A certificateless access authentication method for industrial edge devices based on Chebyshev polynomials
Through the distributed collaborative authentication method of Chebyshev polynomial, the problem of insufficient real-time authentication performance of industrial equipment is solved, certificate-free access authentication is realized, the efficiency and security of authentication are improved, and certificate exchange and resource consumption are avoided.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202211049292.9
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2022-08-30
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-12
- Estimated Expiration
- 2042-08-30
AI Technical Summary
In the existing trusted access method for industrial equipment, the centralized authentication method based on certificate exchange cannot meet the real-time authentication performance requirements of massive industrial equipment, and there are problems such as high delay, large resource consumption and high certification pressure.
The distributed collaborative authentication method based on Chebyshev polynomial is adopted to achieve mutual authentication between the two parties under the conditions of no certificates through cloud-edge and edge-edge collaborative authentication, avoid certificate exchange, save resource consumption and shorten authentication time.
It improves the security of the two-party conversations, reduces resource consumption and authentication delays of edge nodes, makes authentication more efficient and faster, and reduces the risk of session key leakage.
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Figure CN115459975B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of network information security, and in particular relates to a certificate-free access authentication method for industrial edge devices. Background Art
[0002] As the global industry develops towards digitalization, networking, and intelligence, the network system, as the "nerve center" of the intelligent manufacturing infrastructure, will generate greater security risks when illegal industrial terminal devices are connected to the system, such as device data information leakage, illegal session hijacking, running malicious code, and even irreversible major disasters. For this reason, it is extremely important to study the trusted access of industrial terminal devices and ensure the legitimacy of the identity of the accessed industrial devices. The main problem faced by the current mainstream industrial equipment trusted access method is that the centralized authentication method based on certificate exchange cannot meet the performance requirements of real-time authentication of massive industrial equipment, and there are technical problems such as high latency and poor real-time performance.
[0003] As a link between the upper and lower devices, the edge authentication node must obtain the trust and authentication authorization of the cloud authentication center on the one hand, and provide access authentication services for industrial equipment terminals on the other hand. However, traditional server-to-server authentication is mostly based on certificate exchange, which cannot meet the technical requirements of access authentication in the industrial intelligent manufacturing system, such as real-time and high efficiency. Not only does the exchange of certificates between the two authentication parties bring huge resource consumption problems, but the centralized authentication method in the cloud also brings certain authentication pressure to the cloud authentication center, as well as the high authentication delay generated by industrial equipment access authentication. Summary of the invention
[0004] In order to overcome the shortcomings of the prior art, the present invention provides a certificate-free access authentication method for industrial edge devices based on Chebyshev polynomials. Through a distributed collaborative authentication method, cloud-edge and edge-edge collaborative trusted access authentication in the industrial equipment authentication system is realized. Cloud-edge authentication stage: using the semigroup characteristics based on Chebyshev polynomials, mutual authentication between the two communicating parties is realized without a certificate under the cooperation of a third-party trusted device KDC, which greatly improves the security of the conversation between the two communicating parties; Edge-edge authentication stage: mainly through a tree-like hierarchical authentication chain to achieve interconnection and mutual trust between edge devices, edge devices are interconnected in pairs, and the same authentication method of the cloud-edge stage is adopted. The present invention technically avoids the exchange of certificates during the authentication process of the two communicating parties, saves the resource consumption of edge nodes and shortens the time of access authentication, making authentication more convenient, efficient and fast.
[0005] The technical solution adopted by the present invention to solve the technical problem includes the following steps:
[0006] Step 1: Build cloud-edge collaborative authentication and edge-edge collaborative authentication environments;
[0007] The cloud-edge collaborative authentication, that is, the edge nodes located in different security domains must first obtain authentication authorization from the server of the cloud authentication center before they can provide access authentication services for terminal industrial equipment;
[0008] The edge-to-edge collaborative authentication is built based on numerous edge nodes, and the trusted interconnection between edge authentication servers in different security domains is achieved through two-way authentication between different edge nodes;
[0009] Industrial equipment only needs to send access authentication information to edge devices, and complete cross-domain access authentication through authentication hosting between edge nodes in different security domains. For the access authentication stage of edge nodes and cloud authentication centers, a cloud-edge and edge-edge distributed authentication mode is adopted.
[0010] The meanings of the symbols used are shown in Table 1;
[0011] Table 1 Symbol meaning comparison table
[0012]
[0013] Step 2: Bidirectional access authentication for cloud-edge collaboration;
[0014] In the bidirectional access authentication process of cloud-edge collaboration, the default KDC is a third-party trusted device. The third-party KDC has independent shared keys with the edge node E and the cloud server S respectively. The shared key between the edge node E and the third-party KDC is denoted as K EK , the shared key between server S and the third-party KDC is denoted as K SK ,The industrial equipment cloud-edge access authentication method is described as follows:
[0015] Step 2-1: The edge node E sends the device ID number and the ID number of the server S to be logged in to the server S:
[0016] E→S:{|ID E ||ID S |} (1)
[0017] Where:
[0018] ID S ——ID number of cloud server S;
[0019] Step 2-2: After S receives E's data, the system randomly generates large numbers x and r, as well as large prime numbers p and q, and then calculates N = T r (x)(mod p), M = p·q, and use the shared key K between S and KDC SK Encryption {|p,T S |}, with ID S, x, M and N are encapsulated and sent to the edge node E:
[0020] S→E:{|ID S ||x||M||N||{|p,T S |}K SK |} (2)
[0021] Where:
[0022] T r (x)(mod p)——the value of the rth term of the Chebyshev polynomial with x and p as parameters;
[0023] T S ——Clock authentication information generated by server S;
[0024] Step 2-3: After receiving the information, E will S |}K SK Sent to KDC, and the system randomly generates a large number h, and calculates L = T according to h and the received M value according to the relevant formula h (x)(mod M), according to the semigroup characteristics of Chebyshev polynomials, we get W = T h (N)(mod M)=T h (Tr(x)(mod p)(mod M):
[0025] E→KDC:{|{|p,T S |}K SK ||ID S |} (3)
[0026] Where:
[0027] L——the value of the hth term of the Chebyshev polynomial with x and M as parameters;
[0028] W——the value of the hth term of the Chebyshev polynomial with N and M as parameters;
[0029] Step 2-4: KDC first receives a message from E (p, T S )K SK , using the shared key with the server S to decrypt the encapsulated information received in the decryption phase, and then using the shared key K with the edge node E EK The encrypted information is sent to E, including the ID number of the server S and the received data information:
[0030] KDC→E:{|p,T S ,ID S |}K EK (4)
[0031] Step 2-5: Edge node E uses the private key to decrypt the received information to obtain the p value and the W value calculated in step 2-3, and calculates the shared key K between edge node E and server S. SE Then use the shared key K SE Encrypted communication clock T S Finally, encapsulate the L and edge node E ID numbers calculated in steps 2-3 and send them to S:
[0032] E→S:{|L||ID E ||{|T S |}K SE |} (5)
[0033] Step 2-6: The cloud server S calculates the results M and T based on p·q. h The result of (x)(mod M) is L, and L' = T is estimated h (x)(mod p), and then calculate the shared key between S and edge node E based on L', denoted as K' SE ; S uses K′ SE Decryption If T S =T' S , S can verify E's identity; S then uses K′ SE The encrypted L is sent to E; if it is incorrect, the authentication ends;
[0034] S→E:{|L'|}K′ SE (6) Where:
[0035] L'——the value of the hth term of the Chebyshev polynomial with x and p as parameters;
[0036] K′ SE ——The shared key between S and E calculated by using the information received from E;
[0037] Step 2-7: Edge node E receives encapsulated data K′ SE (L) and then share the key K SE Decryption results in L. If L = L', it means that the communication parties have successfully authenticated each other. At the same time, the edge node E and the cloud authentication center S have also established a session key K SE ; If L is not equal to L', it means that the two parties have not passed mutual authentication;
[0038] Step 2-8: Complete the two-way authentication between the edge node and the cloud;
[0039] Step 3: Bidirectional access authentication for edge-to-edge collaboration;
[0040] The bidirectional access authentication of edge-to-edge collaboration is divided into two cases: one is mutual authentication within the edge device domain; the other is mutual authentication between edge devices; define ID G1 and ID G2 It is a central node server belonging to two different security domains PKG1 and PKG2, ID E1 ~ID En are n different edge nodes;
[0041] When the edge node ID in a security domain Ei To the edge node ID in another security domain Ej When sending a mutual authentication request, the specific steps are as follows:
[0042] Step 3-1: Edge Node ID Ei First, according to the edge node ID Ej The identification number determines whether the two parties are in the same security domain; if the two parties belong to different security domains, the edge node ID Ei Send its request information to the central node server ID of this security domain G2 , and request ID G2 With ID Ej The server ID of the central node of the security domain G1 Perform collaborative authentication; i, j∈[1,n];
[0043] If both parties belong to the same security domain, then ID Ei Send the ID of the central node server in this security domain to G1 Request ID verification Ej The identity and obtain the central node server ID G1 and ID Ej The session key encrypted with the proof ID Ei Information about your true identity;
[0044] Step 3-2: Central Node Server ID G1 Receive the ID from the edge device in the domain Ei The request information first verifies the authenticity of its identity, and then Ei The information provided is located at the ID Ej Belongs to security domain PKG1, through the central node server ID G1 and the central node server ID G1 The session key K G1-G2 After encryption, the request information is sent to the central node ID G1 ;
[0045] Step 3-3: Central Node Server ID G1 Receive edge device ID EiThe request information first verifies the authenticity of its identity, and then searches for the edge node ID according to the tree-shaped authentication chain within the domain. Ej , and then send the request information and pass the central node server ID G1 and edge node ID Ej The session key K G1-Ej Encryption is performed;
[0046] Step 3-4: Edge Node ID Ej After receiving the request information, decrypt the information and get the edge device ID Ei The mutual authentication request is then Ei The identification number is signed with the private key and returned to the central node server ID G1 ;
[0047] Step 3-5: Central Node Server ID G1 Received from edge node ID Ej Return information; if the authentication initiator is an out-of-domain device, the information is returned to the out-of-domain central node server ID G2 , proceed to steps 3-6;
[0048] If the authentication initiator belongs to the device ID in the domain Ek , then the edge node ID Ej The returned information is passed through the session key K G1-Ek Encrypt and send to ID Ek , including through ID Ej The identification number of the authentication initiator signed by the private key, and go to step 3-7; k∈[1,n];
[0049] Step 3-6: Central Node Server ID G2 Received from the central node server ID G1 Information, including verification of ID Ei Information on the correctness of your identity and the ID Ej The authentication initiator's identification number is signed with the private key, and then the information is transmitted through the session key K G2-Ei Encrypt and send to ID Ei ;
[0050] Step 3-7: Authentication initiator ID Ei or ID Ek After receiving the return information, confirm the ID Ej The authenticity of the identity is verified by the ID Ej The private key signature is then sent to the ID Ej Initiate a mutual authentication request;
[0051] Step 3-8: ID Ej Receive the device ID from the edgeEi or ID Ek The access authentication request information includes the information signed by its own private key. After the decrypted information is consistent with the authentication party requesting access, the access request is passed and the authentication success information is returned.
[0052] Step 3-8: Bidirectional authentication between edge nodes is completed.
[0053] Furthermore, the shared key K in step 2-5 SE The calculation is as follows:
[0054] By K SE =W(mod,p) according to T n (x)(mod P)=T n (x(mod(P))(mod P) gives: K SE =(T h (N)(modM))(mod p);
[0055] According to T n (T m (x))(mod P)=T n-m (x)(mod P)=T m (T n (x))(mod P) gives: K SE =(T h (T r (x))(mod p)(mod M)(mod P)=T h (T r (x)(mod p))(mod p)=T h (T r (x))(mod p).
[0056] Furthermore, in step 2-6, L' and the shared key K' SE The value of is calculated as follows:
[0057] According to the formula Tn(x)(mod P) = T n (x(mod(P))(mod P) and formula T n (T m (x))(mod P)=T n-m (x)(mod P)=T m (T n (x))(mod P) calculates L' and shared key K' SE Value: The value of the hth term of the Chebyshev polynomial with x and p as parameters L'=L(mod p)=(T h (x)(mod M))(mod p)=Th (x)(mod p); S calculates the shared key K′ with E using the information received from E SE =T r (L')(mod p)=T r (T h (x)(mod p))(mod p)=T r (T h (x))(mod p).
[0058] The beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows:
[0059] (1) The present invention proposes a certificate-free access authentication method for industrial edge devices based on Chebyshev polynomials, which technically avoids the exchange of certificates during the authentication process of the communicating parties, saves resource consumption of edge nodes and shortens the time of access authentication, making authentication more convenient, efficient and fast.
[0060] (2) In an industrial system, the edge node access authentication method and the mutual authentication mechanism between edge nodes proposed in the present invention are more efficient and faster, greatly reducing the resource consumption and inefficiency problems caused by multiple mutual authentications between edge nodes.
[0061] (3) The present invention introduces a third-party KDC trusted device. Unlike other access authentication methods, this method does not use traditional random number technology, but instead uses a technology in which a clock is generated only by the cloud authentication server, thereby avoiding the problem of authentication failure that is easily caused by the asynchrony of multiple clocks and avoiding network replay attacks.
[0062] (4) The authentication method used in the present invention utilizes the Chebyshev semigroup characteristics based on finite fields. Compared with the traditional authentication method, it needs to generate a series of large numbers for data encryption processing, and the generated and transmitted data are all large prime numbers. Once the attacker obtains the transmitted data, it is easy to crack the required information based on the period number of the polynomial. Although this method also generates large prime numbers, what is transmitted is the result of the product of two large prime numbers, so the data is more secure. In the intermediate authentication process, the method of the present invention only needs to perform corresponding encryption operations on the clock and the prime number product result, and other data can be directly transmitted in plain text, which greatly reduces the amount of calculation of communication interaction.
[0063] (5) The generation of the session key between the edge node and the cloud authentication center of the present invention is based on the semigroup property of Chebyshev polynomials. The traditional authentication system based on a trusted third party will distribute session keys to both communicating parties, so there is a huge risk of key leakage. However, during the authentication process of the present invention, the session keys of the communicating parties are generated through negotiation based on the semigroup property of Chebyshev polynomials, and do not involve a third-party KDC. Therefore, the security problem of the session between the edge node and the cloud authentication server caused by the leakage of the session keys of the communicating parties is avoided. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0064] Figure 1 This is the cloud-edge access scene graph of the method of the present invention.
[0065] Figure 2 This is a flow chart of bidirectional access authentication for cloud-edge collaboration according to the method of the present invention.
[0066] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of bidirectional access authentication in an edge-to-edge system according to the method of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0067] The present invention is further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments.
[0068] The purpose of the present invention is to solve the access authentication problem between the cloud authentication center and the edge authentication node, and between the edge authentication nodes in the industrial intelligent manufacturing system. The present invention proposes a certificateless access authentication method for industrial edge devices based on Chebyshev polynomials, and realizes cloud-edge and edge-edge collaborative trusted access authentication in the industrial equipment authentication system through a distributed collaborative authentication method.
[0069] Cloud-edge authentication stage: the semigroup characteristics based on Chebyshev polynomials are adopted to realize mutual authentication between the communicating parties under certificate-less conditions with the cooperation of a third-party trusted device KDC. At the same time, in the authentication method of the present invention, the communicating parties negotiate the session key by themselves, thereby avoiding the risk of leakage of device private keys by the traditional key distribution center, greatly improving the security of the conversation between the communicating parties; Edge-edge authentication stage: the interconnection and mutual trust between edge devices are mainly realized through a tree-like hierarchical authentication chain, and the edge devices are interconnected in pairs, using the same authentication method as the cloud-edge stage.
[0070] In the intelligent manufacturing system, both the cloud-edge and edge-edge authentication processes are two-way authentication between two physical devices, so the authentication methods of both parties in the two stages are the same, and the cloud-edge collaborative authentication method proposed in the present invention is also applicable to edge-edge collaborative authentication. Cloud-edge collaborative authentication, that is, edge devices located in different security domains must first obtain authentication authorization from the server of the cloud authentication center before they can provide access authentication services for terminal industrial equipment. Edge-edge collaborative authentication is an interconnected collaborative authentication system built based on numerous edge nodes. Through two-way authentication between edge nodes, trusted interconnection between edge authentication servers in different security domains is achieved; industrial equipment only needs to send access authentication information to the edge device, and complete cross-domain access authentication through authentication hosting between edge devices in different security domains.
[0071] In the intelligent manufacturing system, the premise for industrial equipment to achieve access authentication is that the edge device has obtained identity verification and authentication authorization from the cloud authentication center. For the access authentication stage of edge nodes and cloud authentication centers, a cloud-edge and edge-edge distributed authentication mode is adopted. Figure 1 shown.
[0072] exist Figure 1 In the process, the cloud and edge devices and edge devices directly perform two-way identity authentication. As the source of authentication and authorization, the cloud authentication server is mainly responsible for authenticating edge devices in the domain. The cloud decouples some authentication functions and authorizes them to legitimate edge devices. Edge devices can also authenticate nearby edge devices. Identity authentication between edge devices can be traced back through the hierarchical tree authentication chain to find the same parent node, so as to prove the credibility of the other party's identity.
[0073] The meanings of the relevant symbols used in the authentication method of the present invention are shown in Table 1.
[0074] Phase 1: Bidirectional access authentication for cloud-edge collaboration
[0075] like Figure 2 As shown in Figure 1, in the bidirectional access authentication process of cloud-edge collaboration, the default KDC is a third-party trusted device, which has independent shared keys with the edge node E and the cloud server S. In the following authentication process, the shared key between the edge node E and the third-party KDC is denoted as K EK , the shared key between server S and the third-party KDC is denoted as K SK ,The industrial equipment cloud-edge access authentication method is described as follows.
[0076] 1. Edge device E sends the device ID number and the ID number of the server S it wants to log in to to server S.
[0077] E→S:{|ID E ||ID S|}
[0078] Where:
[0079] E——edge node;
[0080] S——Cloud authentication server;
[0081] ID E ——ID number of edge node E;
[0082] ID S ——ID number of cloud server S.
[0083] 2. After S receives E's data, the system randomly generates large numbers x and r, as well as large prime numbers p and q, and then calculates N = T r (x)(mod p), M = p·q, and use the shared key K between S and KDC SK Encryption {|p,T S |}, with ID S , x, M and N are encapsulated and sent to the edge node E.
[0084] S→E:{|ID S ||x||M||N||{|p,T S |}K SK |}
[0085] Where:
[0086] T r (x)(mod p)——the value of the rth term of the Chebyshev polynomial with x and p as parameters;
[0087] T S ——Clock authentication information generated by server S;
[0088] K SK ——Shared key between server S and KDC.
[0089] 3. After receiving it, E will S |}K SK Sent to KDC, and the system randomly generates a large number h, and calculates L = T according to h and the received M value according to the relevant formula h (x)(mod M), according to the semigroup characteristics of Chebyshev polynomials, we can get W = T h (N)(mod M)=T h (Tr(x)(mod p)(mod M).
[0090] E→KDC:{|{|p,T S |}K SK ||ID S |}
[0091] Where:
[0092] L——the value of the hth term of the Chebyshev polynomial with x and M as parameters;
[0093] W is the value of the hth term of the Chebyshev polynomial with N and M as parameters.
[0094] 4. KDC first receives a message from E (p, T S )K SK , using the shared key with the server S to decrypt the encapsulated information received in the decryption phase, and then using the shared key K with the edge node E EK The encrypted information is sent to E, which includes the ID number of server S and the received data information.
[0095] KDC→E:{|p,T S ,ID S |}K EK
[0096] Where:
[0097] K EK ——The shared key between E and KDC.
[0098] 5. The edge node E uses the private key to decrypt the received information to obtain the p value and the W value calculated in step 3, and calculates the shared key K between it and the server S according to the relevant formula. SE Then use the shared key to encrypt the communication clock T S Finally, encapsulate the L and edge node E ID numbers calculated in step 3 and send them to S.
[0099] E→S:{|L||ID E ||{|T S |}K SE |}
[0100] 6. S according to the result of p·q M and T h The result of (x)(mod M) is L, and L' = T is estimated h (x)(mod p), and then calculate the shared key with the edge node E based on L', denoted as K' SE . S uses K′ SE Decryption If T S =T' S , S can verify E’s identity. S then uses K′ SE The encrypted L is sent to E. If it is incorrect, the authentication ends.
[0101] S→E:{|L'|}K′ SE
[0102] Where:
[0103] L'——the value of the hth term of the Chebyshev polynomial with x and p as parameters;
[0104] K′ SE ——The shared key between S and E calculated using the information received from E.
[0105] 7. Edge node E receives encapsulated data K′ SE (L) and then share the key K SE Decrypted to get L, if L = L', it means that the communication parties have successfully authenticated. At the same time, the edge node E and the cloud authentication center S also established a session key K SE If L is not equal to L', it means that the two parties have not passed mutual authentication.
[0106] In summary, the two-way authentication between the edge node and the cloud is completed. During the entire authentication process, according to the semigroup characteristics of the finite field Chebyshev polynomial, K can be calculated. SE , L' and shared key K' SE The value of .
[0107] K, the shared key in step 5 SE The calculation is as follows: K SE =W(mod,p) according to T n (x)(mod P)=T n (x(mod(P))(mod P) gives: K SE =(T h (N)(mod M))(mod p); according to T n (T m (x))(mod P)=T n-m (x)(mod P)=T m (T n (x))(mod P) gives: K SE =(T h (T r (x))(mod p)(mod M)(mod P)=T h (T r (x)(mod p))(mod p)=T h (T r (x))(mod p).
[0108] In step 6, according to formula T n (x)(mod P)=T n (x(mod(P))(mod P) and formula T n(T m (x))(mod P)=T n-m (x)(mod P)=T m (T n (x))(mod P) can calculate L' and shared key K' SE Value: The value of the hth term of the Chebyshev polynomial with x and p as parameters L'=L(mod p)=(T h (x)(mod M))(mod p)=T h (x)(mod p); S calculates the shared key K′ with E using the information received from E SE =T r (L')(mod p)=T r (T h (x)(modp))(mod p)=T r (T h (x))(mod p).
[0109] Phase 2: Bidirectional access authentication for edge-to-edge collaboration
[0110] The present invention still uses the access authentication method based on the cloud-edge authentication stage for the tree-structured hierarchical authentication of edge nodes. However, for the situation where two edge nodes that are not parent-child nodes in the tree-structured authentication model need to authenticate each other, a mutual authentication mechanism between edge nodes is proposed. This mechanism avoids repeated authentication caused by industrial equipment in the process of cross-domain access to edge nodes, so that the edge devices in the tree-structured authentication chain form a complete interconnected and trustworthy system, and realizes indirect mutual authentication between nodes through traceability, which greatly saves authentication resource overhead and improves authentication efficiency. The edge-to-edge authentication stage is mainly divided into two situations: one is mutual authentication within the edge device domain; the other is mutual authentication between edge device domains. The schematic diagram of mutual authentication between edge nodes is shown in the figure. Figure 3 As shown, ID G1 and ID G2 The central node of the security domain, ID E1 ~ID E6 It is an edge node device.
[0111] exist Figure 3 In the example, first the edge node ID E6 Prepare to send edge node ID E3 Send a mutual authentication request. The specific steps are as follows:
[0112] 1. Edge node ID E6 First, according to the edge node ID E3The identification number determines whether the two parties are in the same security domain. If the two parties belong to different domains, the request information is sent to the central node server ID of this domain. G2 , and request ID G2 and ID E3 The security domain center node ID G1 Conduct collaborative authentication.
[0113] If both parties belong to the same domain, such as the communicating node with ID E2 and ID E3 , then send the ID of the central node server in this domain to G1 Request ID verification E3 The identity and ID of the domain center node E3 The session key encrypted with the proof ID E6 If your identity is genuine, skip to step 3.
[0114] 2. Central node ID G1 Receive the ID from the edge device in the domain E6 The request information first verifies the authenticity of its identity, and then E6 The information provided is located at the ID E3 Belongs to the security domain ID G1 , through it and the central node ID G1 The session key K G1-G2 After encryption, the request information is sent to the central node ID G1 .
[0115] 3. Central node ID G1 Receive edge device ID E6 The request information first verifies the authenticity of its identity, and then searches for the edge node ID according to the tree-shaped authentication chain within the domain. E3 , and then send the request information and pass it and the edge node ID E3 The session key K G1-E3 Encryption is performed.
[0116] 4. Edge Node ID E3 After receiving the request information, decrypt the information and get the edge device ID E6 The mutual authentication request is then E6 The identification number is signed with the private key and returned to the central node ID G1 .
[0117] 5. Central node ID G1 Received from edge node ID E3 Return information. If the authentication initiator is an out-of-domain device, the information is returned to the out-of-domain central node ID G2 , proceed to the next step;
[0118] If the authentication initiator is a device within the domain, such as ID E2 , then pass it through the session key K G1-E2 Encrypt and send to ID E2 , which mainly includes ID E3 The identification number of the authentication initiator signed with the private key and go to step 7.
[0119] 6. Central Node ID G2 Received from the central node ID G1 Information, including verification of ID E6 Information on the correctness of your identity and the ID E3 The initiator's identification number is signed with the private key, and then the information is transmitted through the session key K G2-E6 Encrypt and send to ID E6 .
[0120] 7. Authentication initiator ID E6 / ID E2 After receiving the return information, confirm the ID Ej The authenticity of the identity is verified by the ID E3 The private key signature is then sent to the ID E3 Initiate a mutual authentication request.
[0121] 8. ID E3 Receive the device ID from the edge E6 / ID E2 The access authentication request information includes the information signed by its own private key. After the decrypted information is consistent with the authentication party requesting access, the access request is passed and the authentication success information is returned.
[0122] In summary, two-way authentication between edge nodes is completed.
Claims
1. A certificateless access authentication method for industrial edge devices based on Chebyshev polynomials, characterized in that: The steps include: Step 1: Build cloud-edge collaborative authentication and edge-edge collaborative authentication environments; The cloud-edge collaborative authentication, that is, the edge nodes located in different security domains must first obtain authentication authorization from the server of the cloud authentication center before they can provide access authentication services for terminal industrial equipment; The edge-to-edge collaborative authentication is built based on numerous edge nodes, and the trusted interconnection between edge authentication servers in different security domains is achieved through two-way authentication between different edge nodes; Industrial equipment only needs to send access authentication information to edge devices, and complete cross-domain access authentication through authentication hosting between edge nodes in different security domains. For the access authentication stage of edge nodes and cloud authentication centers, a cloud-edge and edge-edge distributed authentication mode is adopted. The meanings of the symbols used are shown in Table 1; Table 1 Symbol meaning comparison table Step 2: Bidirectional access authentication for cloud-edge collaboration; In the bidirectional access authentication process of cloud-edge collaboration, the default KDC is a third-party trusted device. The third-party KDC has independent shared keys with the edge node E and the cloud server S respectively. The shared key between the edge node E and the third-party KDC is denoted as K EK , the shared key between server S and the third-party KDC is denoted as K SK ,The industrial equipment cloud-edge access authentication method is described as follows: Step 2-1: The edge node E sends the device ID number and the ID number of the server S to be logged in to the server S: , E→S: {|ID} E || ID S |} (1) Where: ID S ——ID number of cloud server S; Step 2-2: After S receives E's data, the system randomly generates large numbers x and r, as well as large prime numbers p and q, and then calculates N = T r (x)(mod p), M = p·q, and use the shared key K between S and KDC SK Encryption {|p,T S |}, with ID S , x, M and N are encapsulated and sent to the edge node E: S→E: {|ID S || x || M || N || {|p, T S |}K SK |} (2) Where: T r (x)(mod p)——the value of the rth term of the Chebyshev polynomial with x and p as parameters; T S ——Clock authentication information generated by server S; Step 2-3: After receiving the information, E will S |}K SK Sent to KDC, and the system randomly generates a large number h, and calculates L = T according to h and the received M value according to the relevant formula h (x)(mod M), according to the semigroup characteristics of Chebyshev polynomials, we get W = T h (N)(mod M)=T h (Tr(x)(mod p)(mod M): E→KDC: {|{|p, T S |}K SK || ID S |} (3) Where: L——the value of the hth term of the Chebyshev polynomial with x and M as parameters; W——the value of the hth term of the Chebyshev polynomial with N and M as parameters; Step 2-4: KDC first receives a message from E (p, T S )K SK , using the shared key with the server S to decrypt the encapsulated information received in the decryption phase, and then using the shared key K with the edge node E EK The encrypted information is sent to E, including the ID number of the server S and the received data information: KDC→E: {|p, T S , ID S |}K EK (4) Step 2-5: Edge node E uses the private key to decrypt the received information to obtain the p value and the W value calculated in step 2-3, and calculates the shared key K between edge node E and server S. SE Then use the shared key K SE Encrypted communication clock T S Finally, encapsulate the L and edge node E ID numbers calculated in steps 2-3 and send them to S: E→S: {|L || ID E || {|T S |}K SE |} (5) Step 2-6: The cloud server S calculates the results M and T based on p·q. h The result of (x)(mod M) is L, and L′=T is calculated. h (x)(modp), and then calculate the shared key between S and edge node E based on L′, denoted as K′ SE ; S uses K′ SE Decryption If T S =T S ′, S can verify E's identity; S then uses K′ SE The encrypted L is sent to E; if it is incorrect, the authentication ends; S→E: {|L′|}K′ SE (6) Where: L′——the value of the hth term of the Chebyshev polynomial with x and p as parameters; K′ SE ——The shared key between S and E calculated by using the information received from E; Step 2-7: Edge node E receives encapsulated data K′ SE (L) and then share the key K SE Decryption results in L. If L = L′, it means that the communication parties have successfully authenticated each other. At the same time, the edge node E and the cloud authentication center S have also established a session key K SE ; If L is not equal to L′, it means that the two parties have not passed mutual authentication; Step 2-8: Complete the two-way authentication between the edge node and the cloud; Step 3: Bidirectional access authentication for edge-to-edge collaboration; The bidirectional access authentication of edge-to-edge collaboration is divided into two cases: one is mutual authentication within the edge device domain; the other is mutual authentication between edge devices; define ID G1 and ID G2 It is a central node server belonging to two different security domains PKG1 and PKG2, ID E1 ~ID En are n different edge nodes; When the edge node ID in a security domain Ei To the edge node ID in another security domain Ej When sending a mutual authentication request, the specific steps are as follows: Step 3-1: Edge Node ID Ei First, according to the edge node ID Ej The identification number determines whether the two parties are in the same security domain; if the two parties belong to different security domains, the edge node ID Ei Send its request information to the central node server ID of this security domain G2 , and request ID G2 With ID Ej The server ID of the central node of the security domain G1 Conduct collaborative authentication; i,j∈[1,n]; If both parties belong to the same security domain, then ID Ei To the central node server ID in this security domain G1 Request ID verification Ej The identity and obtain the central node server ID G1 and ID Ej The session key encrypted with the proof ID Ei Information about your true identity; Step 3-2: Central Node Server ID G1 Receive the ID from the edge device in the domain Ei The request information first verifies the authenticity of its identity, and then Ei The information provided is located at the ID Ej Belongs to security domain PKG1, through the central node server ID G1 and the central node server ID G2 The session key K G1-G2 After encryption, the request information is sent to the central node ID G1 ; Step 3-3: Central Node Server ID G1 Receive edge device ID Ei The request information first verifies the authenticity of its identity, and then searches for the edge node ID according to the tree-shaped authentication chain within the domain. Ej , and then send the request information and pass the central node server ID G1 and edge node ID Ej The session key K G1-Ej Encryption is performed; Step 3-4: Edge Node ID Ej After receiving the request information, decrypt the information and get the edge device ID Ei The mutual authentication request is then Ei The identification number is signed with the private key and returned to the central node server ID G1 ; Step 3-5: Central Node Server ID G1 Received from edge node ID Ej Return information; If the authentication initiator is an out-of-domain device, the information is returned to the out-of-domain central node server ID G2 , proceed to steps 3-6; If the authentication initiator belongs to the device ID in the domain Ek , then the edge node ID Ej The returned information is passed through the session key K G1-Ek Encrypt and send to ID Ek , including through ID Ej The identification number of the authentication initiator signed by the private key, and go to step 3-7; k∈[1,n]; Step 3-6: Central Node Server ID G2 Received from the central node server ID G1 information, including verification of ID Ei Information on the correctness of your identity and the ID Ej The authentication initiator's identification number is signed with the private key, and then the information is transmitted through the session key K G2-Ei Encrypt and send to ID Ei ; Step 3-7: Authentication initiator ID Ei or ID Ek After receiving the return information, confirm the ID Ej The authenticity of the identity is verified by the ID Ej The private key signature is then sent to the ID Ej Initiate a mutual authentication request; Step 3-8: ID Ej Receive the device ID from the edge Ei or ID Ek The access authentication request information includes the information signed by its own private key. After the decrypted information is consistent with the authentication party requesting access, the access request is approved and the authentication success information is returned; Step 3-8: Bidirectional authentication between edge nodes is completed.
2. According to claim 1, a method for certificateless access authentication of industrial edge devices based on Chebyshev polynomials is characterized in that: The shared key K in step 2-5 SE The calculation is as follows: By K SE =W(mod,p) according to T n (x)(mod P)=T n (x(mod(P))(mod P) gives: K SE =(T h (N)(mod M))(mod p); According to T n (T m (x))(mod P) = T n-m (x)(mod P) = T m (T n (x))(mod P) gives: K SE =(T h (T r (x))(mod p)(mod M)(mod P) = T h (T r (x)(mod p))(mod p) = T h (T r (x))(mod p).
3. According to claim 1, a method for certificateless access authentication of industrial edge devices based on Chebyshev polynomials is characterized in that: In step 2-6, L and the shared key K′ SE The value of is calculated as follows: According to the formula Tn(x)(mod P) = T n (x(mod(P))(mod P) and formula T n (T m (x))(mod P)=T n-m (x)(mod P)=T m (T n (x))(mod P) calculates L and shared key K′ SE Value: The value of the hth term of the Chebyshev polynomial with x and p as parameters L = L (mod p) = (T h (x)(mod M))(mod p)=T h (x)(mod p); S calculates the shared key K′ with E using the information received from E SE =T r (L)(mod p)=T r (T h (x)(mod p))(mod p)=T r (T h (x))(mod p).
