Access authentication method and system based on power Internet of Things

Abstract

The present invention relates to the field of Internet of Things access authentication, and specifically to an access authentication method and system based on the power Internet of Things. The method first obtains the data packets sent by each terminal device in the local power Internet of Things and the time point of each data packet sending, as well as the historical packet loss rate and average trouble-free time of each terminal device, and screens out the normal data packets of each terminal device; according to the proportion of the number of normal data packets of each terminal device, the difference between the time point and the encapsulation timestamp of the data packet, and the historical packet loss rate and the average trouble-free time, the real transmission rationality of each terminal device is obtained; according to the difference in the power consumption of the data packets between the terminal devices, the data authenticity of each terminal device is obtained; according to the real transmission rationality and data authenticity, the terminal device access to the power Internet of Things is authenticated. The present invention can improve the reliability of the power Internet of Things for terminal device access authentication.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of Internet of Things access authentication, and in particular to an access authentication method and system based on power Internet of Things. Background Art

[0002] The power Internet of Things is a specific application of the Internet of Things in the power industry, focusing on the intelligent management and operation of the power system. As more and more terminal devices are connected to the power Internet of Things, these terminal devices are often subject to malicious attacks and network hijacking, causing some terminal devices to become potential security vulnerabilities. Therefore, before the terminal device is officially connected to the power Internet of Things, it needs to be authenticated to ensure that the terminal device can be safely connected to the power Internet of Things.

[0003] In the related technology, pre-set keys or certificates are usually used in network communications to complete the authentication of terminal devices, but attackers can also complete device authentication by cracking and forging keys or certificates, resulting in the existing methods being unable to guarantee the security of authenticated terminal devices, resulting in low reliability of access authentication. Summary of the invention

[0004] In order to solve the technical problem of low reliability of the existing access authentication method, the purpose of the present invention is to provide an access authentication method and system based on the power Internet of Things. The technical solution adopted is as follows:

[0005] The present invention proposes an access authentication method based on the power Internet of Things, the method comprising:

[0006] Obtain the data packets sent by each terminal device in the same local power Internet of Things within a preset time period and the time point of each sent data packet, and obtain the historical packet loss rate and average trouble-free time of each terminal device, wherein the data packet at least includes an encapsulation timestamp and power consumption;

[0007] Take any terminal device as the target terminal device, and filter out normal data packets from all data packets sent by the target terminal device according to the difference between the time points of the data packets sent by the target terminal device twice in a row; obtain the initial transmission rationality of the target terminal device according to the proportion of the number of normal data packets sent by the target terminal device to the number of all data packets, the time point of each data packet and the difference between the encapsulation timestamp; adjust the initial transmission rationality according to the historical packet loss rate and the mean time between failures of the target terminal device, and obtain the real transmission rationality of the target terminal device;

[0008] According to the difference in the power consumption of the data packets between the target terminal device and other terminal devices except the target terminal device, the data authenticity of the target terminal device is obtained; according to the real transmission rationality and the data authenticity, the credibility of the target terminal device is obtained;

[0009] Based on the credibility, the target terminal device is authenticated for access to the power Internet of Things.

[0010] Further, the filtering out normal data packets from all data packets sent by the target terminal device includes:

[0011] The absolute value of the difference between the time points of each data packet sent by the target terminal device and the next adjacent data packet sent is used as the time interval of each data packet sent by the target terminal device;

[0012] Based on the time interval, normal data packets are screened out from all data packets sent by the target terminal device.

[0013] Further, the filtering out normal data packets from all data packets sent by the target terminal device based on the time interval includes:

[0014] The data packets whose time interval is greater than the preset interval threshold are regarded as normal data packets of the target terminal device.

[0015] Furthermore, obtaining the initial transmission rationality of the target terminal device includes:

[0016] The number of the normal data packets sent by the target terminal device is used as the numerator, the number of all data packets sent by the target terminal device is used as the denominator, and the ratio is used as the first transmission rationality of the target terminal device;

[0017] Obtaining second transmission rationality of the target terminal device according to the difference between the time point of each data packet sent by the target terminal device and the encapsulation timestamp;

[0018] The first transmission rationality and the second transmission rationality are integrated to obtain the initial transmission rationality of the target terminal device.

[0019] Further, obtaining the second transmission rationality of the target terminal device includes:

[0020] The absolute value of the difference between the time point of each data packet sent by the target terminal device and the encapsulation timestamp is used as the processing time of each data packet;

[0021] Negatively correlate the processing time of each data packet to obtain the probability of each data packet not being attacked;

[0022] The non-attacked possibilities of all data packets sent by the target terminal device are integrated to obtain a second transmission rationality of the target terminal device.

[0023] Furthermore, obtaining the real transmission rationality of the target terminal device includes:

[0024] According to the historical packet loss rate and the mean time between failures of the target terminal device, the transmission confidence of the target terminal device is obtained, wherein the transmission confidence is negatively correlated with the historical packet loss rate, and positively correlated with the mean time between failures, and the transmission confidence is a normalized value;

[0025] The transmission confidence is used to weight the initial transmission rationality of the target terminal device to obtain the real transmission rationality of the target terminal device.

[0026] Furthermore, obtaining the data authenticity of the target terminal device includes:

[0027] Any other terminal device except the target terminal device is used as a reference terminal device;

[0028] Sequences of the power consumption of all data packets of the target terminal device and the reference terminal device sorted according to the time points are respectively used as a first sequence and a second sequence;

[0029] Based on a dynamic time warping algorithm, the first sequence and the second sequence are processed to obtain data similarity between the target terminal device and the reference terminal device;

[0030] The overall level of data similarity between the target terminal device and all other terminal devices except the target terminal device is analyzed to obtain the data authenticity of the target terminal device.

[0031] Furthermore, obtaining the credibility of the target terminal device includes:

[0032] The product value of the real transmission rationality of the target terminal device and the data authenticity is normalized to obtain the credibility of the target terminal device.

[0033] Furthermore, the authentication of access of the target terminal device to the power Internet of Things based on the credibility includes:

[0034] If the credibility is greater than the preset authentication threshold, the target terminal device is allowed to access the power Internet of Things.

[0035] The present invention also proposes an access authentication system based on the power Internet of Things, the system comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, and the processor implements any one of the steps of an access authentication method based on the power Internet of Things when executing the computer program.

[0036] The present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0037] Taking into account the low reliability of existing access authentication methods, the present invention first obtains the data packets sent by each terminal device in the same local power Internet of Things within a preset time period and the time point of each sent data packet, and obtains the historical packet loss rate and average trouble-free time of each terminal device. Taking into account that attackers may forge a large number of abnormal data packets and send data packets frequently, resulting in a larger time interval between abnormal data packets than normal data packets, the normal data packets of the target terminal device can be screened out based on this feature, and the terminal device under attack should not be allowed to access the power Internet of Things. Under normal circumstances, the number of normal data packets accounts for a large proportion. At the same time, the interval between the encapsulation and sending of the data packet is very short. When the attacker launches an attack such as data tampering on the data packet, it will delay the access. The interval between long encapsulation and transmission, therefore, the possibility that the target terminal device has not been attacked during the communication process can be preliminarily reflected through the initial transmission rationality, and then the initial transmission rationality can be adjusted to obtain the real transmission rationality; when the target terminal device has not been attacked, the power consumption data contained in the data packets sent by other terminal devices in the same local Internet of Things and the target terminal device are relatively similar. When the target terminal device is attacked, the power consumption data contained in the data packets sent by other terminal devices and the target terminal device are quite different. Therefore, the data authenticity can be used to reflect the possibility that the data in the data packet of the target terminal device has not been attacked during the communication process, and then the target terminal device can be more securely authenticated for access to the power Internet of Things through the obtained credibility, thereby improving the reliability of terminal device access authentication. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0038] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions and advantages in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the prior art descriptions are briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0039] Figure 1 A flow chart of an access authentication method based on the power Internet of Things provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0040] Figure 2A flow chart of a method for acquiring normal data packets of a target terminal device provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0041] Figure 3 A flow chart of a method for obtaining the rationality of initial transmission of a target terminal device provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0042] In order to further explain the technical means and effects adopted by the present invention to achieve the predetermined invention purpose, the following is a detailed description of the access authentication method and system based on the power Internet of Things proposed by the present invention, its specific implementation method, structure, features and effects, in combination with the accompanying drawings and preferred embodiments. In the following description, different "one embodiment" or "another embodiment" does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment. In addition, specific features, structures or characteristics in one or more embodiments may be combined in any suitable form.

[0043] Unless defined otherwise, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to which this invention belongs.

[0044] The following is a detailed description of a specific scheme of an access authentication method and system based on the power Internet of Things provided by the present invention in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0045] See also Figure 1 , which shows a flow chart of an access authentication method based on the power Internet of Things provided by an embodiment of the present invention, the method comprising:

[0046] Step S1: Obtain the data packets sent by each terminal device in the same local power Internet of Things within a preset time period and the time point of each data packet sent, and obtain the historical packet loss rate and average trouble-free time of each terminal device. The data packet includes at least an encapsulation timestamp and power consumption.

[0047] The embodiment of the present invention first uses a data packet analysis tool such as Wireshark or tcpdump to capture the data packets sent by each terminal device in the same local power Internet of Things within a preset time period, and uses the data packet analysis tool to analyze the time point corresponding to when each data packet is sent from the terminal device, and analyzes the key data contained in the data packet, namely the encapsulation timestamp and power consumption. Among them, the terminal device is specifically a smart meter or sensor in the power Internet of Things. The encapsulation timestamp refers to the time corresponding to the start of data packaging and encapsulation before the terminal device sends the communication data to the Internet of Things, which can be recorded and saved in the data packet header. The power consumption refers to the specific power consumption of the user monitored by the terminal device in the power Internet of Things. The data is packaged and packaged to form a data packet and sent to the Internet of Things.

[0048] The preset time period is set to 1 day, and the specific value of the preset time period can also be set by the implementer according to the specific implementation scenario, which is not limited here.

[0049] At the same time, the embodiment of the present invention also needs to obtain the historical packet loss rate and average trouble-free time of each terminal device, wherein the historical packet loss rate refers to the probability of losing data packets sent by the terminal device during the historical operation process, and the data can be recorded by the terminal device itself, and the average trouble-free time refers to the average time during which the terminal device does not experience any faults such as physical layer faults, data link layer faults or network layer faults during the historical operation process, and the data can also be recorded by the terminal device itself.

[0050] Step S2: Take any terminal device as the target terminal device, and filter out normal data packets from all data packets sent by the target terminal device according to the difference in time points between two consecutive data packets sent by the target terminal device; obtain the initial transmission rationality of the target terminal device according to the proportion of the number of normal data packets sent by the target terminal device to the number of all data packets, the time point of each data packet and the difference in encapsulation timestamps; adjust the initial transmission rationality according to the historical packet loss rate and the average trouble-free time of the target terminal device to obtain the real transmission rationality of the target terminal device.

[0051] The embodiment of the present invention requires authentication for each terminal device accessing the power Internet of Things. Therefore, any terminal device is first analyzed and any terminal device is used as a target terminal device. When the target terminal device is attacked by an external attack, it means that the target terminal device is not suitable for formal access to the power Internet of Things. Considering that when the target terminal device is attacked by a data packet forgery network, the attacker will forge a large number of abnormal data packets and send data packets frequently, resulting in a larger time interval between abnormal data packets than normal data packets. Therefore, normal data packets can be screened out from all data packets sent by the target terminal device based on the difference in time points between two adjacent data packets sent by the target terminal device. The more normal data packets there are, the less likely the target terminal device is to be attacked during data packet transmission. Subsequently, the rationality of the initial transmission of the target terminal device can be calculated and analyzed based on the number of normal data packets.

[0052] Preferably, in one embodiment of the present invention, the method for acquiring a normal data packet of a target terminal device specifically includes:

[0053] See also Figure 2 , which shows a flow chart of a method for acquiring normal data packets of a target terminal device provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0054] Step S201: taking the absolute value of the time difference between a data packet sent each time by the target terminal device and a data packet sent next time as the time interval between data packets sent each time by the target terminal device.

[0055] Through the above analysis, it can be seen that when the target terminal device is attacked by a data packet forgery network attack, a large number of forged abnormal data packets will be sent more frequently than the frequency of normal data packets. Therefore, the absolute value of the difference between the time point of each data packet sent by the target terminal device and the next adjacent data packet sent can be first used as the time interval between each data packet sent by the target terminal device. The larger the time interval, the longer the time interval between each data packet sent and the next data packet sent, which means that the smaller the frequency of each data packet sent, the greater the possibility that the data packet is normal rather than abnormal.

[0056] It should be noted that in network communication, if the data packet sent is too large, the communication mechanism will divide the large data packet into multiple smaller data packets for sending, and reconnect and combine them into a complete large data packet at the receiving end. At this time, the time point corresponding to the first small data packet sent can be used as the time point when the complete large data packet is sent.

[0057] It should be noted that for the existing boundary problem, the next data packet adjacent to the last data packet sent by the target terminal device does not exist. At this time, the calculated average or median of the time intervals of all data packets before the last data packet can be used as the time interval of the last data packet to solve the boundary problem.

[0058] Step S202: based on the time interval, filter out normal data packets from all data packets sent by the target terminal device.

[0059] The larger the time interval between each data packet, the lower the frequency of sending the data packet, which means that the data packet is less likely to be a forged abnormal data packet. Therefore, normal data packets can be filtered out from all data packets sent by the target terminal device based on the time interval.

[0060] Preferably, in one embodiment of the present invention, the method for screening normal data packets further comprises:

[0061] Data packets whose time interval is greater than a preset interval threshold are regarded as normal data packets of the target terminal device, where the preset interval threshold is set to 5 minutes. The specific value of the preset interval threshold can also be set by the implementer according to the specific implementation scenario, and is not limited here.

[0062] Taking into account that under normal circumstances when the target terminal device is not attacked, the number of normal data packets sent by the target terminal device accounts for a large proportion. At the same time, the interval between the encapsulation and sending of each data packet is very short. When the attacker performs network attacks such as data tampering on the data packet, the interval between the encapsulation and sending of the data packet will be extended. Therefore, the proportion of the number of normal data packets sent by the target terminal device to the number of all data packets and the difference between the time point and the encapsulation timestamp of each data packet can be analyzed. The initial transmission rationality obtained can preliminarily reflect the possibility that the target terminal device has not been attacked during the data packet transmission process. The greater the initial transmission rationality, the more reasonable the transmission of the target terminal device data packet, and then the smaller the possibility of the target terminal device being attacked. The initial transmission rationality can be adjusted later to further improve the accuracy of the analysis of the possibility of the target terminal device being attacked.

[0063] Preferably, in one embodiment of the present invention, a method for obtaining the rationality of initial transmission of a target terminal device specifically includes:

[0064] See also Figure 3 , which shows a flow chart of a method for obtaining the rationality of initial transmission of a target terminal device provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0065] Step S211: taking the number of normal data packets sent by the target terminal device as the numerator and the number of all data packets sent by the target terminal device as the denominator, and taking the ratio as the first transmission rationality of the target terminal device.

[0066] Through the above analysis, it can be seen that the larger the proportion of the number of normal data packets sent by the target terminal device to the number of all data packets sent, the smaller the possibility that the target terminal device will be attacked during the data packet transmission process. Therefore, the number of normal data packets sent by the target terminal device can be used as the numerator, and the number of all data packets sent by the target terminal device can be used as the denominator, and the ratio can be used as the first transmission rationality of the target terminal device. The larger the first transmission rationality, the more reasonable the data packet transmission of the target terminal device is, and the smaller the possibility that it will be attacked by the outside world is.

[0067] Step S212: obtaining the second transmission rationality of the target terminal device according to the difference between the time point of each data packet sent by the target terminal device and the encapsulation timestamp.

[0068] Through the above analysis, it can be seen that when the target terminal device is not attacked, the difference between the time point of sending the data packet and the encapsulation timestamp is small, but when attacked, the difference will increase. Therefore, the second transmission rationality of the target terminal device can be obtained according to the difference between the time point of each data packet sent by the target terminal device and the encapsulation timestamp. The greater the second transmission rationality, the more reasonable the data packet transmission of the target terminal device is, and the less likely it is to be attacked by the outside world. Subsequently, the first transmission rationality and the second transmission rationality can be combined to calculate and analyze the initial transmission rationality of the target terminal device.

[0069] Preferably, in one embodiment of the present invention, a method for acquiring the second transmission rationality of a target terminal device specifically includes:

[0070] The absolute value of the difference between the time point of each data packet sent by the target terminal device and the encapsulation timestamp is used as the processing time of each data packet. The longer the processing time, the more likely the processing of the data packet of the target terminal device is to be attacked from the outside. Therefore, the processing time of each data packet is negatively correlated to obtain the possibility of each data packet not being attacked.

[0071] Then, the possibility of all data packets sent by the target terminal device not being attacked is synthesized to obtain the second transmission rationality of the target terminal device.

[0072] In an embodiment of the present invention, the accumulated value or the multiplied value of the possibility of all data packets sent by the target terminal device not being attacked can be used as the second transmission rationality of the target terminal device to achieve a comprehensive evaluation of the possibility of all data packets sent by the target terminal device not being attacked, which is not limited here.

[0073] Step S213: The first transmission rationality and the second transmission rationality are integrated to obtain the initial transmission rationality of the target terminal device.

[0074] Furthermore, the first transmission rationality and the second transmission rationality of the target terminal device may be combined to calculate the initial transmission rationality of the target terminal device.

[0075] In the embodiment of the present invention, the sum or product of the first transmission rationality and the second transmission rationality may be used as the initial transmission rationality of the target terminal device to achieve a combination of the two, which is not limited here.

[0076] As an example, in one embodiment of the present invention, the expression of the rationality of the initial transmission of the target terminal device may be specifically, for example, as follows:

[0077] in, Indicates the rationality of the initial transmission of the target terminal device; Indicates the number of normal data packets sent by the target terminal device; Indicates the number of data packets sent by the target terminal device; Indicates the first The processing time of a data packet; Indicates the first transmission rationality of the target terminal device; Indicates the first The probability that a packet is not attacked; Indicates the rationality of the second transmission of the target terminal device; Indicates the preset first adjustment parameter, which is used to prevent the denominator from being 0. The value range is In one embodiment of the present invention, Set to 0.01, The specific value of can also be set by the implementer according to the specific implementation scenario and is not limited here.

[0078] It should be noted that in other embodiments of the present invention, the positive and negative correlations may be represented by other basic mathematical operations, which will not be elaborated herein.

[0079] Since the data packets sent by the target terminal device may be lost during the network communication process, and when the physical layer or data link layer of the target terminal device fails, it will also affect the sending and transmission of the data packets, thereby affecting the accuracy of the above-mentioned analysis of the possibility of the target terminal device being attacked. Therefore, the embodiment of the present invention adjusts the initial transmission rationality according to the historical packet loss rate and the average failure-free time of the target terminal device, and obtains the real transmission rationality of the target terminal device. The real transmission rationality accurately reflects the possibility that the data packet transmission of the target terminal device has not been attacked during the communication process.

[0080] Preferably, in one embodiment of the present invention, a method for obtaining the real transmission rationality of a target terminal device specifically includes:

[0081] The smaller the historical packet loss rate of the target terminal device and the longer the mean trouble-free time, the smaller the possibility of abnormal situations such as packet loss or failure during the data packet transmission of the target terminal device, which further indicates that the confidence of the above analysis of the rationality of the initial transmission is greater. Therefore, the transmission confidence of the target terminal device can be obtained according to the historical packet loss rate and the mean trouble-free time of the target terminal device. The transmission confidence is negatively correlated with the historical packet loss rate, and positively correlated with the mean trouble-free time. The transmission confidence is a normalized value.

[0082] In one embodiment of the present invention, the normalization processing can be specifically, for example, maximum and minimum value normalization processing, and the normalization in subsequent steps can all adopt maximum and minimum value normalization processing. In other embodiments of the present invention, other normalization methods can be selected according to the specific range of numerical values, which will not be described in detail.

[0083] As an example, in one embodiment of the present invention, the expression of the transmission confidence of the target terminal device may be specifically, for example, as follows:

[0084] in, Indicates the transmission confidence of the target terminal device; Indicates the historical packet loss rate of the target terminal device; Indicates the average time between failures of the target terminal equipment; represents the normalization function; Indicates the preset second adjustment parameter, which is used to prevent the denominator from being 0. The value range is In one embodiment of the present invention, Set to 0.001, The specific value of can also be set by the implementer according to the specific implementation scenario and is not limited here.

[0085] It should be noted that in other embodiments of the present invention, the positive and negative correlations may be represented by other basic mathematical operations, which will not be elaborated herein.

[0086] The greater the transmission confidence of the target terminal device, the greater the confidence of the initial transmission rationality calculated above that reflects the possibility that the target terminal device has not been attacked. Therefore, the transmission confidence can be used to weight the initial transmission rationality of the target terminal device to obtain the true transmission rationality of the target terminal device.

[0087] As an example, in one embodiment of the present invention, the expression of the real transmission rationality of the target terminal device may be specifically, for example, as follows:

[0088] in, Indicates the real transmission rationality of the target terminal device; Indicates the transmission confidence of the target terminal device; Indicates the initial transmission rationality of the target terminal device.

[0089] At this point, the real transmission rationality of the target terminal device is obtained.

[0090] Step S3: According to the difference in power consumption of data packets between the target terminal device and other terminal devices except the target terminal device, the data authenticity of the target terminal device is obtained; according to the rationality of the actual transmission and the authenticity of the data, the credibility of the target terminal device is obtained.

[0091] When the target terminal device is not attacked, the power consumption data contained in the data packets sent by the target terminal device and other terminal devices in the same local Internet of Things are relatively similar. When the target terminal device is attacked, for example, the data packets sent by the target terminal device are forged and tampered with, the power consumption data contained in the forged or tampered data packets and the power consumption data contained in the data packets sent by other terminal devices are quite different. Therefore, the difference in power consumption of the data packets between the target terminal device and other terminal devices except the target terminal device can be analyzed, and the authenticity of the acquired data reflects the possibility that the data in the data packet of the target terminal device has not been attacked during the communication process. Subsequently, the credibility of the target terminal device in the authentication process can be evaluated based on the authenticity of the data and the rationality of the real transmission obtained above.

[0092] Preferably, in one embodiment of the present invention, the method for obtaining the data authenticity of the target terminal device specifically includes:

[0093] First, any other terminal device except the target terminal device is taken as a reference terminal device, and the power consumption of all data packets of the target terminal device and the reference terminal device are respectively sorted according to time points as the first sequence and the second sequence. In one embodiment of the present invention, the power consumption can be sorted in ascending order according to the time points.

[0094] Since the dynamic time warping algorithm can compare the similarity of two time series by bending the time axis, especially when the lengths of these time series are inconsistent, this algorithm can automatically distort the time series to make the two sequences as consistent in shape as possible, thereby obtaining the maximum possible similarity. Therefore, the first sequence and the second sequence can be processed based on the dynamic time warping algorithm to obtain the data similarity between the target terminal device and the reference terminal device. The greater the data similarity, the greater the similarity between the power consumption data in the data packets sent by the target terminal device and the reference terminal device, which further indicates that the greater the authenticity of the data in the data packet sent by the target terminal device, the less likely it is that the data packet sent by the target terminal device has not been attacked. Among them, the dynamic time warping algorithm is a technical field well known to technicians in this field and will not be elaborated here.

[0095] The data similarity between the target terminal device and each other terminal device can be obtained by the same method as above, and then the overall level of data similarity between the target terminal device and all other terminal devices except the target terminal device can be analyzed to obtain the data authenticity of the target terminal device.

[0096] In an embodiment of the present invention, the average value or median of the data similarity between the target terminal device and all other terminal devices except the target terminal device can be used as the data authenticity of the target terminal device to realize the analysis of the overall level of data similarity between the target terminal device and all other terminal devices except the target terminal device, which is not limited here.

[0097] As an example, in one embodiment of the present invention, the expression of data authenticity of the target terminal device may be specifically, for example, as follows:

[0098] in, Indicates the data authenticity of the target terminal device; Indicates the target terminal device and the The data similarity between other terminal devices; Indicates the number of terminal devices other than the target terminal device.

[0099] The greater the real transmission rationality and data authenticity of the target terminal device, the less likely the data packet transmission of the target terminal device and the data in the data packet are to be attacked during the communication process, which further indicates that the target terminal device has higher security during operation. Therefore, the credibility of the target terminal device can be further obtained based on the real transmission rationality and data authenticity of the target terminal device. The higher the credibility, the higher the security of the target terminal device, and the greater the possibility of allowing it to access the power Internet of Things. Subsequently, the target terminal device can be more securely and reliably authenticated for access to the power Internet of Things based on the credibility, thereby improving the reliability of terminal device access authentication.

[0100] Preferably, in one embodiment of the present invention, the method for obtaining the credibility of the target terminal device specifically includes:

[0101] The product value of the real transmission rationality and data authenticity of the target terminal device is normalized to obtain the credibility of the target terminal device.

[0102] As an example, in one embodiment of the present invention, the expression of the credibility of the target terminal device may be specifically, for example, as follows:

[0103] in, Indicates the credibility of the target terminal device; Indicates the real transmission rationality of the target terminal device; Indicates the data authenticity of the target terminal device; Represents the normalization function.

[0104] In other embodiments of the present invention, the sum of the real transmission rationality and the data authenticity may also be normalized to obtain the credibility of the target terminal device, which is not limited here.

[0105] At this point, the credibility of the target terminal device is obtained.

[0106] Step S4: Based on the credibility, the target terminal device is authenticated for access to the power Internet of Things.

[0107] The greater the credibility of the target terminal device, the less likely the target terminal device is to be attacked during the communication process, and its communication is more secure, which means the greater the possibility of allowing the target terminal device to access the power Internet of Things. Therefore, based on the credibility, the target terminal device can be more securely authenticated for access to the power Internet of Things, thereby improving the reliability of the terminal device access authentication.

[0108] Preferably, in one embodiment of the present invention, by setting a threshold, if the credibility is greater than a preset authentication threshold, the target terminal device is allowed to access the power Internet of Things. In one embodiment of the present invention, the preset authentication threshold is set to 0.7. The specific value of the preset authentication threshold can also be set by the implementer according to the specific implementation scenario, which is not limited here.

[0109] Furthermore, each terminal device connected to the power Internet of Things can be authenticated through the same method as above.

[0110] In other embodiments of the present invention, each terminal device may be authenticated multiple times. During the multiple authentication processes, if the calculated credibility of the terminal device meets the above conditions, it is allowed to access the power Internet of Things.

[0111] An embodiment of the present invention provides an access authentication system based on the power Internet of Things, the system includes a memory, a processor and a computer program, wherein the memory is used to store the corresponding computer program, the processor is used to run the corresponding computer program, and when the computer program runs in the processor, it can implement the method described in steps S1 to S4.

[0112] In summary, the embodiment of the present invention first obtains the data packets sent by each terminal device in the same local electric power Internet of Things within a preset time period and the time point of each sent data packet, and obtains the historical packet loss rate and average trouble-free time of each terminal device; according to the difference in the time points of the data packets sent by the target terminal device twice adjacently, the normal data packets are screened out from all the data packets sent by the target terminal device; according to the proportion of the number of normal data packets sent by the target terminal device to the number of all data packets, the time point of each data packet and the difference in encapsulation timestamps, the initial transmission rationality of the target terminal device is obtained; according to the historical packet loss rate and the average trouble-free time of the target terminal device, the initial transmission rationality is adjusted to obtain the real transmission rationality of the target terminal device; according to the difference in power consumption of the data packets between the target terminal device and other terminal devices, the data authenticity of the target terminal device is obtained; according to the real transmission rationality and data authenticity, the credibility of the target terminal device is obtained; based on the credibility, the target terminal device is authenticated for access to the electric power Internet of Things.

[0113] It should be noted that the sequence of the above embodiments of the present invention is only for description and does not represent the advantages and disadvantages of the embodiments. The processes depicted in the accompanying drawings do not necessarily require the specific order or continuous order shown to achieve the desired results. In some embodiments, multitasking and parallel processing are also possible or may be advantageous.

[0114] The various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner, and the same or similar parts between the various embodiments can be referenced to each other, and each embodiment focuses on the differences from other embodiments.

Claims

1. An access authentication method based on power Internet of Things, characterized in that: The method comprises: Obtain the data packets sent by each terminal device in the same local power Internet of Things within a preset time period and the time point of each sent data packet, and obtain the historical packet loss rate and average trouble-free time of each terminal device, wherein the data packet at least includes an encapsulation timestamp and power consumption; Take any terminal device as the target terminal device, and filter out normal data packets from all data packets sent by the target terminal device according to the difference between the time points of the data packets sent by the target terminal device twice in a row; obtain the initial transmission rationality of the target terminal device according to the proportion of the number of normal data packets sent by the target terminal device to the number of all data packets, the time point of each data packet and the difference between the encapsulation timestamp; adjust the initial transmission rationality according to the historical packet loss rate and the mean time between failures of the target terminal device, and obtain the real transmission rationality of the target terminal device; According to the difference in the power consumption of the data packets between the target terminal device and other terminal devices except the target terminal device, the data authenticity of the target terminal device is obtained; according to the real transmission rationality and the data authenticity, the credibility of the target terminal device is obtained; Based on the credibility, authenticating the target terminal device for access to the power Internet of Things; The obtaining of the initial transmission rationality of the target terminal device includes: The number of the normal data packets sent by the target terminal device is used as the numerator, the number of all data packets sent by the target terminal device is used as the denominator, and the ratio is used as the first transmission rationality of the target terminal device; Obtaining second transmission rationality of the target terminal device according to the difference between the time point of each data packet sent by the target terminal device and the encapsulation timestamp; Combining the first transmission rationality and the second transmission rationality to obtain initial transmission rationality of the target terminal device; The obtaining of the real transmission rationality of the target terminal device includes: According to the historical packet loss rate and the mean time between failures of the target terminal device, the transmission confidence of the target terminal device is obtained, wherein the transmission confidence is negatively correlated with the historical packet loss rate, and positively correlated with the mean time between failures, and the transmission confidence is a normalized value; The transmission confidence is used to weight the initial transmission rationality of the target terminal device to obtain the real transmission rationality of the target terminal device.

2. According to claim 1, a method for access authentication based on electric power Internet of Things is characterized in that: The step of filtering out normal data packets from all data packets sent by the target terminal device includes: The absolute value of the difference between the time points of each data packet sent by the target terminal device and the next adjacent data packet sent is used as the time interval of each data packet sent by the target terminal device; Based on the time interval, normal data packets are screened out from all data packets sent by the target terminal device.

3. The access authentication method based on the power Internet of Things according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The filtering out normal data packets from all data packets sent by the target terminal device based on the time interval includes: The data packets whose time interval is greater than the preset interval threshold are regarded as normal data packets of the target terminal device.

4. The access authentication method based on the power Internet of Things according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The obtaining of the second transmission rationality of the target terminal device includes: The absolute value of the difference between the time point of each data packet sent by the target terminal device and the encapsulation timestamp is used as the processing time of each data packet; Negatively correlate the processing time of each data packet to obtain the probability of each data packet not being attacked; The non-attacked possibilities of all data packets sent by the target terminal device are integrated to obtain a second transmission rationality of the target terminal device.

5. The access authentication method based on the power Internet of Things according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The obtaining of data authenticity of the target terminal device includes: Any other terminal device except the target terminal device is used as a reference terminal device; Sequences of the power consumption of all data packets of the target terminal device and the reference terminal device sorted according to the time points are respectively used as a first sequence and a second sequence; Based on a dynamic time warping algorithm, the first sequence and the second sequence are processed to obtain data similarity between the target terminal device and the reference terminal device; The overall level of data similarity between the target terminal device and all other terminal devices except the target terminal device is analyzed to obtain the data authenticity of the target terminal device.

6. The access authentication method based on the power Internet of Things according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The obtaining of the credibility of the target terminal device includes: The product value of the real transmission rationality of the target terminal device and the data authenticity is normalized to obtain the credibility of the target terminal device.

7. The access authentication method based on the power Internet of Things according to claim 1 is characterized in that: Based on the credibility, authenticating the target terminal device accessing the power Internet of Things includes: If the credibility is greater than the preset authentication threshold, the target terminal device is allowed to access the power Internet of Things.

8. An access authentication system based on the power Internet of Things, the system comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that: When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

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