Object protection system attack and defense efficiency evaluation method of stream attack graph model

Through the application of the flow attack graph model, the problem of difficult to consider the sensitivity differences between multiple intrusion paths and protection devices in traditional evaluation methods is solved, and a more accurate and intuitive physical protection system evaluation is achieved, and security strategies are dynamically optimized.

CN118966775APending Publication Date: 2024-11-15XIDIAN UNIV HANGZHOU RES INST +1
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411058517.6
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-08-02
Publication Date
2024-11-15

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Traditional physical protection system evaluation methods are difficult to comprehensively and accurately consider the sensitivity differences between multiple intrusion paths and protection devices, and the lack of graphical means to show the complex relationships and dynamic changes between protection elements, resulting in inaccurate and intuitive enough evaluation results.

Method used

The flow attack graph model is used to simulate the intrusion path by constructing directed acyclic graphs, calculate the interception probability, and use Bayesian network for reverse deduction and risk assessment, providing graphical means to demonstrate the correlation process between protective elements.

Benefits of technology

It realizes comprehensive consideration of multi-path evaluation of physical protection systems and differences in protection device sensitivity, improves the accuracy and intuitiveness of the evaluation, and can dynamically characterize the interaction of protection elements, identify weak links and optimize security strategies.

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Abstract

The invention discloses an attack and defense efficiency evaluation method for a physical protection system of a stream attack graph model, and belongs to the technical field of electronic information. The method comprises the steps of constructing a physical protection system flow attack model; an intrusion path is displayed through a physical protection system flow attack model; considering an opponent detection probability, and obtaining an interception probability according to the intrusion path; according to the interception probability, reverse deduction is carried out after an enemy intrusion event is detected; and by taking the detection probability as a flow attack decision basis, constructing a Bayesian network undirected graph according to a reverse deduction result, and performing flow attack model reasoning. According to the method, the association process between the protection elements is displayed through a graphical means, and the security defense state of the physical protection system is accurately reflected by a bottom layer.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of electronic information technology, and in particular to a method, system, device, medium and program for evaluating the attack and defense effectiveness of a physical protection system of a flow attack graph model. Background Art

[0002] In the field of physical protection system effectiveness evaluation, as the security threats faced by critical infrastructure become increasingly complex and diverse, traditional evaluation methods can no longer meet actual needs. Especially for highly sensitive and complex critical infrastructure such as nuclear power plants, their security protection requirements are more stringent, and a new method that can comprehensively, meticulously and scientifically evaluate system effectiveness is needed.

[0003] Traditionally, these critical infrastructures have mostly adopted a single intrusion path assessment method developed by Sandia Laboratories. This method evaluates the system's protection capabilities by simulating specific intrusion scenarios. However, this method has significant limitations: it only considers a single intrusion path, ignoring the multiple paths and interactions that may exist in the actual intrusion process, resulting in incomplete and inaccurate assessment results. In addition, this method also fails to fully consider the differences in the sensitivity of protection devices, that is, the role and effect of different protection devices in resisting intrusion may vary depending on a variety of factors, which are often ignored in the single path assessment method.

[0004] More importantly, traditional assessment methods lack graphical means to intuitively display the complex connections and dynamic changes between protection elements. In the physical protection system, there are close connections and interactions between protection elements, which together constitute the system's protection network. However, since traditional assessment methods cannot effectively express these connections and changes, it is difficult for assessors to fully understand the system's protection mechanism, making it difficult to make accurate assessments and optimization decisions. Summary of the invention

[0005] Aiming at the problem that the existing technology cannot intuitively display the complex associations and dynamic changes between protection elements, the present invention provides a method for evaluating the attack and defense effectiveness of a physical protection system based on a flow attack graph model, which uses graphical means to display the association process between protection elements and accurately reflects the security and defense status of the physical protection system at the bottom layer.

[0006] In order to achieve the above object, the present invention provides the following technical solutions.

[0007] In a first aspect, the present invention provides a method for evaluating the attack and defense effectiveness of a physical protection system based on a flow attack graph model, comprising:

[0008] Constructing a physical protection system flow attack model;

[0009] Demonstrate intrusion paths through physical protection system flow attack models;

[0010] Considering the detection probability of the adversary, the interception probability is obtained according to the intrusion path;

[0011] According to the interception probability, reverse deduction is performed after the enemy intrusion event is detected;

[0012] Taking the detection probability as the decision-making basis for flow attack, a Bayesian network undirected graph is constructed according to the reverse deduction results to perform flow attack model inference.

[0013] As a further improvement of the present invention, the construction of the physical protection system flow attack model includes:

[0014] The flow attack model is defined as a directed acyclic graph of threats and attacks on the protection system by the adversary, which is used to simulate the behavior of physical protection systems being threatened and attacked by the adversary.

[0015] Construct the basic elements in the physical protection system flow attack model, and the basic elements are organized and arranged according to the structure of a directed acyclic graph;

[0016] The basic elements in the physical protection system flow attack model include: initial state, final state, general state, special state and arrow state.

[0017] As a further improvement of the present invention, the presenting of the intrusion path through the physical protection system flow attack model includes:

[0018] The physical protection system flow attack model is used to analyze the invasion cost, invasion success probability, and system risk. The optimal route of the adversary's invasion is determined through the minimum benefit relationship to obtain the invasion path.

[0019] As a further improvement of the present invention, the method of taking into account the detection probability of the enemy and obtaining the interception probability according to the intrusion path includes:

[0020] When an adversary invades critical infrastructure, assuming that n layers of defense measures are set up, the interception probability is calculated as follows:

[0021]

[0022] Where P(C) is the detection probability of the enemy, P(D) is the communication probability, and P(R|A) is the probability that the response force arrives at the target area in advance.

[0023] As a further improvement of the present invention, the reverse deduction is performed after the enemy intrusion event is detected based on the interception probability, including:

[0024] The probability of the guard arriving at the target area in advance after detecting the enemy intrusion event is expanded from one-dimensional calculation to two-dimensional and three-dimensional calculation; the Dijkstra algorithm is used to perform reverse deduction based on the flow attack model;

[0025] Taking the exploration probability as the basis for the flow attack decision, under the conservative assumption that the intrusion behavior is detected in the final stage, the response force can still reach the target point in time and intercept the intrusion, the interception probability is calculated as follows:

[0026]

[0027] Where P(C) is the adversary detection probability and P(D) is the communication probability.

[0028] As a further improvement of the present invention, the detection probability is used as the basis for stream attack decision-making, and a Bayesian network undirected graph is constructed according to the reverse deduction result to perform stream attack model reasoning, including:

[0029] Using detection probability as the basis for flow attack decision-making, the defense path is obtained based on the reverse deduction results and network structure analysis methods;

[0030] Construct a Bayesian network undirected graph to conduct risk assessment analysis on defense paths;

[0031] Perform flow attack model inference based on the evaluation and analysis results.

[0032] In a second aspect, the present invention provides a physical protection system attack and defense effectiveness evaluation system based on a flow attack graph model, comprising:

[0033] Model building module: used to build a physical protection system flow attack model;

[0034] Intrusion path module: used to display the intrusion path through the physical protection system flow attack model;

[0035] Interception probability module: used to consider the enemy detection probability and obtain the interception probability based on the intrusion path;

[0036] Reverse deduction module: used to perform reverse deduction after detecting an enemy intrusion event based on the interception probability;

[0037] Model reasoning module: It is used to use the detection probability as the basis for stream attack decision-making, build a Bayesian network undirected graph according to the reverse deduction results, and perform stream attack model reasoning.

[0038] In a third aspect, the present invention provides an electronic device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor implements the steps of a method for evaluating the attack and defense effectiveness of a physical protection system based on a flow attack graph model when executing the computer program.

[0039] In a fourth aspect, the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of a method for evaluating the attack and defense effectiveness of a physical protection system based on a flow attack graph model.

[0040] In a fifth aspect, the present invention provides a computer program product, comprising computer instructions, which, when executed by a processor, implement the steps of a method for evaluating the attack and defense effectiveness of a physical protection system based on a flow attack graph model.

[0041] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0042] By constructing a flow attack model, the present invention can comprehensively consider the sensitivity differences of multiple intrusion paths and protection devices in the physical protection system, and overcome the limitations of the traditional single intrusion path evaluation method. This comprehensiveness and flexibility make the evaluation results more accurate and can better reflect the actual security threat situation. The flow attack model uses graphical means to display the association process between protection elements and the enemy's intrusion path, so that the evaluator can intuitively understand the security defense status of the system. This visualization method not only improves the convenience of evaluation, but also helps to quickly identify weak links and potential risks in the system. Based on the evaluation results of the flow attack method, the present invention can dynamically characterize the interaction between protection elements and identify sensitive protection elements. This dynamic evaluation capability enables system administrators to adjust security strategies in time according to actual conditions and optimize the security performance of the physical protection system. At the same time, it also provides strong data support for future system upgrades and modifications. Taking the interception probability as the basis for flow attack decision-making, the present invention provides scientific decision-making support for system administrators. By calculating the interception probability under different intrusion paths, administrators can more accurately evaluate the protection capability of the system and formulate effective countermeasures. This data-based decision-making method helps to improve the scientificity and accuracy of decision-making. In the flow attack model reasoning stage, the present invention introduces the Bayesian network undirected graph for risk assessment analysis. The Bayesian network can handle complex uncertainty and correlation problems and provide the system with more accurate risk assessment results. At the same time, the structure learning and parameter learning functions of the Bayesian network also make the risk assessment process more automated and intelligent. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0043] The drawings described herein are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to limit the scope of the present disclosure in any way. In the drawings:

[0044] Figure 1 A schematic flow chart of a method for evaluating the attack and defense effectiveness of a physical protection system based on a flow attack graph model of the present invention;

[0045] Figure 2 It is a schematic diagram of the visual analysis process of the attack and defense effectiveness of the physical protection system of the flow attack model of the present invention;

[0046] Figure 3 It is a schematic diagram of the reverse deduction process of the remaining invasion time for an enemy to invade a target location according to the present invention;

[0047] Figure 4 It is a structural schematic diagram of an attack and defense effectiveness evaluation system of a physical protection system of a flow attack graph model of the present invention;

[0048] Figure 5 Schematic diagram of an electronic device in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0049] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the technical solutions in the present invention, the technical solutions in the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the present invention. The described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in the field without creative work should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0050] Unless otherwise defined, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as those generally understood by those skilled in the art of the present invention. The terms used herein in the specification of the present invention are only for the purpose of describing specific embodiments and are not intended to limit the present invention. The term "and / or" used herein includes any and all combinations of one or more related listed items.

[0051] Aiming at the problem that the existing technology cannot intuitively display the complex associations and dynamic changes between protection elements, the present invention provides a method for evaluating the attack and defense effectiveness of a physical protection system based on a flow attack graph model. Figure 1 As shown, the method includes:

[0052] Constructing a physical protection system flow attack model;

[0053] Demonstrate intrusion paths through physical protection system flow attack models;

[0054] Considering the detection probability of the adversary, the interception probability is obtained according to the intrusion path;

[0055] According to the interception probability, reverse deduction is performed after the enemy intrusion event is detected;

[0056] Taking the detection probability as the decision-making basis for flow attack, a Bayesian network undirected graph is constructed according to the reverse deduction results to perform flow attack model inference.

[0057] The present invention is further explained below.

[0058] The purpose of the present invention is to provide a flow attack model, simulate the attack and defense process of a physical protection system, and establish a method for visualizing the physical attack and defense effectiveness of a physical protection system.

[0059] S1: Physical Protection System Flow Attack Model

[0060] The present invention defines the flow attack model as a directed acyclic graph of threats and attack behaviors of the protection system against adversaries. The flow attack model graphically represents the in-depth defense between the protection area and the protection device of the critical infrastructure. The protection device is a state node, and the state flow covers the direction of the adversary's invasion. The protection device integrates the functions of the delay device and the detection device, and has basic delay and detection functions.

[0061] S2: Construction of basic elements of stream attack model

[0062] In the flow attack modeling method, the top-level node represents the attack initial point, that is, the potential intrusion starting point of the adversary, which can determine the intrusion threat level. Each node corresponds to a specific intrusion event. The adversary may use a variety of means to complete the intrusion task of the node, so as to finally reach the target point and achieve the intrusion goal. The flow attack model consists of five basic elements.

[0063] Initial status: Determine the threat information of the physical protection system including type, level, adversary information, etc.

[0064] End state: defines the level of risk to which the physical protection system is subject and the potential consequences of an intrusion.

[0065] General state: The adversary can only successfully invade by destroying certain protective elements, such as walls, windows, etc. The state displays the name of the element and the physical area in which it is located.

[0066] Special status: Intrusion can be carried out without destroying any protective elements, such as through doors, windows, exhaust vents, etc. The status shows the name of the element, the physical area where the element is located, and the number of employees responsible for controlling this entrance and exit.

[0067] General state: The adversary can only successfully invade by destroying certain protective elements, such as walls, windows, etc. The state displays the name of the element and the physical area in which it is located.

[0068] Special status: Intrusion can be carried out without destroying any protective elements, such as through doors, windows, exhaust vents, etc. The status shows the name of the element, the physical area where the element is located, and the number of employees responsible for controlling this entrance and exit.

[0069] Arrow state: The enemy's intrusion direction is transferred from the arrow head to the tail of the arrow, which is marked as a transfer event.

[0070] Each state element executes a custom action. Basic operations include entry action, exit action, input action, and transfer action. State transition refers to a transition relationship between two elements. A specific attack action is executed in the first element state, and the second state is entered when a certain intrusion event occurs. It is used to show the attack flow from the initial state to the target state, describing the transition of the participant between the two states, represented by a solid connecting line with parameters.

[0071] S3: Flow attack effectiveness analysis method

[0072] The calculation formula for the effectiveness of the flow attack includes the adversary detection probability P(C), the communication probability P(D), and the probability P(R|A) that the response force arrives at the target area in advance. When the adversary invades critical infrastructure, assuming that n layers of defense measures are set up, the interception probability is calculated as follows:

[0073]

[0074] S4: After detecting the enemy’s invasion, the probability P(R|A) of the response force reaching the target point is reversed

[0075] The probability of the guard arriving at the target area in advance after detecting the enemy intrusion event is expanded from one-dimensional calculation to two-dimensional and three-dimensional calculation. The Dijkstra algorithm is used to perform reverse deduction based on the flow attack model.

[0076] S5: Using detection probability as the basis for flow attack decision-making

[0077] According to a report by Sandia National Laboratories, if the adversary is detected by the system after the critical detection point (CDP), the probability that the response force arrives at the target area to prevent the invasion is P(P|A) = 0, that is, the response force cannot quickly reach the target area to intercept the adversary. On the contrary, if the adversary's intrusion behavior is discovered before the critical detection point is detected, P(R|A) = 1. The detection capability of the critical detection point area is crucial to the overall effectiveness of the system. Under conservative assumptions, the intrusion behavior is detected in the final stage, and the response force can still arrive at the target point in time and intercept the intrusion. Therefore, the formula can be simplified to

[0078]

[0079] S6: Stream Attack Model Reasoning

[0080] The reasoning method of the flow attack model is based on the network structure analysis method. First, the mutual influence between each device is comprehensively considered, and the physical protection system is comprehensively analyzed. Then, the method focuses on analyzing the most vulnerable defense path, models all parameters on the path through a graphical method, and evaluates the sensitivity of each parameter to the path. In the underlying analysis of the flow attack model, the Bayesian belief network is used for risk assessment analysis. The Bayesian belief network analysis in the flow attack model includes two stages: structure learning and parameter learning. Structural learning is used to determine the flow attack structure, which is expressed as a directed acyclic graph; parameter learning is to complete parameter calculation based on the complete structure.

[0081] In summary, the present invention combines the attack graph theory and proposes a flow attack model based on the Bayesian attack tree, which is used for the analysis of the physical attack and defense effectiveness evaluation process of the physical protection system, so that the effectiveness evaluation process is visible and the parameters are adjustable. Secondly, the present invention proposes the basic elements of the flow attack model, which are used to describe the elements included in the physical protection system effectiveness evaluation process, including the initial state, the final state, the general state and the special state, and defines each state. Compared with the traditional intrusion sequence diagram, the flow attack model better reflects the state between real devices. The flow intrusion model provides a conditional probability paradigm table of interception probability, which can describe the interception probability of the node. Based on Bayesian theory, sensitive analysis of relevant parameters can be performed on a single path, and key nodes can be analyzed in the overall analysis. It can be used to describe the dynamic and static risks of the system, calculate the comprehensive effectiveness, and infer the weak nodes of the system, providing defense strategy support for the deployment of defense devices for critical infrastructure.

[0082] The present invention will be further explained below in conjunction with the specific drawings.

[0083] The present invention belongs to the field of critical infrastructure security prevention, and specifically relates to a method for evaluating the attack and defense effectiveness of a physical protection system based on a flow attack graph model. The present invention includes the construction of basic elements of a flow attack model of a physical protection system, a flow attack effectiveness analysis method, a P(R|A) probability reverse deduction, a method for using detection probability as a basis for flow attack decision-making, and a flow attack model reasoning method.

[0084] The present invention adopts the following technical solutions:

[0085] S1. Construction of basic elements of physical protection system flow attack model;

[0086] In the flow attack model, the protection device is a state node, and the state flow covers the direction of the adversary's invasion. The protection device combines the functions of the delay device and the detection device, and has basic delay and detection functions, as shown in Table 1 and Appendix. Figure 2 shown.

[0087] Table 1 describes the basic elements of the flow attack model

[0088]

[0089] In the flow attack model, the top-level node represents the initial node, which is the intrusion attack point of the adversary and can determine the intrusion threat level. Each node is a specific intrusion event. The adversary can use various intrusion methods to complete the task of the node, thereby reaching the target point and successfully completing the intrusion. The basic operations that can be performed in each state include entry action, exit action, input action, and transfer action.

[0090] S2,Flow attack effectiveness analysis method;

[0091] The flow attack model is used to analyze the invasion cost, invasion success probability, system risk, etc. The optimal route of the enemy invasion can be determined through the minimum benefit relationship. The minimum benefit of the present invention is limited to the minimum interception probability. Therefore, the flow attack comprehensively evaluates the correlation between each protection link and analyzes the safety precautions of the power plant. Graphically display the actual invasion sequence and analyze the sensitivity of the protection device. Compared with the invasion sequence diagram, the flow attack model can more truly reflect the invasion status between devices.

[0092] The invention considers introducing the possibility of intrusion implementation into the flow attack model, and evaluates the impact on the entire physical protection system by considering the possibility of intrusion implementation. When analyzing a certain intrusion path, the possibility of intrusion implementation can be used to evaluate the cost of the enemy's intrusion. Assuming that the interception probability is small, the possibility of intrusion implementation is small, and the path is also within the security range, which is specifically reflected in the internal threat.

[0093] The core idea of ​​the calculation method is as follows: When an enemy intrusion event is detected, the conditions for the response force to successfully intercept the enemy's successful intrusion are met:

[0094] X=TR-RFT>0 (3)

[0095] In the formula: TR is the remaining time for the enemy to successfully invade the target area under successful detection; RFT is the time for the guard to arrive at the target area after the communication response. From this, the critical detection point (CDP) is derived, which refers to the first time that the remaining time TR exceeds the response time RFT. The existence of the critical detection point can preliminarily determine whether the nuclear power plant can effectively intercept the enemy. If the enemy intrusion is discovered before the critical detection point, sufficient alarm evaluation and response time are given, and the response force has the opportunity to intercept the enemy.

[0096] Under the premise that the physical protection system effectively detects the intrusion of the enemy (defined as event A), the probability that the guard arrives at the target area in advance to defend is:

[0097]

[0098] Wherein, P(R|A)=0 is the normal distribution function with respect to time.

[0099] When an enemy invades a nuclear power plant, if the nuclear power plant has multiple layers of defense measures, the interception probability is calculated as follows:

[0100]

[0101] S3, P(R|A) probability reverse deduction;

[0102] The present invention proposes a new method to calculate the extended P(R|A) probability.

[0103] There are multiple paths from the current node to the target point. The present invention uses the shortest delay time as the delay time that can delay the enemy at the current node, and reversely deduce the shortest delay time. The shortest delay time means that the probability of the enemy's successful invasion is greater, so it is the most conservative delay time. Since there are no negative numbers in the weight values ​​between each path, the shortest delay time from each node to the target point can be calculated by the Dijkstra algorithm. The shortest delay time can also be calculated using the Freud algorithm and the short path fast algorithm. The Dijkstra algorithm calculates the shortest path problem in a directed graph, with the source being the target point, and searches the outer layer in reverse to obtain the shortest time value of the target node to other nodes.

[0104] S4, detection probability is proposed as a method for stream attack decision-making;

[0105] The Sandia report pointed out that the regional assessment method is a conservative assessment. The probability that the response force will reach the target area after the enemy is detected in the key detection area is P(R|A) = 0, that is, the response force cannot quickly reach the target area to intercept the enemy. On the contrary, if the enemy's intrusion behavior is discovered before the key detection point is detected, P(R|A) = 1. Therefore, the detection capability of the key detection point area needs to be very high. As the most conservative assumption, the enemy is detected at the last layer, and the response force can also reach the target point in time to intercept the intrusion. The formula is simplified to:

[0106]

[0107] A node of the physical protection system is taken as a state. The parameters that can be determined in this state are detection probability, delay time and response probability. The decision space under the current node is the path selection from the invasion to the next node. The delay time and detection probability on the path are used as decision parameters. Therefore, the flow attack theory analysis module includes two cases, and the interception probability and detection probability are used as the decision space under the current state. The traditional method only analyzes and evaluates a single invasion path. The enumeration method is used to sort and analyze all possible paths, so that all possible invasion paths meet the design requirements of the nuclear power plant.

[0108] S5. Stream attack model reasoning method

[0109] The flow attack reasoning method uses the network structure method to first consider the overall impact between each device and analyze the physical protection system; secondly, analyze the weakest single defense path, graphically model all parameters on the path, and analyze the sensitivity of each parameter to the single path. The flow attack method uses the Bayesian method to perform risk assessment analysis. The Bayesian network analysis includes two parts: structural learning and parameter learning. Structural learning is used to determine the Bayesian network structure, which is expressed as a directed acyclic graph; parameter learning is to calculate parameters based on the complete structure. The structural learning method of the present invention is constructed based on the intrusion sequence diagram provided by Sandia Laboratories to obtain a Bayesian network undirected graph.

[0110] Prior probability calculation represents the static security risk of each protection element state of the physical protection system. Prior probability represents the implementation probability of the intrusion node, which is related to the difficulty of the intrusion. The probability value can be assumed to be the detection probability of the protection element and the interception probability of the adversary intrusion.

[0111] The posterior probability calculation indicates the risk status of the state node being attacked by the adversary. During the adversary intrusion process, once a state node is used by the adversary (especially the internal adversary threat should be considered, and the internal staff usually have the access rights to a certain area), the entire state space will be changed, and the probability of the adversary's state being successfully invaded will be recalculated. The use of posterior probability calculation can better describe the dynamic risk situation of the physical protection system, and dynamically update the risk of the physical protection system according to the changes in the posterior probability of the protection element node.

[0112] Conditional probability calculation,The present invention adopts two approaches to analyze the effectiveness of the physical protection system,,one is single intrusion path analysis, and the other is multiple intrusion path,evaluation.

[0113] The first one: vulnerability analysis of the physical protection system under a single intrusion path.

[0114] The intrusion paths of the physical protection system under a single path include P(D), P(R|A), and P(C). Taking two intrusion tasks as an example, a Bayesian network is established as shown in the figure. Taking n=2 as an example, the conditional probability table assignment method perfectly combines the EASI single path analysis method, and the conditional probability table design pattern is shown in Table 2:

[0115] Table 2 Interception probability conditional probability table

[0116]

[0117] In the interception probability formula of the physical protection system, due to a 1 +a 2 ≤1, so 1-a 1 *a2 / [(1-a 1 )*(1-a 2 )]≤1. At the same time, the present invention proposes a general calculation method. For all nodes that are "NO", the probability calculation is expressed as follows:

[0118]

[0119] Except for the above cases, the probability value is 1.

[0120] The second method: the flow attack method models and analyzes the defense devices of the physical protection system.

[0121] The present invention assumes that the enemy has only one intrusion route, so the probability that the enemy exists in two areas at the same time is 0. The enemy intrusion process can be guided by the underlying Bayesian network, which maps the dependencies (causal relationships) between nodes of the physical protection system. Flow attacks can be used to select the enemy intrusion path in the current state. The overall dependency relationship between the intrusion nodes is established based on the topological relationship of the physical protection system device, and the overall defense effectiveness of the physical protection system against enemy intrusion is evaluated based on the single path analysis method.

[0122] When the flow attack model is complete (complete means there are protected targets and adversary starting position states), a state probability table is constructed to assess the risk of the physical protection system and analyze the most likely intrusion path taken by the adversary. The conditional probability table reflects the possibility of the adversary choosing the next node to invade. The local conditional probability distribution can be calculated using Bayesian reasoning, and combined with the unconditional probability of each intermediate node, the unconditional probability of the target node being invaded can be inferred.

[0123] like Figure 3 As shown, the present invention assumes that the state probability table is given by the physical protection system EASI method, that is, P(I) = P(C)*P(D)*P(R|A). P(R|A) can be given by the Dijkstra algorithm, and the enumeration method is used to reversely infer the enemy's remaining task time and the corresponding time relationship. The detection probability and the communication probability are fixed values ​​for each protection device, so the interception probability can be calculated. When the enemy is an internal threat, it can be assumed that the defense probability of the protection element is 0, or a very low number, so that the internal enemy can easily enter and exit the device.

[0124] Under the premise of adopting the flow attack model analysis, this paper assumes that when setting the conditional probability table, it is assumed that the probability of two devices being invaded at the same time is 0, and the probability of two devices not being invaded at the same time is also 0.

[0125] The above embodiments are preferred implementation modes of the present invention, but the implementation modes of the present invention are not limited to the above embodiments. Any other changes, modifications, substitutions, combinations, and simplifications that do not deviate from the spirit and principles of the present invention should be equivalent replacement methods and are included in the protection scope of the present invention.

[0126] The second object of the present invention is to propose a physical protection system attack and defense effectiveness evaluation system based on a flow attack graph model, such as Figure 4 As shown, including:

[0127] Model building module: used to build a physical protection system flow attack model;

[0128] Intrusion path module: used to display the intrusion path through the physical protection system flow attack model;

[0129] Interception probability module: used to consider the enemy detection probability and obtain the interception probability based on the intrusion path;

[0130] Reverse deduction module: used to perform reverse deduction after detecting an enemy intrusion event based on the interception probability;

[0131] Model reasoning module: It is used to use the detection probability as the basis for stream attack decision-making, build a Bayesian network undirected graph according to the reverse deduction results, and perform stream attack model reasoning.

[0132] like Figure 5 As shown, the third object of the present invention is to provide an electronic device, the electronic device comprising: a processor, a memory and a display screen. The memory and the display screen are both connected to the processor, such as through a bus. Optionally, the electronic device may also include a transceiver. It should be noted that in actual applications, the transceiver is not limited to one, and the structure of the electronic device does not constitute a limitation on the embodiments of the present application.

[0133] The processor may be a CPU (Central Processing Unit), a general-purpose processor, a DSP (Digital Signal Processor), an ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit), an FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array) or other programmable logic devices, transistor logic devices, hardware components or any combination thereof. It may implement or execute various exemplary logic blocks, modules and circuits described in conjunction with the disclosure of this application. The processor may also be a combination that implements computing functions, such as a combination of one or more microprocessors, a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, etc.

[0134] The bus may include a path to transmit information between the above components. The bus may be a PCI (Peripheral Component Interconnect) bus or an EISA (Extended Industry Standard Architecture) bus, etc. The bus may be divided into an address bus, a data bus, a control bus, etc.

[0135] The memory can be ROM (Read Only Memory) or other types of static storage devices that can store static information and instructions, RAM (Random Access Memory) or other types of dynamic storage devices that can store information and instructions, or it can be EEPROM (Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory), CD-ROM (Compact Disc Read Only Memory) or other optical disk storage, optical disk storage (including compressed optical disk, laser disk, optical disk, digital versatile disk, Blu-ray disk, etc.), magnetic disk storage medium or other magnetic storage device, or any other medium that can be used to carry or store the desired program code in the form of instructions or data structures and can be accessed by a computer, but is not limited to this.

[0136] The memory is used to store the application code for executing the solution of the present application, and the execution is controlled by the processor. The processor is used to execute the application code stored in the memory to implement the content shown in the above method embodiment.

[0137] Figure 5 The electronic device shown is merely an example and should not bring any limitation to the functions and scope of use of the embodiments of the present application.

[0138] The fourth object of the present invention is to provide a computer-readable storage medium, wherein the computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, wherein the computer program is stored thereon, and when the program is executed by a processor, the aforementioned Figure 1 The various processes of the method embodiment shown in the figure include, for example, a memory including instructions, and the instructions can be executed by a processor of an electronic device to complete the method.

[0139] A computer-readable storage medium may be a tangible device that holds and stores instructions used by an instruction execution device. A computer-readable storage medium may be, but is not limited to, an electrical storage device, a magnetic storage device, an optical storage device, an electromagnetic storage device, a semiconductor storage device, or any combination thereof. Specifically, a computer-readable storage medium may be a portable computer disk, a hard disk, a USB flash drive, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), a podium random access memory (SRAM), a portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), a digital versatile disk (DVD), a memory stick, a floppy disk, an optical disk, a magnetic disk, a mechanical encoding device, and any combination thereof.

[0140] A fifth object of the present invention is to provide a computer program product, comprising computer instructions, which, when executed by a processor, implement the above Figure 1 The various processes of the method embodiment shown can achieve the same technical effect, and will not be described again here to avoid repetition.

[0141] Many embodiments and many applications beyond the examples provided will be apparent to those skilled in the art upon reading the above description. Therefore, the scope of the present teachings should not be determined with reference to the above description, but rather with reference to the preceding claims and the full scope of equivalents to which such claims are entitled. For the purpose of comprehensiveness, all articles and references, including disclosures of patent applications and publications, are incorporated herein by reference. The omission of any aspect of the subject matter disclosed herein in the preceding claims is not intended to be a disclaimer of such subject matter, nor should it be considered that the applicants did not consider such subject matter to be part of the disclosed inventive subject matter.

[0142] The above content is a further detailed description of the present invention. It cannot be determined that the specific implementation methods of the present invention are limited to these. For ordinary technicians in the technical field to which the present invention belongs, without departing from the concept of the present invention, they can also make several simple deductions or substitutions, which should be regarded as belonging to the protection scope of the present invention determined by the submitted claims.

Claims

1. A method for evaluating the attack and defense effectiveness of a physical protection system based on a flow attack graph model, characterized in that: include: Construct a physical protection system flow attack model; Demonstrate intrusion paths through physical protection system flow attack models; Considering the detection probability of the adversary, the interception probability is obtained according to the intrusion path; According to the interception probability, reverse deduction is performed after the enemy intrusion event is detected; Taking the detection probability as the decision-making basis for flow attack, a Bayesian network undirected graph is constructed according to the reverse deduction results to perform flow attack model inference.

2. According to the method for evaluating the attack and defense effectiveness of a physical protection system based on a flow attack graph model of claim 1, it is characterized in that: The construction of the physical protection system flow attack model includes: The flow attack model is defined as a directed acyclic graph of threats and attacks on the protection system by the adversary, which is used to simulate the behavior of physical protection systems being threatened and attacked by the adversary. Construct the basic elements in the physical protection system flow attack model, and the basic elements are organized and arranged according to the structure of a directed acyclic graph; The basic elements in the physical protection system flow attack model include: initial state, final state, general state, special state and arrow state.

3. The method for evaluating the attack and defense effectiveness of a physical protection system based on a flow attack graph model according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The attack model through the physical protection system flow shows the intrusion path, including: The physical protection system flow attack model is used to analyze the invasion cost, invasion success probability, and system risk. The optimal route of the adversary's invasion is determined through the minimum benefit relationship to obtain the invasion path.

4. The method for evaluating the attack and defense effectiveness of a physical protection system based on a flow attack graph model according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The method of considering the detection probability of the enemy and obtaining the interception probability according to the intrusion path includes: When an adversary invades critical infrastructure, assuming that n layers of defense measures are set up, the interception probability is calculated as follows: Where P(C) is the detection probability of the enemy, P(D) is the communication probability, and P(R|A) is the probability that the response force arrives at the target area in advance.

5. The method for evaluating the attack and defense effectiveness of a physical protection system based on a flow attack graph model according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The reverse deduction is performed after the enemy intrusion event is detected based on the interception probability, including: The probability of the guard arriving at the target area in advance after detecting the enemy intrusion event is expanded from one-dimensional calculation to two-dimensional and three-dimensional calculation; the Dijkstra algorithm is used to perform reverse deduction based on the flow attack model; Taking the exploration probability as the basis for the flow attack decision, under the conservative assumption that the intrusion behavior is detected in the final stage, the response force can still reach the target point in time and intercept the intrusion, the interception probability is calculated as follows: Where P(C) is the adversary detection probability and P(D) is the communication probability.

6. The method for evaluating the attack and defense effectiveness of a physical protection system based on a flow attack graph model according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The detection probability is used as the decision basis for the flow attack, and according to the reverse deduction result, a Bayesian network undirected graph is constructed to perform flow attack model reasoning, including: Using detection probability as the basis for flow attack decision-making, the defense path is obtained based on the reverse deduction results and network structure analysis methods; Construct a Bayesian network undirected graph to conduct risk assessment analysis on defense paths; Perform flow attack model inference based on the evaluation and analysis results.

7. A physical protection system attack and defense effectiveness evaluation system based on a flow attack graph model, characterized in that: include: Model building module: used to build a physical protection system flow attack model; Intrusion path module: used to display the intrusion path through the physical protection system flow attack model; Interception probability module: used to consider the enemy detection probability and obtain the interception probability based on the intrusion path; Reverse deduction module: used to perform reverse deduction after detecting an enemy intrusion event based on the interception probability; Model reasoning module: It is used to use the detection probability as the basis for stream attack decision-making, build a Bayesian network undirected graph according to the reverse deduction results, and perform stream attack model reasoning.

8. An electronic device, characterized in that: The method comprises a memory, a processor and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor implements the steps of a method for evaluating the attack and defense effectiveness of a physical protection system of a flow attack graph model as described in any one of claims 1 to 6 when executing the computer program.

9. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the method for evaluating the attack and defense effectiveness of a physical protection system of a flow attack graph model described in any one of claims 1 to 6 are implemented.

10. A computer program product, characterized in that It includes computer instructions, which, when executed by a processor, implement the steps of a method for evaluating the attack and defense effectiveness of a physical protection system of a flow attack graph model as described in any one of claims 1 to 6.

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