A transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method and management device thereof

The transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method uses anti-cracking modules to monitor and verify processes and modules, employing hook technology to secure encryption, effectively preventing unauthorized access and tampering.

CN112131565BActive Publication Date: 2024-12-03ZHEJIANG VAMTOO INFORMATION SECURITY TECH CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202011032042.5
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2020-09-27
Publication Date
2024-12-03
Estimated Expiration
2040-09-27

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Current encryption and decryption products lack effective security measures to prevent unauthorized access and tampering, allowing criminals to obtain plaintext content by disguising as trusted processes or injecting malicious modules, thereby compromising file security.

Method used

Implement a transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method using anti-cracking modules that monitor and verify processes and modules for trustworthiness, employing hook technology to modify interfaces and perform trust checks, and a third anti-cracking module to secure the encryption process.

Benefits of technology

Prevents unauthorized access to encrypted files by identifying and blocking malicious processes and modules, ensuring the security of office files by preventing plaintext content reading.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The present invention provides a transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method and management device thereof, wherein the method comprises the following steps: creating a first anti-cracking module, the first anti-cracking module monitors each non-trusted process, and performs a trust detection on the executable program generated by each non-trusted process, and determines the non-trusted process corresponding to the executable program that passes the trust detection as a malicious process; creating a second anti-cracking module, the second anti-cracking module monitors each non-trusted process, and the second anti-cracking module determines whether the target module injected by the non-trusted process is a trusted module, and determines the target module determined to be a trusted process as a malicious process. The beneficial effect of the present invention is that: multiple malicious processes that read the plaintext content of encrypted files are avoided at the same time, thereby effectively ensuring the security of office files.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of file encryption and decryption, and in particular to a transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method and management equipment thereof. Background Art

[0002] At present, the office business systems of various companies usually use transparent encryption and decryption to ensure the security of the company's electronic documents. The so-called transparency means that the encryption and decryption process will not be noticed by the user during the operation of the file, and the entire encryption and decryption operation process is completed automatically; the transparent encryption and decryption system will determine whether the file needs to be encrypted and decrypted according to the pre-set strategy, including the file type to be protected, encryption algorithm, and encryption key, and automatically complete the encryption and decryption of the file.

[0003] However, current encryption and decryption products all have a trusted process list, and the trusted list has rules. When criminals need to obtain the plaintext content of encrypted files, they can crack the encryption and decryption products by obtaining the trusted rules, thereby obtaining the plaintext content of the encrypted files.

[0004] Currently, criminals can obtain the plaintext content of encrypted files through the following methods:

[0005] The first method is to pretend to be a trusted process and read the plaintext content of the encrypted file;

[0006] The second method is to inject or load it into a trusted process and read the plaintext content of the encrypted file.

[0007] Therefore, the encryption and decryption products in the prior art cannot effectively prevent documents, programs, etc. from being maliciously tampered with, resulting in relatively low security protection of files. Summary of the invention

[0008] In view of the above problems existing in the prior art, a transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method and management device thereof are now provided.

[0009] The specific technical solutions are as follows:

[0010] A transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method, comprising the following steps:

[0011] Step S1, creating a first anti-cracking module, the first anti-cracking module monitors each untrusted process, and performs a trust check on the executable program generated by each untrusted process, and determines the untrusted process corresponding to the executable program that passes the trust check as a malicious process;

[0012] Step S2, creating a second anti-cracking module, the second anti-cracking module monitors each untrusted process, and the second anti-cracking module determines whether the target module injected by the untrusted process is a trusted module, and determines the target module determined to be a trusted module as a malicious process.

[0013] Preferably, a transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method, wherein step S1 specifically includes: when starting an untrusted process, injecting a first anti-cracking module into the untrusted process, the first anti-cracking module uses hook technology to modify the corresponding interface, the first anti-cracking module determines whether the executable program obtained by the untrusted process using the corresponding interface passes the trust test, and determines the untrusted process corresponding to the executable program that passes the trust test as a malicious process.

[0014] Preferably, a transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method, wherein:

[0015] Step S1 specifically includes the following steps:

[0016] Step S11, when starting the untrusted process, injecting the first anti-cracking module into the untrusted process, the first anti-cracking module modifies the first interface using hook technology;

[0017] Step S12, the first anti-cracking module determines whether the executable program generated by the untrusted process using the first interface is a trusted program;

[0018] If so, the untrusted process is determined to be a malicious process;

[0019] If not, the untrusted process is determined to be a non-malicious process.

[0020] Preferably, a transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method, wherein:

[0021] Step S1 specifically includes the following steps:

[0022] Step S13, when starting the untrusted process, injecting the first anti-cracking module into the untrusted process, the first anti-cracking module modifies the second interface using hook technology;

[0023] Step S14, the untrusted process uses the second interface to modify the attribute characteristics of the executable program;

[0024] Step S15, the first anti-cracking module performs a credit check on the modified attribute characteristics;

[0025] When the attribute characteristics pass the trust check, the untrusted process is determined to be a malicious process;

[0026] When the attribute feature fails the trust check, the untrusted process is determined to be a non-malicious process.

[0027] Preferably, a transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method, wherein:

[0028] Step S1 also includes the following steps:

[0029] Step S16, when starting the untrusted process, using the first anti-cracking module to detect each item of trust information in the untrusted process, the trust information includes the trust information of the executable program;

[0030] When all the trust information in the untrusted process passes the trust detection, it is proved that the untrusted process is an authorized process;

[0031] When at least one item of the trust information of the untrusted process fails the detection, it is proved that the untrusted process is a malicious process.

[0032] Preferably, a transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method, wherein:

[0033] Step S2 specifically includes the following steps:

[0034] Step S21, when starting the untrusted process, injecting the second anti-cracking module into the untrusted process, the second anti-cracking module modifies the third interface using hook technology;

[0035] Step S22, the non-trusted process uses the third interface to access the target module;

[0036] Step S23, the second anti-cracking module determines whether the target module is a trusted module;

[0037] If so, determine that the untrusted process corresponding to the target module is a malicious process;

[0038] If not, it is determined that the untrusted process corresponding to the target module is a non-malicious process.

[0039] Preferably, a transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method, wherein:

[0040] Step S2 specifically includes the following steps:

[0041] Step S24, when starting the credit granting process, injecting the second anti-cracking module into the credit granting process, and the second anti-cracking module modifies the fourth interface using hook technology;

[0042] Step S25, the second anti-cracking module determines whether the module loaded by the credit granting process using the fourth interface is legal;

[0043] If yes, allow the trusted process to continue loading using the fourth interface;

[0044] If not, the trusted process is not allowed to continue loading using the fourth interface.

[0045] Preferably, the transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method further includes:

[0046] Step S3, creating a third anti-cracking module, and setting the third anti-cracking module at the upper layer of the anti-cracking system to encrypt and decrypt office documents through the third anti-cracking module.

[0047] Preferably, a transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method, wherein:

[0048] Step S3 includes: a third anti-cracking module is set at the application layer, so as to encrypt and decrypt the office file by using the hook technology through the third anti-cracking module.

[0049] It also includes a transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking management device, which includes a memory and a processor. The memory stores a transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking program that can be run on the processor. When the transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking program is executed by the processor, it implements any of the transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking methods mentioned above.

[0050] The above technical solution has the following advantages or beneficial effects:

[0051] When a malicious process reads the plain text content of an encrypted file by disguising itself as a trusted process, the first anti-cracking module can monitor the executable program generated by each untrusted process to identify the malicious process disguising itself as a trusted process;

[0052] When a malicious process reads the plaintext content of an encrypted file by injecting or loading into a trusted process, the first anti-cracking module can monitor the target module injected by each untrusted process to identify the malicious module injected or loaded into the trusted process;

[0053] When a malicious process reads the plain text content of an encrypted file through the filter driver layer, a third anti-cracking module provided in the upper layer of the anti-cracking system can be used to prevent the malicious process from reading the plain text content of the encrypted file through the filter driver layer.

[0054] This achieves a method for simultaneously preventing multiple malicious attempts to read the plaintext content of encrypted files, thereby effectively ensuring the security of office files. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0055] The embodiments of the present invention will be described more fully with reference to the attached drawings, which are provided for illustration and description only and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention.

[0056] Figure 1 It is a flow chart of an embodiment of the transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method of the present invention;

[0057] Figure 2 A block diagram of the principle of the prior art disguised as a credit granting process;

[0058] Figures 3A-3CThis is a principle block diagram of step S1 of an embodiment of the transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method of the present invention;

[0059] Figure 4 A block diagram of the principle of disguising as an injection or loading into a trusted process in the prior art;

[0060] Figure 5A-5B This is a principle block diagram of step S2 of an embodiment of the transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method of the present invention;

[0061] Figure 6 It is a principle block diagram of the anti-cracking system of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0062] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0063] It should be noted that, in the absence of conflict, the embodiments of the present invention and the features in the embodiments may be combined with each other.

[0064] The present invention will be further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments, but they are not intended to limit the present invention.

[0065] The present invention includes a transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method, such as Figure 1 As shown, the following steps are included:

[0066] Step S1, creating a first anti-cracking module, the first anti-cracking module monitors each untrusted process, and performs a trust check on the executable program generated by each untrusted process, and determines the untrusted process corresponding to the executable program that passes the trust check as a malicious process;

[0067] Step S2, creating a second anti-cracking module, the second anti-cracking module monitors each untrusted process, and the second anti-cracking module determines whether the target module injected by the untrusted process is a trusted module, and determines the target module determined to be a trusted module as a malicious process.

[0068] In the above embodiment, step S1 and step S2 are in parallel relationship, that is, they can be executed sequentially or simultaneously;

[0069] When a malicious process reads the plaintext content of an encrypted file by disguising itself as a trusted process, the malicious process disguising itself as a trusted process can be identified through step S1;

[0070] When a malicious process reads the plaintext content of an encrypted file by being injected or loaded into a trusted process, the malicious process injected into the trusted process can be identified through step S2.

[0071] In the present application, step S1 and step S2 can be used simultaneously to simultaneously avoid the above three malicious readings of the plaintext content of the encrypted file, thereby effectively ensuring the security of the office file.

[0072] Furthermore, when a malicious process creates or modifies a disguised trusted process, the disguised trusted process enters the transparent encryption and decryption step just like the real trusted process, thereby causing the trusted process disguised by the malicious process to read the plaintext content of the encrypted file, such as Figure 2 shown.

[0073] Furthermore, in the above embodiment, step S1 specifically includes: when starting an untrusted process, injecting a first anti-cracking module into the untrusted process, the first anti-cracking module uses hook technology to modify the corresponding interface, the first anti-cracking module determines whether the executable program obtained by the untrusted process using the corresponding interface passes the trust detection, and determines the untrusted process corresponding to the executable program that passes the trust detection as a malicious process.

[0074] At this time, any one of the following two preferred implementations of step S1 can be used to handle the problem from the root, prohibiting the non-trusted process from creating a new trusted process;

[0075] Further, as a preferred implementation mode 1 of step S1,

[0076] like Figure 3A As shown,

[0077] When a malicious process wants to create a trusted process, the malicious process can directly create a new executable program using the first interface, and the new executable program is a malicious process;

[0078] At this time, step S1 may specifically include the following steps:

[0079] Step S11, when starting the untrusted process, injecting the first anti-cracking module into the untrusted process, the first anti-cracking module modifies the first interface using hook technology;

[0080] Step S12, the first anti-cracking module determines whether the executable program generated by the untrusted process using the first interface is a trusted program;

[0081] If so, the untrusted process is determined to be a malicious process;

[0082] If not, the untrusted process is determined to be a non-malicious process.

[0083] Among them, hook technology (i.e. hook technology) is a special message processing mechanism, which can monitor various event messages in the system or process, intercept messages sent to the target window and process them. Therefore, we can customize hooks in the system to monitor the occurrence of specific events in the system and complete specific functions.

[0084] In the above preferred implementation, when the untrusted process is started, the first anti-cracking module is injected into the untrusted process, thereby realizing monitoring of the untrusted process through the first anti-cracking module;

[0085] The first anti-cracking module uses hook technology to modify the first interface, and the first interface is an interface for writing executable files (Application Programming Interface, API). Therefore, an untrusted process can write executable files through the first interface to generate an executable program. Since the first interface is modified by the first anti-cracking module using hook technology, only the executable files generated by malicious processes through the first interface will be forged into trusted programs, while the executable files generated by non-malicious processes through the first interface are untrusted programs; therefore, the first anti-cracking module determines whether the executable program is a trusted program to determine whether the untrusted process is a malicious process; thereby prohibiting malicious processes from creating new trusted processes.

[0086] Furthermore, when a malicious process creates or modifies a disguised trusted process, the disguised trusted process enters the transparent encryption and decryption step just like the real trusted process, thereby causing the trusted process disguised by the malicious process to read the plaintext content of the encrypted file, such as Figure 2 shown.

[0087] At this time, the problem can be solved from the root through the implementation method 2 of step S1 below, prohibiting untrusted processes from modifying the characteristic attributes of the executable program;

[0088] Further, as a preferred implementation method of step S1, Figure 3B As shown,

[0089] When the malicious process wants to modify the characteristic attributes of the executable program, the malicious process can use the second interface to modify the characteristic attributes of the executable program to obtain the modified executable program, and the modified executable program is the malicious process;

[0090] At this time, step S1 may specifically include the following steps:

[0091] Step S13, when starting the untrusted process, injecting the first anti-cracking module into the untrusted process, the first anti-cracking module modifies the second interface using hook technology;

[0092] Step S14, the untrusted process uses the second interface to modify the attribute characteristics of the executable program;

[0093] Step S15, the first anti-cracking module performs a credit check on the modified attribute characteristics;

[0094] When the attribute characteristics pass the trust check, the untrusted process is determined to be a malicious process;

[0095] When the attribute feature fails the trust check, the untrusted process is determined to be a non-malicious process.

[0096] In the above preferred implementation, when the untrusted process is started, the first anti-cracking module is injected into the untrusted process, thereby realizing monitoring of the untrusted process through the first anti-cracking module;

[0097] The first anti-cracking module adopts the hook technology to modify the second interface. The second interface is an interface for modifying the attribute characteristics of the executable program. Therefore, the untrusted process can modify the attribute characteristics of the executable program through the second interface. Since the second interface is modified by the first anti-cracking module using the hook technology, only the attribute characteristics of the executable program modified by the malicious process through the second interface can pass the trust check, while the attribute characteristics of the executable program modified by the non-malicious process through the second interface cannot pass the trust check; therefore, when the first anti-cracking module judges the modified attribute characteristics, it can determine whether the untrusted process is a malicious process through the trust check; thereby prohibiting the malicious process from creating a new trusted process.

[0098] Furthermore, when a malicious process creates or modifies a disguised trusted process, the disguised trusted process enters the transparent encryption and decryption steps just like the real trusted process, thereby causing the trusted process disguised by the malicious process to read the plaintext content of the encrypted file, such as Figure 2 shown.

[0099] At this time, each credit information in the credit granting process can be strengthened by implementing the third embodiment of the following step S1;

[0100] Further, as a preferred implementation method of step S1, Figure 3C As shown,

[0101] Step S1 also includes the following steps:

[0102] Step S16, when starting the untrusted process, using the first anti-cracking module to detect each item of trust information in the untrusted process, the trust information includes the trust information of the executable program;

[0103] When all the trust information in the untrusted process passes the trust detection, it is proved that the untrusted process is an authorized process;

[0104] When at least one item of the trust information of the untrusted process fails the detection, it is proved that the untrusted process is a malicious process.

[0105] In the above preferred implementation, the trust information may include: process name, characteristic attributes, trust information of the executable program and file fingerprint, etc. The trust information of the executable program may include the executable program signature. Only when all the trust information passes the trust detection, it is proved that the untrusted process is an authorized process.

[0106] Furthermore, when a malicious module is injected or loaded into a trusted process, the trusted process that injects or loads the malicious module enters the transparent encryption and decryption step, thereby causing the trusted process that injects or loads the malicious process to read the plaintext content of the encrypted file, such as Figure 4 shown.

[0107] At this time, remote injection of malicious modules can be prevented by the following preferred implementation mode of step S2;

[0108] Further, as a preferred implementation mode 1 of step S2, as Figure 5A As shown,

[0109] When a malicious process wants to inject remotely, step S2 may specifically include the following steps:

[0110] Step S21, when starting the untrusted process, injecting the second anti-cracking module into the untrusted process, the second anti-cracking module modifies the third interface using hook technology;

[0111] Step S22, the non-trusted process uses the third interface to access the target module;

[0112] Step S23, the second anti-cracking module determines whether the target module is a trusted module;

[0113] If so, determine that the untrusted process corresponding to the target module is a malicious process;

[0114] If not, it is determined that the untrusted process corresponding to the target module is a non-malicious process.

[0115] In the above preferred implementation, when the untrusted process is started, the second anti-cracking module is injected into the untrusted process, thereby realizing monitoring of the untrusted process through the second anti-cracking module;

[0116] The second anti-cracking module adopts the hook technology to modify the third interface, and the third interface is a remote injection interface. Therefore, the untrusted process can inject the target module through the third interface. Since the third interface is modified by the second anti-cracking module using the hook technology, only the target module injected by the malicious process through the third interface will be a trusted program, while the target module injected by the non-malicious process through the third interface is an untrusted process; therefore, the second anti-cracking module determines whether the target module is a trusted module to determine whether the untrusted process is a malicious process; thereby prohibiting the malicious process from injecting a new trusted process (the new trusted process is also a malicious process).

[0117] Furthermore, when a malicious module is injected or loaded into a trusted process, the trusted process that injects or loads the malicious module enters the transparent encryption and decryption step, thereby causing the trusted process that injects or loads the malicious module to read the plaintext content of the encrypted file, such as Figure 4 shown.

[0118] At this time, any one of the following two preferred implementations of step S2 can be used to prevent the loading of malicious modules;

[0119] Further, as a preferred implementation method of step S2, Figure 5B As shown,

[0120] When a malicious module is loaded, the adopted second anti-cracking module can be set as the second anti-cracking module;

[0121] Step S2 specifically includes the following steps:

[0122] Step S24, when starting the credit granting process, injecting the second anti-cracking module into the credit granting process, and the second anti-cracking module modifies the fourth interface using hook technology;

[0123] Step S25, the second anti-cracking module determines whether the module loaded by the credit granting process using the fourth interface is legal;

[0124] If yes, allow the trusted process to continue loading using the fourth interface;

[0125] If not, the trusted process is not allowed to continue loading using the fourth interface.

[0126] In the above preferred implementation, when the untrusted process is started, the second anti-cracking module is injected into the untrusted process, thereby realizing monitoring of the untrusted process through the second anti-cracking module;

[0127] The second anti-cracking module adopts hook technology to modify the fourth interface. The fourth interface is the interface for loading modules. Therefore, untrusted processes can load modules through the fourth interface. Since the fourth interface is modified by the second anti-cracking module using hook technology, only modules loaded by malicious processes through the fourth interface will be illegal, while modules loaded by non-malicious processes through the fourth interface are legal; therefore, the second anti-cracking module determines whether the loaded module is legal to determine whether the untrusted process continues to load it; thereby prohibiting malicious processes from loading malicious modules.

[0128] Furthermore, criminals can also read the plaintext content of the encrypted file through the filter driver layer. That is, when a malicious process reads the plaintext content of the encrypted file through the filter driver layer, step S3 can be used to prevent the malicious process from reading the plaintext content of the encrypted file.

[0129] Furthermore, in the above embodiment, in step S3, a third anti-cracking module is created, and the third anti-cracking module is set at an upper layer of the anti-cracking system to encrypt and decrypt office documents through the third anti-cracking module.

[0130] Further, as a preferred implementation, step S3 includes: a third anti-cracking module is set at the application layer, so as to encrypt and decrypt the office file by using the hook technology through the third anti-cracking module.

[0131] In the above embodiment, step S1, step S2 and step S3 are in parallel relationship;

[0132] When a malicious process reads the plain text content of an encrypted file through the filter driver layer, step S3 can be used to prevent the malicious process from reading the plain text content of the encrypted file through the filter driver layer.

[0133] In the above preferred embodiment, Figure 6 As shown, the anti-cracking system includes an application layer, a first filter driver layer, a second filter driver layer...an Nth filter driver layer and an encrypted file layer in sequence; wherein the upper filter driver layer can obtain the file content returned by the lower filter driver layer and the plaintext content written by the application; the third anti-cracking module can be set in the application layer to ensure that the malicious process will not obtain the plaintext content of the encrypted file through other filter driver layers.

[0134] It also includes a transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking management device, which includes a memory and a processor. The memory stores a transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking program that can be run on the processor. When the transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking program is executed by the processor, it implements any of the transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking methods mentioned above.

[0135] The specific implementation of the transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking management device of the present invention is basically the same as the various embodiments of the transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method described above, and will not be repeated here.

[0136] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and does not limit the implementation mode and protection scope of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, it should be aware that all solutions obtained by equivalent substitutions and obvious changes made using the description and illustrations of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: Step S1, when a malicious process reads the plaintext content of an encrypted file by disguising itself as a trusted process, a first anti-cracking module is created, the first anti-cracking module monitors each untrusted process, and performs a trust check on the executable program generated by each untrusted process, and determines the untrusted process corresponding to the executable program that passes the trust check as a malicious process, wherein the step S1 specifically includes: when starting the untrusted process, injecting the first anti-cracking module into the untrusted process, the first anti-cracking module modifies the corresponding interface using the hook technology, the first anti-cracking module determines whether the executable program obtained by the untrusted process using the corresponding interface passes the trust check, and determines the untrusted process corresponding to the executable program that passes the trust check as a malicious process; Step S2, when a malicious process reads the plaintext content of an encrypted file by injecting or loading into a trusted process, a second anti-cracking module is created, the second anti-cracking module monitors each of the untrusted processes, the second anti-cracking module determines whether the target module injected by the untrusted process is a trusted module, and determines the target module determined to be a trusted module as a malicious process, wherein step S2 specifically includes the following steps: step S21, when starting the untrusted process, injecting the second anti-cracking module into the untrusted process, the second anti-cracking module using a hook technology to modify a third interface; step S22, the untrusted process uses the third interface to access the target module; step S23, Step S23, the second anti-cracking module determines whether the target module is a trusted module; if so, determines that the non-trusted process corresponding to the target module is a malicious process; if not, determines that the non-trusted process corresponding to the target module is a non-malicious process; step S24, when starting the trusted process, injects the second anti-cracking module into the trusted process, and the second anti-cracking module uses hook technology to modify the fourth interface; step S25, the second anti-cracking module determines whether the module loaded by the trusted process using the fourth interface is legal; if so, allows the trusted process to continue loading using the fourth interface; if not, does not allow the trusted process to continue loading using the fourth interface.

2. The transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method according to claim 1, characterized in that: Step S1 specifically includes the following steps: Step S11, when starting the untrusted process, injecting the first anti-cracking module into the untrusted process, wherein the first anti-cracking module modifies the first interface using a hook technology; Step S12, the first anti-cracking module determines whether the executable program generated by the untrusted process using the first interface is the trusted program; If so, determining that the untrusted process is a malicious process; If not, determine that the untrusted process is a non-malicious process.

3. The transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method according to claim 1, characterized in that: Step S1 specifically includes the following steps: Step S13, when starting the untrusted process, injecting the first anti-cracking module into the untrusted process, wherein the first anti-cracking module modifies the second interface using a hook technology; Step S14, the untrusted process uses the second interface to modify the attribute characteristics of the executable program; Step S15, the first anti-cracking module performs a credit check on the modified attribute characteristics; When the attribute characteristic passes the trust check, determining that the untrusted process is a malicious process; When the attribute characteristic fails the trust check, the untrusted process is determined to be a non-malicious process.

4. The transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method according to claim 1, characterized in that: Step S1 also includes the following steps: Step S16, when starting the untrusted process, using the first anti-cracking module to detect each item of trust information in the untrusted process, the trust information including the trust information of the executable program; When all the credit information in the untrusted process passes the credit detection, it is proved that the untrusted process is an authorized process; When at least one item of the trust information of the untrusted process fails the detection, it is proved that the untrusted process is a malicious process.

5. The transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method according to claim 1, characterized in that: Also includes: Step S3, creating a third anti-cracking module, and setting the third anti-cracking module at the upper layer of the anti-cracking system to encrypt and decrypt office documents through the third anti-cracking module.

6. The transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method according to claim 5, characterized in that: The step S3 includes: the third anti-cracking module is set at the application layer, so as to encrypt and decrypt the office file by using the hook technology through the third anti-cracking module.

7. A transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking management device, characterized in that: It comprises a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking program that can be run on the processor, and when the transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking program is executed by the processor, the transparent encryption and decryption anti-cracking method as described in any one of claims 1 to 6 is implemented.