Trusted remote attestation system and storage, verification method and storage medium thereof

Through alliance chain and smart contract technology, the problem that challengers in remote proof cannot provide integrity verification services is solved, decentralized integrity verification and data privacy protection is achieved, and centralized problems and privacy risks are avoided.

CN114679284BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-08CHINA MOBILE COMM LTD RES INST +1
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202011547884.4
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2020-12-24
Publication Date
2024-11-08
Estimated Expiration
2040-12-24

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In the existing remote proof methods, the challenger cannot provide remote integrity verification services normally, which poses centralized problems and risks of privacy leakage.

Method used

Adopting alliance chain technology, a alliance chain is built through multiple trusted remote proof servers, storage devices measure expected values, and using smart contracts to perform integrity verification, replacing the traditional management center, ensuring the decentralized integrity verification process, which is not easy to use. Read the device alias instead of the device name to protect data privacy.

Benefits of technology

Decentralized remote integrity verification is realized, service interruption caused by central system failure is avoided, the privacy of the proof party is protected, and public and fair device integrity verification is carried out through smart contracts, preventing data leakage.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The present invention discloses a trusted remote attestation system and its storage, verification method and storage medium, including: a consortium chain composed of multiple trusted remote attestation servers, used for storing device measurement expected values, after receiving the prover integrity verification request initiated by the challenger and forwarding the prover integrity measurement data, the prover actual integrity measurement data and the measurement expected value are compared, the prover verification result is obtained and returned to the challenger, the trusted remote attestation server is provided by each authorized consortium organization; the challenger, after receiving the integrity measurement data sent by the prover, initiates the prover integrity verification request to the consortium chain and forwards the prover integrity measurement data to the prover. With the present invention, there is no central system, and the challenger will not be unable to provide remote integrity verification services normally due to the inaccessibility of the central system or problems with the server.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of wireless communication technology, and in particular to a trusted remote certification system and a storage and verification method and storage medium thereof. Background Art

[0002] At present, most network security systems are mainly composed of firewalls, intrusion detection, anti-virus, etc., which are security measures to prevent external attacks on the periphery. Trusted computing is to establish a safe and reliable defense system within the system to ensure that the computer can provide stable services as expected.

[0003] Trusted computing introduces trusted hardware as the root of trust inside the device and uses a combination of software and hardware technology to establish a trust chain, with each level authenticating and trusting another level, thereby achieving trustworthiness of the entire computer system.

[0004] Remote attestation is the process of conducting trusted attestation between two devices in a network, including remote identity authentication and remote integrity verification. During the remote integrity verification process, the prover needs to provide the challenger with integrity measurement data related to the trusted state. After the challenger obtains the data sent by the prover, it compares it with the prover's expected measurement data and determines whether the prover is in a trusted state based on the verification results.

[0005] The deficiency of the existing technology is that the existing remote attestation method has the problem that the challenger cannot normally provide remote integrity verification services. Summary of the invention

[0006] The present invention provides a trusted remote attestation system and its storage, verification method and storage medium, which are used to solve the problem in the existing remote attestation method that the challenger cannot normally provide remote integrity verification service.

[0007] The present invention provides the following technical solutions:

[0008] A trusted remote attestation system, comprising:

[0009] A consortium chain consisting of multiple trusted remote attestation servers is used to store device measurement expected values. After receiving the prover integrity verification request initiated by the challenger and forwarding the prover integrity measurement data, the prover's actual integrity measurement data is compared with the measurement expected value, and the prover's verification result is obtained and returned to the challenger. The trusted remote attestation servers are provided by each authorized consortium organization;

[0010] The prover is used to send integrity measurement data to the challenger when trusted remote attestation is required;

[0011] The challenger is used to initiate a prover integrity verification request to the consortium chain and forward the prover integrity measurement data to the prover after receiving the integrity measurement data sent by the prover.

[0012] During implementation, it further includes:

[0013] The measurement expected value management server is provided by each authorized alliance organization and is used to generate and / or update the device measurement expected value on the alliance chain based on the identity authentication and authorization of the alliance chain.

[0014] In implementation, the trusted remote attestation server is further used to transmit information securely based on TLS; or,

[0015] The prover is further used to transmit information securely based on TLS; or,

[0016] The challenger is further used to transmit information securely based on TLS; or,

[0017] The metric expected value management server is further used to transmit information securely based on TLS.

[0018] In implementation, the trusted remote attestation server is further used to ensure data transmission security through trusted identity authentication; or,

[0019] The prover is further used to ensure data transmission security through trusted identity authentication; or,

[0020] The challenging party is further used to ensure data transmission security through trusted identity authentication; or,

[0021] The measurement expected value management server is further used to ensure the security of data transmission through trusted identity authentication.

[0022] During implementation, the consortium chain is further used to compare the actual integrity measurement data of the proving party with the expected value of the measurement through smart contracts.

[0023] A storage method for a trusted remote attestation system, comprising:

[0024] The authorized alliance organization shall pre-store the device measurement expected value created by the measurement expected value management party server before the trusted remote attestation server is put into use;

[0025] Initiate a storage request for the expected value of measurement to the consortium chain network;

[0026] After the alliance chain node verifies the legitimacy of the request, it stores the expected value of the device measurement in the alliance chain.

[0027] In implementation, the measurement expected value storage request includes a device alias, and the device alias is a character string obtained by encrypting the EK public key in the device trusted chip after adding a random number and a timestamp.

[0028] During implementation, it further includes:

[0029] Retrieve the expected value of a device's metric from the blockchain based on its device alias.

[0030] During implementation, the alliance chain node verifies the legitimacy of the request by using the public key of the measurement expected value manager to verify the digital signature to determine whether the request comes from the measurement expected value manager's server.

[0031] During implementation, it further includes:

[0032] The device measurement expected value in the alliance chain is updated in a manner that the device measurement expected value is stored in the alliance chain.

[0033] A verification method for a trusted remote attestation system, comprising:

[0034] The challenger obtains the integrity measurement data of the prover;

[0035] The prover returns the device name and integrity measurement data;

[0036] The challenger forms a device integrity verification request and broadcasts it to the consortium chain network;

[0037] The alliance chain node obtains the corresponding device measurement expected value in the alliance chain according to the prover device name in the request, determines the device integrity measurement data and the device measurement expected value, and determines whether it is credible according to the device measurement expected value;

[0038] The alliance chain node returns the verification result to the challenging party.

[0039] In implementation, the device name is a device alias, which is a character string obtained by encrypting the EK public key in the device's trusted chip after adding a random number and a timestamp.

[0040] During implementation, when determining the device integrity measurement data and the expected value of the device measurement, the alliance chain compares the actual integrity measurement data of the prover and the expected value of the measurement through a smart contract.

[0041] A computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program for executing the storage method of the trusted remote attestation system and / or the verification method of the trusted remote attestation system.

[0042] The beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows:

[0043] In the technical solution provided by the embodiment of the present invention, in the process of remote integrity verification, a consortium chain is used to replace the management center to complete the integrity verification process in the remote proof in a decentralized manner. Since it is based on blockchain technology, there is no central system, and the challenging party will not be unable to provide remote integrity verification services normally due to the inability to access the central system or problems with the server.

[0044] Since the expected value of the measurement can only be added to the blockchain after verification and is stored persistently, forming a chronologically recorded, tamper-proof, and trustworthy database, the challenger does not need to obtain the expected value of the measurement, thus protecting the privacy of the prover.

[0045] Furthermore, since integrity verification is performed through smart contracts, the integrity of the device can be verified openly and impartially.

[0046] Furthermore, since the device name is replaced by a non-readable device alias, the device name is replaced by a mutable, non-readable device alias, and the blockchain node does not know the device name corresponding to the stored metric expected value, thereby preventing data leakage.

[0047] Furthermore, the following are provided: a storage solution for expected values ​​of device measurements and a remote integrity verification solution. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0048] The drawings described herein are used to provide a further understanding of the present invention and constitute a part of the present invention. The exemplary embodiments of the present invention and their descriptions are used to explain the present invention and do not constitute an improper limitation of the present invention. In the drawings:

[0049] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of direct trusted verification in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0050] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of third-party trusted verification in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0051] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a trusted remote attestation system in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0052] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of a storage method implementation flow of a system in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0053] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of an implementation flow of a storage process for an expected value of device metrics in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0054] Figure 6 A schematic diagram of the implementation flow of the verification method of the system in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0055] Figure 7Schematic diagram of the remote integrity verification process in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0056] The inventors noticed during the invention process that:

[0057] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of direct trusted verification. As shown in the figure, a commonly used solution for implementing remote integrity verification is that two communicating devices directly verify each other, one is the challenger and the other is the prover. The challenger stores the expected value of the measurement of the prover's device, and has a built-in verification module to compare the actual integrity measurement data of the prover with its expected value to derive the trust status of the prover.

[0058] Figure 2 The third-party trusted verification diagram is shown in the figure. Another solution is to establish a third-party trusted remote attestation server to centrally store the expected values ​​of each trusted device measurement and verify the device integrity status. During the remote integrity verification process, the challenger first obtains the integrity measurement data of the prover, and then forwards it to the third-party trusted remote attestation server. The third-party trusted remote attestation server compares the actual integrity measurement data of the prover with the expected value of the measurement through the built-in verification module, and obtains the verification result of the prover and returns it to the challenger.

[0059] The first method of direct verification between two devices has at least one of the following four problems:

[0060] 1. The challenger needs to store the expected values ​​of different devices it communicates with, which requires a lot of storage space;

[0061] 2. The challenger knows the expected values ​​of all provers communicating with it, which may lead to privacy leakage.

[0062] 3. The prover can only trust the verification result of the challenger, and the challenger may face security risks such as data tampering and being attacked;

[0063] 4. The management of device measurement expected values ​​is complex. Changes to the prover's measurement expected value require the upgrade of all challenger devices that store the measurement expected value.

[0064] Although the second method of establishing a trusted remote attestation server can solve the problems of the first method, namely, large storage capacity, expected value privacy leakage, and complex management of measured expected values, this method additionally introduces a centralization problem. When the challenger cannot access the trusted remote attestation server or a problem occurs with the trusted remote attestation server, the challenger will not be able to provide remote integrity verification services normally.

[0065] Based on this, a solution for remote integrity verification based on blockchain technology is proposed in the embodiment of the present invention. This solution can at least avoid and solve one of the four problems faced by the challenger and the prover in the first method by building a consortium chain and ensuring the expected value update process and integrity verification process, and is also used to solve the centralization problem of the second method.

[0066] The specific implementation of the present invention will be described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0067] Figure 3 The following is a schematic diagram of the structure of a trusted remote attestation system, as shown in the figure, including:

[0068] A consortium chain consisting of multiple trusted remote attestation servers is used to store device measurement expected values. After receiving the prover integrity verification request initiated by the challenger and forwarding the prover integrity measurement data, the prover's actual integrity measurement data is compared with the measurement expected value, and the prover's verification result is obtained and returned to the challenger. The trusted remote attestation servers are provided by each authorized consortium organization;

[0069] The prover is used to send integrity measurement data to the challenger when trusted remote attestation is required;

[0070] The challenger is used to initiate a prover integrity verification request to the consortium chain and forward the prover integrity measurement data to the prover after receiving the integrity measurement data sent by the prover.

[0071] During implementation, the method may further include:

[0072] The measurement expected value management server is provided by each authorized alliance organization and is used to generate and / or update the device measurement expected value on the alliance chain based on the identity authentication and authorization of the alliance chain.

[0073] In implementation, the trusted remote attestation server is further used to transmit information securely based on TLS; or,

[0074] The prover is further used to transmit information securely based on TLS; or,

[0075] The challenger is further used to transmit information securely based on TLS; or,

[0076] The metric expected value management server is further used to transmit information securely based on TLS.

[0077] In implementation, the trusted remote attestation server is further used to ensure data transmission security through trusted identity authentication; or,

[0078] The prover is further used to ensure data transmission security through trusted identity authentication; or,

[0079] The challenging party is further used to ensure data transmission security through trusted identity authentication; or,

[0080] The measurement expected value management server is further used to ensure the security of data transmission through trusted identity authentication.

[0081] During implementation, the consortium chain is further used to compare the actual integrity measurement data of the proving party with the expected value of the measurement through smart contracts.

[0082] Specifically, the system proposed in the embodiment is based on blockchain technology to solve the problem of device integrity verification in remote proof. Through the joint construction of a remote integrity verification alliance chain by relevant alliance organizations, combined with the respective measurement expected value managers of the alliance organizations, it is possible to decentralizedly solve the security storage and management of measurement expected values ​​and integrity verification problems.

[0083] The overall technical solution can be composed of four parts:

[0084] 1. Remote integrity verification consortium chain: The nodes in the consortium chain network are composed of trusted remote proof servers provided by multiple alliance organizations with related interests. They are responsible for storing the expected values ​​of device measurements and verifying the integrity of the device through smart contracts.

[0085] 2. The measurement expected value manager is the server for generating and updating the device measurement expected value provided by each alliance organization. It is a trusted device with a trusted root. Only after passing the identity authentication and authorization of the alliance chain can the measurement expected value be submitted to the alliance chain.

[0086] 3. The proving party is the device being verified and has passed the identity authentication in remote attestation. If the remote integrity verification result meets expectations, it is determined to be a trusted device;

[0087] 4. The challenger is a device that needs to obtain the prover's trusted status from the remote integrity verification alliance chain. It can be a trusted or untrusted device and is responsible for initiating the prover's integrity verification request and forwarding the prover's integrity measurement data.

[0088] In the specific implementation, the communication between the four components is based on the secure transmission method of TLS (Transport Layer Security), and trusted identity authentication is used to ensure the security of data transmission.

[0089] The remote integrity verification process based on blockchain can be divided into two parts: 1. The storage process of the expected value of device measurement; 2. The remote integrity verification process. Device integrity verification depends on the expected value of device measurement, so the storage of the expected value of device measurement needs to be completed before the remote integrity verification.

[0090] The specific implementation methods thereof are described below.

[0091] 1. Storage process of expected values ​​of equipment measurements.

[0092] Figure 4 A flowchart for implementing a storage method of the system, as shown in the figure, may include:

[0093] Step 401: Before the trusted remote attestation server is put into use, the authorized alliance organization pre-stores the device measurement expected value created by the measurement expected value management party server;

[0094] Step 402: Initiate a request to store the expected value of the measurement to the alliance chain network;

[0095] Step 403: After the alliance chain node verifies the legitimacy of the request, it stores the expected value of the device measurement in the alliance chain.

[0096] The following is an example to illustrate.

[0097] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of the implementation process of the storage process of the expected value of device measurement is shown in the figure. The storage process of the expected value of device measurement can be as follows:

[0098] First, ① before a certain alliance member's equipment is put into use, the alliance member's measurement expected value manager creates the equipment measurement expected value and presets it in the equipment;

[0099] ② Initiate a measurement expected value storage request to the alliance chain network. The measurement expected value storage request may include the device alias, encrypted expected value, random number and digital signature.

[0100] In implementation, the measurement expected value storage request includes a device alias, and the device alias is a character string obtained by encrypting the EK public key in the device trusted chip after adding a random number and a timestamp.

[0101] Specifically, the device alias is a 20-byte string obtained by adding a random number and timestamp to the EK (Endorsement Key) public key in the device's trusted chip, and then encrypting it with SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm) 256 and RIPEMD160 (RACE Raw Integrity Check Message Digest). It can not only ensure the uniqueness of the device alias while hiding the EK, but also serve to anonymize the device.

[0102] ③The alliance chain node verifies the legitimacy of the request and stores the expected value of the device measurement in the alliance chain.

[0103] During implementation, the alliance chain node verifies the legitimacy of the request by using the public key of the measurement expected value manager to verify the digital signature to determine whether the request comes from the measurement expected value manager's server.

[0104] Specifically, the consortium chain uses the public key of the measurement expected value manager to verify the digital signature to confirm that the request comes from the measurement expected value manager. If the verification fails, the request will be discarded.

[0105] During implementation, the method may further include:

[0106] The device measurement expected value in the alliance chain is updated in a manner that the device measurement expected value is stored in the alliance chain.

[0107] Specifically, if the device metric expected value changes subsequently, the metric expected value manager will regenerate a new device alias and use the same method to implement the device metric expected value update and chain process.

[0108] During implementation, the method may further include:

[0109] Retrieve the expected value of a device's metric from the blockchain based on its device alias.

[0110] Specifically, the expected measurement value of a device in the blockchain can be retrieved by reverse tracing based on the latest device alias, and the first value retrieved is the current expected measurement value of the device.

[0111] 2. Remote integrity verification process.

[0112] Figure 6 The schematic diagram of the implementation process of the system verification method is shown in the figure, including:

[0113] Step 601: The challenger obtains the integrity measurement data of the prover;

[0114] Step 602: The prover returns the device name and integrity measurement data;

[0115] Step 603: The challenger forms a device integrity verification request and broadcasts it to the alliance chain network;

[0116] Step 604: The consortium chain node obtains the corresponding device measurement expected value in the consortium chain according to the prover device name in the request, determines the device integrity measurement data and the device measurement expected value, and determines whether it is credible according to the device measurement expected value;

[0117] Step 605: The alliance chain node returns the verification result to the challenging party.

[0118] The following is an example to illustrate.

[0119] Figure 7The remote integrity verification process is shown in the figure. As shown in the figure, the remote integrity verification process can be as follows:

[0120] When the challenger needs to verify the integrity of the prover, first, ① the challenger obtains the integrity measurement data of the prover.

[0121] ②The prover returns the device alias and integrity measurement data.

[0122] In implementation, the device name is a device alias, which is a character string obtained by encrypting the EK public key in the device's trusted chip after adding a random number and a timestamp.

[0123] ③ The challenger forms a device integrity verification request and broadcasts it to the alliance chain network. The integrity verification request includes the prover's device alias, the prover's integrity measurement data encrypted with the alliance chain public key, and a random number.

[0124] ④ The alliance chain node uses its own private key to decrypt, obtains the corresponding device measurement expected value in the alliance chain according to the alias of the prover's device in the request, and compares the device integrity measurement data in the request with the device measurement expected value through the smart contract. If it meets the expectations, it is considered to be a trusted state, otherwise it is untrustworthy. That is, in the implementation, when determining the device integrity measurement data and the device measurement expected value, the alliance chain compares the actual integrity measurement data of the prover with the measurement expected value through the smart contract.

[0125] Finally, ⑤ returns the verification result to the challenging party.

[0126] Based on the same inventive concept, an embodiment of the present invention further provides a computer-readable storage medium, which stores a computer program for executing the above-mentioned storage method of the trusted remote attestation system and / or the verification method of the trusted remote attestation system.

[0127] For specific implementation, please refer to the specific implementation methods of the storage method of the trusted remote attestation system and / or the verification method of the trusted remote attestation system.

[0128] In summary, in the technical solution provided by the embodiment of the present invention, the remote integrity verification alliance chain solution replaces the management center, and the integrity verification process in the remote proof is completed in a decentralized manner. The specific solution includes: a remote integrity verification alliance chain, a trusted measurement expected value manager, a proving party, and a challenging party. Two processes are also provided: a storage solution for device measurement expected values ​​and a remote integrity verification solution.

[0129] In the solution for secure storage and management of device measurement expected values: a request for updating the measurement expected values ​​is initiated by a trusted measurement expected value manager, and the alliance chain node stores the measurement expected values ​​in the alliance chain after verifying the request. Furthermore, the privacy of the measurement expected value data in the alliance chain is protected by replacing the device name with an unreadable device alias.

[0130] In the remote integrity verification scheme: the challenger obtains the integrity measurement data of the prover and initiates a proof integrity verification request to the consortium chain. After the consortium chain node verifies the request, it compares and verifies the integrity measurement data and the expected value of the device measurement through the smart contract, and finally returns the result to the challenger.

[0131] The solution is based on blockchain technology. There is no central system. The challenger will not be unable to provide remote integrity verification services normally due to the inaccessibility of the central system or problems with the server.

[0132] The expected value of the measurement can only be added to the blockchain after verification and is stored persistently, forming a chronological, tamper-proof, and trustworthy database. The challenger does not need to obtain the expected value of the measurement, which protects the privacy of the prover.

[0133] Open and impartial verification of device integrity through smart contracts.

[0134] The device name is replaced by a mutable, non-readable device alias, and the blockchain node does not know the device name corresponding to the stored metric expected value, preventing data leakage.

[0135] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that embodiments of the present invention may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present invention may take the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware. Moreover, the present invention may take the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage and optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0136] The present invention is described with reference to flowcharts and / or block diagrams of methods, devices (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the present invention. It should be understood that each process and / or block in the flowchart and / or block diagram, as well as the combination of processes and / or blocks in the flowchart and / or block diagram, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to produce a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device generate instructions for implementing the processes in the flowchart and / or block diagram. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1A device that provides the functions specified in a block or multiple blocks.

[0137] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory capable of directing a computer or other programmable data processing device to operate in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising an instruction device, which implements the process Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A function specified in one or more boxes.

[0138] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device so that a series of operating steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions for implementing the process. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A step that specifies a function in one or more boxes.

[0139] Obviously, those skilled in the art can make various changes and modifications to the present invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. Thus, if these modifications and variations of the present invention fall within the scope of the claims of the present invention and their equivalents, the present invention is also intended to include these modifications and variations.

Claims

1. A trusted remote attestation system, characterized in that: include: A consortium chain consisting of multiple trusted remote attestation servers is used to store device measurement expected values. After receiving the prover integrity verification request initiated by the challenger and forwarding the prover integrity measurement data, the prover's actual integrity measurement data is compared with the measurement expected value, and the prover's verification result is obtained and returned to the challenger. The trusted remote attestation servers are provided by each authorized consortium organization; The prover is used to send integrity measurement data to the challenger when trusted remote attestation is required; The challenger is used to initiate a prover integrity verification request to the consortium chain and forward the prover integrity measurement data to the prover after receiving the prover integrity measurement data. Further including: The measurement expected value management server is provided by each authorized alliance organization and is used to generate and / or update the device measurement expected value on the alliance chain based on the identity authentication and authorization of the alliance chain.

2. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that The trusted remote attestation server is further used to securely transmit information based on the Transport Security Layer TLS; or, The prover is further used to transmit information securely based on TLS; or, The challenger is further used to transmit information securely based on TLS; or, The metric expected value management server is further used to transmit information securely based on TLS.

3. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that The trusted remote attestation server is further used to ensure data transmission security through trusted identity authentication; or, The prover is further used to ensure data transmission security through trusted identity authentication; or, The challenging party is further used to ensure data transmission security through trusted identity authentication; or, The measurement expected value management server is further used to ensure the security of data transmission through trusted identity authentication.

4. The system according to claim 1, characterized in that The consortium chain is further used to compare the actual integrity measurement data of the proving party with the expected value of the measurement through smart contracts.

5. A storage method of a system according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that: include: The authorized alliance organization shall pre-store the device measurement expected value created by the measurement expected value management party server before the trusted remote attestation server is put into use; Initiate a storage request for the expected value of measurement to the consortium chain network; After the alliance chain node verifies the legitimacy of the request, it stores the expected value of the device measurement in the alliance chain.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The measurement expected value storage request includes a device alias, and the device alias is a character string obtained by encrypting the endorsement key EK public key in the device trusted chip by adding a random number and a timestamp.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that Further including: Retrieve the expected value of a device's metric from the blockchain based on its device alias.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that The alliance chain node verifies the legitimacy of the request by using the public key of the measurement expected value manager to verify the digital signature to determine whether the request comes from the measurement expected value manager's server.

9. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that Further including: The device measurement expected value in the alliance chain is updated in a manner that the device measurement expected value is stored in the alliance chain.

10. A verification method for a system according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that: include: The challenger obtains the integrity measurement data of the prover; The prover returns the device name and integrity measurement data; The challenger forms a device integrity verification request and broadcasts it to the consortium chain network; The alliance chain node obtains the corresponding device measurement expected value in the alliance chain according to the prover device name in the request, determines the device integrity measurement data and the device measurement expected value, and determines whether it is credible according to the device measurement expected value; The alliance chain node returns the verification result to the challenging party.

11. The method according to claim 10, characterized in that The device name is a device alias, which is a character string obtained by encrypting the EK public key in the device's trusted chip by adding a random number and a timestamp.

12. The method according to claim 10, characterized in that When determining the device integrity measurement data and the device measurement expected value, the consortium chain compares the actual integrity measurement data of the proving party and the measurement expected value through a smart contract.

13. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program for executing the method according to any one of claims 5 to 12.