GPS signal anti-interference analysis method, device and equipment and readable storage medium
By analyzing the power line spectrum of the pseudo-random code, the pseudo-random code that is most vulnerable to continuous wave interference is solved, and the anti-interference performance of the GPS receiver is improved.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202310591824.X
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2023-05-24
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-26
AI Technical Summary
The prior art is difficult to effectively analyze and process the continuous wave interference of GPS signals on pseudo-random codes, resulting in insufficient anti-interference capability of GPS receivers.
By obtaining the ranging code of the pseudo-random code, calculating its power spectrum, selecting the spectral line with the highest amplitude, determining the vulnerability of each pseudo-random code to be affected by continuous wave interference, and then analyzing and processing interference.
It improves the anti-interference capability of the GPS receiver, provides a new idea of monitoring the radio noise environment, and can more effectively identify and process pseudo-random codes that are most susceptible to continuous wave interference.
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Figure CN119024365A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of global navigation satellite systems, and in particular to a GPS signal anti-interference analysis method, device, equipment and readable storage medium. Background Art
[0002] Satellite navigation signals have low power. For example, the Global Positioning System (GPS) has only 155-160 dBW, which is lower than the noise floor level. Therefore, it is susceptible to interference signals. Radio interference is one of the main methods of interfering with GPS. Among the different types of interference, continuous wave (CW) interference has a strong adverse effect on the quality of received signals.
[0003] In summary, how to effectively analyze and clarify the specific interference of continuous waves on pseudo-random codes is a technical problem that technicians in this field urgently need to solve. Summary of the invention
[0004] The purpose of this application is to provide a GPS signal anti-interference analysis method, device, equipment and readable storage medium, which analyzes the degree of influence of continuous wave interference on GPS signals with different pseudo-random code numbers, thereby providing theoretical points and new ideas for monitoring radio noise environment and improving the anti-interference ability of GPS receivers.
[0005] In order to solve the above technical problems, this application provides the following technical solutions:
[0006] A GPS signal anti-interference analysis method, comprising:
[0007] Obtaining a ranging code of a pseudo-random code;
[0008] Calculating a power line spectrum of the ranging code;
[0009] Select the spectrum line with the highest amplitude from the power line spectrum, and save the amplitude value of the spectrum line;
[0010] The amplitude value is used to determine the vulnerability analysis result of each of the pseudo-random codes being interfered by the continuous wave.
[0011] Preferably, calculating the power line spectrum of the ranging code includes:
[0012] Performing extended sampling on the ranging code to obtain a ranging code signal;
[0013] The ranging code signal is subjected to fast Fourier transformation, and conjugate multiplication is performed on the signals before and after the transformation to obtain the power spectrum line.
[0014] Preferably, using the amplitude value to determine the vulnerability analysis result of each of the pseudo-random codes being interfered with by a continuous wave, comprises:
[0015] Compare the amplitude values corresponding to the pseudo-random codes, and select the target amplitude value with the highest amplitude;
[0016] The target pseudo-random code corresponding to the target amplitude value is determined as the worst pseudo-random code that is most susceptible to continuous wave interference.
[0017] Preferably, using the amplitude value to determine the vulnerability analysis result of each of the pseudo-random codes being interfered with by a continuous wave, comprises:
[0018] Compare the amplitude values corresponding to the pseudo-random codes with a preset threshold value, and select a target amplitude value whose amplitude is greater than the preset threshold value;
[0019] The target pseudo-random code corresponding to the target amplitude value is determined as a pseudo-random code type that is most susceptible to continuous wave interference.
[0020] Preferably, selecting the spectrum line with the highest amplitude from the power line spectrum comprises:
[0021] Deleting the line spectrum in the power line spectrum that is not within the preset range of the continuous wave interference frequency;
[0022] After deletion, the line with the highest amplitude is selected from the remaining power line spectra.
[0023] Preferably, it also includes:
[0024] The vulnerability analysis result is used to interfere with the GPS signal.
[0025] Preferably, it also includes:
[0026] The vulnerability analysis result is used to perform anti-interference processing on the GPS signal.
[0027] A GPS signal anti-interference analysis device, comprising:
[0028] A ranging code acquisition module, used to acquire a ranging code of a pseudo-random code;
[0029] A power line spectrum calculation module, used to calculate the power line spectrum of the ranging code;
[0030] A spectrum line selection module, used to select the spectrum line with the highest amplitude from the power line spectrum and save the amplitude value of the spectrum line;
[0031] The result analysis module is used to determine the vulnerability analysis result of each of the pseudo-random codes being interfered by the continuous wave by using the amplitude value.
[0032] An electronic device, comprising:
[0033] Memory for storing computer programs;
[0034] A processor is used to implement the steps of the above-mentioned GPS signal anti-interference analysis method when executing the computer program.
[0035] A readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the above-mentioned GPS signal anti-interference analysis method are implemented.
[0036] Apply the method provided in the embodiment of the present application to obtain the ranging code of the pseudo-random code; calculate the power line spectrum of the ranging code; select the spectrum line with the highest amplitude from the power line spectrum, and save the amplitude value of the spectrum line; use the amplitude value to determine the vulnerability analysis result of each pseudo-random code under continuous wave interference.
[0037] The GPS coarse acquisition code, also known as the ranging code (C / A, Coarse Acquisition) Code), has a short code period of only 1 millisecond (ms), that is, the pseudo code repeats once every millisecond. This results in the C / A code not having a continuous power spectrum, but a power line spectrum. Generally, each spectrum line of the C / A code signal power spectrum is -24dB or lower relative to the total power, but in each C / A code signal, there are always some spectrum lines with smaller attenuation. In the signal capture process, the received signal is correlated with the local pseudo code, and the capture is successful if the calculation result has a peak exceeding the threshold. When the CW interference coincides with the strongest spectrum line number of the C / A code, the CW interference intensity in the correlator output signal is high, drowning out the capture peak. Therefore, the output power of the CW interference after passing through the receiver is related to the spectrum line amplitude of the C / A code, and the stronger the power of the spectrum line, the worse the anti-interference ability. That is to say, the frequency corresponding to the spectrum line with the highest amplitude in the power line spectrum is the most vulnerable frequency of the corresponding PRN number GPS signal when it is interfered by CW. In this way, the weakest GPS PRN number and its corresponding worst spectrum line can be found.
[0038] Based on this, in this application, first, a pseudo-random code ranging code C / A code is generated, and then the power line spectrum estimation of the C / A code is obtained, and then the spectrum line with the highest amplitude in the power line spectrum is found. The frequency corresponding to the highest spectrum line is the most vulnerable frequency of the signal corresponding to the pseudo-random code to continuous wave interference. Different pseudo-random codes (PRN, pseudo random noise code) have a unique most vulnerable frequency. By traversing all PRN codes, the PRN that is most susceptible to CW interference among all C / A codes can be found, and the vulnerability analysis results of each pseudo-random code to continuous wave interference can be determined. Further, based on the conclusions drawn in this application, different ideas can be provided in the monitoring of radio noise environment, and the anti-interference ability of GPS receivers can also be improved from this perspective.
[0039] Correspondingly, the embodiments of the present application also provide a GPS signal anti-interference analysis device, equipment and readable storage medium corresponding to the above-mentioned GPS signal anti-interference analysis method, which have the above-mentioned technical effects and will not be repeated here. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0040] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application or the related technologies, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the related technical descriptions are briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.
[0041] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of an implementation method of a GPS signal anti-interference analysis method in an embodiment of the present application;
[0042] Figure 2 A logical schematic diagram of ranging code generation in an embodiment of the present application;
[0043] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of a specific implementation of a GPS signal anti-interference analysis method in an embodiment of the present application;
[0044] Figure 4 This is a structural schematic diagram of a GPS signal anti-interference analysis device in an embodiment of the present application;
[0045] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device in an embodiment of the present application;
[0046] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the specific structure of an electronic device in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0047] In order to enable those skilled in the art to better understand the present application, the present application is further described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific implementation methods. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present application, rather than all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in the field without making creative work are within the scope of protection of the present application.
[0048] Please refer to Figure 1 , Figure 1 This is a flowchart of a GPS signal anti-interference analysis method in an embodiment of the present application, the method comprising the following steps:
[0049] S101. Obtain a ranging code of a pseudo-random code.
[0050] For details, please refer to Figure 2 and Table 1, Figure 2 1 is a logic diagram of a ranging code generation in an embodiment of the present application. Table 1 is a logic table of a ranging code generation in an embodiment of the present application.
[0051] Table 1
[0052]
[0053]
[0054] in, Is the exclusive OR logical operator.
[0055] For example, initialize the PRN number, such as PRN = 1, combined with the C / A code signal generation logic, that is, Figure 2 , and the G1G2 selector allocation table, as shown in Table 1, to obtain the C / A code x(n).
[0056] S102: Calculate the power line spectrum of the ranging code.
[0057] After obtaining the corresponding ranging code, the power line spectrum of the ranging code can be calculated.
[0058] Specifically, the power line spectrum of the ranging code may be calculated by means of fast Fourier transform. Of course, in order to improve the continuity of the ranging code, the ranging code may be oversampled.
[0059] In a specific implementation of the present application, step S102 calculates the power line spectrum of the ranging code, including:
[0060] Step 1: perform extended sampling on the ranging code to obtain a ranging code signal;
[0061] Step 2: Perform fast Fourier transform on the ranging code signal, and perform conjugate multiplication on the signals before and after the transform to obtain the power spectrum line.
[0062] For ease of description, the above two steps are combined for explanation below.
[0063] Generally, the C / A code x(n) generated in step S101 contains 1023 chips per period, and the period is 1 ms.
[0064] The generated C / A code is expanded and sampled to obtain the number of chips per cycle Fs*10 -3 , where Fs is the sampling frequency. The extended sampling can be performed using a sampling frequency greater than or equal to the ranging code rate.
[0065] Then, the FFT-based autocorrelation estimation method is used to first perform FFT on the C / A code.
[0066] Where N is the total number of sampling points, k = 0, ... N-1, X N (K) is the signal after FFT, which is then conjugate multiplied by itself: P(k)=R x (k) = conj(X(k))*X(k), thus obtaining the power spectrum line distribution and determining the spectrum line interval, R C / P=1.023*10 6 / 1023=1kHz.
[0067] After the power line spectrum of the ranging code is obtained, the operation of step S103 may be performed.
[0068] S103. Select the spectrum line with the highest amplitude from the power line spectrum, and save the amplitude value of the spectrum line.
[0069] It should be noted that in the process of signal capture, the received signal is correlated with the local pseudo code, and the peak that exceeds the threshold is used for capture. When the CW interference coincides with the strongest spectrum line number of the C / A code, the CW interference intensity in the correlator output signal is high, drowning the capture peak. Therefore, the output power of the CW interference after passing through the receiver is related to the spectrum line amplitude of the C / A code, and the stronger the spectrum line, the worse the anti-interference ability.
[0070] Therefore, the frequency corresponding to the spectrum line with the highest amplitude in the power line spectrum is the most vulnerable frequency of the corresponding PRN number GPS signal when it is interfered by CW. In this way, the weakest GPS PRN number and its corresponding worst spectrum line can be found.
[0071] That is, after obtaining the power line spectrum corresponding to each PRN number, the spectrum line with the highest amplitude can be selected from the power line spectrum, and the amplitude value of the spectrum line is retained for further statistics.
[0072] S104. Determine the vulnerability analysis result of each pseudo-random code under the interference of the continuous wave by using the amplitude value.
[0073] As can be seen from the above, the higher the amplitude value, the worse the ability of the pseudo-random code to resist continuous wave interference. Therefore, the vulnerability analysis results of each pseudo-random code to continuous wave interference can be determined by using the amplitude value.
[0074] Specifically, the pseudo-random codes may be sorted based on the amplitude value, and the sorting is a sorting of the vulnerability of the pseudo-random codes to continuous wave interference.
[0075] Of course, one or several (a type of) pseudo-random codes that are most susceptible to continuous wave interference may also be selected based on the amplitude value.
[0076] In addition, since the amplitude value represents the vulnerability of the corresponding PRN number to continuous wave interference, the amplitude value can be directly sorted and output (such as Table 2, which is a GPS worst spectrum line correspondence table in an embodiment of the present application), that is, the table is the vulnerability analysis result of each pseudo-random code to continuous wave interference.
[0077] Table 2
[0078]
[0079]
[0080] In a specific implementation of the present application, step S103 uses the amplitude value to determine the vulnerability analysis result of each pseudo-random code being interfered by the continuous wave, including:
[0081] Step 1: compare the amplitude values corresponding to each pseudo-random code and select the target amplitude value with the highest amplitude;
[0082] Step 2: determine the target pseudo-random code corresponding to the target amplitude value as the worst pseudo-random code that is most susceptible to continuous wave interference.
[0083] For ease of description, the above two steps are combined for explanation below.
[0084] That is, in this embodiment, the amplitude values corresponding to the pseudo-random codes can be compared to select the target amplitude value with the highest amplitude, and the target pseudo-random code corresponding to the target amplitude value is determined as the worst pseudo-random code that is most susceptible to continuous wave interference.
[0085] In a specific implementation of the present application, step S103 uses the amplitude value to determine the vulnerability analysis result of each pseudo-random code being interfered by the continuous wave, including:
[0086] Step 1: compare the amplitude values corresponding to each pseudo-random code with a preset threshold value, and select a target amplitude value whose amplitude is greater than the preset threshold value;
[0087] Step 2: Determine the target pseudo-random code corresponding to the target amplitude value as the pseudo-random code type that is most susceptible to continuous wave interference.
[0088] For ease of description, the above two steps are combined for explanation below.
[0089] That is, in this embodiment, the amplitude values corresponding to each pseudo-random code can be compared with the preset threshold, and the target amplitude value with an amplitude greater than the preset threshold is selected, and then several pseudo-random codes corresponding to the target amplitude value are determined as the pseudo-random code class that is most susceptible to continuous wave interference. Among them, the preset threshold can be specifically determined according to the power spectrum of the continuous wave, which will not be described one by one here.
[0090] After obtaining the vulnerability analysis results, different ideas can be provided for detection in a radio noise environment based on the vulnerability analysis results. At the same time, the anti-interference capability of the GPS receiver can be improved from this perspective, and the interference capability of the GPS jammer can also be improved from this perspective.
[0091] In a specific implementation of the present application, the vulnerability analysis result can also be used to interfere with the GPS signal. For example, based on the vulnerability analysis result, the PRN number with the worst resistance to continuous waves is focused on interference.
[0092] In a specific implementation of the present application, the vulnerability analysis result can also be used to perform anti-interference processing on the GPS signal. For example, based on the vulnerability analysis result, in the process of modulating the signal, the use of PRN numbers with poor vulnerability is avoided as much as possible.
[0093] Apply the method provided in the embodiment of the present application to obtain the ranging code of the pseudo-random code; calculate the power line spectrum of the ranging code; select the spectrum line with the highest amplitude from the power line spectrum, and save the amplitude value of the spectrum line; use the amplitude value to determine the vulnerability analysis result of each pseudo-random code under continuous wave interference.
[0094] The GPS coarse acquisition code, also known as the ranging code (C / A, Coarse Acquisition) Code), has a short code period of only 1 millisecond (ms), that is, the pseudo code repeats once every millisecond. This results in the C / A code not having a continuous power spectrum, but a power line spectrum. Generally, each spectrum line of the C / A code signal power spectrum is -24dB or lower relative to the total power, but in each C / A code signal, there are always some spectrum lines with smaller attenuation. In the signal capture process, the received signal is correlated with the local pseudo code, and the capture is successful if the calculation result has a peak exceeding the threshold. When the CW interference coincides with the strongest spectrum line number of the C / A code, the CW interference intensity in the correlator output signal is high, drowning out the capture peak. Therefore, the output power of the CW interference after passing through the receiver is related to the spectrum line amplitude of the C / A code, and the stronger the power of the spectrum line, the worse the anti-interference ability. That is to say, the frequency corresponding to the spectrum line with the highest amplitude in the power line spectrum is the most vulnerable frequency of the corresponding PRN number GPS signal when it is interfered by CW. In this way, the weakest GPS PRN number and its corresponding worst spectrum line can be found.
[0095] Based on this, in this application, first, a pseudo-random code ranging code C / A code is generated, and then the power line spectrum estimation of the C / A code is obtained, and then the spectrum line with the highest amplitude in the power line spectrum is found. The frequency corresponding to the highest spectrum line is the most vulnerable frequency of the signal corresponding to the pseudo-random code to continuous wave interference. Different pseudo-random codes (PRN, pseudo random noise code) have a unique most vulnerable frequency. By traversing all PRN codes, the PRN that is most susceptible to CW interference among all C / A codes can be found, and the vulnerability analysis results of each pseudo-random code to continuous wave interference can be determined. Further, based on the conclusions drawn in this application, different ideas can be provided in the monitoring of radio noise environment, and the anti-interference ability of GPS receivers can also be improved from this perspective.
[0096] It should be noted that, based on the above embodiments, the embodiments of the present application also provide corresponding improved solutions. In the preferred / improved embodiments, the same steps or corresponding steps as those in the above embodiments can be referenced to each other, and the corresponding beneficial effects can also be referenced to each other, which will not be described one by one in the preferred / improved embodiments of this article.
[0097] In a specific implementation of the present application, selecting the spectrum line with the highest amplitude from the power line spectrum includes:
[0098] Step 1, deleting the line spectrum in the power line spectrum that is not within the preset range of the continuous wave interference frequency;
[0099] Step 2: After deletion, select the spectrum line with the highest amplitude from the remaining power line spectra.
[0100] For ease of description, the above two steps are combined for explanation below.
[0101] Considering that the CW interference frequency is usually maintained at <10kHz, the power spectrum line corresponding to each pseudo-random code can be screened so that only a number of spectrum line numbers related to CW interference are left. That is, in practical applications, the preset range can also be set to the range where the CW interference frequency is most likely to appear. For example, the preset range can be set to <10kHz.
[0102] Specifically, it is generally believed that the spectral line number within 10 corresponds to continuous wave interference, so only the correspondence between the worst spectral line within 10 and the PRN number can be retained. The correspondence can be presented in a table. For example, a correspondence table is shown in Table 3:
[0103] Table 3
[0104]
[0105]
[0106] It can be seen that in Table 3, only the worst spectral line with a spectral line number less than or equal to 10 and its corresponding amplitude value are used to characterize the vulnerability of each PRN number against continuous waves.
[0107] To facilitate those skilled in the art to better understand and implement the GPS signal anti-interference analysis method provided in the embodiment of the present application, the implementation of the method is described in detail below in combination with specific scenarios.
[0108] The technical problem solved by this application is to provide an analysis and processing of the degree of influence of CW interference on GPS signals of different PRN numbers. In this application, first, the GPSL1 signal ranging code C / A code is generated, the sampling frequency is increased, and then the power line spectrum estimation of the C / A code is obtained. The FFT-based autocorrelation estimation method is used to find the spectrum line with the highest amplitude in the power line spectrum. The frequency corresponding to the highest spectrum line is the most vulnerable frequency of the GPSL1 signal corresponding to the PRN to CW interference. Different PRN codes have unique most vulnerable frequencies. By traversing all PRN codes, the PRN number that is most susceptible to CW interference among all C / A codes can be found. This conclusion provides a different approach to monitoring the radio noise environment, and can also improve the anti-interference ability of the GPS receiver from this perspective.
[0109] To implement the solution of this application: first, it is necessary to generate the GPSL1 signal ranging code according to the rules, determine the PRN number, and increase the sampling rate. The power spectrum line diagram of the C / A code is obtained by the FFT-based autocorrelation estimation method. The frequency corresponding to the spectrum line with the highest amplitude in the power line spectrum is the most vulnerable frequency of the PRN number GPS signal when it is interfered by CW. This method can be used to find the weakest GPS PRN number and its corresponding worst spectrum line.
[0110] For details, please refer to Figure 3 , the method comprises the following steps:
[0111] Step 1: Initialize PRN = 1, generate the G1G2 generator allocation table corresponding to the C / A code, and determine the sampling frequency Fs. Figure 3 The G1 register and the G2 register are shown.
[0112] Step 2: Generate C / A code x(n). In x(n), each period contains 1023 chips and the period is 1 ms.
[0113] Step 3: According to Fs, sample the generated C / A code signal to obtain x N (n);
[0114] Step 4: Execute the FFT-based autocorrelation estimation method, perform FFT on the C / A code, and then multiply it with its own conjugate to obtain the power spectrum line distribution. Determine each spectrum line based on the determined spectrum line interval, and the spectrum line interval can be set according to actual needs.
[0115] Step 5: Save the frequency of the line with the highest amplitude in the power spectrum, that is, the line number, and save the amplitude value corresponding to the line.
[0116] Step 6: Traverse all PRN numbers and repeat steps 1 to 5 to obtain the worst spectral line correspondence table of GPS signals with different PRN numbers (the correspondence table can refer to Table 2 and Table 3 above).
[0117] It should be noted that during the signal capture process, the received signal will be correlated with the local pseudo code, and the capture is successful if the result of the operation exceeds the threshold. If the CW interference signal is consistent with the worst spectrum line frequency of the C / A code, it will cause the correlator output to leak the CW interference signal, so that the correlation peak in the receiver output result is submerged by the CW interference, resulting in capture failure. Therefore, the research method based on the C / A code power spectrum will effectively analyze the problem of GPS receivers being affected by CW interference of different frequencies.
[0118] The technical effect of the present application is: based on the ranging code part of the GPS signal, the influence of CW interference on the acquisition performance of the GPS receiver is analyzed from the perspective of the power spectrum line amplitude, and the worst spectrum line table for different PRN numbers is given. When the CW interference signal has a specific frequency obtained according to the C / A code spectrum line, the capture performance will be worse than other interference frequencies. The analysis conclusion provides a different idea for monitoring the radio noise environment, and can also improve the anti-interference ability of the GPS receiver from this perspective.
[0119] Furthermore, based on the worst spectral line tables for different PRN numbers obtained in this application, the validity of the results was verified using a GPS software receiver.
[0120] Corresponding to the above method embodiment, the embodiment of the present application further provides a GPS signal anti-interference analysis device. The GPS signal anti-interference analysis device described below and the GPS signal anti-interference analysis method described above can refer to each other.
[0121] See also Figure 4 As shown, the device includes the following modules:
[0122] A ranging code acquisition module 101 is used to acquire a ranging code of a pseudo-random code;
[0123] A power line spectrum calculation module 102, used to calculate the power line spectrum of the ranging code;
[0124] The spectrum line selection module 103 is used to select the spectrum line with the highest amplitude from the power line spectrum and save the amplitude value of the spectrum line;
[0125] The result analysis module 104 is used to determine the vulnerability analysis result of each pseudo-random code being interfered by the continuous wave by using the amplitude value.
[0126] Using the device provided in the embodiment of the present application, the ranging code of the pseudo-random code is obtained; the power line spectrum of the ranging code is calculated; the spectrum line with the highest amplitude is selected from the power line spectrum, and the amplitude value of the spectrum line is saved; and the vulnerability analysis result of each pseudo-random code under continuous wave interference is determined using the amplitude value.
[0127] The GPS coarse acquisition code, also known as the ranging code (C / A, Coarse Acquisition) Code), has a short code period of only 1 millisecond (ms), that is, the pseudo code repeats once every millisecond. This results in the C / A code not having a continuous power spectrum, but a power line spectrum. Generally, each spectrum line of the C / A code signal power spectrum is -24dB or lower relative to the total power, but in each C / A code signal, there are always some spectrum lines with smaller attenuation. In the signal capture process, the received signal is correlated with the local pseudo code, and the capture is successful if the calculation result has a peak exceeding the threshold. When the CW interference coincides with the strongest spectrum line number of the C / A code, the CW interference intensity in the correlator output signal is high, drowning out the capture peak. Therefore, the output power of the CW interference after passing through the receiver is related to the spectrum line amplitude of the C / A code, and the stronger the power of the spectrum line, the worse the anti-interference ability. That is to say, the frequency corresponding to the spectrum line with the highest amplitude in the power line spectrum is the most vulnerable frequency of the corresponding PRN number GPS signal when it is interfered by CW. In this way, the weakest GPS PRN number and its corresponding worst spectrum line can be found.
[0128] Based on this, in this application, first, a pseudo-random code ranging code C / A code is generated, and then the power line spectrum estimation of the C / A code is obtained, and then the spectrum line with the highest amplitude in the power line spectrum is found. The frequency corresponding to the highest spectrum line is the most vulnerable frequency of the signal corresponding to the pseudo-random code to continuous wave interference. Different pseudo-random codes (PRN, pseudo random noise code) have a unique most vulnerable frequency. By traversing all PRN codes, the PRN that is most susceptible to CW interference among all C / A codes can be found, and the vulnerability analysis results of each pseudo-random code to continuous wave interference can be determined. Further, based on the conclusions drawn in this application, different ideas can be provided in the monitoring of radio noise environment, and the anti-interference ability of GPS receivers can also be improved from this perspective.
[0129] In a specific implementation of the present application, the power line spectrum calculation module 102 is specifically used to perform extended sampling on the ranging code to obtain the ranging code signal; perform fast Fourier transform on the ranging code signal, and perform conjugate multiplication on the signals before and after the conversion to obtain the power spectrum line.
[0130] In a specific implementation of the present application, the result analysis module 104 is specifically used to compare the amplitude values corresponding to each pseudo-random code, and select the target amplitude value with the highest amplitude;
[0131] The target pseudo-random code corresponding to the target amplitude value is determined as the worst pseudo-random code that is most susceptible to continuous wave interference.
[0132] In a specific implementation of the present application, the result analysis module 104 is specifically used to compare the amplitude values corresponding to each pseudo-random code with a preset threshold value, and select a target amplitude value whose amplitude is greater than the preset threshold value;
[0133] The target pseudo-random code corresponding to the target amplitude value is determined as a pseudo-random code type that is most susceptible to continuous wave interference.
[0134] In a specific implementation of the present application, the spectrum line selection module 103 is specifically used to delete the line spectrum in the power line spectrum that is not within the preset range of the continuous wave interference frequency; after deletion, select the spectrum line with the highest amplitude from the remaining power line spectrum.
[0135] In a specific implementation of the present application, it also includes:
[0136] The signal interference module is used to interfere with GPS signals using the vulnerability analysis results.
[0137] In a specific implementation of the present application, it also includes:
[0138] The anti-interference module is used to perform anti-interference processing on GPS signals using the vulnerability analysis results.
[0139] Corresponding to the above method embodiment, the embodiment of the present application further provides an electronic device. The electronic device described below and the GPS signal anti-interference analysis method described above can refer to each other.
[0140] See also Figure 5 As shown, the electronic device includes:
[0141] A memory 332, for storing computer programs;
[0142] The processor 322 is used to implement the steps of the GPS signal anti-interference analysis method of the above method embodiment when executing the computer program.
[0143] For details, please refer to Figure 6 , Figure 6 A specific structural diagram of an electronic device provided for this embodiment, the electronic device may have relatively large differences due to different configurations or performances, and may include one or more processors (central processing units, CPU) 322 (for example, one or more processors) and a memory 332, and the memory 332 stores one or more computer programs 342 or data 344. Among them, the memory 332 can be a temporary storage or a permanent storage. The program stored in the memory 332 may include one or more modules (not shown in the figure), and each module may include a series of instruction operations in the data processing device. Furthermore, the processor 322 can be configured to communicate with the memory 332 to execute a series of instruction operations in the memory 332 on the electronic device 301.
[0144] The electronic device 301 may further include one or more power supplies 326 , one or more wired or wireless network interfaces 350 , one or more input and output interfaces 358 , and / or one or more operating systems 341 .
[0145] The steps in the GPS signal anti-interference analysis method described above can be implemented by the structure of an electronic device.
[0146] Corresponding to the above method embodiment, the embodiment of the present application further provides a readable storage medium. The readable storage medium described below and the GPS signal anti-interference analysis method described above can refer to each other.
[0147] A readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the GPS signal anti-interference analysis method of the above method embodiment are implemented.
[0148] The readable storage medium may specifically be a U disk, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk or an optical disk, or other readable storage medium that can store program codes.
[0149] In this specification, each embodiment is described in a progressive manner, and each embodiment focuses on the differences from other embodiments. The same or similar parts between the embodiments can be referred to each other. For the device disclosed in the embodiment, since it corresponds to the method disclosed in the embodiment, the description is relatively simple, and the relevant parts can be referred to the method part.
[0150] Those skilled in the art may further appreciate that the units and algorithm steps of each example described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented with electronic hardware, computer software, or a combination of the two. In order to clearly illustrate the interchangeability of hardware and software, the composition and steps of each example have been generally described in terms of function in the above description. Whether these functions are performed in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art may use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered to be beyond the scope of this application.
[0151] The steps of the method or algorithm described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein may be implemented directly using hardware, a software module executed by a processor, or a combination of the two. The software module may be placed in a random access memory (RAM), a memory, a read-only memory (ROM), an electrically programmable ROM, an electrically erasable programmable ROM, a register, a hard disk, a removable disk, a CD-ROM, or any other form of storage medium known in the art.
[0152] Finally, it should be noted that, in this article, relationships such as first and second, etc. are used only to distinguish one entity or operation from another entity or operation, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Moreover, the terms include, include or any other variations are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, article or device that includes a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also other elements not explicitly listed, or also includes elements inherent to such process, method, article or device.
[0153] Specific examples are used herein to illustrate the principles and implementation methods of the present application. The description of the above embodiments is only used to help understand the method and core idea of the present application. At the same time, for those skilled in the art, according to the idea of the present application, there will be changes in the specific implementation methods and application scope. In summary, the content of this specification should not be understood as a limitation on the present application.
Claims
1. A GPS signal anti-interference analysis method, It is characterized in that include: Obtaining a ranging code of a pseudo-random code; Calculating a power line spectrum of the ranging code; Select the spectrum line with the highest amplitude from the power line spectrum, and save the amplitude value of the spectrum line; The amplitude value is used to determine the vulnerability analysis result of each of the pseudo-random codes being interfered by the continuous wave.
2. The GPS signal anti-interference analysis method according to claim 1, It is characterized in that Calculating the power line spectrum of the ranging code includes: Performing extended sampling on the ranging code to obtain a ranging code signal; The ranging code signal is subjected to fast Fourier transformation, and conjugate multiplication is performed on the signals before and after the transformation to obtain the power spectrum line.
3. The GPS signal anti-interference analysis method according to claim 1, It is characterized in that Determining the vulnerability analysis results of each of the pseudo-random codes being interfered with by a continuous wave by using the amplitude value, including: Compare the amplitude values corresponding to the pseudo-random codes, and select the target amplitude value with the highest amplitude; The target pseudo-random code corresponding to the target amplitude value is determined as the worst pseudo-random code that is most susceptible to continuous wave interference.
4. The GPS signal anti-interference analysis method according to claim 1, It is characterized in that Determining the vulnerability analysis results of each of the pseudo-random codes being interfered with by a continuous wave by using the amplitude value, including: Compare the amplitude values corresponding to the pseudo-random codes with a preset threshold value, and select a target amplitude value whose amplitude is greater than the preset threshold value; The target pseudo-random code corresponding to the target amplitude value is determined as a pseudo-random code type that is most susceptible to continuous wave interference.
5. The GPS signal anti-interference analysis method according to claim 1, It is characterized in that Select the line with the highest amplitude from the power line spectrum, including: Deleting the line spectrum in the power line spectrum that is not within the preset range of the continuous wave interference frequency; After deletion, the line with the highest amplitude is selected from the remaining power line spectra.
6. The GPS signal anti-interference analysis method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, It is characterized in that Also includes: The vulnerability analysis result is used to interfere with the GPS signal.
7. The GPS signal anti-interference analysis method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, It is characterized in that Also includes: The vulnerability analysis result is used to perform anti-interference processing on the GPS signal.
8. A GPS signal anti-interference analysis device, It is characterized in that include: A ranging code acquisition module, used to acquire a ranging code of a pseudo-random code; A power line spectrum calculation module, used to calculate the power line spectrum of the ranging code; A spectrum line selection module, used to select the spectrum line with the highest amplitude from the power line spectrum and save the amplitude value of the spectrum line; The result analysis module is used to determine the vulnerability analysis result of each of the pseudo-random codes being interfered by the continuous wave by using the amplitude value.
9. An electronic device, It is characterized in that include: Memory for storing computer programs; A processor, configured to implement the steps of the GPS signal anti-interference analysis method as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 7 when executing the computer program.
10. A readable storage medium, It is characterized in that The readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the GPS signal anti-interference analysis method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.
