Operation terminal security protection method and device based on trusted security communication

Abstract

The invention relates to the field of terminal security, and discloses an operation terminal security protection method and device based on trusted security communication, and the method comprises the steps: carrying out the security verification of a starting process of an operation terminal system through taking a security mirror image as a root of trust, so as to judge whether the security verification is passed or not; after the security verification is passed, a system BootLoader starting process is entered; the method comprises the following steps of: after an operation terminal system is started, negotiating a session key with a communication opposite terminal through a special Internet of Things SIM card based on an elliptic curve key negotiation algorithm in a trusted execution environment TEE, and safely storing the session key in the TEE; and the operation terminal completes trusted secure communication with the communication opposite terminal based on the session key. Safe and credible encryption and decryption of the mobile operation terminal are realized, and the reliability of security verification of starting of the mobile operation terminal is improved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of terminal security, and in particular to a method, device and equipment for protecting the security of an operating terminal based on trusted secure communication. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of information technology, especially the widespread application of mobile Internet technology, data has become a key production factor. In the power industry, with the rapid development of smart grids and infrastructure communication systems, a large number of mobile operation terminals (hereinafter referred to as terminals) are connected to the power grid system, and the amount of data generated and processed is increasing. These terminals not only have many brands and inconsistent security mechanisms, but also have scattered usage scenarios. They can directly access the internal system of the power grid, posing a huge challenge to the information security of the power grid.

[0003] There are at least the following technical problems in the prior art:

[0004] In existing data encryption schemes, although data is encrypted during transmission or storage, the encryption process itself on the terminal device may be exposed to malicious applications. These malicious applications may monitor or tamper with the encryption process, resulting in sensitive data leakage, posing a serious threat to the safety of power operations.

[0005] Existing encryption systems often lack a centralized and unified key management mechanism. This limits the secure sharing and transmission of encrypted data between different devices or systems, because the complexity of managing and synchronizing keys on multiple mobile working terminals increases the difficulty of operation and the risk of errors.

[0006] There is a lack of effective security verification mechanism in the startup process of existing mobile work terminals. Malware or attackers may exploit system vulnerabilities to obtain unauthorized access rights, thereby threatening the security of the entire system and the integrity of data. Summary of the invention

[0007] In view of this, the present application provides a method for protecting the security of operating terminals based on trusted secure communication, which solves the technical problems in the prior art that data encryption and decryption of mobile operating terminals are easily attacked by malicious applications and the startup process lacks a complete security verification mechanism.

[0008] According to a first aspect of the present application, there is provided a method for protecting the security of an operation terminal based on trusted secure communication, comprising:

[0009] Based on the security image as the root of trust, a security check is performed on the startup process of the operation terminal system to determine whether the security check passes, wherein the security image is the bl1.bin image of the ARM trusted firmware ATF;

[0010] After the security check is passed, the system BootLoader startup process is entered;

[0011] After the operation terminal system is started, based on the elliptic curve key negotiation algorithm in the trusted execution environment TEE, the session key is negotiated with the communication peer through the dedicated IoT SIM card, and the session key is securely stored in the TEE;

[0012] The operation terminal completes trusted and secure communication with the communication counterpart based on the session key.

[0013] According to a second aspect of the present application, there is provided a work terminal safety protection device based on trusted secure communication, comprising:

[0014] A startup verification module is used to perform a security check on the startup process of the operation terminal system based on the security image as a trust root to determine whether the security check passes, wherein the security image is the bl1.bin image of the ARM trusted firmware ATF;

[0015] A startup execution module is used to enter the system BootLoader startup process after the security check passes;

[0016] A trusted communication module is used to negotiate a session key with a communication peer through a dedicated IoT SIM card in a trusted execution environment TEE based on an elliptic curve key negotiation algorithm after the operation terminal system is started, and the session key is securely stored in the TEE;

[0017] A feasible communication module is used to complete trusted and secure communication with the communication peer based on the session key.

[0018] According to the third aspect of the present application, a computer device is provided, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, and when the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the above-mentioned operation terminal security protection method based on trusted secure communication are implemented.

[0019] According to a fourth aspect of the present application, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, which stores a computer program. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the above-mentioned operation terminal security protection method based on trusted secure communication are implemented.

[0020] By means of the above technical scheme, the present application provides a method, device, equipment and medium for security protection of operation terminals based on trusted secure communication. By using a secure image as a trust root, the operation terminal system startup process is security checked to determine whether the security check has passed; when the security check passes, the system BootLoader startup process is entered; after the operation terminal system is started, the session key is negotiated with the communication peer based on the elliptic curve key negotiation algorithm in the trusted execution environment TEE through a dedicated IoT SIM card, and the session key is securely stored in the TEE; the operation terminal completes trusted secure communication with the communication peer based on the session key. The secure and trusted encryption and decryption of the mobile operation terminal is realized, and the reliability of the security verification of the mobile operation terminal startup is improved.

[0021] The above description is only an overview of the technical solution of the present application. In order to more clearly understand the technical means of the present application and to implement it in accordance with the contents of the specification, and to make the above and other purposes, features and advantages of the present application more obvious and easy to understand, the specific implementation methods of the present application are listed below. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0022] The drawings described herein are used to provide a further understanding of the present application and constitute a part of the present application. The illustrative embodiments of the present application and their descriptions are used to explain the present application and do not constitute an improper limitation on the present application. In the drawings:

[0023] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of an application scenario of a method for protecting the safety of an operation terminal based on trusted secure communication provided in an embodiment of the present application is shown;

[0024] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a process flow of a method for protecting the safety of an operation terminal based on trusted secure communication provided in an embodiment of the present application is shown;

[0025] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of a method for encrypted communication provided in an embodiment of the present application is shown;

[0026] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of the process flow of a method for detecting abnormality of an operation terminal provided in an embodiment of the present application is shown;

[0027] Figure 5 A schematic structural diagram of a work terminal safety protection device based on trusted secure communication provided in an embodiment of the present application is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0028] The specific implementation of the present application will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and in combination with the embodiments. It should be noted that the embodiments and features in the embodiments of the present application can be combined with each other without conflict.

[0029] The embodiment of the present invention provides a method for protecting the security of an operation terminal based on trusted secure communication, which can be applied to Figure 1In the scenario of the mobile operation application system for power marketing services shown in the figure, the service capability of the power grid can be effectively improved. In the figure, the trusted execution environment (TEE) and the rich execution environment (REE) run together. TEE is used to execute important data generated by important applications to prevent them from being stolen or tampered with in an untrusted environment, while REE is used to execute other data. TEE has its own execution space, and its security level is higher than REE. TEE achieves security through a three-layer architecture. The three-layer architecture includes: (1) Trusted Application Software Layer (TA), which is the application software that needs to be protected; (2) Trusted Operating System Layer, which provides support for the upper-layer application software TA; (3) Hardware Layer, which provides hardware support. The hardware corresponding to TEE and REE are isolated from each other and cannot access each other at will. They communicate with each other through a communication agent. Each TA needs to be authorized to access each other, and they run independently of each other. REE is usually the operating environment of a mobile terminal operating system such as Android or iOS, including modules such as the operation terminal application (CA), TEE function application programming interface API, TEE operation terminal API, and multimedia operating system components. The TEE operation terminal API provides the CA running in the REE environment with the underlying communication interface for accessing the TA in the TEE environment and exchanging data with the TA. Compared with the open environment REE, TEE provides a relatively secure closed execution environment. TEE is mainly composed of TA, TEE internal API, trusted operating system components and trusted kernel. The data of the mobile operation terminal is transmitted to the power grid management information system platform through the secure access gateway. The secure access gateway and the mobile operation terminal are encrypted and authenticated to ensure that only trusted mobile operation terminals can access the network. When the terminal and the system platform transmit data, according to the relevant provisions of the power grid network security, when the terminal transmits data to the information intranet or information extranet, the dedicated Internet of Things SIM of the operation terminal implements the terminal side data encryption / decryption. When the data is transmitted to the boundary of the information intranet or information extranet, it is decrypted / encrypted by the secure access gateway. In the process of data interaction between the terminal and the system platform of each domain of the information intranet or information extranet, if the terminal is attacked and the data security is threatened, the security module of the system platform will form the corresponding security data and generate an abnormal alarm.The controller of the mobile operation terminal is written with a corresponding program to execute a method for protecting the operation terminal security based on trusted secure communication provided by the present invention. The operation terminal system startup process is security-verified based on a secure image as a trust root to determine whether the security verification has passed; when the security verification has passed, the system BootLoader startup process is entered; after the operation terminal system is started, the session key is negotiated with the communication peer based on the elliptic curve key negotiation algorithm in the trusted execution environment TEE through a dedicated Internet of Things SIM card, and the session key is securely stored in the TEE; the operation terminal completes trusted secure communication with the communication peer based on the session key. The secure and trusted encryption and decryption of the mobile operation terminal is realized, and the reliability of the security verification of the startup of the mobile operation terminal is improved.

[0030] The operation terminal security protection method based on trusted secure communication provided by the embodiment of the present invention constructs a secure communication method between operation terminals and system platforms without the need for a trusted third party. The bl1.bin image in the ARM Trust Firmware (ATF) is used as the root of trust to achieve trusted startup of the mobile operation terminal system and ensure the credibility of the initial environment between the sender and the receiver. Secondly, the ECDH key agreement algorithm used can significantly improve the security and reliability of the session key, and the generated session key is stored in a secure environment to prevent the key from being stolen. TrustZone technology and the trusted execution environment ensure the security of the data encryption environment.

[0031] It should be noted that during the implementation of the present invention, it is necessary to write relevant driver programs for a specific mobile work terminal in combination with the firmware information of the hardware device so that the method of the present invention can be transplanted to the physical hardware platform of the work terminal equipment manufacturer. The relevant driver programs belong to the prior art and will not be repeated here.

[0032] The present invention is described in detail below through specific embodiments.

[0033] Embodiment 1:

[0034] like Figure 2 As shown, a method for protecting the safety of an operation terminal based on trusted secure communication is provided in an embodiment of the present invention, comprising:

[0035] Step 201: Based on the security image as the root of trust, a security check is performed on the startup process of the operation terminal system to determine whether the security check passes;

[0036] Wherein, the secure image is the bl1.bin image of the ARM trusted firmware ATF;

[0037] Step 202: After the security check is passed, the system BootLoader startup process is entered;

[0038] Step 203: After the operation terminal system is started, based on the elliptic curve key negotiation algorithm in the trusted execution environment TEE, the session key is negotiated with the communication peer through the dedicated IoT SIM card, and the session key is securely stored in the TEE;

[0039] Step 204: The operation terminal completes trusted and secure communication with the communication counterpart based on the session key.

[0040] Wherein, step 204 specifically includes:

[0041] Step 204-1, initialize the TEE side environment and start the security service session on the TEE side;

[0042] Step 204-2: Register the shared memory to realize data and command transmission between the dedicated IoT SIM card and the TEE side;

[0043] Step 204-3, sending encryption and decryption commands through TEEC_InvokeCommand and performing data encryption and decryption through the dedicated IoT SIM card, and storing the encryption and decryption results in the shared memory;

[0044] Among them, TEEC_InvokeCommand is a trusted API.

[0045] Step 204-4: read the encrypted and decrypted data from the shared memory, and complete trusted and secure communication with the communication peer through the data transceiver module.

[0046] Among them, the communication counterpart includes a system platform, another mobile operation terminal, etc.

[0047] During the encrypted communication process, the job terminal initializes the context of the TEE environment through the TEEC_InitializeContext function; opens a session with the security service in the TEE through the TEEC_OpenSession function; and uses TEEC_RegisterSharedMemory to register shared memory for data and command transmission between the job terminal application layer and the TEE.

[0048] The application layer sends an encryption command through TEEC_InvokeCommand and writes the encrypted data into the shared memory; the security service in the TEE reads the data information in the shared memory and uses the session key stored in the TEE to encrypt the data; the encrypted data is returned to the job terminal through the shared memory, and the job terminal sends the encrypted data to the receiving end; after receiving the encrypted data, the receiving end job terminal sends a decryption command through TEEC_InvokeCommand and writes the encrypted data into the shared memory; the security service in the TEE reads the encrypted data in the shared memory and uses the same session key to decrypt the data; the decrypted data is returned to the receiving end job terminal through the shared memory

[0049] The present invention provides a method for protecting the security of an operation terminal based on trusted secure communication. The method performs a security check on the startup process of the operation terminal system based on a secure image as a trust root to determine whether the security check has passed. When the security check has passed, the system BootLoader startup process is entered. After the operation terminal system is started, the session key is negotiated with the communication peer through a dedicated Internet of Things SIM card in a trusted execution environment TEE based on an elliptic curve key negotiation algorithm, and the session key is securely stored in the TEE. The operation terminal completes trusted secure communication with the communication peer based on the session key. The secure and trusted encryption and decryption of the mobile operation terminal is realized, and the reliability of the security verification of the startup of the mobile operation terminal is improved.

[0050] Embodiment 2:

[0051] In order to improve the reliability of security verification during the startup process of the mobile operation terminal and prevent malware or attackers from exploiting system vulnerabilities to obtain unauthorized access rights, the verification mechanism for secure startup is strengthened in step 201, including:

[0052] Step 201-1, execute the code in the ChipRom of ARM on the operation terminal, and jump to the bl1.bin image of the ARM trusted firmware ATF for execution;

[0053] Step 201-2, bl1.bin loads the bl2.bin image, sets the interrupt vector table, and then performs signature verification on bl2;

[0054] Step 201-3, if the signature verification is successful, jump from bl1 to bl2 through the EL3 exit function and continue the startup process;

[0055] Step 201-4: Initialize the signature verification module in bl2. If the signature verification passes, load the image files of bl31, OP-TEE and the operation terminal system of BootLoader into the memory and set the corresponding permissions. Among them, bl31 is the execution software of EL3 security mode, and OP-TEE is the open source feasible execution environment TEE, which is used for the execution of secure applications in the operation terminal system.

[0056] Step 201-5, bl31 decides whether to load OP-TEE by parsing the entry function of OP-TEE and verifying the validity of the OP-TEE image signature;

[0057] Step 201-6: If the entry function of OP-TEE exists and the image signature verification passes, OP-TEE is started, and then the security monitoring mode call is triggered to re-enter bl31;

[0058] Step 201-7, bl31 obtains the next BootLoader image file of the operating terminal system that needs to be loaded into the rich execution environment REE side from the startup file, and verifies the validity of the BootLoader file. If the verification passes, set the CPU state and the operating environment on the REE side, exit the EL3 security mode and enter the BootLoader image startup of the operating terminal system.

[0059] Among them, the root of trust is transferred from bl1 to the bootloader of the mobile operation terminal system. If any part of the verification in the above process fails, it will directly cause the system to hang and suspend the startup process to prompt the user that there is a security risk.

[0060] The secure boot verification mechanism provided by the second implementation of the present invention ensures that only verified software components can be executed by implementing security verification at each stage of system startup, thereby preventing malicious software from being loaded and run during the system startup process. By verifying the integrity of hardware and software components, it is ensured that they have not been tampered with or replaced. It can further detect and prevent boot program attacks (such as Bootkit attacks), which may inject malicious code before the system starts. Multi-stage startup verification ensures the chain transfer of security trust at each startup stage from hardware to software, and establishes a complete trust chain from the mobile operation terminal hardware to the operating system.

[0061] Embodiment three:

[0062] In order to achieve encrypted communication with the other end in step 203, Figure 3 As shown, including:

[0063] Step 203 specifically includes:

[0064] Step 301: Receive the public key and RSA signature sent by the communication peer;

[0065] Step 302: Verify the RSA signature of the communication peer's public key through the TEE side;

[0066] Step 303: After verification, the session key is calculated on the TEE side using the private key of the mobile operation terminal and the public key of the communication peer.

[0067] Step 304: securely store the session key by calling the trusted storage API interface of TEE.

[0068] Among them, secure storage is achieved through the TEE_CreatePersistentObject, TEE_OpenPersistentObject and TEE_WriteObjectData trusted storage API interfaces.

[0069] The encryption and decryption mechanism provided in the third embodiment of the present invention allows two communicating parties to securely negotiate a shared session key on an insecure channel based on the ECDH algorithm without going through a trusted third party. By using digital signatures in the key negotiation process, the identity of the communicating party can be verified, thereby reducing the risk of man-in-the-middle attacks. The elliptic curve key negotiation ECDH algorithm is based on elliptic curve encryption technology, providing stronger security than traditional encryption algorithms, even in the face of the threat of quantum computing. The ECDH algorithm can quickly generate keys, which is suitable for environments that require frequent key exchanges and is suitable for power Internet of Things environments. The session key negotiated by the ECDH algorithm is temporary and unique in each communication session, which increases the confidentiality of the key. The negotiated key encrypts the data, ensures the security of the data during transmission, prevents data leakage, can work across different platforms and devices, supports various operating systems and hardware configurations, and enhances the flexibility of communication. Since each communication session uses a new key, the need for long-term key management and storage is reduced, and the key management process is simplified. End-to-end encryption is achieved to ensure that the data remains encrypted throughout the entire transmission process from the sender to the receiver.

[0070] Embodiment 4:

[0071] In order to realize the abnormal behavior detection of the mobile operation terminal accessing the dedicated network by the system platform, the abnormal behavior of the mobile operation terminal is externally analyzed and detected from the behavior level. In the case that the above embodiment fails, the security of accessing the mobile operation terminal can be ensured. After step 204 in the first embodiment, as shown in FIG. Figure 4 As shown, including:

[0072] Step 401: The communication peer verifies the access rights of the operation terminal;

[0073] Step 402: The communication peer mines and identifies the access behavior characteristics of the operation terminal to monitor abnormal behavior of the operation terminal.

[0074] Wherein, step 402 specifically includes:

[0075] Step 402-1, the communication peer obtains the historical flow data of the operation terminal and performs preprocessing;

[0076] Step 402-2: extracting characteristic information of historical traffic data through a time sliding window and an incremental calculation mode;

[0077] Wherein, step 402-2 specifically includes:

[0078] Step 402-21, selecting a preset time length as a sliding window;

[0079] Step 402-22: at each time point, obtain historical traffic data within the current window;

[0080] Step 402-23, calculating statistical characteristic values ​​in the window, wherein the statistical characteristic values ​​include mean value, variance, maximum value, and minimum value;

[0081] Step 402-24: Each time the window is moved, the data on the far left of the window is removed, new time point data is added, and the statistical feature values ​​are recalculated.

[0082] Step 402-3: Identify the abnormal operation state of the operation terminal based on the clustering algorithm and association rules to monitor the abnormal behavior of the operation terminal.

[0083] Compared with the traditional two-stage clustering method, the method for detecting abnormal behavior of operating terminals in the fourth embodiment of the present invention can process a large amount of data more effectively and improve the accuracy of abnormal detection. The average F1 value in the actual data set verification reaches 0.98, indicating that the detection result has a high accuracy. Through data preprocessing normalization and fusion of data of different dimensions, the consistency and availability of data are improved, the integration ability of data of different types and sources is enhanced, and a more balanced data foundation is provided for feature extraction and anomaly detection. The time sliding window and incremental calculation mode are used to extract the characteristic information of traffic data, which can capture the behavioral changes of mobile operating terminals accessing the network in real time, and provide real-time and dynamic characteristic information, which is helpful to timely discover and respond to potential abnormal behaviors. The abnormal operation state of the mobile operating terminal is identified by applying clustering algorithms and association rules, which improves the accuracy of detection. Through the construction of the pattern rule library, the normal and abnormal operation states are effectively distinguished, and the reliability of anomaly detection is enhanced.

[0084] Further, as Figures 2 to 4 The specific implementation of the method, the embodiment of the present invention provides a work terminal security protection device based on trusted secure communication, such as Figure 5 As shown, the device comprises:

[0085] The startup verification module 510 is used to perform a security verification on the startup process of the operation terminal system based on the security image as the trust root to determine whether the security verification passes, wherein the security image is the bl1.bin image of the ARM trusted firmware ATF;

[0086] The startup execution module 520 is used to enter the system BootLoader startup process after the security check passes;

[0087] The trusted communication module 530 is used to negotiate a session key with the communication peer through a dedicated IoT SIM card in a trusted execution environment TEE based on an elliptic curve key negotiation algorithm after the operation terminal system is started, and to securely store the session key in the TEE;

[0088] The feasible communication module 540 is used to complete trusted and secure communication with the communication peer based on the session key.

[0089] In an embodiment of the present invention, a computer device is provided, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of implementing a method for protecting a work terminal security based on trusted secure communication include:

[0090] Based on the security image as the root of trust, a security check is performed on the startup process of the operation terminal system to determine whether the security check passes, wherein the security image is the bl1.bin image of the ARM trusted firmware ATF;

[0091] After the security check is passed, the system BootLoader startup process is entered;

[0092] After the operation terminal system is started, based on the elliptic curve key negotiation algorithm in the trusted execution environment TEE, the session key is negotiated with the communication peer through the dedicated IoT SIM card, and the session key is securely stored in the TEE;

[0093] The operation terminal completes trusted and secure communication with the communication counterpart based on the session key.

[0094] In an embodiment of the present invention, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, on which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the following steps are implemented:

[0095] Based on the security image as the root of trust, a security check is performed on the startup process of the operation terminal system to determine whether the security check passes, wherein the security image is the bl1.bin image of the ARM trusted firmware ATF;

[0096] After the security check is passed, the system BootLoader startup process is entered;

[0097] After the operation terminal system is started, based on the elliptic curve key negotiation algorithm in the trusted execution environment TEE, the session key is negotiated with the communication peer through the dedicated IoT SIM card, and the session key is securely stored in the TEE;

[0098] The operation terminal completes trusted and secure communication with the communication counterpart based on the session key.

[0099] It should be noted that, in the above embodiments, only the ARM architecture Android system is used as an example to illustrate the principles and implementation steps of the embodiments of the present invention, and no specific limitation is made to the actual application scenarios. For example, based on Apple A series processors, x86 processors, Mac systems, Liunx systems, etc., the functions or steps that can be implemented by computer-readable storage media or computer devices can be referred to the aforementioned method embodiments. To avoid repetition, they will not be described one by one here.

[0100] Those skilled in the art can understand that all or part of the processes in the above-mentioned embodiment methods can be completed by instructing the relevant hardware through a computer program, and the computer program can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium. When the computer program is executed, it can include the processes of the embodiments of the above-mentioned methods. Among them, any reference to memory, storage, database or other media used in the embodiments provided in this application can include non-volatile and / or volatile memory. Non-volatile memory can include read-only memory (ROM), programmable ROM (PROM), electrically programmable ROM (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM) or flash memory. Volatile memory can include random access memory (RAM) or external cache memory. As an illustration and not limitation, RAM is available in many forms, such as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), double data rate SDRAM (DDRSDRAM), enhanced SDRAM (ESDRAM), synchronous link (Synchlink) DRAM (SLDRAM), memory bus (Rambus) direct RAM (RDRAM), direct memory bus dynamic RAM (DRDRAM), and memory bus dynamic RAM (RDRAM).

[0101] Those skilled in the art can clearly understand that for the convenience and simplicity of description, only the division of the above-mentioned functional units and modules is used as an example. In actual applications, the above-mentioned functions can be distributed and completed by different functional units and modules as needed, that is, the internal structure of the device can be divided into different functional units or modules to complete all or part of the functions described above.

[0102] The embodiments described above are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than to limit the same. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments may still be modified, or some of the technical features may be replaced by equivalents. Such modifications or replacements do not deviate the essence of the corresponding technical solutions from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, and should all be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for protecting the safety of an operation terminal based on trusted secure communication, characterized in that: include: Based on the security image as the root of trust, a security check is performed on the startup process of the operation terminal system to determine whether the security check passes, wherein the security image is the bl1.bin image of the ARM trusted firmware ATF; After the security check is passed, the system BootLoader startup process is entered; After the operation terminal system is started, based on the elliptic curve key negotiation algorithm in the trusted execution environment TEE, the session key is negotiated with the communication peer through the dedicated IoT SIM card, and the session key is securely stored in the TEE; The operation terminal completes trusted and secure communication with the communication counterpart based on the session key.

2. The operation terminal security protection method based on trusted secure communication according to claim 1 is characterized in that: After the operation terminal completes the step of trusted and secure communication with the communication peer based on the session key, the step includes: The communication peer verifies the access rights of the operation terminal; The communication peer mines and identifies the access behavior features of the operation terminal to monitor abnormal behavior of the operation terminal.

3. The operation terminal security protection method based on trusted secure communication according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The step of performing a security check on the startup process of the operation terminal system based on the image as the trust root to determine whether the security check passes includes: Execute the code in the ChipRom of ARM on the operation terminal and jump to the bl1.bin image of the ARM trusted firmware ATF for execution; bl1.bin loads the bl2.bin image, sets the interrupt vector table, and then performs signature verification on bl2; If the signature verification is successful, jump from bl1 to bl2 through the EL3 exit function to continue the startup process; Initialize the signature verification module in bl2. If the signature verification passes, load the BootLoader's bl31, OP-TEE, and the image file of the operating terminal system into the memory and set the corresponding permissions. Among them, bl31 is the execution software of the EL3 security mode, and OP-TEE is the open source feasible execution environment TEE, which is used for the execution of secure applications in the operating terminal system. bl31 decides whether to load OP-TEE by parsing the entry function of OP-TEE and verifying the validity of the OP-TEE image signature; If the entry function of OP-TEE exists and the image signature verification passes, OP-TEE is started, and then the security monitoring mode call is triggered to re-enter bl31; bl31 obtains the next BootLoader image file of the operating terminal system that needs to be loaded into the rich execution environment (REE) from the startup file and verifies the validity of the BootLoader file. If the verification passes, it sets the CPU state and the operating environment on the REE side, exits the EL3 security mode, and enters the BootLoader image startup of the operating terminal system.

4. The operation terminal security protection method based on trusted secure communication according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The steps of negotiating a session key with a communication peer through a dedicated IoT SIM card based on an elliptic curve key negotiation algorithm in a trusted execution environment TEE, and securely storing the session key in the TEE include: Receive the public key and RSA signature sent by the communication peer; Verify the RSA signature of the communication peer's public key through the TEE side; After verification, the session key is calculated on the TEE side using the private key of the mobile operation terminal and the public key of the communication peer; The session key is securely stored by calling the trusted storage API interface of TEE.

5. The operation terminal security protection method based on trusted secure communication according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The step of the operation terminal completing trusted secure communication with the communication peer based on the session key includes: Initialize the TEE side environment and start the security service session on the TEE side; Register shared memory to realize data and command transmission between dedicated IoT SIM card and TEE side; Send encryption and decryption commands through TEEC_InvokeCommand and perform data encryption and decryption through the dedicated IoT SIM card, and store the encryption and decryption results in the shared memory; The encrypted and decrypted data are read from the shared memory, and trusted and secure communication is completed with the communication peer through the data transceiver module.

6. The operation terminal security protection method based on trusted secure communication according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The step of the communication peer end mining and identifying the access behavior features of the operation terminal to monitor abnormal behavior of the operation terminal includes: The communication peer obtains the historical flow data of the operation terminal and performs preprocessing; Extract characteristic information of historical traffic data through time sliding window and incremental calculation mode; The abnormal operation state of the operation terminal is identified based on clustering algorithms and association rules to monitor abnormal behavior of the operation terminal.

7. The method for protecting the safety of operation terminals based on trusted secure communication according to claim 6, characterized in that: The step of extracting characteristic information of historical traffic data through a time sliding window and an incremental calculation mode includes: Select a preset time length as the sliding window; At each time point, obtain the historical traffic data within the current window; Calculate the statistical characteristic values ​​within the window, wherein the statistical characteristic values ​​include the mean value, variance, maximum value, and minimum value; Each time the window is moved, the data on the far left of the window is removed, the new time point data is added, and the statistical feature values ​​are recalculated.

8. A safety protection device for an operation terminal based on trusted secure communication, characterized in that: include: A startup verification module is used to perform a security check on the startup process of the operation terminal system based on the security image as a trust root to determine whether the security check passes, wherein the security image is the bl1.bin image of the ARM trusted firmware ATF; A startup execution module is used to enter the system BootLoader startup process after the security check passes; A trusted communication module is used to negotiate a session key with a communication peer through a dedicated IoT SIM card in a trusted execution environment TEE based on an elliptic curve key negotiation algorithm after the operation terminal system is started, and the session key is securely stored in the TEE; A feasible communication module is used to complete trusted and secure communication with the communication peer based on the session key.

9. A computer device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that: When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the operation terminal security protection method based on trusted secure communication as described in any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

10. A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by the processor, the steps of the operation terminal security protection method based on trusted secure communication as described in any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

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