Anti-tamper circuit for password card and password card assembly
By designing a tamper-proof circuit in the password card, and using the cooperation of a microcontroller and a micro switch, the key is automatically erased when the shell is removed, solving the problem that the password card is easily disassembled and cracked, and improving information security.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202421492869.8
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Utility models(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-06-26
- Publication Date
- 2025-04-11
- Estimated Expiration
- 2034-06-26
AI Technical Summary
Existing password card products are easily disassembled and cracked, and the encrypted information in password cards is obtained, and there is a lack of effective anti-tamping solution.
Design a tamper-proof circuit for password cards, including microcontrollers, microswitches and power supply systems. When the password card case is removed, the micro switch is turned off, and the microcontroller is powered by the first power supply, causing it to execute erase instructions, and eliminate the key in the storage module.
Effectively prevent the password card from being disassembled and cracked, avoid obtaining encrypted information in the password card, thereby improving information security.
Smart Images
Figure CN222748974U_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of password cards, and in particular to an anti-disassembly circuit and a password card assembly for password cards. Background Art
[0002] Information security is a comprehensive and interdisciplinary scientific field, which widely involves many disciplines such as mathematics, cryptography, computer, communication, control, artificial intelligence, security engineering, humanities, etc. It is a hot subject area that has developed rapidly in recent years. With the development of information technology, people are facing the severe test of information security while enjoying the huge benefits brought by information resources. The security problem of information is becoming increasingly prominent, and various security applications based on cryptographic principles are becoming more and more extensive. Data encryption has penetrated into every corner of information application. So far, cryptographic technology is the most effective way to achieve information security and is the core technology of information security. Through data encryption, people can effectively ensure that the content on the communication line is not leaked, and can also verify the integrity of the transmitted information.
[0003] Currently, there are many password card products on the market for data encryption. However, password card products are easily disassembled and cracked to obtain the encrypted information in the password card. It is urgent to provide a solution that can effectively prevent password card products from being disassembled and cracked.
[0004] It should be noted that the information disclosed in the background technology section of this application is only intended to deepen the understanding of the general background technology of this application, and should not be regarded as an admission or suggestion in any form that the information constitutes prior art already known to those skilled in the art. Utility Model Content
[0005] The purpose of the present application is to provide an anti-disassembly circuit and a password card assembly for a password card, so as to effectively prevent the password card product from being disassembled and cracked.
[0006] In order to achieve the above objectives, this application provides the following technical solutions:
[0007] On one hand, the present application provides an anti-tampering circuit for a password card, comprising:
[0008] A single-chip microcomputer, wherein a storage module for storing a key is provided therein, wherein an erase instruction is stored in the storage module, and wherein the erase instruction is used to erase the key stored in the storage module when an IO port of the single-chip microcomputer detects a high level;
[0009] A micro switch, wherein a first end of the micro switch is electrically connected to a power input end of the single-chip microcomputer and an IO port of the single-chip microcomputer, and a second end of the micro switch is electrically connected to a first power supply;
[0010] Wherein, the movable arm of the micro switch is connected to the shell of the password card; when the shell is removed, the micro switch is closed, and the power input terminal and IO port of the single-chip microcomputer are powered by the first power supply to enable the single-chip microcomputer to execute the erase instruction.
[0011] The anti-tampering circuit as described above further comprises: a second power supply, the second power supply being electrically connected to a power input terminal of the single-chip microcomputer;
[0012] A first diode, wherein a positive electrode of the first diode is electrically connected to the first power supply through a micro switch, and a negative electrode of the first diode is electrically connected to a power input terminal of the single chip microcomputer.
[0013] The anti-disassembly circuit as described above further includes a second diode, wherein the positive electrode of the second diode is electrically connected to the second power supply, and the negative electrode of the second diode is electrically connected to the power input terminal of the single-chip microcomputer.
[0014] The anti-tampering circuit as described above further includes a processing module, which is communicatively connected to the single-chip microcomputer and is used to retrieve a key from the single-chip microcomputer and perform cryptographic operations.
[0015] As the anti-tampering circuit described above, further, the storage module includes an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory and / or a flash memory.
[0016] The anti-tampering circuit as described above, further, the storage module also includes a random access memory.
[0017] As described above, the anti-tampering circuit further comprises: an algorithm for cryptographic operations in the processing module including at least one of a national secret algorithm and a post-quantum cryptographic algorithm.
[0018] In another aspect, the present application further provides a password card assembly, including a password card, a housing disposed on the password card, and the above-mentioned anti-tampering circuit.
[0019] The password card assembly as described above, further, the password card comprises a PCB board;
[0020] Among them, the single-chip microcomputer, the micro switch and the first power supply are all integrated on the first surface of the PCB board, the first surface is arranged in the shell so that the single-chip microcomputer, the micro switch and the first power supply are all placed in the shell, and the movable arm of the micro switch is arranged on the inner wall of the shell.
[0021] As the password card assembly described above, further, the housing is detachably connected to the PCB board.
[0022] The beneficial effects of this application are:
[0023] The single-chip microcomputer of the present application takes into account both the storage function and the key erasing function. The single-chip microcomputer is arranged in the shell of the password card, and the micro switch is arranged on the shell of the password card. When the shell is removed, the microwave switch is closed, and the first power supply supplies power to the power input terminal and the IO port of the single-chip microcomputer, so that the single-chip microcomputer works normally and the IO port detects a high level, so that the single-chip microcomputer executes an erase instruction to eliminate the key stored in the storage module; thereby preventing the password card from being disassembled and cracked by someone to obtain the encrypted information in the password card.
[0024] The password card assembly provided in the present application includes the above-mentioned anti-disassembly circuit, and therefore has the same beneficial effects, which will not be described in detail here. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0025] Figure 1 Schematic diagram of the anti-tampering circuit provided in the embodiment of the present application Figure 1 ;
[0026] Figure 2 Schematic diagram of the anti-tampering circuit provided in the embodiment of the present application Figure 2 ;
[0027] In the accompanying drawings: 1, single chip microcomputer; 2, processing module; 3, micro switch; 4, first power supply; 5, second power supply; 6, first diode; 7, second diode. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0028] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the technical solutions in the present application, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present application, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work should fall within the scope of protection of this application. The embodiments described below with reference to the drawings are exemplary and are only used to explain the present application, and cannot be interpreted as limitations on the present application.
[0029] In the description of the present application, it should be understood that the terms "center", "up", "down", "left", "right", etc., indicating directions or positional relationships are based on the directions or positional relationships shown in the accompanying drawings, and are only for the convenience of describing the present application and simplifying the description, and do not indicate or imply that the device or element referred to must have a specific direction, be constructed and operated in a specific direction, and therefore should not be understood as a limitation on the present application.
[0030] In addition, the terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only and should not be understood as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of the indicated technical features. Therefore, the features defined as "first" and "second" may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of the features. In the description of this application, the meaning of "plurality" is at least two, such as two, three, etc., unless otherwise clearly and specifically defined.
[0031] Figure 1 Schematic diagram of the anti-tampering circuit provided in the embodiment of the present application Figure 1 ,like Figure 1 As shown: The embodiment of the present application discloses an anti-disassembly circuit for a password card, comprising: a single-chip computer 1, which is provided with a storage module for storing a key, wherein the storage module stores an erase instruction, and the erase instruction is used to eliminate the key stored in the storage module when the IO port of the single-chip computer 1 detects a high level; a micro switch 3, wherein the first end of the micro switch 3 is electrically connected to the power input end of the single-chip computer 1 and the IO port of the single-chip computer 1, and the second end of the micro switch 3 is electrically connected to the first power supply 4; wherein the movable arm of the micro switch 3 is connected to the shell of the password card; when the shell is removed, the micro switch 3 is closed, and the power input end and the IO port of the single-chip computer 1 are powered by the first power supply 4 so that the single-chip computer 1 executes the erase instruction.
[0032] The single-chip microcomputer 1 of this embodiment takes into account both the storage function and the key erasing function. The single-chip microcomputer 1 is arranged in the shell of the password card, and the micro switch 3 is arranged on the shell. When the shell is removed, the microwave switch is closed, and the first power supply 4 supplies power to the power input terminal and the IO port of the single-chip microcomputer 1, so that the single-chip microcomputer 1 works normally and the IO port detects a high level, so that the single-chip microcomputer 1 executes an erase instruction to eliminate the key stored in the storage module; thereby preventing the password card from being disassembled and cracked by someone to obtain the encrypted information in the password card.
[0033] The housing in this embodiment may be a cover plate, directly covering the password card, or may be composed of a box body and a cover plate, with the password card placed in a space formed by the box body and the cover plate. Specifically, when the housing is a cover plate, the cover plate and the password card are detachably connected together, for example, by screws. When the housing is composed of a box body and a cover plate, the box body and the cover plate may be connected by screws, riveting or gluing.
[0034] In this embodiment, the micro switch 3 is not specifically limited. By way of example, the micro switch 3 (Microswitch) may be composed of the following main components:
[0035] Contacts: The micro switch 3 has contacts inside, which are usually gold-plated or silver-plated, for conducting electricity. When the switch is operated, these contacts can connect or disconnect the circuit.
[0036] Actuator: The actuator is an arm-shaped structure on the micro switch 3, usually made of metal, responsible for contacting and transmitting force with external mechanical movement (such as housing movement). The design of the actuator can vary according to specific needs, such as straight arm, curved arm or ball arm.
[0037] Spring: The spring is used to provide a rebound force so that the micro switch 3 can quickly return to its initial state when the external force is removed. This helps to ensure the stability and reliability of the switch.
[0038] Mounting Bracket: The micro switch 3 usually needs to be mounted on a device or machine through a mounting bracket or mounting bracket. These brackets and brackets are located at the bottom or side of the micro switch 3 and usually have screw holes for fixing the switch.
[0039] Housing: The housing is the outer packaging of the micro switch 3, usually made of plastic or metal. It not only protects the internal mechanical components from the external environment, but also provides support and structural strength.
[0040] Pivot Point: A pivot point is a mechanical structure, usually located inside a switch, that supports the movable arm and ensures that the movable arm triggers or releases the contacts of the switch when it moves.
[0041] These components work together to enable the micro switch 3 to be precisely controlled under the action of external forces, thereby playing an important role in mechanical or electronic equipment, such as triggering a circuit state change when the housing is removed.
[0042] Based on the specific structure of the above-mentioned micro switch 3, the specific connection relationship between the micro switch 3, the password card and the shell is as follows: in this embodiment, the movable arm of the micro switch 3 is connected to the shell of the password card, and the shell of the micro switch 3 is fixed on the password card through a fixing bracket or a mounting seat.
[0043] Based on the above connection relationship, when the shell is removed, the movable arm of the micro switch 3 moves, and the internal contact thereof is electrically connected to the first power supply 4, turning on the anti-disassembly circuit, and the first power supply 4 supplies power to the power input terminal and IO port of the single-chip computer 1, so that the single-chip computer 1 works normally and the IO port detects a high level, so that the single-chip computer 1 executes an erase instruction and eliminates the key stored in the storage module; thereby preventing the password card from being disassembled and cracked by someone to obtain the encrypted information in the password card. Furthermore, when the shell is not removed, the movable arm of the micro switch 3 does not move, and the internal contact thereof is disconnected from the first power supply 4, so that the anti-disassembly circuit is disconnected, and then the single-chip computer 1 will not execute an erase instruction and will not eliminate the key stored in the storage module.
[0044] Furthermore, in order to ensure that the storage function of the single chip microcomputer 1 operates normally when the housing is not removed, Figure 2 Schematic diagram of the anti-tampering circuit provided in the embodiment of the present application Figure 2 ,like Figure 2 As shown: In this embodiment, the anti-disassembly circuit also includes: a second power supply 5, which is electrically connected to the power input terminal of the single-chip computer 1; a first diode 6, the positive electrode of the first diode 6 is electrically connected to the first power supply 4 through the micro switch 3, and the cathode of the first diode 6 is electrically connected to the power input terminal of the single-chip computer 1.
[0045] When the housing is not removed, the microswitch 3 is in the open state, and the OE port of the single-chip microcomputer 1 detects a low level so that it will not execute the erase instruction; at this time, the single-chip microcomputer 1 can be powered by the second power supply 5 to enable the storage function of the single-chip microcomputer 1 to operate normally. By setting the first diode 6, the second power supply 5 will not supply power to the OE port, ensuring that the OE port detects a low level so that it will not execute the erase instruction.
[0046] In this embodiment, the first power source 4 and the second power source 5 are not specifically limited. For example, the first power source 4 may be a 3V battery, and the second power source 5 may be a 3.3V power source.
[0047] Further, continue as Figure 2 As shown: In order to avoid mutual interference when two power supplies are supplied, the anti-disassembly circuit also includes a second diode 7, the positive electrode of the second diode 7 is electrically connected to the second power supply 5, and the cathode of the second diode 7 is electrically connected to the power input terminal of the single-chip computer 1.
[0048] In some implementations of this embodiment, the anti-disassembly circuit further includes a processing module 2, which is in communication with the single-chip microcomputer 1 and is used to retrieve the key from the single-chip microcomputer 1 and perform cryptographic operations. When the housing is not removed, the single-chip microcomputer 1 communicates with the processing module 2 to ensure the execution of the cryptographic operations.
[0049] In some implementations of this embodiment, the storage module includes an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory and / or a flash memory; both the electrically erasable programmable read-only memory and the flash memory have the characteristic that data will not be lost when power is off, and can be used to store the key in this embodiment and run the program.
[0050] Furthermore, in some implementations of the present embodiment, the storage module also includes a random access memory, which has the characteristics of extremely fast reading and writing speeds and is suitable for temporary storage and runtime data. Therefore, a random access memory is set up to store some data generated during program operation, and even if the data is lost during power failure, it will not affect the storage function and erase key function of the microcontroller 1.
[0051] In summary, the single chip computer 1 of this embodiment enhances security and flexibility by providing multiple types of memories.
[0052] The anti-tampering circuit in this embodiment can be used for PQC password cards (where PQC is the abbreviation of Post Quantum Cryptography, which means post-quantum cryptography. As the name suggests, it is the password used after quantum computers and is a password that can resist cracking by quantum computers), and can also be used for traditional password card products.
[0053] In this embodiment, the algorithm of the cryptographic operation in the processing module 2 includes at least one of a national secret algorithm and a post-quantum cryptographic algorithm. Among them, the national secret algorithm refers to the national commercial cryptographic algorithm, which is a cryptographic algorithm standard and its application specification recognized and announced by the State Cryptography Administration, and some of the cryptographic algorithms have become international standards; such as the SM series of cryptography, SM stands for commercial secrets, that is, commercial cryptography, which refers to cryptographic technology used for business and does not involve state secrets. National secret algorithms include but are not limited to: SM1, SM2, SM3, SM4, SM7, SM9, and Zu Chongzhi algorithm. Post-quantum cryptographic algorithms include but are not limited to: Crystals-Kyber, Crystals-Dilithium (based on lattice cryptography), FALCON (based on lattice cryptography (Structured-lattices)), SPHINCS+ (based on hash functions (Hash-based)).
[0054] Based on the same application concept, the embodiment of the present application further proposes a password card assembly, including a password card, a shell arranged on the password card and the above-mentioned anti-tampering circuit.
[0055] The password card assembly provided in this embodiment includes the above-mentioned anti-tampering circuit, and therefore has the same beneficial effects, which will not be described in detail here.
[0056] In some implementations of this embodiment, the password card includes a PCB board; wherein the single-chip microcomputer 1, the micro switch 3, and the first power supply 4 are all integrated on the first surface of the PCB board, the first surface is arranged in the housing so that the single-chip microcomputer 1, the micro switch 3, and the first power supply 4 are all placed in the housing, and the movable arm of the micro switch 3 is arranged on the inner wall of the housing. By integrating the single-chip microcomputer 1, the micro switch 3, and the first power supply 4 on the first surface of the PCB board, the integration of the entire component is improved. Furthermore, when the anti-disassembly circuit also includes a processing module 2, the processing module 2 is also integrated on the first surface of the PCB board.
[0057] Specifically, the housing in this embodiment can be a cover plate, which is directly covered on the first surface of the PCB board, and the cover plate and the PCB board are detachably connected together, for example, by screws. The housing can also be composed of a box body and a cover plate, and the PCB board is placed in a space formed by the box body and the cover plate, and the box body and the PCB board are detachably connected together, for example, by screws.
[0058] In the description of this specification, the description with reference to the terms "some embodiments" or "examples" etc. means that the specific features, structures, materials or characteristics described in conjunction with the embodiments or examples are included in at least one embodiment or example of the present application. In this specification, the schematic representations of the above terms do not necessarily refer to the same embodiments or examples. Moreover, the specific features, structures, materials or characteristics described may be combined in any one or more embodiments in a suitable manner. In addition, those skilled in the art may combine and combine different embodiments or examples described in this specification.
[0059] The above are only preferred embodiments of the present application and do not have any limiting effect on the present application. Any technical personnel in the relevant technical field, without departing from the scope of the technical solution of the present application, may make any form of equivalent replacement or modification to the technical solution and technical content disclosed in the present application, which shall be deemed as the content of the technical solution of the present application and still fall within the protection scope of the present application.
Claims
1. An anti-tampering circuit for a password card, characterized in that: include: A single-chip microcomputer, wherein a storage module for storing a key is provided therein, wherein an erase instruction is stored in the storage module, and wherein the erase instruction is used to erase the key stored in the storage module when an IO port of the single-chip microcomputer detects a high level; A micro switch, wherein a first end of the micro switch is electrically connected to a power input end of the single-chip microcomputer and an IO port of the single-chip microcomputer, and a second end of the micro switch is electrically connected to a first power supply; Wherein, the movable arm of the micro switch is connected to the shell of the password card; when the shell is removed, the micro switch is closed, and the power input terminal and IO port of the single-chip microcomputer are powered by the first power supply to enable the single-chip microcomputer to execute the erase instruction.
2. The anti-tampering circuit for a password card according to claim 1, characterized in that: Also includes: A second power supply, the second power supply is electrically connected to a power input terminal of the single chip microcomputer; A first diode, wherein a positive electrode of the first diode is electrically connected to the first power supply through a micro switch, and a negative electrode of the first diode is electrically connected to a power input terminal of the single chip microcomputer.
3. The anti-tampering circuit for password card according to claim 2, characterized in that: It also includes a second diode, the positive pole of the second diode is electrically connected to the second power supply, and the cathode of the second diode is electrically connected to the power input terminal of the single chip computer.
4. The anti-tampering circuit for a password card according to claim 1, characterized in that: It also includes a processing module, which is connected to the single-chip microcomputer for communication and is used to retrieve the key from the single-chip microcomputer and perform cryptographic operations.
5. The anti-tampering circuit for password card according to claim 1, characterized in that: The storage module includes an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory and / or a flash memory.
6. The anti-tampering circuit for password card according to claim 5, characterized in that: The storage module also includes a random access memory.
7. The anti-tampering circuit for a password card according to claim 4, characterized in that: The cryptographic operation algorithm in the processing module includes at least one of a national secret algorithm and a post-quantum cryptographic algorithm.
8. A password card assembly, characterized in that: It comprises a password card, a shell arranged on the password card and an anti-disassembly circuit as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 7.
9. The password card assembly according to claim 8, characterized in that: The password card includes a PCB board; Among them, the single-chip microcomputer, the micro switch and the first power supply are all integrated on the first surface of the PCB board, the first surface is arranged in the shell so that the single-chip microcomputer, the micro switch and the first power supply are all placed in the shell, and the movable arm of the micro switch is arranged on the inner wall of the shell.
10. The password card assembly according to claim 9, characterized in that: The housing is detachably connected to the PCB board.