A battery cell anti-counterfeiting authentication method suitable for new energy battery management system

By using PUF and LFSR in fingerprint chips in the new energy battery management system for battery cell certification, the problems of battery cell status management and safe transmission are solved, and the accurate identification and safety certification of battery cells are realized, reducing the certification complexity. Improves system security and performance.

CN118586931BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-15HUBEI UNIV OF TECH
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202410724703.2
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-06-05
Publication Date
2024-11-15
Estimated Expiration
2044-06-05

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In the new energy battery management system, it is difficult for the prior art to accurately identify and manage the status of each battery cell, resulting in the impact of system performance and safety, and there are risks in safe transmission between the battery cells.

Method used

Adopt a battery cell anti-counterfeiting authentication method, using PUF and LFSR in the fingerprint chip for lightweight encryption, and through the transmission of random seeds and keys and the comparison of response keys, accurate query and authentication of the battery cell is realized, reducing authentication Complexity.

Benefits of technology

Effectively identify and screen out counterfeit battery cells, reduce the complexity of certification, ensure safe transmission between battery cells and system security, reduce encryption overhead, and improve the credibility and performance of the battery management system.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The present invention relates to the field of information security and communication technology, and discloses a cell anti-counterfeiting authentication method suitable for a new energy battery management system. According to the method, before the cell authentication inside the battery management system, a server unit performs authentication with an MCU microcontroller unit. If the authentication succeeds, the method proceeds to the next step. If the authentication fails, the method repeats the authentication until it succeeds. After the authentication succeeds, the method proceeds to the next step. After the MCU microcontroller unit is credible, the server unit sends a random seed S and a corresponding key M to the MCU microcontroller unit. After the MCU microcontroller unit receives the seed S and the key M, the present invention performs lightweight encryption by utilizing LFSR and PUF, and protects the key security during the transmission and authentication process, reduces the encryption overhead, and can also ensure the security of data transmission. The MCU only needs to communicate with the first and last cell, and the remaining cells all communicate with the cells adjacent to them. The MCU does not need to perform authentication with each cell separately, thereby reducing the complexity of authentication.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of information security and communication technology, and in particular to a battery cell anti-counterfeiting authentication method applicable to a new energy battery management system. Background Art

[0002] The battery management system is an important component of the power battery of new energy vehicles. It monitors the use status of the power battery in real time, estimates the remaining capacity of the battery, avoids overcharging, over-discharging and over-temperature of the battery, and actively balances the consistency between batteries, which directly affects the service life of the power battery and the safe operation and vehicle performance of the electric vehicle. The battery system of an electric vehicle is often composed of hundreds or even thousands of battery cells. Although there are so many battery cells working together, the overall performance of the battery system is actually determined by the worst battery cell, which is what we often call the barrel principle. Therefore, only by accurately monitoring, evaluating and efficiently managing each battery cell and ensuring that all batteries remain in a consistent and good state can the system's high performance, long life and safe operation be achieved.

[0003] BMS holds a large amount of information about power batteries. Anti-counterfeiting identification of battery cells and prevention of data theft have become important links in protecting battery information. Ensuring the credibility of each battery in the battery pack is a problem that needs to be solved. The physical unclonable function uses the inevitable random differences in the chip manufacturing process to generate a unique "chip fingerprint", which has natural anti-tampering and anti-cloning capabilities. Therefore, PUF can provide a low-cost and high-security authentication method for battery cells, which can effectively solve the problem of safe transmission between battery cells. Therefore, a battery cell anti-counterfeiting authentication method suitable for new energy battery management systems is proposed to solve the above problems. Summary of the invention

[0004] In view of the shortcomings of the prior art, the present invention provides a battery cell anti-counterfeiting authentication method suitable for a new energy battery management system, which has the advantages of being able to accurately query counterfeit batteries and greatly reduce the complexity of authentication, thereby solving the problems mentioned in the above background technology.

[0005] In order to achieve the above-mentioned purpose of accurately finding counterfeit batteries and greatly reducing the complexity of authentication, the present invention provides the following technical solution: a battery anti-counterfeiting authentication method applicable to a new energy battery management system, comprising the following steps:

[0006] The battery management system includes an A module, a B module and a C module;

[0007] The A module includes a Server unit;

[0008] The B module includes an MCU micro control unit;

[0009] The C module includes a fingerprint chip IC unit, and the fingerprint chip IC unit has PUF and LFSR embedded inside;

[0010] The authentication method includes the following steps:

[0011] S1: Before the fingerprint chip IC inside the battery management system is authenticated, the server unit and the MCU microcontroller unit are authenticated. If the authentication is successful, the process goes to step S2. If the authentication fails, the authentication is repeated until it succeeds. If successful, the process goes to step S2.

[0012] S2: After the MCU microcontroller unit successfully authenticates, the Server unit sends the random seed S and its corresponding key M to the MCU microcontroller unit. After the MCU microcontroller unit receives the seed S and key M, the MCU microcontroller unit sends the seed S to the fingerprint chip IC unit;

[0013] S3: The LFSR embedded in the fingerprint chip IC unit generates an excitation signal X through the seed S, and the excitation signal X generates a response key H through the PUF embedded in the fingerprint chip IC unit;

[0014] S4: The response key H is transmitted back to the MCU micro-control unit to determine whether the response key H generated in the fingerprint chip IC unit is consistent with the key M generated in the Server unit. If so, the response key H = key M, and the fingerprint chip IC unit authentication is successful. Otherwise, go to step S5;

[0015] S5: If the response key H≠key M, the authentication between the MCU microcontroller unit and the fingerprint chip IC unit fails, and the MCU microcontroller unit requests the key M in the Server unit and the response key H of the fingerprint chip IC unit to compare the two sets of values ​​one by one to query the counterfeit fingerprint chip IC unit.

[0016] After the server unit and the MCU microcontroller unit are successfully authenticated, the server unit in module A needs to send the random seed S and its corresponding key M j The seed S is sent to the MCU microcontroller unit in module B, and then the MCU microcontroller unit sends the seed S to the fingerprint chip IC unit in module C;

[0017] When the number of fingerprint chip IC units is i, the process of generating the response key H is:

[0018] Step 1: Fingerprint chip IC 1 After the unit receives the seed S, it uses the seed S as the fingerprint chip IC 1 The unit embeds the initial seed of the LFSR to generate the excitation signal X 1 , X 1 =LFSR(S), excitation signal X 1Through fingerprint chip IC 1 PUF embedded in the cell 1 Generate response key H 1 , H 1 =PUF 1 (X 1 ), and then the response key H 1 Send to fingerprint chip IC 2 unit;

[0019] Step 2: Fingerprint chip IC i The unit receives the response key H i-1 After that, the response key H i-1 Through fingerprint chip IC i The unit embeds LFSR to generate the excitation signal X i , X i =LFSR(H i-1 ), excitation signal X i Through fingerprint chip IC i PUF embedded in the cell i Generate response key H i , H i =PUF i (X i ), obtain the subordinate response key step by step according to the method in step 2;

[0020] Where, i∈[2,n], n is a positive integer;

[0021] The key H i Sent to the MCU microcontroller unit, which determines the key M in module A. j Is it the same as the response key H in module B? i equal;

[0022] Among them, j∈[1,n], n is a positive integer;

[0023] If the key M j =Response Key H i , then the MCU microcontroller unit completes the authentication of the fingerprint chip IC unit, and the i fingerprint chip IC units in module B are all credible to the MCU microcontroller unit;

[0024] If the key M j ≠Response Key H i , then the MCU microcontroller unit fails to authenticate the fingerprint chip IC unit, that is, there is a counterfeit fingerprint chip IC unit.

[0025] The specific steps to check for counterfeit fingerprint chip IC units are:

[0026] The MCU microcontroller unit first requests the Server unit to send the PUF response authentication key M of each fingerprint chip IC unit in module A. 1 To M j issue;

[0027] The MCU microcontroller unit also requests each fingerprint chip IC unit in the C module to send its corresponding response key H 1 To Response Key H i ;

[0028] The MCU microcontroller unit determines the key M 1 Is it related to the response key H 1 Equal until the key M is determined j Is it related to the response key H i equal;

[0029] The key M will be found j With the response key H i Different fingerprint chip IC units are regarded as counterfeit fingerprint chip IC units and reported to the Server unit.

[0030] Compared with the prior art, the present invention provides a cell anti-counterfeiting authentication method applicable to a new energy battery management system, which has the following beneficial effects:

[0031] The battery cell anti-counterfeiting authentication method suitable for new energy battery management systems uses LFSR and PUF for lightweight encryption and protects key security during transmission and authentication, thereby reducing encryption overhead while ensuring data transmission security. The MCU only needs to communicate with the first and last battery cells, and the remaining battery cells communicate with their adjacent battery cells. The MCU does not need to authenticate each battery cell separately, thereby reducing the complexity of authentication. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0032] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of a battery cell anti-counterfeiting authentication method applicable to a new energy battery management system proposed by the present invention;

[0033] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a battery cell anti-counterfeiting authentication method applicable to a new energy battery management system proposed by the present invention;

[0034] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of a battery management system for a battery cell anti-counterfeiting authentication method suitable for a new energy battery management system proposed by the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0035] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0036] See also Figure 1-3 , a cell anti-counterfeiting authentication method applicable to a new energy battery management system, comprising the following steps:

[0037] The battery management system includes an A module, a B module and a C module;

[0038] The A module includes a Server unit;

[0039] The B module includes an MCU micro control unit;

[0040] The C module includes a fingerprint chip IC unit, and the fingerprint chip IC unit has PUF and LFSR embedded inside;

[0041] The authentication method includes the following steps:

[0042] S1: Before the fingerprint chip IC inside the battery management system is authenticated, the server unit and the MCU microcontroller unit are authenticated. If the authentication is successful, the process goes to step S2. If the authentication fails, the authentication is repeated until it succeeds. If successful, the process goes to step S2.

[0043] S2: After the MCU microcontroller unit successfully authenticates, the Server unit sends the random seed S and its corresponding key M to the MCU microcontroller unit. After the MCU microcontroller unit receives the seed S and key M, the MCU microcontroller unit sends the seed S to the fingerprint chip IC unit;

[0044] S3: The LFSR embedded in the fingerprint chip IC unit generates an excitation signal X through the seed S, and the excitation signal X generates a response key H through the PUF embedded in the fingerprint chip IC unit;

[0045] S4: The response key H is transmitted back to the MCU micro-control unit to determine whether the response key H generated in the fingerprint chip IC unit is consistent with the key M generated in the Server unit. If so, the response key H = key M, and the fingerprint chip IC unit authentication is successful. Otherwise, go to step S5;

[0046] S5: If the response key H≠key M, the authentication between the MCU microcontroller unit and the fingerprint chip IC unit fails, and the MCU microcontroller unit requests the key M in the Server unit and the response key H of the fingerprint chip IC unit to compare the two sets of values ​​one by one to query the counterfeit fingerprint chip IC unit.

[0047] After the server unit and the MCU microcontroller unit are successfully authenticated, the server unit in module A needs to send the random seed S and its corresponding key M j The seed S is sent to the MCU microcontroller unit in module B, and then the MCU microcontroller unit sends the seed S to the fingerprint chip IC unit in module C;

[0048] When the number of fingerprint chip IC units is i, the process of generating the response key H is:

[0049] Step 1: Fingerprint chip IC 1 After the unit receives the seed S, it uses the seed S as the fingerprint chip IC 1 The unit embeds the initial seed of the LFSR to generate the excitation signal X 1 , X 1 =LFSR(S), excitation signal X 1 Through fingerprint chip IC 1 PUF embedded in the cell 1 Generate response key H 1 , H 1 =PUF 1 (X 1 ), and then the response key H 1 Send to fingerprint chip IC 2 unit;

[0050] Step 2: Fingerprint chip IC i The unit receives the response key H i-1 After that, the response key H i-1 Through fingerprint chip IC i The unit embeds LFSR to generate the excitation signal X i , X i =LFSR(H i-1 ), excitation signal X i Through fingerprint chip IC i PUF embedded in the cell i Generate response key H i , H i =PUF i (X i ), obtain the subordinate response key step by step according to the method in step 2;

[0051] Where, i∈[2,n], n is a positive integer;

[0052] The key H i Sent to the MCU microcontroller unit, which determines the key M in module A. j Is it the same as the response key H in module B? i equal;

[0053] Among them, j∈[1,n], n is a positive integer;

[0054] If the key M j =Response Key H i , then the MCU microcontroller unit completes the authentication of the fingerprint chip IC unit, and the i fingerprint chip IC units in module B are all credible to the MCU microcontroller unit;

[0055] If the key M j ≠Response Key H i , then the MCU microcontroller unit fails to authenticate the fingerprint chip IC unit, that is, there is a counterfeit fingerprint chip IC unit.

[0056] The specific steps to check for counterfeit fingerprint chip IC units are:

[0057] The MCU microcontroller unit first requests the Server unit to send the PUF response authentication key M of each fingerprint chip IC unit in module A. 1 To M j issue;

[0058] The MCU microcontroller unit also requests each fingerprint chip IC unit in the C module to send its corresponding response key H 1 To Response Key H i ;

[0059] The MCU microcontroller unit determines the key M 1 Is it related to the response key H 1 Equal until the key M is determined j Is it related to the response key H i equal;

[0060] The key M will be found j With the response key H i Different fingerprint chip IC units are regarded as counterfeit fingerprint chip IC units and reported to the Server unit.

[0061] In the new energy battery management system (BMS), the authentication failure between the server and the microcontroller unit (MCU) may involve multiple technical aspects. Here are some possible problems and their solutions: 1. Communication problem: There is a problem with the physical connection or network connection between the server and the MCU. You need to check and make sure that all physical connections (such as cables, interfaces) are good. Verify whether the network settings (such as IP address, gateway, subnet mask, etc.) are correct; 2. Time synchronization problem: The system time of the server and MCU is not synchronized, which may cause the timestamp mismatch during the authentication process. You need to ensure that both the server and the MCU can be synchronized to an accurate time source, such as through the NTP (Network Time Protocol) service; 3. Security certificate or key problem: The security certificate is expired, damaged or untrusted, and the key does not match or has been leaked. You need to update and redeploy valid security certificates, replace keys and ensure the security and confidentiality of keys. 4. Configuration error: The configuration settings of the server or MCU are wrong, such as improper authentication protocol settings, permission settings, etc. You need to carefully check and adjust the configuration settings to ensure that the settings on both ends are consistent and correct. Through the above measures, the authentication problems of the server and MCU in the new energy battery management system can be effectively solved to ensure the normal operation of the system and data security.

[0062] This battery management system can determine whether the fingerprint chip IC is a legitimate battery cell or a counterfeit battery cell based on the matching results, thereby improving the safety of the battery during use, while reducing the complexity of authentication and reducing hardware resources.

[0063] In summary, the anti-counterfeiting authentication method for battery cells suitable for new energy battery management systems uses LFSR and PUF for lightweight encryption, and protects key security during transmission and authentication, thereby reducing encryption overhead while ensuring the security of data transmission. The MCU only needs to communicate with the first and last battery cells, and the remaining battery cells communicate with their adjacent battery cells. The MCU does not need to authenticate each battery cell separately, thereby reducing the complexity of authentication.

[0064] It should be noted that the terms "include", "comprises" or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, article or device including a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also other elements not explicitly listed, or also includes elements inherent to such process, method, article or device. In the absence of further restrictions, an element defined by the sentence "comprises a ..." does not exclude the existence of other identical elements in the process, method, article or device including the element.

[0065] Although embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that various changes, modifications, substitutions and variations may be made to the embodiments without departing from the principles and spirit of the present invention, and that the scope of the present invention is defined by the appended claims and their equivalents.

Claims

1. A battery cell anti-counterfeiting authentication method applicable to a new energy battery management system, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: The battery management system includes an A module, a B module and a C module; The A module includes a Server unit; The B module includes an MCU micro control unit; The C module includes a fingerprint chip IC unit, and the fingerprint chip IC unit has PUF and LFSR embedded inside; The authentication method includes the following steps: S1: Before the fingerprint chip IC inside the battery management system is authenticated, the server unit and the MCU microcontroller unit are authenticated. If the authentication is successful, the process goes to step S2. If the authentication fails, the authentication is repeated until it succeeds. If successful, the process goes to step S2. S2: After the server unit and the MCU microcontroller unit are successfully authenticated, the server unit in module A needs to send the random seed S and its corresponding key M n The seed S is sent to the MCU microcontroller unit in module B, and then the MCU microcontroller unit sends the seed S to the fingerprint chip IC unit in module C; When the number of fingerprint chip IC units is n, the process of generating the response key is: Step 1: After receiving the seed S, the fingerprint chip IC1 unit uses the seed S as the initial seed of the LFSR embedded in the fingerprint chip IC1 unit to generate an excitation signal X1, X1=LFSR(S). The excitation signal X1 generates a response key H1 through the PUF1 embedded in the fingerprint chip IC1 unit, H1=PUF1(X1), and then sends the response key H1 to the fingerprint chip IC2 unit; Step 2: Fingerprint chip IC i The unit receives the response key H i-1 After that, the response key H i-1 Through fingerprint chip IC i The unit embeds LFSR to generate the excitation signal X i , X i =LFSR(H i-1 ), excitation signal X i Through fingerprint chip IC i PUF embedded in the cell i Generate response key H i , H i =PUF i (X i ), obtain the subordinate response key step by step according to the method in step 2; Where i∈[2,n], n is a positive integer; The key H n Sent to the MCU microcontroller unit, which determines the key M in module A. n Is it the same as the response key H in module B? n equal; If the key M n =Response Key H n , then the MCU microcontroller unit completes the authentication of the fingerprint chip IC unit, and the n fingerprint chip IC units in module B are all credible to the MCU microcontroller unit; If not, go to S3: S3: If the key M n ≠Response Key H n , then the MCU microcontroller unit fails to authenticate the fingerprint chip IC unit, that is, there is a counterfeit fingerprint chip IC unit, and further query the counterfeit fingerprint chip IC unit; The specific steps to check for counterfeit fingerprint chip IC units are: The MCU microcontroller unit first requests the Server unit to send the PUF response authentication keys M1 to M2 of each fingerprint chip IC unit in module A. n issue; The MCU microcontroller unit also requests each fingerprint chip IC unit in the C module to send its corresponding response key H1 to the response key H n ; The MCU microcontroller unit determines whether the key M1 is equal to the response key H1 until the key M n Is it related to the response key H n equal; The key M will be found i With the response key H i Different fingerprint chip IC units are regarded as counterfeit fingerprint chip IC units and reported to the Server unit.

Citation Information

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