A cross-domain access control method based on blockchain

By adopting a blockchain-based cross-domain access control method in the Internet of Things environment, combining dynamic and static verification, the security threat problem of traditional access control is solved, and fine-grained and transparent permission management is realized to prevent forging tokens and middlemen. Attack to ensure the security and efficiency of the system.

CN114154193BInactive Publication Date: 2024-11-08HARBIN ENG UNIV
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202111424122.X
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2021-11-26
Publication Date
2024-11-08
Estimated Expiration
Not applicable · inactive patent

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In the IoT environment, traditional trusted third-party identity authentication and access control poses security threats, such as privacy issues and lack of transparency, which cannot meet the needs of cross-domain information services.

Method used

A cross-domain access control method based on blockchain is adopted, combining dynamic and static verification, through capability token generation, dynamic verification and static verification, and a smart contract is used for permission management to ensure the identity and permission verification of the subject.

Benefits of technology

It provides finer-grained and secure access control, prevents forged tokens and man-in-the-middle attacks, resists malicious node flooding attacks, and ensures the transparency and efficiency of the system.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The present invention belongs to the field of information security technology, and specifically relates to a cross-domain access control method based on blockchain. The present invention provides a more fine-grained and secure access control based on a more rigorous permission verification logic and optimization of the capability token structure. The token can be processed in the token generation phase to prevent the behavior of forging tokens. Dynamic verification can resist man-in-the-middle attacks, prevent malicious nodes from flooding the system, and prevent single point failures from causing abnormal system behavior. Based on the transparent and public characteristics of blockchain, all nodes can synchronize their status by accessing transactions and smart contracts in the blockchain.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of information security technology, and specifically relates to a cross-domain access control method based on blockchain. Background Art

[0002] With the development of technology, the Internet of Things environment has shown the characteristics of large-scale, distributed, dynamic and heterogeneous. Traditional identity authentication and access control that rely on trusted third parties have many security threats, such as privacy issues and lack of transparency. Data sharing and information interaction in a single domain can no longer meet people's needs. How to overcome this limitation and provide efficient information services among multiple domains has become an urgent problem to be solved.

[0003] Blockchain technology is gaining more and more attention and adoption from countries and companies around the world. Blockchain is currently creating a technological revolution in many industries such as finance, healthcare, supply chain, insurance and the Internet of Things. In addition to encryption technology, blockchain can also help many industries improve efficiency and overcome bottlenecks. The use of blockchain can speed up transaction settlement, reduce costs, and provide transparency, auditability, high efficiency, and security.

[0004] Blockchain is an ideal architecture to ensure that all participants conduct distributed transactions in a multi-domain environment. It optimizes traditional cross-domain access control technology and combines it with blockchain technology. It innovates on the basis of ensuring feasibility and security, improves efficiency, and provides a more secure and granular solution. Summary of the invention

[0005] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a more fine-grained blockchain-based access control method that can perform cross-domain access and combines dynamic and static verification.

[0006] A cross-domain access control method based on blockchain, comprising the following steps:

[0007] Step 1: Registration phase: Unregistered users and service providers register with the domain owner to obtain a unique identifier EID. The domain owner maintains a local configuration database and provides identity authentication.

[0008] Step 2: Generation of capability tokens: A registered user initiates a request to the domain owner for service provider resources. The user is the subject of access control and the service provider is the object. The domain owner executes a predefined decision policy, generates a capability token after evaluating the subject’s request, and synchronizes it with the smart contract in the blockchain.

[0009] Step 3: Dynamic verification of capability tokens: The subject initiates a service request to the object. The object uses the smart contract in the blockchain to dynamically verify the capability token based on the subject’s EID to check whether the subject has any bad behavior.

[0010] Step 4: Static verification of capability tokens: For subjects that do not have bad behavior, static verification of capability tokens is performed to check their permissions;

[0011] Step 5: Respond or deny service: Based on the results of dynamic verification and static verification, the object will decide whether to respond to the subject's request and provide service or deny the request.

[0012] Furthermore, the step 2 comprises the following steps:

[0013] Step 2.1: The registered user is the subject of access control, the service provider is the object to be accessed, and the subject sends a request to the domain owner to access the object resources;

[0014] Step 2.2: After receiving the request, the domain owner executes the predefined capability token generation strategy to generate the subject's capability token;

[0015] Step 2.3: The domain owner initiates a transaction to update the capability token to the smart contract in the blockchain. From then on, all nodes in the blockchain can synchronize or verify the capability token;

[0016] Step 2.4: The domain owner returns the smart contract address of its capability token to the subject.

[0017] Furthermore, the step 3 comprises the following steps:

[0018] Step 3.1: The subject sends an access request including its own EID to the object;

[0019] Step 3.2: After receiving the request, the object requests the subject's capability token from the smart contract for dynamic verification based on the subject's EID;

[0020] Step 3.3: The smart contract first determines whether the token exists based on the subject EID. If it does not exist, the request will be rejected and the access control record will be recorded.

[0021] Step 3.4: The smart contract checks whether the token is in an available state, that is, based on the attributes in the subject's capability token: the disabled start time DT and the disabled duration TOM, it compares the time of initiating the request to determine whether the subject initiates the request within the disabled time;

[0022] Step 3.5: The smart contract calculates the time difference between the last time the subject initiated an access request to the object and the time of the current request based on the LRT recorded in the token, and determines whether the subject has the bad behavior of frequent access based on the predefined frequent access time threshold;

[0023] Step 3.6: The smart contract queries the results of the subject’s previous n requests based on the access control record table. If all requests are rejected but the subject still initiates the request, the subject is judged to have engaged in bad behavior.

[0024] Step 3.7: If the subject has bad behavior, its access request will be denied and the disabling time ToM of the capability token will be calculated based on the number of bad behaviors Times. The subject's capability token will be disabled, and the bad behavior record table and access control record table will be updated; if the subject passes the verification, the static verification of the capability token will be started.

[0025] Furthermore, step 4 includes the following steps:

[0026] Step 4.1: Static verification first checks whether the subject capability token has been granted access rights to the object. If not, the request is directly rejected;

[0027] Step 4.2: Verify the subject's permissions and verify whether the attributes of the context conditions in the token meet the access control conditions that the object needs to meet locally;

[0028] Step 4.3: If the conditions are met, the service is provided and the access control record table is updated. If the conditions are not met, the next set of permissions of the subject is checked and step 4.2 is repeated until all permissions are verified.

[0029] Furthermore, the step 5 comprises the following steps:

[0030] Step 5.1: The smart contract returns the check results of dynamic and static permission verification to the object;

[0031] Step 5.2: If there are no abnormal circumstances, the object will respond to the request and provide services to the subject. If the result contains the token blocking time, the object will return the time to the subject.

[0032] The beneficial effects of the present invention are:

[0033] The present invention provides a more fine-grained and secure access control based on more rigorous permission verification logic and optimization of the capability token structure. The processing of tokens in the token generation phase can prevent the behavior of counterfeiting tokens. Dynamic verification can resist man-in-the-middle attacks, prevent malicious nodes from flooding the system, and prevent single point failures from causing abnormal system behavior. Based on the transparency and openness of the blockchain, all nodes can synchronize their status by accessing transactions and smart contracts in the blockchain. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0034] Figure 1 This is an architectural diagram of a cross-domain access control method based on blockchain of the present invention.

[0035] Figure 2 This is a process diagram for generating capability tokens in the present invention.

[0036] Figure 3 This is a dynamic verification flow chart of the present invention.

[0037] Figure 4 This is a static verification flow chart of the present invention.

[0038] Figure 5 This is a process diagram of permission verification in the present invention.

[0039] Figure 6 It is a schematic diagram of the bad behavior record table and the access control record table in the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0040] The present invention will be further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0041] Combination Figure 1-6 ,The present invention proposes a cross-domain access control method based on blockchain, including user and service provider registration, capability token generation, and access authority verification, which mainly includes the following steps:

[0042] Step 1: During the registration phase, entities participating in the access control process are divided into subjects and objects. The subject is the entity that requests access to services or resources, and the object is usually a service provider or resource provider. All entities need to participate in access control through the registration process and generate a unique identifier EID based on their own address information. The domain owner maintains a profile database locally.

[0043] Step 2: Capability token generation phase. The registered user, as the subject, sends a request to the object to access the object's resources. After receiving the request, the domain owner executes the predefined capability token generation strategy to generate the subject's capability token and initiates a transaction to update the capability token to the smart contract in the blockchain. From then on, all nodes in the blockchain can synchronize or verify the capability token. Finally, the domain owner returns the smart contract address of its capability token to the subject. The specific flow chart is as follows: Figure 2 shown.

[0044] Step 3: In the capability token dynamic verification phase, in order to determine whether the subject is a malicious node and whether there is any bad behavior, the subject's capability token is dynamically verified according to the token attributes, bad behavior record table, and access control record table.

[0045] The specific process of dynamic verification implemented by the present invention is as follows Figure 3 As shown, the steps are as follows:

[0046] Step 3.1: The subject sends a service request to the object, along with its own EID;

[0047] Step 3.2: After receiving the request, the object requests the subject's capability token from the smart contract based on the subject's EID for dynamic verification;

[0048] Step 3.3: The smart contract first determines whether the main force's ability token exists. If not, the request will be rejected and the access control record will be recorded;

[0049] Step 3.4: The smart contract checks whether the token is in an available state, that is, based on the attributes in the subject's capability token: the disabled start time DT and the disabled duration TOM, it compares the time of initiating the request to determine whether the subject initiates the request within the disabled time;

[0050] Step 3.5: The smart contract calculates the time difference between the last time the subject initiated an access request to the object and the time of the current request based on the LRT recorded in the token, and determines whether the subject has the bad behavior of frequent access in a short period of time based on the predefined frequent access time threshold;

[0051] Step 3.6: The smart contract queries the results of the subject’s previous n requests based on the access control record table. If all requests are rejected but the subject still initiates a request, it is determined that the subject has engaged in bad behavior.

[0052] Step 3.7: If the subject has bad behavior, its access request will be denied and the disabling time ToM of the capability token will be calculated based on the number of bad behaviors Times. The subject's capability token will be disabled, and the bad behavior record table and access control record table will be updated; if the subject passes the verification, the static verification of the capability token will be started.

[0053] Step 4: During the capability token static verification phase, the permissions in the capability token are checked without considering the subject’s historical behavior.

[0054] The specific process of static permission verification implemented by the present invention is as follows: Figure 4 As shown, the steps are as follows:

[0055] Step 4.1: Static verification first checks whether the subject capability token has been granted access rights to the object. If not, the request is directly rejected;

[0056] Step 4.2: Verify the subject's permissions and verify whether the attributes of the context conditions in the token meet the access control conditions that the object needs to meet locally;

[0057] Step 4.3: If the conditions are met, the service is provided and the access control record table is updated. If the conditions are not met, the next set of permissions of the subject is checked and step 4.2 is repeated until all permissions are verified.

[0058] Step 5: In the response or service denial phase, based on the results of dynamic and static verification, the object will decide whether to respond to the subject's request and provide service or deny the request.

[0059] The specific process of the permission verification implemented by the present invention is as follows Figure 5 As shown, the steps are as follows:

[0060] Step 5.1: The smart contract returns the check results of dynamic and static permission verification to the object;

[0061] Step 5.2: If there are no abnormal circumstances, the object will respond to the request and provide services to the subject. If the result contains the token blocking time, the object will return the time to the subject.

[0062] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows: the cross-domain access control based on blockchain provides more fine-grained and secure access control according to more rigorous permission verification logic and optimization of capability token structure, and can prevent the behavior of counterfeiting tokens according to the processing of tokens in the token generation stage, and can resist man-in-the-middle attacks according to dynamic verification, prevent malicious nodes from flooding the system, and prevent single point failures from causing abnormal system behavior. Based on the transparency and openness of blockchain, all nodes can synchronize the status by accessing transactions and smart contracts in the blockchain.

[0063] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. For those skilled in the art, the present invention may have various modifications and variations. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present invention shall be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A cross-domain access control method based on blockchain, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: Step 1: Registration phase: Unregistered users and service providers register with the domain owner to obtain a unique identifier EID. The domain owner maintains a local configuration database and provides identity authentication. Step 2: Generation of capability tokens: A registered user initiates a request to the domain owner for service provider resources. The user is the subject of access control and the service provider is the object. The domain owner executes a predefined decision policy, generates a capability token after evaluating the subject’s request, and synchronizes it with the smart contract in the blockchain. Step 2.1: The registered user is the subject of access control, the service provider is the object to be accessed, and the subject sends a request to the domain owner to access the object resources; Step 2.2: After receiving the request, the domain owner executes the predefined capability token generation strategy to generate the subject's capability token; Step 2.3: The domain owner initiates a transaction to update the capability token to the smart contract in the blockchain. From then on, all nodes in the blockchain can synchronize or verify the capability token; Step 2.4: The domain owner returns the smart contract address of its capability token to the subject; Step 3: Dynamic verification of capability tokens: The subject initiates a service request to the object. The object uses the smart contract in the blockchain to dynamically verify the capability token based on the subject’s EID to check whether the subject has any bad behavior. Step 3.1: The subject sends an access request including its own EID to the object; Step 3.2: After receiving the request, the object requests the subject's capability token from the smart contract for dynamic verification based on the subject's EID; Step 3.3: The smart contract first determines whether the token exists based on the subject EID. If it does not exist, the request will be rejected and the access control record will be recorded. Step 3.4: The smart contract checks whether the token is in an available state, that is, based on the attributes in the subject's capability token: the disabled start time DT and the disabled duration TOM, it compares the time of initiating the request to determine whether the subject initiates the request within the disabled time; Step 3.5: The smart contract calculates the time difference between the last time the subject initiated an access request to the object and the time of the current request based on the LRT recorded in the token, and determines whether the subject has the bad behavior of frequent access based on the predefined frequent access time threshold; Step 3.6: The smart contract queries the results of the subject’s previous n requests based on the access control record table. If all requests are rejected but the subject still initiates the request, the subject is judged to have engaged in bad behavior. Step 3.7: If the subject has bad behavior, its access request will be rejected and the disable time ToM of the capability token will be calculated according to the number of bad behaviors Times, the subject's capability token will be disabled, and the bad behavior record table and access control record table will be updated; if the subject passes the verification, the static verification of the capability token will be started; Step 4: Static verification of capability tokens: For subjects that do not have bad behavior, static verification of capability tokens is performed to check their permissions; Step 4.1: Static verification first checks whether the subject capability token has been granted access rights to the object. If not, the request is directly rejected; Step 4.2: Verify the subject's permissions and verify whether the attributes of the context conditions in the token meet the access control conditions that the object needs to meet locally; Step 4.3: If the conditions are met, provide services and update the access control record table. If the conditions are not met, continue to check the next set of permissions of the subject and repeat step 4.2 until all permissions are verified; Step 5: Response or rejection of service: Based on the results of dynamic and static verification, the object will decide to respond to the subject's request and provide service or reject the request; Step 5.1: The smart contract returns the check results of dynamic and static permission verification to the object; Step 5.2: If there are no abnormal circumstances, the object will respond to the request and provide services to the subject. If the result contains the token blocking time, the object will return the time to the subject.

Citation Information

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