Method, user equipment and network node for detecting communication with illegal devices

By obtaining mobile network technology details from user equipment and network nodes, detecting false base station attacks, the economic losses caused by false base station attacks are solved, and efficient detection and prevention of communications of illegal equipment are achieved.

CN112956225BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-19TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON (PUBL)
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN201980070369.0
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2018-10-26
Filing Date
2019-10-25
Publication Date
2024-11-19
Estimated Expiration
2039-10-25

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing mobile networks cannot effectively prevent false base station attacks, resulting in users being misled to use unintended services, resulting in economic losses and waste of time.

Method used

Technical details related to service transmission, including mobile network generation information, are obtained through user equipment (UE) and network nodes, to detect whether the service is received by an illegal device and provide it to users or applications to prevent unauthorized Response or message.

Benefits of technology

Efficient detection and warning of communications of illegal equipment is achieved, and additional fees are avoided, such as surcharge services related to unanswered numbers and high call fees, improving user security and economic benefits.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

A UE (120), a network node (110, 111, 140) and a method therein for detecting that a user equipment UE has communicated with an illegal device (150) posing as a network node of a legitimate network. In the method, the UE or the network node obtains information about technical details of a transmission of a service received by the UE, wherein the information includes the generation of the RAT / mobile network used for the transmission. The UE then provides the technical details to a user of the UE and / or an application on the UE. The network node can also determine that the service is received from an illegal device when the technical details do not correspond to the technical details expected for the legitimate network.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] Embodiments herein relate to a user equipment UE, a network node and methods therein for detecting that the UE has communicated with an unauthorized device posing as a network node of a legitimate network. Background Art

[0002] In a typical wireless communication network, wireless devices (also referred to as wireless communication devices, mobile stations, stations (STAs) and / or user equipment (UEs)) communicate with one or more core networks (CNs) via a local area network (e.g., a Wi-Fi network or a radio access network (RAN)). The RAN covers a geographical area divided into service areas or cell areas (which may also be referred to as beams or beam groups), each of which is served by a radio network node, such as a radio access node (e.g., a Wi-Fi access point or a radio base station (RBS)), which in some networks may also be referred to as, for example, a NodeB, an eNodeB (eNB), or a gNB as represented in 5G. A service area or cell area is a geographical area in which radio coverage is provided by a radio network node. The radio network node communicates with wireless devices within the range of the radio network node via an air interface operating on radio frequencies. The CN includes several types of core network functions that are responsible for various functions, such as handling the mobility of UEs, interconnection with data networks, packet routing and forwarding, and other responsibilities.

[0003] Figure 1 A simplified wireless communication network is disclosed. A wireless communication network, which may also be referred to as a mobile network, provides various services, such as short message service (SMS), telephony, and wireless Internet access for users. There are currently several generations of mobile networks available, such as second generation (2G), third generation (3G), fourth generation (4G), and fifth generation (5G), with 5G being the latest generation. The architecture, interfaces, protocols, procedures and messages, as well as security aspects of these mobile networks are standardized by the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).

[0004] The specification of the Evolved Packet System (EPS), also known as 4G networks, has been completed within 3GPP, and this work continues in upcoming 3GPP releases, such as the standardization of the fifth generation (5G) network, also known as 5G New Radio (NR). EPS includes the Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN), also known as the Long Term Evolution (LTE) Radio Access Network, and the Evolved Packet Core (EPC), also known as the System Architecture Evolution (SAE) Core Network. E-UTRAN / LTE is a variant of the 3GPP radio access network in which the radio network nodes are directly connected to the EPC core network (instead of the RNC used in 3G networks). Generally, in E-UTRAN / LTE, the functionality of the 3G RNC is distributed between the radio network nodes (e.g., eNodeB in LTE or gNB in ​​5G) and the core network. Therefore, the RAN of EPS has a basically "flat" architecture, which includes radio network nodes that are directly connected to one or more core networks, i.e., they are not connected to the RNC. To compensate for this, the E-UTRAN specifications define a direct interface between the radio network nodes, which is denoted as the X2 interface.

[0005] Mobile networks are typically operated and their services are provided by so-called Mobile Network Operators (MNOs). In order to use a particular mobile network provided by a particular MNO, a user is required to have a contractual relationship with that MNO. This contractual relationship is often referred to as a subscription.

[0006] The common business model may generally work as follows. The MNO provides services to users with valid subscriptions. These users use the services provided by the MNO, such as sending messages, commonly referred to as SMS or text messages, making calls and / or obtaining Internet access. The MNO charges these users for the services they have used through the MNO's billing or charging system. The users pay according to the billed amount.

[0007] Several security features built into the mobile network support this business model. For example, the network can authenticate the user and determine whether they have a valid subscription. Traffic belonging to services such as SMS, phone calls and / or Internet data is transmitted in a secure manner so that the user is correctly billed for their use of the service.

[0008] The services themselves are generally of two types, including control plane (CP) services and user plane (UP) services. Control plane services are used for service management, while user plane services carry the actual data. Secure transmission of services is achieved through confidentiality / encryption and integrity protection. In this context, confidentiality / encryption means the encryption of the transmitted message, which makes it impossible for unauthorized parties to decrypt and read the original message. Integrity protection in this context means that the sender adds a security token or message authentication code (MAC) to the message that the receiver can verify, which makes it impossible for unauthorized parties to tamper with the original message without the receiver detecting the tampering.

[0009] Even with these security features, mobile networks are not immune to different types of fraudulent attacks. Existing frauds often cause financial harm to the MNO or the user. Financial harm to the user is mainly caused by the fraudster enticing the user to use a service that brings a large bill amount to the fraudster. Even if the user did not intend to use the service in the first place, they will end up paying the bill amount.

[0010] Figure 2 An example of how a fake base station attack may occur is disclosed. One of the several tools at the disposal of fraudsters is a so-called false base station, which is a generic name for a device that impersonates a real base station of a legitimate mobile network controlled by the user's MNO and is used to eavesdrop on over-the-air traffic and track mobile users. The false base station will be referred to herein as a non-legitimate device. The capabilities of the false base station vary depending on whether the real mobile network is 2G, 3G, 4G or 5G.

[0011] 3G, 4G and 5G mobile networks are resistant to several types of attacks from fake base stations that 2G networks are vulnerable to. In 2G mobile networks, fake base stations can in principle impersonate a complete network and perform various activities and services, such as sending spam or advertising SMS and calls to UEs. The user of the UE may reply with an SMS or call back. This may generate expensive bills for these users because the termination numbers of those replied SMS or calls may belong to expensive value-added service numbers. Ultimately, users who fall victim to such fake base stations may lose money or waste time to recover their money.

[0012] It is desirable but challenging to prevent victims from paying for services that the fake base station deceived them into using, also referred to herein as fake services. Summary of the invention

[0013] It is an object of the embodiments described herein to address at least some of the above outlined challenges and problems.This object and other objects may be achieved by using a User Equipment UE, a network node and methods therein as defined in the appended independent claims.

[0014] According to one aspect, a method is performed by a user equipment UE in a communication network for detecting that the UE has communicated with an illegal device that impersonates a network node of a legitimate network. In the method, the UE obtains information related to technical details of the transmission of a service received by the UE, wherein the information includes the generation of the radio access technology RAT / mobile network used for the transmission. The UE also provides the technical details to a user of the UE and / or an application on the UE. Such technical details can reveal that the service is transmitted in a manner that is not expected from a legitimate network node, for example when the service is transmitted using 2G technology, but the legitimate network node is expected to communicate with 3G or later generation technology. Information related to the technical details can be displayed visibly to the user on the UE, and / or can be provided to an application that can use the information as a basis to block any responsive calls or messages from the UE to the illegal device.

[0015] According to another aspect, the UE is arranged to detect that the UE has communicated with an illegal device posing as a network node of a legitimate network. The UE is configured to obtain information related to technical details of a transmission of a service received by the UE, wherein the information includes the generation of the RAT / mobile network used for the transmission. The UE is also configured to provide the technical details to a user of the UE and / or an application on the UE.

[0016] According to another aspect, a method performed by a network node in a communication network is used to detect that a UE has communicated with an illegitimate device posing as a network node of a legitimate network. In the method, the network node obtains information related to technical details of a transmission of a service received by the UE, wherein the information includes a generation of a RAT / mobile network used for transmission of the service to the UE. The network node also determines that the service is received from the illegitimate device based on the received information, wherein the service is determined to be received from the illegitimate device when the technical details do not correspond to technical details expected for the legitimate network.

[0017] According to another aspect, a network node in a communication network is arranged to detect that a UE has communicated with an illegitimate device posing as a network node of a legitimate network. The network node is configured to obtain information about technical details of a transmission of a service received by the UE, wherein the information includes a generation of a RAT / mobile network used for transmission of the service to the UE. The network node is further configured to determine, based on the received information, that the service is received from the illegitimate device, wherein the service is determined to be received from the illegitimate device when the technical details do not correspond to technical details expected for the legitimate network.

[0018] The above-mentioned UE, network node and method have the following advantages: it is possible to detect fraudulent communications from non-legitimate devices more efficiently and reliably, and to warn the user of the UE or notify the application therein to avoid calling back the missed phone number, which may otherwise result in additional charges, for example, when the missed number is related to a premium service associated with high call charges.

[0019] The above-described UE, network node, and method may be configured and implemented according to different optional embodiments to achieve additional features and benefits to be described below.

[0020] A computer program comprising instructions is also provided, and when the instructions are executed on at least one processor in the above UE or network node, the at least one processor causes the at least one processor to perform any of the above methods. A carrier containing the above computer program is also provided, wherein the carrier is one of an electronic signal, an optical signal, a radio signal or a computer-readable storage medium. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0021] Examples of how embodiments herein may be used are described in more detail with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:

[0022] Figure 1 is a schematic block diagram illustrating a simplified example of a wireless communication network.

[0023] Figure 2 is a schematic block diagram illustrating how a fake base station attack may occur in a wireless communication network.

[0024] Figure 3 is a schematic block diagram illustrating an example of a wireless communication network in which embodiments herein may be used.

[0025] Figure 4 is a flow chart illustrating a method performed by a UE according to some embodiments.

[0026] Figure 5 is a schematic diagram showing technical details of how a received service may be indicated according to other embodiments.

[0027] Figure 6 is a schematic diagram showing some other examples of indicating technical details of received services according to other embodiments.

[0028] Figure 7 is a schematic diagram showing some other examples of indicating technical details of received services according to other embodiments.

[0029] Figure 8 is a diagram showing another example of indicating technical details of a received service according to other embodiments.

[0030] Fig. 9 is a schematic diagram showing some other ways of indicating technical details in the history of received SMS services according to other embodiments.

[0031] Fig.10 is a diagram showing some other examples of indicating technical details of received services according to an embodiment.

[0032] Fig.11 is a flow chart illustrating a method performed by a network node according to other embodiments.

[0033] Fig.12 is a schematic block diagram illustrating a UE according to some embodiments.

[0034] Fig.13 is a schematic block diagram illustrating a UE according to some other embodiments.

[0035] Fig.14 is a schematic block diagram illustrating a network node according to some embodiments.

[0036] Fig.15 is a schematic block diagram illustrating a network node according to some other embodiments.

[0037] Fig.16 is a schematic block diagram illustrating technical details of a UE arranged for obtaining a received service.

[0038] Fig.17 is a schematic block diagram illustrating a UE for obtaining technical details of a received service according to some other embodiments of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0039] Embodiments disclosed herein relate to a solution in which technical details related to the transmission of services to a UE are provided to enable detection of communications with an illegal device, such as a fake base station, that impersonates a network node of a legitimate network. The technical details may be provided to a user of the UE and / or an application on the UE so that the user and / or the application can determine whether the communication device is legitimate based on the provided technical details. More specifically, the technical details may, for example, include the type of mobile network technology used for communication, such as 2G, 3G, 4G, 5G, and / or configuration parameters used for communication, such as the confidentiality / encryption used, the integrity protection used, the encryption algorithm used, etc.

[0040] Embodiments herein also enable a sanity check of the service. Sanity check here should be interpreted as the UE providing information about the technical details of the received service to a network node of a legitimate network, which legitimate network is, for example, a mobile network of which the user is a subscriber. The network node may determine, based on the received information from the UE, whether the information about the technical details corresponds to the expected technical details of the legitimate network. If the network node determines that the information about the technical details does not correspond to the expected technical details, the network node may indicate to the UE that the service may have been received from a potentially fraudulent device, which is referred to herein as an illegal device.

[0041] Embodiments herein may maintain a history of service usage with timestamps and potentially location tags, and this history may be used as a basis for determining whether current communications of a service may be considered expected. For example, if any technical details related to the transmission of a service differ significantly from what is expected based on the maintained service usage history, then the device transmitting the service may be considered potentially illegitimate. Some examples of such service usage that may be maintained as service usage history are listed below:

[0042] 1. SMS may have been sent with a set of characteristics (e.g., 3G network with null ciphering or 2G fallback network, but there are other more secure networks nearby for UE to connect to, but with less transmission power) using a specific protocol data unit (PDU) connection. The characteristics may also be referred to herein as technical details of the received service.

[0043] 2. Web page access may have initiated 3 different PDU connections with 3 different characteristics at 3 different time points.

[0044] In these cases, the storage of service usage history in the UE enables the UE (e.g., an application running on the UE) to present to the user of the UE an assessment of the presence of non-legitimate devices or false base stations in a certain area. The UE or an anti-virus application running on the UE can also provide advice to the user of the UE on the legitimacy of certain data (e.g., SMS from a false base station as described previously). In addition, the UE can be a one-stop node with a standardized application program interface (API) on the UE for ensuring the trustworthiness of the underlying communications based on the described characteristics. For autonomous or "headless" UEs (e.g., IoT devices), this can be a useful node for implementing automatic UE decisions based on security policies set by the operator of the IoT deployment.

[0045] Embodiments herein may be used to address the above-mentioned problems by providing a lightweight, effective and flexible solution for detecting non-legitimate devices or fake base stations that deceive users into using unintended services (eg, fake and / or fraudulent services).

[0046] The lightweightness of the embodiments disclosed herein comes from the fact that there is no significant impact on the hardware (if any) at both the network and UE sides. In addition, the impact on the signaling between the UE and the network is minimal, if any.

[0047] The effectiveness of the embodiments disclosed herein comes from the fact that fake services spoofed by non-legitimate devices or fake base stations can be easily detected.

[0048] The flexibility in the embodiments disclosed herein comes from the fact that fake services spoofed by non-legitimate devices or fake base stations can be detected automatically by the UE without human interaction, or by the user of the UE or the network, depending on how the embodiments disclosed herein are implemented.

[0049] In some embodiments of the present invention, the general term "network node" is used and may correspond to any type of radio network node or at least any network node that communicates with a radio network node. Examples of network nodes are any of the radio network nodes described above; core network nodes (e.g., mobile switching center (MSC), mobility management entity (MME)), operations and management (O&M) nodes, operations, administration and maintenance (OAM) nodes, operations support system (OSS) nodes, self-organizing network (SON) nodes, positioning nodes (e.g., enhanced serving mobile location center (E-SMLC)), or functions related to drive test minimization (MDT), etc.

[0050] In some embodiments, the non-limiting term "network device" is used and refers to any type of wireless device that communicates with a network node in a cellular or mobile communication system and is capable of performing measurements on other network nodes around the network device or in a tracking area. Examples of network devices are UE, mobile terminal, target device, device-to-device UE, machine-type UE or UE capable of machine-to-machine communication, PDA, iPAD, tablet, mobile terminal, smart phone, laptop embedded device (LEE), laptop mounted device (LME), USB dongle, radio network node, radio access node, etc.

[0051] Figure 3 An example of a communication network 100 according to a first scenario in which embodiments herein may be implemented is depicted. The communication network 100 is a wireless communication network such as LTE, E-Utran, WCDMA, GSM network, any 3GPP cellular network, Wimax or any cellular network or system.

[0052] The communication network 100 includes a radio access network (RAN) and a core network (CN). The communication network 100 can use a variety of different technologies, such as Wi-Fi, long-term evolution (LTE), advanced LTE, 5G, wideband code division multiple access (WCDMA), global mobile communication system / enhanced data rate for GSM evolution (GSM / EDGE), worldwide microwave access interoperability (WiMax), or ultra mobile broadband (UMB), which are just some possible implementations. In the communication network 100, one or more UEs 120 can communicate with one or more CNs through one or more access networks (ANs) (e.g., RAN). UE 120 can be, for example, a wireless device (WD), a mobile station, a non-access point (non-AP) STA, a STA, and / or a wireless terminal. It should be understood by those skilled in the art that: "wireless device" is a non-restrictive term, which means any terminal, wireless communication terminal, user equipment, machine type communication (MTC) device, device to device (D2D) terminal, or node (e.g., smart phone, laptop computer, mobile phone, sensor, relay, mobile tablet computer, or even a base station communicating within a cell).

[0053] The RAN includes a set of radio network nodes, such as radio network nodes 110, 111, each of which provides radio coverage over one or more geographical areas, such as cells 130, 131 of radio access technologies (RATs) such as LTE, UMTS, Wi-Fi, etc. Depending on, for example, the first radio access technology and terminology used, the radio network nodes 110, 111 may be radio access network nodes such as radio network controllers or access points (e.g., wireless local area network (WLAN) access points or access point stations (AP STA)), access controllers, base stations such as radio base stations (e.g., NodeB, evolved NodeB (eNB, eNodeB)), base transceiver stations, access point base stations, base station routers, transmission devices of radio base stations, standalone access points, or any other network element capable of providing services to wireless devices within a cell (which may also be referred to as a service area) served by the radio network nodes 110, 111.

[0054] The CN also includes a core network node 140, which is configured to communicate with the radio network nodes 110, 111 via, for example, an S1 interface. The core network node can be, for example, a mobile switching center (MSC), a mobility management entity (MME), an operation and management (O&M) node, an operation, management and maintenance (OAM) node, an operation support system (OSS) node and / or a self-organizing network (SON) node. The core network node 140 can also be a distributed node included in the cloud 141.

[0055] UE 120 is located in cell 130 of network node 110, which is referred to as a serving cell, and cell 131 of network node 111 is referred to as a neighboring cell. Figure 3 The network node 110 in FIG. 1 is depicted only as providing a serving cell 130 , but the network node 110 may also provide one or more neighboring cells 131 to the serving cell 130 .

[0056] The communication network 100 may also include an illegal device 150. The radio network nodes 110, 111 and the core network nodes may all be associated with a first domain of the communication network 100. The first domain is part of a network operated by a provider with which a user or UE 120 has a service agreement, i.e., in this context, the first domain may be considered a legal network. Network nodes operated by a roaming partner of the provider are also associated with the first domain. The first domain of the communication network 100 may also be referred to as a legal network in this article. The illegal device 150 is a device that may be considered to be associated with a second domain of the communication network 100 (i.e., a domain that is not operated by a provider or roaming partner). The illegal device 150 impersonates a network node 110, 111, 140 of the first domain of the communication network 100 in an attempt to induce the UE 120 to connect to the device. The second domain of the communication network 100 may be referred to as an illegal network in this article.

[0057] UE 120 may also be configured to communicate via a variety of different RATs such as LTE, UMTS, Wi-Fi, etc.

[0058] Note that although terminology from 3GPP LTE has been used in this disclosure to exemplify embodiments of this document, this should not be considered to limit the scope of embodiments of this document to only the systems mentioned above. Other wireless systems including WCDMA, WiMax, UMB, GSM networks, any 3GPP cellular networks or any cellular networks or systems can also benefit from utilizing the ideas covered by this disclosure.

[0059] It should also be noted that terms such as "network node" and "network device" should be considered non-restrictive and do not specifically imply a certain hierarchical relationship between the two; generally, a "network node" can be considered as a first device or device 1, and a "network device" can be considered as a second device or device 2, and the two devices can communicate with each other through a radio channel. The embodiments of this article also focus on wireless transmission in the downlink, however, the embodiments of this article can also be applied to the uplink.

[0060] As mentioned above, it is very difficult to prevent users from paying for services (fake services) that are deceived by fake base stations (i.e., non-legitimate devices). In other words, it is very challenging to prevent users from using fake services (e.g., preventing users from replying some SMS messages or calling back some phone numbers).

[0061] One known technique may be that the user always calls the customer service of his MNO to verify whether the received SMS and / or calls are genuine, meaning whether they originate from the MNO. Although this technique works in theory, it is impractical and expensive for the MNO, since the number of users of the MNO may range from hundreds of thousands to millions. Furthermore, this solution is inconvenient for the user, since an additional action is required each time an SMS or call is received.

[0062] Another known technique may be that the UE rejects services received with null encryption, such as SMS or calls. Null encryption here means that no encryption is applied to the service. Fake base stations (i.e., non-legitimate devices) need to use null encryption when transmitting services to the UE because they do not have an encryption key derived from a secret key shared by the UE and the real mobile network, which is used as the basis for most security mechanisms between the UE and the mobile network. In 3G, 4G and 5G mobile networks, in addition to the network authenticating the UE, the UE also authenticates the network. Therefore, non-legitimate devices cannot deliver false SMS or calls over the air in 3G, 4G and / or 5G networks. Therefore, an attacker induces the UE to connect to a non-legitimate device based on 2G and then commands the UE to use null encryption. Afterwards, the attacker may send a false SMS or call to the UE. Therefore, rejecting services received with null encryption may be an option to prevent users from being incorrectly billed. However, this may also hinder real services from legitimate devices using null encryption because null encryption is also allowed in 3G, 4G and 5G mobile networks for various reasons (e.g., testing, regulatory obligations, etc.).

[0063] Another known technique may be that, for example, for SMS or for calls, the UE displays an empty encryption indicator during the service. For example, 3GPP TS 33.501 version 15.2.0 mentions security visibility in subsection 5.10.1, i.e., the UE should provide visibility of information such as confidentiality / encryption, integrity, algorithm, and bearer information to applications in the UE via an API. TS 33.501 version 15.2.0 mentions that this information is provided to applications by the UE for certain events and based on the user's or application's concerns. In addition, according to TS 33.501 version 15.2.0, the UE should provide such security information at a per-protocol data unit (PDU) session granularity. A PDU session is an association between a UE and a data network that provides a data connection service.

[0064] This display of null encryption may provide some guidance to the user that their UE may be connected to a fake base station or a non-legitimate device. However, such a null encryption indicator is not always useful. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, null encryption is also allowed in real 3G, 4G and 5G mobile networks. Secondly, the user may, for example, miss the indication when actually making a call, or the user may never see the indication, for example because the indication will disappear after the SMS has been delivered. Thirdly, the security information may change when the PDU Session changes, which means that the earlier PDU Session when the service was received may have different security properties, for example, encryption algorithm, than the later PDU Session.

[0065] In the following section, the embodiments of this paper will be described in more detail by multiple exemplary embodiments. It should be noted that these embodiments are not mutually exclusive. It can be assumed by default that components from one embodiment exist in another embodiment, and it will be apparent to those skilled in the art how these components can be used in other exemplary embodiments.

[0066] The basic idea of ​​the embodiments herein is to use the technical details of how the UE receives the service during and after service use in order to be able to detect potentially fraudulent services. The embodiments herein also enable sanity checks to be performed by the network. Such details will be of great help to users, allowing them to detect non-legitimate devices based on these details.

[0067] It should be understood that the following description and examples are helpful for those skilled in the art to understand the present invention, and the following description and examples are not limiting. For example, some actions may be taken by the UE itself or by the user of the UE; the examples described for SMS are also applicable to calls or other types of services, etc.

[0068] Now refer to Figure 4 The flowchart shown is used to describe an example embodiment of a method in a communication network 100, performed by a UE 120 in the communication network 100, for detecting that the UE 120 has communicated with an illegal device 150 that impersonates a network node of a legitimate network. The UE 120 can be considered to be associated with a first domain of the communication network 100. The illegal device 150 can also be considered to be a device associated with a second domain of the communication network 100, which impersonates a network node 110, 111, 140 of the first domain of the communication network 100.

[0069] The method may include the following actions, which may be performed in any suitable order. Figure 4 The dashed line in the middle box indicates whether the action is required.

[0070] Action 4010

[0071] The UE 120 obtains information about the technical details of the transmission of the service received by the UE 120. The information includes the RAT and / or the generation of the mobile network used for the transmission.

[0072] The UE 120 may obtain this information, for example, from a terminal equipment (TE) comprised in the UE 120. The technical details of how the service is delivered may be, for example, the generation of the mobile network, security algorithms, location.

[0073] Action 4020

[0074] UE 120 may determine that service is being received from non-legitimate device 150 based on the obtained information.

[0075] When service is received via a second generation (2G) mobile network even though a later generation mobile network is expected, UE 120 may determine that service is received from an illegitimate device 150 .

[0076] UE 120 may also determine that services are received from non-legitimate device 150 when UE 120 uses a newer generation network and UE 120 switches to a 2G mobile network for a short period of time and receives services during the period when UE 120 is connected to the 2G network.

[0077] Action 4030

[0078] The UE 120 indicates or provides the technical details to a user of the UE 120 and / or an application on the UE.

[0079] If, in act 4020 UE 120 has determined that the service is received from a non-legitimate device, then in act 4030 UE 120 may indicate, for example to a user of UE 120 , that the service is received from a non-legitimate device 150 .

[0080] about Figures 5 to 10 Examples of how the generation of a RAT may be indicated are described.

[0081] Action 4040

[0082] Next, UE 120 may prevent establishment of services from UE 120 to non-legitimate devices 150 .

[0083] For example, if the user attempts to call back or text a missed number, in this case, instead of sending the call or text message, the UE 120 may display a notification indicating that the number the user attempted to call or text may be associated with an illegal device or may be fraudulent. The UE 120 may also provide an option that allows the user of the UE 120 to accept that the call to the missed number may be a call to an illegal device, so as to allow the blocked call to be transmitted. This may be beneficial, for example, if the UE 120 mistakenly blocks a number that the user of the UE 120 can identify and recognize as a legitimate number.

[0084] In some embodiments, UE 120 or an application in UE 120 may prevent calls to non-legitimate devices, for example by removing suspected fraudulent calls from the notification, or only displaying the notification if the service is received via a RAT generation later than a certain threshold (e.g., 3G or later). This action may be configured as a default by the manufacturer of UE 120 or by an application developer, or by configuration from the user.

[0085] In some other embodiments, the call may be marked as fraudulent and may be stored by the UE 120 or an application in the UE 120 so that such calls can be blocked in the future and the corresponding network service is also notified for further fraud analysis corresponding to preventive measures. A user may, for example, mark a certain number as fraudulent, and the UE may store the numbers marked by the user, and based on these stored numbers, may block incoming calls from the stored numbers and / or block outgoing calls to the stored numbers.

[0086] Action 4050

[0087] UE 120 can also send an indication that the service is received by an illegal device 150 to, for example, a network node 110 of a legitimate network (e.g., in the above-mentioned first domain of the communication network 100). The indication can be used by the network node 110 to take various actions, for example, trigger an alarm in a network operation center. Triggering an alarm can increase the warning level. The network node 110 can raise a warning message based on the indication received from the UE 120, which provides an alarm about the possible presence of an illegal device (e.g., a false base station or a fake base station) in the area, and the warning message can be sent to the UE 120 or a second recipient (e.g., a network provider and / or the police). The alarm can be performed, for example, by email and / or SMS. Once a false base station or an illegal device is detected, they can be reported to an official agency (authority), for example, by triangulation to locate and remove it.

[0088] Figure 5An exemplary SMS conversation is shown in , which illustrates how different information may be indicated on UE 120. When UE 120 receives an SMS requesting the user of UE 120 to call a foreign number, the user will likely do so if the contact is trusted. However, such an SMS may have been received from an illegal device. The UE may have been using a 4G network. Then, an attacker (e.g., an operator of the illegal device) may have tricked UE 120 into connecting to its own fake 2G mobile network for a short period of time, and may have then passed the SMS to UE 120, and may have then sent the UE back to the original 4G network. According to embodiments of the present invention, a user may be able to make a more qualified decision about whether to trust the SMS by having the possibility to view the details of how the SMS was received. In . Figure 5 In the example of , the user can long press on a specific SMS and find out details about how the SMS was delivered, in this case, it was sent by the 2G GSM network. Therefore, the user may suspect a fake base station or non-legitimate device and may instead call the local number of the sender (John in this example).

[0089] Figure 6 Other examples of how information may be indicated on UE 120 in conjunction with SMS interactions are shown. A user traveling abroad may suddenly receive an SMS in a foreign language on the UE. The user may be eager to dial the number or reply with an SMS because the user may think that the message may be from a hotel or some other contextual reasoning, such as from a taxi service that the user called previously, etc. In the leftmost example, the exposure of the details is a small indicator that the user can click to receive details of how the SMS or call was received. The middle example shows that the information is presented in a floating display, while the rightmost example shows that the information is presented in an inline display in the SMS message.

[0090] According to another embodiment, information about how the call was received may be presented in the call history of UE 120, such as Figure 7 , which shows how information related to the history of previously received calls can be indicated on UE 120. One option can be to display text related to each call, such as "4G LTE", "3G UMTS", "2G GSM". Another option is to display an icon ("i" as shown) or a button ("View details..." as shown) that the user can click to display the details of a particular call. It should be understood that similar information can also be provided for SMS history. Figure 7 display.

[0091] In the above example, the detail display may additionally include other technical details, such as whether confidentiality / encryption protection is applied, whether integrity protection is applied, which encryption algorithm is used, which integrity protection algorithm is used, etc. Figure 8 An example of how such technical details of received services may be indicated on UE 120 is shown. Figure 8 As shown, this particular service (eg, call or SMS) is received via a 4G LTE connection with active encryption using the EEA1 algorithm and active integrity using the EIA1 algorithm.

[0092] According to an embodiment of the present invention, the technical details related to the received service may also include location information indicating where the UE is located when the service is received. For example, the details of the SMS may also include the GPS location of the UE receiving the SMS.

[0093] Embodiments herein also provide the possibility to indicate the history of different generations of mobile networks to which the UE has been connected, as well as other corresponding details like the number of SMS or calls received or made at the time, the algorithms used at the time, etc. Fig. 9 and Fig.10 Some examples are shown. The X-axis of the graph shown is Fig. 9 and Fig.10 Zhongdu indicates time. Fig. 9 The number of SMS received using different network generations at different times 19:00, 19:05, 19:10 and 19:15 is shown. It can be seen that at 19:00, 5 SMS were received, of which 2 were received using 3G, 2 were received using 4G, and 1 was received using 5G, and 3 SMS were received using 3G, 4G and 5G at 19:05 and 19:15. However, at 19:10, the number of received SMS increased, with a total of 8 SMS received, of which 5 were received using 2G. Since UE 120 typically uses 3G or newer generation networks to receive SMS, a sudden increase in SMS received via the 2G network may be an indication of an attack on a fake base station or non-legitimate device.

[0094] Fig.10 The generation of the mobile network for the service received at different times 19:00, 19:05, 19:10 and 19:15 is shown. It can be seen that the service is received using 5G at 19:00, 4G at 19:05, and the network generation suddenly drops from 4G to 2G at 19:10, and then returns to the 5G connection at 19:15. The sudden drop in network generation at 19:10 may be an indication of an attack on a fake base station or non-legitimate device.

[0095] In the following, some other examples of UE and network interactions are described, which can further mitigate the risk of users becoming victims of fraud (e.g., fake base stations or non-legitimate device attacks).

[0096] According to some embodiments, the network may configure the UE to report a summary of received services (e.g., SMS and / or calls), as well as technical details related to the received services. The technical details related to the services may be the type of mobile network technology, such as the generation of RAT (e.g., 2G, 3G, 4G, 5G), and / or configuration parameters, such as the confidentiality / encryption used, the integrity protection used, the encryption algorithm used, etc. The UE 120 may send the summary to the network. The network 100 (e.g., the base station 110) may check whether the service reported by the UE actually matches the expected data of the network based on the received summary. If the reported service does not match the expected data, the network may determine that a fake base station or an illegal device may have committed fraud. Therefore, the network may perform a sanity check of the network.

[0097] Similarly, when the user of UE 120 or UE 120 itself determines, for example, by means of a learning algorithm or rule in the UE, that a service looks suspicious (for example, when a known user, for example, sends an SMS and requests to call a foreign number), UE 120 can send a summary of the received service to the network, which includes details about the service. This can be triggered by the user of UE 120, or can be sent by the UE when a suspicious service is detected. The network can check whether the service reported by the UE actually matches the expected data of the network. If they do not match, it can be inferred that there may be fraud by an illegal device or a fake base station. Therefore, the network can perform a sanity check of the network. This is similar to action 1120 described below. In this case, if UE 120 determines, for example, by means of a learning algorithm or rule in the UE, that the service is considered suspicious, UE 120 can also alert the user of UE 120, for example, by displaying a warning pop-up window, etc.

[0098] In addition, the location information where the UE receives the fake service can be used to identify problematic areas, such as areas where non-legitimate devices or fake base stations may be located.

[0099] The network may then perform some action, such as notifying the user, authorities and / or service personnel by sending an SMS or email, or attempting to locate and neutralize or block the rogue base station or non-legitimate device.

[0100] Now refer to Fig.11The flowchart shown is used to describe an example embodiment of a method performed by a network node 110, 111, 140 in a communication network 100 for enabling detection that a UE 120 has communicated with an unauthorized device 150 posing as a network node of a legitimate network. As described above, the UE 120 may be associated with a first domain of the communication network 100, and the unauthorized device 150 may be associated with a second domain of the communication network 100, the device posing as a network node 110, 111, 140 of the first domain of the communication network 100.

[0101] The method may include the following actions, which may be performed in any suitable order. Fig.11 The dashed line in the middle box indicates whether the action is required.

[0102] Action 1110

[0103] The network node 110, 111, 140 obtains information about technical details of the transmission of the service received by the UE 120. The information includes the RAT and / or the generation of the mobile network used for the transmission.

[0104] The technical details of how the service is delivered may be, for example, the generation of the mobile network, security algorithms and / or location.

[0105] The network node 110 , 111 , 140 may also receive an indication from the UE 120 that the service was received from a non-legitimate device 150 .

[0106] Action 1120

[0107] The network nodes 110, 111, 140 determine based on the received information that the service is received from the non-legitimate device 150. The network nodes 110, 111, 140 may determine that the service is received from the non-legitimate device when the technical details do not correspond to the technical details expected for the legitimate network.

[0108] The network node 110, 111, 140 may determine that the service is received from the non-legitimate device 150 when the information regarding the technology details indicates that the service is received via a second generation (2G) mobile network although a later generation mobile network is expected.

[0109] Action 1130

[0110] The network node 110 , 111 , 140 may indicate that the service is received from a non-legitimate device 150 .

[0111] The network may indicate that the service is received from an illegal device by performing some actions, such as notifying the user, authorities and / or service personnel by, for example, sending an SMS or email, or attempting to locate and neutralize the illegal device. Locating and neutralizing the illegal device may be performed, for example, based on information such as the location of the UE 120 when the service was received.

[0112] The network node 110 may take various actions based on a determination or indication that the service is received from an illegal device, such as triggering an alarm at, for example, a network operations center. Triggering an alarm may increase the alert level. The network node 110 may raise a warning message that provides an alert about the possible presence of an illegal device 150 (e.g., a false base station or a fake base station) in the area, which may be sent to the UE 120 or a second recipient (e.g., a network provider and / or the police). The alarm may be performed, for example, via email and / or SMS. Once a false base station or illegal device is detected, it may be reported to an official agency, such as by triangulation to locate and remove or otherwise deactivate it.

[0113] In order to implement the above Figure 4 In the method described above for detecting that a UE 120 has communicated with an illegal device 150, the UE 120 may include: Fig.12 The following apparatus is depicted.

[0114] The UE 120 may include a processing unit 1101 and a communication unit 1102 for communicating with a network device such as a network node 110, 111, 140 or other UEs. The communication unit 1102 may include a sending unit 1110 and a receiving unit 1104.

[0115] UE 120 may be configured to obtain information about technical details of transmission of a service received by UE 120, e.g. by means of communication unit 1102 and / or obtaining unit 1111 and / or processing unit 1101, wherein the information includes the generation of RAT / mobile network used for transmission.

[0116] The UE 120 may also be configured to indicate or provide technical details to a user of the UE 120 and / or an application on the UE 120, for example by means of the indicating unit 1106 and / or the processing unit 1101, wherein the provided technical details may include the generation of the RAT / mobile network on which the service is received. The indicating unit may be, for example, a display of the UE 120.

[0117] The UE 120 may also be configured to determine, based on the obtained information, that the service is received from a non-legitimate device 150 , for example by means of the determining unit 1105 and / or the processing unit 1101 .

[0118] The UE 120 may also be configured to determine, for example by means of the determining unit 1105 and / or the processing unit 1101 , that the service is received from a non-legitimate device 150 when the service is received via a 2G mobile network although a later generation mobile network is expected.

[0119] The UE 120 may also be configured to determine, for example by means of the determining unit 1105 and / or the processing unit 1101 , that the service is received from a non-legitimate device 150 when the service is received via a 2G mobile network although a later generation mobile network is expected.

[0120] The UE 120 may also be configured to indicate, for example by means of the indicating unit 1106 and / or the processing unit 1101 , to a user of the UE 120 that the service is received by a non-legitimate device 150 .

[0121] The UE 120 may also be configured to prevent establishment of a service from the UE 120 to the non-legitimate device 150 , for example by means of the preventing unit 1103 and / or the processing unit 1101 .

[0122] The UE 120 may further be configured to send information about technical details of the transmission of the received service to the network node 110, e.g. by means of the communication unit 402 and / or the sending unit 410 and / or the processing unit 401, wherein the information includes the generation of the RAT / mobile network used for the transmission.

[0123] It will also be understood by those skilled in the art that the above-mentioned blocking unit 1103, determining unit 1105, indicating unit 1106 and obtaining unit 1111 may refer to a combination of analog and digital circuits, and / or may refer to one or more processors configured with software and / or firmware stored in, for example, memory 1107, which, when executed by one or more processors (e.g., processing unit 1101), are executed as described above. One or more of these processors and other digital hardware may be included in a single application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or several processors and various digital hardware may be distributed over several separate components, whether packaged individually or assembled as a system on a chip (SoC).

[0124] The embodiments herein for detecting that UE 120 has communicated with non-legitimate device 150 may be as follows: Fig.13 The above-mentioned method is implemented by a corresponding processor or one or more processors of a processing circuit in UE 120, and the processing circuit is configured to execute the processing according to Figure 4 and the method actions of the embodiments described above for UE 120.

[0125] The embodiments may be executed by a processor together with corresponding computer program codes for performing the functions and actions of the embodiments herein. The program codes mentioned above may also be provided as a computer program product, such as a computer program product in the form of a data carrier carrying the computer program code for executing the embodiments herein when loaded into the UE 120. One such carrier may be in the form of a CD ROM disk. However, it may also be other data carriers such as a memory stick. In addition, the computer program code may be provided as pure program code on a server and downloaded to the UE 120.

[0126] UE 120 may also include a memory 1107. The memory may include one or more memory units for storing data regarding, for example, numbers determined to be associated with non-legitimate devices, software, patches, system information (SI), configurations, diagnostic data, performance data, and / or applications that, when executed, perform the methods disclosed herein, etc.

[0127] The method according to the embodiments described herein for UE 120 may be implemented by means of, for example, a computer program product 1109, 1201 or a computer program, which includes instructions, i.e., software code portions, which, when executed on at least one processor, cause the at least one processor to perform the actions described herein as performed by UE 120. The computer program product 1108, 1201 may be stored on a computer-readable storage medium 1108, 1202 (such as a disk, etc.). The computer-readable storage medium 1108, 1202 having the computer program stored thereon may include instructions, which, when executed on at least one processor, cause the at least one processor to perform the actions described herein as performed by UE 120. In some embodiments, the computer-readable storage medium may be a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium. The computer program may also be included on a carrier, wherein the carrier is one of an electronic signal, an optical signal, a radio signal, or a computer-readable storage medium.

[0128] Those skilled in the art who are familiar with communication design will readily understand that digital logic and / or one or more microcontrollers, microprocessors or other digital hardware may be used to implement functional devices or units. In some embodiments, several or all of the various functions may be implemented together, such as in a single application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) or in two or more separate devices (with suitable hardware and / or software interfaces therebetween). Several functions may be implemented on a processor shared with other functional components of the UE.

[0129] Alternatively, several functional elements in the processing device discussed may be provided using dedicated hardware, while other functional elements are provided using hardware for executing software in combination with suitable software or firmware. Thus, the term "processor" or "controller" as used herein does not exclusively refer to hardware capable of executing software, and may implicitly include (without limitation) digital signal processor (DSP) hardware, read-only memory (ROM) for storing software, random access memory for storing software and / or program or application data, and non-volatile memory. Other conventional and / or customized hardware may also be included. Designers of network nodes or devices will understand the inherent tradeoffs of cost, performance, and maintenance between these design choices.

[0130] In order to implement the above Fig.11 The method described above for detecting that the UE 120 has communicated with the non-legitimate device 150 may include the following: Fig.14 The following apparatus is depicted.

[0131] The network node 110, 111, 140 may include a processing unit 1401 and a communication unit 1402 for communicating with a network device such as a UE 120 or other network nodes 110, 111, 140. The communication unit 1402 may include a sending unit 1410 and a receiving unit 1404.

[0132] The network nodes 110, 111, 140 may be configured to obtain information about technical details of the transmission of a service received by the UE 120, e.g., by means of the communication unit 1402 and / or the obtaining unit 1411 and / or the processing unit 1401, wherein the information includes the generation of the RAT / mobile network used for the transmission of the service to the UE 120.

[0133] The network nodes 110, 111, 140 may also be configured to determine, based on the received information, that the service is received from the non-legitimate device 150, for example by means of the determination unit 1405 and / or the processing unit 1401, wherein the service is determined to be received from the non-legitimate device 150 when the technical details do not correspond to the technical details expected for a legitimate network (e.g., the first domain of the communication network).

[0134] The network node 110 , 111 , 140 may also be configured to indicate, for example by means of the indicating unit 1406 and / or the processing unit 1401 , that the service is received from a non-legitimate device 150 .

[0135] The network nodes 110, 111, 140 may further be configured to determine, for example by means of the determining unit 1405 and / or the processing unit 1401, that a service is received from a non-legitimate device 150 when the information relating to the technical details indicates that the service is received via a 2G mobile network although a later generation of mobile network is expected.

[0136] It will also be understood by those skilled in the art that the above-mentioned blocking unit 1403, determining unit 1405, indicating unit 1406 and obtaining unit 1411 may refer to a combination of analog and digital circuits, and / or may refer to one or more processors configured with software and / or firmware stored in, for example, memory 1407, which, when executed by one or more processors (e.g., processing unit 1401), are executed as described above. One or more of these processors and other digital hardware may be included in a single application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or several processors and various digital hardware may be distributed over several separate components, whether packaged individually or assembled as a system on a chip (SoC).

[0137] The embodiments herein for detecting that UE 120 has communicated with non-legitimate device 150 may be as follows: Fig.14 As shown, the processing circuit in the network node 110, 111, 140 is implemented by a corresponding processor or one or more processors, and the processing circuit is configured to execute the processing according to Fig.11 and the method actions of the embodiments described above for the network nodes 110 , 111 , 140 .

[0138] The embodiments may be executed by a processor together with corresponding computer program codes for performing the functions and actions of the embodiments herein. The program codes mentioned above may also be provided as a computer program product, such as a computer program product in the form of a data carrier carrying the computer program code for executing the embodiments herein when loaded into the UE 120. One such carrier may be in the form of a CD ROM disk. However, it may also be other data carriers such as a memory stick. In addition, the computer program code may be provided as pure program code on a server and downloaded to the UE 120.

[0139] UE 120 may also include memory 1407. The memory may include one or more memory units for storing data regarding, for example, numbers determined to be associated with non-legitimate devices, software, patches, system information (SI), configurations, diagnostic data, performance data, and / or applications that, when executed, perform the methods disclosed herein, etc.

[0140] The method according to the embodiments described herein for UE 120 may be implemented by means of, for example, a computer program product 1409, 1501 or a computer program, which includes instructions, i.e., software code portions, which, when executed on at least one processor, cause the at least one processor to perform the actions described herein as performed by UE 120. The computer program product 1408, 1501 may be stored on a computer-readable storage medium 1408, 1502 (such as a disk, etc.). The computer-readable storage medium 1408, 1502 having the computer program stored thereon may include instructions, which, when executed on at least one processor, cause the at least one processor to perform the actions described herein as performed by UE 150. In some embodiments, the computer-readable storage medium may be a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium. The computer program may also be included on a carrier, wherein the carrier is one of an electronic signal, an optical signal, a radio signal, or a computer-readable storage medium.

[0141] Those skilled in the art who are familiar with communication design will readily understand that digital logic and / or one or more microcontrollers, microprocessors or other digital hardware may be used to implement functional devices or units. In some embodiments, several or all of the various functions may be implemented together, such as in a single application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) or in two or more separate devices (with suitable hardware and / or software interfaces therebetween). Several functions may be implemented on a processor shared with other functional components of the UE.

[0142] Alternatively, several functional elements in the processing device discussed may be provided using dedicated hardware, while other functional elements are provided using hardware for executing software in combination with suitable software or firmware. Thus, the term "processor" or "controller" as used herein does not exclusively refer to hardware capable of executing software, and may implicitly include (without limitation) digital signal processor (DSP) hardware, read-only memory (ROM) for storing software, random access memory for storing software and / or program or application data, and non-volatile memory. Other conventional and / or customized hardware may also be included. Designers of network nodes or devices will understand the inherent tradeoffs of cost, performance, and maintenance between these design choices.

[0143] When the word “comprises” or “comprising” is used, it should be interpreted as non-limiting, meaning “consisting at least of…”

[0144] An example of how to obtain the above technical details will now be described in more detail. In the following, some other parts included in the UE will also be described. Afterwards, a description of the technical details of how the UE can obtain the received service will be provided.

[0145] Some examples of the internal parts of the UE will now be described.

[0146] At a high level, the UE 120 consists of two parts, namely the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) and the Mobile Equipment (ME), such as Fig.16 The USIM part is a special software application that provides various functions, such as providing identifiers and authentication of user subscriptions, security key generation, etc. The USIM runs on a tamper-proof secure hardware component such as a Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC). The ME part represents the wireless device including the hardware and software required to communicate with the network. The ME is usually called a mobile phone or a smart phone.

[0147] Fig.17 shows that it can be included in Fig.16 The ME included in the UE may also include the various parts disclosed in 3GPP TS27.007 version 15.3.0. Fig.17 In , the ME consists of a Terminal Equipment (TE), a Terminal Adaptation (TA) unit and a Mobile Terminal (MT) unit. The TE can send attention commands (AT cmds) to the TA. Since the design of the ME is heavily influenced by different stakeholders and markets, the internal and external interfaces of the ME are not standardized with a few exceptions. For example, interfaces such as TE users and applications, MT / TA-TE and MT-TA are not standardized. The exceptions are that the Radio (MT Network), ME-USIM and AT commands are standardized. Non-standardized interfaces are open to manufacturer-specific implementations.

[0148] Some examples of technical details of the received services will now be described.

[0149] Fig.17The user and application parts in the TE can be, for example, service applications, SMS applications, phone applications, SMS history applications, call history applications, or mobile operating systems (e.g., Android). Generally, the user and application parts can be any software or hardware that can obtain and process the technical details of the received services. The user and application parts can be interfaced with the TE part to obtain the technical details of how to deliver the service, such as the generation of the mobile network, security algorithms, location, etc. The user and application parts can obtain information from the TE part by making a request from the TE part, which can also be referred to as the user and application part obtaining or requesting information from the TE. The TE part can push information to the user and application part. Instead of the user and application part obtaining the technical details from the TE part and processing the technical details, it can also be that the TE part provides the processed information to the user and application part. Similarly, as mentioned above, the TE part can be interfaced with the MT / TA component in an acquisition mode or a push mode. One way of interfacing can be to use an AT command. For example, 3GPP TS 27.007 defines a command called the "+CREG" command, which can be used to obtain information about the mobile network generation (also referred to as the generation of the RAT).

[0150] In addition to RAT-related information, visibility of encryption information ("notifying the user whether the confidentiality of user data is protected on the radio access link") is also specified in the following 3GPP specifications: for 3G, in subsection 5.5.1 of 3GPP TS 33.102; for 4G, in subsection 5.2 of 3GPP TS33.401; and for 5G, in subsection 5.10.1 of 3GPP TS 33.501 version 15.2.0. In addition, the manufacturer of UE 120 including TE, TA and MT may also provide proprietary AT commands or responses to expose additional technical details of the received services. The above-mentioned parts may also be referred to as units.

[0151] Although the solution is described with reference to a specific exemplary embodiment, the description is generally intended only to illustrate the concept of the invention and should not be considered to limit the scope of the solution. For example, the terms "user equipment UE", "network node", "communication network", "legal network", "illegal device" and "technical details" are used throughout this disclosure, but any other corresponding entities, functions and / or parameters having the features and characteristics described herein may also be used. The solution is defined by the attached claims.

Claims

1. A method performed by a user equipment UE (120) in a communication network (100) for detecting that the UE (120) has communicated with an illegal device (150) posing as a network node (110, 111, 140) of a legitimate network, wherein: The method comprises: - obtaining (4010) information about technical details of a transmission of a service received by the UE, wherein the information includes a generation of a radio access technology RAT / mobile network used for the transmission, configuration parameters for communicating with the non-legitimate device, and a location of the UE when the service was received; - based on the obtained information and historical usage data of the service by the UE, determining (4020) that the service is received from the non-legitimate device, wherein the service is determined to be received from the non-legitimate device when the technical details do not correspond to the technical details expected for the legitimate network or to the historical usage data of the service by the UE; and - providing (4030) the technical details to a user of the UE (120) and / or an application on the UE.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein: Information on technical details also includes: -Whether confidentiality protections were applied; -Whether encryption protection is applied; - Which encryption algorithm is used; - Whether integrity protection is applied; - which integrity protection algorithm is used; and / or -Secure algorithms.

3. The method according to claim 2, wherein: When the service is received via a second generation (2G) mobile network although a later generation mobile network is expected, the service is determined to be received from the non-legitimate device (150).

4. The method according to claim 2 or 3, wherein: When the UE (120) uses a newer generation network and the UE (120) switches to a 2G mobile network for a short period of time and receives the service during the period of time when the UE (120) is connected to the 2G mobile network, the service is determined to be received from the non-legitimate device (150).

5. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein: The providing (4030) step also includes indicating that the service is received from the non-legitimate device (150).

6. The method (400) according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein: The method further comprises: - Preventing (4040) establishing a service from the UE (120) to the non-legitimate device (150).

7. The method (400) according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein: The method further comprises: - sending (4050) to a network node (110) of the legitimate network an indication that the service was received from a non-legitimate device (150).

8. A user equipment UE (120) in a communication network (100), the UE (120) being used to detect that the UE (120) has communicated with an illegal device (150) posing as a network node (110, 111, 140) of a legitimate network, wherein: The UE (120) includes a processor, and when the processor executes the computer instructions, the UE performs the following operations: - obtaining information about technical details of a transmission of a service received by the UE, wherein the information includes the generation of the radio access technology RAT / mobile network used for the transmission, configuration parameters for communicating with the non-legitimate device, and the location of the UE when the service was received; - based on the obtained information and historical usage data of the service by the UE, determining that the service is received from the non-legitimate device, wherein the service is determined to be received from the non-legitimate device when the technical details do not correspond to the technical details expected for the legitimate network or to the historical usage data of the service by the UE; and - providing the technical details to a user of the UE (120) and / or an application on the UE.

9. The UE according to claim 8, wherein: Information on technical details also includes: -Whether confidentiality protections were applied; -Whether encryption protection is applied; - Which encryption algorithm is used; - Whether integrity protection is applied; - which integrity protection algorithm is used; and / or -Secure algorithms.

10. The UE according to claim 9, wherein: The UE (120) is configured to determine that the service is received from the non-legitimate device (150) when the service is received via a second generation (2G) mobile network although a later generation mobile network is expected.

11. The UE according to claim 9 or 10, wherein: The UE (120) is configured to determine that the service is received from the non-legitimate device (150) when the UE (120) uses a newer generation network and the UE (120) switches to a 2G mobile network for a short period of time and receives the service during the period of time when the UE (120) is connected to the 2G mobile network.

12. The UE according to any one of claims 9 to 10, wherein: The UE (120) is further configured to: - Indicating to a user of the UE (120) and / or to an application on the UE that the service is received from the non-legitimate device (150).

13. The UE according to any one of claims 9 to 10, wherein: The UE (120) is further configured to: - Preventing establishment of services from the UE (120) to the non-legitimate device (150).

14. The UE according to any one of claims 9 to 10, wherein: The UE (120) is further configured to: - sending information about the technical details of the transmission of the received service to a network node (110) of the legitimate network, wherein the information comprises the generation of the RAT / mobile network used for the transmission.

15. A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program comprising instructions, which, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

16. A method performed by a network node in a communication network (100) for detecting that a user equipment UE (120) has communicated with an illegal device (150) posing as a network node (110, 111, 140) of a legitimate network, wherein: The method comprises: - obtaining (1110) from the UE information about technical details of a transmission of a service received by the UE (120), wherein the information comprises a generation of a radio access technology RAT / mobile network used for transmission of the service to the UE (120), configuration parameters used for communicating with the non-legitimate device, and a location of the UE when the service was received; -Based on the received information and the historical usage data of the service by the UE, determine (1120) that the service is received from the non-legitimate device, wherein when the technical details do not correspond to the technical details expected for the legitimate network or to the historical usage data of the service by the UE, the service is determined to be received from the non-legitimate device.

17. The method according to claim 16, wherein: The method further comprises: - indicating (1130) to the UE that the service is received from the non-legitimate device (150).

18. The method according to claim 16 or 17, wherein: The service is determined to be received from the non-legitimate device (150) when the information related to the technical details indicates that the service is received via a second generation (2G) mobile network although a later generation mobile network is expected.

19. A network node in a communication network (100), the network node being used to detect that a user equipment UE (140) has communicated with an illegal device (150) posing as a network node (110, 111, 140) of a legitimate network, wherein: The network node includes a processor, and when the processor executes computer instructions, the network node performs the following operations: - obtaining from the UE information about technical details of the transmission of a service received by the UE (120), wherein the information includes the generation of the radio access technology RAT / mobile network used for the transmission of the service to the UE (120), configuration parameters used for communicating with the non-legitimate device, and the location of the UE when the service was received; -Based on the received information and the historical usage data of the service by the UE, determining that the service is received from the non-legitimate device, wherein when the technical details do not correspond to the technical details expected for the legitimate network or do not correspond to the historical usage data of the service by the UE, the service is determined to be received from the non-legitimate device.

20. The network node according to claim 19, wherein the network node is further configured to: - Indicating to the UE that the service is received from the non-legitimate device (150).

21. A network node according to claim 19 or 20, wherein the network node is further configured to determine that the service is received from the non-legitimate device (150) when the information related to the technical details indicates that the service is received via a second generation (2G) mobile network although a later generation of mobile network is expected.

22. A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program comprising instructions which, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform the method according to any one of claims 16 to 18.