A hardware root-of-trust based operating condition data visualization method and medium
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202611072650.6
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-07-20
- Publication Date
- 2026-08-18
AI Technical Summary
[0002]现有工业生产、公共监管场景下的数据状态公开呈现、人机交互及可信校验技术存在多项固有底层缺陷,无法适配高安全等级、强实时性、硬防规避的需求
[0040]The aforementioned hardware root-of-trust-based method and medium for visualizing operating condition data involves transmitting the collected raw operating condition data to the isolated trusted execution domain of the hardware root of trust, signing the raw operating condition data using the hardware root of trust to obtain signed data, encrypting the signed data and the operating condition data, and transmitting them to the interactive display module. Upon receiving a data visualization request from the interactive display module, the hardware root of trust is used to perform a first signature verification on the standard feature parameter set. After the first signature verification passes, the signed data and the operating condition data are decrypted, and the hardware root of trust is used to perform a second signature verification on the decrypted signed data. After the second signature verification passes, the decrypted operating condition data is matched hierarchically with the standard feature parameter set to obtain a hierarchical matching result. The interactive display module calls the corresponding hierarchical rendering template based on the hierarchical matching result to visualize the operating condition data to be displayed on the interactive display module, thus achieving data visualization security.
Smart Images

Figure CN122595378A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This application relates to the field of data processing technology, and in particular to a method and medium for visualizing operational data based on a hardware root of trust. Background Technology
[0002] Existing technologies for public data status presentation, human-computer interaction, and trusted verification in industrial production and public regulatory scenarios have several inherent underlying defects, making them unsuitable for the needs of high security levels, strong real-time performance, and hardware-based security measures.
[0003] Existing data visualization methods have the following drawbacks: they rely on upper-layer business software to collect and forward data, lack hardware trust roots with physical security attributes, and data is easily tampered with, replaced, or forged throughout the entire transmission, caching, scheduling, and editing process; conventional hash verification is deployed at the application layer, which has vulnerabilities to verification bypass and bypass, and cannot achieve physical-level rigid data integrity locking; data visualization suffers from a lack of layer trust, resulting in low security of data visualization. Summary of the Invention
[0004] Therefore, it is necessary to provide a method and medium for visualizing operational data based on a hardware root of trust to address the aforementioned technical issues.
[0005] In a first aspect, embodiments of this application provide a method for visualizing operational data based on a hardware root of trust, applied to a terminal device. The terminal device includes a main control module and an interactive display module. The main control module includes a hardware root of trust and a hardware isolated storage area. The hardware isolated storage area stores a set of standard feature parameters. The method includes:
[0006] The collected raw operating condition data is transmitted to the isolated trusted execution domain of the hardware trust root, and the raw operating condition data is signed using the hardware trust root to obtain signed data; the signed data and the operating condition data are encrypted and transmitted to the interactive display module.
[0007] When a data visualization request initiated by the interactive display module is received, the hardware root of trust is used to perform the first signature verification on the standard feature parameter set.
[0008] After the first signature verification is successful, the signature data and the operating condition data are decrypted using the hardware root of trust, and the decrypted signature data is then verified a second time using the hardware root of trust. After the second signature verification is successful, the decrypted operating condition data is matched hierarchically with the standard feature parameter set to obtain a hierarchical matching result.
[0009] The interactive display module calls the corresponding hierarchical rendering template based on the hierarchical matching result, and then visualizes the working condition data to be displayed on the interactive display module based on the hierarchical rendering template.
[0010] In one embodiment, the interactive display module calls the corresponding hierarchical rendering template based on the hierarchical matching result, including:
[0011] The hierarchical matching result is signed using the private key inside the hardware root of trust, a status identifier code is generated, and the status identifier code is fed back to the interactive display module;
[0012] The interactive display module initiates a request to the main control module to call the corresponding hierarchical rendering template based on the status identification code;
[0013] The main control module uses the public key inside the hardware root of trust to verify the status identifier code; after successful verification, the interactive display module is allowed to call the corresponding hierarchical rendering template.
[0014] In one embodiment, the hierarchical matching result is signed using the private key within the hardware root of trust to generate a status identifier code, including:
[0015] Based on the hierarchical matching results, a hierarchical result code is generated;
[0016] Based on the hardware's inherent unique fingerprint encoding, anti-replay random number, timestamp, and the hierarchical result encoding, a status identification code is generated using the hardware root of trust.
[0017] In one embodiment, the hardware root of trust internally stores a private key and a corresponding public key. The hardware isolated storage area also stores digital signatures of the standard feature parameter set using the private key. Signature verification of the standard feature parameter set using the hardware root of trust includes:
[0018] The standard feature parameter set and the digital signature are read from the hardware isolated storage area using the hardware root of trust.
[0019] The standard feature parameter set is hashed using the hardware root of trust to obtain a first hash value;
[0020] The digital signature is decrypted using the public key embedded within the hardware root of trust to obtain a second hash value;
[0021] If the first hash value matches the second hash value, the signature verification is successful.
[0022] In one embodiment, the signature data includes a unique intrinsic fingerprint of the hardware root of trust, a tamper-proof timestamp, and a digital signature. The digital signature is generated based on the original operating condition data using the hardware root of trust. A second signature verification is performed on the decrypted signature data using the hardware root of trust, including:
[0023] If the unique fingerprint, the tamper-proof timestamp, and the digital signature are all verified, then the second signature verification is successful.
[0024] In one embodiment, the decrypted operating condition data is matched hierarchically with the standard feature parameter set to obtain hierarchical matching results, including:
[0025] Feature extraction is performed on the decrypted operating condition data to obtain the operating condition feature vector;
[0026] Based on the locality-sensitive hashing algorithm, the corresponding standard feature parameters are determined from the set of standard feature parameters;
[0027] Calculate the deviation between the operating condition feature vector and the corresponding standard feature parameters; based on the deviation, obtain the hierarchical matching result.
[0028] In one embodiment, before the working condition data to be displayed is visualized by the interactive display module based on the hierarchical rendering template, the method further includes:
[0029] The operating data to be displayed is hashed to obtain a third hash value;
[0030] The third hash value is compared with the original hash value stored internally in the hardware trust root. If the comparison is consistent, the operating condition data is visualized in the interactive display module based on the hierarchical rendering template.
[0031] In one embodiment, the method further includes: if the comparison is inconsistent, then cutting off the rendering process via a hardware physical channel.
[0032] In one embodiment, cutting off the rendering process via a hardware physical channel includes at least one of the following: interrupting the GPU data write channel of the main control module, or turning off the enable terminal of the interactive display module.
[0033] In one embodiment, the hierarchical rendering template is stored in the hardware-isolated storage area.
[0034] Secondly, embodiments of this application also provide a working condition data visualization system based on a hardware root of trust, applied to a terminal device. The terminal device includes a main control module and an interactive display module. The main control module includes a hardware root of trust and a hardware isolated storage area. The hardware isolated storage area stores a set of standard feature parameters. The system includes:
[0035] An encryption module is used to transmit the collected raw operating condition data to the isolated trusted execution domain of the hardware trust root, sign the raw operating condition data using the hardware trust root to obtain signed data, encrypt the signed data and the operating condition data and transmit them to the interactive display module.
[0036] The signature verification module is used to perform the first signature verification on the standard feature parameter set using the hardware root of trust when it receives a data visualization request initiated by the interactive display module.
[0037] The matching module is used to decrypt the signature data and the operating condition data using the hardware root of trust after the first signature verification is successful, and to perform a second signature verification on the decrypted signature data using the hardware root of trust; after the second signature verification is successful, the decrypted operating condition data is matched hierarchically with the standard feature parameter set to obtain a hierarchical matching result.
[0038] The rendering module is used by the interactive display module to call the corresponding hierarchical rendering template in the main control module based on the hierarchical matching result, so as to visualize the working condition data to be displayed in the interactive display module based on the hierarchical rendering template.
[0039] Thirdly, embodiments of this application also provide a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the method described in the first aspect.
[0040] The aforementioned hardware root-of-trust-based method and medium for visualizing operating condition data involves transmitting the collected raw operating condition data to the isolated trusted execution domain of the hardware root of trust, signing the raw operating condition data using the hardware root of trust to obtain signed data, encrypting the signed data and the operating condition data, and transmitting them to the interactive display module. Upon receiving a data visualization request from the interactive display module, the hardware root of trust is used to perform a first signature verification on the standard feature parameter set. After the first signature verification passes, the signed data and the operating condition data are decrypted, and the hardware root of trust is used to perform a second signature verification on the decrypted signed data. After the second signature verification passes, the decrypted operating condition data is matched hierarchically with the standard feature parameter set to obtain a hierarchical matching result. The interactive display module calls the corresponding hierarchical rendering template based on the hierarchical matching result to visualize the operating condition data to be displayed on the interactive display module, thus achieving data visualization security.
[0041] Details of one or more embodiments of this application are set forth in the following drawings and description to make other features, objects and advantages of this application more readily apparent. Attached Figure Description
[0042] The accompanying drawings, which are included to provide a further understanding of this application and form part of this application, illustrate exemplary embodiments and are used to explain this application, but do not constitute an undue limitation of this application. In the drawings:
[0043] Figure 1 This is a hardware structure block diagram of a terminal device for a working condition data visualization method based on a hardware root of trust in one embodiment.
[0044] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating a hardware root of trust-based operational data visualization method in one embodiment. Detailed Implementation
[0045] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this application clearer, the application is described and illustrated below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of this application and are not intended to limit this application.
[0046] This application provides a method for visualizing operational data based on a hardware root of trust, applied to terminal devices, such as... Figure 1As shown, the terminal device includes a main control module 10 and an interactive display module 20. The main control module 10 is connected to the interactive display module 20. The main control module 10 includes a hardware root of trust and a hardware isolated storage area, which stores a set of standard feature parameters. The main control module 10 is mainly used for data processing and verification, while the interactive display module 20 is mainly used for data visualization requests and data visualization display.
[0047] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the process for visualizing operating condition data based on a hardware root of trust, as provided in the embodiments of this application. Figure 2 As shown, the method includes the following steps:
[0048] Step S201: The collected raw operating condition data is transmitted to the isolated trusted execution domain of the hardware trust root, and the raw operating condition data is signed using the hardware trust root to obtain signed data; the signed data and the operating condition data are encrypted and transmitted to the interactive display module.
[0049] The terminal devices (such as industrial equipment, integrated monitoring screens, mobile inspection terminals, AR wearable devices, etc.) in this application embodiment possess hardware security capabilities. The core hardware components include: a hardware root of trust, a hardware physical channel, and a hardware isolated storage area. The hardware root of trust is integrated within the main SoC chip of the terminal device (such as the ARM TrustZone security area) or uses a separate security chip (such as a national cryptographic level 2 or higher security chip), providing PUF (Physical Unclonable Function), eFUSE (eFuse Fuse Storage), an independent key isolation area, and a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). All sensitive operations (hash generation, asymmetric signature, key derivation) are performed within the hardware root of trust, and the software layer cannot read or tamper with its internal state.
[0050] The main control module uses dedicated data interfaces (such as ADC, I2C, SPI, DMA) to collect raw operating condition data streams from industrial production and public supervision in real time across the entire domain. The collected raw operating condition data is then sent to the isolated trusted execution domain of the hardware root of trust. The hardware root of trust independently performs offline hash digest computation and asymmetric key native signature encryption at the hardware level, outputting a trusted data stream carrying a unique hardware fingerprint, a tamper-proof timestamp, and the original encrypted signature. The unique hardware fingerprint refers to the unique physical characteristic value output by the Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) of the hardware root of trust chip, and can also be further combined with the chip's unique ID, eFUSE fuse identifier, or the public key hash corresponding to the private key within the hardware root of trust.
[0051] Meanwhile, the terminal device is equipped with multiple types of secure encrypted transmission channels and dedicated hardware interaction interfaces. The channels are compatible with proprietary protocols based on TLS 1.3 extensions, IPsec, and MACsec. In actual use, one of the channels can be selected as needed to transmit data to the interactive display module. A dedicated hardware signature field is added to the protocol. Upper-layer services have no right to intercept, rewrite, or replace the original data.
[0052] This step involves signing the original acquired operating condition data stream using a hardware root of trust, thereby outputting a trusted data stream.
[0053] Step S202: When a data visualization request initiated by the interactive display module is received, the hardware root of trust is used to perform the first signature verification on the standard feature parameter set.
[0054] The standard feature parameter set is stored in a hardware-isolated storage area, which refers to a dedicated area within the memory chip that is protected by hardware (such as the RPMB partition of eMMC, the OTP area of SPI Flash, or a separate secure Flash chip) used to store the standard feature parameter set. This area can only be read and written by the hardware root of trust through a dedicated interface; ordinary CPU instructions cannot access it directly.
[0055] The hardware-isolated storage area is divided into a core fixed-value benchmark area and a dynamically adjustable benchmark area. The core fixed-value benchmark area is used to store legally mandated or immutable standard parameters (such as national standard limits and mandatory process parameters). It is hardware-based and encrypted using national cryptographic algorithms, and can only be read by the hardware root of trust, prohibiting arbitrary external reading, writing, and modification. The dynamically adjustable benchmark area is used to store updatable business standard parameters (such as enterprise internal control standards and new industry regulations). Only compliant process parameters that have passed offline signature verification by the hardware root of trust are allowed to be incrementally updated. During the update process, the original benchmark area continues to operate normally, and the new database is automatically and smoothly updated after full verification and signature completion.
[0056] Each time the baseline area is powered on and invoked, the hardware root of trust forces an integrity signature comparison and verification of the loaded standard feature parameter set data. When the interactive display module initiates a data visualization request, the hardware root of trust first verifies the signature of the standard feature parameter set to verify the legitimacy of its source and the fact that its content has not been tampered with. An abnormal signature verification immediately triggers an irreversible hardware lock, preventing a response to the data visualization request, blocking all visualization output, initiating a hardware-level alarm, and permanently logging the fault in an unalterable manner for traceability.
[0057] Step S203: After the first signature verification is successful, the signature data and the operating condition data are decrypted using the hardware root of trust, and the decrypted signature data is verified a second time using the hardware root of trust. After the second signature verification is successful, the decrypted operating condition data is matched hierarchically with the standard feature parameter set to obtain a hierarchical matching result.
[0058] After receiving the hardware-encrypted operating condition data stream and after the signature verification of the standard feature parameter set is passed, the interactive display module decrypts the encrypted operating condition data stream and verifies the signature using the hardware root of trust to verify that the data source is a legitimate hardware root of trust and that the transmission process has not been tampered with.
[0059] After the signature verification is successful, the decrypted working condition data is matched with the standard feature parameter set in a hierarchical manner to obtain the hierarchical matching result.
[0060] In step S204, the interactive display module calls the corresponding hierarchical rendering template based on the hierarchical matching result, so as to visualize the working condition data to be displayed in the interactive display module based on the hierarchical rendering template.
[0061] The hierarchical rendering template is pre-stored in a secure storage medium bound to the hardware root of trust. Specifically, this can be: on-chip storage within the hardware root of trust (such as secure SRAM, eFUSE, or built-in Flash); an external hardware-isolated storage chip connected via a secure interface (such as secure Flash or encrypted EEPROM); or a protected storage area on the motherboard (such as a secure partition of TPMNVRAM or BIOS Flash). Regardless of the storage location of the hierarchical rendering template, reading, calling, and modifying the template all require signature authorization from the hardware root of trust; it cannot be loaded or tampered with without authorization.
[0062] Steps S201 to S204 above involve transmitting the collected raw operating condition data to the isolated trusted execution domain of the hardware trust root, signing the raw operating condition data using the hardware trust root to obtain signed data, encrypting the signed data and the operating condition data, and transmitting them to the interactive display module. When a data visualization request is received from the interactive display module, the hardware trust root is used to perform a first signature verification on the standard feature parameter set. After the first signature verification passes, the signed data and the operating condition data are decrypted, and the hardware trust root is used to perform a second signature verification on the decrypted signed data. After the second signature verification passes, the decrypted operating condition data is matched hierarchically with the standard feature parameter set to obtain a hierarchical matching result. The interactive display module calls the corresponding hierarchical rendering template based on the hierarchical matching result to visualize the operating condition data to be displayed on the interactive display module, thereby improving the security of operating condition data visualization.
[0063] In one embodiment, the interactive display module's invocation of the corresponding hierarchical rendering template based on the hierarchical matching result includes: signing the hierarchical matching result using the private key within the hardware root of trust, generating a status identifier code, and feeding the status identifier code back to the interactive display module; the interactive display module initiating a request to the main control module to invoke the corresponding hierarchical rendering template based on the status identifier code; the main control module verifying the status identifier code using the public key within the hardware root of trust; and, upon successful verification, allowing the interactive display module to invoke the corresponding hierarchical rendering template.
[0064] In this embodiment, the wake-up loading, business calls, version replacement, and parameter modification of the hierarchical rendering template all require real-time offline signature authorization through the hardware trust root. It calls the matching lightweight rendering resources in a targeted manner and dynamically loads compliant text prompts, working status icons, abnormal alarm indicators, and AR real-scene overlay layers; it is adapted to low-computing-power edge terminals; templates without legal hardware authorization cannot be started and loaded, and templates already running online are prohibited from being tampered with or rewritten by background software and unauthorized system processes.
[0065] Specifically, after obtaining the hierarchical matching result, a hierarchical result code is generated based on the hierarchical matching result. Then, a signature is generated based on the hardware's inherent unique fingerprint code, anti-replay random number, timestamp, and the hierarchical result code. A fixed standardized structure and a unique, single-use, non-reusable status identifier code are generated. After the main control module generates the status identifier code, the interactive display module can actively obtain the status identifier code (or the main control module can actively push it to the interactive display module), and send the identifier code again in the request to call the corresponding hierarchical rendering template. After receiving the call request, the main control module verifies the hardware signature in the identifier code and verifies the hardware signature using the public key of the hardware root of trust. If the verification is successful, the corresponding hierarchical rendering template is directly called for visualization display based on the hierarchical result code.
[0066] In one embodiment, the hierarchical matching result is signed using the private key inside the hardware root of trust to generate a status identifier code, including: generating a hierarchical result code based on the hierarchical matching result; and generating a status identifier code using the hardware root of trust based on the hardware-inherent unique fingerprint code, a replay-protected random number, a timestamp, and the hierarchical result code.
[0067] In this embodiment, the hardware trust root generates a secondary encrypted signature, namely the status identification code, based on the hardware's inherent unique fingerprint code, anti-replay random number, timestamp, and the hierarchical result code, which serves as the core credential for authorizing the call to the rendering template.
[0068] In one embodiment, the hardware root of trust internally stores a private key and a corresponding public key. The hardware isolated storage area also stores a digital signature of the standard feature parameter set using the private key. Signature verification of the standard feature parameter set using the hardware root of trust includes: reading the standard feature parameter set and the digital signature from the hardware isolated storage area using the hardware root of trust; performing a hash calculation on the standard feature parameter set using the hardware root of trust to obtain a first hash value; decrypting the digital signature using the public key internally stored in the hardware root of trust to obtain a second hash value; if the first hash value matches the second hash value, the signature verification passes; if the first hash value does not match the second hash value, the signature verification fails.
[0069] In one embodiment, the signature data includes a unique intrinsic fingerprint of the hardware root of trust, a tamper-proof timestamp, and a digital signature. The digital signature is generated by the hardware root of trust based on the original operating condition data. The hardware root of trust is used to perform a second signature verification on the decrypted signature data, including: if the unique intrinsic fingerprint, the tamper-proof timestamp, and the digital signature all pass verification, then the second signature verification passes.
[0070] Among them, the unique intrinsic fingerprint of the hardware root of trust refers to the unique physical characteristics that the hardware root of trust chip itself possesses, which cannot be copied or changed, including at least one of the following: PUF value, chip unique ID (UID), eFUSE fuse identifier, and public key hash corresponding to the signature private key inside the hardware root of trust.
[0071] The PUF (Physically Unclonable Function) value is a unique physical characteristic value generated for each chip by utilizing random differences in the chip manufacturing process; it can be regarded as the chip's "physical DNA." Even using the same process and layout, it is impossible to manufacture two chips with the same PUF value. The chip's unique ID (UID) refers to the unique serial number burned into the eFUSE at the time of chip manufacturing; it is read-only and cannot be tampered with. The public key hash corresponding to the signature private key inside the hardware trust root can be used as a cryptographic fingerprint of the device's identity.
[0072] In one embodiment, the decrypted operating condition data is matched hierarchically with the standard feature parameter set to obtain a hierarchical matching result, including the following steps:
[0073] Step S301: Extract features from the decrypted operating data to obtain the operating feature vector.
[0074] After preprocessing (normalization and noise reduction) the decrypted operating condition data, a high-dimensional feature vector is formed, resulting in the operating condition feature vector.
[0075] Operating data can include temperature, pressure, current, capacity load, temperature and humidity parameters, equipment operation and maintenance status, compliance rating labels, etc.
[0076] Step S302: Based on the Locality Sensitive Hash algorithm, determine the corresponding standard feature parameters from the set of standard feature parameters.
[0077] Locality Sensitive Hash (LSH) is employed to perform dimensionality reduction indexing and fast matching on the feature vector. This maps high-dimensional features to hash buckets, achieving near-nearest neighbor fast search and reducing the comparison complexity from O(n) to O(log n). This allows for the determination of the corresponding standard feature parameters within the standard feature parameter set. LSH maps the high-dimensional feature vector to hash buckets using a hash function, ensuring that similar feature vectors fall into the same bucket with a high probability. During comparison, distance calculations are only performed between the feature vector and vectors in the standard feature benchmark library within the same or adjacent buckets, avoiding global traversal and significantly reducing computational complexity.
[0078] Step S303: Calculate the deviation between the working condition feature vector and the corresponding standard feature parameters; based on the deviation, obtain the hierarchical matching result.
[0079] The processed operating condition feature vector is precisely matched with the corresponding standard feature parameters. A three-level preset judgment logic is implemented.
[0080] Level 1 (Fully Compliant): Deviation is less than the strict threshold (e.g., 0.1%), and all mandatory items are matched.
[0081] Level 2 (Partial Match / Fluctuation within Threshold): Deviation is within the normal fluctuation threshold range (e.g., 0.1%~5%), with no non-critical indicators exceeding the limit.
[0082] Level 3 (Abnormal / Tampered): Deviation exceeds the normal fluctuation threshold (>5%), or key indicators exceed limits, or signature / hash verification fails.
[0083] A three-level judgment logic accurately identifies three scenarios: inherent sensor noise, compliant process iteration and optimization, and malicious forgery attacks. It outputs refined, graded matching results, represented by graded result codes (0x01, 0x02, and 0x03 respectively). Different graded result codes correspond to different graded rendering templates. Then, according to fixed structure rules, a unique, non-reusable status identifier code is generated, binding to the hardware's inherent fingerprint, anti-replay nonce, encrypted timestamp, graded verification code, and hardware secondary signature. When the interactive display module initiates a visualization request, it obtains the latest status identifier code from the main control module (or the main control module actively pushes it to the interactive display module) and includes this identifier code in the request. After receiving the request, the main control module verifies the hardware signature in the identifier code and directly calls the corresponding graded rendering template for visualization based on the graded result code.
[0084] In one embodiment, before the operating condition data to be displayed is visualized on the interactive display module based on the hierarchical rendering template, the method further includes the following: performing a hash calculation on the operating condition data to be displayed to obtain a third hash value; comparing the third hash value with the original hash value stored internally in the hardware root of trust; if the comparison is consistent, then visualizing the operating condition data on the interactive display module based on the hierarchical rendering template.
[0085] In this embodiment, an instantaneous hash comparison is initiated at the moment of rendering execution. The hash of the data to be displayed is compared with the original data hash stored internally in the hardware trust root. Relying on hardware timing physical gating logic, if the comparison is successful, the display controller enable terminal of the interactive display module is unlocked through a physical signal, and the GPU data writing channel of the main control module is opened to complete the dynamic visualization mapping output; if the comparison fails, the rendering process is cut off through the hardware physical channel. The entire process adopts a combination of composite triggering and periodic secondary verification mode. An anomaly immediately physically cuts off the rendering channel, triggers a hardware alarm, and solidifies an unalterable log.
[0086] In one embodiment, the method further includes: if the comparison is inconsistent, then cutting off the rendering process via a hardware physical channel. Cutting off the rendering process via a hardware physical channel includes at least one of the following: interrupting the GPU data write channel of the main control module, or disabling the enable terminal of the interactive display module.
[0087] The following describes and illustrates this embodiment through preferred embodiments. This embodiment provides a method for visualizing operational data based on a hardware root of trust, applied to a monitoring large-screen all-in-one machine, for fixed centralized display scenarios in factory control rooms and public regulatory information halls.
[0088] The integrated monitoring screen includes a main control module and an interactive display module. The main control module includes a hardware root of trust and a hardware isolated storage area. The hardware isolated storage area stores a set of standard feature parameters. The hardware isolated storage area includes a core fixed-value benchmark area and a dynamically adjustable benchmark area. The core fixed-value benchmark area stores legally mandated or immutable business standard parameters, which are hardware-based and encrypted using national cryptographic algorithms. Only the hardware root of trust can read these parameters, and arbitrary external reading, writing, and modification are prohibited. The dynamically adjustable benchmark area stores updatable business standard parameters. Only compliant business standard parameters that have passed offline signature verification by the hardware root of trust are allowed to be incrementally updated. During the update process, the original benchmark area continues to operate normally.
[0089] The hardware root of trust, which has PUF value and eFUSE fuse identification attributes, continuously collects real-time operating status data from the production line PLC. After being offline signed and encrypted at the underlying level, the hardware root of trust transmits the data to the interactive display module through a secure encrypted channel configured with the highest hardware-level QoS priority via the hardware network interface layer (MAC / PHY).
[0090] When the interactive display module has a data visualization request, it sends the request to the main control module. Upon receiving the request, the main control module first uses the hardware root of trust to verify the signature of the standard feature parameter set. After successful signature verification, the signature data and the operating condition data are decrypted, and the decrypted signature data is verified using the hardware root of trust. After successful verification, the decrypted operating condition data is matched hierarchically with the standard feature parameter set to obtain a hierarchical matching result. A hierarchical result code is generated based on the hierarchical matching result, and a unique, non-reusable status identifier code is generated according to fixed structure rules. This code includes a bound hardware fingerprint, a replay-protected random number, an encrypted timestamp, the hierarchical result code, and an offline signature of the hierarchical result code by the hardware root of trust. The unique status identifier code is then fed back to the interactive display module.
[0091] The interactive display module sends a data visualization request to the main control module again, carrying the unique status identifier code. The main control module uses the public key inside the hardware trust root to verify the hardware signature built into the status identifier code carried in the request, and verifies the hardware's inherent fingerprint, anti-replay random number, and encrypted timestamp. Only legitimate requests are authorized to access the system. The module retrieves a dedicated lightweight rendering template that has been authorized by the hardware trust root in real time, and dynamically displays the production capacity load, temperature and humidity parameters, equipment operation and maintenance status, and compliance rating in real time. Simultaneously, a real-time physical gating comparison of the same source hash is performed during screen rendering. Only if the comparison passes is the display controller enabled channel opened, along with a compound periodic secondary verification. When network jitter latency exceeds the limit, the local trusted benchmark snapshot is automatically switched to a downgraded display. In case of an anomaly, the rendering channel is physically cut off, a black screen hardware alarm is triggered, and a solidified traceability log is generated. The entire domain can be rigidly and reliably publicized without manual intervention.
[0092] This application also provides a working condition data visualization system based on a hardware root of trust, applied to a terminal device. The terminal device includes a main control module and an interactive display module. The main control module includes a hardware root of trust and a hardware isolated storage area. The hardware isolated storage area stores a set of standard feature parameters. The system includes an encryption module, a signature verification module, a matching module, and a rendering module.
[0093] An encryption module is used to transmit the collected raw operating condition data to the isolated trusted execution domain of the hardware trust root, sign the raw operating condition data using the hardware trust root to obtain signed data, encrypt the signed data and the operating condition data, and transmit them to the interactive display module. A signature verification module is used to perform a first signature verification on the standard feature parameter set using the hardware trust root when a data visualization request is received from the interactive display module. A matching module is used to decrypt the signed data and the operating condition data using the hardware trust root after the first signature verification passes, and then perform a second signature verification on the decrypted signed data using the hardware trust root. After the second signature verification passes, the decrypted operating condition data is matched hierarchically with the standard feature parameter set to obtain a hierarchical matching result. A rendering module is used by the interactive display module to call the corresponding hierarchical rendering template in the main control module based on the hierarchical matching result, so as to visualize the operating condition data to be displayed on the interactive display module based on the hierarchical rendering template.
[0094] In one embodiment, the system further includes a status identifier code generation and verification module, used to sign the hierarchical matching result using the private key inside the hardware root of trust, generate a status identifier code, and feed the status identifier code back to the interactive display module; the interactive display module initiates a request to the main control module to call the corresponding hierarchical rendering template based on the status identifier code; the main control module verifies the status identifier code using the public key inside the hardware root of trust; after successful verification, the interactive display module is allowed to call the corresponding hierarchical rendering template.
[0095] It should be noted that the information interaction and execution process between the above modules are based on the same concept as the method embodiment of this application. It is a system corresponding to the above-mentioned hardware root of trust-based working condition data visualization method. All implementation methods in the above method embodiment are applicable to the embodiment of this device. For details on its specific functions and the resulting technical effects, please refer to the method embodiment section. It will not be repeated here.
[0096] In one embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium is provided having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps in any of the above embodiments of the hardware root of trust-based operational data visualization method.
[0097] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the processes in the methods of the above embodiments can be implemented by a computer program instructing related hardware. The computer program can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium, and when executed, it can include the processes of the embodiments of the methods described above. Any references to memory, storage, databases, or other media used in the embodiments provided in this application can include at least one of non-volatile and volatile memory. Non-volatile memory can include read-only memory (ROM), magnetic tape, floppy disk, flash memory, or optical storage, etc. Volatile memory can include random access memory (RAM) or external cache memory. By way of illustration and not limitation, RAM can be in various forms, such as static random access memory (SRAM) or dynamic random access memory (DRAM), etc.
[0098] The technical features of the above embodiments can be combined in any way. For the sake of brevity, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this specification.
[0099] The embodiments described above are merely illustrative of several implementation methods of this application, and while the descriptions are relatively specific and detailed, they should not be construed as limiting the scope of the invention patent. It should be noted that those skilled in the art can make various modifications and improvements without departing from the concept of this application, and these all fall within the protection scope of this application. Therefore, the protection scope of this patent application should be determined by the appended claims.
Claims
1. A method for visualizing operational data based on a hardware root of trust, applied to a terminal device, the terminal device comprising a main control module and an interactive display module, the main control module comprising a hardware root of trust and a hardware isolated storage area, the hardware isolated storage area storing a set of standard feature parameters, characterized in that, The method includes: The collected raw operating condition data is transmitted to the isolated trusted execution domain of the hardware trust root, and the raw operating condition data is signed using the hardware trust root to obtain signed data; the signed data and the operating condition data are encrypted and transmitted to the interactive display module. When a data visualization request initiated by the interactive display module is received, the hardware root of trust is used to perform the first signature verification on the standard feature parameter set. After the first signature verification is successful, the signature data and the operating condition data are decrypted using the hardware root of trust, and the decrypted signature data is then verified a second time using the hardware root of trust. After the second signature verification is successful, the decrypted operating condition data is matched hierarchically with the standard feature parameter set to obtain a hierarchical matching result. The interactive display module calls the corresponding hierarchical rendering template in the main control module based on the hierarchical matching result, so as to visualize the working condition data to be displayed in the interactive display module based on the hierarchical rendering template.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The interactive display module calls the corresponding hierarchical rendering template based on the hierarchical matching result, including: The hierarchical matching result is signed using the private key inside the hardware root of trust, a status identifier code is generated, and the status identifier code is fed back to the interactive display module; The interactive display module initiates a request to the main control module to call the corresponding hierarchical rendering template based on the status identification code; The main control module uses the public key inside the hardware root of trust to verify the status identifier code; after successful verification, the interactive display module is allowed to call the corresponding hierarchical rendering template.
3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The hierarchical matching result is signed using the private key within the hardware root of trust to generate a status identifier code, including: Based on the hierarchical matching results, a hierarchical result code is generated; Based on the hardware's inherent unique fingerprint encoding, anti-replay random number, timestamp, and the hierarchical result encoding, a status identification code is generated using the hardware root of trust.
4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The hardware root of trust internally stores a private key and a corresponding public key. The hardware isolated storage area also stores digital signatures of the standard feature parameter set using the private key. Signature verification of the standard feature parameter set using the hardware root of trust includes: The standard feature parameter set and the digital signature are read from the hardware isolated storage area using the hardware root of trust. The standard feature parameter set is hashed using the hardware root of trust to obtain a first hash value; The digital signature is decrypted using the public key embedded within the hardware root of trust to obtain a second hash value; If the first hash value matches the second hash value, the signature verification is successful.
5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The signature data includes the unique intrinsic fingerprint of the hardware root of trust, a tamper-proof timestamp, and a digital signature. The digital signature is generated based on the original operating condition data using the hardware root of trust. A second signature verification is performed on the decrypted signature data using the hardware root of trust, including: If the unique fingerprint, the tamper-proof timestamp, and the digital signature are all verified, then the second signature verification is successful.
6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The decrypted operating condition data is then matched hierarchically with the standard feature parameter set to obtain hierarchical matching results, including: Feature extraction is performed on the decrypted operating condition data to obtain the operating condition feature vector; Based on the locality-sensitive hashing algorithm, the corresponding standard feature parameters are determined from the set of standard feature parameters; Calculate the deviation between the operating condition feature vector and the corresponding standard feature parameters; based on the deviation, obtain the hierarchical matching result.
7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Before the interactive display module visualizes the working condition data to be displayed based on the hierarchical rendering template, the method further includes: The operating data to be displayed is hashed to obtain a third hash value; The third hash value is compared with the original hash value stored internally in the hardware trust root. If the comparison is consistent, the operating condition data is visualized in the interactive display module based on the hierarchical rendering template.
8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that, The method further includes: if the comparison is inconsistent, cutting off the rendering process through the hardware physical channel.
9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that, Cutting off the rendering process through a hardware physical channel includes at least one of the following: interrupting the GPU data write channel of the main control module, or turning off the enable terminal of the interactive display module.
10. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The hierarchical rendering template is stored in the hardware-isolated storage area.
11. A working condition data visualization system based on a hardware root of trust, applied to a terminal device, the terminal device comprising a main control module and an interactive display module, the main control module comprising a hardware root of trust and a hardware isolated storage area, the hardware isolated storage area storing a set of standard feature parameters, characterized in that, The system includes: An encryption module is used to transmit the collected raw operating condition data to the isolated trusted execution domain of the hardware trust root, sign the raw operating condition data using the hardware trust root to obtain signed data, encrypt the signed data and the operating condition data and transmit them to the interactive display module. The signature verification module is used to perform the first signature verification on the standard feature parameter set using the hardware root of trust when it receives a data visualization request initiated by the interactive display module. The matching module is used to decrypt the signature data and the operating condition data using the hardware root of trust after the first signature verification is successful, and to perform a second signature verification on the decrypted signature data using the hardware root of trust; after the second signature verification is successful, the decrypted operating condition data is matched hierarchically with the standard feature parameter set to obtain a hierarchical matching result. The rendering module is used by the interactive display module to call the corresponding hierarchical rendering template in the main control module based on the hierarchical matching result, so as to visualize the working condition data to be displayed in the interactive display module based on the hierarchical rendering template.
12. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by a processor, it implements the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 10.