Method and device for accessing router based on trusted computing

Abstract

The invention relates to a method and a device for accessing a router based on trusted computing. The method comprises the following steps: generating a target message according to route updating information of a router sender; carrying out integrity measurement on software and hardware configuration of the router platform through the trusted root to obtain current platform configuration information of the router platform; according to the initial platform configuration information and the current platform configuration information, head information of the target message and the current platform configuration information are signed, and the target message attached with a signature result is sent to a router receiver, so that the router receiver determines that the behavior of a router sender is credible according to the initial platform configuration information and the current platform configuration information, the behavior credibility means that the router sender is not maliciously invaded or no software and hardware errors of the router sender cause harm to the network. According to the method, the configuration of the router platform is ensured not to be tampered through trusted computing, and the transmission authenticity of the routing update information is ensured through signature, so that the network security is realized.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of trusted computing technology, and in particular to a method and device for accessing a router based on trusted computing. Background Art

[0002] In today's digital age, routers are the key hubs that connect various network environments such as homes and enterprises with the Internet. Their importance is self-evident. With the rapid development of network technology and people's increasing dependence on the network, the security situation faced by routers is becoming increasingly severe, and they are subject to various attack threats from all sides. The main attack methods are as follows.

[0003] (1) Man-in-the-middle attack.

[0004] Fake access point attack: The attacker sets up a fake wireless access point, whose signal strength and name may be similar to the legitimate router. When the user device searches for and tries to connect to this fake access point, the attacker can intercept and tamper with the data between the user and the real router. For example, in a public place, the attacker names the fake access point "Free-WiFi" to attract users to connect, and then steals sensitive information such as bank account numbers and passwords entered by users online.

[0005] ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) spoofing attack: In a LAN environment, the attacker sends fake ARP messages to deceive the user's device and router, causing them to send data to the attacker's device. In this way, the attacker can obtain the data transmitted between the user and the router, including but not limited to web browsing content, file transfer data, etc.

[0006] (2) Malware attacks.

[0007] Infected connected device attacks: When a device connected to a router (such as a mobile phone, computer, etc.) is infected with malware, the malware may exploit the relationship between the device and the router to attack the router. For example, the malware may try to scan the router for vulnerabilities, then use these vulnerabilities to invade the router, gain control of the router, and then tamper with the network settings, steal user information, etc.

[0008] Firmware vulnerability attacks: Router firmware is the software that manages the functions of a router. If there are vulnerabilities in the firmware, attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities to implant malware into the router. For example, some older versions of router firmware may have buffer overflow vulnerabilities. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability to implant malicious code into the router by sending carefully constructed data packets, and then perform arbitrary operations, such as modifying DNS (Domain Name System) settings and directing users to malicious websites.

[0009] Therefore, current routers are vulnerable to various attacks and cannot guarantee network security. Summary of the invention

[0010] The present application provides a method and device for accessing a router based on trusted computing to solve the problem that network security cannot be guaranteed.

[0011] In a first aspect, the present application provides a method for accessing a router based on trusted computing, characterized in that the method comprises:

[0012] Generate a target message according to routing update information of a router sender, wherein the router sender has an authentication certificate issued by a trusted third party based on initial platform configuration information, and the initial platform configuration information is used to indicate the platform configuration state of the router sender when it first registers with the network;

[0013] Performing integrity measurement on the software and hardware configuration of its own router platform through the trusted root to obtain the current platform configuration information of the router platform, wherein the current platform configuration information is used to indicate the current platform configuration status;

[0014] The header information of the target message and the current platform configuration information are signed, and the target message with the signature result is sent to the router receiver, so that the router receiver determines that the behavior of the router sender is credible according to the initial platform configuration information and the current platform configuration information, wherein credible behavior means that the router sender has not been maliciously invaded or has not caused any software or hardware errors to cause harm to the network.

[0015] Optionally, before generating the target message according to the routing update information of the router sender, the method further includes:

[0016] The integrity of the software and hardware configuration of the router platform is measured through the trusted root to obtain the initial platform configuration information of the router platform;

[0017] Obtaining a metric log, wherein the metric log includes a record of integrity measurements during startup and operation of the router platform;

[0018] Sending the initial platform configuration information and the measurement log to the trusted third party, so that the trusted third party verifies the initial platform configuration information based on the measurement log, and stores the initial platform configuration information after the verification is passed;

[0019] Obtain an authentication certificate issued by the trusted third party based on the verified initial platform configuration information.

[0020] Optionally, signing the header information of the target message and the current platform configuration information includes:

[0021] Performing hash calculation on the header information of the target message;

[0022] Perform hash calculation on the hash value of the header information and the current platform configuration information to obtain a signature hash value;

[0023] The signature hash value is signed using its own private key.

[0024] In a second aspect, the present application provides a method for accessing a router based on trusted computing, which is applied to a router receiver, and the method includes:

[0025] Obtain the authentication certificate, current platform configuration information, and signed target message sent by the router sender;

[0026] Determining through the authentication certificate that the router sender is a legitimate router verified by a trusted third party;

[0027] Determining that the behavior of the router sender is credible through the initial platform configuration information and the current platform configuration information in the authentication certificate;

[0028] The signed target message is used to determine that the route update information has not been tampered with during transmission.

[0029] Optionally, determining, through the authentication certificate, that the router sender is a legitimate router verified by a trusted third party includes:

[0030] Decrypting the authentication certificate using the pre-stored public key of the trusted third party, wherein the authentication certificate has been encrypted using the private key of the trusted third party;

[0031] If the decryption is successful, it is determined that the router sender is a legitimate router verified by the trusted third party.

[0032] Optionally, determining that the behavior of the router sender is credible through the initial platform configuration information and the current platform configuration information in the authentication certificate includes:

[0033] Obtaining initial platform configuration information of the router sender from the authentication certificate;

[0034] If the current platform configuration information successfully matches the initial platform configuration information, it is determined that the behavior of the router sender is credible.

[0035] Optionally, determining, by means of the signed target message, that the route update information has not been tampered with during transmission includes:

[0036] Decrypt the signed target message using the pre-stored public key of the router sender to obtain an initial signature hash value, wherein the public key is distributed by the router sender after obtaining the authentication certificate;

[0037] Extracting the header information and current platform configuration information of the target message from the signed target message, and performing a hash operation according to the same hash algorithm as the router sender to obtain a new signature hash value;

[0038] If the initial signature hash value matches the new signature hash value, it is determined that the target message has not been tampered with during transmission.

[0039] Optionally, before using the pre-stored public key of the trusted third party to decrypt the authentication certificate, the method further includes:

[0040] Obtaining a message broadcast by a third party during an initialization phase, wherein the message includes a public key of the third party and a non-interactive proof value;

[0041] The public key of the third party is verified by using the non-interactive proof value to determine that the third party is a trusted third party.

[0042] In a third aspect, the present application provides a device for accessing a router based on trusted computing, which is applied to a router sender, and the device includes:

[0043] A generating module, configured to generate a target message according to routing update information of a router sender, wherein the router sender has an authentication certificate issued by a trusted third party based on initial platform configuration information, and the initial platform configuration information is used to indicate a platform configuration state when the router sender first registers a network;

[0044] A measurement module, used to measure the integrity of the software and hardware configuration of its own router platform through a trusted root, and obtain the current platform configuration information of the router platform, wherein the current platform configuration information is used to indicate the current platform configuration state;

[0045] The signature module is used to sign the header information of the target message and the current platform configuration information, and send the target message with the signature result to the router receiver, so that the router receiver determines that the behavior of the router sender is credible based on the initial platform configuration information and the current platform configuration information, wherein the credible behavior means that the router sender has not been maliciously invaded or has not caused any software or hardware errors to cause harm to the network.

[0046] In a fourth aspect, the present application provides a device for accessing a router based on trusted computing, which is applied to a router receiving party, and the device includes:

[0047] The acquisition module is used to obtain the authentication certificate, current platform configuration information and signed target message sent by the router sender;

[0048] A first determination module, configured to determine, through the authentication certificate, that the router sender is a legitimate router verified by a trusted third party;

[0049] A second determination module, configured to determine that the behavior of the router sender is credible through the initial platform configuration information and the current platform configuration information in the authentication certificate;

[0050] The third determination module is used to determine that the routing update information has not been tampered with during the transmission process through the signed target message.

[0051] In a fifth aspect, the present application provides an electronic device comprising: at least one communication interface; at least one bus connected to the at least one communication interface; at least one processor connected to the at least one bus; and at least one memory connected to the at least one bus.

[0052] In a sixth aspect, the present application further provides a computer storage medium storing computer executable instructions, wherein the computer executable instructions are used to execute the method for accessing a router based on trusted computing as described in any one of the above items of the present application.

[0053] The above technical solution provided by the embodiment of the present application has the following advantages over the prior art: only routers holding authentication certificates can join the network, reducing the risk of illegal device intrusion, continuously measuring the software and hardware configuration of the router platform through the trusted root, and preventing the status of the router platform and its configuration from being tampered with based on the comparison of the platform configuration information. In addition, by signing the header information of the target message and the current platform configuration information, it is ensured that the routing update information will not be maliciously attacked and tampered with during the transmission process, and the receiver can verify the signature to confirm the authenticity and integrity of the data. The present application ensures that the configuration of the router platform has not been tampered with through trusted computing, and ensures the authenticity of the transmission of routing update information through signatures, thereby achieving network security. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0054] The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and constitute a part of this specification, illustrate embodiments consistent with the present application and, together with the description, serve to explain the principles of the present application.

[0055] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, for ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying any creative labor.

[0056] One or more embodiments are exemplarily described by pictures in the corresponding drawings, and these exemplified descriptions do not constitute limitations on the embodiments. Elements with the same reference numerals in the drawings represent similar elements, and unless otherwise stated, the figures in the drawings do not constitute proportional limitations.

[0057] Figure 1 A flow chart of a method for accessing a router based on trusted computing provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0058] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the structure of an LSU message provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0059] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the structure of a public key link broadcast message provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0060] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of the functional modules of a router node provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0061] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of the structure of a device for accessing a router based on trusted computing provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0062] Figure 6 A schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0063] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the embodiments of the present application clearer, the technical solution in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present application, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative work are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0064] The disclosure below provides many different embodiments or examples to realize the different structures of the present application. In order to simplify the disclosure of the present application, the parts and settings of specific examples are described below. Of course, they are only examples, and the purpose is not to limit the present application. In addition, the present application can repeat reference numbers and / or letters in different examples. This repetition is for the purpose of simplification and clarity, and does not itself indicate the relationship between the various embodiments and / or settings discussed.

[0065] In order to solve the problem mentioned in the background technology, according to one aspect of the embodiments of the present application, an embodiment of an access router based on trusted computing is provided.

[0066] The following will be combined with specific implementation methods to provide a method for accessing a router based on trusted computing provided by an embodiment of the present application in detail, which is applied to a router sender or a router receiver, such as Figure 1 As shown, the specific steps are as follows:

[0067] Step 101: Generate a target message according to routing update information of a router sender, wherein the router sender has an authentication certificate issued by a trusted third party based on initial platform configuration information, and the initial platform configuration information is used to indicate the platform configuration state when the router sender first registers the network;

[0068] Step 102: perform integrity measurement on the software and hardware configuration of the router platform itself through the trusted root to obtain the current platform configuration information of the router platform, wherein the current platform configuration information is used to indicate the current platform configuration status;

[0069] Step 103: Sign the header information and current platform configuration information of the target message, and send the target message with the signature result to the router receiver, so that the router receiver determines that the behavior of the router sender is credible based on the initial platform configuration information and the current platform configuration information, where credible behavior means that the router sender has not been maliciously invaded or has not caused any software or hardware errors to cause harm to the network.

[0070] In this application, the method of using trusted computing to access the router is implemented based on the routing algorithm model. The following two conditions must be met before step 101: 1) The routing nodes in the algorithm are all configured with TPCM (Trusted Platform Control Module) and have corresponding software support; 2) There is a trusted third party, and each router applying to enter the autonomous system must obtain an authentication certificate from the trusted third party to ensure that the platform configuration when the router initially joins the network is trusted.

[0071] Among them, the routing algorithm model can be a TC-OSPF (Traffic Engineering Open Shortest Path First) routing algorithm model. This model introduces the concept of traffic engineering based on the OSPF protocol, allowing network administrators to more accurately control the transmission path of data packets, thereby improving network efficiency and performance.

[0072] The sending router builds a target message based on the routing update information it currently obtains (such as new link status, topology changes, etc.). This message will be used to notify other routers in the network about changes in the network structure or path to ensure that all routers have the latest routing information.

[0073] The sending router holds an authentication certificate issued by a trusted third party (TTP) based on its initial platform configuration information. By using the authentication certificate issued by the TTP, it is ensured that only authorized and legitimate routers can join the network and participate in communications. Any attempt to forge an identity will fail due to the inability to provide a valid certificate. This application establishes a trust chain from the TTP to each router, enhancing the mutual trust between network members and making the entire network more secure and reliable. In addition, the authentication certificate not only confirms the identity of the router, but also contains the platform configuration status when it first registered the network. These initial platform configuration information is obtained by measuring key components such as BIOS (Basic Input / Output System), firmware, and operating system kernel during the startup process, ensuring that the configuration of the router when joining the network is credible and secure.

[0074] Then, the sending router uses the built-in root of trust, such as TPCM, to measure the integrity of its own hardware and software configuration. The integrity measurement covers all components from BIOS, firmware to the operating system kernel and key applications, and then expands the hash value of the measurement result to the corresponding PCR (Platform Configuration Register) to form a cumulative, tamper-proof state record, thereby obtaining the current platform configuration information. Whenever a key component changes (such as loading a new driver or application), TPCM will re-measure and update the corresponding PCR value. Therefore, the current platform configuration information reflects the current complete platform configuration status of the router and reflects the latest status of the router during actual operation.

[0075] The sending router uses its private key to digitally sign the header information and platform configuration information of the target message. This signing process ensures the authenticity and integrity of the data, prevents man-in-the-middle attacks and other forms of data tampering, and finally sends the message containing the signature result to the receiving router. The receiver can verify the identity of the sending router and the authenticity of its platform configuration by verifying the signature. The receiver determines whether the router platform status and its configuration have been tampered with, or whether the platform runs illegal programs, based on the initial platform configuration information (obtained through the authentication certificate) and the current platform configuration information (obtained through signature verification) provided by the sender, thereby verifying whether the sender's behavior is credible. The so-called credible behavior means that the router has not been maliciously invaded or has not caused its own software and hardware errors to cause harm to the network.

[0076] Optionally, the target message of the present application is an LSU message, and the structure of the LSU message is as follows: Figure 2 As shown in FIG. 1 , the use of LSU messages can resist sequence number attacks and maximum age attacks.

[0077] In this application, only routers with authentication certificates can join the network, reducing the risk of illegal device intrusion. The software and hardware configuration of the router platform is continuously measured through the trusted root, and the status of the router platform and its configuration are prevented from being tampered with based on the comparison of platform configuration information. In addition, by signing the header information of the target message and the current platform configuration information, it is ensured that the routing update information will not be maliciously attacked and tampered with during the transmission process. The receiver can verify the signature to confirm the authenticity and integrity of the data. This application ensures that the configuration of the router platform has not been tampered with through trusted computing, and ensures the authenticity of the transmission of routing update information through signatures, thereby achieving network security.

[0078] The access authentication method of traditional wireless routers may be at risk of being cracked or forged. Based on trusted computing technology, this application can use hardware-level security modules (such as trusted platform modules TPM) to perform stricter authentication on the identity of connected devices. For example, the device is authenticated through a unique key stored in a trusted root to ensure that only legitimate and authorized devices can access the wireless router, preventing the intrusion of illegal devices, greatly improving the security and reliability of identity authentication.

[0079] As an optional implementation, the process of the router sender obtaining the authentication certificate from the trusted third party includes the following:

[0080] Step S11: perform integrity measurement on the software and hardware configuration of the router platform itself through the trusted root to obtain the initial platform configuration information of the router platform;

[0081] Step S12: Obtaining a measurement log, wherein the measurement log includes a record of integrity measurements during startup and operation of the router platform;

[0082] Step S13: sending the initial platform configuration information and the measurement log to a trusted third party, so that the trusted third party verifies the initial platform configuration information based on the measurement log, and stores the initial platform configuration information after the verification is passed;

[0083] Step S14: Obtain an authentication certificate issued by a trusted third party based on the verified initial platform configuration information.

[0084] When the router is first started or registered, the built-in root of trust is used to perform a comprehensive integrity measurement of the software and hardware configuration of the router platform. This process ensures that the router is secure and has not been tampered with in its initial state. The measurement results constitute the initial platform configuration information, which accurately reflects the platform configuration state of the router when it is first started or registered with the network, including hash values ​​and status summaries of all key components.

[0085] The root of trust not only measures at startup, but also continuously monitors the status changes of key components during the entire operation, and records the results of each measurement in the measurement log, which records in detail all integrity measurements of the router from startup to the current operation. The measurement log usually contains the timestamp of each measurement, the measurement object (such as BIOS, firmware, operating system kernel, etc.), the measurement value (hash value), and any abnormal detection results.

[0086] The router sends the initial platform configuration information and the complete measurement log to the trusted third party TTP through a secure channel. This process ensures that the data will not be tampered with or leaked during transmission. After receiving the data, the TTP will recalculate the hash value of the initial platform configuration information based on the historical records in the measurement log and compare it with the received initial platform configuration information. If the two are consistent, it means that the initial platform configuration of the router is credible and no unauthorized changes have occurred. After verification, the TTP stores the initial platform configuration information in its database as the basis for future verification of the router.

[0087] After the TTP passes the verification, it will issue an authentication certificate to the router based on the initial platform configuration information. The certificate contains the router's identity information and the measurement results of the initial platform configuration to confirm its legitimacy and credibility. After the sender holds this certificate, it can prove its identity and the credibility of its platform configuration to other network members in future communications. The receiver can verify the sender's identity and whether its platform configuration meets the expected security standards by verifying the certificate.

[0088] After the router initiator applies for a certificate, it uses the reliable distribution mechanism of LSA (Link State Advertisement) - flooding to distribute its public key to other routers to ensure that every router that receives its LSA can receive its public key, so that these routers can verify the signature message sent by the initiator. Among them, LSA is defined using the public key link broadcast message PKLSA (Public Key Link State Advertisement). The structure of PKLSA is as follows: Figure 3 shown.

[0089] As an optional implementation, in step 103, signing the header information of the target message and the current platform configuration information includes the following steps:

[0090] Step S21: performing hash calculation on the header information of the target message;

[0091] Step S22: Hash the hash value of the header information and the current platform configuration information to obtain a signature hash value;

[0092] Step S23: Use its own private key to sign the signature hash value.

[0093] The sending router first selects a secure hash algorithm (such as SHA-256 or SHA-3) to generate a unique and irreversible hash value. This algorithm ensures that even a slight change in the input will result in a completely different output hash value. The sender extracts the header information from the target message, including but not limited to the version number, type, length, sending router ID and other fields, and then uses the selected secure hash algorithm to hash the header information to obtain a fixed-length hash value. This hash value uniquely identifies the content of the header information. Any tampering with the header information will change the hash value. Next, the sender combines the header information hash value with the current platform configuration information (such as the measurement results in the PCR register). This step ensures that the signature not only covers the message header information, but also includes the current status of the router platform. The same secure hash algorithm is used again to hash the combined data to obtain the final signature hash value. This signature hash value comprehensively reflects the status of the target message header information and platform configuration information, ensuring the integrity and consistency of the two. Finally, the sending router uses its private key to digitally sign the above signature hash value. The private key signature ensures that only the recipient holding the corresponding public key can verify the validity of the signature, thereby ensuring the authenticity and non-repudiation of the signature. The signing process generates a digital signature, which is attached to the target message and sent to the recipient. The digital signature not only proves the source of the message, but also ensures that the message content has not been tampered with during transmission.

[0094] In this application, by performing two hash calculations and signing on the header information and platform configuration information, it is ensured that the routing update information will not be maliciously attacked or tampered with during transmission, and the receiver can verify the signature to confirm the authenticity and integrity of the data; by signing with a private key, it is ensured that only the legitimate sender can generate a valid signature, and any attempt to forge a signature will fail due to the inability to provide the correct private key.

[0095] As an optional implementation, the functional steps of the router receiver include:

[0096] Step S31: Obtain the authentication certificate, current platform configuration information and signed target message sent by the router sender;

[0097] Step S32: Determine through the authentication certificate that the router sender is a legitimate router verified by a trusted third party;

[0098] Step S33: Determine that the behavior of the router sender is credible through the initial platform configuration information and the current platform configuration information in the authentication certificate;

[0099] Step S34: Determine through the signed target message that the route update information has not been tampered with during the transmission process.

[0100] The receiving router receives three key pieces of information from the sending router: the authentication certificate, the current platform configuration information, and the signed target message. Among them, the authentication certificate: a certificate issued by a trusted third party (TTP) that confirms the identity of the sending router and its initial platform configuration information; the current platform configuration information: reflects the latest status of the sending router during actual operation, usually including the measurement results in the PCR register; the signed target message: a target message containing routing update information, which has been digitally signed by the sender's private key.

[0101] By verifying the authentication certificate issued by a trusted third party (TTP), it ensures that only authorized and legitimate routers can join the network and participate in communications. Any attempt to forge an identity will fail due to the inability to provide a valid certificate. A trust chain is established from the TTP to each router, enhancing mutual trust between network members and making the entire network more secure and reliable.

[0102] By comparing the initial platform configuration information with the current platform configuration information, it ensures that the platform configuration state of the sending router during its actual operation is always kept in a known good state, preventing potential threats from malicious code or unauthorized modifications. It not only verifies the identity of the router, but also ensures that its behavior is trustworthy, that is, the router can only perform predefined, safe operations and will not pose a potential threat to the network.

[0103] By verifying the signed target message, it is ensured that the routing update information has not been tampered with during transmission. The receiver can verify the signature to confirm the authenticity and integrity of the data. Compared with directly signing the original data, calculating the hash value before signing improves efficiency while ensuring security.

[0104] Among them, in step S32, determining that the router sender is a legitimate router verified by a trusted third party through the authentication certificate includes: using a pre-stored public key of a trusted third party to decrypt the authentication certificate, wherein the authentication certificate has been encrypted using a private key of a trusted third party; if the decryption is successful, it is determined that the router sender is a legitimate router verified by a trusted third party.

[0105] The third party will perform a series of initialization work at the beginning of the system, generate its own public key, private key and non-interactive proof value to verify the correctness of the public key, and broadcast its own public key and non-interactive proof value in the network. After receiving the broadcast message, the router node in the network uses the non-interactive proof value to verify the public key of the third party, and confirm that the third party is a trusted third party. Only then will the trusted third party issue an authentication certificate to the router newly joining the network. The authentication certificate is encrypted with the private key of the trusted third party, so that other routers can use the public key of the trusted third party to decrypt the certificate of the router that joins the network again to verify the reliability of the router.

[0106] When the router enters the network again, it needs to show its authentication certificate to other routers, and other routers verify the authenticity of the authentication certificate. The process of the receiver verifying the authentication certificate is as follows: the receiver pre-stores the public key of the trusted third party according to the broadcast message of the trusted third party. After the receiver receives the authentication certificate encrypted with the private key of the trusted third party, it uses the pre-stored TTP public key to decrypt the signature information in the authentication certificate. If the decryption is successful, it means that the signature is indeed generated by TTP using its private key. In addition, it also verifies that the certificate content has not been tampered with, because any change will cause the decryption to fail. This application decrypts the authentication certificate by the receiver holding the public key of the trusted third party, which ensures that the certificate content has not been tampered with during the transmission process, improves the authenticity of the certificate, and then the receiver can confirm the identity information of the sender's router to ensure that it is not a forged or unauthorized device. Only authorized and legitimate routers can join the network and participate in communication.

[0107] Among them, in step S33, determining that the behavior of the router sender is credible through the initial platform configuration information and the current platform configuration information in the authentication certificate includes: obtaining the initial platform configuration information of the router sender from the authentication certificate; if the current platform configuration information successfully matches the initial platform configuration information, then determining that the behavior of the router sender is credible.

[0108] The receiver separates and extracts the initial platform configuration information from the authentication certificate. The initial platform configuration information is verified and recorded by a trusted third party when the sender first registers the network, ensuring that the initial platform configuration of the router is credible and secure. The receiver extracts the current platform configuration information from the received message. The current platform configuration information reflects the latest status of the router during its actual operation, usually including the measurement results in the PCR register.

[0109] The receiver compares the initial platform configuration information extracted from the authentication certificate with the current platform configuration information received. Specifically, this involves the following aspects: 1. Hash value comparison: Compare the hash values ​​of key components of the two (such as BIOS, firmware, operating system kernel, etc.) to ensure that they are consistent or contain only expected changes. 2. PCR register value comparison: Check the measurement results in the PCR register to ensure that they have not been changed without authorization. If the initial platform configuration information matches the current platform configuration information successfully, it means that the operating environment of the sender's router is normal, that is, its platform integrity has not been damaged, and the routing information sent by the sender is credible.

[0110] Among them, in step S34, determining that the routing update information has not been tampered with during the transmission process through the signed target message includes: using the pre-stored public key of the router sender to decrypt the signed target message to obtain an initial signature hash value, wherein the public key is distributed by the router sender after obtaining the authentication certificate; extracting the header information and current platform configuration information of the target message from the signed target message, and performing a hash operation according to the same hash algorithm as that of the router sender to obtain a new signature hash value; if the initial signature hash value matches the new signature hash value, it is determined that the target message has not been tampered with during the transmission process.

[0111] The receiver pre-stores the public key distributed by the sender through the flooding distribution mechanism, and then separates the digital signature part from the received target message. The digital signature is generated by the sender using its private key to encrypt the hash value of the message header information and platform configuration information. The receiver uses the sender's public key to decrypt the digital signature and restore the initial signature hash value. This step verifies the authenticity of the signature and ensures that the signature is indeed generated by the legitimate sender holding the corresponding private key.

[0112] The receiver extracts the target message header information and current platform configuration information from the target message after signing, and performs the same hash calculation on the received information according to the hash algorithm used by the sender (such as SHA-256 or SHA-3). The receiver compares the decrypted initial signature hash value with the newly calculated signature hash value. If the two are exactly the same, it means that the target message has not been tampered with during transmission, and the data remains intact and authentic. Based on the above verification results, the receiver can determine that the content of the target message is complete and has not been maliciously modified or tampered with. This ensures the authenticity and reliability of the routing update information.

[0113] The present application provides a method for accessing a router based on trusted computing, comprising the following steps.

[0114] 1. Certificate application and public key distribution.

[0115] 1. In the initialization phase, the third party first generates its own public and private keys and a non-interactive proof value to verify the correctness of the public key, and broadcasts its own public key and non-interactive proof value in the network. After receiving the broadcast message, the router node in the network uses the non-interactive proof value to verify the third party's public key to determine that the third party is trustworthy.

[0116] 2. Certificate application steps:

[0117] (1) The router uses the trusted root to test the integrity of the platform and generates the initial platform configuration information PCR1 of its own platform integrity;

[0118] (2) The router sends the initial platform configuration information and measurement logs to the trusted third party;

[0119] (3) The trusted third party verifies the initial platform configuration information through the received measurement log. After verification, the initial platform configuration information is stored as a standard and a certificate is issued to the router. The certificate is generated by encrypting with the private key of the trusted third party and contains the initial platform configuration information PCR1.

[0120] 3. Distribution of router public keys: After the router applies for a certificate, it uses LSA's reliable distribution mechanism - flooding to distribute its public key to other routers, ensuring that each router that receives its LSA can use its public key to verify the signed messages subsequently sent by the router.

[0121] 2. The router sender generates the message.

[0122] 1. The sender generates a target message based on the routing update information;

[0123] 2. Perform hash calculation on the header information of the target message:

[0124] 3. The trusted chip measures the integrity of its own router platform and calculates the current platform configuration information PCR2;

[0125] 4. Perform hash calculation on the PCR2 value and the LSU message header hash value to obtain the signature hash value;

[0126] 5. Call the sender's private key to sign the signature hash value, attach the signature result to the target message and send it to the receiver.

[0127] 3. The router receiver parses the message.

[0128] 1. The receiver calls the public key of the trusted third party to decrypt the authentication certificate. If the decryption is successful, it confirms that the initiator is a legitimate router verified by the trusted third party.

[0129] 2. Use the public key provided by the initiator to decrypt the target message and restore the initial signature hash value. Then use the same encryption algorithm to hash the PCR2 value and the LSU message header hash value to obtain a new signature hash value. If the two hash values ​​are the same, it is considered that the target message has not been maliciously attacked or tampered with during transmission.

[0130] 3. Extract the initial platform configuration information PCR1 from the authentication certificate, and extract the current platform configuration information PCR2 from the target message. If PCR1 and PCR2 are the same, it is determined that the operating environment of the initiator is normal, that is, its platform integrity has not been damaged; if the verification fails, it means that the platform integrity of the source route has been damaged, and it is in a state of being attacked or running illegal programs. The routing information it sends is no longer credible, and the receiver can choose to discard the routing information.

[0131] Figure 4 It is a structural diagram of a router node. It can be seen that the router includes an initialization module, a trusted computing module, a key management module, a general control module and a secure communication module. The functions of each module are as follows.

[0132] Initialization module: This module is responsible for the node system startup and some initialization work of the node joining the network, such as verifying the credibility of the third party. The trusted third party issues an authentication certificate to the router that joins the network for the first time. The trusted third party broadcasts its own public key and non-interactive proof value. The router distributes its own public key using flooding.

[0133] Trusted computing module: responsible for measuring the integrity information of the system platform, providing cryptographic operations and storage functions related to trusted computing. This module is the core of the entire solution, and measures the integrity of the platform through a trusted root (such as TPM) to ensure that the platform status of the router is trustworthy, such as computing the platform configuration information PCR.

[0134] Key management module: responsible for storing the public and private keys of the router's digital signature, as well as key update and deletion. This module ensures the security of the signature and verification process of routing information, and prevents illegal devices from obtaining signature keys and tampering with or forging routing information.

[0135] General control module: As the core module, it is responsible for controlling the entire system, parsing the information received by the communication module, and implementing its corresponding functions through the interface with other modules. The general control module is also responsible for the routing selection of the entire router and the generation of messages, and is the central nervous system of the system.

[0136] Secure communication module: It has two functions: one is responsible for sending and receiving routing information; the other is signing and verifying routing information. This module ensures that the transmission process of routing information is secure and can resist man-in-the-middle attacks and data tampering.

[0137] This application can achieve the following effects:

[0138] During data transmission, trusted computing technology can provide wireless routers with more powerful encryption capabilities. In addition to common wireless encryption protocols (such as WPA2, WPA3, etc.), trusted computing can encrypt and decrypt data at the hardware level, making it difficult to crack and steal data even if it is intercepted during transmission. At the same time, this hardware-level encryption method is more efficient and has less impact on system performance than software encryption.

[0139] Centralized security management: For multiple wireless routers in an enterprise or large network environment, centralized security management can be achieved through trusted computing technology. Administrators can monitor, configure and manage all wireless routers and their connected devices on a unified management platform, greatly improving the efficiency and convenience of security management. At the same time, security policies based on trusted computing can ensure the communication security between the management platform and wireless routers, preventing management instructions from being tampered with or stolen.

[0140] Enforcement of security policies: Trusted computing technology ensures that the security policies of wireless routers can be enforced in any case. Even if the operating system or application of the device has vulnerabilities or has been maliciously tampered with, the trusted computing module can limit its behavior that violates the security policy and ensure the safe operation of the network. For example, when a device attempts to access unauthorized network resources, the trusted computing module can immediately block the operation, thereby avoiding the leakage of sensitive information.

[0141] Compatibility with multiple devices: This method can better enable devices of different types and operating systems to access wireless routers. Since trusted computing technology provides a unified identity authentication and secure communication mechanism, whether it is a smartphone, tablet, laptop or IoT device, it can be securely connected to the wireless router under the premise of following the trusted computing standards, breaking the limitations of traditional wireless routers in terms of device compatibility.

[0142] Easy to expand and upgrade: With the continuous development of technology and the continuous improvement of security requirements, wireless routers need to be constantly upgraded and expanded. The wireless router method based on trusted computing technology has good scalability and can easily add new security function modules or upgrade existing security mechanisms to adapt to the ever-changing security environment.

[0143] The present application also provides a device for accessing a router based on trusted computing, which is applied to a router sender, such as Figure 5 As shown, the device comprises:

[0144] A generating module 501 is used to generate a target message according to the routing update information of the router sender, wherein the router sender has an authentication certificate issued by a trusted third party based on the initial platform configuration information, and the initial platform configuration information is used to indicate the platform configuration state when the router sender first registers the network;

[0145] The measurement module 502 is used to measure the integrity of the software and hardware configuration of its own router platform through the trusted root to obtain the current platform configuration information of the router platform, wherein the current platform configuration information is used to indicate the current platform configuration state;

[0146] The signature module 503 is used to sign the header information and current platform configuration information of the target message, and send the target message with the signature result to the router receiver, so that the router receiver can determine the credible behavior of the router sender based on the initial platform configuration information and the current platform configuration information, wherein credible behavior means that the router sender has not been maliciously invaded or has not caused any software or hardware errors to cause harm to the network.

[0147] Optionally, the device is also used for:

[0148] The integrity of the software and hardware configuration of its own router platform is measured through the trusted root to obtain the initial platform configuration information of the router platform;

[0149] Obtaining a measurement log, wherein the measurement log includes a record of integrity measurements during startup and operation of the router platform;

[0150] Sending the initial platform configuration information and the measurement log to a trusted third party, so that the trusted third party verifies the initial platform configuration information based on the measurement log, and stores the initial platform configuration information after the verification is passed;

[0151] Obtain an authentication certificate issued by a trusted third party based on the verified initial platform configuration information.

[0152] Optionally, the signature module 503 is used to:

[0153] Perform hash calculation on the header information of the target message;

[0154] Hash the hash value of the header information and the current platform configuration information to obtain the signature hash value;

[0155] Use your own private key to sign the signature hash value.

[0156] The present application also provides a device for accessing a router based on trusted computing, which is applied to a router receiving party, and the device includes:

[0157] The acquisition module is used to obtain the authentication certificate, current platform configuration information and signed target message sent by the router sender;

[0158] A first determination module is used to determine through an authentication certificate that the router sender is a legitimate router verified by a trusted third party;

[0159] A second determination module is used to determine that the behavior of the router sender is credible through the initial platform configuration information and the current platform configuration information in the authentication certificate;

[0160] The third determination module is used to determine, through the signed target message, that the route update information has not been tampered with during transmission.

[0161] Optionally, the first determining module is used to:

[0162] Decrypting the authentication certificate using the pre-stored public key of the trusted third party, wherein the authentication certificate has been encrypted using the private key of the trusted third party;

[0163] If the decryption is successful, it is determined that the router sender is a legitimate router verified by a trusted third party.

[0164] Optionally, the second determining module is used to:

[0165] Obtain the initial platform configuration information of the router sender from the authentication certificate;

[0166] If the current platform configuration information matches the initial platform configuration information successfully, it is determined that the behavior of the router sender is credible.

[0167] Optionally, the third determining module is used to:

[0168] The pre-stored public key of the router sender is used to decrypt the signed target message to obtain the initial signature hash value, where the public key is distributed by the router sender after obtaining the authentication certificate;

[0169] Extract the header information and current platform configuration information of the target message from the signed target message, and perform hash operation according to the same hash algorithm as the router sender to obtain a new signature hash value;

[0170] If the initial signature hash value matches the new signature hash value, it is determined that the target message has not been tampered with during transmission.

[0171] Optionally, the device is also used for:

[0172] Obtain a message broadcast by the third party during the initialization phase, wherein the message includes the third party's public key and a non-interactive proof value;

[0173] The public key of the third party is verified through a non-interactive proof value to confirm that the third party is a trusted third party.

[0174] like Figure 6 As shown, an embodiment of the present application provides an electronic device, including a processor 601, a communication interface 602, a memory 603 and a communication bus 604, wherein the processor 601, the communication interface 602, and the memory 603 communicate with each other through the communication bus 604.

[0175] The memory 603 is used to store computer programs.

[0176] In one embodiment of the present application, the processor 601 is configured to implement the method for accessing a router based on trusted computing provided by any one of the aforementioned method embodiments when executing the program stored in the memory 603 .

[0177] The embodiment of the present application further provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the method for accessing a router based on trusted computing provided in any of the aforementioned method embodiments are implemented.

[0178] The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative, wherein the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed on multiple network units. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment.

[0179] Through the description of the above implementation methods, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that each implementation method can be implemented by means of software plus a general hardware platform, and of course, by hardware. Based on this understanding, the above technical solution is essentially or the part that contributes to the relevant technology can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, such as ROM / RAM, a disk, an optical disk, etc., including a number of instructions for a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute the methods described in each embodiment or some parts of the embodiments.

[0180] It should be understood that the terms used herein are only for the purpose of describing specific example embodiments and are not intended to be limiting. Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the singular forms "one", "an" and "said" as used herein may also be meant to include plural forms. The terms "include", "comprise", "contain", and "have" are inclusive, and therefore specify the existence of stated features, steps, operations, elements and / or parts, but do not exclude the existence or addition of one or more other features, steps, operations, elements, parts, and / or combinations thereof. The method steps, processes, and operations described herein are not interpreted as necessarily requiring them to be performed in the specific order described or illustrated, unless the execution order is clearly indicated. It should also be understood that additional or alternative steps may be used.

[0181] The above description is only a specific implementation of the present application, so that those skilled in the art can understand or implement the present application. Various modifications to these embodiments will be apparent to those skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein can be implemented in other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the present application. Therefore, the present application will not be limited to the embodiments shown herein, but will conform to the widest range consistent with the principles and novel features applied for herein.

Claims

1. A method for accessing a router based on trusted computing, characterized in that: Applied to a router sender, the method comprises: Generate a target message according to routing update information of a router sender, wherein the router sender has an authentication certificate issued by a trusted third party based on initial platform configuration information, and the initial platform configuration information is used to indicate the platform configuration state of the router sender when it first registers with the network; Performing integrity measurement on the software and hardware configuration of its own router platform through the trusted root to obtain the current platform configuration information of the router platform, wherein the current platform configuration information is used to indicate the current platform configuration status; The header information of the target message and the current platform configuration information are signed, and the target message with the signature result is sent to the router receiver, so that the router receiver determines that the behavior of the router sender is credible according to the initial platform configuration information and the current platform configuration information, wherein credible behavior means that the router sender has not been maliciously invaded or has not caused any software or hardware errors to cause harm to the network.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Before generating the target message according to the routing update information of the router sender, the method further includes: The integrity of the software and hardware configuration of the router platform is measured through the trusted root to obtain the initial platform configuration information of the router platform; Obtaining a metric log, wherein the metric log includes a record of integrity measurements during startup and operation of the router platform; Sending the initial platform configuration information and the measurement log to the trusted third party, so that the trusted third party verifies the initial platform configuration information based on the measurement log, and stores the initial platform configuration information after the verification is passed; Obtain an authentication certificate issued by the trusted third party based on the verified initial platform configuration information.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Signing the header information of the target message and the current platform configuration information includes: Performing hash calculation on the header information of the target message; Perform hash calculation on the hash value of the header information and the current platform configuration information to obtain a signature hash value; The signature hash value is signed using its own private key.

4. A method for accessing a router based on trusted computing, characterized in that: Applied to a router receiver, the method comprises: Obtain the authentication certificate, current platform configuration information, and signed target message sent by the router sender; Determining through the authentication certificate that the router sender is a legitimate router verified by a trusted third party; Determining that the behavior of the router sender is credible through the initial platform configuration information and the current platform configuration information in the authentication certificate; The signed target message is used to determine that the route update information has not been tampered with during transmission.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that Determining through the authentication certificate that the router sender is a legitimate router verified by a trusted third party includes: Decrypting the authentication certificate using the pre-stored public key of the trusted third party, wherein the authentication certificate has been encrypted using the private key of the trusted third party; If the decryption is successful, it is determined that the router sender is a legitimate router verified by the trusted third party.

6. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that Determining that the behavior of the router sender is credible by using the initial platform configuration information and the current platform configuration information in the authentication certificate includes: Obtaining initial platform configuration information of the router sender from the authentication certificate; If the current platform configuration information successfully matches the initial platform configuration information, it is determined that the behavior of the router sender is credible.

7. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that Determining that the route update information has not been tampered with during transmission by using the signed target message includes: Decrypt the signed target message using the pre-stored public key of the router sender to obtain an initial signature hash value, wherein the public key is distributed by the router sender after obtaining the authentication certificate; Extracting the header information and current platform configuration information of the target message from the signed target message, and performing a hash operation according to the same hash algorithm as the router sender to obtain a new signature hash value; If the initial signature hash value matches the new signature hash value, it is determined that the target message has not been tampered with during transmission.

8. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that Before using the pre-stored public key of the trusted third party to decrypt the authentication certificate, the method further includes: Obtaining a message broadcast by a third party during an initialization phase, wherein the message includes a public key of the third party and a non-interactive proof value; The public key of the third party is verified by using the non-interactive proof value to determine that the third party is a trusted third party.

9. A device for accessing a router based on trusted computing, characterized in that: Applied to a router sender, the device comprises: A generating module, configured to generate a target message according to routing update information of a router sender, wherein the router sender has an authentication certificate issued by a trusted third party based on initial platform configuration information, and the initial platform configuration information is used to indicate a platform configuration state when the router sender first registers a network; A measurement module, used to measure the integrity of the software and hardware configuration of its own router platform through a trusted root, and obtain the current platform configuration information of the router platform, wherein the current platform configuration information is used to indicate the current platform configuration state; The signature module is used to sign the header information of the target message and the current platform configuration information, and send the target message with the signature result to the router receiver, so that the router receiver determines that the behavior of the router sender is credible based on the initial platform configuration information and the current platform configuration information, wherein the credible behavior means that the router sender has not been maliciously invaded or has not caused any software or hardware errors to cause harm to the network.

10. A device for accessing a router based on trusted computing, characterized in that: Applied to a router receiving side, the device comprises: The acquisition module is used to obtain the authentication certificate, current platform configuration information and signed target message sent by the router sender; A first determination module, configured to determine, through the authentication certificate, that the router sender is a legitimate router verified by a trusted third party; A second determination module, configured to determine that the behavior of the router sender is credible through the initial platform configuration information and the current platform configuration information in the authentication certificate; The third determination module is used to determine that the routing update information has not been tampered with during the transmission process through the signed target message.

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