Identity authentication method based on PWKTAP protocol
Through the three-factor authentication method of the PWKTAP protocol, the physical non-cloneable function and wireless channel fingerprint are used to solve the problems of key leakage and DoS attacks in IoT identity authentication, enhance security and authentication stability, and reduce computing overhead.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411015364.7
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-07-26
- Publication Date
- 2024-12-03
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-07-26
AI Technical Summary
The existing IoT identity authentication protocol is difficult to resist key leakage, desynchronization attacks, DoS attacks and ensure authentication stability, and at the same time, the calculation overhead is high.
Using the identity authentication method based on the PWKTAP protocol, through three-factor authentication of physical non-clone functions, wireless channel fingerprints and pre-shared keys, two-way authentication between devices and devices and servers is realized, and the excitation-response of PUF is used. For replacing symmetric cryptographic systems, the calculation overhead is reduced and the identification authentication accuracy is increased through wireless channel fingerprints.
It realizes strong mutual authentication, device anonymity and non-linkability, complete forward and backward confidentiality, resist cloning, replaying and man-in-the-middle attacks, anti-key leakage and DoS attacks, and enhances the security of device communication.
Smart Images

Figure CN119070996A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention belongs to the field of Internet of Things communication protocol device identity authentication and data confidentiality security technology, and specifically relates to an identity authentication technology based on a PWKTAP (physical unclonable function, wireless channel fingerprint and key three-factor authentication protocol) protocol. Background Art
[0002] Telemedicine systems, smart transportation, industrial automation, and smart cities are all examples of real-world applications of the Internet of Things. The development of other technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, as well as the development of high-speed 5G networks, has brought about a new generation of the Internet of Things called IoT 2.0. The new generation of IoT focuses on development in different areas such as scalability, interoperability, quality of service enhancement, and security and privacy.
[0003] In order to ensure the availability and confidentiality of IoT services, the authentication server needs to authenticate the communication participants such as devices and gateways, and establish session keys securely and effectively on public channels. Many scholars at home and abroad have proposed improvement schemes for IoT authentication protocols, such as changing the key distribution method, introducing random numbers, adding timestamps, multi-factor authentication, secondary PUF (physical unclonable function) encryption, and strengthening anonymity. Through analysis, it is found that the above methods only solve some problems existing in some IoT authentication protocols, but cannot resist key leakage, desynchronization attacks, DoS attacks, and guarantee authentication stability, and also increase the computational overhead. Summary of the invention
[0004] In view of the defects of the prior art, the present invention provides an identity authentication method based on the PWKTAP protocol to achieve the above technical objectives.
[0005] To achieve the above object, the present invention adopts the following technical solutions:
[0006] The identity authentication method based on the PWKTAP protocol includes the following steps:
[0007] S1. Sensor device SD registration: The sensor device SD applies for registration with the authentication server AS and uses the device’s pseudo-identity to and key K s Stored in the device SD memory, the pseudo identity of the device SD Real ID s , key K s , wireless channel fingerprint information F sd and PUF stimulus response pair <C 1 ,R 1 >Stored in the authentication server AS database, this step is transmitted over a secure channel;
[0008] S2, terminal device TD registration: The terminal device TD applies for registration with the authentication server AS, and uses the device's pseudo-identity to and key K s Stored in the memory of the device TD, the pseudo identity of the device TD Real ID t , key K s , wireless channel fingerprint information F td and PUF stimulus response to C 2 ,R 2 >Stored in the authentication server AS database, this step is transmitted over a secure channel;
[0009] S3, device SD initiates a session: After registration is completed, device SD starts key negotiation. Device SD generates a timestamp T 1 , according to the stimulus C in its memory 1 , output the corresponding PUF response R 1 , and calculate the wireless channel fingerprint information F sd , generate the sequence X 1 , calculate verification information I 1 Then the device SD sends the message M 1 Send to the authentication server AS through a public channel;
[0010] S4, key generation and distribution: After the authentication server AS receives the message from the device SD, it checks M 1 Timestamp T 1 Validity, timestamp T 1 After the check is passed, the pseudo-identity is checked in the database of the authentication server AS The authenticity of the device SD card is retrieved. <C 1 ,R 1 >、F sd and K s . Then the authentication server AS calculates F sd and verification information And compare the result with M 1 Sent from I 1 Compare and verify If the verification fails, the AS terminates the authentication key exchange process; otherwise, the AS continues to execute the subsequent steps. The AS generates a random number N 1 and timestamp T 2 and sequence X 2 , then AS generates the session key K between device SD and TD st , sequence X 3 , X 4 and verification information I 2. The authentication server AS then sends the message M through a public channel 2 Send to device TD, and send message M 3 The service is sent to the device SD;
[0011] S5. Device TD key reception: Device TD receives message M from authentication server AS 2 After that, check M 2 Timestamp T 2 Validity, timestamp T 2 After the check is passed, TD will 2 Generate PUF response R 2 , calculate the random number N 1 , the session key K between the device SD and TD st and verification information And compare the result with M 2 Sent from I 2 Compare and verify If the verification fails, the device TD will terminate the authentication key exchange process; otherwise, TD will save the session key in its own memory. At this point, TD has obtained the session key K between SD and TD. st After that, TD waits for SD to obtain the session key and then requests a session from TD;
[0012] S6. Device SD key reception: Device SD receives message M from authentication server AS 3 After that, check M 3 Timestamp T 2 Validity, timestamp T 2 After the check is passed, SD calculates the random number N 1 , and the session key K between the devices SD and TD st and verification information And compare the result with M 2 Sent from I 2 Compare and verify If the verification fails, the device SD will terminate the authentication key exchange process; otherwise, SD will save the session key in its own memory. At this point, SD has obtained the session key K between TD and SD. st At this point, the device SD and the device TD can communicate using the session key;
[0013] S7. The authentication server AS initiates the element information update: the authentication server AS generates a timestamp T 3 and a random number N 2 , calculate the sequence X 5 , then the message M 4 Send to the device SD to request the device SD to update the element information;
[0014] S8. Device SD generates information: Device SD receives message M 4 After that, first check the timestamp T 3 , and then use the received message M 4 Calculate the random number N 2 , then randomly generate incentive C 3 and the response R 3 , computing devices' new wireless channel fingerprints and false identities Calculate the sequence X 6 , X 7 , X 8 , X 9 and verification value I 3 , then the message M 5 Send to the authentication server AS;
[0015] S9, the authentication server AS receives the information of the device SD: the authentication server AS receives the message M 5 After that, first check the timestamp T 3 , and then use the received message M 5 Calculate C 3 , R 3 , and calculate And verify If the verification fails, the AS will interrupt the authentication key exchange process; otherwise, the AS will update the above information in the database;
[0016] S10, device TD generates information: device TD receives message M 6 After that, first check the timestamp T 3 , and then use the received message M 6 Calculate the random number N 2 , then randomly generate incentive C 4 and the response R 4 , computing devices' new wireless channel fingerprints and false identities Calculate the sequence X 10 , X 11 , X 12 , X 13 and verification value I 4 , then the message M 7 Send to the authentication server AS;
[0017] S11, the authentication server AS receives the information of the device TD: the authentication server AS receives the message M 7 After that, first check the timestamp T 3 , and then use the received message M 7Calculate C 4 , R 4 , and Computation I 4 And verify If the verification fails, the AS will interrupt the authentication key exchange process; otherwise, the AS will update the above information in the database. At this point, the element information of the device SD and the device TD has been updated in the authentication server AS.
[0018] Furthermore, the specific sub-steps of step S1 are as follows:
[0019] S1-1, the sensor device SD randomly generates an incentive C 1 , using its PUF chip to generate a response R 1 , and calculate the wireless channel fingerprint F sd , through a secure channel to send the device SD ID s , stimulus-response pair <C 1 ,R 1 Send to the authentication server AS;
[0020] S1-2. After receiving the above information, the authentication server AS generates a pseudo-identity of the device SD. and pre-shared key K s , then the authentication server AS will and K s Store it in the database and send it to the device SD;
[0021] S1-3, device SD receives a pseudo-identity and pre-shared key K s After that, and K s Saved in device memory.
[0022] Furthermore, the specific sub-steps of step S2 are as follows:
[0023] S2-1. The terminal device TD randomly generates an incentive C 2 , using its PUF chip to generate a response R 2 , and calculate the wireless channel fingerprint F td , through a secure channel to send the device TD identity ID t , stimulus-response pair <C 2 ,R 2 Send to the authentication server AS;
[0024] S2-2. After receiving the above information, the authentication server AS generates a pseudo-identity of the device TD. and pre-shared key K s , then the authentication server AS will and K s Store it in the database and send it to the device TD;
[0025] S2-3. Device TD receives a pseudo-identity and pre-shared key K s After that, and K s Saved in device memory.
[0026] Furthermore, the specific sub-steps of step S3 are as follows:
[0027] S3-1. Device SD generates timestamp T 1 , according to the stimulus C in its memory 1 , output the corresponding PUF response R 1 , and calculate the wireless fingerprint F of the device sd ;
[0028] S3-2, device SD generates sequence X based on the above information 1 , and calculate the verification information I 1 ;
[0029] S3-3, the device SD sends the message M 1 Sent to the authentication server AS through a public channel.
[0030] Furthermore, the specific sub-steps of step S4 are as follows:
[0031] S4-1. After receiving the message from the device SD, the authentication server AS checks M 1 Timestamp T 1 , if the timestamp T 1 If it is valid, then start the subsequent steps, otherwise terminate the session;
[0032] S4-2. Authentication server AS check authenticity and retrieve the information stored in the database C 1 ,R 1 >, F sd and K s ;
[0033] S4-3, the authentication server AS calculates the wireless channel fingerprint F sd and verification information And compare the result with M 1 Sent from I 1 Compare and verify If the verification fails, the AS terminates the authentication key exchange process; otherwise, the AS continues to execute the subsequent steps;
[0034] S4-4, the gateway sends the message M2 Sent to server S through a public channel.
[0035] S4-5. The authentication server AS generates a random number N 1 and timestamp T 2 , calculate the sequence X 2 , generate the session key K between device SD and TD st , and calculate the sequence X 3 and X 4 , generate verification information I 2 ;
[0036] S4-6, the authentication server AS sends the message M 2 Send the message M to the device TD through the public channel. 3 Sent to the device SD via a public channel.
[0037] Furthermore, the specific sub-steps of step S5 are as follows:
[0038] S5-1. After receiving the message from the authentication server AS, the device TD checks T 2 The validity of the timestamp T 2 If it is valid, then start the subsequent steps, otherwise terminate the session;
[0039] S5-2, the device TD according to the stimulus C in the memory 2 , output the corresponding PUF response R 2 , calculate the wireless channel fingerprint F of device TD td , random number N 1 , the session key K between the device SD and TD st and verification information and will With M 2 Sent from I 2 Compare and verify If the verification fails, the device TD will terminate the authentication key exchange process; otherwise, the device TD will continue to perform subsequent steps;
[0040] S5-3. Device TD uses the session key K between it and device SD. st The data is saved in the memory of the device and waits for the device SD to initiate a session with the device TD.
[0041] Furthermore, the specific sub-steps of step S6 are as follows:
[0042] S6-1. After receiving the message from the authentication server AS, the device SD checks T 2 The validity of the timestamp T 2 If it is valid, then start the subsequent steps, otherwise terminate the session;
[0043] S6-2, the device SD according to the stimulus C in the memory 1 , output the corresponding PUF response R 1 , calculate the wireless channel fingerprint F of device SD sd , random number N 1 , the session key K between the device SD and TD st and verification information and will With M 2 Sent from I 2 Compare and verify If the verification fails, the device SD will terminate the authentication key exchange process; otherwise, the device SD will continue to execute the subsequent steps;
[0044] S6-3. The device SD uses the session key K between it and the device TD. st Save in the memory of its own device. At this point, the session key K can be used between device SD and device TD st to communicate.
[0045] Furthermore, the specific sub-steps of step S7 are as follows:
[0046] S7-1. The authentication server AS generates a timestamp T 3 and a random number N 2 , calculate the sequence X 5 ;
[0047] S7-2, the authentication server AS sends the message M 4 Send the message M to the device SD through the public channel. 5 It is sent to the device TD through the public channel to request the device SD and the device TD to update the element information.
[0048] Furthermore, the specific sub-steps of step S8 are as follows:
[0049] S8-1. Device SD receives message M 4 After that, check T 3 The validity of the timestamp T 3 If it is valid, then start the subsequent steps, otherwise terminate the session;
[0050] S8-2, device SD calculates random number N 2 , randomly generate an incentive C 3 , using its PUF chip to generate a response R 3 , and calculate the new wireless channel fingerprint of the device SD and a new pseudo-identity Calculate the sequence X 6 , X 7 , X8 , X 9 and verification value I 3 ;
[0051] S8-3, the device SD sends the message M 5 Sent to the authentication server AS through a public channel.
[0052] Furthermore, the specific sub-steps of step S9 are as follows:
[0053] S9-1. The authentication server AS receives the message M 5 After that, check T 3 The validity of the timestamp T 3 If it is valid, then start the subsequent steps, otherwise terminate the session;
[0054] S9-2. Authentication server AS calculates incentive C 3 , response R 3 、New wireless channel fingerprint of device SD and a new pseudo-identity The authentication server AS calculates the verification information And M 5 Information in I 3 With the calculated verification information Compare and verify If the verification fails, the authentication server AS will terminate the data receiving process; otherwise, it will continue to execute the subsequent steps;
[0055] S9-3, the authentication server AS receives the received information C 3 , R 3 , and Save it to the server's database for use in the next round of identity authentication.
[0056] Furthermore, the specific sub-steps of step S10 are as follows:
[0057] S10-1. Device TD receives message M 6 After that, check T 3 The validity of the timestamp T 3 If it is valid, then start the subsequent steps, otherwise terminate the session;
[0058] S10-2. Device TD calculates random number N 2 , randomly generate an incentive C 4 , using its PUF chip to generate a response R 4 , and calculate the new wireless channel fingerprint of the device TD and a new pseudo-identity Calculate the sequence X 10 , X11 , X 12 , X 13 and verification value I 4 ;
[0059] S10-3, the device TD sends the message M 7 Sent to the authentication server AS through a public channel.
[0060] Furthermore, the specific sub-steps of step S11 are as follows:
[0061] S11-1. The authentication server AS receives the message M 7 After that, check T 3 The validity of the timestamp T 3 If it is valid, then start the subsequent steps, otherwise terminate the session;
[0062] S11-2, the authentication server AS calculates the incentive C 4 , response R 4 、New wireless channel fingerprint of device SD and a new pseudo-identity The authentication server AS calculates the verification information And M 7 Information in I 4 With the calculated verification information Compare and verify If the verification fails, the authentication server AS will terminate the data receiving process; otherwise, it will continue to execute the subsequent steps.
[0063] S11-3, the authentication server AS receives the received information C 4 , R 4 , and Save it to the server's database for use in the next round of identity authentication.
[0064] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:
[0065] 1. Strong mutual authentication: AS passes verification and Is it established to authenticate the identity of SD and TD and obtain the session key K st , indicating that this protocol achieves mutual authentication.
[0066] 2. Device anonymity and unlinkability: The PWKTAP protocol does not use the real identity of the device. All pseudo identities and session keys between the server and the device SD, TD are changed in each round, so that the adversary A cannot connect to the device or server by intercepting messages. Therefore, this protocol provides strong anonymity and unlinkability.
[0067] 3. Perfect forward and backward confidentiality: The keys in the PWKTAP protocol are generated based on random numbers, keys, pseudo-identities, and channel fingerprints, so that there is no connection between the session keys generated each time. Adversary A can only obtain the public keys of the device and the server, but the key cannot be verified. Even if A eavesdrops and records multiple interactive messages, A cannot calculate any previous or subsequent session keys. Therefore, this protocol meets complete forward and backward security.
[0068] 4. Anti-cloning, replay and man-in-the-middle attacks: Changes to the device will affect the output of the PUF, and the adversary A will not be able to obtain the complete PUF stimulus response pair. <C i ,R i >,At the same time, PUF is non-replicable, so that the adversary A cannot obtain the data in the memory or tamper with the relevant data, and the timestamp can ensure that the adversary cannot tamper with the message through a man-in-the-middle attack. Therefore, this protocol can resist cloning and man-in-the-middle attacks.
[0069] 5. Anti-key leakage: In the PWKTAP protocol, the interactive message transmission is XOR encrypted data, or the verification value encrypted by the hash value. Assume that the adversary A obtains the pre-shared key K s , and hopes to simulate any party in the device or server to verify the other party. However, the information obtained is not enough to calculate the verification value, and the device verification method cannot be known. Therefore, this protocol can resist key leakage attacks.
[0070] 6. Anti-DoS attack: Both parties in the PWKTAP protocol will check the message timestamp T at the beginning of each session. n (n=1,2,3…) and the validity of the verification code. If the verification fails, the negotiation ends immediately. Prevent DoS attacks from consuming the computing resources of the entity. Therefore, this protocol can resist DoS attacks.
[0071] 7. Anti-desynchronization attack: Assuming that adversary A obtains the pseudo-identity of the device through interception, it is possible to link the pseudo-identity with the real identity of the device. However, the server in the protocol retains the previous parameters of the current and previous rounds, which are acceptable when requested. If a device uses an outdated parameter more than once, the server will record this and alert the system. Therefore, this protocol is resistant to desynchronization attacks.
[0072] 8. Anti-side channel attack: In each round of the session, the server will randomly generate incentives to make the device generate a new response for the current round of the session. Although the side channel attack will predict the response by revealing the internal parameters of the PUF, it is difficult to work because even if the side information or internal parameters have been learned, the response may still be unknown. At the same time, the protocol adds random numbers as noise to blur the side channel information, and these noises are also randomly generated. Through a comprehensive strategy, this protocol can resist side channel attacks. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0073] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative labor.
[0074] Figure 1 This is the flow chart of the registration phase of the PWKTAP protocol device SD and device TD.
[0075] Figure 2 This is the flow chart of the PWKTAP protocol authentication and key exchange phase.
[0076] Figure 3 It is the flow chart of the PWKTAP protocol element information update phase. Implementation
[0078] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.
[0079] In order to make the above-mentioned objects, features and advantages of the present invention more obvious and easy to understand, the present invention is further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.
[0080] like Figure 1 , 2 and 3. The embodiment of the present invention provides an identity authentication method based on the PWKTAP protocol;
[0081] The identity authentication method based on the PWKTAP protocol includes:
[0082] S1. Sensor device SD registration: The sensor device SD applies for registration with the authentication server AS and uses the device’s pseudo-identity to and key K sStored in the device SD memory, the pseudo identity of the device SD Real ID s , key K s , wireless channel fingerprint information F sd and PUF stimulus response pair <C 1 ,R 1 >Stored in the authentication server AS database. This step is transmitted over a secure channel.
[0083] Specifically, in the embodiment of the present invention, step S1 includes the following steps:
[0084] S1-1, the sensor device SD randomly generates an incentive C 1 , using its PUF chip to generate a response R 1 , and calculate the wireless channel fingerprint F sd , through a secure channel to send the device SD ID s , stimulus-response pair <C 1 ,R 1 Send to the authentication server AS;
[0085] S1-2. After receiving the above information, the authentication server AS generates a pseudo-identity of the device SD. and pre-shared key K s , then the authentication server AS will and K s Store it in the database and send it to the device SD;
[0086] S1-3, device SD receives a pseudo-identity and pre-shared key K s After that, and K s Saved in device memory.
[0087] S2, terminal device TD registration: The terminal device TD applies for registration with the authentication server AS, and uses the device's pseudo-identity to and key K s Stored in the memory of the device TD, the pseudo identity of the device TD Real ID t , key K s , wireless channel fingerprint information F td and PUF stimulus response to C 2 ,R 2 >Stored in the authentication server AS database, the above steps are performed in a secure channel.
[0088] Specifically, in the embodiment of the present invention, step S2 includes the following steps:
[0089] S2-1. The terminal device TD randomly generates an incentive C 2 , using its PUF chip to generate a response R 2 , and calculate the wireless channel fingerprint F td , through a secure channel to send the device TD identity ID t , stimulus-response pair <C 2 ,R 2 Send to the authentication server AS;
[0090] S2-2. After receiving the above information, the authentication server AS generates a pseudo-identity of the device TD. and pre-shared key K s , then the authentication server AS will and K s Store it in the database and send it to the device TD;
[0091] S2-3. Device TD receives a pseudo-identity and pre-shared key K s After that, and K s Saved in device memory.
[0092] S3, device SD initiates a session: After registration is completed, device SD starts key negotiation. Device SD generates a timestamp T 1 , according to the stimulus C in its memory 1 , output the corresponding PUF response R 1 , and calculate the wireless channel fingerprint information F sd , generate the sequence X 1 , calculate verification information I 1 Then the device SD sends the message M 1 Sent to the authentication server AS through a public channel.
[0093] Specifically, in the embodiment of the present invention, step S3 includes the following steps:
[0094] S3-1. Device SD generates timestamp T 1 , according to the stimulus C in its memory 1 , output the corresponding PUF response R 1 , and calculate the wireless fingerprint F of the device sd ;
[0095] S3-2, device SD generates a sequence based on the above information And calculate the verification information
[0096] S3-3, the device SD will send the message Sent to the authentication server AS through a public channel.
[0097] S4, key generation and distribution: After the authentication server AS receives the message from the device SD, it checks M 1 Timestamp T 1 Validity, timestamp T 1 After the check is passed, check the pseudo identity in the database The authenticity of the device SD card is retrieved. <C 1 ,R 1 >、F sd and K s . Then the authentication server AS calculates F sd and verification information And compare the result with M 1 Sent from I 1 Compare and verify If the verification fails, the AS terminates the authentication key exchange process; otherwise, the AS continues to execute the subsequent steps. The AS generates a random number N 1 , timestamp T 2 and sequence X 2 , then AS generates the session key K between device SD and TD st , sequence X 3 , X 4 Check and verify information 2 . The authentication server AS then sends the message M through a public channel 2 Send to device TD, and send message M 3 The service is sent to the device SD.
[0098] Specifically, in the embodiment of the present invention, step S4 includes the following steps:
[0099] S4-1. After receiving the message from the device SD, the authentication server AS checks M 1 Timestamp T 1 , if the timestamp T 1 If it is valid, then start the subsequent steps, otherwise terminate the session;
[0100] S4-2. Authentication server AS check authenticity and retrieve the information stored in the database C 1 ,R 1 >, F sd and K s ;
[0101] S4-3, the authentication server AS calculates the wireless channel fingerprint F sd and verification information ^
[0102] And compare the result with M 1 Sent from I 1Compare and verify I 1 =I 1 If the verification fails, the AS terminates the authentication key exchange process; otherwise, the AS continues to execute the subsequent steps;
[0103] S4-4, the gateway sends the message M 2 ={SID i ,X 1 ,I 1 ,X 2 ,I 2 ,T 1}Sent to server S through a public channel.
[0104] S4-5. The authentication server AS generates a random number N 1 and timestamp T 2 , calculate the sequence Generate session keys between device SD and TD And calculate the sequence and Generate verification information I 2 =H(K s ||K st ||N 1 ||T 2 );
[0105] S4-6, the authentication server AS sends the message Send the message to the device TD through the public channel. Sent to the device SD via a public channel.
[0106] S5, device TD key reception: After receiving the message from the authentication server AS, the device TD checks M 2 Timestamp T 2 Validity, timestamp T 2 After the check is passed, TD will 2 Generate PUF response R 2 , calculate the wireless channel fingerprint F of device TD td , random number N 1 , the session key K between the device SD and TD st and verification information And compare the result with M 2 Sent from I 2 Compare and verify If the verification fails, the device TD will terminate the authentication key exchange process; otherwise, TD will save the session key in its own memory. At this point, TD has obtained the session key K between SD and TD. st After that, TD waits for SD to obtain the session key and then requests a session from TD.
[0107] Specifically, in the embodiment of the present invention, step S5 includes the following steps:
[0108] S5-1. After receiving the message from the authentication server AS, the device TD checks T 2 The validity of the timestamp T 2 If it is valid, then start the subsequent steps, otherwise terminate the session;
[0109] S5-2, the device TD according to the stimulus C in the memory 2 , output the corresponding PUF response R 2 , calculate the wireless channel fingerprint F of device TD td , random numbers Session key between device SD and TD and verification information and will With M 2 Sent from I 2 Compare and verify If the verification fails, the device TD will terminate the authentication key exchange process; otherwise, the device TD will continue to perform subsequent steps;
[0110] S5-3. Device TD uses the session key K between it and device SD. st The data is saved in the memory of the device and waits for the device SD to initiate a session with the device TD.
[0111] S6, device SD key reception: After receiving the message from the authentication server AS, the device SD checks M 3 Timestamp T 2 Validity, timestamp T 2 After the check is passed, SD calculates the random number N 1 , and the session key K between the devices SD and TD st and verification information And compare the result with M 2 Sent from I 2 Compare and verify If the verification fails, the device SD will terminate the authentication key exchange process; otherwise, SD will save the session key in its own memory. At this point, SD has obtained the session key K between TD and SD. st At this point, the device SD and the device TD can communicate using the session key.
[0112] Specifically, in the embodiment of the present invention, step S6 includes the following steps:
[0113] S6-1. After receiving the message from the authentication server AS, the device SD checks T 2 The validity of the timestamp T2 If it is valid, then start the subsequent steps, otherwise terminate the session;
[0114] S6-2, the device SD according to the stimulus C in the memory 1 , output the corresponding PUF response R 1 , calculate the wireless channel fingerprint F of device SD sd , random numbers Session key between device SD and TD and verification information and will With M 2 Sent from I 2 Compare and verify If the verification fails, the device SD will terminate the authentication key exchange process; otherwise, the device SD will continue to execute the subsequent steps;
[0115] S6-3. The device SD uses the session key K between it and the device TD. st Save in the memory of its own device. At this point, the session key K can be used between device SD and device TD st to communicate.
[0116] S7. The authentication server AS initiates the element information update: the authentication server AS generates a timestamp T 3 and a random number N 2 , calculate the sequence X 5 , then the message M 4 Sent to the device SD to request the device SD to update the element information.
[0117] Specifically, in the embodiment of the present invention, step S7 includes the following steps:
[0118] S7-1. The authentication server AS generates a timestamp T 3 and a random number N 2 , calculate the sequence
[0119] S7-2, the authentication server AS sends the message M 4 ={X 5 ,T 3} is sent to the device SD through the public channel, and the message M 5 ={X 5 ,T 3}Sent to device TD through the public channel, requesting element information update from device SD and device TD.
[0120] S8. Device SD generates information: Device SD receives message M 4 After that, first check the timestamp T 3 , and then use the received message M4 Calculate the random number N 2 , then randomly generate incentive C 3 and the response R 3 , computing devices' new wireless channel fingerprints and fake identities Calculate the sequence X 6 , X 7 , X 8 , X 9 and verification value I 3 , then the message M 5 Sent to the authentication server AS.
[0121] Specifically, in the embodiment of the present invention, step S8 includes the following steps:
[0122] S8-1. Device SD receives message M 4 After that, check T 3 The validity of the timestamp T 3 If it is valid, then start the subsequent steps, otherwise terminate the session;
[0123] S8-2, device SD calculates random number Randomly generate an incentive C 3 , using its PUF chip to generate a response R 3 , and calculate the new wireless channel fingerprint of the device SD and a new pseudo-identity Calculation sequence and validation value
[0124] S8-3, the device SD sends the message M 5 ={X 6 ,X 7 ,X 8 ,X 9 ,I 3 ,T 3}Sent to the authentication server AS through a public channel.
[0125] S9, the authentication server AS receives the information of the device SD: the authentication server AS receives the message M 5 After that, first check the timestamp T 3 , and then use the received message M 5 Calculate C 3 , R 3 , and calculate And verify If the verification fails, the AS will interrupt the authentication key exchange process; otherwise, the AS will update the above information in the database.
[0126] Specifically, in the embodiment of the present invention, step S9 includes the following steps:
[0127] S9-1. The authentication server AS receives the message M 5 After that, check T 3 The validity of the timestamp T 3 If it is valid, then start the subsequent steps, otherwise terminate the session;
[0128] S9-2. Authentication server AS calculation incentive response Device SD new wireless channel fingerprint and a new pseudo-identity The authentication server AS calculates the verification information And M 5 Information in I 3 With the calculated verification information Compare and verify If the verification fails, the authentication server AS will terminate the data receiving process; otherwise, it will continue to execute the subsequent steps;
[0129] S9-3, the authentication server AS receives the received information C 3 , R 3 , and Save it to the server's database for use in the next round of identity authentication.
[0130] S10, device TD generates information: device TD receives message M 6 After that, first check the timestamp T 3 , and then use the received message M 6 Calculate the random number N 2 , then randomly generate incentive C 4 and the response R 4 , computing devices' new wireless channel fingerprints and fake identities Calculate the sequence X 10 , X 11 , X 12 , X 13 and verification value I 4 , then the message M 7 Sent to the authentication server AS.
[0131] Specifically, in the embodiment of the present invention, step S10 includes the following steps:
[0132] S10-1. Device TD receives message M 6 After that, check T 3 The validity of the timestamp T3 If it is valid, then start the subsequent steps, otherwise terminate the session;
[0133] S10-2. Device TD calculates random number Randomly generate an incentive C 4 , using its PUF chip to generate a response R 4 , and calculate the new wireless channel fingerprint of the device TD and a new pseudo-identity Calculation sequence and validation value
[0134] S10-3, the device TD sends the message M 7 ={X 10 ,X 11 ,X 12 ,X 13 ,I 4 ,T 3}Sent to the authentication server AS through a public channel.
[0135] S11, the authentication server AS receives the information of the device TD: the authentication server AS receives the message M 6 After that, first check the timestamp T 3 , and then use the received message M 7 Calculate C 4 , R 4 , and Computation I 4 And verify If the verification fails, the AS will interrupt the authentication key exchange process; otherwise, the AS will update the above information in the database. At this point, the element information of the device SD and the device TD has been updated in the authentication server AS.
[0136] Specifically, in the embodiment of the present invention, step S11 includes the following steps:
[0137] S11-1. The authentication server AS receives the message M 7 After that, check T 3 The validity of the timestamp T 3 If it is valid, then start the subsequent steps, otherwise terminate the session;
[0138] S11-2. Authentication server AS calculation incentive response Device SD new wireless channel fingerprint and a new pseudo-identity The authentication server AS calculates the verification information And M 7Information in I 4 With the calculated verification information Compare and verify If the verification fails, the authentication server AS will terminate the data receiving process; otherwise, it will continue to execute the subsequent steps.
[0139] S11-3, the authentication server AS receives the received information C 4 , R 4 , and Save it to the server's database for use in the next round of identity authentication.
[0140] The present invention is based on the PWKTAP protocol, and uses a physical unclonable function, a wireless channel fingerprint, and a pre-shared key to implement a two-way authentication and key negotiation method between devices and between devices and servers. On the basis of meeting security requirements, the "stimulus-response pair" of PUF is used to replace the symmetric cryptographic system, reducing the computational overhead, using a pre-shared key to shorten the authentication time, and using a wireless channel fingerprint to increase the accuracy of protocol authentication. The PWKTAP protocol not only effectively solves the key leakage attack and DoS attack problems existing in the Internet of Things authentication and key exchange, but also enhances the security of device communication, ensures the safe operation of the Internet of Things, and has practical significance.
[0141] In this specification, each embodiment is described in a progressive manner, and each embodiment focuses on the differences from other embodiments. The same or similar parts between the embodiments can be referred to each other. For the system disclosed in the embodiment, since it corresponds to the method disclosed in the embodiment, the description is relatively simple, and the relevant parts can be referred to the method part.
[0142] The above are only preferred implementations of the present invention. The protection scope of the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments. All technical solutions under the concept of the present invention belong to the protection scope of the present invention. It should be pointed out that for ordinary technicians in this technical field, some improvements and modifications without departing from the principle of the present invention should be regarded as the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims
1. An identity authentication method based on the PWKTAP protocol, comprising a registration phase, an identity authentication phase, and an element information update phase, characterized in that: The steps are: S1. Sensor device SD registration: The sensor device SD applies to the authentication server AS for registration. The device SD randomly generates a PUF stimulus C1 and generates its response R1. At the same time, the wireless channel fingerprint F of the device SD is calculated. s ; Then the device SD sends its own identity information ID s , the PUF stimulus-response pair <C1, R1> and the wireless channel fingerprint F sd to the authentication server AS; After receiving them, the authentication server AS stores ID s , <C1, R1> and F sd in the database, generates the pseudo-identity of the device SD according to the device SD identity information ID s and generates a pre-shared key K at the same time, and sends it to the device SD; After receiving the pseudo-identity s and the pre-shared key K , the device SD stores s K in the memory of the device SD. The above steps are carried out in a secure channel; S2, terminal device TD registration: The terminal device TD applies for registration with the authentication server AS. The device TD randomly generates a PUF stimulus C2 and generates its response R2. At the same time, the wireless channel fingerprint F of the device TD is calculated. td ; After that, the device TD will set its own identity information ID t , PUF stimulus-response pair<C2,R2> and wireless channel fingerprint F td Send to the authentication server AS; after receiving the authentication server AS, t 、<C2,R2> and F td Stored in the database, according to the device TD identity information ID t Generate a pseudo-identity for the device TD At the same time, a pre-shared key K is generated s , sent to device TD; device TD receives the pseudo identity and pre-shared key K s Afterwards, K s The data is stored in the device TD memory. The above steps are performed in a secure channel. S3, device SD initiates a session: device SD generates a timestamp T1, outputs the corresponding PUF response R1 based on the stimulus C1 in its memory, and calculates the wireless channel fingerprint information F sd , generate sequence X1, calculate verification information I1, then device SD sends the message Send to the authentication server AS through a public channel; S4, key generation and distribution: After receiving the message from device SD, the authentication server AS checks the validity of the timestamp T1 of M1. If the timestamp T1 is valid, the subsequent steps will be started, otherwise the session will be terminated. After the timestamp T1 check passes, the authentication server AS checks the pseudo-identity in the database. Authenticity, retrieve the device SD related information<C1,R1> 、F sd and K s ; Then the authentication server AS calculates F sd and verification information And compare the result with I1 sent by M1 to verify Is it established? If the verification fails, AS will terminate the authentication key exchange process; otherwise, AS will continue to perform the subsequent steps; AS generates a random number N1, a timestamp T2 and a sequence X2, and then AS generates a session key K between devices SD and TD st , sequence X3, X4 check and verify information I2; then the authentication server AS sends the message through the public channel Send the message to the device TD The service is sent to the device SD; S5, device TD key reception: After receiving the message from the authentication server AS, the device TD checks the validity of the timestamp T2 of M2. If the timestamp T2 is valid, the subsequent steps will be started, otherwise the session will be terminated. After the timestamp T2 check passes, the TD generates a PUF response R2 based on the stimulus C2 in the memory and calculates the wireless channel fingerprint F of the device TD. td , random number N1, session key K between devices SD and TD st and verification information And compare the result with I2 sent by M2 to verify Is it established? If the verification fails, the device TD will terminate the authentication key exchange process; otherwise, TD will use the session key K st Save in its own memory; at this point, TD obtains the session key K between it and SD st ;After that, TD waits for SD to obtain the session key and then requests a session from TD; S6, device SD key reception: After receiving the message from the authentication server AS, the device SD checks the validity of the timestamp T2 of M3. If the timestamp T2 is valid, the subsequent steps will be started, otherwise the session will be terminated. After the timestamp T2 check passes, SD calculates the random number N1 and the session key K between the device SD and TD. st and verification information And compare the result with I2 sent by M2 to verify Is it established? If the verification fails, the device SD will terminate the authentication key exchange process; otherwise, SD will use the session key K st Save in its own memory; at this point, SD obtains the session key K between it and TD st ; At this point, the device SD and the device TD can communicate using the session key; S7. The authentication server AS initiates an element information update: The authentication server AS generates a timestamp T3 and a random number N2, calculates a sequence X5, and then sends a message M4 = {X5, T3} to the device SD to request an element information update from the device SD. S8, device SD generates information: After receiving message M4, device SD first checks timestamp T3. If timestamp T3 is valid, it starts the subsequent steps, otherwise it terminates the session. It then uses the received message M4 to calculate the random number N2, and then randomly generates incentive C3 and response R3 to calculate the device's new wireless channel fingerprint. and fake identities Calculate the sequence X6, X7, X8, X9 and the verification value I3, and then send the message M5 = {X6, X7, X8, X9, I3, T3} to the authentication server AS; S9, the authentication server AS receives the information of the device SD: after receiving the message M5, the authentication server AS first checks the timestamp T3. If the timestamp T3 is valid, the subsequent steps are started, otherwise the session is terminated; then the received message M5 is used to calculate C3, R3, and calculate and verify Is it established? If the verification fails, AS will terminate the element update process; otherwise, if the verification succeeds, AS will update C3, R3, and information; S10, device TD generates information: After receiving message M6, device TD first checks timestamp T3. If timestamp T3 is valid, it starts the subsequent steps, otherwise it terminates the session. It then uses the received message M6 to calculate the random number N2, and then randomly generates incentive C4 and response R4 to calculate the device's new wireless channel fingerprint. and fake identities Calculate sequence X 10 、X 11 、X 12 、X 13 and verification value I4, then the message M7={X 10 ,X 11 ,X 12 ,X 13 ,I4,T3} is sent to the authentication server AS; S11, the authentication server AS receives the information of the device TD: after receiving the message M7, the authentication server AS first checks the timestamp T3. If the timestamp T3 is valid, the subsequent steps are started, otherwise the session is terminated; then the received message M7 is used to calculate C4, R4, and Calculate I4 and verify Is it established? If the verification fails, AS will terminate the element update process; otherwise, AS will update C4, R4, and information; At this point, the element information of the device SD and the device TD is updated in the authentication server AS.
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