Quantum group signature method based on quantum short key cryptography
Through quantum short key cryptography and quantum walk stealth transmission technology, quantum signature state is generated, which solves the problems of insufficient security and large key length of quantum group signature scheme under the threat of quantum computers, and realizes efficient and secure quantum group signature .
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202210785670.3
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2022-07-04
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-26
- Estimated Expiration
- 2042-07-04
AI Technical Summary
The existing quantum group signature scheme is insufficient in the face of the threat of quantum computers, and the key length of the classic group signature scheme is large and not practical. The quantum one-crypto-on-one encryption and decryption algorithm has problems with identity fraud and message debunk.
The quantum group signature method based on quantum short key cryptography is adopted to generate quantum signature state through quantum one-time encryption and quantum roaming stealth transmission, ensuring information confidentiality and authenticity of the source, and using exchange testing technology to verify signature validity. Reduce key bandwidth requirements.
High reliability, security and high efficiency quantum group signatures are achieved, avoiding the problems of large key lengths and identity fraud in traditional solutions, and ensuring the non-refutability and validity of the signature.
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Figure CN115174066B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of quantum communication, and in particular relates to a quantum group signature method based on quantum short key cryptography. Background Art
[0002] With the development of economy and technology and the improvement of people's living standards, people's requirements for data security have become higher and higher. With the continuous development of the information technology revolution, electronic authentication has become an indispensable part of people's daily production and life. Authentication theory and technology have become an important part of cryptography, playing an important role in information protection, network and communication security and credibility.
[0003] Signature is an important concept in the field of authentication, which can be used to achieve identity authentication and message confirmation at the same time. At present, digital signatures have been widely used in a variety of security fields, such as e-government, e-payment, and e-commerce. Group signature is a meaningful digital signature. Any group member has the opportunity to sign information on behalf of the group, thereby meeting the needs of special application scenarios, such as the signing of financial contracts. However, the security of classical group signature schemes mostly relies on some difficult mathematical problems, such as large integer decomposition and discrete logarithm problems; however, these problems can be effectively cracked by Shor's quantum algorithm in polynomial time; and Grover's quantum search algorithm can reduce the key length to half of the original when deciphering passwords. From this perspective, once quantum computers become practical in the future, many widely used modern cryptographic algorithms will no longer be secure. In order to resist the threat of quantum computers, researchers have begun to investigate quantum cryptographic algorithms and protocols.
[0004] In the quantum group signature scheme, the two key sub-processes are the quantum encryption and decryption algorithm and the quantum state transmission method. In terms of encryption and decryption algorithms, most of the current quantum group signature schemes are based on the quantum one-time pad encryption algorithm. On the one hand, the one-time pad method has been confirmed by Shannon to be the most secure information encryption method to date, but according to Shannon's cryptographic theory, the length of the encryption key must not be less than the length of the information itself, resulting in a large demand for key bandwidth, which makes the one-time pad scheme often impractical. Moreover, the quantum one-time pad is implemented by combining quantum key distribution and one-time pad, in which quantum key distribution is mainly used for key generation and key distribution, and encryption still follows the traditional cryptographic system; on the other hand, the quantum one-time pad uses "commutative Pauli operators" bit by bit to perform encryption and decryption operations. Various identity fraud, message denial and forgery problems often occur in the cryptographic communication system based on quantum one-time pad. Therefore, the existing quantum one-time pad encryption algorithm is not very suitable for today's quantum group signature requirements. Summary of the invention
[0005] The object of the present invention is to provide a quantum group signature method based on quantum short key cryptography with high reliability, good security and high efficiency.
[0006] The quantum group signature method based on quantum short key cryptography provided by the present invention comprises the following steps:
[0007] Initialization phase:
[0008] S1. The jth sender applies to a third party to join the group; then the third party notifies the receiver to prepare for communication;
[0009] S2. The third party prepares a sending shared key with the jth sender, and the third party prepares a receiving shared key with the receiver;
[0010] Signature phase:
[0011] S3. The jth sender prepares a quantum bit sequence to carry the information to be signed;
[0012] S4. The jth sender selects a random sequence and performs quantum one-time pad encryption on the quantum bit sequence obtained in step S3 based on the selected random sequence;
[0013] S5. The jth sender uses a quantum short key cryptographic algorithm based on sending a shared key to encrypt the first copy of the encryption result obtained in step S4 to generate a quantum signature state;
[0014] S6. The jth sender encodes its identity information into a quantum state and encrypts it using a quantum short key cryptographic algorithm based on sending a shared key;
[0015] S7. The j-th sender transmits a second copy of the encrypted result obtained in step S4 by using quantum walk teleportation on a straight line containing two coins;
[0016] S8. The jth sender sends the information obtained in steps S4 to S7 and the third copy of the encryption result obtained in step S4 to the receiver through quantum secure direct communication technology;
[0017] Verification phase:
[0018] S9. The receiver uses a quantum short key cryptographic algorithm based on the received shared key to encrypt the received information and send it to a third party;
[0019] S10. The third party decrypts the received information using a decryption operation based on the received shared key;
[0020] S11. The third party continues to use the quantum short key decryption algorithm based on the sent shared key to decrypt the result of step S10 again, thereby obtaining the identity information of the jth sender;
[0021] S12. The third party verifies the authenticity of the source of the circulating message and obtains a copy of the encryption result obtained in step S4;
[0022] S13. The third party prepares a new quantum state again based on the result of step S12 and sends it to the recipient;
[0023] S14. The receiver verifies the integrity of the original message;
[0024] S15. The jth sender publishes the random sequence selected in step S4 through a public channel;
[0025] S16. The receiver confirms the message-signature pair according to the published random sequence, thereby completing the quantum group signature based on quantum short key cryptography.
[0026] The quantum group signature method based on quantum short key cryptography also includes the following steps:
[0027] Open stage:
[0028] S17. If there is a dispute regarding the signature preparer, the recipient will sign to a third party; when there is a dispute, the third party has the ability to disclose the identity of the signature preparer.
[0029] In step S1, the j-th sender applies to the third party to join the group; then, the third party notifies the receiver to prepare for communication, which specifically includes the following steps:
[0030] The j-th sender Alice-j applies to the third party Charlie to join the group, where j∈{1,2,...,l}, l is the total number of users on the sender side, and l+1 is the size of the group; then, the third party Charlie notifies the receiver Bob to prepare for communication.
[0031] The third party and the j-th sender prepare a sending shared key in step S2, and the third party and the receiver prepare a receiving shared key, which specifically includes the following steps:
[0032] The third party Charlie prepares and sends a shared key with the jth sender Alice-j for The third party Charlie and the receiver Bob prepare and receive the shared key K cb for Where n is the key length;
[0033] The process of preparing and sending a shared key between a third party and the j-th sender, as well as the process of preparing and receiving a shared key between a third party and a receiver, are both implemented through the quantum key distribution system, thereby ensuring the security of key distribution.
[0034] The j-th sender in step S3 prepares a quantum bit sequence for carrying information to be signed, which specifically includes the following steps:
[0035] The j-th sender Alice-j prepares the quantum bit sequence |ψ> as |ψ>={|ψ1>,|ψ2>,...,|ψ i >,...,|ψ n >}; where |ψ i > is a single quantum bit, expressed as |ψ i >=α i |0>+β i |1>, α i and β i is a complex coefficient and satisfies |α i | 2 +|β i | 2 =1;
[0036] The identity information of the jth sender Alice-j is represented as a binary string ID j for in The identity of the j-th sender Alice-j is known only to herself and the third party Charlie.
[0037] The j-th sender in step S4 selects a random sequence and performs quantum one-time pad encryption on the quantum bit sequence obtained in step S3 based on the selected random sequence, which specifically includes the following steps:
[0038] The jth sender Alice-j chooses a random sequence r, and each element r in r i All satisfy r i ∈{0,1},r∈{0,1} 2n ={r1,r2,...,r i ,...,r 2n};
[0039] The quantum bit sequence |ψ> obtained in step S3 is encrypted once and for all based on the selected random sequence, and the encryption result |ψ′> is |ψ′>=E r (|ψ>)={|ψ′1>,|ψ′2>,...,|ψ′ i >,...,|ψ′ n >}, where E r() is a quantum one-time pad encryption process based on a random sequence r, and the i-th element |ψ′ in the encryption result |ψ′> i >Satisfaction is the controlled Pauli operator, r (2i-1) is the 2i-1th element in the random sequence r; the random number r 2i r (2i-1) and controlled Pauli operator And the corresponding relationship of the corresponding matrix is:
[0040] If r (2i-1) r 2i =00, then The corresponding matrix is expressed as
[0041] If r (2i-1) r 2i =01, then The corresponding matrix is expressed as
[0042] If r (2i-1) r 2i =10, then The corresponding matrix is expressed as
[0043] If r (2i-1) r 2i =11, then The corresponding matrix is expressed as
[0044] The j-th sender in step S5 uses a quantum short key cryptographic algorithm based on sending a shared key to encrypt the first copy of the encryption result obtained in step S4 to generate a quantum signature state, which specifically includes the following steps:
[0045] The jth sender Alice-j uses the shared key The quantum short key cryptographic algorithm is used to encrypt the first copy of the encryption result |ψ′> and generate the quantum signature state |S a > for in To adopt the method based on sending shared key The first controlled non-encryption operation in the quantum short-key cryptography algorithm, To adopt the method based on sending shared key The second coin operator encryption operation in the quantum short key cryptography algorithm, the two operations together constitute the sending of the shared key The encryption process of the quantum short key cryptography algorithm.
[0046] The j-th sender in step S6 encodes its own identity information into a quantum state and encrypts it using a quantum short key cryptographic algorithm based on sending a shared key, specifically including the following steps:
[0047] The j-th sender Alice-j calculates the basis B X Your own identity information ID j Encoded into quantum states | ID j >, where the basis B is calculated X For B X ={|+>,|->};|ID j >Description
[0048] Calculation Base B X Expressed as Where m i is the coefficient, taking the value of ±1; when the identity information bit is 0, it is encoded as a quantum state When the identity information bit is 1, it is encoded as a quantum state
[0049] Then the jth sender Alice-j sends the shared key Quantum short key cryptography algorithm for quantum state | ID j > Encrypt and get
[0050] The j-th sender in step S7 transmits the second copy of the encryption result obtained in step S4 by using quantum walk teleportation on a straight line containing two coins, which specifically includes the following steps:
[0051] Assume that the jth sender Alice-j has two single particles A j1 and A j2 , where A j2 The initial state is the second copy of the encrypted result |ψ′> i > = α′ i |0>+β′ i |1>,A j1 The initial state is |0>; the receiver Bob has a single particle B, the initial state is |0>;
[0052] The initial state of the quantum walk system |φ> is expressed as in is a tensor product operation; the following preprocessing process is performed to transform particle A j2 The quantum bit state |ψ′ on i >Transfer to particle B:
[0053] The first step of the quantum walk is expressed as: where W1 is the first-step walk operator, E1 is the conditional shift operator and where T is the shift operator, is the Hermitian conjugate of T and satisfies is the coin operator acting on A j2 , SU(2) is an arbitrary 2×2 unitary matrix and satisfies that the value of the determinant is 1, is the coin operator acting on A j1 is the identity operator acting on A, I B is the identity operator acting on B; the shift operator T is expressed as T = ∑ n |n + 1><n|, the shift operator is expressed as If is selected, then after the action of W1 in the first step of the quantum walk, the state |φ> of the quantum walk system becomes |φ>1 = α′ i |100> + β′ i |-110>;
[0054] The second step of the quantum walk is expressed as: where W2 is the second-step walk operator, C B ∈SU(2) is a coin operator acting on B; select C B = H, H is the Hadamard gate and has the form Then after the second step W2 of the quantum walk, |φ>1 evolves into |φ>2 = α′ i |200> + α′ i |001> + β′ i |010> + β′ i |-211>; at this time, the j-th sender Alice-j uses the basis to measure A j1 , where and records the measurement results -1, 0, and 1 corresponding to the measurement bases |0> and respectively. After that, Alice uses the computational basis B X to measure A j2 and marks the measurement results 1 and -1 corresponding to the measurement bases |+> and |->; at this time, if the measurement results on particles A j1 and A j2 are 0 and 1 respectively, then the state of B collapses to α′ i |1> + β′ i |0>;
[0055] Integrate the measurement bases of the j-th sender Alice-j on A j1 and A j2 into a set to obtain |M a > is the measurement basis set of Alice-j, Contains A j1 The measurement basis and A j2 The measurement base on .
[0056] The j-th sender in step S8 sends the information obtained in steps S4 to S7 and the third copy of the encryption result obtained in step S4 to the receiver through quantum secure direct communication technology, which specifically includes the following steps:
[0057] The j-th sender Alice-j sends the third copy of the quantum state |S> and the encryption result |ψ′> to the receiver Bob through quantum secure direct communication technology; where the quantum state |S> is represented by |S>=(|ψ′>,|S a >,|ID′ j >,|M a >).
[0058] The receiving party in step S9 uses a quantum short key cryptographic algorithm based on the received shared key to encrypt the received information and send it to a third party, which specifically includes the following steps:
[0059] After receiving the quantum state |S>, the receiver Bob uses the received shared key K cb The quantum short key cryptographic algorithm encrypts the third copy of |ψ′> and the quantum signature state |S a > and encrypted identity information |ID′ j >, and get the quantum state |Y b > for Then the quantum state |Y b >Sent to third party Charlie.
[0060] The third party in step S10 uses a decryption operation based on the received shared key to decrypt the received information, which specifically includes the following steps:
[0061] The third party Charlie uses the received shared key K cb The decryption operation of the received quantum state |Y b > is decrypted to obtain the third copy of |ψ′>, the quantum signature state |S a > and encrypted identity information |ID′ j >.
[0062] The third party described in step S11 continues to use the quantum short key decryption algorithm based on the sent shared key to decrypt the result of step S10 again, thereby obtaining the identity information of the jth sender, which specifically includes the following steps:
[0063] The third party Charlie uses the shared key The quantum short key decryption algorithm obtains |ID′ j >Decode and get in To adopt the method based on sending shared key The first coin operator decryption operation in the quantum short key cryptography algorithm, To adopt the method based on sending shared key The second controlled non-decryption operation in the quantum short key cryptography algorithm, the two operations together constitute the sending of the shared key The decryption process of quantum short key cryptographic algorithm;
[0064] At this time, the third party Charlie uses the computing base B X Measured |ID j >, thereby obtaining the identity information of the j-th sender Alice-j.
[0065] The third party in step S12 verifies the authenticity of the source of the circulating message and obtains a copy of the encryption result obtained in step S4, which specifically includes the following steps:
[0066] The third party Charlie checks the authenticity of the source of the message |ψ′> by using the element |S a >, send the shared key and a third copy of |ψ′>, the third party Charlie defines a binary parameter Used for the first round of verification; binary parameters for The quantum state |S a >Sourced from |Y b >The third copy, quantum state |S c > is derived from the third copy of |ψ′>;
[0067] To verify and The consistency of the sequence is verified by using the exchange test technology. and The verification process is expressed in the following formula:
[0068]
[0069] Where H is the Hadamard gate and |a> is the ground state of the two-dimensional Hilbert space and a∈{0,1}, I is the identity matrix, and CSWAP is the use of SWAP to convert the two-qubit state Convert to Controlled SWAP transformation; tracking the circuit execution, the quantum state |Θ> before measurement is obtained as
[0070] Using calculation base B z The first quantum bit of |Θ> was measured by theoretical calculation The probability of getting output 1 is when The probability is 0 when The probability is ε is and The inner product of .
[0071] The third party in step S13 prepares a new quantum state again according to the result of step S12 and sends it to the receiving party, which specifically includes the following steps:
[0072] Third Party Charlie from |S c > to obtain a third copy of |ψ′>, and then prepare a new quantum state |Y c > for And send it to the recipient Bob.
[0073] The receiving party in step S14 checks the integrity of the original message, which specifically includes the following steps:
[0074] The receiver Bob checks the integrity of the original message |ψ>: The receiver Bob checks the integrity of the original message |ψ> based on the accessible data stored in |M a >, and performs the corresponding local operation U on particle B. b , to produce the quantum state |ψ o ' ut >, and at the same time expect the quantum state |ψ o ' ut >With K cb From |Y c >The decrypted |ψ'> remains consistent;
[0075] The jth sender Alice-j in A j1 and A j2 The measurement basis on B, the state of B and the corresponding recovery operator U of Bob b The relationship between them is:
[0076] If particle A j1 and A j2 The measurement basis on Then the state of particle B is α i ′|0>+β i ′|1>, local operation U b is I;
[0077] If particle A j1 and A j2 The measurement basis on Then the state of particle B is α i ′|0>-β i ′|1>, local operation U b is z ;
[0078] If particle A j1 and A j2 The measurement basis on Then the state of particle B is -α i ′|0>+β i ′|1>, local operation U b -σ z ;
[0079] If particle A j1 and A j2 The measurement basis on Then the state of particle B is -α′ i |0>-β′ i |1>, local operation U b for -I;
[0080] If particle A j1 and A j2 The measurement basis on is |0>,|+>, then the state of particle B is β′ i |0>+α′ i |1>, local operation U b is x ;
[0081] If particle A j1 and A j2 The measurement basis on is |0>,|->, then the state of particle B is -β i ′|0>+α i ′|1>, local operation U b =-σ x σ z ;
[0082] Then, the receiver Bob defines another binary verification parameter for At the same time, if Then the receiver Bob sends a notification requesting the j-th sender Alice-j to publish the random number sequence r on the public channel.
[0083] The receiver in step S16 confirms the message-signature pair according to the published random sequence, thereby completing the quantum group signature based on quantum short key cryptography, which specifically includes the following steps:
[0084] Bob obtains the original message |ψ> based on the received r and confirms (|ψ>,|S a >,|ID′ j >) is the message-signature pair of the jth sender Alice-j, where (|S a >,|ID′ j >) is determined to be the signature of the j-th sender Alice-j.
[0085] The quantum group signature method based on quantum short key cryptography provided by the present invention utilizes a quantum one-time pad or quantum bit block encryption algorithm to encrypt an original quantum bit information sequence to generate a ciphertext quantum bit information sequence to ensure the confidentiality of the original information, and then applies a quantum short key cryptography algorithm to prepare a group signature quantum state to ensure the authenticity of the source of the original information and the non-repudiation of the group signer, while reducing the key bandwidth requirement; utilizes quantum walk stealth transmission based on two coins on a straight line to realize the remote transmission of any single quantum bit ciphertext state to facilitate signature validity verification, wherein the advance preparation of necessary entangled states and difficult joint measurements can be avoided; moreover, the use of random number sequences and public channels avoids the non-repudiation of the verifier's receipt and integrity of the signature; therefore, the method of the present invention has high reliability, good security and high efficiency. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0086] Figure 1 The figure is a schematic diagram of the method flow of the present invention.
[0087] Figure 2 Schematic diagram of the quantum one-time pad encryption process based on the random number sequence r in the method of the present invention.
[0088] Figure 3 Schematic diagram of quantum walking invisible transmission line based on two coins on a straight line in the method of the present invention.
[0089] Figure 4 Schematic diagram of a quantum circuit for verifying the continuity of any two single quantum bits based on the exchange test technology in the method of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0090] like Figure 1 The method flow diagram of the method of the present invention is shown as follows: The quantum group signature method based on quantum short key cryptography provided by the present invention comprises the following steps:
[0091] Initialization phase: This phase aims to establish a group and communication system, as well as prepare the keys necessary for the encryption and decryption process;
[0092] S1. The jth sender applies to a third party to join the group; then the third party notifies the receiver to prepare for communication; specifically, the steps include:
[0093] The jth sender Alice-j applies to the third party Charlie to join the group, where j∈{1,2,...,l}, l is the total number of users on the sender side, and l+1 is the size of the group; then, the third party Charlie notifies the receiver Bob to prepare for communication;
[0094] S2. The third party and the jth sender prepare a sending shared key, and the third party and the receiver prepare a receiving shared key; specifically, the steps include:
[0095] The third party Charlie prepares and sends a shared key with the jth sender Alice-j for The third party Charlie and the receiver Bob prepare and receive the shared key K cb for Where n is the key length;
[0096] The process of preparing and sending a shared key between the third party and the jth sender, as well as the process of preparing and receiving a shared key between the third party and the receiver, are all implemented through the quantum key distribution system, thereby ensuring the security of key distribution;
[0097] Signature phase: This phase aims to prepare a signature for the message to be transmitted using an appropriate signature algorithm, which is expected to ensure the authenticity and integrity of the message, the privacy of the jth sender Alice-j's identity from Bob, and the non-repudiation of the signed signature and information by the jth sender Alice-j. In particular, the jth sender Alice-j is authorized to sign the transmitted message on behalf of Charlie's group;
[0098] S3. The jth sender prepares a quantum bit sequence for carrying the information to be signed; specifically, the steps include:
[0099] The j-th sender Alice-j prepares the quantum bit sequence |ψ> as |ψ>={|ψ1>,|ψ2>,...,|ψ i >,...,|ψ n >}; where |ψ i > is a single quantum bit, expressed as |ψ i >=α i |0>+β i |1>, α i and β i is a complex coefficient and satisfies |α i | 2 +|βi | 2 =1;
[0100] The identity of the j-th sender Alice-j is represented by a binary string ID j for in The identity of the j-th sender Alice-j is known only to herself and the third party Charlie;
[0101] S4. The jth sender selects a random sequence and performs quantum one-time pad encryption on the quantum bit sequence obtained in step S3 based on the selected random sequence; specifically, the steps include:
[0102] The jth sender Alice-j chooses a random sequence r, and each element r in r i All satisfy r i ∈{0,1},r∈{0,1} 2n ={r1,r2,...,r i ,...,r 2n};
[0103] The quantum bit sequence |ψ> obtained in step S3 is encrypted once and for all based on the selected random sequence, and the encryption result |ψ′> is |ψ′>=E r (|ψ>)={|ψ′1>,|ψ′2>,...,|ψ′ i >,...,|ψ′ n >}, where E r () is a quantum one-time pad encryption process based on a random sequence r, and the i-th element |ψ′ in the encryption result |ψ′> i >Satisfaction is the controlled Pauli operator, r (2i-1) is the 2i-1th element in the random sequence r; the random number r 2i r (2i-1) and controlled Pauli operator And the corresponding relationship of the corresponding matrix is:
[0104] If r (2i-1) r 2i =00, then The corresponding matrix is expressed as
[0105] If r (2i-1) r 2i =01, then The corresponding matrix is expressed as
[0106] If r (2i-1) r 2i=10, then The corresponding matrix is expressed as
[0107] If r (2i-1) r 2i =11, then The corresponding matrix is expressed as
[0108] Figure 2 is a quantum one-time pad encryption process based on a random number sequence r;
[0109] S5. The jth sender uses a quantum short key cryptographic algorithm based on sending a shared key to encrypt the first copy of the encryption result obtained in step S4 to generate a quantum signature state; specifically, the steps include:
[0110] The jth sender Alice-j uses the shared key The quantum short key cryptographic algorithm is used to encrypt the first copy of the encryption result |ψ′> and generate the quantum signature state |S a > for in To adopt the method based on sending shared key The first controlled non-encryption operation in the quantum short-key cryptography algorithm, To adopt the method based on sending shared key The second coin operator encryption operation in the quantum short key cryptography algorithm, the two operations together constitute the sending of the shared key The encryption process of quantum short key cryptographic algorithm;
[0111] S6. The jth sender encodes its identity information into a quantum state and encrypts it using a quantum short key cryptographic algorithm based on sending a shared key; specifically, the steps include:
[0112] The j-th sender Alice-j calculates the basis B X Your own identity information ID j Encoded into quantum states | ID j >, where the basis B is calculated X For B X ={|+>,|->};|ID j >Description
[0113] Calculation Base B X Expressed as Where m i is the coefficient, taking the value of ±1. When the identity information bit is 0, it is encoded as a quantum state When the identity information bit is 1, it is encoded as a quantum state
[0114] In addition, there is also a computational basis B Z which is B Z = {|0>, |1>};
[0115] Then the j-th sender Alice-j encrypts the quantum state |ID > by using a quantum short key cryptography algorithm based on the transmitted shared key j to obtain
[0116] S7. The j-th sender uses quantum walk teleportation containing two coins on a straight line to transmit the second copy of the encrypted result obtained in step S4; as Figure 3 shown, it specifically includes the following steps:
[0117] It is assumed that the j-th sender Alice-j has two single particles A j1 and A j2 , where the initial state of A j2 is |ψ′ i > in the second copy of the encrypted result |ψ′>, that is, |ψ′ i > = α′ i |0> + β′ j1 |1>, and the initial state of A j2 is |0>; the receiver Bob has a single particle B with an initial state of |0>;
[0118] The initial state |φ> of the quantum walk system is expressed as where i is the tensor product operation; the following preprocessing process is performed to transfer the qubit state |ψ′ j2 > on the particle A
[0119] The first step of the quantum walk is expressed as: where W1 is the first-step walk operator, E1 is the conditional shift operator and where T is the displacement operator, is the Hermitian conjugate of T and satisfies is the coin operator acting on A j1 , SU(2) is an arbitrary 2×2 unitary matrix and satisfies the determinant value of 1, is the identity operator acting on A B , I n is the identity operator acting on B; the displacement operator T is expressed as T = ∑ i |n + 1><n|, and the displacement operator is expressed as If After the first step of quantum walk W1, the state of quantum walk system |φ> becomes |φ>1=α′ i |100>+β′ i |-110>;
[0120] The second step of the quantum walk is expressed as: Where W2 is the second-step walk operator, C B ∈SU(2) is a coin operator acting on B; choose C B =H, H is the Hadamard gate, its form is Then after the second step W2 of the quantum walk, |φ>1 evolves into |φ>2=α′ i |200>+α′|001>+β′ i |010>+β′ i |-211>; At this time, the j-th sender Alice-j uses the basis To measure A j1 ,in And record the measurement results - 1, 0 and 1 correspond to the measurement basis |0> and Afterwards, Alice uses the computation base B X Measurement A j2 And the measurement results 1 and -1 are marked corresponding to the measurement basis |+> and |->; at this time, if particle A j1 and A j2 The measurement results on are 0 and 1 respectively, then the state of B collapses to α i ′|1>+β i ′|0>;
[0121] Integrate the jth sender Alice-j in A j1 and A j2 The measurement basis on a set is obtained |M a > is the measurement basis set of Alice-j, Contains A j1 The measurement basis and A j2 The measurement base on
[0122] S8. The jth sender sends the information obtained in steps S4 to S7 and the third copy of the encryption result obtained in step S4 to the receiver through quantum secure direct communication technology; specifically comprising the following steps:
[0123] The j-th sender Alice-j sends the third copy of the quantum state |S> and the encryption result |ψ′> to the receiver Bob through quantum secure direct communication technology; where the quantum state |S> is represented by |S>=(|ψ′>,|Sa >,|ID′ j >,|M a >);
[0124] Verification phase: This phase aims to verify the validity of the completed signature and the integrity of the transmitted information by using a suitable verification algorithm; this process requires Charlie's active participation because Bob does not have access to Alice's key. ability;
[0125] S9. The receiver uses a quantum short key cryptographic algorithm based on the received shared key to encrypt the received information and send it to a third party; specifically, the steps include:
[0126] After receiving the quantum state |S>, the receiver Bob uses the received shared key K cb The quantum short key cryptographic algorithm encrypts the third copy of |ψ′> and the quantum signature state |S a > and |ID′ j >, and get the quantum state |Y b > for Then the quantum state |Y b >Sent to the third party Charlie; At the same time, this step does not send |M a >Sent to third party Charlie;
[0127] S10. The third party uses a decryption operation based on the received shared key to decrypt the received information; specifically, the steps include:
[0128] The third party Charlie uses the received shared key K cb The decryption operation of the received quantum state |Y b > is decrypted to obtain the third copy of |ψ′>, the quantum signature state |S a > and |ID′ j >
[0129] S11. The third party continues to use the quantum short key decryption algorithm based on the sent shared key to decrypt the result of step S10 again, thereby obtaining the identity information of the jth sender; specifically, the steps include:
[0130] The third party Charlie uses the shared key The quantum short key decryption algorithm obtains |ID′ j >Decode and get in To adopt the method based on sending shared key The first coin operator decryption operation in the quantum short key cryptography algorithm, To adopt the method based on sending shared key The second controlled non-decryption operation in the quantum short key cryptography algorithm, the two operations together constitute the sending of the shared key The decryption process of quantum short key cryptographic algorithm;
[0131] At this time, the third party Charlie uses the computing base B X Measured |ID j >, thereby obtaining the identity information of the j-th sender Alice-j;
[0132] S12. The third party verifies the authenticity of the source of the circulating message and obtains a copy of the encryption result obtained in step S4; specifically, the steps include:
[0133] The third party Charlie checks the authenticity of the source of the message |ψ′> by using the element |S a >, send the shared key and a third copy of |ψ′>, the third party Charlie defines a binary parameter Used for the first round of verification; binary parameters for The quantum state |S a >Sourced from |Y b >The third copy, quantum state |S c > is derived from the third copy of |ψ′>;
[0134] To verify and The consistency of the exchange test technology (such as Figure 4 As shown) to verify the sequence and The verification process is expressed in the following formula:
[0135]
[0136] Where H is the Hadamard gate and |a> is the ground state of the two-dimensional Hilbert space and a∈{0,1}, I is the identity matrix, and CSWAP is the use of SWAP to convert the two-qubit state Convert to Controlled SWAP transformation; tracking the circuit execution, the quantum state |Θ> before measurement is obtained as
[0137] Using calculation base B z The first quantum bit of |Θ> was measured by theoretical calculation The probability of getting output 1 is when The probability is 0 when The probability is ε is and The inner product of
[0138] S13. The third party prepares a new quantum state again according to the result of step S12 and sends it to the recipient; specifically, the steps include:
[0139] Third Party Charlie from |S c > to obtain a third copy of |ψ′>, and then prepare a new quantum state |Y c > for And send it to the receiver Bob;
[0140] S14. The receiver verifies the integrity of the original message; specifically, the steps include:
[0141] The receiver Bob checks the integrity of the original message |ψ>: The receiver Bob checks the integrity of the original message |ψ> according to the information stored in |M a > The jth sender Alice-j's measurement basis performs the corresponding local operation U on particle B b , to produce the quantum state |ψ′ out >, and the expected quantum state |ψ′ out >With K cb From |Y c >The decrypted |ψ'> remains consistent;
[0142] The jth sender Alice-j in A j1 and A j2 The measurement basis on B, the state of B and the corresponding recovery operator U of Bob b The relationship between them is:
[0143] If particle A j1 and A j2 The measurement basis on Then the state of particle B is α′ i |0>+β′ i |1>, local operation U b is I;
[0144] If particle A j1 and A j2 The measurement basis on Then the state of particle B is α′ i |0>-β′ i |1>, local operation U b is z ;
[0145] If particle A j1 and Aj2 The measurement basis on Then the state of particle B is -α′ i |0>+β′ i |1>, local operation U b =-σ z ;
[0146] If particle A j1 and A j2 The measurement basis on Then the state of particle B is -α′ i |0>-β′ i |1>, local operation U b for -I;
[0147] If particle A j1 and A j2 The measurement basis on is |0>,|+>, then the state of particle B is β′ i |0>+α′ i |1>, local operation U b is x ;
[0148] If particle A j1 and A j2 The measurement basis on is |0>,|->, then the state of particle B is -β′ i |0>+α′ i |1>, local operation U b =-σ x σ z ;
[0149] Then, the receiver Bob defines another binary verification parameter for At the same time, if Then the receiver Bob sends a notification requesting the jth sender Alice-j to publish the random number sequence r on the public channel;
[0150] S15. The jth sender publishes the random sequence selected in step S4 through a public channel;
[0151] S16. The receiver confirms the message-signature pair according to the published random sequence, thereby completing the quantum group signature based on quantum short key cryptography; specifically, the steps include:
[0152] Bob obtains the original message |ψ> based on the received r and confirms (|ψ>,|S a >,|ID′ j >) is the message-signature pair of the jth sender Alice-j, where (|S a >,|ID′ j>) is determined to be the signature of the jth sender Alice-j
[0153] S17. If there is a dispute about the signature preparer, the recipient will sign to a third party; when there is a dispute, the third party can disclose the identity of the signature preparer; in specific implementation, according to steps S4 and S5 in the verification phase, it can be seen that the third party Charlie obtains the identity of the signer; therefore, when a dispute occurs, Charlie can choose to "open" the identity of the signer.
Claims
1. A quantum group signature method based on quantum short key cryptography, comprising the following steps: Initialization phase: S1. The jth sender applies to a third party to join the group; then the third party notifies the receiver to prepare for communication; specifically, the steps include: The jth sender Alice-j applies to the third party Charlie to join the group, where j∈{1,2,...,l}, l is the total number of users on the sender side, and l+1 is the size of the group; then, the third party Charlie notifies the receiver Bob to prepare for communication; S2. The third party and the jth sender prepare a sending shared key, and the third party and the receiver prepare a receiving shared key; specifically, the steps include: The third party Charlie prepares and sends a shared key with the jth sender Alice-j for The third party Charlie and the receiver Bob prepare and receive the shared key K cb for in, n is the key length; The process of preparing and sending a shared key between the third party and the jth sender, as well as the process of preparing and receiving a shared key between the third party and the receiver, are all implemented through the quantum key distribution system, thereby ensuring the security of key distribution; Signature phase: S3. The jth sender prepares a quantum bit sequence for carrying the information to be signed; specifically, the steps include: The j-th sender Alice-j prepares the quantum bit sequence |ψ> as |ψ>={|ψ1>,|ψ2>,...,|ψ i >,...,|ψ n >}; where |ψ i > is a single quantum bit, expressed as |ψ i >=α i |0>+β i |1>, α i and β i is a complex coefficient and satisfies |α i | 2 +|β i | 2 =1; The identity of the j-th sender Alice-j is represented by a binary string ID j for in The identity of the j-th sender Alice-j is known only to herself and the third party Charlie; S4. The jth sender selects a random sequence and performs quantum one-time pad encryption on the quantum bit sequence obtained in step S3 based on the selected random sequence; specifically, the steps include: The jth sender Alice-j chooses a random sequence r, and each element r in r i All satisfy r i ∈{0,1},r∈{0,1} 2n ={r1,r2,…,r i ,…,r 2n }; The quantum bit sequence |ψ> obtained in step S3 is encrypted once and for all based on the selected random sequence, and the encryption result |ψ′> is |ψ′>=E r (|ψ>)={|ψ1′>,|ψ2′>,...,|ψ i ′>,...,|ψ n ′>}, where E r () is a quantum one-time pad encryption process based on a random sequence r, and the i-th element |ψ in the encryption result |ψ′> i ′>Satisfaction is the controlled Pauli operator, r (2i-1) is the 2i-1th element in the random sequence r; the random number r 2i r (2i-1) and controlled Pauli operator And the corresponding relationship of the corresponding matrix is: If r (2i-1) r 2i =00, then The corresponding matrix is expressed as If r (2i-1) r 2i =01, then The corresponding matrix is expressed as If r (2i-1) r 2i =10, then The corresponding matrix is expressed as If r (2i-1) r 2i =11, then The corresponding matrix is expressed as S5. The jth sender uses a quantum short key cryptographic algorithm based on sending a shared key to encrypt the first copy of the encryption result obtained in step S4 to generate a quantum signature state; specifically, the steps include: The jth sender Alice-j uses the shared key The quantum short key cryptographic algorithm is used to encrypt the first copy of the encryption result |ψ′> and generate the quantum signature state |S a > for in To adopt the method based on sending shared key The first controlled non-encryption operation in the quantum short-key cryptographic algorithm, To adopt the method based on sending shared key The second coin operator encryption operation in the quantum short key cryptography algorithm, the two operations together constitute the sending of the shared key The encryption process of quantum short key cryptographic algorithm; S6. The jth sender encodes its identity information into a quantum state and encrypts it using a quantum short key cryptographic algorithm based on sending a shared key; specifically, the steps include: The j-th sender Alice-j calculates the basis B X Your own identity information ID j Encoded into quantum states | ID j >, where the basis B is calculated X For B X ={|+>,|->};|ID j >Description Calculation Base B X Expressed as Where m i is the coefficient, taking the value of ±1; when the identity information bit is 0, it is encoded as a quantum state When the identity information bit is 1, it is encoded as a quantum state Then the jth sender Alice-j sends the shared key Quantum short key cryptography algorithm for quantum state | ID j > Encrypt and get S7. The jth sender transmits a second copy of the encrypted result obtained in step S4 by using quantum walk teleportation on a straight line containing two coins; S8. The jth sender sends the information obtained in steps S4 to S7 and the third copy of the encryption result obtained in step S4 to the receiver through quantum secure direct communication technology; Verification phase: S9. The receiver uses a quantum short key cryptographic algorithm based on the received shared key to encrypt the received information and send it to a third party; S10. The third party decrypts the received information using a decryption operation based on the received shared key; S11. The third party continues to use the quantum short key decryption algorithm based on the sent shared key to decrypt the result of step S10 again, thereby obtaining the identity information of the jth sender; S12. The third party verifies the authenticity of the source of the circulating message and obtains a copy of the encryption result obtained in step S4; S13. The third party prepares a new quantum state again based on the result of step S12 and sends it to the recipient; S14. The receiver verifies the integrity of the original message; S15. The jth sender publishes the random sequence selected in step S4 through a public channel; S16. The receiver confirms the message-signature pair according to the published random sequence, thereby completing the quantum group signature based on quantum short key cryptography.
2. The quantum group signature method based on quantum short key cryptography according to claim 1 is characterized in that The quantum group signature method based on quantum short key cryptography also includes the following steps: S17. If there is a dispute about the signature preparer, the recipient will sign to a third party; when there is a dispute, the third party can disclose the identity of the signature preparer.
3. The quantum group signature method based on quantum short key cryptography according to claim 1 is characterized in that The j-th sender in step S7 transmits the second copy of the encryption result obtained in step S4 by using quantum walk teleportation on a straight line containing two coins, which specifically includes the following steps: Assume that the jth sender Alice-j has two single particles A j1 and A j2 , where A j2 The initial state is the second copy of the encrypted result |ψ′> i ′>=α i ′|0>+β i ′|1>,A j1 The initial state is |0>; the receiver Bob has a single particle B, the initial state is |0>; The initial state of the quantum walk system |φ> is expressed as in is the tensor product operation; The following pre-processing process is performed to transform particle A j2 The quantum bit state |ψ i ′>Transfer to particle B: The first step of the quantum walk is expressed as: where \(W_1\) is the first-step walk operator, \(E_1\) is the conditional shift operator and where \(T\) is the displacement operator, the Hermitian conjugate of \(T\) satisfies acting on \(A\) j2 is the coin operator, \(SU(2)\) is any \(2\times2\) unitary matrix and satisfies the determinant value of 1, acting on \(A\) j1 is the identity operator, \(I\) B is the identity operator acting on \(B\); the displacement operator \(T\) is expressed as \(T = \sum\) n \(|n + 1\rangle\langle n|\), the displacement operator is expressed as If is selected, then after the action of \(W_1\) in the first step of the quantum walk, the state \(|\varphi\rangle\) of the quantum walk system becomes \(|\varphi\rangle_1=\alpha\) i '\(|100\rangle+\beta\) i '\(|-110\rangle\); The second step of the quantum walk is expressed as: Where W2 is the second-step walk operator, C B ∈SU(2) is a coin operator acting on B; choose C B =H, H is the Hadamard gate and is of the form Then after the second step W2 of the quantum walk, |φ>1 evolves into |φ>2=α i ′|200>+α′|001>+β i ′|010>+β i ′|-211>; At this time, the j-th sender Alice-j uses the basis To measure A j1 ,in And record the measurement results - 1, 0 and 1 correspond to the measurement basis |0> and Afterwards, Alice uses the computation base B X Measurement A j2 And the measurement results 1 and -1 are marked corresponding to the measurement basis |+> and |->; at this time, if particle A j1 and A j2 The measurement results on are 0 and 1 respectively, then the state of B collapses to α i ′|1>+β i ′|0>; Integrate the jth sender Alice-j in A j1 and A j2 The measurement basis on a set is obtained |M a > is the measurement basis set of Alice-j, Contains A j1 The measurement basis and A j2 The measurement base on .
4. The quantum group signature method based on quantum short key cryptography according to claim 3 is characterized in that The j-th sender in step S8 sends the information obtained in steps S4 to S7 and the third copy of the encryption result obtained in step S4 to the receiver through quantum secure direct communication technology, which specifically includes the following steps: The j-th sender Alice-j sends the third copy of the quantum state |S> and the encryption result |ψ′> to the receiver Bob through quantum secure direct communication technology; where the quantum state |S> is represented by |S>=(|ψ′>,|S a >,|ID′ j >,|M a >); The receiving party in step S9 uses a quantum short key cryptographic algorithm based on the received shared key to encrypt the received information and send it to a third party, which specifically includes the following steps: After receiving the quantum state |S>, the receiver Bob uses the received shared key K cb The quantum short key cryptographic algorithm encrypts the third copy of |ψ′> and the quantum signature state |S a > and encrypted identity information |ID′ j >, and get the quantum state |Y b > for Then the quantum state |Y b >Sent to third party Charlie; The third party in step S10 uses a decryption operation based on the received shared key to decrypt the received information, which specifically includes the following steps: The third party Charlie uses the received shared key K cb The decryption operation of the received quantum state |Y b > is decrypted to obtain the third copy of |ψ′>, the quantum signature state |S a > and encrypted identity information |ID′ j > The third party in step S11 continues to use the quantum short key decryption algorithm based on the sent shared key to decrypt the result of step S10 again, thereby obtaining the identity information of the jth sender, which specifically includes the following steps: The third party Charlie uses the shared key The quantum short key decryption algorithm obtains |ID′ j >Decode and get in To adopt the method based on sending shared key The first coin operator decryption operation in the quantum short key cryptography algorithm, To adopt the method based on sending shared key The second controlled non-decryption operation in the quantum short key cryptography algorithm, the two operations together constitute the sending of the shared key The decryption process of quantum short key cryptographic algorithm; At this time, the third party Charlie uses the computing base B X Measured |ID j >, thereby obtaining the identity information of the j-th sender Alice-j.
5. The quantum group signature method based on quantum short key cryptography according to claim 4 is characterized in that The third party in step S12 verifies the authenticity of the source of the circulating message and obtains a copy of the encryption result obtained in step S4, which specifically includes the following steps: The third party Charlie checks the source authenticity of the message |ψ′> by using the element |S a >, send the shared key and a third copy of |ψ′>, the third party Charlie defines a binary parameter Used for the first round of verification; binary parameters for The quantum state |S a >Sourced from |Y b >The third copy, quantum state |S c > is derived from the third copy of |ψ′>; To verify and The consistency of the sequence is verified by using the exchange test technology. and The verification process is expressed in the following formula: Where H is the Hadamard gate and |a> is the ground state of the two-dimensional Hilbert space and a∈{0,1}, I is the identity matrix, and CSWAP is the use of SWAP to convert the two-qubit state Convert to Controlled SWAP transformation; tracking the circuit execution, the quantum state |Θ> before measurement is obtained as Using calculation base B z The first quantum bit of |Θ> was measured by theoretical calculation The probability of getting output 1 is when The probability is 0 when The probability is ε is and The inner product of .
6. The quantum group signature method based on quantum short key cryptography according to claim 5 is characterized in that The third party in step S13 prepares a new quantum state again according to the result of step S12 and sends it to the receiving party, which specifically includes the following steps: Third Party Charlie from |S c > to obtain a third copy of |ψ′>, and then prepare a new quantum state |Y c > for And send it to the receiver Bob; The receiving party in step S14 checks the integrity of the original message, which specifically includes the following steps: The receiver Bob checks the integrity of the original message ψ>: The receiver Bob checks the integrity of the original message ψ> based on the information stored in |M a >, and performs the corresponding local operation U on particle B. b , to produce the quantum state |ψ′ out >, and the expected quantum state |ψ′ out >With K cb From |Y c >The decrypted |ψ'> remains consistent; The jth sender Alice-j in A j1 and A j2 The measurement basis on B, the state of B and the corresponding recovery operator U of Bob b The relationship between them is: If particle A j1 and A j2 The measurement basis on |+>, then the state of particle B is α i ′|0>+β i ′|1>, local operation U b is I; If particle A j1 and A j2 The measurement basis on |->, then the state of particle B is α i ′|0>-β i ′|1>, local operation U b is z ; If particle A j1 and A j2 The measurement basis on |+>, then the state of particle B is -α i ′|0>+β i ′|1>, local operation U b =-σ z ; If particle A j1 and A j2 The measurement basis on |->, then the state of particle B is -α i ′|0>-β i ′|1>, local operation U b for -I; If particle A j1 and A j2 The measurement basis on is |0>,|+>, then the state of particle B is β i ′|0>+α i ′|1>, local operation U b is x ; If particle A j1 and A j2 The measurement basis on is |0>,|->, then the state of particle B is -β i ′|0>+α i ′|1>, local operation U b =-σ x σ z ; Then, the receiver Bob defines another binary verification parameter for At the same time, if Then the receiver Bob sends a notification requesting the jth sender Alice-j to publish the random number sequence r on the public channel; The receiver in step S16 confirms the message-signature pair according to the published random sequence, thereby completing the quantum group signature based on quantum short key cryptography, which specifically includes the following steps: Bob obtains the original message |ψ> based on the received r and confirms (|ψ>,|S a >,|ID′ j >) is the message-signature pair of the jth sender Alice-j, where (|S a >,|ID′ j >) is determined to be the signature of the j-th sender Alice-j.
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