New energy vehicle charging data interaction method and charging pile operation management system

By obtaining the attribute information of the charging control request in the new energy vehicle charging system for checksum P2P network key negotiation, encrypting communication, the attack risk in the communication between the charging pile and the BMS is solved, ensuring the security of the charging process and data communication. reliability.

CN119142189BActive Publication Date: 2025-01-10SHENZHEN WEILAN ELECTRIC VEHICLE IND SERVICE CO LTD
View PDF 2 Cites 0 Cited by

Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411659819.9
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-11-20
Publication Date
2025-01-10
Estimated Expiration
2044-11-20

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Communication between charging piles of new energy vehicles and BMS is vulnerable to attack, resulting in incorrect charging control parameters and posing safety hazards.

Method used

Using the charging data interaction method of new energy vehicles, the verification strategy is determined by obtaining the attribute information of the charging control request, local or remote verification is used to identify the attack risk, and the session key is generated through P2P network negotiation to ensure the charging process safety.

Benefits of technology

Without modifying the vehicle and BMS, the safety of the charging control process is improved, the risk of misjudgment is reduced, and the security and verification efficiency of data communication is improved.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

Smart Images

  • Figure CN119142189B_ABST
    Figure CN119142189B_ABST
Patent Text Reader

Abstract

The present application relates to the technical field of new energy vehicle charging, and provides a new energy vehicle charging data interaction method and a charging pile operation and management system. The method includes: the target charging pile responds to the charging control request sent by the BMS, obtains the attribute information of the charging control request, and determines the verification strategy based on the attribute information; when the verification strategy is determined to be local verification, the charging control request is verified based on the historical charging data to determine whether the charging control request has an attack risk; when the verification strategy is determined to be remote verification, the first charging parameter in the charging control request is extracted, and a first parameter verification request is constructed; the target client processes the first parameter verification request and generates a first verification result; the target charging pile determines whether the charging control request has an attack risk based on the first verification result, thereby realizing the identification of network attack behavior and improving the communication security between the target charging pile and the BMS.
Need to check novelty before this filing date? Find Prior Art

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of new energy vehicle charging technology, and in particular to a new energy vehicle charging data interaction method, a charging pile operation management system, and a computer program product. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of the new energy vehicle industry, related charging facilities are becoming more and more complete, and the network security issues of charging piles are receiving more and more attention. In some application scenarios, the communication process between the charging pile and the BMS (Battery Management System) is vulnerable to attacks, causing the charging pile to obtain incorrect charging control parameters, which has a negative impact on the charging process and brings safety hazards. Summary of the invention

[0003] In order to avoid the problem that the communication process between the charging pile and the BMS is attacked, causing the charging pile to obtain incorrect charging control parameters, thereby having a negative impact on the charging process, the embodiments of the present application provide a new energy vehicle charging data interaction method, a charging pile operation and management system, and a computer program product.

[0004] On the one hand, the new energy vehicle charging data interaction method provided in the embodiment of the present application is applied to the charging pile operation and management system, the system includes a target charging pile and a target client, and includes the following steps: the target charging pile responds to the charging control request sent by the BMS, obtains the attribute information of the charging control request, and determines the verification strategy based on the attribute information; when it is determined that the verification strategy is local verification, the charging control request is verified based on historical charging data to determine whether there is an attack risk in the charging control request; when it is determined that the verification strategy is remote verification, the first charging parameter in the charging control request is extracted to construct a first parameter verification request; the first parameter verification request is encrypted based on the first session key and the encrypted first parameter verification request is sent to The target client; wherein the first parameter verification request is used to instruct the target client to request the second charging parameter from the BMS, and to verify the authenticity of the first charging parameter based on the second charging parameter; the target client receives the encrypted first parameter verification request, decrypts it based on the first session key, obtains the first parameter verification request, processes the first parameter verification request, and generates a first verification result; encrypts the first verification result based on the first session key, and returns the encrypted first verification result to the target charging pile; the target charging pile receives the encrypted first verification result and decrypts it to obtain the first verification result; and determines whether the charging control request has an attack risk based on the first verification result.

[0005] Based on the above technical solution, when the target charging pile receives the charging control request sent by the target vehicle BMS, it first identifies whether the charging control request has an attack risk through the local or target client. In this way, it can ensure that the target charging pile will not be interfered by illegal requests when controlling the charging process. Based on this, the safety of the charging control process can be guaranteed without modifying the target vehicle and BMS. Furthermore, the data interaction between the target charging pile and the target client is encrypted based on the first session key, thereby improving the data communication security during the confirmation process. In addition, selecting the verification strategy based on the attribute information of the charging control request can guarantee the verification efficiency to a certain extent.

[0006] In one implementation, the obtaining of attribute information of the charging control request and determining a verification strategy based on the attribute information includes: obtaining a predicted distance and a charging time between the target client and the target vehicle corresponding to the BMS; when the charging time is less than a preset time threshold, determining that the verification strategy is a remote verification; when the charging time is greater than or equal to the preset time threshold and the predicted distance is less than a preset distance threshold, determining that the verification strategy is a remote verification; when the charging time is greater than or equal to the preset time threshold and the predicted distance is greater than or equal to the preset distance threshold, determining that the verification strategy is a local verification.

[0007] Based on the above technical solution, the communication status between the target client and the target vehicle is predicted by predicting the distance and the charging time. When the communication status is good, the target client is selected for verification. When the communication status is not good, verification is performed locally, which can guarantee the verification efficiency to a certain extent. At the same time, the target client is used for verification as much as possible to ensure the accuracy of the verification.

[0008] In one implementation, the authenticity verification of the first charging parameter based on the second charging parameter includes: determining whether the second charging parameter contains the first charging parameter, and if so, determining that the first charging parameter is authentic; if not, determining whether the first charging parameter is calculated based on the second charging parameter, and if so, determining that the first charging parameter is authentic.

[0009] Based on the above technical solution, the first charging parameter is verified in a variety of ways to reduce the risk of misjudgment and improve the accuracy of the verification result.

[0010] In one implementation, the method for generating the first session key includes: the target client and the target charging pile negotiate the key generation method for this session and the basic data for generating the first session key based on the P2P network; the basic data is calculated based on the key generation method determined by the negotiation to obtain the first session key.

[0011] Based on the above technical solution, the target charging pile and the target client realize the negotiated generation of the first session key by directly establishing a P2P network. Compared with the method of uniformly generating keys by a cloud server, it can increase the difficulty of key cracking, and also avoid the situation where all communication security may be threatened after the cloud server is attacked.

[0012] In one implementation, the method for negotiating the key generation method for this session and the basic data for generating the first session key includes: the target client randomly selects basic data from the session data, and sends the identifier of the basic data to the target charging pile; after the target charging pile receives the identifier, it performs a hash calculation based on the basic data corresponding to the identifier, and returns the identifier of the key generation method and the identifier of the encryption algorithm determined according to the calculation result to the target client; the target client performs the hash calculation based on the basic data, compares the self-calculation result with the identifier of the key generation method and the identifier of the encryption algorithm, and if they are consistent, sends a negotiation success notification to the target charging pile.

[0013] Based on the above technical solution, the two parties negotiate and determine the key generation method, encryption algorithm and basic data for this session based on the identifier, which can increase the difficulty of cracking the key and improve communication security.

[0014] In one implementation, the system also includes a cloud server, and the method for establishing the P2P network includes: the cloud server sends a first target access address and a second target access address to the target client and the target charging pile respectively; the first target access address is the access address of the target charging pile, and the second target access address is the access address of the target client; the target client and the target charging pile establish the P2P network based on the first target access address and the second target access address.

[0015] In one implementation, the target client accesses the local area network where the target charging pile is located, and the P2P network is established based on the TCP protocol.

[0016] Based on the above technical solution, the communication security between the target client and the target charging pile can be ensured, and the difficulty of cracking the first session key can be increased.

[0017] In one implementation, the method also includes: the target charging pile encrypts the charging information based on the second session key and sends it to the cloud server; the cloud server decrypts the encrypted charging information based on the second session key to obtain the charging information, and generates a charging bill based on the charging information; the charging bill is encrypting based on the third session key and sending it to the target client; the target client decrypts the encrypted charging bill based on the third session key, and displays the charging bill to the user for payment, and after the payment is completed, sends the payment result encrypted based on the third session key to the cloud server; the cloud server receives the encrypted payment result, decrypts it based on the third session key to obtain the payment result, and verifies the payment result.

[0018] Based on the above technical solution, by using different session keys to encrypt different communication processes, communication security is further improved, reducing the risk of charging data, charging bills and payment results being tampered with. At the same time, by verifying the payment results, the correctness of the charging settlement data can be further guaranteed to avoid related economic losses.

[0019] On the other hand, an embodiment of the present application further provides a charging pile operation and management system, which implements charging data interaction based on the above method.

[0020] In addition, the embodiment of the present application also provides a computer program product, which includes a computer program stored in a computer-readable storage medium. The processor of the computer device reads the computer program from the computer-readable storage medium, and the processor executes the computer program, so that the computer device performs the above method. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0021] The drawings constituting a part of the present application are used to provide further understanding of the present application. The illustrative embodiments of the present application and their descriptions are used to explain the present application and do not constitute improper limitations on the present application.

[0022] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application, the drawings required for use in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative work.

[0023] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of the structure of a charging pile operation and management system provided in an embodiment of the present application is shown.

[0024] Figure 2A schematic diagram of the flow of a method for determining a session key provided in an embodiment of the present application is shown.

[0025] Figure 3 A flow chart of a new energy vehicle charging data interaction method provided in an embodiment of the present application is shown.

[0026] Figure 4 A flow chart of a method for processing a first parameter verification request provided in an embodiment of the present application is shown.

[0027] Figure 5 A flow chart of a charging bill processing method provided in an embodiment of the present application is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0028] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present application, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0029] In the description of the embodiments of the present application, unless otherwise specified, "multiple" means two or more, and "first", "second" and various digital numbers are only distinguished for the convenience of description and are not used to limit the scope of the embodiments of the present application.

[0030] The features, structures or characteristics in this application may be combined in one or more embodiments in any suitable manner. In various embodiments of this application, the size of the sequence number of each process does not mean the order of execution. The execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of this application.

[0031] Some optional features in the embodiments of the present application may be implemented independently in some scenarios without relying on other features to solve corresponding technical problems and achieve corresponding effects. They may also be combined with other features in some scenarios as needed.

[0032] In this application, unless otherwise specified, the same or similar parts between the various embodiments can refer to each other. In the various embodiments of this application, if there is no special description and logical conflict, the terms and / or descriptions between different embodiments are consistent and can be referenced to each other, and the technical features in different embodiments can be combined to form new embodiments according to their inherent logical relationships. The implementation methods of this application do not constitute a limitation on the scope of protection of this application.

[0033] The embodiments of the present application are described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0034] Please refer to Figure 1 The charging pile operation management system provided in the embodiment of the present application includes a charging pile 11, a cloud server 12 and a client 13, wherein the cloud server 12 is respectively connected to the charging pile 11 and the client 13 for communication, and is used to manage the charging pile 11, and receive and respond to requests sent by users through the client 13. The client 13 may be an application installed on a user terminal device, and the user may charge the vehicle based on the application request.

[0035] In one example, when a user needs to charge a target vehicle, the target vehicle is first parked in the charging parking space corresponding to the target charging pile, and the target client is awakened to send a charging request to the cloud server 12 by scanning the QR code on the target charging pile, wherein the charging request carries the identification information of the target charging pile. The target charging pile is any charging pile selected by the user for charging, and the target client is the client used by the charging user.

[0036] After receiving the charging request sent by the target client, the cloud server 12 may first verify the target client, including but not limited to verification based on user information, terminal device identification, etc., and after the verification is passed, send the first target access address of the target charging pile to the target client, so that the target client can establish a P2P network connection with the target charging pile based on the first target access address, and after the connection is established, negotiate a first session key for encrypting the interaction data based on the P2P network connection.

[0037] In one example, after the cloud server 12 completes and passes the verification of the target client, it obtains the first target access address of the target charging pile according to the target charging pile identifier carried in the charging request, and sends it to the target client, and at the same time sends the second target access address of the target client to the target charging pile to instruct the target client and the target charging pile to establish a P2P connection. After receiving the corresponding access address, the target client and the target charging pile send data packets to each other to complete the hole punching.

[0038] In a specific implementation, please refer to Figure 2 , the method for determining the session key includes the following steps.

[0039] S201, the target client sends a charging request to the cloud server.

[0040] After scanning the QR code on the target charging pile, the target client first connects to the local area network where the target charging pile is located, and interacts with the cloud server through the local area network. The specific interaction process includes: the target client sends a charging request to the cloud server. After receiving the charging request, the cloud server authenticates the target client. If the authentication is successful, the subsequent steps are executed, otherwise charging is rejected.

[0041] In the embodiment of the present application, the cloud server authenticates the target client, including but not limited to verifying the user identity information and the client device identification.

[0042] S202, the cloud server sends a first target access address and a second target access address to a target client and a target charging pile respectively.

[0043] Among them, the first target access address is the access address of the target charging pile, and the second target access address is the access address of the target client.

[0044] S203, the target client and the target charging pile establish a P2P network.

[0045] In one implementation, when the target client and the target charging pile are both connected to the same local area network, P2P hole punching can be implemented based on the TCP protocol based on the first target access address and the second target access address to establish a secure and stable P2P communication connection. It is understandable that if the target client cannot normally access the local area network where the target charging pile is located, it can interact with the cloud server 12 based on the Internet and implement P2P hole punching based on the UDP protocol.

[0046] S204, the target client and the target charging pile negotiate a key generation method and an encryption algorithm.

[0047] After establishing the P2P communication connection, the target charging pile and the target client can negotiate the key generation method and encryption algorithm for the first session key for this session based on the P2P network.

[0048] Specifically, the target charging pile and the target client are configured with a variety of key generation methods and encryption algorithms, and are respectively provided with corresponding identifiers. The two parties can negotiate and select a key generation method and encryption algorithm to encrypt the interactive data involved in this charging service.

[0049] In one example, the two parties may first negotiate the basic data used to generate the key, and then calculate the basic data based on the same hash algorithm to hit the corresponding key generation method and encryption algorithm according to the calculation result, wherein the basic data is selected and determined from the session data, and the session data includes but is not limited to the target client identifier, target charging pile identifier, target charging pile location, access address information, charging request sending time, message length, etc. The basic data includes one or more data items in the session data, which are specifically determined based on the content of the negotiation between the two parties.

[0050] The negotiation process may include the target client randomly selecting basic data from the session data, and sending the selected basic data identifier to the target charging pile, wherein the basic data identifier is used to indicate all data item information contained in the basic data.

[0051] After the target charging pile receives the basic data identifier, it performs a hash calculation based on the basic data corresponding to the identifier to hit the key generation method and encryption algorithm used for this session from a variety of key generation methods and encryption algorithms, and returns the identifier of the key generation method and the identifier of the encryption algorithm determined according to the calculation result to the target client.

[0052] The target client obtains a hit result based on the executed hash calculation, and compares its own hash calculation result with the received related identification. If the results are consistent, a negotiation success notification is sent to the target charging pile to complete the negotiation.

[0053] The target server and the target client can respectively calculate the first session key based on the basic data and the negotiated key generation method.

[0054] Based on this, the negotiation process between the two parties is only based on the relevant identifiers. Even if the message is illegally intercepted, the specific key generation method and encryption algorithm cannot be directly obtained. In addition, the key generation method and encryption algorithm are negotiated and determined by the target charging pile and the target client, and do not depend on the cloud server. This can prevent the problem of illegal acquisition of all session keys after the cloud server is attacked.

[0055] After determining the encryption key (i.e., the first session key) and encryption algorithm used in this charging service process, in order to ensure the communication security between the two parties and the cloud server during the charging service process, the target charging pile and the target client can generate the second session key and the third session key based on the first session key and send them to the cloud server. The second session key and the third session key are used for session encryption between the target charging pile and the cloud server and between the target client and the cloud server, respectively. The corresponding encryption algorithm can be determined by negotiation between each party and the cloud server. Among them, the method of generating the second session key and the third session key based on the first session key includes but is not limited to intercepting a fragment of the first session key, calculating the first session key based on a preset algorithm, etc.

[0056] In this way, data transmission between the three parties is encrypted using different encryption keys to improve data communication security. In one example, the three session keys are different from each other, and in another example, the three session keys are partially or completely the same, but the corresponding encryption algorithms are different from each other.

[0057] The charging service process also involves data interaction between the target charging pile and the BMS of the target vehicle. In one example, before charging starts, the target charging pile and the BMS will be physically connected and handshake, including the simulated charging pile sending a CHM handshake message, the BMS responding to the BHM handshake message, and the subsequent CRM and BRM identification message exchange to confirm the identity and readiness of both parties. After the handshake is successful, the target charging pile and the BMS will enter the charging parameter configuration stage. The BMS sends a BCP message to inform the target charging pile of its charging parameters, such as the maximum allowable charging voltage and maximum allowable charging current of a single cell. During the charging process, the BMS sends battery charging requirements (such as BCL messages) to the target charging pile in real time, and the target charging pile adjusts the charging voltage and current according to these requirements. At the same time, the BMS will also send a BSM message to provide specific battery status information, such as the maximum single cell voltage and temperature.

[0058] However, the above data interaction process also has the risk of being attacked, for example, the interaction message is tampered with, so that the target charging pile obtains incorrect charging parameters, resulting in overcharging of the battery, thereby causing battery damage.

[0059] In response to the above problems, in some existing solutions, the interaction process between the charging pile and the BMS has been optimized, including adding an identity authentication mechanism, data encryption, and modifying the vehicle gateway. Although these solutions can improve the data interaction security between the charging pile and the BMS, they all require upgrading the vehicle-related software and hardware, which has a high modification cost, and requires classified modifications for different vehicle models and BMS types, and the R&D investment is also large. Based on this, a new energy vehicle charging data interaction method proposed in an embodiment of the present application can improve the interaction security between the charging pile and the BMS without modifying the vehicle-related software and hardware.

[0060] Please refer to Figure 3 The charging data interaction method provided in the embodiment of the present application is applied to the above-mentioned charging pile operation and management system, and specifically includes the following steps.

[0061] S301, the target charging pile responds to the charging control request sent by the BMS, obtains attribute information of the charging control request, and determines a verification strategy based on the attribute information.

[0062] In implementation, a strategy selector is pre-configured on the target charging pile, and a corresponding verification strategy can be selected based on the input attribute information, wherein the attribute information of the charging control request includes the predicted distance between the target client and the target vehicle and the charging time.

[0063] In one example, obtaining the predicted distance in the attribute information of the charging control request includes: first, reading the local configuration information to determine the installation area type of the target charging pile. In one example, the installation area types include communities, shopping malls, office buildings, parks, roadside parking lots, etc. Then, the user's activity range is predicted based on the installation area type and the time when the charging request was issued. Specifically, the system is pre-configured with the user's maximum activity range corresponding to different installation area types, and at the same time, the user's maximum activity duration is determined by combining the time when the charging request was issued with the current system time, and the farthest distance between the user and the target vehicle is calculated based on the average walking speed as the predicted distance.

[0064] The charging time is the time that has been charged in this charging service. The target charging pile can be directly determined based on the charging data.

[0065] The strategy selector selects the corresponding verification strategy based on the predicted distance and the charging time. Specifically, when the charging time is less than the preset time threshold, the verification strategy is determined to be remote verification, where the preset time threshold is determined based on statistical data. Within the preset time threshold, the distance between the target customer terminal and the target vehicle does not affect the communication status between the two, that is, the target customer terminal can successfully establish a communication connection with the BMS system of the target vehicle.

[0066] When the charging time is greater than or equal to the preset time threshold and the predicted distance is less than the preset distance threshold, the verification strategy is determined to be remote verification, that is, the target customer terminal can still successfully establish a communication connection with the BMS system.

[0067] When the charging time is greater than or equal to the preset time threshold and the predicted distance is greater than or equal to the preset distance threshold, the verification strategy is determined to be local verification. That is, when the network communication between the target customer terminal and the target vehicle may be unstable due to the influence of the distance, local verification is performed.

[0068] When it is determined that the verification strategy is local verification, the charging control request is verified based on historical charging data to determine whether the charging control request has an attack risk.

[0069] Specifically, the historical charging data is the charging data recorded during this charging service, including historical charging control request data, actual charging control data, and historical verification results.

[0070] In one example, verifying a charging control request based on historical charging data specifically includes: extracting a first charging parameter in the charging control request, obtaining a verification parameter corresponding to the first charging parameter from historical charging data such as historical charging control request data, actual charging control data, and historical verification results according to the first charging parameter, and then evaluating whether the first charging parameter is reasonable based on the verification parameter; if reasonable, determining that the verification has passed; if unreasonable, determining that the verification has failed, and identifying that the charging control request has an attack risk.

[0071] Among them, the verification parameters include other types of parameters that are the same as the first charging parameter type or related to the first charging parameter. Evaluating whether the first charging parameter is reasonable based on the verification parameters includes predicting a reasonable time range for the BMS to send this charging control request based on each verification parameter. If the sending time of the charging control request is not within the reasonable time range, it is further determined whether the first charging parameter carries information for indicating battery abnormality. If so, the battery abnormality information is analyzed for authenticity based on the verification parameters that affect the battery status, and the historical request confidence is determined based on the historical verification results. The credibility of the battery abnormality information is then analyzed in combination with the authenticity analysis results and the request confidence. If the credibility meets the requirements, the charging control request is determined to be a normal request and the verification passes.

[0072] In one example, the abnormal state that may occur in the current battery can be predicted based on the battery temperature, charging time, and current power. If the abnormal state is inconsistent with the battery abnormality information, the authenticity is determined to be low, and if they are consistent, the authenticity is determined to be high. The system sets corresponding values ​​for different authenticity settings.

[0073] The historical verification result is determined based on the verification result of each charging control request in this charging service. The initial value is a fixed value. When a request with a failed verification result appears, the value of the historical request confidence is reduced. When a request with a passed verification result appears, the value does not change.

[0074] In this way, the value corresponding to the authenticity and the sum of the confidence values ​​can be used as the credibility of the battery abnormality information. If the credibility is not less than the preset credibility threshold, it is determined that the credibility meets the requirements; if it is greater than or equal to the preset credibility threshold, it is determined that the credibility does not meet the requirements. The credibility can be obtained based on historical data analysis.

[0075] If the credibility does not meet the requirements, the charging control request is determined to be an abnormal request, there is an attack risk, and the verification fails.

[0076] If the sending time of the charging control request is within a reasonable range, and there is no conflict between the first charging parameter and the historical charging control request data or the actual charging control data, the verification is determined to be passed, otherwise the verification fails. For example, when the first charging parameter this time is a charge start instruction and the previous first charging parameter was also a charge start instruction, the verification is determined to be failed, or when the first charging parameter this time is to adjust the charging power to the target value, and the charging power in the current charging control data is already at the target value, the verification is determined to be failed.

[0077] For another example, if the battery is close to saturation according to the current charging data, and if the first charging parameter is to increase the charging power, the verification is determined to be unsuccessful. In this way, data verification can be implemented based on the correlation between the first charging parameter and the verification parameter, thereby further ensuring that the first charging parameter is authentic and reliable data.

[0078] If the sending time of the charging control request is not within a reasonable range, and the first charging parameter does not carry information indicating battery abnormality, it is determined that the verification has failed.

[0079] When it is determined that the verification strategy is remote verification, the first charging parameter in the charging control request is extracted, a first parameter verification request is constructed, and step S302 is executed.

[0080] As mentioned above, after the target charging pile establishes a communication connection with the BMS on the target vehicle, the BMS will send a charging control request to the target charging pile before and during charging to control the charging process and ensure the smooth charging process. The charging control request carries the first charging parameters such as the maximum allowable charging voltage, the maximum allowable charging current, the maximum single cell voltage, temperature, start charging, stop charging, and charging power. The target charging pile uses its own address as the source address and the target client as the destination address to construct a first parameter verification request carrying the first charging parameter.

[0081] S302: Encrypt the first parameter verification request based on the first session key, and send the encrypted first parameter verification request to the target client.

[0082] In implementation, the target charging pile encrypts the first parameter verification request based on the first session key to obtain a ciphertext, constructs a second parameter verification request carrying the ciphertext based on the address of the cloud server as the destination address, and sends it to the cloud server, and adds a forwarding identifier in the second parameter verification request, so that after the cloud server receives the second parameter verification request, it forwards the ciphertext in the request to the target client.

[0083] S303: The target client receives the encrypted first parameter verification request and decrypts it based on the first session key to obtain the first parameter verification request.

[0084] S304: Process the first parameter verification request and generate a first verification result.

[0085] The first parameter verification request is used to instruct the target client to request the second charging parameter from the BMS, and to verify the authenticity of the first charging parameter based on the second charging parameter.

[0086] In an example, see Figure 4 The method for processing the first parameter verification request specifically includes the following steps.

[0087] S401, establishing a communication connection with the BMS of the target vehicle.

[0088] S402: Obtain a charging parameter within a target time period from the BMS as a second charging parameter.

[0089] The target time period is determined based on the reception time of the first charging parameter, including the charging parameters within a preset time period before the target charging pile receives the first charging parameter.

[0090] The method for the target client to obtain the second charging parameter from the BMS includes but is not limited to: obtaining the charging parameters within a preset time by calling the BMS API access with authorization; obtaining the second charging parameter from the target application installed locally on the target device, wherein the target device is a user terminal device on which the target client is installed, and the target application is a battery management program or a vehicle monitoring program for remotely controlling the BMS. In other implementations of the present application, the second charging parameter can also be obtained by directly reading the hardware interface or reading a third-party library, and the specific implementation method needs to be selected based on the API openness of the BMS.

[0091] S403: Verify the authenticity of the first charging parameter based on the second charging parameter.

[0092] In a specific implementation, the authenticity of the first charging parameter can be determined by determining whether the second charging parameter includes the first charging parameter. If the second charging parameter includes the first charging parameter, it is determined that the first charging parameter is authentic.

[0093] The first charging parameter may be a dynamic parameter obtained through calculation. For example, the BMS determines the current maximum allowable charging current of the battery system by collecting key parameters such as the battery voltage, temperature, and current, and analyzing the battery's operating environment and status, and sends it to the target charging pile. When obtaining the second charging parameter, only parameters such as voltage, temperature, and current can be obtained, and the maximum allowable charging current cannot be directly obtained. Therefore, when the second charging parameter does not include the first charging parameter, the target client needs to make a judgment based on the second charging parameter to determine whether the first charging parameter is calculated based on the second charging parameter.

[0094] In one example, the calculation rules of the BMS can be obtained in advance, and the second charging parameter can be calculated according to the calculation rules, and it can be determined whether the first charging parameter is included in the calculation result. If so, the first charging parameter is determined to be true. In another example, a mapping relationship between the charging parameters can be constructed according to historical real data, so as to determine whether the charging parameter with a mapping relationship with the first charging parameter is included in the second charging parameter according to the mapping relationship. If so, the first charging parameter is determined to be true.

[0095] After the authenticity of the first charging parameter is determined, a first verification result may be generated accordingly to provide feedback on the authenticity of the first charging parameter.

[0096] S305: Encrypt the first verification result based on the first session key, and return the encrypted first verification result to the target charging pile.

[0097] In order to ensure the security of data transmission, after generating the first verification result, the target client can encrypt the first verification result based on the first session key and the negotiated encryption algorithm, and then construct a second verification result based on the encrypted first verification result to send it to the cloud server, and add a forwarding identifier in the second verification result to instruct the cloud server to send the encrypted first verification result to the target charging pile.

[0098] S306, the target charging pile receives the second verification result, extracts the encrypted first verification result and decrypts it to obtain the first verification result.

[0099] S307: Determine whether the charging control request has an attack risk according to the first verification result.

[0100] Specifically, when the first verification result indicates that the first charging parameter is not true, it is determined that the charging control request has an attack risk, and step S308 is executed; if the first charging parameter is true, it is determined that the charging control request is normal, and step S309 is executed.

[0101] S308: Determine that there is an attack risk in the charging control request, ignore the charging control request and report it to the cloud server.

[0102] In implementation, if it is determined that there is an abnormality in the charging control request, it is identified as an attack behavior, and the target charging pile reports the attack behavior to the cloud server, so that the cloud server can analyze the security status of the target charging pile.

[0103] S309: Control the charging process based on the first charging parameter.

[0104] Based on the above technical solution, by verifying the authenticity of the charging control request sent by the BMS and processing the request only when the verification is passed, it is possible to prevent the target charging pile from performing charging control based on forged charging parameters, thereby damaging the battery or affecting the efficiency of the charging service. Furthermore, the verification process is handled by the target client, and the transmission data is encrypted by the first session key, which can solve the problem that after the charging pile is exposed to attack, it is impossible to directly obtain the real charging data through interaction with the BMS, and at the same time avoid the problem that plain text transmission is easily cracked.

[0105] In the embodiment of the present application, when the target charging pile determines that the charging is completed, it needs to send the charging information to the cloud server, so that the cloud server generates a bill based on the charging information and sends it to the user for payment. To prevent the charging information and bill information from being tampered with, please refer to Figure 5 The charging bill processing method provided in the embodiment of the present application includes the following steps.

[0106] S501, the target charging pile encrypts the charging information based on the second session key and sends it to the cloud server.

[0107] S502, the cloud server decrypts the encrypted charging information based on the second session key to obtain the charging information, and generates a charging bill based on the charging information.

[0108] S503, the cloud server encrypts the charging bill based on the third session key and sends it to the target client.

[0109] S504, the target client decrypts the encrypted charging bill based on the third session key, and displays the charging bill to the user for payment, and after the payment is completed, sends the payment result encrypted based on the third session key to the cloud server.

[0110] S505, the cloud server receives the encrypted payment result, decrypts it based on the third session key, obtains the payment result, and verifies the payment result.

[0111] In practice, the verification method of payment results includes obtaining the payment amount in the payment result, the actual amount received, and the amount to be paid in the charging bill, and judging whether the three are the same. If they are the same, the payment process is considered normal and the charging service is completed. If they are different, the abnormal information is fed back to the management personnel so that the management personnel can promptly investigate and deal with the abnormal reasons. Among them, the actual amount received is provided by a third-party payment platform, such as a bank, Alipay, WeChat, etc.

[0112] Based on the above technical solution, by using different session keys to encrypt the transmission data between the two communication entities, the difficulty of cracking the encrypted data is increased, and the communication security is improved. Since the session key is only used for this charging service, after the bill payment is completed and the charging service ends, these session keys become invalid, that is, they will not be reused for other sessions. Therefore, the communication security between the communication entities is further improved, and the charging bill can be guaranteed to a large extent that it is generated based on the real charging information. After the user completes the payment, the payment amount is verified to determine the security of the charging settlement process and prevent economic losses caused by tampering with the payment results.

[0113] In some embodiments, a computer program product is further provided, the computer program product comprising a computer program, the computer program being stored in a computer-readable storage medium. A processor of a computer device reads the computer program from the computer-readable storage medium, and the processor executes the computer program, so that the computer device performs the above method.

[0114] It should be noted that all user data collected in the embodiments of the present application are processed strictly in accordance with the requirements of relevant national laws and regulations. The informed consent or separate consent of the personal information subject is obtained only with the user's consent and authorization. Subsequent data use and processing are carried out within the scope of authorization of laws and regulations and the personal information subject, and the collection, use and processing of relevant user data must comply with the relevant laws, regulations and standards of relevant countries and regions.

[0115] Those skilled in the art can understand that all or part of the steps in the above-mentioned implementation method can be completed by instructing the relevant hardware through a program, and the program is stored in a storage medium, including a number of instructions to enable a device (which can be a single-chip microcomputer, chip, etc.) or a processor (processor) to execute all or part of the steps of each implementation method of the present invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes: U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (ROM, Read-Only Memory), random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), disk or optical disk and other media that can store program codes.

[0116] The above are all preferred embodiments of the present application, and the protection scope of the present application is not limited thereto. Therefore, any equivalent changes made according to the structure, shape, and principle of the present application should be included in the protection scope of the present application.

Claims

1. A new energy vehicle charging data interaction method, characterized in that: The method is applied to a charging pile operation management system, the system includes a target charging pile and a target client, and includes the steps of: The target charging pile responds to the charging control request sent by the BMS, obtains attribute information of the charging control request, and determines a verification strategy based on the attribute information; When it is determined that the verification strategy is local verification, verifying the charging control request based on historical charging data to determine whether the charging control request has an attack risk; When it is determined that the verification strategy is remote verification, extracting a first charging parameter in the charging control request and constructing a first parameter verification request; Encrypting the first parameter verification request based on the first session key and sending the encrypted first parameter verification request to the target client; wherein the first parameter verification request is used to instruct the target client to request a second charging parameter from the BMS, and to verify the authenticity of the first charging parameter based on the second charging parameter; The target client receives the encrypted first parameter verification request, decrypts it based on the first session key, obtains the first parameter verification request, processes the first parameter verification request, and generates a first verification result; encrypts the first verification result based on the first session key, and returns the encrypted first verification result to the target charging pile; The target charging pile receives the encrypted first verification result and decrypts it to obtain the first verification result; and determines whether the charging control request has an attack risk according to the first verification result.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The acquiring the attribute information of the charging control request and determining the verification strategy based on the attribute information includes: Obtaining a predicted distance and a charging time between the target client and a target vehicle corresponding to the BMS; When the charging time is less than a preset time threshold, determining that the verification strategy is remote verification; When the charging time is greater than or equal to the preset time threshold and the predicted distance is less than the preset distance threshold, determining that the verification strategy is remote verification; When the charging time is greater than or equal to the preset time threshold and the predicted distance is greater than or equal to the preset distance threshold, it is determined that the verification strategy is local verification.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The verifying the authenticity of the first charging parameter based on the second charging parameter includes: Determine whether the second charging parameter includes the first charging parameter, and if so, determine that the first charging parameter is true; if not, determine whether the first charging parameter is calculated based on the second charging parameter, and if so, determine that the first charging parameter is true.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The method for generating the first session key includes: The target client and the target charging pile negotiate, based on the P2P network, a key generation method for this session and basic data for generating the first session key; The basic data is calculated based on the key generation method determined by negotiation to obtain the first session key.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The method for negotiating a key generation method for this session and basic data for generating the first session key includes: The target client randomly selects basic data from the session data, and sends an identifier of the basic data to the target charging pile; After receiving the identifier, the target charging pile performs a hash calculation according to the basic data corresponding to the identifier, and returns the identifier of the key generation method and the identifier of the encryption algorithm determined according to the calculation result to the target client; The target client performs the hash calculation based on the basic data, compares the self-calculated result with the identifier of the key generation method and the identifier of the encryption algorithm, and if they are consistent, sends a negotiation success notification to the target charging pile.

6. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The system also includes a cloud server, and the method for establishing the P2P network includes: The cloud server sends a first target access address and a second target access address to the target client and the target charging pile respectively; the first target access address is the access address of the target charging pile, and the second target access address is the access address of the target client; The target client and the target charging pile establish the P2P network based on the first target access address and the second target access address.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that The target client accesses the local area network where the target charging pile is located, and the P2P network is established based on the TCP protocol.

8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The method further comprises: The target charging pile encrypts the charging information based on the second session key and sends it to the cloud server; The cloud server decrypts the encrypted charging information based on the second session key to obtain the charging information, and generates a charging bill based on the charging information; encrypts the charging bill based on the third session key and sends it to the target client; The target client decrypts the encrypted charging bill based on the third session key, and displays the charging bill to the user for payment, and after the payment is completed, sends the payment result encrypted based on the third session key to the cloud server; The cloud server receives the encrypted payment result, decrypts it based on the third session key, obtains the payment result, and verifies the payment result.

9. A charging pile operation management system, characterized in that: The system realizes charging data interaction based on the method described in any one of claims 1 to 8.

10. A computer program product, characterized in that The computer program product comprises a computer program, the computer program is stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and a processor reads and executes the computer program from the computer-readable storage medium to implement the method according to any one of claims 1 to 8.

Citation Information

Patent Citations

  • Secure data exchange method and system for electric vehicle and charging and exchanging power station

    CN102045340A

  • Electric automobile time-sharing rental system car rental fee payment method

    CN105957255A