ, by calculating U={U1,U2,…,U n}, C={C1,C2,…,C n}, T={T1,T2,…,T n}, compress multiple signcrypted ciphertexts into one and send it to the final recipient V k Send the aggregated signed ciphertext σ = {w, U, C} and the timestamp T corresponding to the ciphertext, where V n is the n vehicles in the vehicle set, is the nth pseudonym in the pseudonym set, w is the signcryption parameter set after sending the vehicle signature, w i To send vehicle V i The signature parameters after signing, U is the key parameter set, U n For vehicle V n The key parameter, C is the encrypted information set, C n For vehicle V n Encrypted information, T is the timestamp set, T n For vehicle V n timestamp;

[0048] S432. Receiver V k After receiving the aggregated signcrypted ciphertext of the vehicle set, determine whether the timestamp in T has expired. If it meets the requirements, proceed to the next step, otherwise refuse to receive this information; calculate Recovering the plaintext message calculate Determine whether the conditions are met If the conditions are met, the recovered plaintext is received, otherwise the signature is invalid. as well as The final receiver V k The corresponding pseudonym, public key and private key, and 1≤i≤n, Q′ i To receive the vehicle V k Using an asymmetric encryption algorithm combined with the U i and the signature parameters calculated by receiving the vehicle private key, To receive the vehicle V k The pseudonym and public key, as well as the timestamp of the sending vehicle and some signcryption parameters, are used to decrypt the real message. i is the timestamp, C i The ciphertext after the message is encrypted. To send the vehicle pseudonym, public key, plaintext information, as well as encryption parameters calculated together with timestamp and some signcryption parameters, The vehicle V i pseudonym and public key.

[0049] Using the aggregate signcryption algorithm can significantly reduce the bandwidth required for transmission and reduce the computing overhead of the receiver during the decryption and verification process, greatly improving the efficiency of information transmission.

[0050] In this embodiment, a random oracle model is used to prove the proposed signcryption scheme. The specific proof process is as follows:

[0051] In the security model of certificateless signcryption scheme, two different types of attackers are considered: Ⅰ , A Ⅱ , the attacker’s specific instructions are as follows:

[0052] A Ⅰ Type of attacker: A Ⅰ The attacker simulates a malicious entity, can obtain the entity's public key and has the ability to replace the public key of any legitimate entity, but cannot obtain the system's master key. This attacker includes two types of adversaries, of which the first type of adversary A Ⅰ-1 Focusing on the confidentiality of the attack scheme, the second type of adversary A Ⅰ-2 Committed to the unforgeability of the challenge solution.

[0053] A Ⅱ Type of attacker: A ⅡThe attacker simulates a malicious KGC and can obtain the master key of the system, but does not have the ability to replace the public key of the legitimate entity. This attacker includes two types of adversaries. The first type of adversary A Ⅱ-1 The second type of adversary A is used to attack the confidentiality of the scheme Ⅱ-2 Unforgeability for attack scenarios.

[0054] Confidentiality and unforgeability are two key indicators for ensuring information security in certificateless signcryption schemes. This section will describe the requirements of these two security indicators by defining four simulation games between the adversary and the challenger. The adversary in the game can win by decrypting the ciphertext or forging the signature information. During the entire attack process, the adversary can perform a maximum of polynomial bounded queries and make corresponding judgments based on the query results. Finally, the security of the proposed certificateless signcryption scheme is evaluated by comparing the consistency of the ciphertext information cracked by the adversary with the original plaintext, or verifying the validity of the forged signature.

[0055] Game 1:

[0056] System initialization phase: Challenger C runs the system initialization algorithm to generate system parameters Params and system master key s. Then, Challenger C sends the system parameters to A Ⅰ-1 , and the system master key is kept by challenger c.

[0057] In the query phase, adversary A Ⅰ-1 The following query can be executed:

[0058] Hash query: A Ⅰ-1 Send the data to be hashed and the requested hash algorithm H to c. i (*) type, and feed the calculation result back to A Ⅰ-1 .

[0059] Partial private key query: A Ⅰ-1 Send a pseudonym and a partial private key query request to C, and C sends A Ⅰ-1 Returns the corresponding partial private key.

[0060] Public key query: A Ⅰ-1 Send a user's pseudonym information and public key query request to c, c sends A Ⅰ-1 Returns the corresponding user's public key.

[0061] Public key replacement query: A Ⅰ-1 Send a user's pseudonym information and new public key PK' to c, and c will replace the corresponding user's public key.

[0062] Private key extraction query: A Ⅰ-1 Send a user's pseudonym information and private key query request to c, c sends AⅠ-1 Returns the private key of the corresponding user.

[0063] Signcryption query: A Ⅰ-1 Send the pseudonym of the sender, the pseudonym of the receiver, the message to be encrypted, and the signcryption query request to c. c calculates the signature and encrypted message and returns it to A Ⅰ-1 If the sender's public key has been replaced, then A Ⅰ-1 The secret value corresponding to the new public key needs to be given.

[0064] Decryption query: A Ⅰ-1 Send the identity information of both parties, the encrypted message, and the decryption request to C. C obtains the private key corresponding to the recipient whose public key has not been replaced through private key query. At the same time, C obtains the public key of the sender through public key query. Then execute the decryption algorithm to restore the original plaintext information and send it to A. Ⅰ-1 If the public key of the message recipient has been replaced, then A Ⅰ-1 The secret value corresponding to the recipient's new public key needs to be provided.

[0065] Challenge Phase: Adversary A Ⅰ-1 After completing the above query, you need to select two fixed-length messages (m0, m1) and the identities of the two vehicles participating in the challenge. Challenger c randomly selects b∈{0,1} and calculates the value corresponding to the selected message m b The corresponding ciphertext σ * , and feedback to A Ⅰ-1 . A Ⅰ-1 A is allowed to perform polynomial queries and finally output the result b′. If b′=b, then A Ⅰ-1 Win the game. Against opponent A Ⅰ-1 The restrictions set are as follows: A Ⅰ-1 It is forbidden to query the private key of the user whose public key has been replaced; A Ⅰ-1 Prohibit Perform a private key extraction query; if The public key of A has been replaced. Ⅰ-1 The private key extraction query cannot be performed unless the message m has been b Signcrypted vehicle public key or Replace, otherwise in the identity or Under this condition, it is forbidden to * Perform a decryption query.

[0066] Game 2:

[0067] System initialization phase: Challenger C runs the system initialization algorithm and discloses system parameters. Ⅱ-1 Able to self-generate system master key and system public key.

[0068] Query phase: A Ⅱ-1 All queries in Game 1 except the public key replacement query can be executed.

[0069] Challenge Stage: A Ⅱ-1 After all queries are completed, two fixed-length messages (m0, m1) and the identities of the two vehicles participating in the challenge are selected. Challenger c randomly selects b∈{0,1} and calculates the value that matches the selected message m b The corresponding ciphertext σ * , and feedback to A Ⅱ-1 . A Ⅱ-1 Perform polynomial queries and finally output the result b′. If b′=b, then A Ⅱ-1 Win the game. Against opponent A Ⅱ-1 The restrictions set are as follows: A Ⅱ-1 Prohibition of identity Perform private key extraction query; A Ⅱ-1 It is forbidden to * Perform a decryption query.

[0070] Game 3:

[0071] System initialization phase: Challenger C and Adversary A Ⅰ-2 The operation is the same as game 1.

[0072] Query phase: A Ⅰ-2 The same query as in game 1 can be performed.

[0073] Forgery stage: A Ⅰ-2 Able to satisfy the following restrictions and ensure that the output signature can be verified, A Ⅰ-2 The game is won. Ⅰ-2 The restrictions set are as follows: A Ⅰ-2 Prohibit Conduct private key extraction query;

[0074] like The public key of A has been replaced. Ⅰ-2 Unable to Partial private key extraction query; A Ⅰ-2 It is prohibited to query the private key of a user whose public key has been replaced.

[0075] Game 4:

[0076] System initialization phase: Challenger C and Adversary AⅡ-2 The operation is the same as Game 2.

[0077] Query phase: A Ⅱ-2 The same query as in game 2 can be performed.

[0078] Forgery stage: A Ⅱ-2 Able to satisfy the following restrictions and ensure that the output signature can be verified, A Ⅱ-2 The game is won. Ⅱ-2 The restrictions set are as follows: A Ⅱ-2 Prohibit Perform private key extraction query; in the forgery stage, the generated forged ciphertext σ * It cannot be the result obtained through signcryption query.

[0079] Theorem 1: (Adversary A Ⅰ-1 Confidentiality under attack) In the random oracle model, if there is an adversary A Ⅰ-1 can be calculated with non-negligible probability P in probabilistic polynomial time Ⅰ-1 Win the game with at most q i (i=1,2,3) times hash H i Ask, q sk Private key query and q sc Second-time signature query, then challenger c can with non-negligible probability P Ⅰ-1 e -1 (1-q2 / 2 n )(1-q sk / 2 n ) / (q sk +q sc ) to solve the CDH problem.

[0080] Proof: Assume there is a CDH problem, P is the generator of group G, a is the master key of the system, The goal of challenger c is to calculate the value of abP under the condition of a given CDH instance (P, aP, bP). First, create lists L1, L2, L3, L pk , L sk Used to store A Ⅰ-1 For the query results of H1, H2, H3, and public and private key extraction, all lists are empty at initialization.

[0081] Phase 1: System initialization phase:

[0082] Adversary A Ⅰ-1 Send a system initialization request to challenger c, and c sends the public parameters to A according to the initialization algorithm. Ⅰ-1 .

[0083] Phase 2: Inquiry Phase:

[0084] H1 query: When c receives A Ⅰ-1 When querying H1, if there is The corresponding value is returned; otherwise, i Perform a public key extraction query and obtain the corresponding

[0085] H2 asks: c receives A Ⅰ-1 When H2 is queried, if there is Return the corresponding value; otherwise, randomly select of Then Add to L2 and return

[0086] H3 query: c received A Ⅰ-1 When querying H3, if L3 exists Return the corresponding value; otherwise, randomly select of Then Add to L3 and return

[0087] Public key extraction query: c receives A Ⅰ-1 Pseudonymous identity When a public key extraction query is made, the following operations are performed: If L pk Existence The corresponding public key is returned Give A Ⅰ-1 ; If it does not exist, c selects a random number k i ∈{0,1}, and Pr[k i =1] = δ = 1 / (q sc +q sk +1). If k i =0, c is randomly selected calculate and Requirements to be met Then and Add to L pk , L sk Same as L1, public key is returned at the same time Give A Ⅰ-1 If k i =1, let in is a known parameter of c. Add to L1 and L respectively pk In the At the same time, Ⅰ-1 return

[0088] Private key extraction query: When c receives A Ⅰ-1 Pseudonymous identity When asked to retrieve the private key, do the following: sk Search If it exists, then send it to A Ⅰ-1 Return private key If it does not exist, perform a public key extraction query and get the returned data If k in the data i = 0, returns the public key extraction query to L sk The private key added in; if k i =1, ends the query and terminates the simulation.

[0089] Public key replacement query: For identity A Ⅰ-1 Any public key can be selected to replace the original public key.

[0090] Signcryption extraction query: c receives A Ⅰ-1 The ID of the sender of the message i And the message recipient ID j When performing a signcryption query, in L pk Search If k j =0, c respectively in L sk and L pk Query the sender's private key and the receiver's public key, sign the message m, and return the signed ciphertext σ={w,U,C} to A Ⅰ-1 .

[0091] Decryption query: c receives A Ⅰ-1 ID j A pseudonym When performing a decryption query, in L pk Search Perform the following actions depending on whether the data exists: If exists and k j =0, then in L sk Search The corresponding private key is in L PK Search The corresponding public key decrypts σ to obtain the plaintext m; if k j =1, query L2 and L3 respectively to get and And calculate Then judge Is it true? If the equation is true, return m, otherwise terminate the simulation; if does not exist, indicating that the public key has been replaced. At this time, query the sender information in L1, L2 and L3 to obtain and And calculate Then judge Is it true? If the equation is true, return m, otherwise terminate the simulation.

[0092] Phase 3: Challenge Phase:

[0093] A Ⅰ-1 First enter the challenge identity And two plaintexts of the same length (m0, m1), after receiving the challenge message, challenger c adds pk To the receiving party Perform a public key query to obtain According to k b The following operation is performed on the value of k: b = 0, terminate the simulation and exit; if k b =1, c randomly selects r∈{0,1}, Q * ∈G, obtained by querying list L2 calculate And pick a random number Calculate U * =bP, Finally to A Ⅰ-1 Output the forged signcrypted ciphertext σ * ={w * ,U * ,C *}.

[0094] Adversary A Ⅰ-1 The probability polynomial bounded query described above can be executed. After the query is completed, the result r' needs to be output. If r' = r, c outputs the solution to the CDH problem Otherwise, the CDH issue is not resolved.

[0095] Challenger c is adversary A Ⅰ-1 Provide a real attack environment, define c not terminated in the entire query process as event ε1, and its probability is Define the event ε2 that c does not terminate during the entire challenge phase, with probability Pr[ε2] = δ. Ⅰ-1If H2 query is executed in the challenge phase, the challenge fails and the adversary A is defined as Ⅰ-1 If H2 is not executed, the query is event ε3, and its probability is Pr[ε3] = 1-q2 / 2 n , of which 2 n is the size of the key space; if adversary A Ⅰ-1 Executed The challenge fails if the private key extraction query is made. Define adversary A Ⅰ-1 Not executed The private key extraction query is event ε4, and its probability is Pr[ε4]=1-q sk / 2 n Therefore, the probability of successful simulation of c is Where δ = 1 / (q sc +q sk +1), when q sc +q sk When it is big enough,

[0096] Therefore, in summary, if the whole process is not terminated and the adversary A Ⅰ-1 With a non-negligible probability P Ⅰ-1 To break the confidentiality of this method, challenger c can use the probability P in polynomial time to Ⅰ-1 e -1 (1-q2 / 2 n )(1-q sk / 2 n ) / (q sk +q sc )Solve the CDH problem and ensure the confidentiality of the method.

[0097] Theorem 2: (Adversary A Ⅱ-1 Confidentiality under attack) The proof method is similar to Theorem 3.1.

[0098] Theorem 3: (Adversary A Ⅰ-2 Unforgeability under attack) In the random oracle model, if there is an adversary A Ⅰ-2 can be calculated with non-negligible probability P in probabilistic polynomial time Ⅰ-2 Win the game with at most q i (i=1,2,3) times hash H i Ask, q sk Private key query and q sc Second-time signature query, then challenger c can with non-negligible probability P Ⅰ-2 e -1 (1-q sk / 2 n ) / (q sk +qsc )Solve the ECDLP problem.

[0099] Proof: Assume there is an ECDLP problem, P is the generator of group G, and the goal of challenger c is to calculate the value of a given instance (P, aP), where and a is unknown. First, create lists L1, L2, L3, L pk , L sk For storage A Ⅰ-2 For the query results of H1, H2, H3, and public and private key extraction, all lists are empty at initialization.

[0100] Phase 1: System initialization phase:

[0101] Adversary A Ⅰ-2 Send a system initialization request to challenger c, and c sends the public parameters to A according to the initialization algorithm. Ⅰ-2 . Set P pub =aP, where a is the master key of the system.

[0102] Phase 2: Inquiry Phase:

[0103] Adversary A Ⅰ-2 Execute the same hash query, public key extraction, private key extraction and public key replacement query as in Theorem 3.1. The signature query and signature verification query are introduced as follows:

[0104] Signature query: When challenger c receives adversary A Ⅰ-2 About (m, ID i )'s signature query (A Ⅰ-2 ID has been i The public key extraction query is performed), c is first in the list L pk Search According to k i The following operation is performed on the value of k: i =0, c is in the list Query in, and perform the signcryption algorithm to generate the corresponding signcrypted ciphertext σ i ={w i ,U i ,C i}, and returns σ and timestamp T to adversary A Ⅰ-2 If k i =1, end the inquiry and terminate the simulation process.

[0105] Signature verification query: When challenger c receives adversary A Ⅰ-2 About (ID i ,σ) signature verification query, c in L pk Search According to k iThe following operation is performed on the value of: If there is data and k i = 0, challenger c decrypts σ, returns the decrypted plaintext m, and verifies the signature. If the verification passes, m is received, otherwise the simulation is terminated. i =1, c queries L3 to obtain If the equation If the data does not exist, it means that the public key has been replaced, and c queries L3 to obtain If the equation If true, the decrypted plaintext m is returned, otherwise the simulation is terminated.

[0106] Phase 3: Challenge Phase:

[0107] Challenger C Perform a public key extraction query to obtain If k i =0, the challenge is terminated. Otherwise, a random Calculate separately as well as Output the forged signcrypted ciphertext σ i ={w i ,U i ,C i}. If the forgery is successful, then output As an effective solution to the DLP difficulty problem, otherwise it has not successfully solved the DLP problem.

[0108] Challenger c is adversary A Ⅰ-2 Provide a real attack environment, define c not terminated during the query process as event ε′1, and its probability is Define the event ε′2 that c does not terminate in the challenge phase, with probability Pr[ε′2] = δ; if the adversary A Ⅰ-2 Executed The challenge fails if the private key extraction query is made. Define adversary A Ⅰ-2 Not Executed The private key extraction query is event ε′3, and its probability is Pr[ε′3]=1-q sk / 2 n Therefore, the probability of challenger c's successful simulation is

[0109] Therefore, in summary, if the whole process is not terminated and the adversary A Ⅰ-2 With a non-negligible probability P Ⅰ-2 To break the confidentiality of this method, challenger c can use the probability P in polynomial time to Ⅰ-2e -1 (1-q sk / 2 n ) / (q sk +q sc )Solve the ECDLP problem and ensure the unforgeability of the method.

[0110] Theorem 4: (Adversary A Ⅱ-2 The proof method of unforgeability under attack is similar to that of Theorem 3.3.

[0111] In view of the external attack problem that may exist in the Internet of Vehicles, the present invention designs a lightweight certificateless signcryption method for resource-limited environments. In view of the limited resources of the Internet of Vehicles, the proposed method adopts three ways to improve performance. The first is to simplify cryptographic operations to reduce computational complexity. Second, the vehicle pre-processes the signcryption content using an offline calculation method, and quickly completes the signature assembly work when there is a communication demand, thereby improving communication efficiency. Third, through the aggregate signcryption algorithm, multiple separate signatures are aggregated into signatures that only require a single verification, which simplifies the verification process and reduces the amount of data transmitted in many-to-one transmissions, thereby reducing the storage burden of the device. In addition, this article also uses a random oracle model to prove the security of the proposed scheme. After computer software simulation, the results show that the method of the present invention has higher security and lower computing and communication overhead in a resource-limited Internet of Vehicles environment.

[0112] Although embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that various changes, modifications, substitutions and variations may be made to the embodiments without departing from the principles and spirit of the present invention, and that the scope of the present invention is defined by the appended claims and their equivalents.

Claims

1. A lightweight certificateless signcryption method based on blockchain in the Internet of Vehicles. It is characterized in that include: S1. Build a vehicle networking system, which includes: a key generation center KGC, a roadside unit RSU, a blockchain network, a data center DC and a vehicle. The vehicle networking system generates and publishes its initialization system parameters through KGC; S2. The vehicle applies for a pseudonym identity from KGC in advance. KGC generates a pseudonym and a pseudonym validity period and stores them in the KGC database in the form of a pseudonym warehouse. The vehicle obtains a valid pseudonym to complete vehicle registration. S3. The vehicle sends a pseudonym and key generation request to KGC. KGC generates a key pair consisting of a public key and a private key for the vehicle and issues it, and saves the vehicle's public key in the blockchain network maintained by RSU. S4. Calculate the signcrypted data using the preset algorithm and parameters, use the pseudonym applied for by the vehicle to obtain the key from the blockchain network to encrypt the data, obtain the signcrypted ciphertext, and decrypt the received signcrypted ciphertext to verify the validity of the signature.

2. According to claim 1, a lightweight certificateless signcryption method based on blockchain in the Internet of Vehicles, It is characterized in that The Internet of Vehicles system generates and publishes its initialization system parameters through KGC, including: The key generation center KGC selects a security factor k to generate the public parameters required by the system, which mainly include: a cyclic group G with a large prime number q and its generator P, five anti-collision hash functions H 1 : H 2 : H 3 : H 4 : H 5 :{0,1} * →G; KGC randomly selects the system master key The system public key is P pub = sP, the final public system parameters Params = {G, P, q, P pub ,H 1 ,H 2 ,H 3 ,H 4 ,H 5 }, where l T is the length of the timestamp, l m is the length of the message sent, l ID is the length of the user's real identity information, is a multiplicative cyclic group of order large prime number q; The Internet of Vehicles system publishes the above parameters to other legal entities participating in the signcryption process of the Internet of Vehicles system.

3. According to claim 1, a lightweight certificateless signcryption method based on blockchain in the Internet of Vehicles, It is characterized in that The vehicle applies for a pseudonym identity from KGC in advance. KGC generates a pseudonym and the validity period of the pseudonym and stores it in the KGC database in the form of a pseudonym warehouse. The vehicle obtains a valid pseudonym to complete vehicle registration, including: S21. Real identity is ID i Vehicle V i Randomly select num p Parameters Where 1≤j≤num p , calculate its corresponding The generated Sent to KGC, where V i The first pseudonym identification set of the vehicle uses a pseudonym instead of a real identity during the interaction process of IoV. P is a generator of G, s is the system master key, is a multiplicative cyclic group of order large prime number q; S22, KGC receives vehicle V i After calculating Vehicle V i The valid pseudonyms for The calculation process generates The validity period of the corresponding pseudonym The KGC stores the information confidentially. After the pseudonym generation process is completed, a vehicle V is returned through a secure channel. i Valid pseudonyms If the vehicle V i The pseudonym has exceeded its validity period or has been leaked, the vehicle V i You need to reapply to KGC to update your pseudonym. For vehicle V i The validity period of the jth pseudonym, V i The second pseudonym identifies the set of , ⊕ is the bitwise exclusive OR symbol.

4. According to claim 1, a lightweight certificateless signcryption method based on blockchain in the Internet of Vehicles, It is characterized in that The vehicle sends a pseudonym and key generation request to KGC. KGC generates a key pair consisting of a public key and a private key for the vehicle and issues it. The public key of the vehicle is saved in the blockchain network maintained by RSU, including: S31, when the vehicle V i In the Internet of Vehicles scenario, the vehicle V i Randomly select the first secret number Calculate user public key and as a key generation request, and the vehicle pseudonym The key generation request is sent to KGC through a secure channel, where: is a multiplicative cyclic group of order large prime number q, and P is a generator of G; S32, KGC receives the information from the vehicle V i After the key generation request is received, the second secret number is randomly selected. Calculate the vehicle's partial public key And part of the private key The first and second secret numbers selected by S31 and S32 are two numbers randomly selected from the same number group as keys, where According to the common parameters and vehicle V i The hash value calculated based on the identity information is the key parameter for verifying the legitimate source of the public and private keys of the vehicle. And send the key pair through a secure channel Return to vehicle V i ; Vehicle V i By equation Verify the legitimacy of the public and private keys created by KGC. Once the verification is passed, the vehicle V i The public key is represented as The private key is At the same time, KGC establishes a mapping of the public key corresponding to the vehicle pseudonym And upload it to the blockchain network maintained by RSU.

5. According to claim 1, a lightweight certificateless signcryption method based on blockchain in the Internet of Vehicles, It is characterized in that The signcrypted data is calculated using the preset algorithm and parameters, and the key is obtained from the blockchain network using the pseudonym applied for by the vehicle to encrypt the data, obtain the signcrypted ciphertext, and decrypt the received signcrypted ciphertext to verify the validity of the signature, including: S41, use the idle computing resources of the vehicle to pre-calculate the signcryption data, store the results, exchange information between vehicles, encrypt and sign the message, and obtain the signcryption ciphertext σ s ; S42, receiving message vehicle V r Receive vehicle V s Signature ciphertext σ s After receiving the message, vehicle V r Perform decryption operation; S43. In view of the situation that the vehicles in a certain area or the network coverage is limited or the bandwidth is restricted and it is necessary to use relay nodes to receive multiple ciphertext messages sent from different vehicles, an aggregate signcryption algorithm is proposed for verification.

6. According to claim 5, a lightweight certificateless signcryption method based on blockchain in the Internet of Vehicles, It is characterized in that Use the idle computing resources of the vehicle to pre-calculate the signcrypted data and store the results. Vehicles exchange information, encrypt and sign the message, and obtain the signcrypted ciphertext σ s ,include: S411. The system collects and analyzes the computing resource usage of the vehicle. During the idle time of the vehicle, the system performs offline calculation on the signcrypted data according to the preset algorithm and parameters: s Randomly select a third secret number Calculate U s =u s P, and {u s ,U s }Stored in the list of vehicle OBUs that can generate vehicle partial pseudonyms, vehicle partial public and private keys, and calculate message signatures OBU , which is used to quickly assemble the signature later; among them, U s A key parameter set for offline computing, is a multiplicative cyclic group of order large prime number q, and P is a generator of G; S412, first when the real identity is ID s Vehicle V s Need to submit real identity ID r Vehicle V r Send message m, then vehicle V s The following operations are required: If the list If not empty, use {u s ,U s } as the subsequent signcryption parameter, and remove the corresponding secret number after the signcryption is completed. Otherwise, the vehicle V s Randomly select a secret number Calculate U s =u s P; Vehicle V s By vehicle V r pseudonym Get the corresponding vehicle public key from the blockchain calculate Vehicle V s calculate And encrypt the message to get C s =m⊕h 2,IDr , vehicle V s calculate Last Vehicle V s Towards vehicle V r Send the signcrypted ciphertext σ s ={w s ,U s ,C s } and timestamp T s , where Q s To send vehicle V s The asymmetric encryption algorithm is used to combine the local secret number of the sending vehicle and the receiving vehicle V r The signcryption parameters for the public key calculation, For receiving vehicle V r pseudonym and public key and send vehicle V s The first encryption parameter calculated by the timestamp and some signcryption parameters is used to encrypt the real message, C s is the encrypted message, m is the vehicle V s Towards vehicle V r The message sent, ⊕ is the bitwise XOR symbol, To include the sending vehicle V s A parameter to be signed, w s To send vehicle V s Treat signature parameters with private key The signcryption parameters after signing. To send vehicle V s The private key of the device, mod is the modulus operation.

7. According to claim 5, a lightweight certificateless signcryption method based on blockchain in the Internet of Vehicles, It is characterized in that Receive message vehicle V r Receive vehicle V s Signature ciphertext σ s After receiving the message, vehicle V r Perform decryption operations, including: Vehicle V r Determine the timestamp T based on the time when the message was received s Whether it has timed out. If it meets the requirements, it will proceed to the next step. Otherwise, it will refuse to receive this information. Vehicle V r Calculate separately and Then the vehicle recovers the plaintext message m′=C s ⊕h′ 2,IDr ,calculate Determine whether the conditions are met If it satisfies, the message m′ is received, otherwise it means that the received signature is invalid. s s is the receiving vehicle V r Using asymmetric encryption algorithm combined with sending vehicle V s Provided by U s and receiving vehicle V r Signcryption parameters for private key calculation, For vehicle V r The private key of To receive the vehicle V r pseudonym and public key and send vehicle V s The second encryption parameter calculated by the timestamp and some signcryption parameters is used to decrypt the real message. To send vehicle V s Pseudonym, public key, plaintext message, and sending vehicle V s The encryption parameters calculated together with some signcryption parameters, and The vehicle V r pseudonym and public key, For vehicle V s alias, For vehicle V s The public key, w s For vehicle V s The verification factor.

8. According to claim 5, a lightweight certificateless signcryption method based on blockchain in the Internet of Vehicles, It is characterized in that In the case of limited vehicle or network coverage or bandwidth in a certain area, it is necessary to use relay nodes to receive multiple ciphertext messages sent from different vehicles. An aggregate signcryption algorithm is proposed for verification, including: S431, assuming that there is a vehicle set {V 1 ,V 2 ,…,V n }, the corresponding pseudonym set is Each vehicle entity in the set runs the signcryption algorithm to obtain its corresponding signcryption secret text σ and sends it to the relay node; the relay node V j After receiving the signed ciphertext σ, by calculating U={U 1 ,U 2 ,…,U n },C={C 1 ,C 2 ,…,C n }, T={T 1 ,T 2 ,…,T n }, compress multiple signcrypted ciphertexts into one and send it to the final recipient V k Send the aggregated signed ciphertext σ = {w, U, C} and the timestamp T corresponding to the ciphertext, where V n is the n vehicles in the vehicle set, is the nth pseudonym in the pseudonym set, w is the signcryption parameter set after sending the vehicle signature, w i To send vehicle V i The signature parameters after signing, U is the key parameter set, U n For vehicle V n The key parameter, C is the encrypted information set, C n For vehicle V n Encrypted information, T is the timestamp set, T n For vehicle V n timestamp; S432. Receiver V k After receiving the aggregated signcrypted ciphertext of the vehicle set, determine whether the timestamp in T has expired. If it meets the requirements, proceed to the next step, otherwise refuse to receive this information; calculate Recovering the plaintext message calculate Determine whether the conditions are met If the conditions are met, the recovered plaintext is received, otherwise the signature is invalid. as well as The final receiver V k The corresponding pseudonym, public key and private key, Q i ′ is the receiving vehicle V k Using an asymmetric encryption algorithm combined with the U i and the signature parameters calculated by receiving the vehicle private key, To receive the vehicle V k The pseudonym and public key, as well as the timestamp of the sending vehicle and some signcryption parameters, are used to decrypt the real message. i is the timestamp, C i The ciphertext after the message is encrypted. The encryption parameters calculated by sending the vehicle pseudonym, public key, plaintext information, timestamp and some signcryption parameters are used. The vehicle V i pseudonym and public key.

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