Satellite / inertial integrated navigation anti-deception jamming method and system based on multi-array-element antenna

Abstract

The invention relates to a satellite / inertial integrated navigation anti-deception jamming method and system based on a multi-array-element antenna, and the method comprises the steps: receiving an inertial navigation measurement value through an inertial navigation measurement unit, carrying out the preprocessing of the inertial navigation measurement value, obtaining a processed inertial navigation measurement value, and receiving a navigation signal transmitted by a satellite through a master antenna and a slave antenna; whether a deception jamming signal exists or not is detected according to the received master and slave antenna signals, if the deception jamming signal exists, the incoming wave direction of the deception jamming signal is searched by a multi-array-element antenna, a null is aligned to the direction, meanwhile, the master antenna signal is switched into the multi-array-element antenna signal, detection is conducted, and the deception jamming signal is obtained. And taking the multi-array-element antenna signal as a GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) signal and optimizing the processed inertial navigation measurement value by adopting a factor graph until no deception jamming signal is detected, so as to obtain an anti-deception jamming satellite / inertial integrated navigation result. By adopting the method, accurate navigation can be carried out in a complex environment and a scene with deception jamming.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of navigation anti-interference technology, and in particular to a satellite / inertial combined navigation anti-spoofing interference method and system based on multi-element antennas. Background Art

[0002] Whether it is facing the civilian needs in scenes such as urban high-rise buildings and forest trees, or facing the objective reality of electromagnetic distortion, GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System, GNSS) denial and deception interference in different environments derived from the complex battlefield environment and limited combat equipment. In recent years, there have been many examples of successful implementation of deceptive interference of drone satellite navigation. A large number of GNSS jammers have appeared on the market. They are small in size, low in price, and widely available. The robustness and security of GNSS face huge threats and challenges. The emergence of these situations urgently requires navigation and positioning technologies with higher accuracy and stronger anti-interference capabilities.

[0003] However, the mainstream navigation and positioning method currently used by drones is the GNSS / INS (Inertial Navigation System, INS) combination. GNSS satellite signals are susceptible to intentional / unintentional electromagnetic interference, and high-precision INS is expensive and takes a long time to initialize. These factors seriously restrict the navigation accuracy and reliability of drones in non-fixed sites and complex environments. There is an urgent need for a low-cost, high-precision, anti-interference and flexible drone navigation technology and device. Summary of the invention

[0004] Based on this, it is necessary to provide a satellite / inertial combined navigation anti-deception interference method and system based on multi-element antennas that can perform precise navigation in complex environments to address the above technical problems.

[0005] A satellite / inertial combined navigation anti-spoofing interference method, the method is implemented in an integrated navigation system, the integrated navigation system includes a multi-element antenna, a master-slave antenna and an inertial navigation measurement unit, wherein the master antenna is arranged at the center of the multi-element antenna, the method includes: The inertial navigation measurement unit receives the inertial navigation measurement value, and pre-processes the inertial navigation measurement value to obtain a processed inertial navigation measurement value; The master-slave antenna receives the navigation signal sent by the satellite, and detects whether there is a deception interference signal according to the received master-slave antenna signal; If there is a spoofing interference signal, the multi-element antenna searches for the direction of the spoofing interference signal and aligns the null in the direction, and at the same time switches the main antenna signal to the multi-element antenna signal, and detects the multi-element antenna signal and the slave antenna signal until no spoofing interference signal is detected, and then uses the multi-element antenna signal as the GNSS signal; The GNSS signal and the processed inertial navigation measurement value are optimized by using a factor graph to obtain a satellite / inertial combined navigation result that is resistant to deception and interference.

[0006] In one embodiment, when detecting whether a deceptive interference signal exists based on the received master-slave antenna signals, the deceptive interference signal is detected by differential observations of the master and slave antennas.

[0007] In one embodiment, after detecting whether there is a deception interference signal based on the received master-slave antenna signal, if there is no deception interference, the master-slave antenna signal is used as the GNSS signal.

[0008] In one embodiment, if the multi-element antenna searches for the direction of arrival of a deceptive interference signal and aligns the null in that direction, the multi-element antenna signal and the slave antenna signal are detected within a preset time, and the deceptive interference signal is detected, the processed inertial navigation measurement value is optimized using a factor graph to obtain a satellite / inertial combined navigation result that is resistant to deceptive interference.

[0009] In one embodiment, when factor graph is used for optimization, the optimization process is expressed as:

[0010] In the above formula, represents the maximum a posteriori probability estimate of the state quantity at the kth moment, represents the inertial navigation measurement value after the processing, represents the measured values ​​of pseudorange and pseudorange change rate in the multi-element antenna signal, represents the carrier phase difference measurement value in the master and slave antenna signals, represents the process model factor modeled according to the inertial measurement unit, as well as They represent the measurement model factors obtained by modeling multi-element antennas and master-slave antennas, respectively. Factor Representation and Factor Nodes A collection of connected variable nodes, represents the error covariance matrix corresponding to the inertial navigation measurement value, represents the error covariance matrix corresponding to the pseudorange and pseudorange rate measurements in the multi-element antenna signal, Represents the error covariance matrix corresponding to the carrier phase difference measurement values ​​in the master and slave antenna signals.

[0011] The present application also provides a satellite / inertial combined navigation anti-spoofing interference system based on a multi-element antenna, the system comprising: a multi-element antenna, a master-slave antenna, an inertial navigation measurement unit, a dual-antenna GNSS receiver, a multi-element anti-interference processing unit, an interference detection unit, and a factor graph optimization unit; Wherein, the main antenna is arranged at the center of the multi-element antenna, the inertial navigation measurement unit is fixedly installed with the multi-element antenna, the output of the master-slave antenna is connected with the input of the dual-antenna GNSS receiver, the output of the multi-element anti-interference processing unit and the main antenna output are connected with the dual-antenna GNSS receiver through radio frequency gating, the output of the multi-element anti-interference processing unit is connected to the interference detection unit, and the outputs of the interference detection unit, the dual-antenna GNSS receiver and the inertial navigation measurement unit are all connected to the factor graph optimization unit; The inertial navigation measurement unit is used to receive the inertial navigation measurement value, pre-process the inertial navigation measurement value to obtain a processed inertial navigation measurement value, and output the processed inertial navigation measurement value to the factor graph optimization unit; The dual-antenna GNSS receiver is used to receive navigation signals sent by satellites through the master and slave antennas, and detect whether there are deception interference signals based on the received master and slave antenna signals; If there is a deceptive interference signal, the multi-element anti-interference processing unit searches for the direction of the deceptive interference signal through the multi-element antenna and aligns the null to the direction, and at the same time switches the main antenna signal to the multi-element antenna signal, and the interference detection unit detects the multi-element antenna signal and the slave antenna signal until no deceptive interference signal is detected, and then outputs the multi-element antenna signal as a GNSS signal to the factor graph optimization unit; The factor graph optimization unit is used to optimize the GNSS signal and the processed inertial navigation measurement value using the factor graph to obtain a satellite / inertial combined navigation result that is resistant to deception and interference.

[0012] In one embodiment, the distance between the master antenna and the slave antenna is 1 meter.

[0013] In one embodiment, the multi-element antenna is a four-element antenna; The four-element antennas are arranged in a square, and the main antenna is located at the center of the square.

[0014] In one embodiment, the master-slave antenna and the multi-element antenna receive B1I navigation signals of BeiDou, and the inertial navigation measurement unit receives L1CA signals of GPS.

[0015] A computer device comprises a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and when the processor executes the computer program, the following steps are implemented: The inertial navigation measurement unit receives the inertial navigation measurement value, and pre-processes the inertial navigation measurement value to obtain a processed inertial navigation measurement value; The master-slave antenna receives the navigation signal sent by the satellite, and detects whether there is a deception interference signal according to the received master-slave antenna signal; If there is a spoofing interference signal, the multi-element antenna searches for the direction of the spoofing interference signal and aligns the null in the direction, and at the same time switches the main antenna signal to the multi-element antenna signal, and detects the multi-element antenna signal and the slave antenna signal until no spoofing interference signal is detected, and then uses the multi-element antenna signal as the GNSS signal; The GNSS signal and the processed inertial navigation measurement value are optimized by using a factor graph to obtain a satellite / inertial combined navigation result that is resistant to deception and interference.

[0016] A computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the following steps: The inertial navigation measurement unit receives the inertial navigation measurement value, and pre-processes the inertial navigation measurement value to obtain a processed inertial navigation measurement value; The master-slave antenna receives the navigation signal sent by the satellite, and detects whether there is a deception interference signal according to the received master-slave antenna signal; If there is a spoofing interference signal, the multi-element antenna searches for the direction of the spoofing interference signal and aligns the null in the direction, and at the same time switches the main antenna signal to the multi-element antenna signal, and detects the multi-element antenna signal and the slave antenna signal until no spoofing interference signal is detected, and then uses the multi-element antenna signal as the GNSS signal; The GNSS signal and the processed inertial navigation measurement value are optimized by using a factor graph to obtain a satellite / inertial combined navigation result that is resistant to deception and interference.

[0017] The above-mentioned satellite / inertial combined navigation anti-spoofing interference method and system based on multi-element antennas receives the inertial navigation measurement value through the inertial navigation measurement unit, and pre-processes it to obtain the processed inertial navigation measurement value, and receives the navigation signal sent by the satellite through the master-slave antenna, and detects whether there is a deceptive interference signal according to the received master-slave antenna signal. If there is a deceptive interference signal, the multi-element antenna searches for the direction of the deceptive interference signal and aligns the null in this direction, and at the same time switches the main antenna signal to the multi-element antenna signal, and detects the multi-element antenna signal and the slave antenna signal until the deceptive interference signal is not detected, then the multi-element antenna signal is used as the GNSS signal, and the GNSS signal and the processed inertial navigation measurement value are optimized using a factor graph to obtain a satellite / inertial combined navigation result that is anti-spoofing interference. This method can be used for precise navigation in complex environments and scenes with deceptive interference. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0018] Figure 1 It is a flowchart of an anti-spoofing and interference navigation method based on satellite / inertial combined navigation in one embodiment; Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a tightly combined factor graph model based on an array antenna GNSS / INS in one embodiment; Figure 3 It is a flowchart of an anti-spoofing and interference navigation method based on satellite / inertial combined navigation in one embodiment; Figure 4 It is a structural block diagram of an anti-spoofing and jamming navigation system based on satellite / inertial combined navigation in one embodiment; Figure 5 FIG. 4 is a diagram showing the internal structure of a computer device in one embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0019] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the present application more clearly understood, the present application is further described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the present application and are not used to limit the present application.

[0020] The main threat faced by existing technologies for navigation based on GNSS signals comes from intentional human interference, which is mainly divided into suppression interference and deceptive interference. Among them, common types of suppression interference include blocking suppression interference, aiming suppression interference and sweeping suppression interference, while deceptive interference includes generative deceptive interference, forwarding deceptive interference, etc. With the application of anti-interference technologies such as frequency domain filtering technology, array anti-interference antenna technology, and pseudo-satellite technology, suppression interference is easily discovered and destroyed by the enemy, which greatly increases the difficulty of suppression interference. Deceptive interference technology has low transmission power and is not easily detected directly by multi-element antennas. The deceptive interference signal controls the flight path of the target aircraft by directly invading the target receiver tracking loop. In this application, Figure 1 As shown, a satellite / inertial combined navigation anti-spoofing interference method based on a multi-element antenna is provided. The method is implemented in an integrated navigation system. The integrated navigation system includes a multi-element antenna, a master-slave antenna, and an inertial navigation measurement unit, wherein the master antenna is arranged at the center of the multi-element antenna. The anti-spoofing interference method specifically includes the following steps: Step S100: An inertial navigation measurement unit receives an inertial navigation measurement value and pre-processes the inertial navigation measurement value to obtain a processed inertial navigation measurement value.

[0021] Step S110: The master-slave antenna receives the navigation signal sent by the satellite, and detects whether there is a deception interference signal based on the received master-slave antenna signal.

[0022] Step S120: If there is a spoofing interference signal, the multi-element antenna searches for the direction of the spoofing interference signal and aligns the null in that direction. At the same time, the main antenna signal is switched to the multi-element antenna signal, and the multi-element antenna signal and the slave antenna signal are detected until no spoofing interference signal is detected. Then, the multi-element antenna signal is used as the GNSS signal.

[0023] Step S130, optimizing the GNSS signal and the processed inertial navigation measurement value by using a factor graph to obtain a satellite / inertial combined navigation result that is resistant to deception and interference.

[0024] In this embodiment, a method mainly used for anti-spoofing interference in GNSS / INS tight integration navigation is proposed. By detecting spoofing interference on dual-antenna observation quantities, making full use of multi-element antennas and INS measurement information, a tight combination method based on factor graph optimization is constructed to realize the anti-spoofing interference function of GNSS / INS tight integration.

[0025] In step S100 and step S110, the inertial navigation measurement unit receives the inertial navigation measurement value and the master and slave antennas receive the navigation signal sent by the satellite synchronously, and the navigation signal received by the master and slave antennas includes the normal navigation signal sent by the satellite, and there may also be artificially constructed satellite navigation spoofing signals to interfere with navigation. Here, the master and slave antenna signals refer to the satellite navigation signals received by the master antenna and the slave antenna respectively.

[0026] In step S110, since the baseline distance between the master antenna and the slave antenna is known, the spoofing interference signal is detected through the differential observation of the master and slave antennas.

[0027] Since many error terms in the GNSS non-differenced observation equations in real satellite navigation signals have strong temporal and spatial correlation, the influence of certain temporal and spatial correlation errors can be eliminated or weakened by taking differences through the synchronous observations of dual antenna receivers. Deception interference is usually the broadcast of multiple satellite signals through one interference signal transmitting antenna. The actual distance of the signal propagating to the dual antenna is related to the interference antenna. The change of single difference between different satellite stations can easily detect deception interference. Single difference between stations refers to the dual antenna (main antenna a and from the antenna b ) for the same satellite ( s ) is used to find the difference between the synchronous observations of .

[0028] set up , under the premise of common receiver clock, the pseudorange and carrier phase single difference observation equations of dual antennas are: (1) (2) In formula (1) and formula (2), is the dual-antenna single-difference geometric distance, which is calculated using the following formula: (3) Furthermore, after detecting whether there is a spoofing interference signal based on the received master and slave antenna signals, if there is no spoofing interference, the GNSS measurement values ​​in the master and slave antenna signals can be directly used for subsequent combined navigation.

[0029] In step S120, if it is detected through the detection of the master and slave antenna signals that a spoofing interference signal exists in the currently received satellite navigation signal, then a multi-element antenna is used for filtering to search for the direction of arrival of the spoofing interference signal. Once the possible direction of arrival is determined, the weighting coefficient of the array element is adjusted to adjust the beam pattern of the multi-element antenna to minimize the output signal in the direction of arrival of the spoofing interference signal, that is, to form a null to achieve filtering of the spoofing interference signal.

[0030] In this embodiment, during the process of searching for the direction of arrival of the deceptive interference signal, the main antenna signal is also switched to the multi-element antenna signal. Since the main antenna is placed at the center of the multi-element antenna, the distance between the multi-element antenna and the slave antenna is also known. The above-mentioned differential observation quantity can be used to detect the deceptive interference signal. If the deceptive interference signal still exists, the multi-element antenna signal is used to search for the direction of arrival of the deceptive interference signal until the deceptive interference signal is no longer detected. The current multi-element antenna signal is used for subsequent navigation to achieve the goal of resisting deceptive interference.

[0031] In this embodiment, if the multi-element antenna searches for the direction of the incoming wave of the deceptive interference signal and aligns the null to the direction, the multi-element antenna signal and the slave antenna signal are detected multiple times within a preset time, and the deceptive interference signal is always detected, the processed inertial navigation measurement value is optimized using a factor graph to obtain a satellite / inertial combined navigation result that is resistant to deceptive interference. That is to say, when the number of deceptive interference is too large or the intensity exceeds the upper limit of the multi-element tolerance, it can be switched to a pure inertial navigation mode.

[0032] In step S130, the GNSS signal and the processed inertial navigation signal are fused and optimized by a factor graph method to obtain a navigation result. The GNSS signal refers to the master-slave antenna signal, i.e., the carrier phase difference measurement value, or the multi-element antenna signal, i.e., the pseudorange and pseudorange change rate measurement value.

[0033] Specifically, when using GNSS / INS collaboration for navigation, any k System state at a moment The definition is as follows: (4) In formula (4), and are the position error and velocity error vectors respectively, Represents the attitude error of the carrier coordinate system relative to the reference coordinate system, is the zero bias of the accelerometer, is the gyroscope bias, It is the GNSS receiver clock error and clock drift.

[0034] Any k Observable quantity at time The definition is as follows: (5) In formula (5), and Respectively i The pseudorange and pseudorange change rate observations of the satellites, and The pseudorange and pseudorange change rate of the first satellite are predicted using INS results, Represents the first GNSS carrier phase differential observation, represents the differential observation of the first carrier phase predicted by the INS result. To simplify the differential positioning model, the above formula (5) assumes that the dual antennas share the same clock and uses the differential observation of single difference between stations.

[0035] Assume that at time k, the set of all state quantities is , the set of all observations is According to statistical theory, the optimal navigation solution can be obtained by solving the maximum a posteriori probability estimate of the state quantity. The corresponding mathematical expression is as follows: (6) In this embodiment, the set of measured values ​​is divided into three independent parts, namely , corresponding to the measurement values ​​of the inertial measurement unit , Pseudorange and pseudorange change rate measurements of array antenna GNSS , dual-antenna GNSS carrier phase differential measurement value The above problem is transformed into a global optimization problem: given the measured values ​​at all times, find the maximum delay probability of the state quantity at all times, that is, (7) Combining the factor graph algorithm, the above estimation problem is described using the probability graph model. The maximum a posteriori probability of the state quantity can be reduced to maximizing the product of all factor nodes: (8) In formula (8), In the factor graph i The factor node at time, Factor Representation and Factor Nodes A collection of connected variable nodes, Nodes usually have two forms: one is a process model factor connected to the system state, and the other is a measurement model factor connected to the measurement value and state value. In this method, INS is modeled as a process model factor. , array antenna and dual antenna modeling are measurement model factors and , under the assumption of Gaussian distribution of noise, the formula can be equivalently converted to: (9) In formula (9), represents the maximum a posteriori probability estimate of the state quantity at the kth moment, represents the inertial navigation measurement value after the processing, represents the measured values ​​of pseudorange and pseudorange change rate in the multi-element antenna signal, represents the carrier phase difference measurement value in the master and slave antenna signals, represents the process model factor modeled according to the inertial measurement unit, as well as They represent the measurement model factors obtained by modeling multi-element antennas and master-slave antennas, respectively. Factor Representation and Factor Nodes A collection of connected variable nodes, represents the error covariance matrix corresponding to the inertial navigation measurement value, represents the error covariance matrix corresponding to the pseudorange and pseudorange rate measurements in the multi-element antenna signal, represents the error covariance matrix corresponding to the carrier phase difference measurement value in the master and slave antenna signals. The factor graph model corresponding to the integrated navigation is as follows: Figure 2 shown.

[0036] Compared with the common Kalman filter, the combined navigation based on factor graph has two main advantages: first, it solves the problem of inconsistency between the update rate of satellite observation data and the update rate of IMU observations; second, in complex environments, the dual antennas or array antennas are interfered with or blocked, resulting in the unusability of satellite observation values ​​such as carrier phase and even pseudorange, while the combined navigation structure remains unchanged, thus realizing the plug-and-play function of GNSS high-precision and anti-interference modules.

[0037] like Figure 3 As shown in FIG. 1 , a flow chart of the method proposed in this paper is shown.

[0038] In the above-mentioned satellite / inertial combined navigation anti-deception interference method based on multi-element antenna, dual-antenna differential observation and inertial navigation system are introduced on the basis of multi-element anti-interference antenna, and a multi-element GNSS / INS tightly integrated navigation anti-deception interference method and device is realized, which can be applied to GNSS / INS combined navigation and other scenarios in complex environments such as suppression interference or deception interference.

[0039] It should be understood that although Figure 1 The steps in the flowchart are shown in sequence as indicated by the arrows, but these steps are not necessarily executed in the order indicated by the arrows. Unless otherwise specified in this document, there is no strict order restriction for the execution of these steps, and these steps can be executed in other orders. Moreover, Figure 1At least part of the steps may include multiple sub-steps or multiple stages. These sub-steps or stages are not necessarily executed at the same time, but can be executed at different times. The execution order of these sub-steps or stages is not necessarily sequential, but can be executed in turn or alternately with other steps or at least part of the sub-steps or stages of other steps.

[0040] In one embodiment, if Figure 4 As shown, a satellite / inertial combined navigation anti-deception interference system based on a multi-element antenna is also provided, the system comprising: a multi-element antenna, a master-slave antenna, an inertial navigation measurement unit, a dual-antenna GNSS receiver, a multi-element anti-interference processing unit, an interference detection unit and a factor graph optimization unit.

[0041] Among them, the main antenna is arranged at the center of the multi-element antenna, the inertial navigation measurement unit and the multi-element antenna are fixedly installed, the outputs of the master-slave antenna are connected to the inputs of the dual-antenna GNSS receiver, the outputs of the multi-element anti-interference processing unit and the main antenna output are connected to the dual-antenna GNSS receiver through RF selection, the output of the multi-element anti-interference processing unit is connected to the interference detection unit, and the outputs of the interference detection unit, the dual-antenna GNSS receiver and the inertial navigation measurement unit are all connected to the factor graph optimization unit.

[0042] The inertial navigation measurement unit is used to receive the inertial navigation measurement value, pre-process the inertial navigation measurement value to obtain the processed inertial navigation measurement value, and output the processed inertial navigation measurement value to the factor graph optimization unit.

[0043] The dual-antenna GNSS receiver is used to receive navigation signals sent by satellites through master and slave antennas, and detect whether there are deception interference signals based on the received master and slave antenna signals.

[0044] If there is a deceptive interference signal, the multi-element anti-interference processing unit will search for the direction of the deceptive interference signal through the multi-element antenna and align the null in this direction. At the same time, the main antenna signal is switched to the multi-element antenna signal, and the interference detection unit detects the multi-element antenna signal and the slave antenna signal until the deceptive interference signal is no longer detected. The multi-element antenna signal is then output as a GNSS signal to the factor graph optimization unit.

[0045] The factor graph optimization unit is used to optimize the GNSS signal and the processed inertial navigation measurement value by using the factor graph to obtain a satellite / inertial combined navigation result that is resistant to deception and interference.

[0046] In this embodiment, the installation positions of the multi-element antenna, the dual antenna, namely the master-slave antenna and the INS sensor are relatively fixed. The INS sensor belongs to an inertial navigation measurement unit and is used to receive inertial navigation measurement data.

[0047] In this embodiment, the distance between the master antenna and the slave antenna is 1 meter. In one embodiment, the master and slave antennas support B1 / L1 frequency signals, and the distance between the master and slave antennas is at least greater than 0.2 meters.

[0048] Specifically, the INS sensor is fixedly installed with the multi-element antenna, the output of the four-element anti-interference processing module and the main antenna output are connected to the dual-antenna GNSS receiver through RF gating, and the dual-antenna GNSS receiver is connected to various GNSS antennas through RF cables and does not need to be fixedly installed with the INS sensor.

[0049] In this embodiment, if Figure 4 As shown, the multi-element antenna is a four-element antenna, the four-element antenna is arranged in a square, and the main antenna is located at the center of the square.

[0050] In this embodiment, the master-slave antenna and the multi-element antenna receive the B1I navigation signal of Beidou, and the inertial navigation measurement unit receives the L1CA signal of GPS.

[0051] For the specific definition of the satellite / inertial combined navigation anti-deception interference system based on multi-element antennas, please refer to the definition of the satellite / inertial combined navigation anti-deception interference method based on multi-element antennas above, which will not be repeated here. Each unit in the above-mentioned satellite / inertial combined navigation anti-deception interference system based on multi-element antennas can be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware and a combination thereof. The above-mentioned modules can be embedded in or independent of the processor in the computer device in the form of hardware, or can be stored in the memory of the computer device in the form of software, so that the processor can call and execute the operations corresponding to the above-mentioned modules.

[0052] The above-mentioned satellite / inertial combined navigation anti-deception interference system based on multi-element antennas uses a factor graph optimization framework to deeply integrate interference detection, dual-antenna GNSS ultra-short baselines, inertial measurement values ​​and other factors. Through the four-element antenna and the corresponding anti-interference processing module, on the one hand, three or less suppression interferences can be detected and suppressed; on the other hand, an adaptive zeroing pattern is formed in the airspace, which can be used to suppress potential deception interference. The GNSS ultra-short mobile baseline formed by the dual antenna, on the one hand, by capturing and tracking the GNSS public signal, the code phase, carrier phase and Doppler measurement values ​​can be obtained, and the azimuth and pitch angles can be solved; on the other hand, deception interference can be detected through differential observations and fixed baseline length constraints. When the deception interference signal is detected, the main antenna is switched to the four-element channel to assist the four-element antenna to complete the search and suppression of the interference signal wave direction. When the number or strength of the interference signal exceeds the upper limit of the four-element tolerance, it can be switched to the pure inertial navigation mode. The switching of the above-mentioned usage scenarios is realized by the factor graph optimization algorithm without changing the overall algorithm architecture. Research on the deep fusion method of GNSS mobile baseline + array anti-interference + INS information to achieve information fusion at multiple levels such as antenna, spatial filtering, observation information and navigation status information.

[0053] In one embodiment, a computer device is provided. The computer device may be a terminal, and its internal structure diagram may be as follows: Figure 5 As shown. The computer device includes a processor, a memory, a network interface, a display screen and an input device connected through a system bus. Among them, the processor of the computer device is used to provide computing and control capabilities. The memory of the computer device includes a non-volatile storage medium and an internal memory. The non-volatile storage medium stores an operating system and a computer program. The internal memory provides an environment for the operation of the operating system and the computer program in the non-volatile storage medium. The network interface of the computer device is used to communicate with an external terminal through a network connection. When the computer program is executed by the processor, a satellite / inertial combined navigation anti-deception interference method based on a multi-element antenna is implemented. The display screen of the computer device can be a liquid crystal display screen or an electronic ink display screen, and the input device of the computer device can be a touch layer covering the display screen, or a button, trackball or touchpad set on the computer device housing, or an external keyboard, touchpad or mouse, etc.

[0054] Those skilled in the art will understand that Figure 5 The structure shown in the figure is only a block diagram of a part of the structure related to the solution of the present application, and does not constitute a limitation on the computer device to which the solution of the present application is applied. The specific computer device may include more or fewer components than those shown in the figure, or combine certain components, or have a different arrangement of components.

[0055] In one embodiment, a computer device is provided, including a memory and a processor, wherein a computer program is stored in the memory, and when the processor executes the computer program, the following steps are implemented: The inertial navigation measurement unit receives the inertial navigation measurement value, and pre-processes the inertial navigation measurement value to obtain a processed inertial navigation measurement value; The master-slave antenna receives the navigation signal sent by the satellite, and detects whether there is a deception interference signal according to the received master-slave antenna signal; If there is a spoofing interference signal, the multi-element antenna searches for the direction of the spoofing interference signal and aligns the null in the direction, and at the same time switches the main antenna signal to the multi-element antenna signal, and detects the multi-element antenna signal and the slave antenna signal until no spoofing interference signal is detected, and then uses the multi-element antenna signal as the GNSS signal; The GNSS signal and the processed inertial navigation measurement value are optimized by using a factor graph to obtain a satellite / inertial combined navigation result that is resistant to deception and interference.

[0056] In one embodiment, a computer readable storage medium is provided, on which a computer program is stored, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the following steps are implemented: The inertial navigation measurement unit receives the inertial navigation measurement value, and pre-processes the inertial navigation measurement value to obtain a processed inertial navigation measurement value; The master-slave antenna receives the navigation signal sent by the satellite, and detects whether there is a deception interference signal according to the received master-slave antenna signal; If there is a spoofing interference signal, the multi-element antenna searches for the direction of the spoofing interference signal and aligns the null in the direction, and at the same time switches the main antenna signal to the multi-element antenna signal, and detects the multi-element antenna signal and the slave antenna signal until no spoofing interference signal is detected, and then uses the multi-element antenna signal as the GNSS signal; The GNSS signal and the processed inertial navigation measurement value are optimized by using a factor graph to obtain a satellite / inertial combined navigation result that is resistant to deception and interference.

[0057] Those of ordinary skill in the art can understand that all or part of the processes in the above-mentioned embodiment methods can be implemented by instructing the relevant hardware through a computer program, and the computer program can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium. When the computer program is executed, it can include the processes of the embodiments of the above-mentioned methods. Among them, any reference to memory, storage, database or other media used in the embodiments provided in this application may include non-volatile and / or volatile memory. Non-volatile memory may include read-only memory (ROM), programmable ROM (PROM), electrically programmable ROM (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM) or flash memory. Volatile memory may include random access memory (RAM) or external cache memory. By way of illustration and not limitation, RAM is available in many forms, such as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), double data rate SDRAM (DDRSDRAM), enhanced SDRAM (ESDRAM), synchronous link (Synchlink) DRAM (SLDRAM), memory bus (Rambus) direct RAM (RDRAM), direct memory bus dynamic RAM (DRDRAM), and memory bus dynamic RAM (RDRAM), etc.

[0058] The technical features of the above embodiments may be combined arbitrarily. To make the description concise, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this specification.

[0059] The above-mentioned embodiments only express several implementation methods of the present application, and the descriptions thereof are relatively specific and detailed, but they cannot be understood as limiting the scope of the invention patent. It should be pointed out that, for a person of ordinary skill in the art, several variations and improvements can be made without departing from the concept of the present application, and these all belong to the protection scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the patent of the present application shall be subject to the attached claims.

Claims

1. A satellite / inertial combined navigation anti-spoofing interference method based on multi-element antenna, characterized in that: The method is implemented in an integrated navigation system, the integrated navigation system includes a multi-element antenna, a master-slave antenna and an inertial navigation measurement unit, wherein the master antenna is arranged at the center of the multi-element antenna, and the method includes: The inertial navigation measurement unit receives the inertial navigation measurement value, and pre-processes the inertial navigation measurement value to obtain a processed inertial navigation measurement value; The master-slave antenna receives the navigation signal sent by the satellite, and detects whether there is a deception interference signal according to the received master-slave antenna signal; If there is a spoofing interference signal, the multi-element antenna searches for the direction of the spoofing interference signal and aligns the null in the direction, and at the same time switches the main antenna signal to the multi-element antenna signal, and detects the multi-element antenna signal and the slave antenna signal until no spoofing interference signal is detected, and then uses the multi-element antenna signal as the GNSS signal; The GNSS signal and the processed inertial navigation measurement value are optimized by using a factor graph to obtain a satellite / inertial combined navigation result that is resistant to deception and interference.

2. The satellite / inertial combined navigation anti-spoofing interference method according to claim 1, characterized in that: When detecting whether a deceptive interference signal exists according to the received master-slave antenna signals, the deceptive interference signal is detected by differential observations of the master-slave antennas.

3. The satellite / inertial combined navigation anti-spoofing interference method according to claim 2, characterized in that: After detecting whether there is a deception interference signal based on the received master-slave antenna signal, if there is no deception interference, the master-slave antenna signal is used as the GNSS signal.

4. The satellite / inertial combined navigation anti-spoofing interference method according to claim 3, characterized in that: If the multi-element antenna searches for the incoming wave direction of the deception interference signal and aligns the null in this direction, the multi-element antenna signal and the slave antenna signal are detected within a preset time, and the deception interference signal is detected, the processed inertial navigation measurement value is optimized using a factor graph to obtain a satellite / inertial combined navigation result that is resistant to deception interference.

5. The satellite / inertial combined navigation anti-spoofing interference method according to claim 4, characterized in that: When factor graph is used for optimization, the optimization process is expressed as: In the above formula, represents the maximum a posteriori probability estimate of the state quantity at the kth moment, represents the inertial navigation measurement value after the processing, represents the measured values ​​of pseudorange and pseudorange change rate in the multi-element antenna signal, represents the carrier phase difference measurement value in the master and slave antenna signals, represents the process model factor modeled according to the inertial measurement unit, as well as They represent the measurement model factors obtained by modeling multi-element antennas and master-slave antennas, respectively. Factor Representation and Factor Nodes A collection of connected variable nodes, represents the error covariance matrix corresponding to the inertial navigation measurement value, represents the error covariance matrix corresponding to the pseudorange and pseudorange rate measurements in the multi-element antenna signal, Represents the error covariance matrix corresponding to the carrier phase difference measurement values ​​in the master and slave antenna signals.

6. A satellite / inertial combined navigation anti-spoofing jamming system based on multi-element antenna, characterized in that: The system comprises: a multi-element antenna, a master-slave antenna, an inertial navigation measurement unit, a dual-antenna GNSS receiver, a multi-element anti-interference processing unit, an interference detection unit and a factor graph optimization unit; Wherein, the main antenna is arranged at the center of the multi-element antenna, the inertial navigation measurement unit is fixedly installed with the multi-element antenna, the output of the master-slave antenna is connected with the input of the dual-antenna GNSS receiver, the output of the multi-element anti-interference processing unit and the main antenna output are connected with the dual-antenna GNSS receiver through radio frequency gating, the output of the multi-element anti-interference processing unit is connected to the interference detection unit, and the outputs of the interference detection unit, the dual-antenna GNSS receiver and the inertial navigation measurement unit are all connected to the factor graph optimization unit; The inertial navigation measurement unit is used to receive the inertial navigation measurement value, pre-process the inertial navigation measurement value to obtain a processed inertial navigation measurement value, and output the processed inertial navigation measurement value to the factor graph optimization unit; The dual-antenna GNSS receiver is used to receive navigation signals sent by satellites through the master and slave antennas, and detect whether there are deception interference signals based on the received master and slave antenna signals; If there is a deceptive interference signal, the multi-element anti-interference processing unit searches for the direction of the deceptive interference signal through the multi-element antenna and aligns the null to the direction, and at the same time switches the main antenna signal to the multi-element antenna signal, and the interference detection unit detects the multi-element antenna signal and the slave antenna signal until no deceptive interference signal is detected, and then outputs the multi-element antenna signal as a GNSS signal to the factor graph optimization unit; The factor graph optimization unit is used to optimize the GNSS signal and the processed inertial navigation measurement value using the factor graph to obtain a satellite / inertial combined navigation result that is resistant to deception and interference.

7. The satellite / inertial integrated navigation anti-spoofing jamming system according to claim 6, characterized in that: The distance between the main antenna and the slave antenna is 1 meter.

8. The satellite / inertial integrated navigation anti-spoofing jamming system according to claim 7, characterized in that: The multi-element antenna is a four-element antenna; The four-element antennas are arranged in a square, and the main antenna is located at the center of the square.

9. The satellite / inertial combined navigation anti-spoofing jamming system according to any one of claims 7-8, characterized in that: The master-slave antenna and the multi-element antenna receive the B1I navigation signal of Beidou, and the inertial navigation measurement unit receives the L1CA signal of GPS.

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