A Device Secure Boot and Proofing Method and Terminal Based on Identifier Engine

By acquiring the status measurement values ​​of security elements and issuing certificates during the device startup process, the problem of dynamically binding device identity and compliance proof is solved, realizing multi-dimensional trusted status joint verification during the device startup process, and improving security and anti-tampering capabilities.

CN123122928APending Publication Date: 2026-11-17FUJIAN WISBO DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202611332729.8
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-08-31
Publication Date
2026-11-17

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In existing technologies, device identity and compliance credentials cannot be dynamically bound during device startup, making it difficult for remote verification to verify the trusted status of the device in real time. Furthermore, the trusted status of security elements cannot be synchronized in a timely manner, posing a risk that the device may still be legitimate even after being flashed or its firmware tampered with.

Method used

After the system boots up to the trusted execution environment stage, it acquires the state measurement values ​​of the secure elements, derives the device identifier and public-private key pair of the current stage based on the device identifier of the previous stage, generates measurement factors and issues certificates, and incorporates the trusted state of the secure elements into the measurement chain. Through step-by-step measurement and certificate issuance, the integrity protection of the trust chain is achieved.

Benefits of technology

It achieves joint verification of identity and multi-dimensional trusted status during device startup, improving the security and anti-tampering capabilities of the startup process, ensuring that authentication fails when the device status is abnormal, and providing real-time joint proof of device identity and trusted status.

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Abstract

This invention provides a device secure boot and authentication method and terminal based on an identifier engine. The method includes: after the system boots to the current trusted execution environment (TEX) stage based on the device identifier combination engine, obtaining the state measurement value of the secure element; deriving the current device identifier and current public-private key pair for the current TEX stage based on the device identifier of the previous stage; generating a measurement factor for the current TEX stage based on the state measurement value, the security configuration hash value of the current TEX stage, and the target application signature value; and issuing a certificate using the measurement factor of the private key pair from the previous stage and the public key in the current public-private key pair to obtain the certificate for the current TEX stage. This invention incorporates the trusted state of the secure element into the boot metric chain, achieving trust chain integrity protection through step-by-step measurement and certificate issuance, and jointly verifying the device identity and multi-dimensional trusted state during the boot process.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of device authentication technology, and in particular to a device secure boot and authentication method and terminal based on an identifier engine. Background Technology

[0002] Financial devices need to prove their identity and operational status to remote servers during business operations. Currently, relevant technologies primarily employ DICE (Digital Identity Provider Interface) to generate a dynamic identity root for the device, enabling trusted verification of the initiation chain, and SE (Secure Element) / PSAM (Purchase Secure Application Module) to store transaction keys, achieving hardware-level key protection. However, these two methods operate independently, lacking a coordinated constraint mechanism. When the device's operational status changes, the DICE dynamic identity root changes accordingly, but the transaction keys in the SE / PSAM do not expire synchronously, and issued certificates cannot be revoked in a timely manner. Furthermore, compliance verification relies on static certificate chains or pre-defined security policies, failing to cryptographically bind the dynamic changes in device identity to compliance verification, making it difficult for remote verifiers to verify the device's trusted status in real time. Summary of the Invention

[0003] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a device secure startup and verification method and terminal based on an identifier engine, which can jointly verify the device startup process and the trusted state of security elements, and realize remote dynamic verification of the trusted state of the device.

[0004] To solve the above-mentioned technical problems, the technical solution adopted by the present invention is as follows: A device secure boot and authentication method based on an identifier engine, characterized by comprising: After the system starts up to the current trusted execution environment based on the device identifier combination engine, it acquires the state measurement values ​​of the secure elements; Based on the device identifier of the previous stage, the current device identifier and the current public-private key pair of the current trusted execution environment stage are derived; Based on the state measurement value, the security configuration hash value of the current trusted execution environment stage, and the target application signature value, a measurement factor for the current trusted execution environment stage is generated. The current trusted execution environment stage certificate is obtained by issuing a certificate using the private key pair of the previous stage, the measurement factor, and the public key in the current public-private key pair.

[0005] To solve the above-mentioned technical problems, another technical solution adopted by the present invention is as follows: A device secure boot and authentication terminal based on an identifier engine includes a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor. The processor executes the computer program to implement the various steps of the aforementioned device secure boot and authentication method based on an identifier engine.

[0006] The beneficial effects of this invention are as follows: By acquiring the state measurement value of the secure element, the trusted state of the secure element is incorporated into the measurement system. When the secure element's state is abnormal, the measurement factor changes accordingly, avoiding the risk that authentication can still be achieved when the secure element's state is abnormal; by deriving the current stage's device identifier and public-private key pair based on the device identifier of the previous stage, tampering with the measurement value of any stage will cause changes in the derivation results of all subsequent stages, realizing the step-by-step transmission of the trust chain and integrity protection; by generating a measurement factor from the state measurement value, security configuration hash value, and target application signature value, the trusted state of the secure element, firmware integrity, and target application legitimacy are uniformly measured, enabling the measurement factor to simultaneously reflect multi-dimensional trusted states, improving the comprehensiveness and anti-tampering capability of the startup process measurement; by issuing a certificate using the measurement factor of the previous stage's private key pair and the current public key, the certificate simultaneously contains identity information and trusted state information; through the coordinated operation of the above steps, joint proof of identity and trusted state during the device startup process is achieved. Attached Figure Description

[0007] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of a device secure boot and verification method based on an identifier engine according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 2 This is a system architecture diagram of a device secure boot and verification method based on an identifier engine according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating the startup chain derivation process of a device secure startup and verification method based on an identifier engine, according to an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of a device secure boot and authentication terminal based on an identifier engine, according to an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0008] To explain in detail the technical content, objectives, and effects of the present invention, the following description is provided in conjunction with the embodiments and accompanying drawings.

[0009] In existing technologies, boot verification schemes based on device identifier combination engines can only provide software-level integrity proofs and cannot perceive the hardware trust status of the secure element, such as firmware version and key status. In contrast, integrated security schemes based on secure elements and trusted execution environments pre-inject device identities and keys during the production phase and permanently solidify them, completely decoupling them from the system's operational state. Even after a device is flashed or its firmware is tampered with, its hardware identity still retains its legitimacy. In related technologies, the device identifier combination engine and the secure element operate independently, failing to incorporate the trusted status of the secure element into the boot metric chain and unable to leverage the hardware-level key protection capabilities of the secure element to compensate for the vulnerability of derived keys to theft. This makes standardized boot security authentication across different scenarios difficult.

[0010] To at least address the aforementioned issues, after the system boots up to the current trusted execution environment stage based on the device identifier combination engine, it acquires the security element's state measurement value; derives the current stage's device identifier and public-private key pair based on the device identifier of the previous stage; generates a measurement factor based on the state measurement value, security configuration hash value, and target application signature value; and issues a certificate using the measurement factor of the previous stage's private key pair and the current public key to obtain the current stage certificate. In this way, the trusted state of the security element can be incorporated into the device identifier combination engine's boot metric chain. Through step-by-step measurement and certificate issuance, the integrity of the trust chain is protected, jointly verifying the device identity and multi-dimensional trusted state during the boot process, and achieving standardized security authentication during the boot stage through step-by-step verification of the certificate chain.

[0011] The following details a device secure boot and verification method based on an identifier engine, as described in this invention. Please refer to [link / reference]. Figure 1 The method 100 includes steps 110 to 140.

[0012] Step 110: After the system starts up to the current trusted execution environment stage based on the device identifier combination engine, obtain the state measurement value of the security element.

[0013] For example, after the system powers on, the main chip reads the unique device secret (UDS) and fixed obfuscation fuse value from the electrically programmable fuse (eFuse) area, measures the security configuration hash value level by level, and derives certificates at each level. After booting into the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) stage, the Device Identifier Composition Engine (DICE) proxy module within the TEE reads the firmware version hash, internal key status register value, and card slot presence status of the Secure Element (SE) through the trusted driver interface, and performs digest calculation on the above data to generate the state measurement value of the Secure Element. Taking a smart point-of-sale (POS) terminal as an example, the device reads the firmware version and key status of the security chip every time it powers on to ensure that the security chip itself is in a legitimate state.

[0014] Step 120: Based on the device identifier from the previous stage, derive the current device identifier and the current public-private key pair for the current trusted execution environment stage.

[0015] For example, the device identifier combination engine proxy module receives the device identifier and certificate from the previous stage. After verifying the validity of the certificate signature, it uses the device identifier from the previous stage as the root key to derive the current device identifier for the current trusted execution environment stage, and generates the corresponding current public-private key pair based on the current device identifier. Taking the trusted execution environment startup as an example, when the trusted execution environment kernel starts, it receives the device identifier and certificate from the previous stage from the bootloader. After successful verification, it derives the current device identifier and the corresponding current public-private key pair for the current trusted execution environment stage based on the device identifier from the previous stage.

[0016] Step 130: Generate a measurement factor for the current trusted execution environment stage based on the state measurement value, the security configuration hash value of the current trusted execution environment stage, and the target application signature value.

[0017] For example, the device identifier combination engine proxy module concatenates the state measurement value of the secure element obtained in step 110, the security configuration hash value of the current trusted execution environment stage, and the signature value of the target application. It then performs a hash operation on the concatenated data to generate the measurement factor for the current trusted execution environment stage. The signature value of the target application is generated during the application development or factory release stage, following the system firmware compilation process after the trusted application is signed. Taking a payment scenario as an example, after the trusted payment application is developed, the device manufacturer signs the trusted payment application using its private key and burns the signature value into the device along with the firmware. After the device boots up, the DICE proxy module reads this signature value to generate the measurement factor.

[0018] Step 140: Obtain the current trusted execution environment stage certificate by using the private key pair measurement factor from the previous stage and the public key in the current public-private key pair to issue a certificate.

[0019] For example, the device identifier combination engine proxy module uses the private key from the previous stage to sign the public key in the current public-private key pair generated in step 120 and the measurement factor generated in step 130, thereby generating the current trusted execution environment stage certificate.

[0020] As described above, after the system starts up to the current trusted execution environment stage based on the device identifier combination engine, it obtains the state measurement value of the secure element, derives the device identifier and public-private key pair of the current stage based on the device identifier of the previous stage, generates a measurement factor based on the state measurement value, the security configuration hash value of the current trusted execution environment stage, and the target application signature value, and issues a certificate using the measurement factor of the private key pair of the previous stage and the public key in the current public-private key pair to obtain the certificate of the current trusted execution environment stage. This enables the trusted state of the secure element to be incorporated into the startup measurement chain of the device identifier combination engine, and achieves integrity protection of the trust chain through step-by-step measurement and certificate issuance. It also enables joint verification of the device identity and multi-dimensional trusted state during the startup process, and achieves standardized security authentication of the startup stage through step-by-step verification of the certificate chain.

[0021] In one alternative implementation, step 110 acquires the state measurement value of the safety element, including steps 111 and 112.

[0022] Step 111: Read the state-related data of the security element through the device identifier combination engine agent module of the Trusted Execution Environment.

[0023] For example, the Device Identifier Combination Engine (DIE) proxy module in a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) reads the firmware version hash, internal key status register value, and SIM card slot presence status of the Secure Element (SE) through the Trusted Driver Interface (TPI) as status-related data. Taking a smart POS terminal as an example, the DICE proxy module within the TEE sends a read command to the SE driver during the TEE startup phase to obtain the SE's firmware version number, key injection status, and PSAM (Purchase Secure Application Module) SIM card slot presence information.

[0024] Step 112: Perform a summary calculation on the state-related data to obtain the state measurement values.

[0025] For example, the Device Identifier Combination Engine (DICE) proxy module concatenates the read firmware version hash, internal key status register value, and card slot presence status, and performs digest calculation on the concatenated data to generate the security element's status measurement value. Taking a smart POS terminal as an example, the DICE proxy module concatenates the SE firmware version number, key status value, and PSAM card slot status, and then performs hash calculation to obtain the SE status measurement value.

[0026] As described above, by reading the state-related data of the security element through the device identifier combination engine proxy module in the trusted execution environment and performing digest calculation on the state-related data to obtain the state measurement value, the multi-dimensional trusted state of the security element can be transformed into a unified measurement value that can be used for subsequent chain-like measurement. This allows the hardware trusted information of the security element, such as firmware version, key status, and card slot status, to be incorporated into the measurement system of the device identifier combination engine.

[0027] In one alternative implementation, step 120 includes steps 121 and 122.

[0028] Step 121: Using the device identifier from the previous stage, derive the current device identifier for the current trusted execution environment stage based on hash chaining operations.

[0029] For example, the device identifier combination engine proxy module takes the device identifier from the previous stage as input, performs a hash chain operation on the device identifier from the previous stage and the security configuration hash value of the current trusted execution environment stage, and generates the current device identifier for the current trusted execution environment stage. Taking the trusted execution environment startup as an example, the DICE proxy module in the trusted execution environment receives the CDI (Composite Device Identifier) ​​passed by the Bootloader stage, performs a hash operation on the CDI and the TEE firmware hash, and derives the TEE layer's CDI.

[0030] Step 122: Generate the current public-private key pair for the current trusted execution environment stage based on the current device identifier.

[0031] For example, the device identifier combination engine proxy module generates a corresponding current public-private key pair based on the current device identifier generated in step 121 using an asymmetric key generation algorithm. The current public-private key pair includes the current public key and the current private key. Taking the TEE layer as an example, the DICE proxy module generates an asymmetric public-private key pair for the TEE layer based on the TEE layer CDI, where the public key is used for certificate issuance and the private key is used for signing operations in subsequent stages.

[0032] As described above, the current device identifier of the current trusted execution environment stage is derived from the device identifier of the previous stage based on hash chain operation, and the current public-private key pair is generated based on the current device identifier. This makes the identity and key of the current stage derived from the trusted measurement result of the previous stage in a chain. If the measurement value of any stage is tampered with, the derivation results of all subsequent stages will change, thus realizing the step-by-step transmission of the trust chain and integrity protection.

[0033] In one alternative implementation, step 130 includes steps 131 and 132.

[0034] Step 131: Concatenate the state measurement value, the security configuration hash value of the current trusted execution environment stage, and the target application signature value to obtain the concatenated data.

[0035] For example, the device identifier combination engine proxy module concatenates the state measurement value of the security element obtained in step 110, the security configuration hash value of the current trusted execution environment stage, and the signature value of the target application in a preset order to obtain the concatenated data.

[0036] Step 132: Perform a hash operation on the concatenated data to obtain the measurement factor for the current trusted execution environment stage.

[0037] For example, the Device Identifier Combination Engine proxy module performs a hash operation on the data concatenated in step 131, and uses the result as a measurement factor for the current Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) stage. Taking the TEE layer as an example, the DICE proxy module performs a hash algorithm on the concatenated data to generate a fixed-length hash value as a measurement factor for the TEE layer.

[0038] As described above, by concatenating the state measurement value of the security element, the security configuration hash value of the current trusted execution environment stage, and the signature value of the target application and then performing a hash operation to generate a measurement factor, the trusted state of the security element, the firmware integrity of the current stage, and the legitimacy of the target application can be uniformly measured. This allows the measurement factor to reflect the trusted state of multiple dimensions simultaneously, and attackers cannot tamper with any dimension without changing the measurement factor, thus improving the comprehensiveness and anti-tampering capability of the startup process measurement.

[0039] In an alternative implementation, the method 100 further includes steps 150 to 152.

[0040] Step 150: When a call request from the target application is received, the device identifier combination engine proxy module compares the state measurement value of the security element with the preset compliance benchmark value.

[0041] For example, when the system receives a call request from the target application, the device identifier combination engine proxy module obtains the compliance benchmark value pre-installed in the secure element and compares the state measurement value of the secure element generated and stored during startup with the compliance benchmark value to determine whether the secure element is currently in a trusted state. The compliance benchmark value is pre-installed in the secure element during the device production stage through a secure write process and subsequently serves as the parameter benchmark for state comparison during device operation.

[0042] Step 151: After the comparison is successful, derive the master key based on the current device identifier.

[0043] For example, if the comparison result shows that the security element's status measurement value matches the compliance benchmark value, the device identifier combination engine proxy module derives the master key based on the current device identifier through a key derivation function. Taking the TEE layer as an example, after confirming the SE status compliance, the DICE proxy module derives the corresponding payment function's master key based on the TEE layer CDI. The master key is derived when the target application initiates a call request. For the same target type, the derived master key is reused to handle multiple call requests within a single startup cycle until the device restarts.

[0044] Step 152: Encrypt the master key using the public key of the secure element to obtain the ciphertext.

[0045] For example, the Device Identifier Combination Engine (DICE) proxy module obtains the public key of the secure element, uses this public key to encrypt the master key derived in step 151, generates ciphertext, and sends the ciphertext to the secure element via a secure shared memory channel. Taking a payment scenario as an example, the DICE proxy module uses the SE public key to encrypt the derived master key, and then transmits it to the SE via the secure shared memory between the TEE and the SE.

[0046] As described above, when a call request from a target application is received, the state measurement value of the security element is compared with the compliance benchmark value. The master key is only derived and encrypted with the public key of the security element when the security element is in a trusted state. This makes the derivation and storage of the master key deeply bound to the real-time trusted state of the security element. When the security element is in an abnormal state, the master key cannot be derived and decrypted, thus improving the security of the key management process.

[0047] In an alternative implementation, step 151 derives the master key based on the current device identifier, including step 1511.

[0048] Step 1511: Based on the current device identifier, derive the master key corresponding to the target type.

[0049] For example, the device identifier combination engine proxy module derives the master key corresponding to the target type based on the current device identifier, according to the target type to which the target application belongs. Different types of target applications correspond to different master keys, and each master key is independent of the others.

[0050] As described above, by deriving the master key corresponding to the target type based on the current device identifier, different target types correspond to different master keys. The leakage of the master key of any target type does not affect the security of the master keys of other target types, thus achieving target-level isolation of master keys.

[0051] In an optional implementation, after step 150 compares the status measurement value of the security element with the preset compliance benchmark value through the device identifier combination engine agent module, it further includes steps 1501 to 1503.

[0052] Step 1501: Verify the signature of the current trusted execution environment stage certificate through the secure element.

[0053] For example, the secure element obtains the root public key of the device identifier combination engine and uses it to verify whether the signature of the certificate in the current trusted execution environment stage was issued by the private key of the previous stage. Taking SE verification as an example, the state lock module inside the SE uses the DICE root public key to verify the signature of the TEE layer certificate, confirming that the certificate was legally issued by the Bootloader layer private key.

[0054] Step 1502: After successful verification, the decrypted master key is stored in a secure element.

[0055] For example, after successful signature verification, the secure element uses its own private key to decrypt the received ciphertext, obtaining the master key plaintext, and stores the master key in the secure storage area within the secure element. Taking SE storage as an example, after successful signature verification, the SE uses its private key to decrypt the ciphertext, obtaining the master key plaintext, and stores it in the SE's internal secure storage area.

[0056] Step 1503: Enable the function register of the security element hardware setting function to open the corresponding function interface of the target application.

[0057] For example, after storing the master key, the security element enables the corresponding functional interfaces of the target application by setting the function enable register through hardware logic. Taking the payment scenario as an example, after storing the master key, the security element sets the transaction function enable register in hardware, opening transaction instruction interfaces such as PIN (Personal Identification Number) encryption and MAC (Message Authentication Code) calculation, allowing the target payment application to call the transaction function.

[0058] As described above, the signature of the certificate in the current trusted execution environment is verified by the secure element. After successful verification, the decrypted master key is stored, and the function enable register is set via hardware to open the corresponding function interface of the target application. The function interface is only opened after the certificate verification is successful, so that the function activation of the target application is bound to the current trusted state of the device in real time. When the device state is abnormal, the certificate verification fails and the function interface cannot be opened, avoiding the security risk of sensitive operations being performed when the device state is abnormal.

[0059] In an alternative implementation, step 1101 is included before the system starts up to the current trusted execution environment stage based on the device identifier combination engine in step 110.

[0060] Step 1101: Derive the device identifier of the previous stage and the public / private key pair of the previous stage based on the hardware layer device identifier.

[0061] For example, after the system is powered on, the main chip reads the unique device key and the fixed obfuscated fuse value from the one-time programmable fuse area. Using the unique device key and the fixed obfuscated fuse value as input, it derives the device identifier of the previous stage based on the hash chain operation, and generates the public-private key pair of the previous stage based on the device identifier of the previous stage. The previous stage is the bootloader stage.

[0062] As described above, by deriving the device identifier and corresponding public-private key pair of the previous stage based on the hardware layer device identifier, the starting point of the trust chain is solidified at the hardware layer, providing a reliable derivation basis for subsequent stages. The measurement values ​​and certificates of each subsequent stage at the hardware layer are generated step by step based on this derivation relationship. If the measurement value of any stage is tampered with, the derivation results of all subsequent stages will change, thus realizing the step-by-step transmission of the trust chain and integrity protection.

[0063] In an alternative implementation, steps 1102 to 1104 are included before step 110.

[0064] Step 1102: Receive the device identifier and certificate from the previous stage through the device identifier combination engine agent module.

[0065] For example, after the system starts up to the current trusted execution environment stage, the device identifier combination engine agent module in the trusted execution environment receives the device identifier and certificate of the previous stage.

[0066] Step 1103: Verify the validity of the certificate signature.

[0067] For example, the device identifier combination engine proxy module extracts the public key of the previous stage from the received previous stage certificate, and uses this public key to verify the signature of the received previous stage certificate, confirming that the certificate was legally issued by the previous stage's private key and that its content has not been tampered with. Taking TEE boot as an example, the TEE kernel extracts the BootLoader layer public key from the received BootLoader layer certificate, and uses this public key to verify the signature of the BootLoader layer certificate, confirming that the certificate was indeed legally issued by the BootLoader layer's private key and has not been tampered with.

[0068] Step 1104: After successful verification, proceed with the step of obtaining the status measurement values ​​of the safety element.

[0069] For example, if the certificate signature verification passes, the device identifier combination engine agent module continues to execute the step of obtaining the state measurement value of the security element; if the verification fails, the startup process is terminated.

[0070] As described above, by receiving the device identifier and certificate transmitted from the previous stage through the device identifier combination engine proxy module and verifying the legality of the certificate signature, the step of obtaining the state measurement value of the security element is executed only after the verification is successful. This ensures that the startup of the current trusted execution environment stage is based on the trusted measurement results of the previous stage. If the verification fails, the startup process is terminated, thus realizing the step-by-step transmission of the trust chain and integrity protection.

[0071] Please refer to Figure 2 , Figure 2 This is a system architecture diagram of a device secure boot and verification method based on an identifier engine, provided in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0072] The boot and derivation layer 201 includes a ROM / BootLoader standard DICE derivation module, a TEE DICE proxy module, and a PCI compliance factor-specific measurement module. Specifically, the ROM (Read-Only Memory) / BootLoader standard DICE (Device Identifier Composition Engine) derivation module is responsible for reading the UDS (Unique Device Secret) and fixed obfuscation fuse value from the eFuse (Electrically Programmable Fuse) in the hardware trust root 202 after system power-on, measuring the security configuration hash value level by level, and deriving CDI (Composite Device Identifier) ​​and certificates at each level. The TEE DICE proxy module is responsible for reading the status-related data of the SE chip through the trusted driver interface after the system boots to the TEE stage and incorporating the SE status into the DICE measurement system. The PCI (Peripheral) DICE proxy module is responsible for reading the status-related data of the SE chip through the trusted driver interface after the system boots to the TEE stage and incorporating the SE status into the DICE measurement system. The ComponentInterconnect (PCI) compliance factor dedicated measurement module is responsible for collecting PCI compliance factors at each stage of startup, including hardware configuration layer factors (debug interface fuse status, secure boot enable bit, chip hardware version identifier), security core layer factors (SE firmware hash, trusted payment application, signature value), and peripheral application layer factors (password keypad firmware hash, card reader firmware version, physical tamper trigger record, payment application signature value), and incorporating the above factors into a chain derivation.

[0073] The hardware root of trust 202 includes an eFuse and an SE chip. The eFuse, as the hardware root of trust for DICE, stores the UDS and a fixed obfuscation fuse value, used to derive the first-level CDI and public / private key pair. The SE chip, as the key root, stores the transaction key root, used to store the master key. The DICE dynamic identity root and the SE transaction key root are stored in the eFuse and SE chip respectively, and together they complete device authentication.

[0074] Taking the startup process of a smart POS terminal as an example: After the system powers on, the main chip reads the UDS and fixed obfuscated fuse value from the eFuse, generates the DICE root key seed through one-way calculation, and the ROM / BootLoader standard DICE derivation module measures the security configuration hash value level by level along the startup chain and derives the CDI and certificate at each level; after the system starts up to the TEE stage, the TEE DICE agent module reads the firmware version hash, internal key status register value and PSAM (Purchase Secure Application) of the SE chip through the trusted driver interface. The Module (Endpoint Security Application Module) generates an SE status measurement value when the card slot is in place. This SE status measurement value is then concatenated with the TEE firmware hash and payment TA signature value to generate a TEE layer measurement factor. A certificate is issued using the BootLoader layer private key to the TEE layer public key and the measurement factor, generating a TEE layer certificate that is included in the certificate chain. A dedicated PCI compliance factor measurement module collects compliance factors at each startup stage, ensuring that the compliance status is fully incorporated into the chain-based derivation and certificate system. The state lock module built into the SE chip uses the DICE root public key to verify the signature validity of the TEE layer status credential. Upon successful verification, the signature is decrypted and the master key is stored. The hardware sets the transaction function enable register, opening the transaction computation interface.

[0075] Through the aforementioned system architecture and operating process, this invention, through the coordinated operation of the ROM / BootLoader standard DICE derivation module, the TEE DICE proxy module, and the PCI compliance factor dedicated measurement module, uses DICE as the dynamic identity root and SE as the transaction key root to measure and derive CDI and certificates layer by layer along the boot chain. At the same time, it incorporates SE status and PCI compliance factors into the measurement system, realizing deep cryptographic binding between device identity and software and hardware operating status. This ensures that compliance evidence has cryptographic immutability, effectively solving the technical problems of static SE identity, lack of hardware security carrier for DICE, and inability to dynamically prove compliance status in related technologies.

[0076] Please refer to Figure 3 The following describes in detail an application embodiment of the device secure boot and authentication method based on an identifier engine in this invention. This application can apply the above scheme to high-security scenarios requiring joint verification of identity and trusted status during the device boot process. Taking the secure boot of a smart POS terminal as an example, the method includes the following steps: S301. Generate a root composite device identifier based on the unique device key and the inherent attributes of the hardware.

[0077] The main chip reads the UDS and inherent hardware attributes (including chip hardware version identifier, etc.) from the eFuse. Using the UDS and inherent hardware attributes as input, it generates the DICE root key seed through one-way operation, and derives the root CDI, i.e., the first-level composite device identifier, using the root key seed as input. This is equivalent to step 1101 above.

[0078] S302, ROM firmware layer derivation, combined with BootLoader firmware hash and compliance factor, outputs BootLoader layer key and device identity certificate.

[0079] The ROM layer takes the root CDI as input, combines it with the BootLoader firmware hash and hardware configuration layer compliance factors (including debug interface fuse status, secure boot enable bit, and chip hardware version identifier), and derives the BootLoader layer CDI and its corresponding asymmetric public-private key pair based on hash chain operations. Then, the ROM layer private key is used to sign a certificate with the BootLoader layer public key and measurement factors, generating the BootLoader layer certificate. This is equivalent to steps 120 to 140 above.

[0080] S303, Trusted System Layer Derivation, combines TEE / SE firmware hash and compliance factor to output TEE / SE layer key and layer certificate.

[0081] After the system boots to the TEE stage, the TEE DICE proxy module receives the BootLoader layer CDI and certificate passed from the BootLoader stage, verifies the validity of the certificate signature, and continues execution if the verification is successful; otherwise, the boot process terminates. This is equivalent to steps 1102 to 1104 above.

[0082] After successful verification, the TEE DICE agent module reads the SE firmware version hash, the SE internal key status register value, and the PSAM card slot presence status through the trusted driver interface, and performs digest calculation on the above data to generate the SE status measurement value. This is equivalent to steps 111 to 112 above.

[0083] Using the BootLoader layer CDI as input, and combining the SE state measurement value, TEE firmware hash, and payment TA signature value, the TEE layer CDI and its corresponding asymmetric public-private key pair are derived based on hash chaining operations. This is equivalent to steps 121 to 122 above.

[0084] The measurement factor is generated by concatenating the SE status measurement value, TEE firmware hash, and payment TA signature value. This is equivalent to steps 131 to 132 above.

[0085] The BootLoader layer private key issues a certificate to the TEE layer public key and measurement factor, generating a TEE layer certificate, which is then added to the certificate chain. This is equivalent to step 140 above.

[0086] Meanwhile, the PCI compliance factor dedicated measurement module collects compliance factors during the TEE stage, including SE firmware hash, payment TA signature value, key injection count, key destruction marker, and security algorithm version identifier.

[0087] S304, Business Layer Derivation: Combines the business layer application service hash and compliance factor to output the business layer key and layer certificate.

[0088] The TEE layer CDI continues to be passed down to the business layer (system kernel / application framework stage). Combining the system image hash, keypad firmware hash, magnetic stripe / IC card reader firmware version, physical tamper protection trigger history, and official payment application signature value, the business layer CDI and the corresponding asymmetric public-private key pair are derived. This is equivalent to steps 121 to 122 above.

[0089] A business layer certificate is generated by issuing a certificate using the TEE layer private key, the business layer public key, and the measurement factor. This is equivalent to step 140 above.

[0090] Once the business layer certificate is issued, the system starts normally. During subsequent operation, when a call request from the target application is received, the DICE proxy module compares the security element's status measurement value with the preset compliance benchmark value. This is equivalent to step 150 above.

[0091] After successful comparison, a master key is derived based on the current device identifier. This master key is then encrypted using the public key of the secure element to obtain the ciphertext. This is equivalent to steps 151 and 152 above.

[0092] The security element verifies the signature of the current TEE layer certificate. If the verification is successful, it stores the decrypted master key and sets the hardware enable register, opening the corresponding function interface for the target application. If the comparison fails or the certificate verification fails, it refuses to derive the master key or refuses to open the function interface. This is equivalent to steps 1501 to 1503 above.

[0093] S305, the final output includes the complete hierarchical certificate chain, hierarchical key set, and device identity.

[0094] Through successive derivations at the ROM firmware layer, trusted system layer, and service layer, the final output is a complete hierarchical certificate chain (including ROM layer certificate, BootLoader layer certificate, TEE layer certificate, and service layer certificate), the corresponding hierarchical key set for each layer, and the device identity composed of CDIs at each level. This is equivalent to the overall output of steps 140 and 121 to 122 above.

[0095] Through the above application examples, this invention uses DICE as the dynamic identity root and SE as the transaction key root, measuring the security configuration hash value layer by layer along the startup chain and deriving CDIs and certificates at each level. Simultaneously, it incorporates the SE state and PCI compliance factors into the measurement system, ultimately outputting a complete hierarchical certificate chain, layered key sets, and device identity, achieving deep cryptographic binding between device identity and hardware / software operating status. Because the compliance factor digest participates in the derivation of CDIs at each level, attackers cannot tamper with compliance evidence without changing the device identity, ensuring cryptographic immutability of the compliance evidence. Since the SE state is incorporated into the DICE measurement system, the SE identity is deeply bound to the trusted state of the startup chain, effectively solving the technical problems of static SE identity, lack of hardware security carrier for DICE, and inability to dynamically prove compliance status. This provides a fully provable secure startup solution for scenarios requiring high-security startup guarantees, such as financial payment terminals. Reference Figure 4 The present invention also provides a device secure boot and authentication terminal 400 based on an identifier engine, including a memory 401, a processor 402, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, it implements the various steps of a device secure boot and authentication method based on an identifier engine as described above.

[0096] In summary, the present invention provides a device secure boot and authentication method and terminal based on an identifier engine. After the system boots to the current trusted execution environment stage based on the device identifier combination engine, it obtains the state measurement value of the secure element. Based on the device identifier of the previous stage, it derives the device identifier and public-private key pair of the current stage. It generates a measurement factor based on the state measurement value, security configuration hash value, and target application signature value. Finally, it issues a certificate using the measurement factor of the private key pair from the previous stage and the current public key, thus obtaining a certificate for the current trusted execution environment stage. By incorporating the state measurement value of the secure element into the measurement system of the device identifier combination engine, it achieves deep binding of the hardware trusted state of the secure element, such as firmware version and key state, with the boot chain. By deriving the device identifier and public-private key pair of the current stage based on the device identifier of the previous stage, it achieves hierarchical transmission of the trust chain and integrity protection. By uniformly measuring the state measurement value, security configuration hash value, and target application signature value to generate a measurement factor, it achieves joint measurement of multi-dimensional trusted states. By issuing a certificate using the measurement factor of the private key pair from the previous stage and the current public key, the certificate simultaneously contains identity information and trusted state information.

[0097] This invention effectively solves the technical problems in related technologies, such as the independent operation of the device identifier combination engine and the security element, the inability to incorporate the trusted state of the security element into the startup metric chain, the static identity of the security element, and the continued legitimacy of the hardware identity after the device is flashed or the firmware is tampered with. It achieves the technical effect of joint verification of identity and multi-dimensional trusted state during the device startup process, and can be widely used in high-security scenarios such as financial payment terminals that require joint verification of identity and trusted state during the device startup process. It has the advantages of high security, high degree of automation, and strong integrity of the trust chain.

[0098] The above description is merely an embodiment of the present invention and does not limit the patent scope of the present invention. Any equivalent modifications made based on the content of the present invention specification and drawings, or direct or indirect applications in related technical fields, are similarly included within the patent protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A device secure boot and authentication method based on an identifier engine, characterized in that, include: After the system starts up to the current trusted execution environment based on the device identifier combination engine, it acquires the state measurement values ​​of the secure elements; Based on the device identifier of the previous stage, the current device identifier and the current public-private key pair of the current trusted execution environment stage are derived; Based on the state measurement value, the security configuration hash value of the current trusted execution environment stage, and the target application signature value, a measurement factor for the current trusted execution environment stage is generated. The current trusted execution environment stage certificate is obtained by issuing a certificate using the private key pair of the previous stage, the measurement factor, and the public key in the current public-private key pair.

2. The device secure boot and authentication method based on an identifier engine according to claim 1, characterized in that, The acquisition of the status measurement values ​​of the security element includes: The state-related data of the security element is read through the device identifier combination engine proxy module of the trusted execution environment; The state-related data is summarized to obtain the state measurement value.

3. The device secure boot and authentication method based on an identifier engine according to claim 1, characterized in that... The process of deriving the current device identifier and the current public-private key pair for the current trusted execution environment stage based on the device identifier of the previous stage includes: The current device identifier for the current trusted execution environment stage is derived from the device identifier of the previous stage based on a hash chain operation. Based on the current device identifier, generate the current public-private key pair for the current trusted execution environment stage.

4. The device secure boot and authentication method based on an identifier engine according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of generating the measurement factor for the current trusted execution environment stage based on the state measurement value, the security configuration hash value of the current trusted execution environment stage, and the target application signature value includes: The state measurement value, the security configuration hash value of the current trusted execution environment stage, and the target application signature value are concatenated to obtain the concatenated data; A hash operation is performed on the concatenated data to obtain the measurement factor for the current trusted execution environment stage.

5. The device secure boot and authentication method based on an identifier engine according to claim 1, characterized in that, Also includes: When a call request from the target application is received, the device identifier combination engine proxy module compares the status measurement value of the security element with the preset compliance benchmark value. After the comparison is successful, a master key is derived based on the current device identifier; The master key is encrypted using the public key of the security element to obtain ciphertext.

6. The device secure boot and authentication method based on an identifier engine according to claim 5, characterized in that, The process of deriving the master key based on the current device identifier includes: Based on the current device identifier, derive the master key corresponding to the target type.

7. The device secure boot and authentication method based on an identifier engine according to claim 5, characterized in that, After comparing the status measurement value of the security element with the preset compliance benchmark value through the device identifier combination engine proxy module, the process further includes: The signature of the current trusted execution environment stage certificate is verified by the security element; After successful verification, the decrypted master key is stored in the secure element. The corresponding functional interface of the target application is opened by setting the hardware function enable register of the security element.

8. The device secure boot and authentication method based on an identifier engine according to claim 1, characterized in that, Before the system boots up to the current trusted execution environment stage based on the device identifier combination engine, it also includes: The device identifier and the public / private key pair from the previous stage are derived from the hardware layer device identifier.

9. A device secure boot and authentication method based on an identifier engine according to claim 1, characterized in that, After the system starts up to the current trusted execution environment stage based on the device identifier combination engine, and before obtaining the state measurement value of the secure element, it also includes: The device identifier and certificate from the previous stage are received by the device identifier combination engine proxy module. Verify the validity of the certificate's signature; After successful verification, the step of obtaining the status measurement value of the security element is performed.

10. A device secure boot and authentication terminal based on an identifier engine, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that, When the processor executes the computer program, it implements each step of the device secure boot and authentication method based on an identifier engine as described in any one of claims 1 to 9.