Firmware encryption method, device and equipment and readable storage medium
By using PUF technology in BMC devices to generate a unique key, combined with a secure startup algorithm, the problem of secure startup verification in the existing technology is solved, and secure startup at the chip fingerprint level is achieved, ensuring that each BMC chip is The uniqueness and non-replicability significantly improve the security of the system.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411166955.4
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-08-22
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-26
AI Technical Summary
Existing secure boot technologies pose security risks, such as physical replacement of SPI flash or eMMC storage media can bypass security checks, and attackers can forge a secure bootable firmware environment.
By generating a unique key based on the chip physical characteristics of the local device in advance, using PUF technology and secure boot algorithms, we ensure that the secure boot verification of each BMC chip is unique and non-replicable, and replacing the firmware image with a unique key and verify the legitimacy of the firmware through a secure startup program.
It significantly improves the security of the system, prevents illegal replication and use of legal firmware, ensures that the secure startup of each BMC device is unique and non-replicable, and enhances the protection capabilities of the system.
Smart Images

Figure CN119026153A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to a firmware encryption method, device, equipment and readable storage medium. Background Art
[0002] With the rapid development of information technology, cybersecurity threats are increasing, especially attacks on critical infrastructure such as servers, which can have serious consequences. In order to ensure information security, the industry has proposed a variety of technical means to improve system security. Among them, "Secure Boot" is an important security protection measure that aims to ensure that computer devices only load and execute verified and trusted software during the startup process, thereby preventing unauthorized firmware or operating systems from being loaded and run.
[0003] Traditional secure boot technology mainly relies on digital signatures and encryption technology to verify the firmware image at each stage of the boot process. Specifically, during the device boot process, it starts from the secure boot ROM (bootROM), and loads the SPL (Secondary Program Loader), OpenSBI (Open Source System Base Interface) + UBoot and other boot programs in sequence until the Linux operating system is finally started. Each level of the boot program will perform an integrity check on the firmware image of the next level. The method usually used is to use the preset public key to verify the hash value of the firmware image to ensure that the software has not been tampered with.
[0004] Existing secure boot technologies have certain security risks. For example, when using the public key of the original equipment manufacturer digital signage solution (OEM DSS) for signature verification, if the same public key is used between different devices, then simply physically replacing the SPI flash or eMMC storage medium can enable another device to successfully perform a secure boot, thereby bypassing the security check. In addition, attackers can also obtain the public key of the OEM DSS in an already deployed server environment, program it into a one-time programmable (OTP) memory, and then copy the firmware content in the SPI flash or eMMC medium to forge a firmware environment that can be securely booted. Summary of the invention
[0005] In view of this, the present specification provides a firmware encryption method, device, electronic device, and readable storage medium to improve the problem that the above-mentioned firmware image verification is easily attacked.
[0006] The specific technical solutions are as follows:
[0007] The present specification provides a firmware encryption method, which is applied to a BMC device. The method includes: generating and storing a unique key associated with a local device in advance according to the physical characteristics of a chip of the local device; receiving a firmware image to be written, verifying the legitimacy of the firmware image according to a private key pre-stored in the firmware image, storing the firmware image to be written, and replacing the private key pre-stored in the firmware image with the private key of the unique key; starting the firmware through a secure boot program according to the written firmware image, and verifying the legitimacy of the started firmware using the public key of the stored unique key and the private key of the unique key stored in the firmware image.
[0008] As a technical solution, the method of generating and storing a unique key associated with the local device in advance based on the physical characteristics of the chip of the local device includes: obtaining the unique physical changes of the chip associated with the production process, and generating and storing a unique key associated with the local device based on the physical changes.
[0009] As a technical solution, the receiving of the firmware image to be written and verifying the legitimacy of the firmware image according to the private key pre-stored in the firmware image includes: using a pre-stored public key to verify the legitimacy of the firmware image according to the private key pre-stored in the firmware image.
[0010] As a technical solution, the firmware is started through a secure boot program based on the written firmware image, and the legality of the started firmware is verified using the public key of the stored unique key and the private key of the unique key stored in the firmware image, including: if the unique key verification is legal, the firmware is allowed to load and start; if the unique key verification is illegal, the firmware is refused to load and start.
[0011] This specification also provides a firmware encryption device, which is applied to a BMC device, and the device includes: a first module, which is used to generate and store a unique key associated with a local device in advance according to the physical characteristics of a chip of the local device; a second module, which is used to receive a firmware image to be written, verify the legitimacy of the firmware image according to a private key pre-stored in the firmware image, store the firmware image to be written, and replace the private key pre-stored in the firmware image with the private key of the unique key; a third module, which is used to start the firmware through a secure boot program according to the written firmware image, and use the stored public key of the unique key and the private key of the unique key stored in the firmware image to verify the legitimacy of the started firmware.
[0012] As a technical solution, the method of generating and storing a unique key associated with the local device in advance based on the physical characteristics of the chip of the local device includes: obtaining the unique physical changes of the chip associated with the production process, and generating and storing a unique key associated with the local device based on the physical changes.
[0013] As a technical solution, the receiving of the firmware image to be written and verifying the legitimacy of the firmware image according to the private key pre-stored in the firmware image includes: using a pre-stored public key to verify the legitimacy of the firmware image according to the private key pre-stored in the firmware image.
[0014] As a technical solution, the firmware is started through a secure boot program based on the written firmware image, and the legality of the started firmware is verified using the public key of the stored unique key and the private key of the unique key stored in the firmware image, including: if the unique key verification is legal, the firmware is allowed to load and start; if the unique key verification is illegal, the firmware is refused to load and start.
[0015] This specification also provides an electronic device, including a processor and a readable storage medium, wherein the readable storage medium stores machine executable instructions that can be executed by the processor, and the processor executes the machine executable instructions to implement the aforementioned firmware encryption method.
[0016] This specification also provides a readable storage medium, which stores machine-executable instructions. When the machine-executable instructions are called and executed by a processor, the machine-executable instructions prompt the processor to implement the aforementioned firmware encryption method.
[0017] The above technical solution provided in this specification brings at least the following beneficial effects:
[0018] By introducing PUF technology and combining it with a secure boot algorithm, a secure boot solution at the chip fingerprint level is implemented, ensuring that the secure boot verification of each BMC chip is unique and non-replicable, thereby significantly improving the security of the system and preventing illegal copying and use of legal firmware. This technical solution uses a unique key generated by the physical characteristics of the chip to encrypt and verify the firmware, ensuring that the secure boot of each BMC device is unique and non-replicable, thereby effectively improving the security of the system and preventing illegal copying and use of firmware. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0019] In order to more clearly illustrate the implementation methods of this specification or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the implementation methods of this specification or the description of the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some implementation methods recorded in this specification. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can also be obtained based on these drawings of the implementation methods of this specification.
[0020] Figure 1 is a flowchart of a firmware encryption method in one implementation of this specification;
[0021] Figure 2It is a schematic diagram of a flow chart in one embodiment of this specification;
[0022] Figure 3 is a structural diagram of a firmware encryption device in one implementation of this specification;
[0023] Figure 4 It is a hardware structure diagram of an electronic device in one implementation mode of this specification.
[0024] Reference numerals: first module 21 , second module 22 , third module 23 . DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0025] The terms used in the embodiments of this specification are only for the purpose of describing specific embodiments, rather than limiting this specification. The singular forms of "a", "said" and "the" used in this specification and claims are also intended to include plural forms, unless the context clearly indicates other meanings. It should also be understood that the term "and / or" used herein refers to any or all possible combinations of one or more associated listed items.
[0026] It should be understood that although the terms first, second, third, etc. may be used to describe various information in the embodiments of this specification, this information should not be limited to these terms. These terms are only used to distinguish the same type of information from each other. For example, without departing from the scope of this specification, the first information may also be referred to as the second information, and similarly, the second information may also be referred to as the first information. Depending on the context, in addition, the word "if" used may be interpreted as "at the time of" or "when" or "in response to determining".
[0027] In today's digital age, the security of embedded systems has become a critical issue. As a mechanism to ensure that devices run trusted software, the core purpose of secure boot technology is to prevent malware or unauthorized firmware from being executed on the device. The implementation of secure boot usually relies on a series of verified boot components, starting from the Boot ROM, through various stages of bootloaders, and finally loading the operating system.
[0028] In one technical solution, the secure boot process is usually as follows: First, the Boot ROM loads the first-stage boot program (SPL), then the SPL loads the second-stage boot program (such as OpenSBI+UBoot), and finally the boot program loads and starts the Linux operating system. These components are usually stored in non-volatile memory (such as flash), and the next-level boot image is loaded from these memories when the system starts.
[0029] The above technical solution has some security risks. If the image file in the flash is replaced by a malicious attacker, the system may run the tampered firmware, which will threaten the security of the entire system. To solve this problem, secure boot technology uses encryption and decryption technology to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the firmware.
[0030] Although the existing secure boot technology has improved the security of the system to a certain extent, it still has some potential security vulnerabilities. For example, if an attacker can obtain the public key of the original equipment manufacturer's (OEM) digital signature solution (DSS) and program it into the one-time programmable memory (OTP), and copy the firmware content in the SPI flash / EMMC media, then the attacker can forge a securely bootable BMC firmware environment, thereby bypassing the secure boot protection mechanism.
[0031] In addition, if the same OEM manufacturer's devices are physically replaced, it may also cause the secure boot verification to fail, because the BMC chips of different devices may use the same public key for firmware signature verification.
[0032] In view of this, in response to the aforementioned security vulnerabilities, this specification proposes a new secure boot technology solution that combines chip fingerprints. The core of this solution is to use physical unclonable technology (PUF) to generate a unique key bound to the device, thereby ensuring that the secure boot verification of each chip is unique and non-replicable. By incorporating the individual characteristics of the chip into the secure boot verification measurement algorithm, the present invention effectively improves the security of the system and prevents illegal copying and impersonation of the firmware.
[0033] The specific technical solution is described below.
[0034] In one embodiment, the present specification provides a firmware encryption method, which is applied to a BMC device, the method comprising: generating and storing a unique key associated with a local device in advance according to the physical characteristics of a chip of the local device; receiving a firmware image to be written, verifying the legitimacy of the firmware image according to a private key pre-stored in the firmware image, storing the firmware image to be written, and replacing the private key pre-stored in the firmware image with the private key of the unique key; starting the firmware through a secure boot program according to the written firmware image, and verifying the legitimacy of the started firmware using the stored public key of the unique key and the private key of the unique key stored in the firmware image.
[0035] Specifically, Figure 1 , including the following steps:
[0036] Step S11, generating and storing a unique key associated with the local device in advance according to the physical characteristics of the chip of the local device.
[0037] During the semiconductor manufacturing process, due to slight differences in the process, each chip will produce unique physical characteristics, which is called a physical unclonable function (PUF). PUF can be regarded as the "digital fingerprint" of the chip, which is its unique identity. In order to take advantage of this feature, when the device leaves the factory, PUF technology is used to generate a unique key bound to the device from inside the chip.
[0038] In one technical scenario, this key may not be explicitly stored, but regenerated each time through the PUF mechanism, which ensures that even if someone tries to obtain the key, they cannot copy it without the specific chip.
[0039] In BMC devices, the PUF mechanism generates a key when the device is first started and binds it to the device. This key is used as part of the public key and private key in the subsequent secure boot process. Because the PUF key is generated based on physical characteristics, even if two chips come from the same manufacturer, their PUF keys will be completely different.
[0040] Step S12, receiving the firmware image to be written, verifying the legitimacy of the firmware image according to the private key pre-stored in the firmware image, storing the firmware image to be written, and replacing the private key pre-stored in the firmware image with the private key of the unique key.
[0041] When new firmware needs to be written to the device, the firmware is first verified using a pre-stored private key to ensure the authenticity of the firmware. This private key is usually written into the one-time programmable (OTP) memory by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) during the production process. After verification, the previously generated PUF private key is used to replace the original private key in the firmware, and then the firmware image with the new signature is written to the flash memory.
[0042] For example, when a server administrator is preparing to update the BMC firmware, the administrator will first use the public key provided by the OEM to perform a preliminary verification of the firmware. Once the verification is passed, the system will use the previously generated PUF private key to re-sign the firmware. This means that even if an illegal third party obtains the firmware file, they will not be able to forge a valid signature due to the lack of the correct PUF private key.
[0043] Step S13, starting the firmware through a secure boot program according to the written firmware image, and using the public key of the stored unique key and the private key of the unique key stored in the firmware image to verify the legitimacy of the started firmware.
[0044] When the device starts, the secure boot program reads the signature in the firmware image and uses the PUF public key to verify the validity of the signature. Since the PUF key is specific to each device, even if an illegal third party attempts to replace the firmware, the firmware verification will fail due to the inability to generate the correct PUF private key, preventing the loading of malicious firmware.
[0045] For example, when the server boots up, the BMC verifies the signature of the firmware image using the PUF public key stored in its OTP. Only when the signature is correct will the system continue with the boot process. If the signature does not match, the BMC will prevent the firmware from loading and may trigger an alarm mechanism.
[0046] In one embodiment, a physical unclonable function (PUF) is used to generate a unique key associated with the physical characteristics of the local device chip. PUF technology can extract a unique "digital fingerprint" from the natural physical changes of the chip, which is unpredictable and unreplicable. For example, during the chip manufacturing process, a unique key is generated by detecting tiny differences in transistors. This key is then securely stored in the device's one-time programmable memory (OTP) to ensure its security and immutability.
[0047] When a new firmware image needs to be written to the BMC device, the firmware image to be written is first received. Before writing, the legitimacy of the firmware image needs to be verified. This is usually done by using the private key pre-stored in the firmware image. The firmware image is decrypted and verified using this private key to ensure that it has not been tampered with. Once verified, the firmware image is stored in the device's non-volatile memory, such as SPI flash or eMMC.
[0048] Use the private key of the unique key generated above to replace the pre-stored private key in the firmware image. This step ensures the binding of the firmware image to the local device. Even if the firmware image is copied to other devices, it cannot be run without the corresponding unique key. If a firmware image was originally designed for device A, through this step, it will be transformed to only match the PUF key of device A, thereby preventing the illegal copying and use of the firmware image.
[0049] After the firmware image is written and stored, the firmware is started through the secure boot program. During the boot process, the secure boot program first uses the public key of the unique key stored in the OTP to verify the private key of the unique key stored in the firmware image. This step ensures that the signature of the firmware image is generated by a legitimate private key, thereby verifying the legitimacy of the firmware.
[0050] If an attacker attempts to replace the firmware image, the secure boot process will fail to pass the verification due to the lack of the correct unique key private key, thus preventing the boot of the illegal firmware. This mechanism not only improves the security of the system, but also ensures that only verified firmware can run, thus protecting the integrity and security of the system.
[0051] In one embodiment, the method of generating and storing a unique key associated with the local device in advance based on the physical characteristics of the chip of the local device includes: obtaining unique physical changes of the chip associated with the production process, and generating and storing a unique key associated with the local device based on the physical changes.
[0052] In one embodiment, the receiving the firmware image to be written and verifying the legitimacy of the firmware image according to the private key pre-stored in the firmware image includes: using a pre-stored public key to verify the legitimacy of the firmware image according to the private key pre-stored in the firmware image.
[0053] In one embodiment, the firmware is started through a secure boot program based on the written firmware image, and the legitimacy of the started firmware is verified using the public key of the stored unique key and the private key of the unique key stored in the firmware image, including: if the unique key verification is legal, the firmware loading and startup is allowed; if the unique key verification is illegal, the firmware loading and startup is rejected.
[0054] In one embodiment, PUF (Physical Unclonable Function) technology is used. Based on the naturally occurring unclonable physical changes in the semiconductor manufacturing process, this is a "digital fingerprint" that is used as the unique identity of semiconductor devices (such as microprocessors and chips) and is unique and unpredictable.
[0055] PUF generates a unique key bound to the device from within the chip, and the software can only be decrypted and run on the device that implements encryption. This binding ensures the security of the software program. Even if the software is copied to other devices, the software cannot be decrypted and run because the same decryption key cannot be generated.
[0056] The feature of PUF private key not being stored significantly improves the security of the key and can resist various intrusion attacks.
[0057] As can be seen from the above, PUF can provide the BMC chip with a unique, tamper-proof, unpredictable, and non-copyable PUF-associated key.
[0058] like Figure 2 ,The Secure Boot program has been improved based on the original implementation.
[0059] When writing the firmware, the Public key in the OTP is used to verify the legitimacy of the firmware, and then the original signature is rewritten, and the image signature generated by the PUF private key is overwritten and written to the SPI flash / eMMC medium.
[0060] When the Secure Boot secure boot verifies the signature, the PUF public key is used to verify the signature, and the rewritten Signature in the SPIflash / eMMC medium is used to verify the measurement.
[0061] In one embodiment, Figure 3 This specification also provides a firmware encryption device, which is applied to a BMC device. The device includes: a first module, which is used to generate and store a unique key associated with a local device in advance according to the physical characteristics of a chip of the local device; a second module, which is used to receive a firmware image to be written, verify the legitimacy of the firmware image according to a private key pre-stored in the firmware image, store the firmware image to be written, and replace the private key pre-stored in the firmware image with the private key of the unique key; a third module, which is used to start the firmware through a secure boot program according to the written firmware image, and use the stored public key of the unique key and the private key of the unique key stored in the firmware image to verify the legitimacy of the started firmware.
[0062] In one embodiment, the method of generating and storing a unique key associated with the local device in advance based on the physical characteristics of the chip of the local device includes: obtaining unique physical changes of the chip associated with the production process, and generating and storing a unique key associated with the local device based on the physical changes.
[0063] In one embodiment, the receiving the firmware image to be written and verifying the legitimacy of the firmware image according to the private key pre-stored in the firmware image includes: using a pre-stored public key to verify the legitimacy of the firmware image according to the private key pre-stored in the firmware image.
[0064] In one embodiment, the firmware is started through a secure boot program based on the written firmware image, and the legitimacy of the started firmware is verified using the public key of the stored unique key and the private key of the unique key stored in the firmware image, including: if the unique key verification is legal, the firmware loading and startup is allowed; if the unique key verification is illegal, the firmware loading and startup is rejected.
[0065] The device implementation is the same as or similar to the corresponding method implementation, and will not be described in detail here.
[0066] In one embodiment, this specification provides an electronic device, including a processor and a readable storage medium, wherein the readable storage medium stores machine executable instructions that can be executed by the processor, and the processor executes the machine executable instructions to implement the aforementioned firmware encryption method. From a hardware level, the hardware architecture diagram can be seen in Figure 4 shown.
[0067] In one embodiment, the present specification provides a readable storage medium, wherein the readable storage medium stores machine executable instructions, and when the machine executable instructions are called and executed by a processor, the machine executable instructions prompt the processor to implement the aforementioned firmware encryption method.
[0068] Here, the readable storage medium can be any electronic, magnetic, optical or other physical storage device that can contain or store information, such as executable instructions, data, etc. For example, the readable storage medium can be: RAM (Radom Access Memory), volatile memory, non-volatile memory, flash memory, storage drive (such as hard disk drive), solid state drive, any type of storage disk (such as CD, DVD, etc.), or similar storage medium, or a combination thereof.
[0069] The systems, devices, modules or units described in the above embodiments may be implemented by computer chips or entities, or by products with certain functions. A typical implementation device is a computer, which may be in the form of a personal computer, a laptop computer, a cellular phone, a camera phone, a smart phone, a personal digital assistant, a media player, a navigation device, an email transceiver, a game console, a tablet computer, a wearable device or a combination of any of these devices.
[0070] For the convenience of description, the above device is described in various units according to their functions. Of course, when implementing this specification, the functions of each unit can be implemented in the same or multiple software and / or hardware.
[0071] It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that the embodiments of this specification may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, this specification may be in the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware. Moreover, this specification may be in the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.
[0072] This specification is described with reference to flowcharts and / or block diagrams of methods, devices (systems), and computer program products according to the embodiments of this specification. It should be understood that each process and / or box in the flowchart and / or block diagram, as well as the combination of processes and / or boxes in the flowchart and / or block diagram, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to produce a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device generate instructions for implementing the processes in the flowchart and / or block diagram. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in a block or multiple blocks.
[0073] Moreover, these computer program instructions can also be stored in a computer-readable memory that can guide a computer or other programmable data processing device to work in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce a product including an instruction device, which implements the process Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The function specified in one or more boxes.
[0074] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device so that a series of operating steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions for executing on the computer or other programmable device to implement the process. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A step that specifies a function in one or more boxes.
[0075] It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that the embodiments of this specification may be provided as methods, systems or computer program products. Therefore, this specification may be in the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware. Moreover, this specification may be in the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (which may include but are not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.
[0076] The above description is only an embodiment of the present specification and is not intended to limit the present specification. For those skilled in the art, the present specification may have various changes and variations. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present specification shall be included in the scope of the claims of the present specification.
Claims
1. A firmware image encryption method, characterized in that: Applied to a BMC device, the method includes: Generate and store a unique key associated with the local device in advance based on the physical characteristics of the chip of the local device; Receive the firmware image to be written, verify the legitimacy of the firmware image according to the private key pre-stored in the firmware image, store the firmware image to be written, and replace the private key pre-stored in the firmware image with the private key of the unique key; The firmware is started through the secure boot program according to the written firmware image, and the legitimacy of the started firmware is verified by using the public key of the stored unique key and the private key of the unique key stored in the firmware image.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The step of generating and storing a unique key associated with the local device in advance according to the physical characteristics of the chip of the local device includes: A unique physical change of the chip associated with the production process is obtained, and a unique key associated with the local device is generated and stored according to the physical change.
3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The receiving of the firmware image to be written and verifying the legitimacy of the firmware image according to the private key pre-stored in the firmware image includes: Use the pre-stored public key to verify the legitimacy of the firmware image based on the pre-stored private key of the firmware image.
4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The method of starting the firmware through a secure boot program according to the written firmware image, and using the public key of the stored unique key and the private key of the unique key stored in the firmware image to verify the legitimacy of the started firmware includes: If the unique key is verified to be legal, the firmware is allowed to load and start; If the unique key verification is illegal, the firmware loading and startup will be rejected.
5. A firmware image encryption device, characterized in that: Applied to BMC equipment, the device comprises: The first module is used to generate and store a unique key associated with the local device in advance according to the physical characteristics of the chip of the local device; The second module is used to receive the firmware image to be written, verify the legitimacy of the firmware image according to the private key pre-stored in the firmware image, store the firmware image to be written, and replace the private key pre-stored in the firmware image with the private key of the unique key; The third module is used to start the firmware through the secure boot program according to the written firmware image, and use the public key of the stored unique key and the private key of the unique key stored in the firmware image to verify the legitimacy of the started firmware.
6. The device according to claim 5, characterized in that The step of generating and storing a unique key associated with the local device in advance according to the physical characteristics of the chip of the local device includes: A unique physical change of the chip associated with the production process is obtained, and a unique key associated with the local device is generated and stored according to the physical change.
7. The device according to claim 5, characterized in that The receiving of the firmware image to be written and verifying the legitimacy of the firmware image according to the private key pre-stored in the firmware image includes: Use the pre-stored public key to verify the legitimacy of the firmware image based on the pre-stored private key of the firmware image.
8. The device according to claim 5, characterized in that The method of starting the firmware through a secure boot program according to the written firmware image, and using the public key of the stored unique key and the private key of the unique key stored in the firmware image to verify the legitimacy of the started firmware includes: If the unique key is verified to be legal, the firmware is allowed to load and start; If the unique key verification is illegal, the firmware loading and startup will be rejected.
9. An electronic device, characterized in that: include: A processor and a readable storage medium, wherein the readable storage medium stores machine executable instructions that can be executed by the processor, and the processor executes the machine executable instructions to implement the method described in any one of claims 1 to 4.
10. A readable storage medium, characterized in that: The readable storage medium stores machine executable instructions, and when the machine executable instructions are called and executed by a processor, the machine executable instructions prompt the processor to implement any one of the methods of claims 1-4.
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