Mobile crowd sensing network node trust degree grading evaluation method

Through the public key hierarchical library and trust value calculation method, the node trust in the mobile group intelligence perception network is evaluated, and the problem of malicious nodes spreading false public keys stealing information is solved, ensuring the security of information transmission and the effectiveness of resource allocation.

CN119095054APending Publication Date: 2024-12-06NORTHEAST DIANLI UNIVERSITY
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202411190382.9
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-08-28
Publication Date
2024-12-06

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Mobile group intelligence perceives that malicious nodes spread false public keys to steal node privacy information, resulting in information transmission security issues.

Method used

The public key grading library and trust value calculation method are used to determine node behavior and hierarchical trust through recommended public key selection, trust value update and node grading evaluation to ensure the security of information transmission.

Benefits of technology

It effectively avoids the spread of false public keys, ensures the confidentiality of information content, and reasonably allocates network resources to achieve the flexibility and effectiveness of information forwarding.

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Abstract

The invention discloses a mobile crowd sensing network node trust degree grading evaluation method, and belongs to the technical field of mobile crowd sensing networks. The method comprises a recommended public key selection method, a node trust value calculation method and a node trust degree evaluation method. According to the method, public key distribution and dynamic trust management are combined, a grading model is provided on the basis of trust values, the authenticity of node public keys is judged firstly, then trust value updating is carried out on original trust values of nodes by judging behaviors of the nodes, and then false public keys are effectively prevented from being accepted by judging the trust values of the nodes. The confidentiality of information content is ensured, network resources are reasonably distributed, and the flexibility and effectiveness of information forwarding are realized.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of mobile crowd-sensing networks, and in particular relates to a method for grading trust evaluation of nodes in a mobile crowd-sensing network. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of mobile communication and wireless sensor technology, a large number of sensors have been integrated into smart mobile terminals, which has promoted the rapid development of mobile crowd-sensing networks. In mobile crowd-sensing networks, nodes can use mobility to collect various information through different sensors, wearable devices or other portable electronic devices, and establish reliable communication links between nodes to ensure the transmission quality and integrity of information. In addition to ordinary nodes, there may also be malicious nodes in mobile crowd-sensing networks. Ordinary nodes exchange information and public keys according to the protocol in the network to obtain information about other nodes. Malicious nodes steal information by spreading false public keys.

[0003] Therefore, it is very important to design an effective node trust level evaluation method to ensure the secure transmission of information. Asymmetric encryption is widely used in mobile crowd-sensing networks for secure information transmission between nodes. Asymmetric encryption is public key encryption. Specifically, the nodes in the network initially have a pair of keys: public key and private key. When the nodes meet, they exchange public keys, use the other party's public key to encrypt information and send it, and the receiver uses his own private key to decrypt it to obtain the information. At present, the following problems exist in the process of information transmission among mobile crowd-sensing network nodes:

[0004] (1) When nodes in a mobile crowd-sensing network transmit information, they cannot determine the behavioral characteristics of the nodes they encounter, resulting in information transmission security issues;

[0005] (2) Collusion between malicious nodes in mobile crowdsensing networks can cause false public keys to spread in the network, leading to the theft of node privacy information. Summary of the invention

[0006] The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is: in view of the behavior of malicious nodes spreading false public keys to steal node privacy information when information is transmitted between nodes in a mobile crowd-sensing network, a mobile crowd-sensing network node trust hierarchical evaluation method is proposed.

[0007] In order to solve the technical problems in the above background technology, the technical solution of the present invention is as follows:

[0008] (1) Recommended public key selection method

[0009] In a mobile crowd-sensing network, suppose there are n nodes, and the i-th node is N i , i=1,2,···,n, node Ni Yes i (x) public keys, l i The definition of (x) is:

[0010] l i (x) = 1 + x (1)

[0011] Where x is the node N i The number of successful information exchanges with different encountered nodes;

[0012] When node N i Want to communicate with node N in the network j , j = 1, 2, ···, ni ≠ j, when information is transmitted, only node N i Pass the original public key to node N j , node N j Use this public key to encrypt the information and pass the encrypted information to node N i , node N i To successfully decrypt node N with the private key j Information sent, node N i Used to communicate with node N j The public key to be exchanged is called the recommended public key. i Successfully received node N j The information sent by node N j Defined as node N i A supporting node for the proposed public key;

[0013] Node N i The mth public key of can be expressed as The reliability probability of the original public key is defined as It can be expressed as:

[0014]

[0015] in, Represents node N i The number of supporting nodes for the current mth public key;

[0016] Node N i The reliable probability average of all public keys It can be expressed as:

[0017]

[0018] In order to ensure the selection of reliable recommended public keys, a public key classification library is established. Each node has its own public key classification library. Under normal circumstances, the recommended public key is the original public key of the node. However, when a node is attacked by a malicious node, the recommended public key it selects may not be the original public key. i The public key hierarchical library is represented as K i-lib , K i-lib Contains the node N i The original public key and the public key transmitted by the other party after successful information exchange with other nodes, K i-lib Three sets are defined in: node N i The first-level public key set Node N i Secondary public key set Node N i The three-level public key set As information is transmitted between nodes, the public key classification library will continue to update information. i Estimate the public key hierarchical library K based on the number of supporting nodes i-lib The reliable probability that each public key in is the original public key;

[0019] Node N i The classification of public keys in the public key classification library is implemented using formula (4):

[0020]

[0021] When node N i When you want to obtain the node information you encounter, to ensure that the node itself transmits the original public key, node N i It is necessary to calculate the first-level public key with the highest probability as the recommended public key based on the current public key classification library to obtain the information of the encountered node. When the node successfully exchanges information with the encountered node, the node will collect the recommended public key of the encountered node at this time and update the public key classification library;

[0022] (2) Node trust value calculation method

[0023] The number of nodes supporting a primary public key indicates the trustworthiness of the public key to a certain extent. However, a false public key may also have many supporters. Therefore, if we only consider the number of supporters of a recommended public key, there may be misjudgment. We also need to judge the nodes we encounter, assign trust values ​​to them, and then consider the overall trustworthiness of the nodes supporting the recommended public keys transmitted by the encountered nodes.

[0024] When node N i Encounter node N j When node N i Want to get node N j Information, node N iNot only will the recommended public key be passed to N j To ensure that node N i Pass it to N j The original public key will also be passed to N together with the public key classification library j , node N j Will compare node N i The public key with the largest number of nodes in the public key classification library and the node N i The difference between the recommended public keys passed, if node N i The recommended public key passed to node N i If the public key that supports the largest number of nodes in the public key classification library is inconsistent, then the node N i The behavior is malicious behavior. If node N i The recommended public key passed to node N i If the public key with the largest number of supported nodes in the public key classification library is consistent, the overall trust level of the nodes supporting this recommended public key needs to be further considered;

[0025] Define the initial trust value of all nodes in the network to be 0.5, and the node N i If you want to get node N j Information, node N i The recommended public key needs to be passed to node N j , when node N j Use this public key to encrypt the transmitted information, or node N j If malicious behavior is found, node N will be i The trust value of node N is updated. i Trust value The update formula is:

[0026]

[0027] Among them, Q is the introduced node behavior factor, β i For node N i The introduced parameter uncertainty of

[0028] Q = 1 represents cooperative behavior, Q = -1 represents malicious behavior, and the specific calculation formula of Q is:

[0029]

[0030] in, Representative node N j The average trust value of all nodes encountered, node N i The recommended public key passed is defined as K i , node N i The public key with the largest number of supported nodes in the public key classification library is defined as Representative node N i The overall trust level of the recommended public key supporting node is calculated as shown in formula (7):

[0031]

[0032] in, For node N i The number of nodes supporting the recommended public key, For node N i The trust value of the sth node among the supporting nodes of the recommended public key;

[0033] Node N i The trust value of node N i The number of public keys in the public key classification library is related to the reliability of the first-level public key. i The more public keys a node has, the more likely it is that node N i The more information is successfully exchanged with multiple nodes encountered, the more nodes support the original public key of the node. The more malicious nodes need to be united to collude, the more difficult it is for malicious nodes to collude. Therefore, we define node N i The parameter uncertainty β i for:

[0034]

[0035] in, Representative node N i The reliability probability of the first-level public key;

[0036] (3) Node trust evaluation method

[0037] According to the trust value of the node, establish a node classification library N lib In the node classification library, three sets are defined: the first-level node set N I , secondary node set N II 、Level 3 node set N III , the node classification standard is shown in formula (9):

[0038]

[0039] The initial trust value of all nodes in the network is 0.5. The initial node is regarded as a secondary node by default. When a node is judged as a cooperative behavior or malicious behavior by other nodes, the trust value of the node is updated according to formula (5). When the trust value of the node is greater than or equal to 0.9, it is defined as a primary node. When the trust value of the node is greater than or equal to 0.5 and less than 0.9, it is defined as a secondary node. When the trust value of the node is less than 0.5, it is defined as a tertiary node.

[0040] When node N i Encounter node N j When node N i is a first-level node, then node N j Will directly determine node N i The behavior is cooperative behavior, node N j Will directly use node N i The recommended public key is used to encrypt the information and pass the encrypted information to node N i ; If node N i is a secondary node, then node N j Will determine node N i behavior to confirm whether to exchange information. i It is a cooperative behavior, that is, according to formula (6), when Q=1, information exchange is performed, otherwise no information exchange is performed; if node N i is a third-level node, then node N j Will directly determine node N i The behavior is malicious, and node N is not used. i The recommended public key is transmitted to encrypt the information, and then the trust value of the encountered node is updated according to formula (5) to complete the node trust value update process.

[0041] Through the above design scheme, the present invention brings the following beneficial effects: the present invention combines public key distribution with dynamic trust management, and proposes a hierarchical model based on the trust value. It first determines the authenticity of the node public key, and then updates the trust value by judging its behavior based on the original trust value of the node. Then, by judging the size of the node's trust value, it effectively avoids accepting false public keys, and while ensuring the confidentiality of the information content, it reasonably allocates network resources to achieve flexibility and effectiveness in information forwarding. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0042] The present invention is further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments:

[0043] Figure 1 The present invention is a flow chart of a method for grading trustworthiness of nodes in a mobile crowd-sensing network. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0044] like Figure 1 As shown, the present invention provides a mobile crowd-sensing network node trust hierarchical evaluation method, including: a recommended public key selection method, a node trust value calculation method and a node trust evaluation method, and the technical scheme is as follows:

[0045] (1) Recommended public key selection method

[0046] In a mobile crowd-sensing network, suppose there are n nodes, and the i-th node is Ni , i=1,2,···,n, node N i Yes i (x) public keys, l i The definition of (x) is:

[0047] l i (x) = 1 + x (1)

[0048] Where x is the node N i The number of successful information exchanges with different encountered nodes;

[0049] When node N i Want to communicate with node N in the network j , j = 1, 2, ···, ni ≠ j, when information is transmitted, only node N i Pass the original public key to node N j , node N j Use this public key to encrypt the information and pass the encrypted information to node N i , node N i To successfully decrypt node N with the private key j Information sent, node N i Used to communicate with node N j The public key to be exchanged is called the recommended public key. i Successfully received node N j The information sent by node N j Defined as node N i A supporting node for the proposed public key;

[0050] Node N i The mth public key of can be expressed as The reliability probability of the original public key is defined as It can be expressed as:

[0051]

[0052] in, Represents node N i The number of supporting nodes for the current mth public key;

[0053] Node N i The reliable probability average of all public keys It can be expressed as:

[0054]

[0055] In order to ensure the selection of reliable recommended public keys, a public key classification library is established. Each node has its own public key classification library. Under normal circumstances, the recommended public key is the original public key of the node. However, when a node is attacked by a malicious node, the recommended public key it selects may not be the original public key. i The public key hierarchical library is represented as K i-lib , K i-lib Contains the node N i The original public key and the public key transmitted by the other party after successful information exchange with other nodes, K i-lib Three sets are defined in: node N i The first-level public key set Node N i Secondary public key set Node N i The three-level public key set As information is transmitted between nodes, the public key classification library will continue to update information. i Estimate the public key hierarchical library K based on the number of supporting nodes i-lib The reliable probability that each public key in is the original public key;

[0056] Node N i The classification of public keys in the public key classification library is implemented using formula (4):

[0057]

[0058] When node N i When you want to obtain the node information you encounter, to ensure that the node itself transmits the original public key, node N i It is necessary to calculate the first-level public key with the highest probability based on the current public key classification library as the recommended public key to obtain the node information encountered. When the node successfully exchanges information with the encountered node, the node will collect the recommended public key of the node encountered at this time and update the public key classification library;

[0059] (2) Node trust value calculation method

[0060] The number of nodes supporting a primary public key indicates the trustworthiness of the public key to a certain extent. However, a false public key may also have many supporters. Therefore, if we only consider the number of supporters of a recommended public key, there may be misjudgment. We also need to judge the nodes we encounter, assign trust values ​​to them, and then consider the overall trustworthiness of the nodes supporting the recommended public keys transmitted by the encountered nodes.

[0061] When node N i Encounter node N j When node N i Want to get node N j Information, node N iNot only will the recommended public key be passed to N j To ensure that node N i Pass it to N j The original public key will also be passed to N together with the public key classification library j , node N j Will compare node N i The public key with the largest number of nodes in the public key classification library and the node N i The difference between the recommended public keys passed, if node N i The recommended public key passed to node N i If the public key that supports the largest number of nodes in the public key classification library is inconsistent, then the node N i The behavior is malicious behavior. If node N i The recommended public key passed to node N i If the public key with the largest number of supported nodes in the public key classification library is consistent, the overall trust level of the nodes supporting this recommended public key needs to be further considered;

[0062] Define the initial trust value of all nodes in the network to be 0.5, and the node N i If you want to get node N j Information, node N i The recommended public key needs to be passed to node N j , when node N j Use this public key to encrypt the transmitted information, or node N j If malicious behavior is found, node N will be i The trust value of node N is updated. i Trust value The update formula is:

[0063]

[0064] Among them, Q is the introduced node behavior factor, β i For node N i The introduced parameter uncertainty of

[0065] Q = 1 represents cooperative behavior, Q = -1 represents malicious behavior, and the specific calculation formula of Q is:

[0066]

[0067] in, Representative node N j The average trust value of all nodes encountered, node N i The recommended public key passed is defined as K i , node N i The public key with the largest number of supported nodes in the public key classification library is defined as Representative node N i The overall trust level of the recommended public key supporting node is calculated as shown in formula (7):

[0068]

[0069] in, For node N i The number of nodes supporting the recommended public key, For node N i The trust value of the sth node among the supporting nodes of the recommended public key;

[0070] Node N i The trust value of node N i The number of public keys in the public key classification library is related to the reliability of the first-level public key. i The more public keys a node has, the more likely it is that node N i The more information is successfully exchanged with multiple nodes encountered, the more nodes support the original public key of the node. The more malicious nodes need to be united to collude, the more difficult it is for malicious nodes to collude. Therefore, we define node N i The parameter uncertainty β i for:

[0071]

[0072] in, Representative node N i The reliability probability of the first-level public key;

[0073] (3) Node trust evaluation method

[0074] According to the trust value of the node, establish a node classification library N lib In the node classification library, three sets are defined: the first-level node set N I , secondary node set N II 、Level 3 node set N III , the node classification standard is shown in formula (9):

[0075]

[0076] The initial trust value of all nodes in the network is 0.5. The initial node is regarded as a secondary node by default. When a node is judged as cooperative or malicious by other nodes, the trust value of the node is updated according to formula (5). When the trust value of a node is greater than or equal to 0.9, it is defined as a primary node. When the trust value of a node is greater than or equal to 0.5 and less than 0.9, it is defined as a secondary node. When the trust value of a node is less than 0.5, it is defined as a tertiary node.

[0077] When node N i Encounter node N j When node N i is a first-level node, then node N j Will directly determine node N i The behavior is cooperative behavior, node N j Will directly use node N i The recommended public key is used to encrypt the information and pass the encrypted information to node N i ; If node N i is a secondary node, then node N j Will determine node N i behavior to confirm whether to exchange information. i It is a cooperative behavior, that is, according to formula (6), when Q=1, information exchange is performed, otherwise no information exchange is performed; if node N i is a third-level node, then node N j Will directly determine node N i The behavior is malicious, and node N is not used. i The recommended public key is transmitted to encrypt the information, and then the trust value of the encountered node is updated according to formula (5) to complete the node trust value update process.

[0078] The software program of the present invention is compiled based on automation, network security and computer processing technology, which is a technology familiar to those skilled in the art.

[0079] The specific implementation methods of the present invention are not exhaustive and do not constitute a limitation on the scope of protection of the claims. Based on the inspiration gained from the embodiments of the present invention, those skilled in the art can think of other substantially equivalent alternatives without creative work, all of which are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for evaluating the trustworthiness of nodes in a mobile crowd-sensing network, characterized by: The technical solution is as follows: (1) Recommended public key selection method In a mobile crowd-sensing network, suppose there are n nodes, and the i-th node is N i , i=1,2,···,n, node N i Yes i (x) public keys, l i The definition of (x) is: l i (x)=1+x Where x is the node N i The number of successful information exchanges with different encountered nodes; When node N i With nodes N in the network j , j = 1, 2, ···, ni ≠ j, when transmitting information, node N i Pass the original public key to node N j , node N j Use this public key to encrypt the information and pass the encrypted information to node N i , node N i Decrypt node N with the private key j Information sent, node N i Used to communicate with node N j The public key to be exchanged is called the recommended public key. i Successfully received node N j After sending the information, node N j Defined as node N i A supporting node for the proposed public key; Node N i The mth public key of can be expressed as m=1,2,···,l i (x), public key The reliability probability of the original public key is defined as Node N i The reliable probability average of all public keys is defined as Establish a public key hierarchical library. Each node has its own public key hierarchical library. i The public key hierarchical library is represented as K i-lib , K i-lib Contains the node N i The original public key and the public key passed by the other party after successfully exchanging information with other nodes, K i-lib Three sets are defined in: node N i The first-level public key set Node N i Secondary public key set Node N i The three-level public key set As information is transmitted between nodes, the public key classification library continuously updates information. i Estimate the public key hierarchical library K based on the number of supporting nodes i-lib The reliable probability that each public key in is the original public key; When node N i When you want to obtain the node information you encounter, to ensure that the node itself transmits the original public key, node N i It is necessary to calculate the first-level public key with the highest probability as the recommended public key based on the current public key classification library to obtain the information of the encountered node. When the node successfully exchanges information with the encountered node, the node will collect the recommended public key of the encountered node at this time and update the public key classification library; (2) Node trust value calculation method While considering the number of supporters of the recommended public key, the encountered nodes themselves are judged, a trust value is assigned to the nodes, and then the overall trust level of the nodes supporting the recommended public key transmitted by the encountered nodes is considered; When node N i Encounter node N j When node N i Want to get node N j When the information of node N i Pass the recommended public key to N j To ensure that node N i Pass it to N j The original public key is passed to N together with the public key classification library j , node N j Will compare node N i The public key with the largest number of nodes in the public key classification library and the node N i The difference between the recommended public keys passed, if node N i The recommended public key passed to node N i If the public key that supports the largest number of nodes in the public key classification library is inconsistent, then the node N i The behavior is malicious behavior. If node N i The recommended public key passed to node N i If the public key with the largest number of supported nodes in the public key classification library is consistent, the overall trust level of the nodes supporting this recommended public key needs to be further considered; Define the initial trust value of all nodes in the network to be 0.5, and the node N i To get node N j When the information of node N i Pass the recommended public key to node N j , when node N j Use this public key to encrypt the transmitted information, or node N j If malicious behavior is found, node N will be i Update the trust value of (3) Node trust evaluation method According to the trust value of the node, establish a node classification library N lib In the node classification library, three sets are defined: the first-level node set N I , secondary node set N II 、Level 3 node set N III , the node classification standard is as follows: The initial trust value of all nodes in the network is 0.

5. The initial node is considered a secondary node by default. When a node is judged by other nodes to be a cooperative behavior or a malicious behavior, the trust value of the node is updated. When the trust value of the node is greater than or equal to 0.9, it is defined as a primary node. When the trust value of the node is greater than or equal to 0.5 and less than 0.9, it is defined as a secondary node. When the trust value of the node is less than 0.5, it is defined as a tertiary node. When node N i Encounter node N j When node N i is a first-level node, then node N j Will directly determine node N i The behavior is cooperative behavior, node N j Will directly use node N i The recommended public key is used to encrypt the information and pass the encrypted information to node N i ; If node N i is a secondary node, then node N j Will determine node N i behavior to confirm whether to exchange information. i If it is a cooperative behavior, information exchange will be carried out, otherwise no information exchange will be carried out; if node N i is a third-level node, then node N j Will directly determine node N i The behavior is malicious, and node N is not used. i The recommended public key is transmitted to encrypt the information, and then the trust value of the encountered node is updated to complete the node trust value update process.

2. According to claim 1, a method for evaluating the trustworthiness of nodes in a mobile crowd-sensing network is characterized by: The public key is the reliability probability of the original public key The expression is in, Represents node N i The number of nodes supporting the current m-th public key.

3. According to claim 1, a method for evaluating the trustworthiness of nodes in a mobile crowd-sensing network is characterized by: The node N i The reliable probability average of all public keys The expression is:

4. A method for evaluating the trustworthiness of nodes in a mobile crowd-sensing network according to claim 1, characterized in that: The node N i The hierarchical expression of public keys in the public key hierarchical library is:

5. A method for evaluating the trustworthiness of nodes in a mobile crowd-sensing network according to claim 1, characterized in that: The node N i Trust value The update formula is: Among them, Q is the introduced node behavior factor, β i For node N i The introduced parameter uncertainty.

6. A method for evaluating the trustworthiness of nodes in a mobile crowd-sensing network according to claim 5, characterized in that: The specific calculation formula of Q is: Among them, Q = 1 represents cooperative behavior, Q = -1 represents malicious behavior, Representative node N j The average trust value of all nodes encountered, node N i The recommended public key passed is defined as K i , node N i The public key with the largest number of supported nodes in the public key classification library is defined as Representative node N i The recommended public key supports the overall trust level of the node.

7. A method for evaluating the trustworthiness of nodes in a mobile crowd-sensing network according to claim 6, characterized in that: Said The calculation method of is as follows, in, For node N i The number of nodes supporting the recommended public key, For node N i The trust value of the sth node among the supporting nodes of the recommended public key.

8. A method for evaluating the trustworthiness of nodes in a mobile crowd-sensing network according to claim 5, characterized in that: The node N i The introduced parameter uncertainty is in, Representative node N i The reliability probability of the first-level public key.