A satellite proxy re-encryption communication system based on zero conversion
By adopting a proxy re-encryption communication system with no conversion in satellite communication systems, using public-private key pairing and homomorphic encryption technology to scramble and re-encrypt data, the information leakage problem caused by key leakage is solved and data transmission is enhanced security and reduces the risk of eavesdropping.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411025277.X
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-07-30
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-26
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-07-30
AI Technical Summary
The existing secure transmission method of satellite communication cannot effectively prevent attackers from decrypting communication information when the key is leaked, resulting in information leakage. Moreover, the channel reliability in the wireless satellite-ground communication link is poor and vulnerable to eavesdropping and tampering attacks.
Adopt a satellite proxy re-encryption communication system based on no conversion, encrypt and decrypt the public and private key pairs, use homomorphic encryption and re-encryption keys for data scrambling and re-encryption, and use hash values for data verification. Ensure the security of data transmission.
Even if the agent or receiver's key is leaked, it is difficult for an attacker to decrypt the data, improves the security of data transmission, reduces the risk of eavesdropping, and prevents data tampering through fixed-point transmission and hash verification.
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Figure CN118555567B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of satellite communication security strategy, and in particular to the technical field of on-orbit satellite communication security strategy. Background Art
[0002] The satellite communication link is a wireless satellite-to-earth communication link, which has the characteristics of open link, long transmission distance, wide transmission range, and poor channel reliability. Therefore, it is vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks, tampering attacks, forgery attacks and other attacks.
[0003] The Security Working Group of the Space Data System Advisory Committee proposed relevant standards based on the security needs of spacecraft in 2012 based on the encryption and authentication algorithms in space networks, and highlighted relevant standards for the communication protocols of the space link layer in 2015. Under this standard, the communication security of satellites can be guaranteed, but the space and time complexity is relatively high.
[0004] The secure transmission of data in satellite communications has always attracted much attention. Proxy re-encryption technology has become a key technology in solving problems such as secure transmission of satellite communication data, information privacy protection, and information dependence on the receiving end. At present, there are relatively few proxy re-encryption technologies based on satellite communications in China, which mainly include satellite communication proxy homomorphic trusted transmission mechanisms based on traditional homomorphic encryption models and fully homomorphic encryption models, and have not yet been specifically designed for the characteristics of satellite communications.
[0005] The existing public technology, China's invention patent application "A communication satellite secure transmission method, equipment and medium" (publication number CN 117835231 A) adopts proxy re-encryption technology to perform multi-channel confidential transmission of data. However, there is no effective measure to solve the risk of key leakage. When the key is leaked on the user side or the proxy side, the attacker can decrypt the ciphertext data into plaintext information by eavesdropping, resulting in the leakage of related communication information. Summary of the invention
[0006] In order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention provides a satellite proxy re-encryption communication system based on no conversion, the system includes a sending end, a proxy end and a receiving end, the sending end sends the data to the receiving end after being processed by the proxy end;
[0007] The sender: generates a sender public-private key pair PK A and SK A , where the sender's public key PK A Public, sender private key SK A Confidentiality; encrypt the information to be transmitted to obtain the scrambled data at the sender ; Generate sender pseudo data ; Scramble the data at the sending end and sender dummy data The encrypted data of the sender is merged and input into the agent;
[0008] The agent: generates the agent public-private key pair PK T and SK T , where the agent public key PK T Public, agent private key SK T Keep confidentiality; decrypt the encrypted data on the sender to obtain the ciphertext information C on the sender; encrypt the ciphertext information C on the sender to obtain the encrypted data on the proxy; input the encrypted data on the proxy into the receiving end;
[0009] The receiving end: generates a receiving end public-private key pair PK B and SK B , where the receiving end public key PK B Public, receiving end private key SK B Keep it confidential; decrypt the encrypted data on the proxy side to get the plaintext data GD.
[0010] Furthermore, the sender encrypts the information to be transmitted to obtain the sender scrambled data, specifically:
[0011] S21, grouping the data to obtain data D, ;
[0012] S22, using homomorphic encryption and the sender's public key PK A Encrypt data D in groups to obtain the ciphertext information C at the sender end. ;
[0013] S23, the sending end generates a random number r1 with the same length as the data packet;
[0014] S24, perform a scrambling operation on the ciphertext information C of the sending end to obtain the scrambled data of the sending end , ,in, , , i is an integer greater than 1 and less than or equal to n, where hc i-1 c i-1 The hash value of , the operation represented by ⊕ means the bitwise XOR operation.
[0015] Furthermore, the sender generates sender pseudo data , specifically:
[0016] S31, the private key SK of the sender A and the receiving end public key PK B Generate a re-encryption key RK;
[0017] S32: Perform a scrambling operation on the re-encryption key RK to obtain a scrambled re-encryption key , ;hc n c n The hash value of
[0018] S33. Use the agent private key SK T Encrypt random number r1 to get the encrypted random number 1 ;
[0019] S34, the scrambled re-encryption key and the encrypted random number 1 Merge to generate sender pseudo data .
[0020] Furthermore, the proxy end decrypts the encrypted data of the sender end and obtains the ciphertext information C of the sender end, which is specifically:
[0021] S41. Extract the sender's pseudo data from the sender's encrypted data The encrypted random number 1 , using the agent private key SK T The encrypted random number 1 Decrypt to get random number r1;
[0022] S42, the random number r1 and the scrambled data of the sending end Restore c1 in the ciphertext information C at the sender, ;
[0023] S43, obtain the hash value hc1 of c1 from c1, Knowable i =2, ,because and Known, we can then find c2, and so on, to get the ciphertext information C at the sender;
[0024] S44, by ,get , and thus the re-encryption key RK is obtained.
[0025] Further, the proxy encrypts the sender's ciphertext information C to obtain the proxy encrypted data, specifically:
[0026] S51, re-encrypt the sender ciphertext information C using the re-encryption key RK to obtain the re-encrypted sender ciphertext information RC, ;
[0027] S52, perform homomorphic calculation on the re-encrypted sender ciphertext information RC to obtain the sender ciphertext information GC after homomorphic calculation, ;
[0028] S53, generate a random number r2 with the same length as the data packet, and use the receiving end public key PK for the random number r2 B Encrypt to get the encrypted random number 2 ;
[0029] S54, perform scrambling operation on the ciphertext information GC of the sender after homomorphic calculation to obtain scrambled data of the proxy end , ,in, , , where hgc i-1 For gc i-1 The hash value of
[0030] S55, the encrypted random number 2 As proxy-side pseudo data ;
[0031] S56, scrambling the data of the proxy end and proxy-side pseudo data The combined data is encrypted on the proxy side.
[0032] Furthermore, the receiving end decrypts the encrypted data of the proxy end to obtain the plaintext data GD, which is specifically:
[0033] S61. Extract the encrypted random number 2 from the encrypted data on the proxy side , using the receiving end private key SK B The encrypted random number 2 Decrypt and get random number r2;
[0034] S62, random number r2 and proxy end scramble data In Restore gc1 in the ciphertext information GC of the sender after homomorphic calculation, ;
[0035] S63, obtain the hash value hgc1 of gc1 from gc1, Knowable i =2, because It is known that gc2 can be obtained, and so on, the ciphertext information GC of the sender after homomorphic calculation can be obtained;
[0036] S64, using the receiving end private key SK BDecrypt the ciphertext information GC after homomorphic calculation to obtain the plaintext data GD. .
[0037] The beneficial effects of the system of the present invention are:
[0038] The existing communication satellite security transmission method adopts proxy re-encryption technology to perform multi-channel confidential transmission of data. However, there is no effective measure to solve the risk of key leakage. When there is a key leakage on the user side or the agent side, the attacker can decrypt the ciphertext data into plaintext information by eavesdropping, resulting in the leakage of related communication information. In the system described in the invention, even if the key information of the agent or the receiver is leaked, the attacker still needs to obtain all the data packets to decrypt the re-encrypted data. In the infinite unreliability and distributed transmission environment of the satellite network, it is difficult for the attacker to eavesdrop on all the data packets, thereby enhancing the security of data transmission.
[0039] In the system of the present invention, the agent can know the receiver of the data based on the additional information of the received data, and then know the orbit information of the receiver's satellite, so as to realize fixed-point transmission. The agent will know the forwarding user, so it can use point beam antenna or laser communication and other means to send, instead of broadcasting through full beam antenna, which increases the transmission efficiency and reduces the possibility of data being eavesdropped. And through hash verification means, it prevents the possibility of data being tampered by agents or attackers. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0040] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of the sending end working process in an embodiment of the present invention;
[0041] Figure 2 This is a flowchart of the agent end work flow in an embodiment of the present invention;
[0042] Figure 3 The following is a flowchart of the receiving end working process in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0043] The technical solution of the present invention will be described clearly and completely below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the protection scope of the present invention.
[0044] This embodiment is a satellite proxy re-encryption communication system based on no conversion, the system includes a sending end, a proxy end and a receiving end, the sending end sends data to the receiving end after being processed by the proxy end;
[0045] The sender: generates a sender public-private key pair PK A and SK A , where the sender's public key PK A Public, sender private key SK A Confidentiality; encrypt the information to be transmitted to obtain the scrambled data at the sender ; Generate sender pseudo data ; Scramble the data at the sending end and sender dummy data The encrypted data of the sender is merged and input into the agent;
[0046] The agent: generates the agent public-private key pair PK T and SK T , where the agent public key PK T Public, agent private key SK T Keep confidentiality; decrypt the encrypted data on the sender to obtain the ciphertext information C on the sender; encrypt the ciphertext information C on the sender to obtain the encrypted data on the proxy; input the encrypted data on the proxy into the receiving end;
[0047] The receiving end: generates a receiving end public-private key pair PK B and SK B , where the receiving end public key PK B Public, receiving end private key SK B Keep it confidential; decrypt the encrypted data on the proxy side to get the plaintext data GD.
[0048] like Figure 1 As shown, the sender encrypts the information to be transmitted to obtain the sender scrambled data, specifically:
[0049] S21, grouping the data to obtain data D, ;
[0050] S22, using homomorphic encryption and the sender's public key PK A Encrypt data D in groups to obtain the ciphertext information C at the sender end. ;
[0051] S23, the sending end generates a random number r1 with the same length as the data packet;
[0052] S24, perform a scrambling operation on the ciphertext information C of the sending end to obtain the scrambled data of the sending end , ,in, , , i is an integer greater than 1 and less than or equal to n, where hc i-1 c i-1The hash value of , the operation represented by ⊕ means the bitwise XOR operation.
[0053] like Figure 1 As shown, the sender generates sender pseudo data , specifically:
[0054] S31, the private key SK of the sender A and the receiving end public key PK B Generate a re-encryption key RK;
[0055] S32: Perform a scrambling operation on the re-encryption key RK to obtain a scrambled re-encryption key , ;hc n c n The hash value of
[0056] S33. Use the agent private key SK T Encrypt random number r1 to get the encrypted random number 1 ;
[0057] S34, the scrambled re-encryption key and the encrypted random number 1 Merge to generate sender pseudo data .
[0058] like Figure 2 As shown, the proxy end decrypts the encrypted data of the sender end and obtains the ciphertext information C of the sender end, which is specifically:
[0059] S41. Extract the sender's pseudo data from the sender's encrypted data The encrypted random number 1 , using the agent private key SK T The encrypted random number 1 Decrypt to get random number r1;
[0060] S42, the random number r1 and the scrambled data of the sending end Restore c1 in the ciphertext information C at the sender, ;
[0061] S43, obtain the hash value hc1 of c1 from c1, Knowable i =2, ,because and Known, we can then find c2, and so on, to get the ciphertext information C at the sender;
[0062] S44, by ,get , and thus the re-encryption key RK is obtained.
[0063] like Figure 2 As shown, the proxy encrypts the ciphertext information C of the sender to obtain the proxy encrypted data, which is specifically:
[0064] S51, re-encrypt the sender ciphertext information C using the re-encryption key RK to obtain the re-encrypted sender ciphertext information RC, ;
[0065] S52, perform homomorphic calculation on the re-encrypted sender ciphertext information RC to obtain the sender ciphertext information GC after homomorphic calculation, ;
[0066] S53, generate a random number r2 with the same length as the data packet, and use the receiving end public key PK for the random number r2 B Encrypt to get the encrypted random number 2 ;
[0067] S54, perform scrambling operation on the ciphertext information GC of the sender after homomorphic calculation to obtain scrambled data of the proxy end , ,in, , , where hgc i-1 For gc i-1 The hash value of
[0068] S55, the encrypted random number 2 As proxy-side pseudo data ;
[0069] S56, scrambling the data of the proxy end and proxy-side pseudo data The combined data is encrypted on the proxy side.
[0070] like Figure 3 As shown, the receiving end decrypts the encrypted data of the proxy end to obtain the plaintext data GD, which is specifically:
[0071] S61. Extract the encrypted random number 2 from the encrypted data on the proxy side , using the receiving end private key SK B The encrypted random number 2 Decrypt and get random number r2;
[0072] S62, random number r2 and proxy end scramble data In Restore gc1 in the ciphertext information GC of the sender after homomorphic calculation, ;
[0073] S63, obtain the hash value hgc1 of gc1 from gc1, Knowable i =2, because It is known that gc2 can be obtained, and so on, the ciphertext information GC of the sender after homomorphic calculation can be obtained;
[0074] S64, using the receiving end private key SK B Decrypt the ciphertext information GC after homomorphic calculation to obtain the plaintext data GD. .
[0075] Since the data is first transmitted by the sender's public key PK A Encrypted, and then re-encrypted with the re-encryption key RK, where the re-encryption key RK is composed of the sender's private key SK A and the receiving end public key PK B Generate, the receiver can use the receiver's private key SK B , generate the calculated plaintext data GD.
Claims
1. A satellite proxy re-encryption communication system based on no conversion, characterized in that: The system includes a sending end, an agent end and a receiving end, and the sending end sends data to the receiving end after being processed by the agent end; The sender: generates a sender public-private key pair PK A and SK A , where the sender's public key PK A Public, sender private key SK A Confidentiality; encrypt the information to be transmitted to obtain the scrambled data at the sender ; Generate sender pseudo data ; Scramble the data at the sending end and sender dummy data The encrypted data of the sender is merged and input into the agent; The sender encrypts the information to be transmitted to obtain the sender's scrambled data, specifically: S21, grouping the data to obtain data D, ; S22, using homomorphic encryption and the sender's public key PK A Encrypt data D in groups to obtain the ciphertext information C at the sender end. ; S23, the sending end generates a random number r1 with the same length as the data packet; S24, perform a scrambling operation on the ciphertext information C of the sending end to obtain the scrambled data of the sending end , ,in, , , i is an integer greater than 1 and less than or equal to n, where hc i-1 c i-1 The hash value of , the operation represented by ⊕ means the bitwise XOR operation; The sender generates sender dummy data , specifically: S31, the private key SK of the sender A and the receiving end public key PK B Generate a re-encryption key RK; S32: Perform a scrambling operation on the re-encryption key RK to obtain a scrambled re-encryption key , ;hc n c n The hash value of S33. Use the agent private key SK T Encrypt random number r1 to get the encrypted random number 1 ; S34, the scrambled re-encryption key and the encrypted random number 1 Merge to generate sender pseudo data ; The agent: generates the agent public-private key pair PK T and SK T , where the agent public key PK T Public, agent private key SK T Keep confidentiality; decrypt the encrypted data on the sender to obtain the ciphertext information C on the sender; encrypt the ciphertext information C on the sender to obtain the encrypted data on the proxy; input the encrypted data on the proxy into the receiving end; The proxy decrypts the encrypted data of the sender and obtains the ciphertext information C of the sender, which is: S41. Extract the sender's pseudo data from the sender's encrypted data The encrypted random number 1 , using the agent private key SK T The encrypted random number 1 Decrypt to get random number r1; S42, the random number r1 and the scrambled data of the sending end Restore c1 in the ciphertext information C at the sender, ; S43, obtain the hash value hc1 of c1 from c1, Knowable i =2, ,because and Known, we can then find c2, and so on, to get the ciphertext information C at the sender; S44, by ,get , thus solving the re-encryption key RK; The proxy encrypts the sender's ciphertext information C to obtain the proxy encrypted data, which is: S51, re-encrypt the sender ciphertext information C using the re-encryption key RK to obtain the re-encrypted sender ciphertext information RC, ; S52, perform homomorphic calculation on the re-encrypted sender ciphertext information RC to obtain the sender ciphertext information GC after homomorphic calculation, ; S53, generate a random number r2 with the same length as the data packet, and use the receiving end public key PK for the random number r2 B Encrypt to get the encrypted random number 2 ; S54, perform scrambling operation on the ciphertext information GC of the sender after homomorphic calculation to obtain scrambled data of the proxy end , ,in, , , where hgc i-1 For gc i-1 The hash value of S55, the encrypted random number 2 As proxy-side pseudo data ; S56, scrambling the data of the proxy end and proxy-side pseudo data Merge to obtain the proxy encrypted data; The receiving end: generates a receiving end public-private key pair PK B and SK B , where the receiving end public key PK B Public, receiving end private key SK B Keep confidentiality; decrypt the encrypted data on the proxy end to obtain the plaintext data GD; The receiving end decrypts the encrypted data of the proxy end and obtains the plaintext data GD, which is specifically: S61. Extract the encrypted random number 2 from the encrypted data on the proxy side , using the receiving end private key SK B The encrypted random number 2 Decrypt and get random number r2; S62, random number r2 and proxy end scramble data In Restore gc1 in the ciphertext information GC of the sender after homomorphic calculation, ; S63, obtain the hash value hgc1 of gc1 from gc1, Knowable i =2, because It is known that gc2 can be obtained, and so on, the ciphertext information GC of the sender after homomorphic calculation can be obtained; S64, using the receiving end private key SK B Decrypt the ciphertext information GC after homomorphic calculation to obtain the plaintext data GD. .
