Lattice-based searchable and attribute revocation attribute-based encryption method in cloud edge collaboration
Through the CP-ABE solution based on RLWE problem and online/offline encryption technology, combined with outsourcing decryption and attribute revocation, the problems of low efficiency and insufficient security of the quantum attribute-based encryption solution are solved, and efficient and secure attribute-level access is achieved. Control and ciphertext search, suitable for resource-constrained cloud storage and IoT systems.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202410975216.3
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-07-19
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-26
AI Technical Summary
The existing quantum-resistant cryptographic scheme based on grid-based cryptography has secondary overhead problems, resulting in low efficiency, limited security of collusion attacks between multiple authorized users, and in resource-constrained IoT devices. The cost of adding/decrypting is high, and cloud ciphertext storage makes it difficult to search for cryptographic information.
Using the CP-ABE solution based on RLWE problems, through online/offline encryption phased and outsourcing decryption technology, the calculation overhead is reduced, and the attribute revocation and search algorithm is designed, and the user identity and attributes are managed by trusted authoritative centers to achieve attribute-level access. Control and ciphertext search.
Improve the efficiency and security of attribute-based encryption, realize the attribute revocation and ciphertext search of users, reduce the cost of encryption and decryption, and is suitable for cloud storage and IoT systems with limited resources, and enhance the resistance to conspiring attacks. .
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Figure CN119030702A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the field of network security technology, and in particular to a grid-based searchable and attribute-revocable attribute-based encryption method in cloud-edge collaboration. Background Art
[0002] Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) is a modern cryptographic technology that aims to address the limitations of traditional encryption technology in access control. Traditional encryption technology usually encrypts and decrypts data based on keys, and users need to have the correct key to decrypt the data. This method has limitations in complex access control scenarios, such as difficulty in implementing fine-grained permission control and dynamic access policies. Attribute-Based Encryption technology allows data owners to define access policies, allowing only users who have a specific set of attributes to decrypt related data.
[0003] With the development of technologies such as cloud computing and the Internet of Things, data security and privacy protection have become particularly important. Traditional encryption technology cannot meet the needs of data access control well, so attribute encryption technology has emerged. Attribute-based encryption technology allows data owners to define access policies that encrypt data based on user attributes. User attributes can be various characteristics, such as age, occupation, department, etc. Only users who match the data access policy can decrypt the data, realizing fine-grained access control at the attribute level.
[0004] According to the relationship between the access structure and the key or ciphertext, attribute-based encryption can be divided into two types: key-policy attribute-based encryption (Key-Policy ABE, KP-ABE) and ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (Ciphertext-Policy ABE, CP-ABE). In the KP-ABE scheme, the user's private key is connected to the specified access policy, and the ciphertext is defined by a set of attributes. If the ciphertext attributes can satisfy the access policy of the user's private key, the data user can decrypt the relevant data. In the CP-ABE scheme, the access policy is included in the ciphertext, and the user's private key is associated with the attribute set. If the attributes of the private key match the ciphertext access policy, the user can decrypt the file. The CP-ABE scheme puts data access control rights in the hands of the data owner, allowing the data owner to define the access policy of the ciphertext and specify the data users who can obtain the ciphertext. Therefore, the CP-ABE scheme is more suitable for secure data sharing systems than the KP-ABE scheme.
[0005] In recent years, quantum computing technology has been developing continuously. Many mathematical problems that are difficult to calculate with traditional computers have efficient solutions on quantum computers. In the face of quantum computing attacks, many public key cryptographic systems, including RSA and elliptic curve cryptography, will become insecure. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) of the United States began the standardization process of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms in 2016, and its algorithm selection has reached the fourth round. At present, cryptographic algorithms based on difficult problems on lattices are generally considered to be effective against quantum attacks. Compared with attribute-based encryption schemes based on bilinear pairing, lattice-based attribute-based encryption schemes not only have post-quantum security, but also have advantages in performance.
[0006] In 2006, Sahai and Waters proposed the Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) scheme based on identity-based encryption (IBE). Because it allows data owners to design access policies for data, it can be used to implement fine-grained access control for encrypted files in cloud servers. Only when the attribute set of the data user satisfies the access policy can the corresponding ciphertext be successfully decrypted. Modern ABE algorithms are mainly composed of elliptic curve cryptography and pairing-based cryptography, including the integer factorization problem of the RSA algorithm, the discrete logarithm problem of the Diffie–Hellman algorithm, and the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. These number theory-based methods are difficult in the classical computing model; however, they are not difficult in the quantum computing model, such as Shor's algorithm and Grover's algorithm. Although elliptic curve cryptography is mainly used to build ABE due to its characteristics, such as smaller ciphertexts, keys, and signatures, and faster key and signature generation, it is still weak to quantum attacks. Therefore, it is important to derive quantum resistance structures with a secure foundation for cryptographic design on computing problems that are not easily solved by quantum algorithms.
[0007] Quantum-resistant attribute-based encryption schemes are mainly built on lattices. In 2012, Zhang et al. extended Sahai and Water's identity-based encryption concept to the lattice-based CP-ABE scheme to support multi-valued attributes. Zhang and Zhang studied the CP-ABE scheme in q-ary lattices to support multi-bit operations, however, their scheme suffered from the quadratic overhead problem. Wang improved the AND gate to multi-valued attributes. Fun and Samsudin addressed the computational overhead of the CP-ABE scheme by extending to the hardness of the R-LWE assumption. However, their shared master key is vulnerable. Qian and Wu enhanced the tree structure by proposing a basic access tree (BAT) representing arbitrary disjunctive normal form (DNF). Varri et al. extended CP-ABE to the searchability of encrypted data; but their scheme was built based on the overhead LWE problem.
[0008] Existing quantum-resistant attribute-based encryption schemes are mainly built on lattice cryptography. The hardness assumption of the quantum-resistant CP-ABE scheme is a problem from the average case to the worst case. Theoretically, as long as it meets the worst-case quantum resistance, it also meets the average case quantum resistance. Under the standard fault-tolerant learning problem (LWE) assumption, it is difficult for malicious attackers to crack the cryptographic system through worst-case means. However, the attribute-based encryption scheme built on the LWE problem has a quadratic overhead problem, which leads to low efficiency of the scheme. To solve this problem, some schemes implement attribute-based encryption based on the ring error learning problem (RLWE) to reduce computational costs and transaction bandwidth. At the same time, the designed schemes to resist collusion attacks are very limited, and many of the latest schemes have not proven that they are safe against collusion attacks between multiple authorized users.
[0009] On the other hand, with the increase in the number of attributes in the system and the complexity of the access policy, the CP-ABE scheme has a high encryption / decryption cost, which sets up obstacles for its implementation in resource-constrained IoT devices. Therefore, it is necessary for the CP-ABE scheme to implement attribute-level attribute revocation, which can resist collusion attacks between multiple users to a certain extent and reduce the encryption / decryption cost of the scheme.
[0010] Finally, from the perspective of data privacy protection, the data of the CP-ABE scheme is stored in the cloud in encrypted form, which will bring difficulties to the search query of data users. How to perform keyword search queries in confidential information so that users can quickly find the files they need is an urgent problem to be solved in secure cloud storage. Summary of the invention
[0011] In view of the above problems, the present invention proposes a grid-based searchable and attribute-revocable attribute-based encryption method in cloud-edge collaboration.
[0012] In order to achieve the above object, the present invention adopts the following technical solutions:
[0013] A grid-based searchable and attribute-revocable attribute-based encryption method in cloud-edge collaboration, comprising:
[0014] Step 1: Collect relevant data with the help of IoT system or other channels, filter out the data that needs to be uploaded and stored, and the trusted authority center distributes attributes and identity IDs to legitimate users;
[0015] Step 2: After the trusted authority verifies that the user's attributes and identity ID are correct, it generates the corresponding attribute key and issues it to the user;
[0016] Step 3: The data owner uses the computing resources of the local device to perform offline encryption to obtain the intermediate ciphertext, completes the final encryption when online, and uploads it to the cloud server to store the ciphertext;
[0017] Step 4: The data user queries the ciphertext of the corresponding attribute in the cloud through the attribute distributed by the trusted authority center;
[0018] Step 5: The data user downloads the ciphertext from the cloud server to the edge node, calculates the conversion key for outsourced decryption, and finally performs user decryption to obtain the plaintext message;
[0019] Step 6: The user sends the attribute to be revoked to the trusted authority center. The trusted authority center revokes the attribute and updates it to a new attribute, and updates the corresponding key and ciphertext.
[0020] Furthermore, the step 1 comprises:
[0021] Step 1.1: After the trusted authority confirms the legitimacy of the user’s identity, it randomly selects uid∈R p , output certificate cert(uid), set a set of attributes {att1, att2, ..., att |S|}, randomly select parameters VK0,g j , f j ∈Z p , output the master key PK0 = VK0·u, select the parameter m≥5n·logp; where uid represents the user's identity id, p represents a large prime number, |S| is the number of attributes, m is an integer multiple of |S|, m = η|S|, n represents a security parameter, R p represents a ring modulo p, R p The corresponding value range is arrive
[0022] Step 1.2: The trusted authority outputs a security parameter n that is a power of 2, a large prime number p = 1 (mod 2n), and the polynomial function f(x) = x n +1, polynomial ring R = Z[x] / <f(x)> , R p =Z p [x] / <f(x)> , satisfying: α∈(0,1), The discrete Gaussian distribution Φ α , satisfying: when x∈R p , H(x)∈Z p The hash function H();
[0023] Step 1.3: The trusted authority uses the trapdoor function TrapGen(n, m, p) to calculate each attribute att jGenerate Matrix T j ∈Λ(A j ), Then use TrapGen(n, m, p) to generate the matrix and the corresponding full rank matrix T U ∈Λ ⊥ (U), each Corresponding attribute att j ; among them att j represents the jth attribute, Λ(A j ) represents the matrix A j The corresponding grid, Λ ⊥ (U) represents the dual lattice of matrix U, PK j Represents the public key corresponding to the jth attribute;
[0024] Step 1.4: The trusted authority randomly selects the parameter c∈Z p , using the original image sampling function SamplePre(A j , T j ,c,U j ) Generates the matrix And satisfy A j ·r j =U j (mod p), according to the user attribute U j ′=U j , j∈S j ∩J, generate and Reuse Generate the original image e = (e1, e2, ..., e |S| ).
[0025] Furthermore, the step 2 comprises:
[0026] The data owner sends the certificate cert(uid) to the trusted authority center for registration. For the i-th data owner, the trusted authority center registers the certificate cert(uid) according to the attribute set S of the i-th data owner. i , randomly select parameter t i ∈Z p Generate SK j,1 =H(uid) -1 ·g j ·r j ·t i , j∈S j , then output SK j,2 =H(uid)·g j -1 ·f j ·e j·VK0·t i -1 , j∈S j , and SK j,1 and SK j,2 Combined into attribute private key SK = {SK j,1 , S.K. j,2}.
[0027] Furthermore, the step 3 comprises:
[0028] Step 3.1, the data owner defines a linear secret sharing matrix The jth column of L corresponds to the attribute att j , s∈Z p is the secret value of L, and the parameter a∈R is randomly selected p , χ j ∈Φ α , calculate IC0 = VK0·u·a·s+χ, IC1 = f j · χ j , combine and output the intermediate ciphertext IC = {IC0, IC1};
[0029] Step 3.2: The data owner decides the access policy through L. If S j ∩J satisfies the requirements of the access policy, then there exists a set of constants {ω1, ω2, ..., ω Sj∩J} makes calculate: C j,1 =L j T v, C j,2 =f j -1 (A j a+IC1), output the final ciphertext CT={C0, C j,1 , C j,2};in d1, ..., d n-1 ∈Z p Randomly select, b=(b1,...,b η ) is a plaintext of n*η bits, b λ =(b λ,1 , b λ,2 , ..., b λ,n ) T , b λ,γ is a plaintext bit in row λ and column γ of b, b λ,γ The value is 1 or 0, 1≤λ≤η, 1≤γ≤n, C0 is the encrypted plaintext, C j,1 and C j,2 It is the ciphertext component associated with the attribute.
[0030] Furthermore, the step 4 comprises:
[0031] Input PK j , a, χ j and ciphertext CT, calculate ST = PK j ·a+χ j , and compare ST with C in the ciphertext j,2 Compare them and if the two are the same, output the ciphertext, otherwise it is not the ciphertext.
[0032] Furthermore, the step 5 comprises:
[0033] Step 5.1, download the ciphertext CT from the cloud server, for each attribute S j ∩J computes the transformation attribute key TK j =C j,2 ·SK j,1 , J represents a set of attributes contained in the ciphertext, and then decryption is performed as follows;
[0034] One decryption:
[0035]
[0036] Multi-bit decryption:
[0037]
[0038] Finally, we get the message b′ of n*η bits;
[0039] Step 5.2, the message b′ contains the secret s, and the user finally calculates the secret:
[0040] Further, the step 6 comprises:
[0041] Step 6.1: Assume that the attribute j∈S′ owned by the i-th user needs to be revoked. The trusted authority randomly selects the parameter g j '∈Z p , then output KUK j,1 =(g j '-g j )r j H(uid) -1 t i , KUK j,2 =H(uid)((g j ′) -1 f j ′-g j -1 f j ) j VtK i-1 , j∈S i ∩S′, output CUK j =((f j ′) -1 -f j -1 )A j a+χ j,2 ′, j∈J∩S′;
[0042] Step 6.2: The trusted authority will KUK j,1 and KUK j,2 Sent to the i-th user, the i-th user calculates: SK j,1 ′=SK j,1 +KUK j,1 , S.K. j,2 ′=SK j,2 +KUK j,2 , j∈S′, and then update the key of the i-th user
[0043] Step 6.3: The trusted authority will send CUK j , j∈J∩S′ is sent to the cloud server, and then the cloud server outputs C j,2 ′=C j,2 +CUK j , update the ciphertext
[0044] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:
[0045] 1) Based on the RLWE problem, the present invention constructs a CP-ABE scheme, which can ensure the security of secret values in plaintext and ciphertext, and can resist collusion attacks between revoked users, legitimate users and external attackers by embedding each user's unique secret value in the key component.
[0046] 2) The present invention utilizes online / offline attribute-based encryption technology and outsourced decryption technology to divide the encryption phase into two phases: offline encryption and online encryption. Some complex pre-calculations are performed in the offline phase, while other faster and simpler calculations are completed in the online phase, thereby improving the efficiency of the ABE algorithm encryption phase. In the decryption phase, a partial decryption algorithm is completed using a conversion key through an authorized semi-trusted proxy server. Subsequently, the generated partial ciphertext is sent to the data user, and finally complete decryption is achieved. These two schemes simplify the encryption and decryption algorithms, reduce the computing overhead of data owners and users, and make them suitable for resource-constrained cloud storage systems and some cloud-assisted Internet of Things systems.
[0047] 3) The present invention can achieve effective and safe attribute revocation for users. In the present invention, the relative attribute value is replaced by distributing update components, and the user's attributes are updated to dynamically control the user's access rights, which is impossible to achieve with other CP-ABE schemes.
[0048] 4) The present invention also designs a search algorithm that can realize attribute-level ciphertext search. Data users can search for corresponding ciphertexts by identity and attributes, thereby solving the problem of confidential information search on the basis of data privacy protection, greatly improving the feasibility of the solution. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0049] Figure 1 This is a system model diagram of a grid-based searchable and attribute-revocable attribute-based encryption method in cloud-edge collaboration according to an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0050] The present invention will be further explained below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments:
[0051] Example 1
[0052] A lattice-based searchable and attribute-revocable attribute-based encryption method in cloud-edge collaboration is proposed. The method is constructed based on a lattice-based attribute encryption scheme and includes six stages: system initialization, key generation, encryption, search, decryption, attribute revocation and update. The implementation of the method includes generating polynomial rings, generating discrete Gaussian parameters, constructing R-LWE problem parameters, and lattice operations. The method manages user identities and attributes through a global user-trusted authority AC (Authority Center), and generates relevant parameters and attribute private keys. Users are divided into data owners DO (Data Owner) and data users DU (Data Users) according to their data functions. The data owner DO generates a matrix to define the access policy through the linear secret sharing (LSSS) technology, and encrypts the plaintext at the corresponding stage according to the corresponding attributes and uploads it to the cloud. The data user DU downloads the ciphertext from the cloud (server) and uses the attribute private key and attribute conversion key to outsource the decryption to the edge node EN (EdgeNode) of the edge server for final decryption. The corresponding ciphertext CT can also be queried in the cloud through the corresponding attribute parameters. Figure 1 is the corresponding system model diagram. The method specifically includes:
[0053] S101, collect relevant data with the help of IoT system or other means, filter out the data that needs to be uploaded and stored, and the trusted authority center distributes attributes and identity IDs to legitimate users;
[0054] S102, after the trusted authority verifies that the user's attributes and identity ID are correct, it generates a corresponding attribute key and issues it to the user;
[0055] S103, the data owner uses the computing resources of the local device to perform offline encryption to obtain the intermediate ciphertext, completes the final encryption when online and uploads it to the cloud server to store the ciphertext;
[0056] S104, the data user queries the ciphertext of the corresponding attribute in the cloud through the attribute distributed by the trusted authority center;
[0057] S105, the data user downloads the ciphertext from the cloud server to the edge node, calculates the conversion key for outsourced decryption, and finally performs user decryption to obtain the message plaintext;
[0058] S106, the user sends the attribute to be revoked to the trusted authority center, and the trusted authority center revoks the attribute and updates it to a new attribute, and updates the corresponding key and ciphertext.
[0059] Example 2
[0060] On the basis of the above embodiments, the present invention also proposes another attribute-based encryption method with grid-based searchability and attribute revocation in cloud-edge collaboration.
[0061] Some symbolic parameters in the method are shown in the following table:
[0062]
[0063]
[0064] The specific method is as follows:
[0065] S201, system initialization: Generate system parameters, including user identity ID, attribute set, and parameters such as rings and distribution functions related to the grid. See the following steps for details.
[0066] S201.1, ACSetup: Each user sends his / her identity information to AC. After AC confirms that the user's identity is legitimate, it randomly selects the user's identity id, uid∈R p , output certificate cert(uid). AC sets a set of attributes {att1, att2, ..., att |S|}, |S| is the number of attributes in the solution. Randomly select parameters VK0,g j , f j ∈Z p , output the master key PK0=VK0·u, select the parameter m≥5n·logp, m is an integer multiple of |S|, that is, m=η|S|.
[0067] S201.2, AC outputs a power of 2 safety parameter n, a large prime number p = 1 (mod 2n), let the polynomial function f(x) = xn +1, polynomial ring R = Z[x] / <f(x)> , R p =Z p [x] / <f(x)> , satisfying: α∈(0,1), The discrete Gaussian distribution Φ α , satisfying: when x∈R p , H(x)∈Z p The hash function H().
[0068] S201.3, AC uses the trapdoor function TrapGen(n, m, p) for each attribute att j Generate Matrix T j ∈Λ(A j ), PK j Represents the public key corresponding to the jth attribute, and then uses TrapGen(n, m, p) to generate the matrix and the corresponding full rank matrix T U ∈Λ ⊥ (U), each Corresponding attribute att j .
[0069] S201.4, AC random selection parameters Use the original image sampling function SamplePre(A j , T j ,c,U j ) Generates the matrix And satisfy A j ·r j =U j (mod p). AC is based on the user attribute U j ′=U j , j∈S j ∩J, generate and Reuse Generate the original image e = (e1, e2, ..., e |S| ),parameter
[0070] S202, key generation: The DO (data owner) user sends the identity certificate to the AC for identity verification. After the AC verifies the identity, it generates an attribute key based on the user's attributes, that is, the user's private key, as follows:
[0071] DO user sends the certificate cert(uid) to AC for registration. For the i-th user, AC manages his / her attributes and calculates the attribute set S of the i-th user according to his / her own attributes.i , randomly select parameter t i ∈Z p Generate SK j,1 =H(uid) -1 ·g j ·r j ·t i , j∈S j , then AC output SK j,2 =H(uid)·g j -1 ·f j ·e j ·VK0·t i -1 , j∈S j , these two components are combined into the attribute private key SK = {SK j,1 , S.K. j,2}.
[0072] S203, Encryption: The encryption process is divided into offline encryption and online encryption. After the DO user collects the data to be encrypted, the system will first perform offline encryption to obtain the intermediate ciphertext. After the user connects to the network, the intermediate ciphertext will be encrypted into the final ciphertext CT. The detailed steps are as follows:
[0073] S203.1, Offline Encryption OfflineEnc: The data owner DO defines a linear secret sharing matrix The jth column of L corresponds to the attribute att j s∈Z p is the secret value of L, let v = (s, d1, d2, ..., is randomly selected. Randomly select parameter a∈R p , χ j ∈Φ α , calculate IC0 = VK0·u·a·s+χ, IC1 = f j · χ j , combined and output the intermediate ciphertext IC = {IC0, IC1}. The above process is completed on the terminal device of DO.
[0074] S203.2, Online Encryption OnlineEnc: The data owner DO determines the access policy A through the defined linear secret sharing matrix L. According to the LSSS protocol, if S j ∩J satisfies the requirements of access policy A, then there exists a set of constants Make Let b = (b1, ..., b η ), let b λ =(b λ,1 , b λ,2, ..., b λ,n ) T , b λ,γ The value of is 1 or 0, where 1≤λ≤η, 1≤γ≤n. Multiply so that b λ,γ The value of is magnified, and the presence of χ can magnify the precision. Calculation: C j,1 =L j T ·v,C j,2 =f j -1 (A j a+IC1), output the final ciphertext CT={C0, C j,1 , C j,2}, where C0 is the encrypted plaintext, C j,1 and C j,2 It is the ciphertext component associated with the attribute.
[0075] Note that DO encrypts the n*η bits of plaintext b into n*η bits of IC0 at one time, and finally uploads the online encrypted result CT to the cloud storage.
[0076] S204, ciphertext search: DU users can search for target attribute ciphertext CT at the cloud CS according to attribute parameters. If the target ciphertext exists, CS returns it to the user.
[0077] Search(CT,PK j , a, χ j )→CT / false: Input PK j , a, χ j and ciphertext CT, calculate ST = PK j ·a+χ j , and with C in the ciphertext j,2 For comparison, if they are the same, the ciphertext is output, otherwise it is not the ciphertext. Since the attributes of each user are unique, C j,2 As the ciphertext component of the ciphertext CT, it can be used as a ciphertext identifier.
[0078] S205, decryption: Decryption is divided into two parts: outsourced decryption and user decryption. The DU (data user) user determines the target ciphertext to be decrypted, generates a conversion attribute key TK based on the attribute key obtained from the AC, sends TK to EN, and downloads the ciphertext CT from the cloud CS to the edge node EN for outsourced decryption. After the outsourced decryption is completed, EN sends the result to the user, and the user performs the final decryption to obtain the plaintext message. The detailed steps are as follows:
[0079] S205.1, Outsourcing decryption OutDec: First download the ciphertext CT from the cloud, and for each attribute Sj ∩J computes the transformation attribute key TK j =C j,2 ·SK j,1 Because R-LWE can perform multi-bit operations, decryption is also divided into single-bit decryption and multi-bit decryption.
[0080] One decryption:
[0081]
[0082] Multi-bit decryption:
[0083]
[0084] Finally, we get a message b′ of n*η bits.
[0085] S205.2, user decryption UserDec: Message b′ contains the secret s, and the user finally calculates the secret:
[0086] S206, attribute revocation and update: The user determines the attribute to be revoked and sends the attribute to the authoritative center AC. After revoking the attribute, AC updates the key and ciphertext corresponding to the attribute according to the new attribute. The detailed steps are as follows:
[0087] S206.1, Attribute Update UpdateGen: Assume that the jth (j∈S′)th attribute owned by the i-th user needs to be revoked, AC randomly selects the parameter g j '∈Z p , then output KUK j,1 =(g j '-g j )r j H(uid) -1 t i , KUK j,2 =H(uid)((g j ′) -1 f j ′-g j -1 f j ) j VtK i -1 , j∈S i ∩S′, AC output: CUK j =((f j ′) -1 -f j -1 )A j a+χ j,2 ′, j∈J∩S′.
[0088] S206.2, Key Update: AC changes KUK j,1 and KUK j,2 Sent to the i-th user, who then calculates: SK j,1 ′=SK j,1 +KUK j,1 , S.K. j,2 ′=SK j,2 +KUK j,2 , j∈S′, and then update the user's own key
[0089] S206.3, ciphertext update CTUpdate: AC will CUK j , j∈J∩S′ is sent to CS, and then CS outputs C j,2 ′=C j,2 +CUK j , update the ciphertext
[0090] It is worth noting that the present invention is based on the RLWE problem and has the ability to resist quantum attacks and multi-bit operations. The search version of the RLWE problem is expressed as follows: randomly select p as a large prime number, set the polynomial function f(x) = x n +1, polynomial ring R = Z[x] / <f(x)> , R p =Z p [x] / <f(x)> , randomly selected e∈x B ,turn up So that ‖As′-(As+e)‖ ∞ ≤ B. The final ciphertext encrypted by the scheme here is reduced to the RLWE problem. The scheme that satisfies this problem can be proven to be resistant to quantum attacks, and the matrix operations on the ring can be multi-bit operations.
[0091] The key improvements of the present invention are as follows:
[0092] 1. Improvement of the structure of the lattice attribute-based encryption scheme
[0093] The present invention is constructed based on the difficult problem R-LWE in the lattice, which can prove that the present invention has the ability to resist quantum attacks. Relying on the characteristics of this assumption, the present invention can perform multi-bit operations, in other words, it can encrypt and decrypt multi-bit data together. Since the lattice-based encryption scheme cannot achieve fine-grained access control of user access rights, the present invention applies the CP-ABE structure to assign attributes to users and embed attribute policies in ciphertexts. Only when the attributes meet the access policy can the user successfully decrypt the ciphertext. Therefore, the present invention can flexibly control the user's access rights and achieve fine-grained access control.
[0094] In addition, the present invention can achieve effective and secure attribute revocation for users. In the scheme, we distribute update components to replace relative attribute values and update user attributes to dynamically control user access rights, which is unachievable in most lattice-based CP-ABE schemes. Moreover, the attribute revocation in the present invention can be proven to be effective and secure.
[0095] 2. Improvements in the functional practicality of the lattice attribute-based encryption scheme
[0096] First, in terms of security, the present invention adopts the idea of policy hiding, embeds attribute policy in ciphertext, and only corresponding attributes can successfully decrypt the ciphertext. The present invention designs the revocation of user attribute level, which can resist the conspiracy attack on illegal users, revoked users and users.
[0097] Secondly, in terms of the practicality of the solution, in order to solve the problem that the CP-ABE solution will have a higher encryption / decryption cost as the number of attributes in the system increases and the complexity of the access policy increases, the present invention introduces online / offline encryption and outsourced decryption technology, which greatly reduces the encryption / decryption cost of the solution, making the solution suitable for resource-constrained cloud IoT system devices and more practical. In order to solve the problem that the CP-ABE solution stores data in the form of ciphertext in the cloud, making it difficult for data users to manage or use data, we designed and implemented a retrieval function for data ciphertext based on the idea of searchable encryption, so that the ciphertext corresponding to the attribute can be more conveniently queried.
[0098] The above is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention. It should be pointed out that a person skilled in the art can make several improvements and modifications without departing from the principle of the present invention. These improvements and modifications should also be regarded as within the scope of protection of the present invention.
Claims
1. A grid-based searchable and attribute-revocable attribute-based encryption method in cloud-edge collaboration, characterized in that: include: Step 1: Collect relevant data with the help of IoT system or other channels, filter out the data that needs to be uploaded and stored, and the trusted authority center distributes attributes and identity IDs to legitimate users; Step 2: After the trusted authority verifies that the user's attributes and identity ID are correct, it generates the corresponding attribute key and issues it to the user; Step 3: The data owner uses the computing resources of the local device to perform offline encryption to obtain the intermediate ciphertext, completes the final encryption when online, and uploads it to the cloud server to store the ciphertext; Step 4: The data user queries the ciphertext of the corresponding attribute in the cloud through the attribute distributed by the trusted authority center; Step 5: The data user downloads the ciphertext from the cloud server to the edge node, calculates the conversion key for outsourced decryption, and finally performs user decryption to obtain the plaintext message; Step 6: The user sends the attribute to be revoked to the trusted authority center. The trusted authority center revokes the attribute and updates it to a new attribute, and updates the corresponding key and ciphertext.
2. According to claim 1, a grid-based searchable and attribute-revocable attribute-based encryption method in cloud-edge collaboration is characterized in that: The step 1 comprises: Step 1.1: After the trusted authority confirms the legitimacy of the user’s identity, it randomly selects uid∈R p , output certificate cert(uid), set a set of attributes {att1, att2, ..., att |S| }, randomly select parameters VK0,g j , f j ∈Z p , output the master key PK0 = VK0·u, select the parameter m≥5n·logp; where uid represents the user's identity id, p represents a large prime number, |S| is the number of attributes, m is an integer multiple of |S|, m = η|S|, n represents a security parameter, R p represents a ring modulo p, R p The corresponding value range is arrive Step 1.2: The trusted authority outputs a security parameter n that is a power of 2, a large prime number p = 1 (mod 2n), and the polynomial function f(x) = x n +1, polynomial ring R = Z[x] / <f(x)> , R p =Z p [x] / <f(x)> , satisfying: α∈(0,1), The discrete Gaussian distribution Φ α , satisfying: when x∈R p , H(x)∈Z p The hash function H(); Step 1.3: The trusted authority uses the trapdoor function TrapGen(n, m, p) to calculate each attribute att j Generate Matrix T j ∈Λ(A j ), Then use TrapGen(n, m, p) to generate the matrix and the corresponding full rank matrix T U ∈Λ ⊥ (U), each Corresponding attribute att j ; among them att j represents the jth attribute, Λ(A j ) represents the matrix A j The corresponding grid, Λ ⊥ (U) represents the dual lattice of matrix U, PK j Represents the public key corresponding to the jth attribute; Step 1.4: The trusted authority randomly selects the parameter c∈Z p , using the original image sampling function SamplePre(A j , T j ,c,U j ) Generates the matrix And satisfy A j ·r j =U j (mod p), according to the user attribute U j ′=U j , j∈S j ∩J, generate and Reuse Generate the original image e = (e1, e2, ..., e |S| ).
3. According to claim 2, a grid-based searchable and attribute-revocable attribute-based encryption method in cloud-edge collaboration is characterized in that: The step 2 comprises: The data owner sends the certificate cert(uid) to the trusted authority center for registration. For the i-th data owner, the trusted authority center registers the certificate cert(uid) according to the attribute set S of the i-th data owner. i , randomly select parameter t i ∈Z p Generate SK j,1 =H(uid) -1 ·g j ·r j ·t i , j∈S j , then output SK j,2 =H(uid)·g j -1 ·f j ·e j ·VK0·t i -1 , j∈S j , and SK j,1 and SK j,2 Combined into attribute private key SK = {SK j,1 , S.K. j,2 }.
4. According to claim 3, a grid-based searchable and attribute-revocable attribute-based encryption method in cloud-edge collaboration is characterized in that: The step 3 comprises: Step 3.1, the data owner defines a linear secret sharing matrix The jth column of L corresponds to the attribute att j , s∈Z p is the secret value of L, and the parameter a∈R is randomly selected p , χ j ∈Φ α , calculate IC0 = VK0·u·a·s+χ, IC1 = f j · χ j , combine and output the intermediate ciphertext IC = {IC0, IC1}; Step 3.2: The data owner decides the access policy through L. If S j ∩J satisfies the requirements of the access policy, then there exists a set of constants Make calculate: C j,1 =L j T v, Output the final ciphertext CT = {C0, C j,1 , C j,2 };in Randomly select, b=(b1,...,b η ) is a plaintext of n*η bits, b λ =(b λ,1 , b λ,2 , ..., b λ,n ) T , b λ,γ is a plaintext bit in row λ and column γ of b, b λ,γ The value is 1 or 0, 1≤λ≤η, 1≤γ≤n, C0 is the encrypted plaintext, C j,1 and C j,2 It is the ciphertext component associated with the attribute.
5. According to claim 4, a grid-based searchable and attribute-revocable attribute-based encryption method in cloud-edge collaboration is characterized in that: The step 4 comprises: Input PK j , a, χ j and ciphertext CT, calculate ST = PK j ·a+χ j , and compare ST with C in the ciphertext j,2 Compare them and if the two are the same, output the ciphertext, otherwise it is not the ciphertext.
6. According to claim 5, a grid-based searchable and attribute-revocable attribute-based encryption method in cloud-edge collaboration is characterized in that: The step 5 comprises: Step 5.1, download the ciphertext CT from the cloud server, for each attribute S j ∩J computes the transformation attribute key TK j =C j,2 ·SK j,1 , J represents a set of attributes contained in the ciphertext, and then decryption is performed as follows; One decryption: Multi-bit decryption: Finally, we get the message b′ of n*η bits; Step 5.2, the message b′ contains the secret s, and the user finally calculates the secret:
7. According to claim 6, a grid-based searchable and attribute-revocable attribute-based encryption method in cloud-edge collaboration is characterized in that: The step 6 comprises: Step 6.1: Assume that the attribute j∈S′ owned by the i-th user needs to be revoked. The trusted authority randomly selects the parameter g j '∈Z p , then output KUK j,1 =(g j '-g j )r j H(uid) -1 t i , KUK j,2 =H(uid)((g j ′) -1 f j ′-g j -1 f j ) j VtK i -1 , j∈S i ∩S′, output CUK j =((f j ′) -1 -f j -1 )A j a+χ j,2 ′, j∈J∩S′; Step 6.2: The trusted authority will KUK j,1 and KUK j,2 Sent to the i-th user, the i-th user calculates: SK j,1 ′=SK j,1 +KUK j,1 , S.K. j,2 ′=SK j,2 +KUK j,2 , j∈S′, and then update the key of the i-th user Step 6.3: The trusted authority will send CUK j , j∈J∩S′ is sent to the cloud server, and then the cloud server outputs C j,2 ′=C j,2 +CUK j , update the ciphertext
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Grid-based hybrid revocable attribute encryption and decryption method and system
CN119358006A
